National Park Service
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Northeast Region
History Program

Trails to Freedom

An Administrative History of Boston National Historical Park

Seth C. Bruggeman

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Prepared under cooperative agreement with
the Organization of American Historians

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The last five years, the years I've spent working on this project, witnessed possibly the most dire turn in Federal support for the National Park Service since the agency's establishment over a century ago. Staff turnover, leadership vacancies, government shutdowns, pay inequity, unpredictable budgets, and worst of all, disregard for the agency's mission by those entrusted at the highest levels with protecting it—all of it has become a matter of course today for our nation's most beleaguered steward of American history and culture. I draft these acknowledgements, then, knowing full well that the support I have received from within the agency is truly exceptional, given freely by dedicated public servants during a time of grave distress.

There are a handful of people I should thank for bringing me into Boston NHP's orbit. I suspect that, among them, Paul Weinbaum and Inez Wollins played a key role in convincing others that I might have something useful to say about the National Park Service in Boston. Thereon I benefited from the guidance of a crack project team: Christine Arato, Marty Blatt, Steve Carlson, and David Vecchioli. Arato, who believes like I do that NPS history should be critical history, was the project's formative architect. Blatt, who had just retired from the NPS as this project began, nonetheless agreed to share his expertise, memory, and good cheer throughout. David Vecchioli spent many hours with me in the Navy Yard sorting through records and tracking down this or that along the way. And Steve Carlson, who knows this park's history better than anyone, watched patiently as I tried to figure it out on my own. All of these folks read drafts along the way and provided critical feedback.

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It is my conviction that all research projects, funded through or with universities, should provide some measure of training for students. On that front, this project was quite successful. I relied on research and insights from several students in Temple's graduate program in History, including Abby Gruber, Steve Hausmann, and Gary Scales, each of whom appears in the notes. At Northeastern, Rebecca Bryer provided early research assistance. I owe a special thanks to the students in my spring 2019 introduction to heritage interpretation, who endured having to act out "We've Come Back For a Little Look Around" (see chapter four).

This project, like the agency itself, endured real challenges over the last five years. A number of people pulled together to help it and me along. At Temple, History chair Jay Lockenour

helped me convince those who needed convincing that a research fellowship with the National Park Service does actually constitute scholarly activity. Senior vice dean Kevin Glass graciously managed logistics on our end. Dean Richard Deeg approved two course releases, without which I would not have been able to initiate the project. Key chaos managers for the NPS, particularly during the project's late stages, included April Antonellis and Bethany Serafine. In the Organization of American History, I relied on Paul Zwirecki and Derek Duquette. Duquette, who I am proud to claim as a graduate of Temple's public history program, did heroic work toward moving this project to completion. I must also thank Jay Driskell and Laura Miller for providing skill, expertise, and labor when I most needed it.

Finally, I dedicate this project to the memory of Aidan Smith. It was Aidan, in his capacity as OAH Public History Manager, who convinced me to take on Boston in the first place, and who helped me manage some of this project's most acute challenges. Aidan was a fine historian, an expert crisis manager and, above all, a good friend.

Image 1: Current map of park including Freedom Trail route. Boston National Historical Park Archives.

Table of Abbreviations

AFS	Administrative Finance System
BA	Bachelors of Arts
BHA	Boston Housing Authority
BOAF	Boston African American National Historic Site
CANA	Central Artery North Area Project
CDBG	Community Development Block Grant Program
CRM	cultural resource management
DSC	Denver Service Center
GI	used to describe solders in the United States Army and airmen of the United States Air Force.
GNRP	General Neighborhood Renewal Plan
HFC	Harpers Ferry Center
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NARO	North Atlantic Regional Office
NEH	National Endowment for the Humanities
NERO	Northeast Regional Office
NHP	National Historical Park
NHPA	National Historic Preservation Act
UC	University of California
YACC	Young Adult Conservation Corps

Preface

> The creation of the Boston National Historical Park represents an entirely new character of park, as well as an entirely new character of park management for the National Park Service.
>
> *—National Park Service (1975)*[1]

> "The Freedom Trail Park," everyone called it that.
>
> *—Byron Rushing, former Ninth Suffolk District Representative and former president, Museum of Afro American History (2005)*[2]

> I drove north out of Boston over the Mystic River Bridge with the top down on my car. On the right was Old Ironsides at berth in the Navy Yard and to the left of the bridge the Bunker Hill Monument. Between them stretch three-decker tenements alternating with modular urban renewal units. One of the real triumphs of prefab design is to create a sense of nostalgia for slums.
>
> *—Spenser, in Robert B. Parker's* God Save the Child *(1974)*[3]

Congress authorized the establishment of Boston National Historical Park (BNHP) on October 1, 1974. The park's purpose by law is to preserve and interpret "certain historic structures and properties of outstanding national significance located in Boston, Massachusetts, and associated with the American Revolution and the founding and growth of the United States." These include the Bunker Hill Monument, the Charlestown Navy Yard, Old North Church, the Paul Revere House, Faneuil Hall, the Old State House, the Old South Meeting House, and the Dorchester Heights Monument. Nestled too within the park's oeuvre are the fifteen contributing sites which constitute the Boston African American Historical Site, wherein interpreters recount the dramatic struggle for freedom which emanated out from Boston after the Revolution. Tying them all together is Boston's iconic Freedom Trail, a heritage walking path which predates the park by over two decades. Usually, the National Park Service neither owns nor independently manages the various sites which constitute BNHP. It is, rather, a cooperating steward, an agency, one of many organizations in Boston which contribute money, labor, and expertise to protect the city's historic resources. It is a distinction which few of the park's more than three million annual visitors are either aware of or necessarily interested in. To most, amid the noise and bustle of Boston's summer tourist season, the park's presence—backed by nearly one hundred em-

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[1] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP Archives, revised draft June 23, 1975, 1, Box 30, RG79, NPS Division of Interpretive Planning (entry P417), NARA College Park.

[2] Byron Rushing, interview by Laura Muller, John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-062, November 18, 2005, John Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA.

[3] Robert B. Parker, God Save the Child (New York: Dell Publishing, 1974), 16.

ployees—is most immediately evident in the scores of ranger tours which wind through the city on paths blazed by memories of the Revolution and its legacies.[4]

My purpose in what follows is to write a history of BNHP, specifically an administrative history. What an administrative history should and should not be has become a matter of considerable debate in recent years.[5] Certainly it should aspire to present a picture of the opportunities and challenges which have, over time, informed a unit's development. And certainly it should provide some sense of how a unit has arrived at whatever crossroads it finds itself at today. Presumably the administrative history will guide management decisions going forward and it should speak to an audience equipped to make those decisions. Beyond that, however, myriad variables explain why no two administrative histories can ever be alike. Foremost among them is the sheer variety of units contained within the National Park system. Each is unique, and thus each unique unit begets unique historical questions. Each historian too is unique. A cultural historian like myself will always write a different administrative history than will, say, a political historian, or a military historian. And, of course, what the historian knows about the agency's history will fundamentally shape what they write about the history of any given unit. Beyond that, the prevalence of sources, the willingness of informants, and the availability of financial support and other material resources all fundamentally determine what an administrative history can and cannot accomplish. Every unit wants an exhaustive up-to-the-moment accounting of every person, event, and decision which lingers in the recesses of its institutional memory. Such a thing, however, is neither possible nor useful. What a good administrative history can provide is a deep understanding of the broad context in which the agency and its stakeholders have negotiated the meaning of our nation's park system over time.

How then might one do that for BNHP? It's a difficult park to understand. As early as my first visit, it was evident that the park's iconic simplicity masks a tangle of nested contradictions. For one, its distribution across several discrete sites makes the park seem everywhere and nowhere in Boston. The Freedom Trail is in the park, of course, but not of it. Tourists are excited about Paul Revere and his friends, but most of the park's resources speak to nineteenth- and twentieth-century pasts. The deeper I dug, the deeper the contradictions seemed to get. The park had been first imagined during the 1930s, but not authorized until forty years later. And even though the National Park Service (NPS) advocated for the park during that time, it suddenly opposed authorization in 1974. Ever since then, it seemed, the park—arguably New England's premier National Historical Park—had disregarded, dismissed, or diminished history. Who, I wondered, were the historians who planned this park? There didn't seem to be any. This, in my mind, was the most striking contradiction. Park staff, I came to understand, are fully aware of the complexities in their own history.[6] And yet, publicly, BNHP seemed like the kind of park which visitors could leave without ever grasping how complex history always is.

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[4] For visitor statistics, see the variety of reports available at National Park Service. "Boston NHP (BOST) Reports." NPS Stats: National Park Service Visitor Use Statistics, https://irma.nps.gov/STATS/Reports/Park/BOST. For a superb overview of the park's structure, its significance, and the history of its contributing resources, see BNHP, National Register of Historic Places Nomination, NRIS 15000195 (2014).

[5] See, for instance, Joan M. Zeznen, "Why Administrative Histories Matter," The Public Historian 38, no. 4 (November 2016): 236–263.

[6] In fact, the park's history had already been documented in the pages of its newsletter, The Broadside. See, for instance, Martin Blatt and Stephen P. Carlson, "Boston National Historical Park Celebrates Thirty Years," The Broadside 2 (2004): 1–3.

These contradictions, perhaps, explain another obstacle to writing a history of BNHP: other historians have had very little to say about it. Although volumes have been written about history, memory, and historic preservation in and around Boston, I found barely a mention of the park or the National Park Service's work in Boston in any of them. Even important histories of the city during the second half of the twentieth century omit any mention of the park, despite it having factored in all facets of Boston's postwar renewal saga.[7] An important exception is Stephen P. Carlson's 2010 *Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study*, which includes within it an exacting history—including an administrative history—of a large portion of BNHP. I have sought to augment it wherever possible, though it should be referred to first with regard to the Navy Yard. Otherwise, the park's absence in scholarship beyond the NPS mirrors its ambiguous place in Boston itself. This has always been a park uncertain of its purpose, obligated by its legislative mandate to lurk in the margins but never at the center of Boston's heritage landscape. Indeed, BNHP is neither a place nor a clear set of ideas, but has always rather been perceived as a set of possibilities: the possibility of saving Boston's oldest buildings, the possibility of making the past serve the present, the possibility of operating a so-called partnership park, and the possibility of reviving a torn economy. A core problem, however, is that the NPS's mission is not to manage possibility, and so the park has struggled to find its way.

A key goal of this administrative history, then, is to explain why it is that possibility itself came to predominate at BNHP, how it got hardwired into the park's management routines, and whether or not the park's possibilities have or can ever be realized. For the most part, I've sought to tell the story through three frames of reference hinted at by this chapter's epigraph. The park's story is, of course, the story of the NPS, and its aspiration in Boston to create "an entirely new character of park." It is, at the same time, the story of the Freedom Trail, an incredibly powerful if inadvertent interpretive contrivance which, as Byron Rushing recognized early on, has always delineated the park's possibilities. And then too, the park's story, as Parker reminds us in *God Save the Child*, is also very much the story of urban renewal during the second half of the twentieth century. Urban history is experiencing a renaissance and so my hope is that the park will be encouraged to understand that its own administrative history is deeply significant for what it reveals about the disposition of American cities since World War II. Finally, the park's story is absolutely the story of the people and organizations which have for nearly a half-century counted among its most critical partners. They are here too though, as I suggest at the end of this report, considerably more work must be done to understand how their relationships with the park have ebbed and flowed over time.

Taking a deep dive into the history of BNHP reveals, perhaps above all else, how important passion and commitment are to the success of any park. We see it everywhere in these pages, from the highest ranks of federal government to the daily toils of park maintenance crews. It is no secret that people make a park; Boston's story reminds us of it. It is clear, too, that well-intentioned or not, people can lead parks down perilous paths. BNHP has traveled down several. From my perspective, three problems in particular have limited the park's capacity to realize its potential. First, and as I have already suggested here, BNHP has a history problem. Though designated a historical park, the unit's progenitors never intended for its staff to ask hard questions or to challenge what we think we know about the past. The park, rather, was conceived of as a delivery mechanism for comforting tales of revolutionary valor popularized during the

[7] The National Park Service appears nowhere, for instance, in Thomas H. O'Connor's account of the Faneuil Hall district. See O'Connor, Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950 to 1970 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993), 271–72.

nineteenth century and redeployed during the twentieth in the service of postwar nationalism. Absent the tools necessary to do history or to be cognizant of its own history in Boston, the park suffered acutely from a second problem, what I characterize as a race problem. From the outset, the park emerged not adjacent to but as a part of federal urban renewal policies which sought to remove working people of color from Boston's historic neighborhoods. Its complicity in these policies, combined with its interpretive commitment to white prosperity narratives, marked the park early on as especially hostile to African American Bostonians. Its segregation of white and black history, implied publicly through the juxtaposition of a Freedom Trail and a Black Heritage Trail, lingers on today and undermines the park's capacity to serve its public. Finally, running through this is the park's deepest and most untenable problem: the expectation that it profit from the past. BNHP was designed to facilitate heritage tourism, to create jobs, and to generate financial resources with and for its partners. That expectation, from the outset, has rendered the park perpetually susceptible to the whims of some partners for whom doing history is always secondary to generating capital. It is, in the end, the problem of all problems.

In some ways, the park's problems have always been the agency's problems. As we will see, the BNHP's authorization coincided with a period in the National Park Service's history wherein decentralization and a turn toward privatization almost immediately jeopardized what boosters anticipated would be the park's primary gift to its partners: the distribution of preservation funding. In other ways, however, the history of BNHP is unique to the time and place which created it. During the park's first decade, for instance, a period when its advisory commission exerted considerable influence over the fledgling unit, a remarkable coterie of staff, neighbors, and public servants sensed within the park a real opportunity to leverage the past in service of the future. That, of course, is the potential of every history unit in the National Park System. How BNHP did and did not take advantage of it is the topic of this study and offers, I hope, a road map for those among its leaders today who still believe in the power of our parks to democratize the past.

Chapter One

Introduction: Remembering the Revolution in Old and New Boston, 1776–1951

One gets the sense today, walking along the Freedom Trail, that Bostonians have always lived in quiet partnership with the past. Threads of the Revolutionary era appear everywhere woven throughout the city's modern landscape, making it easy to lose sight of the two centuries which separate us from Paul Revere and the town which he would hardly recognize today. It was precisely this sense of slippage that the progenitors of Boston's postwar heritage landscape had in mind when they set out more than a half-century ago to inscribe—literally, in the case of the Freedom Trail—popular memories of the Revolution onto the streets of Boston. How they achieved it, and their reasons for doing so, constitute the critical context for understanding the Boston National Historical Park's path to authorization and the management concerns which have figured there most prominently ever since.

At the same time, the cast of characters—including politicians, boosters, planners, NPS leaders, preservationists, and no end of private citizens—responsible for the park's physical and interpretive contours were themselves inheritors of ideas about history and nation which had been percolating in Boston and beyond for many generations. To grapple with the park's story, then, we must first pick through the stew of ideas which nourished the NPS's remarkable investment in postwar Boston, and to identify within it those currents which have lingered in administrative matters ever since. This chapter starts us off by pondering the prominence of revolutionary memory in the city's public life. It surveys the history of historic preservation and heritage tourism in Boston since the turn of the last century, and concludes by examining the origins of the Freedom Trail, especially within the context of Boston's economic struggles, its investments in urban renewal, and the emergence of a postwar heritage economy.

Revolutionary Memory and its Uses in Nineteenth-Century Boston

Allusions to the American Revolution are so ubiquitous in Boston which, in some sections, little sense lingers of what happened before or after the two decades we typically associate with the nation's founding drama. Indeed, the city's Puritan past, its abolitionist saga, and especially the struggles of its working people and generations of immigrants, all take a decided back seat to the prevailing narrative of Paul Revere and his exploits. But why is that? The park, of course, is obligated by its authorizing legislation to preserve properties which are "associated with the American Revolution and the founding and growth of the United States."[1] It's a potentially wide-ranging mandate, but one which—with important exceptions—has invariably settled on the late eighteenth century and a few years beyond. As we will see in chapter two, the men and women charged during the mid-twentieth-century with imagining a national park for Boston considered, albeit briefly, casting the unit's interpretive net much wider. More than a few stakeholders wanted the same. The park's commitment to the revolutionary past, therefore, was not somehow preordained. It was, rather, a choice. And, like all choices, the decision to bind up the park with a very particular way of remembering the American Revolution was rooted in habits of memory which have a history all their own.

[1] Boston National Historical Park Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-431, Oct. 1, 1974, 88 Stat. 1184.

The history of remembering the Revolution long predates, of course, the park's authorization in 1974.[2] Historians typically recall its early stages in three acts. First was a brief though intense period of proto-commemorative activity surrounding the war's final days: memorial sermons and battlefield tours in Lexington and Concord; blockbuster Fourth of July celebrations in Philadelphia; the careful editing of Washington's wartime papers by his assistants at Mount Vernon.[3] Subsequent decades, however, introduced a period of commemorative uncertainty which reflected tensions persistent throughout the war. The American Revolution was, after all, "the first American Civil War," a long and costly ideological conflict which pitted friends and families against one another often in murderous violence. And for what? The government it created under the Articles of Confederation succumbed in less than a decade to the radically different vision of a few elite statesmen. And clearly, given the persistence of forced labor and landed patriarchy, the ideals of liberty set forth by the founding generation had very obvious limitations. Historian Michael A. McDonnell notes that, to move past the Revolution's problematic legacy and to build a functional nationalism, Americans set out after the war to forget its most troubling contradictions. But "forgetting," as he puts it, "was a political project and it took time."[4] It wasn't until the 1820s, it seems, that the politics of forgetting had been adequately refined to begin manufacturing something resembling a national consensus about how to remember the Revolution. But not even during this third act, as we will see, could Americans entirely ignore the fierce claims made by many that the Revolution's legacy was incomplete.

