

ANTIETAM



NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD SITE

Maryland



The old sunken road, paralleling the park road, is a portion of "Bloody Lane" as it appears today.

THE COVER

The Maryland Monument was erected by the State of Maryland to commemorate Maryland soldiers who fought at Antietam in both the Federal and Confederate Armies. Eight military organizations from this State fought in the Federal Army and two in the Confederate. Each of these organizations is memorialized by a bronze tablet on the monument

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1941

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

HAROLD L. ICKES, *Secretary*

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · NEWTON B. DRURY, *Director*

Antietam National Battlefield Site

GENERAL ALEXANDER called the Battle of Antietam "The bloodiest battle ever fought upon this continent," and John Codman Ropes wrote, "It is likely that more men were killed and wounded on the 17th of September than on any other single day in the whole war."

Tactically, Antietam was a drawn battle, but in the larger sense its result was decisively in favor of the Union. After it, Lee retreated, while McClellan advanced, into Virginia. This alone was enough to raise the morale of the people of the North, when contrasted with the failures and defeats of the preceding summer. Its favorable issue gave President Lincoln, five days after the battle, the opportunity which he had been awaiting for months to announce that he would issue the Emancipation Proclamation, which would be effective on January 1, 1863.

On the other hand, the Confederate Government was disappointed in its hopes that the presence of a Confederate Army in Maryland would arouse the people of that State to break from the Union and join the Confederates, and that a Confederate victory there would increase the large number of people in the North who were opposed to the war and enable them to force its termination.

More important than all, it deterred England and France from according to the Confederates the

recognition which the governments of those countries had been contemplating ever since the beginning of the war. The diplomatic history of the period makes it evident that in the autumn of 1862 those two great powers were more inclined than at any other time, earlier or later, to pronounce the Confederacy an established nation. Three days before the Battle of Antietam, the Prime Minister of England, Lord Palmerston, stated in a note: "It is evident that a great conflict is now taking place to the northwest of Washington and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs. If the Federalists sustain a great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait a while and see."

Lee's failure to carry the war deeply, or effectively, into the Northern States or even to maintain himself in Maryland, coupled with the almost simultaneous repulse of Bragg's invasion of Kentucky, which was turned back at the Battle of Perryville on October 8, 1862, caused Great Britain to "wait a while and see." No later occa-


This view looks westward on Cornfield Avenue over ground that was a 40-acre cornfield during the battle. The growing corn was leveled to the ground by Federal artillery and musketry fire before the Confederates were driven from their position at this point.



sion arose which seemed favorable to the British Government. Probably the greatest significance of Antietam in our national history, therefore, lies in the fact that if Lee had won that battle it very likely would have foreshadowed the final independence of the Confederacy. But, when he turned back to Virginia, the most promising, if not the last, opportunity of foreign intervention vanished.

Prior to Lincoln's preliminary proclamation of September 22, 1862, which warned the South that on January 1, 1863, he would declare free all slaves in territory still resisting the Union, and the Emancipation Proclamation itself on New Year's, 1863, the avowed purpose of the war on the part of the Government was to preserve the Union. Henceforth, the purpose of the war broadened. It now had two purposes: to preserve the Union and to end slavery.

Thus, in its effect on the outcome of the conflict in relation both to its foreign and internal consequences, the Battle of Antietam was unique and without parallel during the entire course of the war.



Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army at the Battle of Antietam. Signal Corps U. S. Army.




George B. McClellan, commander of the Federal Army at the Battle of Antietam. Signal Corps U. S. Army.

The Maryland Campaign of 1862

THE UNION CAUSE after the disaster of Second Manassas on August 29-30, 1862, was in an extremely critical state. The Federal Army of Gen. John Pope, demoralized and badly defeated, was retiring toward Washington in disorder, with thousands of stragglers congesting the roads. Fearing that Lee would descend upon the Capital, President Lincoln and Gen. Henry W. Halleck, General in Chief of the Army, felt concern for the safety of the city. The Confederate forces, in high morale from recent successes, were animated by the magnificent generalship of Robert E. Lee and T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson. With Pope discredited, Lincoln now turned again to Gen. George B. McClellan, able organizer and popular among the troops, to assume command of the newly consolidated Army of the Potomac in the emergency.