Each of these acts played out in Boston with such vigor that it, alongside Philadelphia, may fairly claim to be a birthplace of American Revolutionary memory. It was Boston, for instance, which generated the epoch's earliest and most durable iconography. Paul Revere's *The Bloody Massacre, Perpetrated in King-Street, Boston, on March 5th, 1770* (1770) "was almost immediately turned into a site of American cultural and national memory," and also famously omitted the mixed-race Crispus Attucks, who later became a hero of abolitionists.[5] Theatrical performances, including Mercy Otis Warren's own tribute to the massacre, *Adulateur* (1773), repeated Revere's themes toward encouraging outrage against the British.[6] Similarly, John Trumball's *The Death of General Warren at The Battle of Bunker Hill* (1786) inspired a painterly genre all its own while, again, erasing race—Peter Salem in this case—from the nation's memory of its founding trauma. And, of course, Charles Bulfinch built the first Revolutionary monument, a towering column,

[2] Regarding BNHP's commemorative history, see BNHP, National Register of Historic Places Nomination, NRIS 15000195 (2014), 108–33.

[3] Scholarly accounts of these instances are prevalent. See, for instance, Bob Gross, "Commemorating Concord," Common-Place 4, no. 1 (October 2003), http://www.common-place-archives.org/vol-04/no-01/gross/index.shtml; David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), especially chapter one; and Joseph Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington (New York: Vintage, 2004), 150.

[4] Michael A. McDonnell, "War and Nationhood: Founding Myths and Historical Realities," in McDonnell et al., eds., Remembering the Revolution: Memory, History, and Nation Making from Independence to the Civil War (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 21, 34.

[5] Karsten Fitz, "Commemorating Crispus Attucks: Visual Memory and the Representations of the Boston Massacre, 1770–1857," Amerikastudien / American Studies 50, no. 3 (2005): 468. Also see, Mitch Kachun, "From Forgotten Founder to Indispensable Icon: Crispus Attucks, Black Citizenship, and Collective Memory, 1770–1865," Journal of the Early Republic 29, no. 2 (2009): 249–86; and, Stephen Kantrowitz, "A Place for 'Colored Patriots': Crispus Attucks among the Abolitionists, 1842–1863," Massachusetts Historical Review 11 (2009): 96–117.

[6] Jason Shaffer, "Making 'An Excellent Die': Death, Mourning, and Patriotism in the Propaganda Plays of the American Revolution," Early American Literature 41, no. 1 (2006): 7.

atop Beacon Hill in 1790, though it would remain there for barely two decades.[7] So, although the war's first commemorations, like the Revolution itself, showcased the diversity and caprice of a young nation, some Bostonians—and others who looked to Boston for symbols of the revolution's legacy—had already begun to sketch out a more staid memory of white entrepreneurs and property owners in earnest struggle against the imperial excesses of a distant monarch.[8]

The War of 1812 seems to have interrupted the nation's commemorative mood, only to intensify it with the United States' second victory against the British. Nostalgic nods to the Revolution, and particularly to George Washington, appeared high above Baltimore and deep within rural Virginia by 1815.[9] Washington's adopted grandson, George Washington Parke Custis, completed his Arlington House by 1817 and created there a veritable theme park of revolutionary memorabilia and costumed performance.[10] It was amid this acute period of revolutionary nostalgia which Boston's 1822 city charter, its first, included a provision tasking city council with the protection of two historic sites: Boston Common and Faneuil Hall.[11] Only three years later, builders set to work on the iconic Bunker Hill Monument.[12] And, amid all of it, as preservation historian Whitney A. Martinko describes, a nascent interest in the adaptive reuse and rehabilitation of Boston's oldest buildings flourished alongside a trade in print guides to the city's historic landscape. Although historians have long looked to the 1853 restoration of Washington's Mount Vernon in Virginia as the real beginning of the nation's heritage industry, it is clear that Bostonians had trod that path at least a generation earlier.

This facet of Boston's early fascination with its own past is particularly relevant to the park. It reminds us, for instance, that although Bostonians have long cherished their Revolutionary heritage, it's not the only history they've valued. Consider, for instance, the city charter and its proto preservation mandate. Although Americans may have associated Faneuil Hall primarily

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[7] Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 113–16.

[8] Recent years have witnessed an outpouring of scholarship concerning memory and nationalism during and in the decades after the American Revolution. Representative works, from which much of this section draws, include Michael G. Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical Imaginative (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1988); Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes; Lee Travers, Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early Republic (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997); G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American Way (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1995), especially chapter one; H. G. Jones, ed., Historical Consciousness in the Early Republic: The Origins of State Historical Societies, Museums, and Collections, 1791–1861 (Chapel Hill: North Caroliniana Society and North Carolina Collection, 1995); and, McDonnell, et al., Remembering the Revolution.

[9] Construction on Washington's monument in Baltimore began in 1815.

[10] On early commemorative architecture associated with George Washington, see Seth C. Bruggeman, "Here, George Washington was Born": Memory, Material Culture, and the Public History of a National Monument (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), chapter one. Custis is profiled in Bruggeman, "More than Ordinary Patriotism: Living History in the Memory Work of George Washington Parke Custis," in Robert Aldrich, W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Clare Corbould, Michael A. McDonnell, eds., Remembering the Revolution: Memory, History, and Nation Making from Independence to the Civil War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 127–43.

[11] Whitney A. Martinko, "Progress and Preservation: Representing History in Boston's Landscape of Urban Reform, 1820–1860," The New England Quarterly 82, no. 2 (June 2009): 310–11.

[12] Though mishaps and missteps delayed its completion until 1842. See Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party, 113–16.

with the Revolution by 1822, Boston Common conjured a much deeper past harkening back to the city's Puritan forbears. It wasn't the only site valued for associations beyond the Revolution. The Old Feather Store (1680) and the Province House (1679), for instance, typified other sites which , though significant for histories predating the Revolution, inspired the city's collectors and would-be preservationists.[13] And this is to say nothing, of course, of early efforts in Boston and its surrounding communities to commemorate Puritan notables including William Bradford and Cotton Mather.[14] Backward-looking Bostonians could—and did—follow any of several paths into the city's deep and rich history. One of those paths led to the Revolution; others did not.

Why then did Boston's heritage gaze shift precipitously toward the revolutionary past by the 1830s? It is true, as others have pointed out, that the Revolution weighed heavily on the minds of Americans after the War of 1812. Just as Americans today lament the passing of World War II veterans, vanguards of the so-called "greatest generation," Americans during the 1820s valorized the lives of a vanishing generation of Revolutionary War soldiers.[15] The triumphant return and nostalgic national tour of General Lafayette in 1824–25 reinforced the tendency to think of veterans, including Lafayette himself, as relics of a bygone era which might endow those near to them with special powers of retrospect.[16] Interestingly, for years after the war, veterans remembered it in decidedly unglamorous terms. Soldiering was monotonous, they recalled, punctuated only occasionally by treacherous combat and more often by unprincipled recruits scavenging the countryside for wine and adventure. Pension records reveal more soldiers propelled to enlist by boredom and churlish in-laws than by conviction.[17] Written accounts of the war shifted significantly, however, by the 1820s, and increasingly "featured common themes, individuals, and tropes," many of which would become staples of modern revolutionary memory.[18] It was a shift, incidentally, which coincided too with the deaths of the Revolution's last remaining political icons, including Thomas Jefferson (1826), John Adams (1826), and James Monroe (1831).

It was precisely that generation's unfinished business, ironically, which intensified longing in subsequent decades for its supposed virtue. The congressional machinations required to sustain slavery in the young republic, typified by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, created anxieties

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bate invoked Revolutionary forbears in their claims to Republican virtue. And, increasingly, the argument against slavery issued forth from Boston. Abolitionism had, of course, been present in

[13] Fay Campbell Kaynor, "The Province House and the Preservation Movement," Old-Time New England (Fall 1996), 5–31. Abbott Lowell Cummings, "The Old Feather Store in Boston," Old-Time New England 48, no. 4 (1958): 85–104.

[14] See, for instance, John Seelye, Memory's Nation: The Place of Plymouth Rock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

[15] Edward Tang, "Writing the American Revolution: War Veterans in the Nineteenth-Century Cultural Memory," Journal of American Studies 32, no 1 (1998): 63–80.

[16] See, for instance, Keith Beutler, "Emma Willard's "True Mnemonic of History": America's First Textbooks, Proto-Feminism, and the Memory of the Revolution," in McDonnell et al., Remembering the Revolution, 169. A great deal has been written about Lafayette and nineteenth-century reliquary sensibilities. See, for instance, Thomas A. Chambers, Memories of War: Visiting Battlegrounds and Bonefields in the Early American Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), chapter three.

[17] On these counts, see William Hunting Howell, "'Starving Memory': Antinarrating the American Revolution," and Caroline Cox, "The First Greatest Generation Remembers the Revolutionary War," both in McDonnell et al., Remembering the Revolution.

[18] McDonnell, et al., cited in "The Revolution in American Life from 1776 to the Civil War," in McDonnell et al., Remembering the Revolution, 2.

American political discourse since before the Revolution, but its terms had been largely defined by the staid and legalistic Quakers of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. By the late 1820s, however, the balance had shifted to Massachusetts. Historian Richard Newman explains the change as owing, in part, to the intensity of revivalism in Massachusetts during the Second Great Awakening, and a greater openness there to the grassroots politics which accompanied the presidency of Andrew Jackson.[19] Also unlike their Quaker counterparts, who advocated for gradual abolition, Massachusetts abolitionists demanded immediate abolition—for which William Lloyd Garrison became the nation's leading advocate. Garrison, by organizing abolitionist societies in Boston and headquartering his newspaper, The Liberator, there in 1831, ensured that any nostalgia for the city's revolutionary past would have to contend with the specter of its greatest failure.

And yet, as concerned as some Americans in the early republic may have been with the past, many were also squarely focused on the future. Boston was no exception. Reverence for Bulfinch's monument to the Revolution, for instance, did not exceed desires to clear the view from his majestic new State House, itself a monument to the potential of American republicanism. The monument's removal in 1811 prefigured widespread change throughout Boston's landscape. As Martinko points out, Boston Mayor Josiah Quincy initiated a period of aggressive urban renewal in the years after the 1822 charter. Key among his accomplishments was construction of Quincy Market in 1826.[20] The market's iconic Greek Revival edifice conjured the hazy grandeur of classical republicanism while imposing order on Boston's generations-old commercial district. Simultaneously backward- and forward-looking, the market's immediate juxtaposition with Faneuil Hall, where Boston's leading patriots famously excoriated British rule, mingled revolutionary memory with some of the 1820s leading preoccupations: power, profit, and party politics.

The folding of revolutionary memory into American political culture is particularly significant for explaining why it was that Boston's historical gaze focused increasingly on the Revolution during the 1830s. It is an argument made most famously in Alfred F. Young's classic 1981 essay, "George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742–1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution," which was reprinted in 1999 and since in The Shoemaker and the Tea Party. Young makes the point that Boston's working people—even folks largely uninterested in ideological matters—found as great a stake in the Revolution as any of its patricians. His example is George Robert Twelves Hewes, a workaday shoemaker who participated in the Boston Tea Party, and who became famous for it shortly before his death in 1840. Young shows us that Hewes, and probably the Tea Party too, would have remained unknown to us had the obscure shoemaker and his revolutionary memories not been repurposed during the 1830s by an affiliation of Whig politicians in their campaign against labor activists, abolitionists, and others who struggled to make real the promises of American liberty. As Young puts it, "Hewes was taken over by such conservatives [who] tamed him, sanitizing him and the audacious popular movement he had been a part of."[21]

Boston's fascination with the revolutionary past, above all other pasts, thus stemmed from its political expediency during an era of radical change wherein it fell to a new generation of leaders to sort out the aspirations of their predecessors. That new generation was anything but unified, but because the Revolution's legacy was so ambiguous its memory could be populated with no

[19] Richard S. Newman, The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

[20] Martinko, "Progress and Preservation," 308–10.

[21] See Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party. The quote is from Young, "Revolution in Boston? Eight Propositions for Public History on the Freedom Trail," The Public Historian 25 (Spring 2003): 30.

end of contradictory meanings. At one end of the spectrum, as Young shows us, Whig politicians managed to transform war veterans into symbolic endorsements of an economic system which bred inequality. At the other end, Boston's abolitionists pitched revolutionary memory in support of their efforts to ensure equality for all Americans. In the years preceding the American Civil War, the contest between these two distinct visions raged within the walls of revolutionary Boston's most iconic building: Faneuil Hall. Beginning in 1837, when abolitionist Wendell Phillips skewered Massachusetts Attorney General James T. Austin there for claiming that the murder of another prominent abolitionist invoked the legacy of Boston's patriots, Faneuil Hall became an epicenter of antislavery oratory. By the 1850s, according to historian Donald M. Jacobs, abolitionists had succeeded "in transforming the building into a temple of patriotic Bostonian resistance to slavecatchers."[22]

It was the powerful interweaving of abolitionist sentiment and revolutionary memory on view in Faneuil Hall and elsewhere in Boston which inspired what has since become the most persistently influential vision of the city's historic landscape. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's Paul Revere's Ride (1861) has long passed as a staple of patriotic Americana, a poem to be memorized by school children and presidents.[23] It made a national hero of Paul Revere whose notoriety had previously been limited to New England.[24] And, for generations of readers, it transformed the Revolution from a vague concept into a palpable event wherein real places—the Old North Church, Boston Harbor, Charlestown, and all "the roofs of the town"—carried the action. What its ubiquity has obscured, however, as scholars and pundits have dwelled on at length in recent decades, is that Longfellow's most famous poem was crafted in the moment to raise up northerners against the terrors of chattel slavery.[25] It is a masterstroke of abolitionist writing which relied upon the prevailing imagery of its time, namely nostalgic invocations of the American Revolution, to warn of a lurking evil which threatened to destroy the nation if not defeated. Just as the Whigs claimed Hewes during the 1830s, Longfellow claimed Revere for the Radical Republicans a generation later, a decade after the Whig Party had folded over the fate of slavery. How and why Boston has remembered the Revolution, then, has always pivoted on politics and, for much of that time, the problem of slavery.

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[22] Donald M. Jacobs, Courage and Conscience: Black and White Abolitionists in Boston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 120.

[23] Robert Pinsky observed that Senator Edward Kennedy had memorized portions of the poem. See Robert Pinsky, "Poetry and American Memory," The Atlantic (October 1999): 60.

[24] Revere had earned some notoriety in Boston by the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1851, for instance, May Street was renamed Revere Street. Outside of New England, however, Revere barely figured at all in Americans' memory of the Revolution. David Hacket Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 331.

[25] Several scholars have explored the poem's long-unrecognized abolitionist intent, including Jill Lepore, "How Longfellow Woke the Dead," The American Scholar (Spring 2011). Lepore further considers the role of revolutionary memory in recent politics in The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010). Also see Kammen, A Season of Youth, chapter four; and, Evert Jan van Leeuwen, "The Graveyard Aesthetics of Revolutionary Elegiac Verse: Remembering the Revolution as a Sacred Cause," in McDonnell, et al., Remembering the Revolution, 75–76.

Case Study: The Bunker Hill Monument

The interweaving of Boston's revolutionary memory with nineteenth-century struggles over race, class, and power is perfectly illustrated by the story of the Bunker Hill Monument.[26] From the standpoint of commemorative history, the Bunker Hill Monument easily ranks among the most significant monuments in the United States. Designed in 1825, it is one of the earliest expressions of monumental nationalism in the United States. Its sponsor, the Bunker Hill Memorial Association, pioneered the public subscription fundraising model by which nonprofit organizations fund projects to this day. And, despite the revolutionary generation's distaste for old-country traditionalism, the association's distinctive obelisk—a commemorative form popularized throughout Europe during the Enlightenment—inspired thousands of subsequent American monuments, including the Washington Monument in Washington, DC.

It is a truly impressive monument which, during its time, was judged an awful inconvenience. Not complete until 1843, its neighbors complained about long years of disruptive construction. Fundraising was harder than anticipated. To pay for the thing, the association was forced to sell off most of the old battlefield which it had been seeking to commemorate. Sarah Josepha Hale spearheaded a last-ditch fundraising campaign which, apart from saving the association's reputation, anticipated the central role American women would later play as caretakers of the nation's memory. The monument's difficulties suggest that, during the 1830s, Americans were significantly less eager to celebrate the Revolution than we might guess from the monuments they left us.

Perhaps their reluctance, in this case, had something to do with how little the Bunker Hill Monument memorial had to do with remembering the American Revolution. Like all monuments, the one at Bunker Hill reveals the desire of its sponsors to enshrine themselves above all else. An earlier Bunker Hill monument actually commemorated Joseph Warren, renowned for setting Revere on his path to Lexington and Concord and rendered iconic by painter John Trumbull. The 1825 monument cast its commemorative net more broadly, but never fully expunged Warren's memory. A grand lodge—quite literally, as Warren was a prominent Mason—built next to the monument during the late nineteenth century to accommodate a growing tourist trade showcased a large statue of Warren who had, by then, grown in significance with Longfellow's popularization of Revere's ride. When Boston's leading citizens—including industrialists, politicians, and others like those who had grown so enamored of Hewes's Tea Party memories—pooled their efforts to form the Memorial Association, they hoped to burnish their own reputations through a symbolic affiliation with Warren's. Building on such an unprecedented scale on the Charles River's far side certainly ensured "a highly visible display of civic and patriotic pride"[27] for the people of Boston. It also suggested that national memory did not belong to the lowly or disenfranchised.

It is worth pointing out that the monument's dedication ceremony in 1843 appears to have garnered considerably more local interest for a scandalous racial faux pas than its tribute to the

[26] This brief account draws on much more extensive engagements with the Bunker Hill story, including Margot Minardi, Making Slavery History: Abolitionism and the Politics of Memory in Massachusetts (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter three; and Purcell, Sealed with Blood, chapter five. For a detailed recounting of the monument's construction, see BNHP, National Register of Historic Places Nomination, NRIS 15000195 (2014), 112–27.

[27] "Revolutionary Battle Monument Movement, 1823–1890" extracted on June 29, 2011 from Saratoga National Historical Park Historic District National Register Documentation draft, prepared by Public Archeology laboratory, Inc. for the National Park Service, Northeast Region, n.p.

American Revolution. Historian Margot Minardi describes the outrage which Boston's radical abolitionists focused on the memorial and its sponsors after it appeared that President John Tyler, invited to speak at the dedicatory ceremonies, brought along an enslaved man to hold his parasol. Although Tyler was not, in fact, accompanied on stage by an enslaved person, Boston's abolitionist press leveraged the non-incident in its indictment of the federal government's complicity in the national crime of slavery.[28] Like Faneuil Hall, the Bunker Hill Memorial assumed powerful symbolic meanings during the nineteenth century which, although rooted in memories of the Revolution, had everything to do with their own historical moment. As we will see in chapter four, the monument's implied meanings still clamored a century and a half later when African American veterans of the Vietnam War sought to make a stand there for their own civil rights.

A City Preserved

Unless they linger in the park's visitor's center and museum, few visitors will ever comprehend the Bunker Hill Monument as a paean to antebellum Whiggery. Indeed, although our memory of Boston's eighteenth century was largely invented for us during the nineteenth century, a host of factors conspired by the turn of the twentieth century to naturalize its myths. For one, there were few historians, at least not as we know them today, to propose credible counter-narratives. The first historians to chronicle the Revolution did so toward shoring up nationalist sentiment. George Bancroft, for instance, typically thought of as the father of American history writing, wrote the foundational History of the United States of America between 1834 and 1874. A wealthy politician and scholar, and descended from one of Massachusetts's first families, Bancroft unsurprisingly portrayed the Revolution as an inevitable stride toward liberty by visionary men (his own ancestors!) heir to American exceptionalism. His celebratory account and others like it, which plagiarized a well-known loyalist account of the war, prevailed well into the early twentieth century and came to be known as the Whig Interpretation of revolutionary history. When American universities began training professional historians during the 1870s, it was Bancroft's understanding of the Revolution which set the standard. It wouldn't be seriously contested until the 1910s.[29]

Even beyond the small orbit of American intellectual circles, the Whig interpretation of the American Revolution found tacit expression in the panoply of activities variously associated with the so-called Colonial Revival.[30] Colonial Revivalism is typically understood in terms of Americans' consumer passions, particularly between the Civil War and World War II, for colonial-themed homes, gardens, furniture, and all sorts of bric-a-brac turned out by men like Wal-

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[28] Minardi, Making Slavery History, chapter three.

[29] On the historiography of the Revolution, see John Selby, "Revolutionary America: The Historiography," OAH Magazine of History 8, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 5-8; and, Michael D. Hattem, "The Historiography of the American Revolution," Journal of the American Revolution (August 27, 2013), https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/08/historiography-of-american-revolution/. On Bancroft and plagiarism, see Eileen Ka-May Cheng, "Plagiarism in Pursuit of Historical Truth: George Chalmers and the Patriotic Legacy of Loyalist History," in McDonald, et al., eds., Remembering the Revolution.

[30] Colonial revival scholarship is voluminous. The most recent overview appears in Wilson, et al., Recreating the American Past: Essays on the Colonial Revival (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). For an overview of colonial revivalism and historic preservation in Boston at the turn of the twentieth century, see BNHP, National Register of Historic Places Nomination, NRIS 15000195 (2014), 133–37.

lace Nutting from his studio outside of Boston.[31] Beneath all this, however, lay the same ideological strains of patriotic nostalgia which had percolated in Boston since the 1820s. In fact, that impulse had sharpened in the years after the Civil War as white Americans perceived increased threats to their longstanding patrimony. Boston was, once again, a bellwether. The collapse of antebellum trade networks, the shifting of industry south and west, and growth among the city's immigrant communities made anxious patriarchs out of those who remained of Boston's first families, the so-called Boston Brahmin. Faced with dwindling fortunes and a shifting social and political landscape, these people turned further to the past. Joining a historical society, celebrating old house days, or buying a Nutting dining room set all figured as expressions of yearning for an imagined era of supposed simplicity.[32]

Colonial revivalism flourished in Boston early on, owing in part to celebrations associated with the one hundredth anniversary of the Revolution. Boston's centennial celebrations, however, revealed just how entwined revolutionary memory still was with matters of race, power, and identity. Between 1870 and 1876, as historian Craig Bruce Smith puts it, a remarkable cast of Bostonians challenged the proclaimed "blood ancestry" of the city's first families by proclaiming their own "symbolic inheritance" of revolutionary ideals. Black Bostonians, for instance, enthusiastically celebrated Crispus Attucks Day in 1870 toward leveraging memories of the Boston Massacre in support of racial equity. In 1873, suffragettes chanted "no taxation without representation" in Faneuil Hall during centennial celebrations of the Boston Tea Party. And throughout these years, Boston's sprawling Irish Catholic population sought to demonstrate its claims to the American saga by monopolizing participation in celebrations such as that in 1875 at Bunker Hill. In each of these cases, however, others turned to genealogy to refute the claims. Genealogical research emerged as a craze among colonial revivalists who, buoyed by a belief in social Darwinism and the delusion of racial purity, sought legitimacy in heredity. Boston's New England Historic Genealogical Society (1845), the first of its kind in the United States, became a base of operations for those who sought to, for instance, cast doubt on Attuck's racial purity, or refute claims that George Washington was part Irish.[33] During the late nineteenth century, then, memories of the American Revolution were much less a matter of history than a matter of context for Boston's simmering culture wars. Revolutionary memory was the stage on which Bostonians vied for social power.

That stage became less figurative all the time thanks to changes in Boston's heritage landscape. As Martinko notes, Bostonians had demonstrated an abiding interest in their city's historic buildings and landscapes for many decades. That tendency intensified after the Civil War owing, in part, to the same anxieties which accelerated colonial revivalism. But other factors, too, convinced many among Boston's nascent preservation set that the city's historic landscapes faced imminent threats. Fire ravaged Boston's downtown, for instance, in 1872, thus revealing woeful inadequacies in the city's infrastructure. Elsewhere, such as in Back Bay, developers built on reclaimed land at a break-neck pace, effectively creating a city which couldn't have existed a

[31] On Wallace Nutting's aggressive promotion of the colonial revival sensibility, see William L. Dulaney, "Wallace Nutting: Collector and Entrepreneur," Winterthur Portfolio 13 (1979): 47–60.

[32] For a broad overview, see Karal Ann Marling, George Washington Slept Here: Colonial Revivals and American Culture, 1876-1986 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). On the transformation of colonial revival sensibilities into a twentieth-century antique consumer industry, see Briann G. Greenfield, Out of the Attic: Inventing Antiques in Twentieth-Century New England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009).

[33] Craig Bruce Smith, "Claiming the Centennial: The American Revolution's Blood and Spirit in Boston, 1870–1876," Massachusetts Historical Review 15 (2013): 7–53.

generation before. Against this backdrop, the successful campaign to save the Old South Meeting House from demolition in 1876 was, according to historian Michael Holleran, "the greatest American preservation effort of the nineteenth century," and consequently, the spark which lit Boston's preservation movement.[34] In its wake, the Bostonian Society coalesced in 1881 around the campaign to preserve the Old State House, architects and patriotic organizations including the Daughters of the American Revolution fought to save the Bulfinch State House throughout the 1890s, and descendants of Paul Revere organized a memorial association in 1907 to restore what remained of the building which Longfellow's hero called home. The project of restoring Revere's home was particularly significant insomuch as it launched the career of William Sumner Appleton, Jr., whose Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities would soon set a standard for historic preservation throughout the United States.[35]

The preservation ethos filtered into other aspects of Boston's turn-of-the century commemorative landscape too. In 1902, for instance, Bostonians gathered in South Boston to celebrate the unveiling of a one-hundred-foot commemorative marble shaft erected atop Dorchester Heights in Thomas Park by the commonwealth with funds appropriated by the General Court (state legislature) in 1898. Designed by the Boston firm Peabody and Stearns to commemorate Washington's preemptive defense of Boston against the British, and their subsequent evacuation to Nova Scotia, the monument exemplified colonial revival architecture. Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts's powerful Republican US senator (and a trained historian), headlined the event. Lodge recalled being fascinated early on by a cannon ball half-buried in the side of the old Brattle Street church, which he noted, had since "fallen before the march of trade." That cannon ball, tradition held, had been lodged there by Washington's cannons. "The historical event," he continued, "that thus came out of the past and made itself real to me" was the fortification of Dorchester Heights. Lodge's paean to Dorchester Heights was, in essence, a tribute to the power of revolutionary memory and the old church "which I wish might have been spared and preserved."[36] In his estimation the new monument was a proxy for both.

Boston thus led the nation in protecting historic buildings and landscapes and making them more or less accessible to the public. And yet, at the same time, Boston is also notable for its early efforts to support the preservation of private properties, including entire neighborhoods. As Holleran points out, the campaign to protect the Bullfinch statehouse had made policy activists

[34] Michael Holleran, "Roots in Boston, Branches in Planning and Parks," in Max Page and Randall Mason, Giving Preservation a History: Histories of Historic Preservation in the United States (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 83.

[35] The history of historic preservation in Boston has been recounted frequently, including by Michael Holleran, Boston's "Changeful Times": Origins of Preservation and Planning in America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), especially chapter nine; Charles B. Hosmer, Jr., Preservation Comes of Age: From Williamsburg to the National Trust, 1926–1949 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981), wherein Appleton and his activities are showcased in chapter three; and throughout James M. Lindgren, Preserving Historic New England: Preservation, Progressivism, and the Remaking of Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Walter Muir Whitehill worked diligently to make postwar preservationists, including the NPS, aware of Boston's preservation past. See, for instance, Whitehill, "Neglected Assets," a talk delivered at the fourth Citizens Seminar on the Fiscal, Economic, and Political Problems of Boston and the Metropolitan Community, Boston College, February 26, 1963, in folder "Historic Sites Committee," Box 148, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives. This story appears too throughout BNHP, National Register of Historic Places Nomination, NRIS 15000195 (2014). Revere's story specifically appears on pp 103–08.

[36] Lodge's remarks are reprinted in A Record of the Dedication of the Monument on Dorchester Heights, South Boston, Built by the Commonwealth as a Memorial of the Evacuation of Boston, March 17, 1776, By the British Troops (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Company, 1903).

out of Boston architects, particularly those inspired by the City Beautiful Movement and its fascination with the White City built for the 1893 World's Colombian Exposition in Chicago. It was their efforts, for instance, which resulted in a commonwealth ordinance limiting building heights to about eleven stories, the first law of its kind in the United States.[37] The height restriction enlivened a nascent effort among wealthy homeowners in the adjacent Beacon Hill neighborhood to reverse what they perceived as architectural and economic decline among their neighbors. Rather than create a public nonprofit organization, however, these individuals pooled their private wealth to buy, renovate, and then sell choice properties to other wealthy Bostonians. The Beacon Hill Association thus formed in 1922 "to keep undesirable business and living conditions from affecting the hill district."[38] Key among the association's early activities was advocating for zoning policies, which took effect in Boston in 1924. Thereafter the association worked diligently to defend against any proposed zoning variances—especially any favoring low-income housing—which might conflict with its notion of what constituted an appropriately historical streetscape.[39]

Private investment in Beacon Hill's preservation mirrored a growing awareness after World War I of the possibility of profiting from the past. Historians frequently cite John D. Rockefeller's Colonial Williamsburg (1926) in Virginia or Henry Ford's Greenfield Village (1929) in Michigan as indices of a rising heritage tourism industry during the 1920s, but Boston was in many ways at the leading edge of the trend. It was the Boston firm of Perry, Shaw, and Hepburn, after all, which Rockefeller hired to manage the Williamsburg restoration. And it was their landscape architect, Arthur Shurcliff, who'd return from that project to design historic Sturbridge Village and, later, as we'll see, important NPS units in and around Boston. Shurcliff—along with other prominent colonial revivalists with Boston ties, including Appleton and DuPont heir Louise Crowninshield—had seen history and profit tied together early on in places like Nantucket, which offered its historical landscape as an enticement to wealthy vacationers since the turn of the twentieth century.[40] And they learned there that the key to making history profitable was giving customers what they wanted: simple affirming stories of American enterprise in charming places which seemed unchanged over time. Accordingly, the historic house museums and heritage attractions which these three helped to preserve during the 1920s engaged deeply in the cultural politics of anticommunism and American nativism which proliferated during the interwar years. Although Appleton died before he could have a direct hand in planning the park, we'll see in chapter two how Shurcliff and Crowninshield—and their notions about historical propriety—figured prominently in the conversations which produced Boston's national park.

Boston's Postwar Heritage Landscape

By the 1920s Bostonians had built a sophisticated heritage infrastructure which projected a patriotic vision of Longfellow's Revolution onto city streets. But even as they did, significant changes anticipated challenges for history-making in Boston and beyond. It was during the 1920s, for instance, that New England's textile industries began to collapse amid the flow of industry into the non-union South. Boston's economic base had thus already begun to atrophy when the Great Depression settled in during the 1930s, taking with it much of what remained

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[37] Holleran, Boston's Changeful Times, 165.

[38] Quoted in Holleran, Boston's Changeful Times, 264.

[39] Overview of Beacon Hill in and zoning in Holleran, Boston's Changeful Times, 262–67.

[40] See, for instance, Seth C. Bruggeman, "'A Most Complete Whaling Museum': Profiting from the Past on Nantucket Island," Museum History Journal 8, no. 2 (2015): 188–208.

of the city's traditional labor markets including its once ubiquitous waterfront jobs. At the same time, Boston's Mayor James Michael Curley's four terms of leadership created its own set of challenges. Curley poured resources into the ethnic neighborhoods surrounding Boston's urban core, thereby destabilizing the already wavering political and economic power of its downtown elite. By prioritizing the periphery, however, Curley neglected Boston's central infrastructure, so much so that even the Boston Globe characterized it as "a hopeless backwater, a tumbled-down has been among cities."[41] At the same time, Curley's notorious machine politics worried federal relief administrators who, during the 1930s, delivered considerably less New Deal funding to Boston than to other cities of comparable size. The situation grew so dire, according to historian Thomas H. O'Connor, that not even the economic boost introduced by World War II could tip the balance. Rather, as the war ended, Boston confronted a situation wherein "even the most optimistic citizen had to concede that the future of Boston did not look promising."[42]

Within just a few years, however, Boston's path shifted abruptly. The "New Boston" as historian Jim Vrabel puts it, was born on November 8, 1949, the day that Mayor Curley lost his last bid for reelection to John Hynes.[43] Hynes, who had been voted in alongside a new city charter which granted him unprecedented power, set out that year to repair the considerable rifts which Curley had cultivated, especially among Boston's Irish majority and its downtown financiers. Growth, he posited, would hinge on building a coalition of government, business, labor, and media, particularly Boston's impressive corps of newspaper publishers. Hynes' plan for doing it was urban redevelopment or, as it was known by the mid-1950s, urban renewal. Urban renewal spread throughout American cities after World War II by way of two federal laws: the Housing Act of 1949 (refined and expanded by the Housing Act of 1954) and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Federal Housing Acts subsidized so-called "slum clearance" in cities which devised redevelopment plans according to federal guidelines and in partnership with private developers. The Highway Act subsidized the construction of new highways and granted state and federal officials considerable authority to determine their routes. Although in many regards these initiatives did revitalize tumbledown urban centers during the second half of the twentieth century, they also did irreparable harm—especially to those communities most vulnerable to the problems urban renewal sought to eliminate. Scholars have written volumes, for instance, documenting the tendency of urban renewal to destroy working-class neighborhoods, encourage racial segregation, and starve economic opportunity within ethnic and immigrant enclaves.[44]

Hynes' investment in urban renewal opened Boston to the opportunity to participate in the meteoric economic growth which appeared everywhere in the years after World War II. Ex-

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[41] Cited in Thomas H. O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 72.