With an audacity impossible to a man less courageous, Lee decided, despite the poor equipment of his ragged army, to invade the North.



Crossing the Potomac near Leesburg on September 5, Lee occupied Frederick, Md., on the 7th. Here he issued a proclamation calculated to cause the people of the State to flock to the Confederate standard. The appeal was a failure. Maryland, though sympathetic toward the southern people, was not shaken from its Union allegiance, and Lee received virtually no active support from its inhabitants. As McClellan slowly moved his force northward, interposing it between Washington and the Confederate Army, Lee took a dangerous risk. He had expected that Harpers Ferry, gateway to Maryland from the Shenandoah Valley, would be evacuated by the Union garrison. When this did not occur, he divided his army in the face of a superior enemy, sending "Stonewall" Jackson in command of 25,000 men, with the cooperation of McLaws and J. G. Walker, to capture Harpers

Ferry. With the remainder of the army he proceeded toward Hagerstown, after detaching a force under Longstreet to intercept a body of militia that was threatening from Chambersburg, Pa.

Lee's instructions, the notable order No. 191, dated September 9, giving the disposition of his forces at this junction, found their way into McClellan's possession on September 13. Wrapped around three cigars, a copy of the order had been dropped at Frederick by a Confederate officer and was picked up by a Federal private. Three copies of this order had been made by Lee's staff. One copy went to Longstreet who chewed it up after he had read it; another went to Stonewall Jackson who pinned it to the inside of his coat; the third copy, intended for D. H. Hill, was the one that was lost. Hill received a copy, however, from Jackson who assumed that Hill was under his

orders. McClellan, still under delusions as to the enemy strength, hesitated to act and lost his chance of striking and possibly of annihilating Lee's divided army. Lee was able to delay the Federal advance by a stiff engagement in the passes at South Mountain. The situation for Lee was serious. His force was far inferior to McClellan's; it was divided; and, facing battle with the Potomac River at his rear, he was in danger of losing his whole force in case of defeat.

Military Terrain


LEE MOVED CAUTIOUSLY down the Boonsboro-Sharpsburg Road, across Antietam Creek a mile east of Sharpsburg. On the 16th he took position on the hills north and south of Sharpsburg, his left flank resting on a line just east of the Hagerstown Road, more than 2 miles north of Sharpsburg, and his right flank more than a mile south-east of the town.

Sharpsburg is located about 8 miles north of Harpers Ferry and 3 miles east of Shepherdstown, the Potomac River at one point being little more

than a mile to the westward. The hills about Sharpsburg extend in a north and south line parallel with the South Mountain Range. A smaller mountain range nearer Sharpsburg is known as Elk Mountain. Extending due northward from Sharpsburg is the Hagerstown Road, and to the northeastward is the road to Boonsboro and Turners Gap in South Mountain.

Antietam Creek was the only tributary of the Potomac of any importance within the field of battle. It was spanned by four bridges in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg and was fordable almost anywhere. Steep bluffs lined its banks in several places. Numerous fords across the Potomac were available during the fall dry season. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, running parallel with the river on the south side, was a greater military obstacle than the river itself. The most important turnpike in the vicinity was the old National Road which crossed South Mountain at

A wartime sketch by Edwin Forbes of McClellan passing through Frederick, Md., at the head of his troops 5 days before the Battle of Antietam. Signal Corps U. S. Army.



Turners Gap. Good dirt roads, dry in the fall, ran in all directions. The region was a thickly settled farming country, with well-tilled fields and heavy copses of woods interspersed over the landscape, except on the mountains which, in general, remained heavily wooded.

The Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg

IN THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM Gen. Robert E. Lee pitted 41,000 Confederates against 87,000 Federal troops commanded by Gen. George B. McClellan. In this deadly encounter the Confederates lost 10,700 men, one-fourth of their army, as against a Federal loss of 12,410.

On September 16 the Federal Army was closing in from the direction of Boonsboro. There was some Federal artillery fire during the day. About sundown an increased cannonading and a minor

An early view of Sharpsburg showing the little country town essentially as it was at the time of the Battle of Antietam. The view is westward from Cemetery Hill.

infantry engagement against the Confederate left flank took place which ended with darkness. The sporadic fire of the skirmish lines far off on the Confederate left, near the East Woods, broke into the steady rattle of a general engagement as daylight approached on the morning of September 17. The heavy fire of the skirmishers was taken up by the artillery as soon as it was light enough for the guns to be sighted. Not only on the Confederate left but also from positions across Antietam Creek the Federal 20-pounder Parrotts swept the ground of attack. The Confederate batteries answered quickly. Lee took the precaution, early in the morning, to warn General Pendleton, commanding the Confederate artillery, to guard carefully the fords across Antietam Creek with part of the reserve artillery.

General Hooker, commanding the Federal troops on the Confederate left, gave the command to charge as soon as it was light enough to fire effectively. He noticed glistening bayonets in a cornfield just back of the East Woods. In the cornfield were the Confederates under Lawton and Trimble, posted in advance of the main Confed-





A part of the farm lane, known after the Battle of Antietam as "Bloody Lane." This sunken road was the scene of heavy loss of life during the Federal attack on the center of the Confederate line posted along this road. Courtesy of Mrs. George E. Phreaner.

erate line awaiting the Union advance. Hooker ordered his artillery to change front and enfilade the position. The thunderous roar of artillery heralded the beginning of America's bloodiest day. The standing corn, in which the Confederates were waiting, was torn to shreds. Men fell by the hundreds, and the panic-stricken survivors fled to cover. The two Confederate brigades stationed here were almost annihilated within a brief space of time. As the few remaining men turned to seek refuge in the West Woods, Hooker sent his three divisions of infantry in pursuit, fully believing that the Confederate left flank had completely collapsed. The Federal divisions charged across the fields, and down the Hagerstown Road to the West Woods, close to the dominating ground of the Dunkard Church.

As the Union troops neared the West Woods, they were struck by a withering blast of musketry fire. Jackson had entered the battle. Hooker's line wavered, but the men held their ground. Hood, responding to Lawton's call, and keeping

his promise to Jackson to come to his aid at once in the event of need, quickly deployed two brigades and furiously countercharged the Federal troops. Known for their hard, driving attack, Hood's men here lived up to their reputation. The Union ranks broke and soon were in full retreat. Hooker himself had been wounded, and many of his brigade commanders had been killed.

In the emergency, Lee had ordered Col. G. T. Anderson from the high ground just east of Sharpsburg and McLaws, who was resting near the town, to rush to the support of Hood. Only seven brigades were thus left to defend $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of battle line south of the town, with only one of these brigades, that of Toombs, guarding the lower bridge over the Antietam.

Hood was not content to have broken up the Federal attack. He pursued the harassed Federals, killing and scattering the survivors. The Confederates were stopped, however, by Hooker's artillery and were forced to fall back to the West Woods for protection. A lull in the battle followed. Then the three Confederate brigades that D. H. Hill had sent to Hood arrived, and once again the Confederates moved forward and occupied the cornfield, which was still strewn with bodies from the earlier encounter.



Wartime photograph of the Dunkard Church, built by German Baptists in 1853 and located about 1 mile north of Sharpsburg. The building, badly scarred during the battle, was used as a hospital immediately afterward. It was repaired soon after the battle, but was destroyed by a windstorm in May 1921.