[42] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 18–19. Boston's struggles during the 1920s and 30s are detailed on pages 3–19. During 1950s, Boston's population declined 13 percent and jobs declined 8 percent. For these figures, see Lizabeth Cohen, "Liberalism in the Postwar City: Public and Private Power in Urban Renewal," in Johnathan Bell and Timothy Stanley, eds., Making Sense of American Liberalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 141.

[43] Jim Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014), 9.

[44] Starting points for this conversation include Christopher Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940–1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); and the essential Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1992, orig. 1961).

plaining the unprecedented growth in the United States' postwar economy has become a preoccupation among historians who identify a range of contributing factors, several which shed light on the story of Boston's evolving heritage landscape. First, the United States emerged from World War II with a new enemy: global communism. The Cold War, wherein the American military campaigned against the communist Soviet Union vis-à-vis its surrogates in Korea, Cuba, and beyond, prolonged the nation's wartime economy. Military spending spurred growth across the United States, including in Boston where universities swelled with federal military funding and, thanks to the GI Bill, welcomed thousands of returning veterans into their classrooms. Hanscom Air Force Base, built just outside Boston during World War II, became an epicenter of military spending during the Cold War, thus spurring the development of a high-tech industrial corridor along nearby Massachusetts Route 128. New technologies and new industries, alongside large-scale federal public works projects (including highway construction), pumped money into the economy and, thanks to powerful labor unions, distributed it across a broad cross-section of American families. And with war and depression behind them, young Americans celebrated by having more kids than ever before. Nearly 80 million Americans were born during the so-called Baby Boom of 1946 to 1964.

Back in downtown, however, Bostonians struggled during the immediate postwar years with what historian Lizbeth Cohen describes as first-phase renewal.[45] It's worth noting that urban renewal began in practice if not in name even before the war. The commonwealth had proposed plans for Boston's Central Artery, for instance, as early as 1927. And public housing initiatives introduced during the 1940s had already built racial segregation into renewal and forced the creation of black ghettos.[46] After the war, and prompted by federal urban renewal laws, Haynes constituted a Boston Housing Authority, which drafted a 1950 city plan with particular emphasis on updating transportation systems and removing pockets of blight from around the downtown business district. When construction on the Central Artery finally began in 1950, residents of Boston's historic North End suddenly realized that, not only would the project cut them off from the city, it would destroy hundreds of buildings and businesses throughout their community. Residents of Boston's Chinatown even convinced the city council to oppose plans for a portion of the Artery which threatened their part of the city. None of this, however, stopped construction, which continued through 1959.[47] At the same time, Haynes and the BHA advanced renewal projects in Boston's South and West End communities which resulted in the displacement of thousands of working-class Bostonians, many of whom were immigrants, people of color, or both. In the West End alone, over 3,000 families lost their homes, with up to half being relocated to lower-quality housing at higher costs. By the late 1960s, urban renewal displaced over 10,000 families throughout Boston, and about one-third of those were families of color. The election of Mayor John F. Collins in 1959, as we will see in chapter three, would shift

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[45] This formulation will figure in Cohen's Saving American Cities: Ed Logue and the Struggle to Renew Urban America in the Suburban Age (forthcoming from Farrar, Straus & Giroux).

[46] See, for instance, Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017).

[47] Thomas H. O'Conner, Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950–1970 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993), chapter three. For a visual survey of the project's impact on Boston, see Yanni K. Tsipis, Boston's Central Artery (Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia Publishing, 2001).

renewal away from demolition and displacement. For many Bostonians, however, the damage had already been done.[48]

The Freedom Trail

In myriad ways, the postwar years created national demand in Boston for precisely the revolutionary memory its local heritage brokers had promulgated for over a century. Boston increasingly beckoned to newly-prosperous white middle-class families whose kids had memorized Paul Revere's Ride in school, and maybe even heard it on the TV or radio, perhaps on the DuPont Company's Cavalcade of America. A trip to Boston was educational, but it also encouraged the kind of Cold War patriotism befitting a young generation charged with protecting democracy at home and abroad. And getting there would be easier than ever before, or so claimed proponents of Boston's Central Artery. Haynes's encouragement of new partnerships between government and business made a prominent place for Boston's Chamber of Commerce, which eagerly sought ways to turn a profit on heritage tourism. It was the chair of the Chamber's Committee on Historical Places, in fact, a plastics magnate and history enthusiast named Mark Bortman who (as we will see in chapter two) lead the effort to develop a national park concept for Boston. How, though, would Boston's new heritage coalition translate a nineteenth-century story about the city's eighteenth century into the language of twentieth-century heritage tourists?

What accounts exist of the Freedom Trail's earliest days typically take as their starting point an essay titled "Hub Needs 'Liberty Loop,'" an installment of editor and daily columnist Bill Schofield's "Have You Heard" column published in the March 8, 1951 issue of the Boston Evening Traveler, a newspaper which Vrabel notes as ranking among Boston's leading advocates for urban renewal.[49] As the story goes, Schofield—a self-described "Swamp Yankee descendant"—hatched a plan in conversation with Old North Church rector Robert M. Winn to "mark out a 'Puritan Path' or 'Liberty Loop' or 'Freedom's Way' or whatever you want to call it, so [tourists] know where to start and what course to follow" in their pursuit of Boston's historic sites. Mayor Hynes or Chamber of Commerce president Harry Blake, Schofield suggested, could "do the trick on a budget of just a few dollars and a bucket of paint" if they were to simply put up a few signs designed "to guide a visitor from one shrine to the next along the most convenient foot-route." Schofield and Winn had even worked out a rough itinerary. Beginning at the State House, tourists would follow fanciful markers (featuring a figurative "Colonial, striding onward") to the Granary Burial Ground, King's Chapel, Old South Meeting House, the Old State House, Faneuil Hall, the Paul Revere House, Old North Church, and then Copps Hill burial ground near where they could catch a ride at North Station to points beyond. The whole thing could be done in "no

[48] For an overview, see O'Connor, Building a New Boston, chapter five. Key quotes around p. 138. Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York: Free Press, 1962). Urban renewal displacement statistics are available at Digital Scholarship Lab, "Renewing Inequality," American Panorama, ed. Robert K. Nelson and Edward L. Ayers, accessed October 5, 2019, https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/renewal/#view=-4750.95/-816.65/6.87&viz=cartogram&cityview=holc&city=bostonMA&loc=16/42.3612/-71.0603.

[49] These include: Matthew Grief, "Freedom Trail Commission Report," BNHP (1995); The Freedom Trail Foundation, "Freedom Trail Establishment," https://www.thefreedomtrail.org/about/freedom-trail-establishment (accessed September 3, 2019); Susan Wilson, "History Notebook: Inventing the Freedom Trail" (March 1996), https://www.thefreedomtrail.org/sites/default/files/content/PDFs/inventing_the_freedom_trail.pdf (accessed October 5). Boston's first urban renewal project, which completely destroyed the South End's New York Streets neighborhood during 1952–1957, was spearheaded by the Boston Herald Traveler, which then built its new headquarters in the "renewed" area. Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, 12, 47–49.



Image 2: On December 23, 1956, the *Boston Sunday Herald* reported on the construction of several new highways, including Route 128, that promised to reinvigorate economic growth throughout the region. "New Road Network Around Boston," *Boston Sunday Herald*, December 23, 1956, Box 5, COI NPS NARO/NERO CRM Division Records 1931-1995, NARA-Boston.

more than a moderate walking jaunt," and a more ambitious motor route might be conceived of along similar lines for those eager to venture beyond the city. "THE PEOPLE would like it," and "it would add to the looks of the city." [50]

Schofield and Winn's nascent plan for what would become Boston's Freedom Trail is remarkable for many reasons. On one hand, it reveals the powerful and persistent imprint of Boston's nineteenth-century heritage brokers. Schofield's proposed itinerary, after all, amounts to a walking tour of Longfellow's historical imagination. And yet, on the other hand, Schofield's vision made the old narrative accessible to modern audiences, particularly vacationers whose postwar appetites for consumer patriotism sent them hurtling across the nation's new web of highways. In other ways, too, the plan spoke specifically to Boston's postwar circumstances. The trail which Schofield and Winn envisioned, history notwithstanding, was conceived of in terms of economic development for a city struggling amid industrial decline. Time spent searching for historic sites, they argued, meant "that much less for pleasure and incidentally for spending money." The broader contours of this argument are on display in additional essays Schofield dedicated to the trail project in 1951. On March 13, for instance, Schofield detailed Winn's eagerness to make space for more tourists and their cars by redesigning "the whole North End peninsula [with] all the occupied buildings moved out of the way" of its historic buildings.[51] A week later, Schofield predicted that the overwhelming response to his column predicted a time soon when "fewer visitors who start out looking for Copps Hill Burying Ground [will] wind up at a Salem street salami counter." None other than Lenox E. Bigelow of the Massachusetts Development and Industrial Commission, Schofield intimated, expected that "such a plan would pay dividends almost beyond belief."[52]

Cast in these terms, what appears on the surface to be a commonsensical solution to the problem of lost tourists, reveals the complicity of Schofield and Winn's plan in a brand of mid-century urban renewal which sought to accommodate upper class white tourists by marginalizing those who were not. As Schofield's quip about salami counters hints at, the North End section which Winn was so eager to clear out was, by 1951, the center of Boston's working-class Italian community. Since the middle of the preceding century, Boston's cramped and commercial North End had been a frequent terminus for immigrants, first Irish and later eastern and southern Europeans. After World War II, the North End's majority Italian population—as well as its historic properties—was effectively cordoned off and, in some cases, displaced by construction of Boston's Central Artery. The colorful street life and frolicking children which urban reformer Jane Jacobs observed there during the late 1950s worried the tourists that Schofield spoke with, who complained of being "greeted with mobs of urchins at Paul Revere's House. We were so irritated we left in a hurry."[53] They wanted the historical North End conjured by Longfellow,

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[50] Bill Schofield, "Have You Heard: Hub Needs 'Liberty Loop,'" Boston Evening Traveler, March 8, 1951. This and other of Schofield's essays from the Evening Traveler are available in photocopy in the Park Resource Management Records, Division of Cultural Resources, Historians Files, Box AfAm Hist to Freedom Trail, Folder Fr.Tr. Foundation, Charlestown Navy Yard. "Swamp Yankee descendant" is excerpted from an interview with Schofield in Wilson, "History Notebook: Inventing the Freedom Trail."

[51] Bill Schofield, "Have You Heard: Historian Seeks Giant North End Park," Boston Evening Traveler, March 13, 1951.

[52] Bill Schofield, "Have You Heard: 'Freedom Way' Sign Idea Big Hit," Boston Evening Traveler, March 19, 1951.

[53] Bill Schofield, "Have You Heard: 'Freedom Way' Sign Idea Big Hit," Boston Evening Traveler, March 19, 1951.

Schofield believed, not the ethnic ghetto made notorious by Sacco and Vanzetti.[54] Other sites remained completely off limits. None among the trail's early planners ever attempted to route tourists past the site of the famous Liberty Tree, which by 1951 abutted Boston's bustling Chinatown. Even a decade later the Freedom Trail Foundation, which had been requested to include the site on its path, remained "reluctant to do so due to the deplorable condition of the area and obvious problems of bringing tourists into that section."[55]

For Schofield, at least, the problem of ethnic and class difference in the North End was just one facet of what he and others perceived to be the corrosive influence throughout Boston of an increasingly "deviant" urban landscape.[56] The trail, Schofield argued would ensure that a tourist could find Bunker Hill, for instance, unlike his "cousin who used to say: 'Nope, I started for Bunker Hill but somehow I wound up at Revere Beach.'"[57] Schofield's reference to Revere Beach, the nation's first public beach and, by the 1950s, a summer retreat for Boston's working class, underscored his concern that the city's historic places were being sidelined by coarse amusements.[58] Directional signs would, he suggested, "prevent [the tourist] from getting lost somewhere among the hamburger stands."[59] The possibility that respectable tourists might encounter the actualities of daily life in postwar Boston so rattled Schofield that he continued to dwell on it over two decades later in the foreword to his book about the Freedom Trail: "It was not unusual for a safari trying to track down Faneuil Hall to get lost in the tattoo shops and burlesque dives of old Scollay Square... It was chaos."[60]

Mayor John B. Hynes agreed. Schofield reported on March 31 that the mayor had called him and expressed his intent to "go along with the Freedom Way plans." The Boston Chamber of Commerce and the Junior Chamber of Commerce too, Schofield added, "are plugging the plan." "More people," he predicted, "will get to the old North church and Paul Revere's House this season than ever before, and fewer lost visitors will wind up wondering how to get out of Scollay Square."[61] Schofield had succeeded. In the following months, the city installed painted plywood signs "along 30 prominent street corners pointing toward Old Boston's most famous

[54] On the challenges of commemorating Sacco and Vanzetti, see Stephanie E. Yuhl, "Sculpted Radicals: The Problem of Sacco and Vanzetti in Boston's Public Memory," The Public Historian 32, no. 2 (2010): 9–30. See also Richard Kreitner, "Anarchy in the BPL: A Little-Known Legacy of Mayor Menino," Boston Globe, November 23, 2014.

[55] Robert F. Friedman to Governor John A. Volpe, October 13, 1966, Folder "Office Files: Department of Public Works, Freedom Trail Foundation, 1962–64," Box 80, John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives. BNHP revisited the possibility of interpreting the Liberty Tree during a symposium it hosted in 2007. See chapter seven.

[56] Daniel A. Gilbert, "'Why Dwell on a Lurid Memory?': Deviance and Redevelopment in Boston's Scollay Square," Massachusetts Historical Review 9 (2007): 103–33.

[57] Bill Schofield, "Have you Heard: 'Freedom Way' Sign Idea Big Hit," Boston Evening Traveler, March 19, 1951.

[58] For more on Revere Beach, see Mark Allan Herlihy, "Leisure, Space, and Collective Memory in the 'Athens of America': A History of Boston's Revere Beach," PhD diss., Brown University, 2000.

[59] Bill Schofield, "Have you Heard: 'Freedom Way' Sign Idea Big Hit," Boston Evening Traveler, March 19, 1951.

[60] William G. Schofield, Freedom by the Bay: The Boston Freedom Trail (Chicago, New York, and San Francisco: Rand McNally & Company, 1974), 11.

[61] Bill Schofield, "Have You Heard: Hub Will Go Along the Freedom Way," Boston Evening Traveler, March 31, 1951.

historical shrines." Mayor Hynes officially dedicated the "Freedom Trail" on June 11, 1951.[62] In his July 25 column, Schofield described a not-so-modest victory lap around the new Freedom Trail. "City workers are busy… cleaning up the rubbish scatterings," he observed, "a very good sign indeed." "Youngsters of the neighborhood" still clustered "around the sightseeing busses… for pennies and dimes," but overall Schofield found the city streets "cleaner than they used to be, except in the North End." As it turned out, the trail "is a comfortable and convenient way to see the sights of Boston," and could be enjoyed in forty-five minutes of leisurely walking.[63] Boston's heritage tourists seem to have agreed. By 1953, an estimated forty thousand visitors had followed the trail. The city considered it such a success that, in that year, it commissioned a new series of permanent metal signs to replace their dilapidated and, in some cases, vandalized predecessors. With a nod to Longfellow, each one prominently featured—in gold—a silhouette of Paul Revere on his horse.[64]

Conclusion

Whereas the advent of Boston's Freedom Trail might be seen as the starting point for a history of the city's modern heritage landscape and, later, the park's role in managing it, my hope in this chapter has been to illustrate how the Freedom Trail really rather represents the culmination of a two-century-long contest over the meanings and uses of revolutionary memory in Boston. Understanding that contest, and the motivations of those who joined it, is absolutely critical for making sense of the challenges which planners encountered in Boston when they arrived during the 1950s to rough out the contours of a new national park. It shows us, for instance, that by mid-century, revolutionary memory was already highly politicized in Boston, and deeply entwined with struggles for social justice. Urban renewal would soon stir old passions among claimants to the revolution's legacy. It shows us too that, by the 1950s, Boston had devised a sophisticated heritage infrastructure reliant upon private investment, complex zoning laws, and the considerable influence of decades-old historical societies. Why would Boston's preservationists want to partner with the federal government, especially having been abandoned by it during the New Deal? And, of course, we've seen how Boston's heritage saga produced a coterie of preservationists deeply nourished on an earlier era's cultural politics and the notion that history could and should turn a profit. Their involvement with the NPS in Boston and beyond would bear significant influence on Cold War era public history, but it would also soon come into conflict with new ideas about history, its uses, and the course of American democracy.

In fact, what is most striking about the Freedom Trail, as it was conceived, is how vigorously it mapped nineteenth-century ideas about the past onto Boston's twentieth-century streets. And yet, remarkably, the history of the Freedom Trail has received virtually no attention from historians within or beyond the NPS.[65] It is an astonishing oversight which is simultaneously symptomatic and generative of a fraught relationship between the NPS and the various organizations which together forged Boston's heritage landscape well before the agency sought to involve itself. As I will suggest in the following chapters, the agency's failure early on to appreciate the Free-

[62] "Mayor Hynes Establishes 'Freedom Trail' to Aid in Guiding Visitors to Historic Spots," City Record, June 9, 1951, 607; cited at https://www.thefreedomtrail.org/about/freedom-trail-establishment.

[63] Bill Schofield, "Have you Heard: Streets Clean; Dotty Loves Richie," Boston Evening Traveler, June 25, 1951.

[64] Joan McPartlin, "Along Boston's Freedom Trail: 40,000 People Take this Path Each Year," Boston Globe, October 6, 1953, 16.

[65] The only study of the trail's past appears to be Grief, "Freedom Trail Commission Report."

dom Trail's significance explains numerous nested management problems which persist in all facets of the park's operation today. This failure also explains why, despite myriad challenges to its authority, the Freedom Trail remains Boston's most resilient interpretive contrivance.

Chapter Two

The Boston National Historic Sites Commission, 1951–1961

In the course of events leading to the creation of a national park in Boston, 1951 was a watershed year. The debut that year of Boston's Freedom Trail, as we've seen, distilled generations of revolutionary memory into a simple story of American exceptionalism ready-made for postwar visitors. Concurrently, the start of work on Boston's Central Artery promised to funnel more and more of those visitors directly downtown. Its path through Boston's historic North End also threatened to divide the modern city along old class lines, and displace ethnic communities roiled by protests, foreshadowing a generation of conflict associated with urban renewal. The year 1951 was also the year in which Boston implemented its new city charter, which granted unprecedented power to Mayor John Hynes, who handily won reelection against a spate of candidates—including his rascally predecessor, James Michael Curley. Armed with a new city plan and a mandate to reinvigorate downtown, Hynes set out to unite a coalition of public and private interests in realizing a new modern Boston just as his mayoral compatriots had done in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia.

And it was in 1951, amid all this, that house minority leader John W. McCormack—a devoted supporter of "historic and patriotic matters"—first introduced a bill proposing to authorize a Boston National Historic Sites Commission to study the possibility of creating a national history park in and around Boston.[66] It was just such a committee which had helped establish Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia only years before.[67] That project demonstrated how powerfully the NPS could figure in postwar urban place-making and, as we will see, its example became a template for possibilities in Boston. Federal park-building in Boston, however, presented a very different set of challenges, owing in part to the existence there of a deeply established heritage infrastructure.[68] Consider, for instance, the web of organizations which, by 1951, staked a claim on Boston's mnemonic landscape. There were, of course, the dozens of private heritage societies which had proliferated during the previous century, and which managed several of Boston's most iconic historic sites. The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), a state entity, had charge of the Bunker Hill Monument ever since 1919, despite persistent budget limitations imposed by the commonwealth's General Court (state legislature). Boston's Chamber of Commerce also exerted considerable authority in heritage matters by way of its sponsorship of the Freedom Trail. In coming years, the commonwealth would involve itself even further

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[66] McCormack is described by Edwin Small in S. Herbert Evison, Oral History Interview of Edwin W. Small, October 19, 1971, Transcript 388, Subseries B: Interview Transcripts, 1938–1978, Series II: S. Herbert Evison's National Park Service Oral History Project, 1952–1999, National Park Service Oral History Collection, 1937–2017, NPS History Collection, Harpers Ferry Center for Media Development, Harpers Ferry, WV.

[67] See Charlene Mires, Independence Hall in American Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

[68] On the history of Philadelphia's heritage infrastructure, see Gary B. Nash, First City: Philadelphia and the Forging of Historical Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

by way of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and, beginning in 1955, the creation and management of local historic districts.[69]

Until this point, involvement by the federal government in Boston's heritage landscape had been limited to a more or less custodial role at the sleepy Dorchester Heights Monument, far south of the city's core historic district. Once McCormick's bill became law, however, determining whether the NPS should, or could, do more fell to a seven-person commission including preservationists, NPS officers, politicians, and business leaders. This chapter examines the Boston National Historic Sites Commission (BNHSC) and its efforts during 1951–61 to imagine a new kind of park befitting Boston's complexities. The result, what is often referred to as the system's first partnership park, was not quite so new as might be suspected. Nor was the commission's work as collaborative as it might have been. As we will see, the BNHSC ultimately channeled ideas about historical significance, organizational partnership, and urban landscapes which had been developing in the work of one particular NPS historian ever since the 1930s. That the BNHSC ultimately proposed two parks—BNHP and, further west, what would become the Minute Man National Historical Park (Minute Man)—reveals too that Longfellow's Boston was never far from the minds of preservationists whose ideas about the past would, within just years, lag far behind scholarly accounts of the American Revolution.

Small in Salem: A Prelude to Boston

McCormack initiated the park's long legislative genesis in 1951. He was not the first, however, to consider the possibility of a national park in Boston. In many ways, the unit's broad contours had already been sketched out under the Historic Sites Act of 1935. That legislation, which bound the agency's advisory board to survey historic sites recommended to it—often by congressmen, historical societies, and private individuals—for inclusion in the park system, generated a familiar list of significant structures in and around Boston. Regional Historian Edwin Small worked up a survey of New England historic sites for the advisory board beginning in 1937.[70] Shirley Place, the Longfellow House, the Old State House, Kings Chapel, the Bunker Hill Monument, Concord Bridge and Lexington Green, Dorchester Heights, Old North Church, Faneuil Hall, and the Harrison Gray Otis House all made the list by 1947. The agency's so-called park resumes, kept secret by the director for fear of stirring real estate speculators, indicate that Concord and Lexington had also become the focus of conversations about a new national park by 1947.[71]

That they had owed to Small's outsized influence. Small's early role in surveying Boston's heritage landscape initiated his career as one of the leading architects of federal history-making in twentieth-century New England. Small was born in 1907 in Goshen, Connecticut, and took his BA (1930) and MA (1934) in history from Yale College, where he wrote a thesis concerning the development of the Adirondack Forest Preserve. In 1935, under authority of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), NPS historian Ronald F. Lee hired Small to satisfy responsibilities

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[69] For an overview of history and operation, see Massachusetts Historical Commission, "Establishing Local Historic Districts," June 2003, reprinted March 2007, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/mhc/mhcpdf/establishinglocalhistoricdistricts.pdf (accessed April 18, 2019).

[70] Joan Zenzen, Bridging the Past: An Administrative History of Minute Man National Historical Park (Boston: NPS Northeast Region History Program, 2010), 35.

[71] National Park Service, "Proposed Areas Resumes" (1947), I-28, Park History Program, Washington, DC. Thanks to Bureau Historian John Sprinkle for providing digital copies of these materials. For a discussion of this process under the Historic Sites Act of 1935 and beyond, see Sprinkle, Crafting Preservation Criteria: The National Register of Historic Places and American Historic Preservation (New York and London: Routledge, 2014).

created by the Historic Sites Act. After brief stints in Springfield, MA, Washington, DC, and in Boston—where the NPS opened a district office in 1936 to serve what would eventually become the Northeast Region—Small moved to the Custom House in Salem, MA in 1937 and became superintendent of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site—the first NPS historic site in New England—when it was established the following year. [72] During World War II, Small received a commission in the Navy Reserve for 1943–46 during which he conducted historical research first for the Office of Naval Intelligence and then for the Director of Naval History. Small returned to spend another decade at Salem before the BNHSC would lead him in new directions.[73]

It is worth taking stock of Small's work at Salem because not only would he have an important hand later on in devising plans for the park, but because by 1951 Salem was still one of just a few models for a federal historic park in New England.[74] Small was well-suited to his work. Eminent preservation historian, Charles Hosmer, describes him as "a most efficient and diplomatic emissary for the National Park Service in a region where the federal government was not trusted."[75] He had to be. Salem was a crossroads for some of the early twentieth century's most important preservationists. It was in Salem, and in partnership with the venerable Essex Institute, that George Francis Dow introduced the period room to American museumgoers at the turn of the century. William Sumner Appleton and his Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities had a keen and longstanding interest in Salem's historic houses. And Louise du Pont Crowninshield, who kept a home in nearby Marblehead, had married into a family of Salem descendants and eagerly involved herself in all things preservation there. Even more locally, businessman Harlan P. Kelsey and Mayor George J. Bates were determined by the 1930s to restore the Revolutionary-era Derby Wharf, intending to cash in on Works Progress Administration (WPA) largess and, they hoped, making a claim on an emergent heritage tourism industry. Add to this a phalanx of private interests, all variously involved through ownership of Salem's historic structures. Once the NPS resolved to stake its own claim at Salem, and to assert there its new commitment to historic preservation, it fell to Small to negotiate this complex and powerful network of private interests.[76]

Small managed it all by taking a pragmatic approach to partnership and an aggressive approach to preservation. Beginning in 1935, for instance, he worked cautiously to earn Appleton's trust, despite the Boston preservationist's deep and well-documented distrust of the federal government.[77] In this task especially, he found an important partner in Crownishield who, though well ensconced within the nation's elite preservation set, had already become a powerful public partner to the NPS at its troubled Washington's Birthplace National Monument on Virginia's

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[72] Pauline Chase-Harrell, Carol Ely, and Stanley Moss, Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site (Boston: NPS North Atlantic Regional Office, 1993), 4. Hosmer discusses the very first NPS historic site in New England—the Old Courthouse associated with the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial—and generally the implementation of the act in Preservation Comes of Age, chapter 8.

[73] Evison, Oral History Interview of Edwin W. Small, 1–5, 59–60, 63. Zenzen, Bridging the Past, 34.

[74] Adams Mansion National Historic Site, authorized in 1947 was another. Laura Miller's forthcoming administrative history shows that Small too was involved in establishing Adams.

[75] Hosmer cited in Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 7.

[76] This is summarized in Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 7–11.

[77] Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age, 175.

Northern Neck Peninsula.[78] Small worked vigorously to align the agency's preservation interests with the concerns of his community partners. He assured them that NPS involvement would "draw people to this section of the country as never before" so that "New England [can] keep pace with other parts of the country as a vacation land."[79] To make sure it would, Small relied on a constant stream of technical support from the regional office, including from Assistant Architect Stuart Barnette, who would return to play an important role in Small's work with the BNHSC. When Barnette drew up a preservation plan for Salem in 1937 which recommended widespread demolition of secondary structures to showcase primary assets, Small supported it entirely. In one case, Small defended the proposed demolition as "desirable not only as a slum clearance proposition, but also to widen the perspective of the waterfront… and could also be effectively utilized in connection with solving the parking problem."[80] This demonstrates the extent to which, as early as 1937, Small had already begun developing strategies for managing collaborative preservation in urban settings with an eye toward heritage tourism, economic development, and of course, urban renewal.

Small's story shows us too that McCormick's bill did not advance an entirely new idea about federal history in Boston. Nor did it, we should also note, create the first opportunity for agency involvement in the city. In fact, McCormick had created a point of entry for the NPS many years before by way of his involvement with the Dorchester Heights Monument. After its construction in 1898 and completion of its surrounding parkland in 1905, the monument had been managed by the City of Boston's Department of Common and Public Grounds during 1906–12 and the Boston Park Department from 1912–51.[81] During those years, the South Boston Citizens' Association had formed in part to coordinate celebration of Evacuation Day (March 17), which had grown into a "gigantic parade and celebration" by the 1930s.[82] McCormack explained to Small in 1938 that he and the association sought federal recognition of the site and the event and desired to transfer the property to the US government without any expectation of payment or improvements to be made. Privately, Small doubted the site's significance, arguing in a report that "it does not appear that the occupation of Dorchester Heights… made very much differ-

[78] On Crowninshield's role at George Washington's Birthplace National Monument, see Seth C. Bruggeman, Here, George Washington Was Born: Memory, Material Culture, and the Public History of a National Monument (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), and especially chapter 4.

[79] Small cited in Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 10.

[80] Small cited in Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 97. Barnette's role is described throughout including on p. 17.

[81] National Park Service Cultural Landscape Inventory, Dorchester Heights National Historic Site, BNHP (2010), 3.

[82] Edwin Small quoted in "Dorchester Heights," CRBIB #015856, September 29, 1938, 5. According to the South Boston Citizen's Association,it was November 23, 1880, that a number of residents met at the studio of Walter Smith, at City Point, to discuss the advisability of forming an association or club to further the interests on the locality in which they resided. At the next meeting, held November 29, the same year, by vote of those attending, the organization was named the City Point Improvement Association. The association held meetings first, every month at City Point; but January 9, 1893 the first meeting was held in the association's present headquarters in Gray's Hall; and in February of the same year, the name was changed to that of the South Boston Citizens' Association. Its membership at that time was eighty-nine. See the association's Facebook page, which serves as its primary website, https://www.facebook.com/pg/South-Boston-Citizens-Association-417334460199/about/?ref=page_internal (accessed April 22, 2019).

ence in the final outcome of the Siege of Boston."[83] Nonetheless, he submitted the proposal to the advisory board for consideration at its November meeting. In the meantime, McCormack secured authorization in 1939 from the commonwealth for Boston to convey the property to the United States to be managed as a national monument under authority of the Historic Sites Act.[84]

The advisory board deferred during its November 7–9, 1939 meetings, but reconvened during March 25–31, 1940 and acknowledged Dorchester Height's eligibility to be designated a national historic site. A nomination drafted in 1941 evidently stalled during the war years. In January 1951 however, the Corporation Counsel of Boston revived the proposal and submitted it to the NPS.[85] Again, however, the board stalled, noting that among the dozen other sites in and around Boston it had also ranked as nationally significant, Dorchester Heights was not the most remarkable. The board suggested additional studies, but neither the city nor McCormack would hear of it. Instead McCormack forced the board's hand by preparing the bill which would establish the BNHSC. With that the Department of Interior agreed to a March 17, 1951 Memorandum of Agreement with the City of Boston designating Dorchester Heights a national historic site. The board finalized designation on April 27, 1951 and, until 1979, the NPS and the Boston Parks Department jointly managed the monument and surrounding Thomas Park as Dorchester Heights National Historic Site.[86]

Creating a Boston National Historic Sites Commission

It was Small then who, in his preliminary surveys and his work at Salem, first imagined what a national park in Boston might look like. And it was McCormack who initiated the process by which a park could be created. Moving the process forward, however, fell to a coalition of NPS officers, local boosters, and politicians. The NPS moved quickly to identify the parameters within which the commission might do its work. That spring, Assistant Director Ronald Lee and Chief Historian Herbert D. Kahler encouraged Chief of Interpretation Rogers W. Young to make a preliminary field survey of Revolutionary-era historic sites in and around Boston. Kahler proceeded by asking for help from who else but Edwin Small, who had of course begun precisely that project a decade earlier. They agreed that the Old State House and Faneuil Hall should become federal property. Several other sites, they resolved, should be recognized as national historic sites in non-federal ownership by way of cooperative agreements. These included the Bunker Hill Monument, Dorchester Heights, Old North Church, the Paul Revere House, and the site on Cambridge Common where Washington became commander of the Continental Army. Sites between Lexington and Concord associated with Paul Revere's ride and the British advance should be marked, they suggested, though the "conservative attitude of these old established Town Governments may make this task a formidable or even impossible one to overcome." The commission might succeed, Young and Small decided, if its membership include "public spirited

[83] Edwin Small quoted in "Dorchester Heights," CRBIB #015856, September 29, 1938, 3–5.

[84] An Act Authorizing the City of Boston to Convey the Dorchester Heights Monument and Adjoining Land in the City of Boston to the United States of America for Preservation and Maintenance as a National Historic Monument," 1939 Mass. Acts 148 pp 121–122. 21 April 1939.

[85] See Advisory Board catalog cards scanned and shared by NPS Bureau Historian John Sprinkle. Relevant minutes include VIII, 2, (2), August 15–18, 1938; XI, 9, (21), November 7–9, 1939; XII, 10 (2), March 25–31, 1940); and XXIV, p. 14, April 26–27, 1951.

[86] See Advisory Board minutes XXIV, p. 14, April 26-27, 1951, and XXVIII, Appendix, I (12), April 18-2, 1953. MOA, March 17, 1951, signed and sealed by Oscar Chapman, secretary of the interior, and John B. Hynes, mayor of Boston. National Park Service Cultural Landscape Inventory, Dorchester Heights National Historic Site BNHP-Dorchester Heights (2010), 3, 38.

citizen[s] of the highest type," who "represent the best in the old tradition of public service, peculiar to New England." It would need an "outstanding" architect as well, and "representatives of the highest type from the political life of the city, the State and the Nation [sic]." Lee suggested that perhaps even someone from the Philadelphia Commission, perhaps Judge Edwin O. Lewis, "should be considered for appointment."[87]

The only problem, of course, was that there was not yet a commission for which to consider appointments. McCormack's bill did not move through Congress as quickly perhaps as the National Park Service suspected it might. On August 15, 1951, the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs considered H.J. Res. 254 to establish a historical sites commission for Boston. McCormick, citing the Interior Department's report, stressed that precedent for such a commission was evident in connection with several national memorials, including Mount Rushmore and the Jefferson Memorial, and especially the Independence National Historical "project" in Philadelphia. The commission would enable Congress, he argued, "to keep in closer touch with the study… which in the final analysis must be enacted into law if the project is to be a success." "A commission stimulates more interest," he added, "in the community itself." McCormick emphasized the Interior Department's conclusion that Boston and its surroundings constituted "one of the greatest historical regions of the nation," though cautioned that, if established, a commission would have to "obtain the permission of the proper local authorities" before venturing beyond Boston's city limits. He assured, however, that "the local authorities are interested," including Mayor Hines from whom McCormack "not only obtain[ed] his consent but his approval."[88]

McCormack's pitch hit its mark. Arizona congressman, John R. Murdock, who also served as chair of the Committee of Memorials, expressed his support given the similarity of McCormack's proposal to what "we are just giving attention now to [at] another cradle of liberty up here at Philadelphia." Colorado Representative Wayne N. Aspinall wondered what specifically McCormack meant by "Boston and the general vicinity." McCormack explained that, in his mind, Boston's "vicinity" included Cambridge, Somerville, Quincy, Newton, Everett, Malden, and Revere, or towns within approximately ten miles of the capitol "which is more or less in the heart of Boston." The subcommittee's chair, Texas Representative Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., inquired whether state and city governments had begun working on the project. McCormack answered "no," prompting Bentsen to note that "we do not feel on this Committee that this is a local matter because all of America feels that it has an interest in these historical sites."