The thunder of the artillery and the clash of arms were portentous summons to the Federal general, Mansfield, who had moved his corps up during the night to support Hooker. He had bivouacked in the vicinity of Smoketown and when Hooker began the attack by enfilading the cornfield with artillery, Mansfield set his men in motion and directed his attack at the Confederates in the cornfield. While making a reconnaissance, Mansfield was struck and mortally wounded. But his men, now under Williams, charged on. The fortunes of

war seesawed backward and forward; the Federals would gain an advantage, then the Confederates would rally and force them back, and again the Federals would force the Confederates to relinquish the advantage. Finally, Federal troops under Greene broke the Confederate line and forced Lee's men back toward the West Woods and southward. Lack of ammunition forced the Federals to seek the protection of trees, knolls, and ledges of rock in the vicinity. They had advanced to the Hagers-town Road with their left near the Dunkard Church.

McClellan sensed that the troops of Hooker and Mansfield were in difficulty and ordered two divisions of Sumner's corps under Generals Sedgwick and French to proceed immediately to their aid. They crossed the Antietam at the upper bridge and moved toward the North Woods. On reaching the field, they learned that Hooker's corps had been nearly annihilated. Sumner turned Sedgwick's troops southward and headed them toward the West Woods.

"Stonewall" Jackson held the West Woods, and Early was on his right holding that part of the West Woods around the Dunkard Church. Early saw on his left the approach of Sedgwick's troops and turned his men to face the new attack. At this critical moment for the Confederates, McLaws arrived to reinforce Jackson and Early.


View of the terrain near the center of the battle line. The masonry tower in the middle distance is situated along "Bloody Lane," part of which can be seen dimly. The Federal attack was from left to right on the ground here.



As Sedgwick's men neared the West Woods, not yet deployed in battle formation, the Confederates shifted to meet the advance. Semmes' Confederate brigade was moved so as to be in an enfilading position on Sedgwick's right. The Confederates cautiously waited for the Union troops to come within range.

As Sedgwick's advance troops neared the Confederate position, they received a sharp fire which rapidly spread and engulfed them. Then Barksdale's Confederate troops charged Sedgwick's left and completely flanked it. Sedgwick's troops were surrounded on three sides. Still undeployed, they were in such close order that they could not return the fire effectively. They were cut down by the hundreds, helpless before the relentless Confederate fire. Officers tried to make a stand, but it was impossible to deploy the men under such heavy fire. The Federal troops became frantic and turned in all directions seeking an avenue of escape. Here in the West Woods struggle, it is said that Sedgwick lost 2,000 men in the short span of 15 minutes. Inspired by the success, McLaws pursued the retreating remnants of the Federal division back to the cover of the strong Federal artillery. In his eagerness, McLaws advanced too far, and his

Monuments at the junction of Hagerstown Road and Cornfield Avenue. The shaft at the left is the New Jersey State Monument; adjoining is the Indiana State Monument; at the right is the Massachusetts State Monument.



Confederates found themselves facing the enemy cannon at short range. Before he could withdraw to the cover of the woods, many of his men were killed or wounded.

The Sunken Road

SUMNER'S SECOND DIVISION under General French had become separated from Sedgwick's troops and had advanced against Hill's three Confederate brigades which occupied the ground on the Mumma Farm. The Federal troops advanced steadily southward from the Smoketown Road in the face of heavy fire from Hill's men, who were nearly exhausted from the heavy fighting they had already experienced and a shortage of ammunition. The southern troops finally gave way and took refuge in a sunken road which formed a natural earthwork. Here, Hill's two reserve brigades were entrenched, and R. H. Anderson's division of Longstreet's Corps was moving up to their support.