The notion that all Americans had a stake in Boston's history pervaded the hearings. McCormack took up the topic in a comment concerning Evacuation Day, "the biggest day in the year in my district," when Bostonians celebrate the eviction of British troops on March 17. "A significant part of the exercises of this year," he explained, "was the signing of the necessary documents which made Dorchester Heights a national historical site." But, McCormack followed, "that is piecemeal." The proposed legislation would encourage a broader coordinated effort worthy of Boston's national significance. The theme continued in a statement made by NPS Assis-

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[87] Rogers W. Young, "Preliminary Survey of Historic Sites in Boston and Vicinity in Connection with H.J. Res. 254, 1st Sess., 82nd Cong.," July 17, 1951, attached to Ronald F. Lee to Tobin, November 23, 1955, in Folder "VII July–Dec 1955 Records," Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[88] US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Public Lands, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Historical Commission for Boston and Vicinity, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (82 H.J. Res. 254), August 15, 1951.

tant Director Ronald F. Lee. Lee had submitted a report on July 27 which emphasized how "the historical properties of the nation are one of its most important heritages which contribute to the national welfare." "In times such as the present," once again invoking the social and political anxieties of the mid-century United States, "it is important to focus national attention upon the basic traditions of our historical heritage."[89] With that, the subcommittee unanimously voted to present McCormack's proposal to the full committee.

Several days later the full Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs convened to consider H.J. Res. 254.[90] This time, however, the bill met resistance almost immediately. Texas representative Kenneth Mills Regan noted the many memorial proposals he had heard while serving on another committee, including those regarding the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis and "many bills doing something for Columbus and Franklin Roosevelt, and probably 25 to 50 others."[91] All those bills, he noted, "we have postponed this year in the interest of economy." "If we pass this bill... it is contrary to the policy we have been following on similar memorials." Representative Wesley A. D'Ewart of Montana wondered why the National Trust for Historic Preservation couldn't manage the Boston project. Toward turning the tide, Chair John Murdock recalled from the subcommittee's deliberation "the similarity between this proposal and that carried out by the Committee and Congress at Philadelphia." "In these times," he continued, "when we have to fight ideologies which are so dangerous, we ought to further our own ideology with its roots and backgrounds as much as possible." C. Norris Poulson of California agreed. He recalled touring Great Britain during World War II and marveling at how its historic sites "create the love and admiration and respect for the past." "It certainly had a great tendency to fight Communism," he argued, "which is to destroy all those things and bring in new ideas." Appeals to anticommunism hit their mark and, despite some continued debate about the purpose of the National Trust, the committee voted and agreed to report the bill favorably.[92]

Although H.J. Res. 254 passed the house, it failed to arrive on the Senate floor before adjournment that year. It did, however, reemerge two years later when reintroduced by D'Ewart as H.J. Res. 122, though this time with a reduced appropriation of $30,000, no doubt intended to appease budget-minded congressmen.[93] Once again, D'Ewart noted a precedent for the bill in the legislation which, in 1936, established the Philadelphia National Shrine Park Commission and which eventually led to the establishment of Independence National Historical Park in 1948. Remarkably, however, though no debate followed D'Ewart's introductory remarks, a preliminary committee vote on advancing the bill resulted in a narrow 10 to 9 victory. After roll call, however, New York Representative James G. Donovan changed his vote to "no" thus spelling defeat for the bill in committee. McCormack returned to the subcommittee on Public Lands on May 4, 1955 to pitch the commission once again. Interestingly, though McCormack hit several of the same notes as before—including the national significance of Boston's local heritage—he lead this time with a different theme: "[Boston's] historic sites are perpetually threatened by...

[89] The report is cited in US Congress, Historical Commission for Boston and Vicinity, but not reprinted in whole.

[90] US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Boston National Historic Sites Commission, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (82 H.J. Res. 254), August 21, 1951.

[91] It is unclear whether Mills referred to his time as chair of the Public Lands and Land Office or as vice chair of Public Buildings and Grounds.

[92] US Congress, Boston National Historic Sites Commission (1951).

[93] US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Boston National Historic Sites Commission, 83rd Cong., 1st sess. (83 H.J. Res. 122), February 17, 1953.

destruction by the bulldozers and steam shovels of progress." "If Paul Revere's house should collapse," he continued, "or if the highway authorities were to build an elevated expressway over Boston Common, that would be the loss, not of Boston alone, but of the Nation."[94] Urban renewal had once again figured as a rationale for shoring up Boston's heritage infrastructure. And it did so with evident success. Without any further debate, the subcommittee voted favorably to report the bill to the full committee.

Imagining A Boston National Park

Congress established the BNHSC by joint resolution on June 16, 1955 and outlined its charge in Public Law 75. On paper, at least, the BNHSC's task seemed straightforward: to investigate the "feasibility of establishing a coordinated program in which the federal government may cooperate with local and state governments and historical and patriotic societies for the preservation and appreciation by the public of the most important of the colonial and revolutionary properties in Boston and the general vicinity thereof which form outstanding examples of the United States' historical heritage." [95] Public Law 75 suggested that 1955 was a "critical period," one during which "the inspiration afforded by such prime examples of the American historical heritage and their interpretation is in the public interest." "It is proper and desirable," therefore, that the United States preserve for public use "historic properties that are intimately associated with American Colonial solidarity and the establishment of American independence." This was very clearly the language of anxious postwar lawmakers buoyed by the mid-century notion, promulgated by consensus historians, that Boston's revolutionary holdovers recalled a bygone era of American "solidarity." In the hypercharged atmosphere of 1955—a year during which the Cold War filled headlines—Public Law 75's nostalgia for an era when political unity supposedly prevailed over a virtuous enemy aimed to manufacture consensus where little existed.

Despite all this, or perhaps because of it, the commission's mandate was riddled with quandaries: Which historical and patriotic societies ought the commission engage? What are the most important colonial and revolutionary properties? What exactly does "general vicinity" mean? And, what counts as an outstanding example of American historical heritage? To make matters more confusing, Public Law 75 allowed for consideration of "architectural merit" in addition to historical significance. Seven people would be chosen to settle these questions. They would include one member of the US Senate, one from the House, one secretary of the interior appointee, and four presidential appointees including at least one from Boston. Together, the commission would focus on completing four tasks outlined in the legislation. First, it would make an inventory of historic properties, including real estate costs. Second, it would document the "existing condition" of the properties in its inventory. Third, it would recommend mechanisms by which state, local, and federal governments might work with cooperating associations toward preserving whatever properties the commission considered "in the public interest." Fourth, the

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[94] US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Public Lands, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, To Provide for Investigating the Feasibility of Establishing a Coordinated Local, State, and Federal Program in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Purpose of Preserving the Historic Properties, Objects, and Buildings in that Area, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (84 H.J. Res. 207), May 4, 1955. Of course, language associating preservation with urban problems would figure prominently in the preamble to the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

[95] Joint resolution to provide for investigating the feasibility of establishing a coordinated local, State, and Federal program in the city of Boston, Massachusetts, and general vicinity thereof, for the purpose of preserving the historic properties, objects, and buildings in that area, Public Law 75, US Statutes at Large 69 Stat. 136 (1955), 136–138.

commission would summarize all its findings in a report and transmit it to Congress within two years. Congress granted the commission authority to hire expert advisers, if needed, only so long as its budget did not exceed $40,000 (about $360,000 today).[96]

The first matter of business, of course, was to assemble the commission. For its part, the Senate appointed Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall. Representative Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill represented the House. As for the remaining four presidential appointees, NPS Director Conrad Wirth recommended eight men, including himself. Most of his recommendations had made notable contributions to mid-century preservation, including William Graves Perry, whose architectural firm managed the restoration of Colonial Williamsburg. Others included wealthy Bostonians with antiquarian bents. Mining executive and bank president Seth Thomas Gano, for instance, served in numerous heritage organizations including as treasurer of the Lantern League of Old North Church. Mark Bortman, a plastics and textile magnate, also held leadership positions throughout Boston's heritage landscape, including as chair of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Historic Places.[97] President Eisenhower did endorse Bortman—who would become a personal friend to the Eisenhower family in later years—but opted against Wirth's other recommendations in favor of individuals recommended through other channels: Boston attorney John P. Sullivan; Charles H. Watkins, president of the Old North Lamp League; and stalwart NPS ally, Louise Crowninshield. Finally, NPS Director Conrad Wirth represented the Department of the Interior.

The commission's first meeting, at Salem NHS in September 1955, foreshadowed tensions which would reemerge periodically over the course of its life. Senator Saltonstall had let it be known before the gathering that Watkins should be appointed commission chair. But because neither Saltonstall nor Watkins could attend the first meeting, O'Neill—who did—immediately nominated Bortman for the job.[98] Crowninshield responded by nominating Watkins on Saltonstall's behalf and then seconding the nomination herself. Sullivan seconded Bortman, thereby leaving Bortman with the deciding vote. Bortman, of course, endorsed himself thereby winning the appointment.[99] A second vote, this time split three to two, made Sullivan the Executive Secretary.[100] Northeast Regional Director Daniel Tobin attended the meeting in place of Conrad Wirth. As presiding officer, he could not vote, but later explained to Wirth that the meeting went "somewhat different from what had been anticipated [and] I am not at all sure but that it is an advantage to the National Park Service."[101] Crowninshield later recalled of the first meeting that

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[96] Figures based on Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (accessed April 22, 2019).

[97] The recommendations appear in NPS Director Conrad Wirth to Special Assistant Harry J. Donohue, July 7, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[98] Though it doesn't appear from correspondence that O'Neill and Bortman had a close relationship. Bortman addresses him as "Tom" rather than "Tip," as was the fashion with O'Neill's close associates.

[99] Summary Minutes, Organizational Meeting of the Boston National Historic Sites Commission at Salem Maritime National Historic Site, September 12, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[100] The action on Sullivan is noted in "Summary of Matters Voted on to Date by the Boston National Historic Sites Commission: March 6, 1957," Folder Jan–Apr 1957, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[101] Tobin to Wirth, September 14, 1955, Folder VII July-Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956-1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

"the Irish politicians… voted me down every time."[102] Word of the cantankerous first meeting seems to have spread throughout Boston's preservation community. In a letter to Wirth, Walter Muir Whitehill—Boston's arch heritage advocate and, eventually, a transitional figure in the commission's story—expressed his "hope that something useful will come out of this Boston Commission even though in many senses it has started off on an awkward foot."[103]

For its second meeting, just two weeks later, the commission gathered in its new headquarters in Boston's Post Office and Courthouse Federal Building. It appointed an executive committee—Bortman, Sullivan, Watkins, and Wirth—charged with sustaining "the proper conduct of the work of the Commission." It also made Regional Director Tobin a designated alternate for Wirth, thus forming a core group which would meet regularly throughout the commission's life, with Crowninshield, Wirth, Saltonstall, and O'Neill joining only periodically.[104] Chief of Interpretation Young, who had surveyed Boston with Small in 1951, joined the meeting to discuss the steps which had been taken in Philadelphia leading to Public Law 795, which authorized Independence National Historical Park in 1948. Young also provided the commission with NPS criteria for the selection of historic sites, its inventory procedure for historic sites survey, the National Trust's criteria for evaluating historic sites and buildings, and portions of the report he and Small had compiled in 1951. Lee had cautioned that "inasmuch as this is a confidential report, our thinking here is that possibly [a few pages] might be released to the Commission." The report's suggestions concerning how to staff the commission and what sites to engage through cooperative agreements would thus be redacted, leaving just fieldnotes for the commission.[105] With that, the commission voted to define "Boston and vicinity" in the same terms which the NPS had: Boston and twenty-seven surrounding cities and towns.

It also voted to host its first public hearing. Working with a mailing list provided by Boston University history professor Robert Moody, the commission invited historical and patriotic organizations to gather on November 9 so that it might "explain the objectives of Public Law 75."[106] Minutes from the gathering do not appear to exist, possibly because the commission had yet to hire a stenographer.[107] The Christian Science Monitor, however, reported that the "lively meeting made plain that plenty of New Englanders are eager to preserve their historic landmarks." Their

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[102] Crowninshield's comment was originally included in a letter to Superintendent Francis S. Ronalds of Morristown National Historical Park, though repeated in a letter from Tobin to Wirth, November 23, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[103] Walter Muir Whitehill to Conrad Wirth, January 3, 1956, folder US Government Misc., Box 28, Walter Muir Whitehill Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

[104] "Summary of Matters Voted on to Date by the Boston National Historic Sites Commission: March 6, 1957," Folder Jan–Apr 1957, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[105] Young shared pages 3-8. "Summary of Minutes of Second Meeting," September 29, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956-1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[106] "Summary of Minutes of Second Meeting," September 29, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. On Moody, see Frederick S. Allis, Jr., "Memoir of Robert Earle Moody" (July 1988), Colonial Society of Massachusetts, https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1778 (accessed April 22, 2019).

[107] For various materials related to this meeting, including participant forms and notes taken by Tobin, see Folder BNHSC A2015 First Hearing 11/9/1955, Box 1, CRM Division Records 1931–1955, Northeast Region, National Park Service, National Archives at Boston, Waltham, MA.



A Sturbridge Village in Faneuil Hall

To the Editor of The Herald:

Faneuil Hall still stands on Dock square, much the same as it was in the 1700's when it was rebuilt after one of Boston's several disastrous fires. Thanks to the Municipal Art Commission and to the patriotic societies, it has been spared the fate of so many other buildings of the time.

The first floor markets, with their multiplicity of signs and smells, seem to be most alien. The city collects revenue from these stalls at the munificent sum of $35, or thereabouts, each month.

This commercial setting adds nothing to the place as one of the city's priceless possessions. Is there any chance of rescuing this building and restoring it as a business landmark, comparable in spirit, if not in scope, to Williamsburg or Old Sturbridge Village? We think there is!

We have no reason to disagree with historic precedent or economic necessity that the first floor be devoted to shops. We just disagree with the type of business which is lodged there at the moment.

We think it would be of far greater advantage to the city and consistent with the character of the place if the areas were given over to 18th century trades and businesses and the dozen or so stalls refurbished in the architectural styles of shops of that time when individual pride of craftsmanship was more important than mass production.

How much more attractive Faneuil Hall would be with modest unprepossessing business places than with the present melange, we leave to your imagination and good judgment.

But we can see visitors by the score, trooping to a "chocolate and mustard shop," for instance, to "chuse" from the goodies displayed there — uniquely Boston's — "comfits, confects, cates, sweet-meats of spiced delights, Indian nectar in lump and lozenge, balls and rowls, cakes and chocolate sticks" as well as "sturdy mustard to put the Stomach in Good Temper."

Or, a woodworking shop where a skilled cabinet maker could carry on with a "adz, mallet and wimble," his casual craft and supply hand-made articles of furniture which could grace the homes of thousands of Americans.

Businesses which might profitably be housed in such an undertaking conceivably might include a silversmith, potter, printer and bookseller; a pub, candy store, weaver, iron worker, cabinet maker, tobacco store and a food and herb shop. (However, the decision of tenancy and merchandise had best be left to the discretion of a committee of citizens whom the mayor could appoint to oversee the transformation.)

Each of these businesses certainly could pay as much as the meat packers and produce dealers now pay. And the distinction that the goods were made and purchased in a Faneuil Hall shop could have as much interest and value, if not more, than any article made or sold in Williamsburg or elsewhere—that is, if properly publicized and promoted.

All merchandise could bear a "Faneuil Hall-Boston" label and the market place would become an attraction to visitors, a continuing, if not greater source of revenue to the city and Faneuil Hall would be preserved as "a thing of beauty and a joy forever."

G. HARRIS DANZBERGER.
Hingham.

Image 3: G. Harris Danzberger shared his vision of Faneuil Hall as a heritage shopping experience in "A Sturbridge Village in Faneuil Hall," Boston Sunday Herald, January 15, 1956, BNHSC A 2015 2ndHearing 2/6/1956, Box 1, COI NPS NARO/NERO CRM Division Records 1931-1995, NARA-Boston.

hopes for doing so evidently ran the gamut, from ridding Faneuil Hall of meat vendors to restoring West Roxbury's oldest standing school.[108]

Meanwhile the commission still struggled to get its own procedures in order. Although Wirth had granted Tobin authority to appoint personnel and spend whatever money was necessary to support the commission, correspondence reveals constant confusion during the commission's early months concerning its spending authority, how to obtain office supplies, and even whether or not the government would pay for its postage expenses.[109] The commission's sole action at its November meeting, after the public hearing, was a unanimous vote that Sullivan write to the secretary of the interior "for assistance in expediting the appointment of a stenographer."[110] Bortman explained to Saltonstall's office that "at this moment we are completely stymied… because of the lack of efficient co-operation from the proper bureaus in Washington."[111] The situation was so dire that Tobin recommended to Wirth a decrease in the commission's 1956 fiscal year operations fund given that "delays… and lapses" had resulted in "considerably lesser need for funds… than was originally programmed."[112]

By spring 1956, however, the commission had begun to hit its pace, in part as a result of appointing a trusted hand as chief of party: Edwin Small. Small had studied New England historic sites on behalf of the advisory board, advocated for the Battle Road as a preservation priority, superintended the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, and had developed a deep understanding of regional heritage concerns and familiarity with all the individuals and organizations which sustained preservation throughout the northeast. And, of course, he had already worked with Young on the problem of a Boston national park back in 1951. When Tobin first approached him about working for the commission, Small worried that the assignment might jeopardize his tenure at Salem, where he and his wife had moved in part to care for elderly parents. But with adequate assurances that his appointment at Salem would remain for him, Small signed on as the commission's principal researcher, writer, and agency liaison.[113] It was a crucial turning point that, in many ways, determined the direction of the commission's work. Indeed, years later, Small recalled that he "actually did all the work [of the commission]," adding that he "initiated and presented the ideas." Before his arrival, according to Small, the commission "had a couple of public hearings, but nobody knew quite what to do so I came in. I got a hold of things and got 'em going."[114]

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[108] Emile Travel, "Bay Staters Plead for Historic Sites," Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 1956. Clipping included in Folder Boston Nat'l Historic Site Commission: Correspondence 2 of 4, Box 188, Leverett Saltonstall Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

[109] Wirth's authorization appears in Wirth to Tobin, January 11, 1956, Folder Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[110] "Summary of Minutes of Second Meeting," September 29, 1955, Folder VII July–Dec 1955 Records, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[111] Bortman to F. Bradford Morse, December 9, 1955, Folder Boston National Historic Site Commission Correspondence 3 of 4, Box 188, Leverett Saltonstall Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

[112] Tobin to Wirth, 6 March 1956, Folder Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[113] It was Small, for instance, who was authorized as an agent of the Division of Disbursement to payout salary checks and US savings bonds to employees of BNHSC.

[114] Evison, Oral History Interview of Edwin W. Small, 35.

Old Models for a New Vision

The commission formally appointed Small, in fact, at the very same February 6 meeting wherein it hosted a second public hearing, this time for officers of state and local government concerned with preservation in and around Boston.[115] Not unlike the November 1955 meeting, during which the commission heard from representatives of historical and patriotic organizations, the February 1956 gathering of state and local government representatives generated lively conversation among over fifty participants. Many of the participants, like the City Historian of Quincy, came to advocate for consideration of particular sites, such as the two Adams birthplaces and the site of the first railroad in the United States. Not all the participants belonged to governmental organizations. A representative of the West Roxbury Historical Society, for instance, again petitioned the commission to consider the neighborhood's first schoolhouse. The matter of Faneuil Hall's meat markets emerged again too. George P. Donaan of Boston's Real Property Department asked that the commission advocate for "a more dignified environment for Faneuil Hall" along the lines of "Independence Hall in Philadelphia." The city, he indicated, hoped that the commission might particularly help with Faneuil Hall, "where it has been suggested that the markets be eliminated… and cleaned up." The suggestion encouraged others to voice similar concerns about Faneuil Hall, and foreshadowed a debate—as we will see—that would return with vigor in the following months.[116]

A topic which particularly interested Bortman, unsurprisingly given his involvement with the Chamber of Commerce, was the potential profitability of Boston's heritage landscape. Lenox E. Bigelow, representing the Massachusetts Department of Commerce, volunteered that "his agency was looking at the Commission's work in a little different way—they were looking at it in a commercial sense." Bigelow reported that his department had surveyed vacation travelers and found "very definitely" that "visitors want to 'see' history." He estimated that vacation travel could earn Massachusetts $425 million each year, but that "we have failed in a great degree by not publicizing." Bortman wondered if travel might be increased "if we put on a show similar to Williamsburg." "Our historic spots are there," he added, "they just needed pointing out." Bortman's concern with profit, like worries over meat markets in Faneuil Hall, would become a recurrent theme in the commission's deliberations.

By March 1956, having gathered community input and with the vital addition of Edward Small, the commission finally hit its stride. It did so, in part, by tasking Small with much of its work. Small managed contact with interested Bostonians including local artists eager to sketch out what a new national park might look like. The commission largely dismissed the artists, though Small viewed their work anyway toward insuring "against any possible criticism that the Commission was disinterred in the cooperation of the public."[117] Small also reached out to the Boston City Planning Board, directed by Thomas E. McCormick, which had worked up a pre-

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[115] "Summary of Matters Voted on to Date by the Boston National Historic Sites Commission: March 6, 1957," Folder Jan–Apr 1957, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[116] "Summary of Minutes of Hearing of the Boston National Historic Sites Commission with State, City and Town Officials (and Others) of Massachusetts," February 6, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[117] Summary of Minutes of Sixth Meeting, March 26, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956-1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

liminary plan to redevelop the North End waterfront and create a park for USS Constitution. Nobody on the commission, however, expected the city to pay for the project and, besides, Small thought the planning board "has done very little work... and has nothing to offer that would be of any interest to the commission."[118]

It is difficult to overstate the extent to which Small's opinions about preservation, historical significance, and community engagement, shaped over long years of working in New England, framed the commission's deliberations. They did so, in part, by merit of Small's copious list making. At the commission's sixth meeting, for instance, Small submitted the first of his surveys of historic properties, what was in essence a first draft of what would become the commission's final report. In it, Small identified ten properties with potential for inclusion in a national park, including with each entry an assessment of each building's "survival value"—how much of its eighteenth-century fabric remained—its relative significance to the commission's period of concern, and whether or not action by the commission was needed to ensure the building's preservation. Four properties in particular garnered the most conversation: the Old State House, Old North Church, the Bunker Hill Monument, and Faneuil Hall.[119] Small presented the Old State House as vitally significant, though poorly restored inside and mismanaged besides. The commission resolved to approach the Bostonian Society, which managed the building, and the city, which owned it, about paths forward. The Old North Church presented a different set of problems. Though also highly significant, its private owners could not manage the site's growing popularity among heritage tourists nor adequately protect it from fire hazards. Bunker Hill, under the jurisdiction of the MDC, was "in deplorable condition" according to Small and, despite its iconic place in revolutionary memory, had "no survival value" and was "of national significance for the 19th century" alone. Just these three cases alone made clear how difficult it would be to develop a single partnership strategy suitable for so many permutations of site ownership and management.

And then, of course, was an even more troubling question: could the commission, which had been charged by Congress to protect "colonial and revolutionary properties" reasonably act on a site like Bunker Hill which had no tangible link to those periods outside of popular memory? It was a question intensified by the situation at Faneuil Hall. Small reported that Faneuil Hall, like the Bunker Hill Monument, possessed virtually no survival value before the nineteenth century. "The test," he explained, "is if a person who lived in that age would recognize the building as it now stands, and that Faneuil Hall would not be recognized." Tobin argued that the Historic Sites Act of 1935 protected sites, not just buildings, and that Faneuil Hall's location was itself worthy of protection. Small agreed and joined with Bortman in recognizing that "public opinion would

[118] Summary of Minutes of Sixth Meeting, March 26, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[119] The complete list included (in order): the Old State House, Old North Church, Old South Meeting House, King's Chapel, Christ Church (Cambridge), Isaac Royall House (Medford), Shirley-Eustis House (Roxbury), Vassall-Craigie-Longfellow House (Cambridge), and Breed's Hill/Bunker Hill Monument (Charlestown). Other sites mentioned in passing included the Paul Revere House, the Moses-Pierce Hichborn House, the Stephen-Langdon House, the Dillaway-Thomas House (Roxbury), Dorchester heights National Historic Site, the Old Ship Church (Hingham), and the Adams Mansion and Birthplaces (Quincy). A summary of Small's report and responses to it appears in Summary of Minutes of Sixth Meeting, March 26, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

doubtless require the commission to make some recommendations regarding improvements or changes in the condition of the market and the shops on the ground floor."[120]

The Faneuil Hall Meat Markets

The commission's preoccupation with Faneuil Hall's ground floor shops is worth dwelling on as it recalls a pitched battle in Boston over the appropriate ends of historic preservation, a battle which the commission drifted into almost immediately. For as long as anyone could remember, Faneuil Hall served as one entrepôt in a citywide network of outdoor market spaces. Indeed, Boston merchant Peter Faneuil, for whom the building was named, gifted it to the town in 1740 on the condition that its ground level remain a market space in perpetuity. Despite the building's transformations, and periods during which vendors likely did not dominate its street-level arcade, meat and produce wholesale merchants had been a fixture there since at least the end of the nineteenth century. After World War II, however, as Boston's urban renewal campaign sought to build a new arterial highway through the center of town, the markets became a point of contention. By 1950, for instance, Senator Charles I. Taylor sought to relocate the markets, claiming that "between four and five million dollars are wasted each year because the Faneuil Hall market area cannot economically handle the present volume of business."[121] Within a year, the newly formed Massachusetts Market Authority had identified a two-hundred-acre plot in South Bay where it aimed to build "the world's largest market district" to relocate Faneuil Hall merchants, many of whom had already received eviction notices. "It has become a construction race," the Boston Globe reported, "between the new arterial highway and the new market district," and the merchants' "business depends on the new market district winning."[122]

Certainly there were those who had been "sold" on the idea, but others "remember[ed] Peter Faneuil and the obstacles facing him back in 1740."[123] The obstacles they referred to regarded ensuring timely construction of the building and also Faneuil's difficulties working with the City of Boston, but Boston meat merchants had other reasons to draw parallels between themselves and the colonial merchants who chafed against taxation from afar. New federal standards in 1951—the very same year McCormack proposed the commission—forced Boston butchers to abandon local traditions such as removing bone from steaks and other cuts of meat. According to "one veteran Faneuil Hall district market man," reported the Boston Globe, "the only thing I recognize there [in the new standards] is hamburg."[124] Federal regulations, intended to standardize meat costs and availability across the United States, received mixed reviews in Boston after their first six months. Independent merchants complained that "there never was a shortage of anything, except customers," and that sales had fallen with the rise of prices. Chain retailers seemed pleased with the arrangement, as did some independent merchants who perceived op-

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[120] Summary of Minutes of Sixth Meeting, March 26, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[121] "Senate Approves $20 Million Plan for Market Place," Boston Globe, July 21, 1950, 7.

[122] "South Bay Area Site for New Market: Authority Hopes to Start Building Within 6 Months," Boston Globe, November 11, 1951, C1.

[123] "South Bay Area Site for New Market: Authority Hopes to Start Building Within 6 Months," Boston Globe, November 11, 1951, C1.

[124] Earl Banner, "Consumer Gets More Bone, Fat," Boston Globe, May 13, 1951, C1. Regarding Boston laws made to manage meat market vendors, see Elijah Adlow, "Municipal Corporations," in The Genius of Lemuel Shaw: Expounder of the Common Law (Boston: The Massachusetts Bar Association, 1962).

portunities associated with postwar defense contracts, such as with nearby Hanscom Air Force Base and MIT. "We don't like anybody meddling with our free economy," noted one Faneuil Hall merchant, "but it certainly seems called for here."[125]

As work continued on the Central Artery, however, the holdouts faced increasing pressure to move on. Indeed, the artery construction aimed to wipe out—as the Globe put it—"the entire market district with the exception of Faneuil Hall."[126] The elimination of so much tax-generating commercial real estate in Boston's cramped downtown put Faneuil Hall firmly in the eyes of politicians and developers concerned to squeeze a profit out of whatever remained. At the same time, the success of the Freedom Trail had, since 1951, encouraged a whole new scale of interest in the building and its capacity to attract tourists. By 1953, for instance, Faneuil Hall's three custodians managed forty-thousand visitors each year. To some, the "rich smell of raw meat which clings to the building" heightened Faneuil Hall's historicity.[127] In fact, as the years passed, something remarkable happened: Faneuil Hall's meat merchants flourished! By 1955, plans to remove and centralize its tenants in South Bay had crumbled amid a host of challenges: failed financing, ineffective city leadership, and independent wholesalers' desire to stick with a routine which worked quite well for them. The Globe reported that Faneuil Hall's market district, though "supposedly doomed [is] still doing business as usual and shows no signs of abandoning its centuries-old location."[128]

As we have seen, debates regarding the appropriateness of meat merchants in Faneuil Hall spilled immediately into the commission's work. At its first public hearing, for instance, G. Harris Danzberger, a public relations executive who relocated to the city from Philadelphia just two years earlier, complained about the "the clutter and debris" around Faneuil Hall, and argued that it ought be "restored on the pattern of Sturbridge Village or Old Williamsburg" with "cabinet-making shops, tobacco, weaving, pottery, food and herbs shops" which could turn, he supposed, just as much profit for the city.[129] Danzberger pitched the idea in a letter to the Boston Sunday Herald. "Is there any chance," he wondered, "of rescuing this building and restoring it as a business landmark [a] greater source of revenue to the city and... a thing of beauty and a joy forever."[130] Publicly, Bortman dismissed the notion out of hand. "Our job is limited to listing historic sites and making recommendations for their preservation," he explained to the Globe, "we are not authorized... to build colonial structures."[131]

Behind closed doors, however, the commission sympathized with Danzberger. During its May 7, 1956 meeting, for instance, the commission generally agreed that the meat merchants should be relocated so that the building's first floor might be more profitably turned toward parking and meetings of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, which had occupied

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[125] Earl Banner, "Boston Meat Dealers Pleased with OPS," Boston Globe, November 11, 1951, C25.

[126] Lewis William, "Boston Artery Cuts Deep Into Taxable Land: City May Lose $20,000,000 in Assessments," The Daily Globe, February 10, 1952, C6.

[127] Quote and visitation figures appear in Joan McPartlin, "Grasshopper Landmark Famous as Hall Itself," Boston Globe, October 10, 1953, 10.

[128] Juan Cameron, "Faneuil Hall Market District Continues to Operate Successfully," Boston Globe, October 16, 1955, A39A. This article includes a graphic portraying the city's network of food markets, along with a careful explanation of the various challenges confronting food distribution in postwar Boston.

[129] "Why Faneuil Hall is a Market Place," (no author) Daily Boston Globe, February 12, 1956, C68.

[130] G. Harris Danzberger, "A Sturbridge Village in Faneuil Hall," Boston Sunday Herald, January 15, 1956.

[131] "Why Faneuil Hall is a Market Place," (no author) Daily Boston Globe, February 12, 1956, C68.

Faneuil Hall's top floor for many years.[132] Later that year, the commission heard directly from the Ancients about their plans to adopt Danzberger's ideas. "The main object," they argued, "is to have the place presentable in such a manner that tourists, who come from all over the country… will see something consistent with our past history."[133] But what really seems to have concerned the Ancients, as Captain Thomas Carty relayed, was "the possibility of the Federal Government taking over Faneuil Hall." Carty feared that the Ancients "might lose their local identity in the vastness of the Federal Government [and thus their] local right to occupy the building."[134] Presented with these concerns, the commission suggested that the Ancients not necessarily take up Danzberger's suggestions, but rather consider the possibility of operating the building's street level as a visitor center for heritage tourists. "The important thing was effective interpretation," pointed out Regional Director Tobin. Under the right circumstances, he added, visitation could approach more than a million per year as it had at Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia. Appropriately managing Faneuil Hall under those conditions, Tobin emphasized, "is not only a matter of business, it is a matter of good citizenship—an investment in citizen redevelopment."[135]

In this way, the meat market debates laid bare a considerable difference of opinion within the commission over the very purpose of historic preservation and, by extension, a national historical park in Boston. On one side was Bortman who seemed eager to turn preservation into profit. "It was a decided asset from both a historical and a business point of view," he opined, "that a number of historical places were in the proximity of a fifteen minute walk of the department stores and the business section of Boston."[136] On the other side was Tobin whose concern for "citizen redevelopment" suggested some faith in the notion that doing good history could, alongside urban renewal, reinforce prospects of American democracy. By and large, however, this difference in opinion remained just that—in part because Tobin, while more broadly concerned than Bortman about the complexity of the meat market situation, was never convinced that the venders were themselves somehow representative of a bygone era. He agreed with Edwin Small's sentiment that "the keeping of the market men is, in effect, subsidized by the City, and hence is just as artificial as [Danzberger's] 'shoppes.'"[137]

What had begun as a polite difference of opinion, however, exploded into a full-on war during 1957. The catalyst had been the sudden death that year of commissioner Charles Wat-

[132] It is worth noting that Bortman also sat on the board of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. Meeting Minutes, May 7, 1956, Folder 6 Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[133] Summary of Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes July–Dec 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[134] Summary of Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes July–Dec 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[135] Summary of Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes July–Dec 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[136] Summary of Minutes of Sixth Meeting, March 26, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes etc. Jan–June 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[137] See January 27, 1958 memo to Tobin. It is unclear whom the memo is from. Presumably it is from Small, though the document is signed "MHN." Folder IV d. Faneuil Hall, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

kins. The commission acted quickly to replace Watkins and settled on Walter Muir Whitehill, renowned president of the Boston Athenaeum and voracious advocate for Boston's historic resources. During the commission's August 16, 1957 meeting, Whitehill engaged immediately with the meat market question. The issue had re-emerged with the suggestion, this time by Ronald Lee, that Faneuil Hall be cast as a visitor center "for the whole Boston program."[138] Whitehill agreed to the possibility, so long as the meat stalls stayed put. "They are," he insisted, "the one living sense of the eighteenth century." Letters poured in, some no doubt at Whitehill's request, from organizations concerned to defend the meat markets. The Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities opposed "any changes [that would] adversely affect the appealing flavor and genuineness [sic] of this important building."[139] The Colonial Society of Massachusetts dismissed plans to replace market vendors with "pseudo-picturesque souvenirs" as a "spurious masquerade." The Massachusetts Historical Society "strongly opposes any step toward removing the markets in Faneuil Hall." Carty restated his concern, on behalf of the Ancients, that "housekeeping and disposal methods of the meat purveyors and wholesale vegetable and fruit dealers… are primitive." "It is not uncommon," he added," for visitors to have to step over or walk around decaying cabbage with its revolting odor before they can enter this historic shrine."