The Union attack was about to shift in the direction of the sunken road, the segmented center of the Confederate battle line. Intense bombardment and the moving of distant blue lines presaged that the Union commander was about to open the second great battle of the day. Some of Hill's troops, those which had held the position at the angle formed by the Hagerstown Road and the




The War Correspondents Memorial Arch at Cramptons Gap. There are also narrative tablets at this point describing the Battle of Cramptons Gap and the fighting that took place along the Burtkettsville Road prior to the Battle of Antietam.

sunken road, already had been badly demoralized. The brunt of the forthcoming attack would have to be borne by Rodes' and George B. Anderson's troops, who stood in the sunken road, aptly styled thereafter "The Bloody Lane," which formed a minor salient in the line, approximately one mile northeast of Sharpsburg. Soon Federal troops began to stream forward in heavy masses. They were met with resolution and hurled back. Twice more the Federal troops attacked and were repulsed. The attacks on the Confederate center seemed about to die away when it was discovered that a Federal force had worked around to a point of vantage from where it could enfilade a part of the sunken road. Colonel Barlow with two regiments, in a flank movement, had taken the road which could not be seized by frontal assault.

Rodes at once ordered the right flank of the Confederate force in the sunken road drawn in to face the attack, but the order was misunderstood, and the entire brigade was withdrawn. Gen. G. B. Anderson, on Rodes' left, held his post for a time but his troops were soon subjected to an enfilade fire, and he fell mortally wounded. Soon his men broke and came across the Hagerstown Road, followed in close pursuit by the Federal troops to a point within a few hundred yards of the Dunkard Church. A serious gap had been opened

in the Confederate line. With the aid of grapeshot and canister from Boyce's battery at his rear, and assembling all available officers and men, Hill drove against the Federals advancing through the break in the line and halted them. The Union artillery continued to pour its fire against a line that had almost disappeared. By early afternoon, the struggle in the northern area of the battlefield was gradually ending. Hill's infantry, aided by Boyce's artillery fire and that of other batteries to the rear, then advanced sufficiently to repossess the Piper Farm buildings and orchard, while the Federal troops retired to the sunken road or beyond. The second great Federal attack was dying away.

The scene of battle again changed. A determined effort was now begun by troops of Pleasonton's Union cavalry division and Sykes' division of infantry, supported by four batteries of artillery,



The McKinley Monument erected by the State of Ohio in honor of Sgt. William McKinley who won distinction during the battle. McKinley, when President of the United States, visited the battlefield in 1900.

to capture the ridge east of Sharpsburg by an advance along the Boonsboro Road. This formidable offensive was opposed at first almost entirely by the fire from Squires' and Gordon's batteries, posted on the hill at the eastern entrance to the town. Only a small force of Confederate infantry was defending their position. By midafternoon, the attack, several times resumed, had been definitely frustrated by these batteries which had been reinforced by repaired guns of other Confederate batteries. Confederate infantry then advanced and forced the Federal troops back toward the Middle Bridge, a mile eastward on the Boonsboro Road.

The Struggle at the Lower Bridge

THE WEIGHT of the struggle in the area north of Sharpsburg had forced Lee to shift every available unit to that part of the battlefield. Longstreet had deployed the four brigades he still had at his command to cover the whole Confederate right and had only 2,000 men to oppose Burnside.

As early as 8 o'clock in the morning, McClellan had dispatched an order to Burnside to begin the assault to carry the bridge and to attack Longstreet on the opposite side. Instead of executing this order by a general attack, Burnside sent a




Wartime photograph showing the Federal signal station on Elk Mountain. From this station the warning was given to the Federals of the approach along the Harpers Ferry Road of A. P. Hill's Confederate troops just as Burnside's troops on the outskirts of Sharpsburg seemed to be on the point of winning a crushing victory Hill's arrival turned the tide of battle. Signal Corps U. S. Army.

small brigade against the defenders of the bridge. The attack was easily repulsed. Two regiments were then ordered to attack but these troops could not even reach the bridge. Thus, repeated attacks by only small parts of Burnside's army were repulsed by two regiments of Confederates posted advantageously along the slopes on the west bank of the Antietam. Another Federal force which was to have crossed at a ford below the bridge met with no better success. Hours were lost in successive efforts by a force insufficient to make headway, and the attempts at the bridge were at once sanguinary and fruitless.

It was about 1 o'clock in the afternoon when Burnside, again urged by McClellan, decided to make a strong effort to force a passage of Antietam Creek. The bridge, on the Confederate side, was commanded by a steep slope, on the summit of which a parallel stone fence formed an excellent parapet for the defenders. The fire of Longstreet's entire artillery was concentrated against the bridgehead. In spite of the concentrated Confederate artillery fire, four regiments of Federals pushed forward to the bridge and other troops were massed at the ford below.

The small Confederate force at this point was now compelled to withdraw from the banks of Antietam Creek, but they hoped to hold the high ground west of the creek and south of Sharpsburg, and there await Gen. A. P. Hill's force which was then approaching from the South on the Harpers Ferry Road. With this aid, they might force the Federals back to the creek. If Hill were delayed, nothing could prevent the Federal troops from moving on to Sharpsburg and beyond, until they could cut off the line of retreat of the Confederate Army to the Potomac in the vicinity of Shepherdstown.

About 3 o'clock a furious Union attack against the hastily formed Confederate position back of Antietam Creek got underway. Up the hill from Antietam Creek the Federals charged. The lines of the southern troops bent and shifted and almost broke as the men slowly gave ground. Everything for the Confederates now depended on the speed with which A. P. Hill's four brigades, approaching along the Harpers Ferry Road, could reach the field. The Federal men advanced steadily. Stubbornly for an hour the Confederates resisted. The field was nearly lost, and the Union troops were near victory. At the same time, along the front of



Reproduction of a contemporary sketch made at the time shows the Federals charging across Burnside Bridge, spanning Antietam Creek. In the afternoon of September 17, Burnside's Federal troops crossed this bridge and drove the Confederates back to the streets of Sharpsburg, but they were in turn driven back to near this point upon the sudden arrival of Confederate reinforcements.

the Confederate position north of the town a new attack was opening against the survivors of Hill's regiments and the troops of R. H. Anderson and of Hood, who had been called back into line for the third time that day.

The power concentrated against the Confederate right was overwhelming. It could only be a matter of minutes before the line must break. As Lee watched the blue columns that were plunging forward under a pall of smoke, he caught sight of A. P. Hill's gray column approaching on the Harpers Ferry Road. Hill came late, but he came with tremendous power. His advance troops formed a line of battle and immediately were hurled against a Federal force which had taken McIntosh's Confederate battery. They swept forward without a halt, recovered McIntosh's guns,



Present day view of Burnside Bridge made from same angle as the above wartime sketch. The tall sycamore tree on the stream bank by the bridge is shown as a small tree in the wartime sketch. The bridge, except for the posts or pillars at each end, is essentially just as it was at the time of the battle.



Wartime photograph showing President Lincoln and the Generals of the Army of the Potomac on the occasion of Lincoln's visit at McClellan's headquarters shortly after the Battle of Antietam. Signal Corps U. S. Army.

and together with other Confederates which came up to join in the assault, repulsed the Federal advance. Hill's three brigades, now supported by Pender, followed steadily the retirement of the Federal line from the edge of the town over the ridges to the shelter of the stream bank. Other units of the Confederate Army joined in the pursuit.

Union artillery continued to thunder across the hills and heavy blue columns could still be seen in overmastering strength across Antietam Creek and far to the northward. But the Union commander had called a halt, and an hour and a half after the timely arrival of A. P. Hill's division from Harpers Ferry the battle ended abruptly.

Thus ended the threefold attack. A gaping hole had been opened in the left sector of the Confederate line at the West Woods early in the struggle but had been closed only to have another open in the center along the sunken road later in the forenoon. This break in the Confederate line had been stopped about the time Burnside attacked in force along the Confederate right at the Lower Bridge. The latter movement, which threatened to envelop the entire right wing of the Confederate Army

and to cut off Lee's line of retreat to the Potomac, was suddenly arrested and repulsed by the dramatic arrival of A. P. Hill's Light Division from Harpers Ferry.

The Retreat from Sharpsburg

REPORTS OF LEE'S LIEUTENANTS during the evening indicated that a Confederate offensive the next day was out of the question, but Lee was confident that the army could defend its position if McClellan again attacked. The morning of September 18 disclosed that the Confederate line had been drawn in about 200 yards at the center; elsewhere it remained where it stood at the close of the battle on the preceding day. The Federal line had been drawn up on the east side of Antietam Creek, and artillery had been massed on the east bank as if expecting an attack.

The morning passed with no action by the Federal commander. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Lee announced to his lieutenants his intention to withdraw that night across the Potomac. After midnight of the 18th, Longstreet led the way over the river and formed in line on the west bank. Steadily through the night and early morning the Confederate columns crossed over into Virginia at Blackford's Ford, a mile below Shepherdstown.

Lincoln urged upon McClellan an immediate pursuit of the Confederate Army, but the latter insisted that his own army needed to be reorganized and reequipped. The President, having lost all confidence in McClellan, removed him from command of the Northern Army on November 7.

Few generals have ever had such an opportunity to destroy the opposing army as was given to McClellan at Antietam. He had almost double the number of troops, and superior equipment and artillery. Then almost unbelievable good fortune gave him possession of "Lost Order" No. 191 and full knowledge of his opponents' plan to divide the already inferior Confederate force. Lee's army might have been destroyed piecemeal prior to his concentration at Antietam. But at Antietam with greatly superior forces, using only two-thirds of his troops, McClellan attacked piecemeal by detachments, instead of by one unified assault, using his large reserve to decide the issue if necessary. The piecemeal attack permitted Lee to shift his troops from one section of the line to another as most badly needed. Lee had no reserve. The entire Confederate Army was in the battle. Had the tables been turned it seems almost certain that the Federal Army would have been not only defeated but utterly destroyed.

The Site

ANTIETAM NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD SITE was established by act of Congress, August 30, 1890, to commemorate the Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg, which occurred on September 17, 1862. The battlefield extends over a large area of farmland north and south of Sharpsburg, the Government-owned land consisting of avenues, monument plots, and farm land totaling approximately 54 acres. Outlying markers associated with Antietam National Battlefield Site, under the supervision of the National Park Service, are situated in Turners,

Fox's, and Cramptons Gaps of South Mountain, and at South Mountain Battlefield.

Antietam National Cemetery, located at the eastern limits of Sharpsburg, is the burial place of Federal dead from the Battles of Antietam, South Mountain, and minor engagements in the region. The national cemetery was established by an act of the Legislature of the State of Maryland in 1865, and its dedication took place on September 17, 1867, the fifth anniversary of the battle. The cemetery plot containing 11.35 acres was deeded by the State of Maryland to the United States Government on March 13, 1878. Of the total of 4,773 Civil War burials, 1,836 are listed as unknown.

HOW TO REACH THE SITE

ANTIETAM NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD SITE may be reached over State Route 34, connecting with U. S. Route 40 at Boonsboro, and over State Route 65, connecting with U. S. Route 40 at Hagerstown. From the south, Route 45 from Martinsburg and Route 48 from Kearneysville lead directly to the park. Tourists traveling on U. S. Route 340 may reach the park via State Routes 9 and 48 from Charles Town, W. Va.

SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC

IN THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING a library and a small museum are available for the use of the visitor. Organizations and groups will be given special service if arrangements are made in advance with the superintendent.

ADMINISTRATION

ANTIETAM NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD SITE is administered by the National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior. The administration office is located at the entrance to the national cemetery. Communications concerning the park should be addressed to the Superintendent, Antietam National Battlefield Site, Sharpsburg, Md.