The problem of Faneuil Hall consumed the commission's November meeting. Despite agreement that Danzberger's letter to the Boston Sunday Herald had created a false impression of what the commission anticipated for Faneuil Hall, tensions erupted around the issue of cleanliness.[140] Crowninshield expressed little concern with what happened inside the building, just so long as the "exterior should be kept clean and the [vendor] canopies removed." Whitehill agreed about the canopies, but noted that it was the "city's job to keep the sidewalks clean." Bortman protested, countering that the vendors made the area impossible to clean. Tobin pointed out that the city's entire historic core was "dirty and unattractive," and that Faneuil Hall was part of a larger problem which "could be controlled by leasing." Small sought, as always, to make a historical argument, suggesting that there had always been opposition to the meat markets. And, besides, in his estimation the vendors likely wouldn't remain if the canopies were removed from the building's exterior. A presentation of plans for the area, sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce, further intensified disagreement.[141] The first portrayed Faneuil Hall's first floor gutted to make room for a visitors center and museum space for the Ancients. Bortman lauded it; Whitehill chafed. The second plan, an exterior view, shows Faneuil Hall standing virtually alone, "with the unimportant old buildings removed," surrounded by highways. Whitehill railed against "the prospect of re-creating Boston from ideas without any actual detailed information to go on." We "are not dealing with another Williamsburg," he insisted, but rather with "a city that has a life of its own."

The commission opted not to go on record concerning the fate of Faneuil Hall, but that didn't stop Whitehill, Bortman, and their surrogates from slugging it out in Boston's newspa-

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[138] Summary of Twenty-seventh Meeting, August 16, 1957, Folder Meeting Minutes May 1957–Mar 1958, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[139] Letters appear summarized in Summary of Minutes of Twenty-eighth Meeting, November 20, 1957, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[140] G. Harris Danzberger, "A Sturbridge Village in Faneuil Hall," Boston Sunday Herald, January 15, 1956.

[141] See proposed sketches in Folder Duplicate Records (Mar. 1958–June 1959), Box 2, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

pers. Whitehill landed the first blows during December 1957 with editorials in the Boston Globe and Boston Herald. A summation of these appeared in the January 1958 edition of the Boston Athenaeum's newsletter, wherein Whitehill expressed his fear that "historic restoration and reconstructions," such as what had been proposed for Faneuil Hall, had become so popular in the United States as to imperil "the safety of certain historic monuments that have survived to the present day."[142] Noted Boston writer and arts promoter, Francis W. Hatch, bent to the cause that February, publishing a tongue-in-cheek poem on the plight of Faneuil Hall in the Boston Globe.[143] Ronald F. Lee reported to the regional director that Hatch's "In the Name of Peter Faneuil: Beef Before Baubles" was "widely posted in clubs, societies, and bookstores in Boston."[144] By March, pundits joked about forming a "Let-it-Alone Club… namely, to 'look for something which is getting along perfectly well and then, —just let it alone!" Even The Pilot, the official newspaper of the Archdiocese of Boston, published an editorial lambasting plans to renovate Faneuil Hall, presuming the idea must have been "brought in by gypsies."[145] The appeal to Catholic Bostonians—and thus to the predominantly Irish and Italian market vendors—drew Bortman into the fight. In a publicized telephone call with Monsignor Francis J. Lally, Bortman asked that "another side" be considered. "It is important that visitors to our city," he explained, "should be lifted by the experience of seeing our great places of history rather than filled with feelings of disappointment and revulsion."

Interestingly, as both sides battled on—The Boston Herald generally anti-meat market, and the Globe generally pro—the NPS watched with careful attention, and some amusement. Small received orders to create a file of all relevant press coverage. Notes in the margins of copies which circulated among regional staff suggest considerable regard for Whitehill's position, and some concern to understand what wisdom the argument revealed concerning preservation policy going forward.[146] In the end, however, it appears that Whitehill's campaign backfired. That February, Small reported to Tobin that as a result of the media storm, Mayor Hynes had constituted a special committee to study the meat market issue. Its members included the City Art Commission chair, the mayor's industrial adviser, the president of a University Club, the president of the Boston and Maine Railroad, and none other than Carty himself. Small stated the obvious: "the composition of the committee points with little doubt to a majority in favor of getting rid of the markets." Small intimated that the mayor sought "to eliminate the markets, irrespective of the protests." In the mayor's mind, he explained, the question is: "shall we continue to operate the

[142] "Historical Continuity versus Synthetic Reconstruction," Athenaeum Items: A Library Letter from the Boston Athenaeum, 67 (January 1958), n.p., in Folder IV d. Faneuil Hall, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[143] N.a., "Old Landmark Doesn't Need its Face Lifted," containing the text of Francis W. Hatch, "In the Name of Peter Faneuil, Beef Before Baubles," Boston Globe, February 1, 1958.

[144] Lee to Regional Directors, Regions One, Two, Three, Four and Five, April 2, 1958, Folder IV d. Faneuil Hall, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[145] Mentions of both of these appear in "The Let-it-Alone Club," Athenaeum Items 68 (March 1958): n.p., in Folder IV d. Faneuil Hall, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[146] These materials appear in Folder IV d. Faneuil Hall, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

building mainly as a wholesale meat mart or shall we operate the building as a patriotic shrine."[147] Small suggested that the so-called "traditionalists," if concerned to retain any space for the markets within sight of Faneuil Hall, would be best served by imagining ways to relocate the markets into Quincy Market, where a fruit and produce exchange had vacated a few months earlier. As always, Small's sense of things would prove propitious.[148]

One Commission, Two Parks

The story of Faneuil Hall's meat markets reveals the extent to which the BNHSC was, from its outset, deeply divided and frequently distracted from its core responsibilities, which included: creating an inventory of Boston's historic properties, documenting the existing conditions of those properties, devising a partnership model for protecting whichever of those properties it deemed most significant, and reporting its findings to Congress. Indeed, since Small had already managed most of the commission's first two obligations on its behalf, all that really remained was to devise a way to bring Boston's various historic sites into some kind of federal stewardship umbrella. But even this seemed unmanageable, despite frequent and not-so-subtle suggestions from Wirth and Tobin to consider, and perhaps emulate, the process which had worked so well in Philadelphia. To its credit, the BNHSC had come into existence amid radical transformations in Boston's built environment, and the temptation to respond to urban renewal—either with support, in Bortman's case, or with resistance in Whitehill's—was difficult to resist. And yet, the impossibility of avoiding the meat market imbroglio, and more broadly, the complexities of memory, profit, and preservation in Boston's historic core, clearly made the BNHSC eager for a problem it could realistically contend with.

Just such a problem presented itself during spring 1956. That May, Bortman concluded that since "the survey work on the City of Boston is pretty near completed, the commission should start thinking about the Concord-Lexington area."[149] The area Bortman had in mind, of course, was the celebrated Battle Road stretching between the towns of Lexington and Concord and along which Longfellow imagined Paul Revere riding to warn "every Middlesex village and farm." Bortman, incidentally, had a deep personal interest in the Paul Revere story, and had even played a key role in returning Revere's so-called Liberty Bowl to the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.[150] Nearly fifteen miles northwest of Boston, however, the Battle Road presented a very different set of circumstances than Boston's core historic area. Bortman perceived it to be "the most important project the commission will have from a national point of view," and argued that the prospect of preserving an entire road and its context was more likely to interest Congress than the possibility of protecting a few buildings in Boston.[151] What's more, the Battle Road proj-

[147] Small to Tobin, February 7, 1958, Folder BNHSC memos to Members 12/1957–12/1958, Box 2, CRM Division Records 1931–1955, Northeast Region, National Park Service, National Archives at Boston, Waltham, MA.

[148] The Park's newsletter, for instance, ran a story about meat merchants still working at Faneuil Hall in 1976. "Boston Historic Sites Still 'Living,'" The Broadside 1, no. 3 (Winter 1976): 4. The meat markets did not leave entirely until completion of Faneuil Hall's rehabilitation in 1990, after which they were replace by stylized colonial shops (see chapter six).

[149] Summary of minutes of 11th meeting, May 28, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[150] Bortman's involvement with causes related to Paul Revere and his objects is well-documented, for instance, in the Mark Bortman Papers, 1948–1967, P-856, American Jewish Historical Society.

[151] Summary of minutes of 15th meeting, August 13, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 19561960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

ect had already been planned for, in 1925, by landscape architect Arthur Schurcliff.[152] And, as it happened, Shurcliff sent a copy of his plans to the BNHSC that June.[153]

What made the matter of the Battle Road so pressing, in Bortman's mind, was the arrival there of the same "bulldozers and steam shovels of progress" which McCormack had warned Congress about in downtown Boston. These too had been mobilized by federally-funded postwar development projects, and particularly expansion of the Hanscom Air Force Base. The commonwealth set to work, just outside of Boston, on building a civil airfield with federal investment during the early days of the war. As the war effort expanded so did the air base, where federal employees flocked to develop high-tech electronic systems, including radar, for military applications. Growth continued into the Cold War years, bringing more technicians and their families to suburban Boston. A radical expansion of state Route 128 accommodated growth along the so-called technology corridor, as did connectors including Route 2A, which transected key portions of Revere's famous ride. Road building, a proliferation of new housing, commercial development everywhere between, and profit-seeking investors complicated Shurcliff's thirty-year-old plan and signaled the likelihood that implementing it might soon not be possible. But what most startled the BNHSC were plans by the air base itself to build hundreds of new housing units right atop the Josiah Nelson homesite, where local lore recalled Nelson as the first casualty of the American Revolution.[154]

Small joined Bortman in encouraging the BNHSC toward an engagement with the Battle Road. So much had changed since 1925, he argued, that the historic landscape would soon be irretrievable.[155] Saltonstall urged the BNHSC to leave the problem of the Battle Road to the state legislature, but the committee persisted.[156] By October 1956, the BNHSC had turned full bore to the problem of the Battle Road, including by staging a conversation with various community representatives at its meeting that month. Tobin urged caution, worrying that any word of NPS interest in the area might spark a land run and make prices prohibitive even for the federal government.[157] Small threw himself entirely into the project, recalling later "that if something weren't done very soon it would be completely absorbed in a sprawling suburbia."[158] The problem, however, was proposing a boundary area inclusive of three towns—Lexington, Lincoln, and Concord—and considerable private property therein. What's more, none of the towns involved in the project had assembled property maps by the time Small arrived on the scene. He,

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[152] On Shurcliff and his Battle Road plan, see Zenzen, Bridging the Past, chapter two. Shurcliff's role is also summarized in Boston National Historic Sites Commission, "The Lexington-Concord Battle Road, Interim Report of the Boston National Historic Sites Commission to the Congress of the United States," June, 16, 1958, 19–20. Hereafter cited as "Interim Report."

[153] Summary of Minutes of 13th meeting, June 22, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[154] Zenzen, Bridging the Past, 37–43.

[155] Summary of minutes of 16th meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[156] Summary of minutes of 16th meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[157] Summary of minutes of 17th meeting, October 15, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[158] Evison, Oral History Interview of Edwin W. Small, October 19, 1971, 20.

his secretary Rita A. Farrell, Lexington town planner Samuel P. Snow, and a real estate agent named Harry Bergland worked together for a year, sifting through registries of deeds, speaking with officials, assessing property values, and drawing up maps which avoided property severances wherever possible.[159] In conversation with Small years later, Herb Evison characterized the Minute Man boundary challenge as "one of the most interesting and probably one of the most complicated things that you've been involved in."[160]

Evison was right: the BNHSC's interim 1959 report on the Battle Road—a report, it's important to note, written entirely by Small and Farrell—advanced a remarkably bold and innovative plan for a new national park encompassing over seven hundred acres spread across two discrete units and at a cost of nearly five million dollars in land purchases alone (approximately $43 million today).[161] It's also worth noting that the report was a stopgap of sorts for the BNHSC, insomuch as it had to produce something for Congress after years of wheel spinning and after having received two term extensions. Small's report demonstrated that, though the BNHSC may not have yet managed the Boston problem, it had invested considerable efforts in developing a proposal for the Battle Road.

Small's was a three-part plan. First, the commission recommended that the secretary of interior, with authority granted by the Historic Sites Act of 1935, negotiate cooperative agreements with seven specific regional governments and heritage societies, and any number of others as necessary, to protect nationally significant historical properties along or adjacent to the Battle Road. A second recommendation concerned erecting a twenty-mile stretch of historical markers all the way from downtown Boston to the Barrett Farm outside of Concord, thereby marking relevant sites not otherwise eligible for protection. Finally, the commission recommended a surgical bout of land purchase intended to permanently protect a four-mile stretch of the Battle Road and Concord's famous North Bridge from "shattering changes on the historic landscape and the irrecoverable loss of historical values."[162] Small's recommendations, as put forth in the report, laid the foundation for Public Law 86-321, which on September 21, 1959, authorized establishment of Minute Man National Historical Park.[163]

With its interim report complete, the BNHSC turned once again to Boston's heritage landscape, though the Battle Road project never drifted out of focus. Indeed, Small's report seemed to suggest that Boston's problems might be untenable. He described Route 128, for instance, as "the dividing line today between the retrievable and irretrievable past," lamenting the destruction of "historical values east of Lexington."[164] Perhaps the solution in Boston, he hinted, might take cues from the mix of partnership and land purchase he proposed for the Battle Road, which could "be the mainspring by which a 'coordinated program' can work to the advantage of all groups... in the vicinity of Boston."[165] Chief Historian Ronald Lee encouraged the BNHSC to call "the whole business by one name and one project," rather than to conceive of the Battle

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[159] Snow is incorrectly identified as "Sam Snell" in Small's oral history. Snow appears in Interim Report, 20.

[160] Evison, Oral History Interview of Edwin W. Small, October 19, 1971, 20–24.

[161] Interim Report, vii.

[162] Interim Report, 2–4, 7.

[163] Public Law 86-321, 73 Stat. 590–592. Note that the park was initially established as Minute Man National Historic Site on April 14, 1959, by designation of the Historic Sites Act of 1935 covering federal property at Hanscom Airforce Base. See 24 F.R. 4987.

[164] Interim Report, 8, 10.

[165] Interim Report, 12.

Road and the Boston sites as constituting separate parks. Whitehill, who had joined the BNHSC to fill Watkins' spot, agreed, noting that "Lexington-Concord was merely a military excursion from Boston and is very closely tied in ordering to the proposed Boston program."[166] Whitehill's tone betrayed his concern that the BNHSC had invested far too much of its time in the Battle Road. Indeed, when the commission requested a year-long extension and additional funding from Congress in December 1957—because, as Small put it, "very little progress has been made with the major problems in Boston Proper during the past year"—Whitehill lashed out.[167] He wrote directly to Wirth that the extension was, in his opinion, "an unwarranted use of public funds" and threatened to undermined the NPS's reputation "in quarters in Boston that are now well disposed."[168] Wirth dismissed the concern, noting that the BNHSC would need the time to satisfy its legal commitment.[169]

It appears though, that Whitehill had good reason to worry that the BNHSC had lost its focus on Boston's core historic area. As late as July 1958, Small was still wrestling with problems of presenting plans for the Battle Road, and particularly how to do it on one simple map. In his report to the regional director that month, Small acknowledged that the commission was returning to the Boston problem, and that it was developing an "explanatory narrative" along the lines of what it had produced for the Battle Road. The Battle Road project, it turned out, had influenced how the BNHSC had thought about its approach to Boston. But dealing with Boston, Small explained, was "more difficult" than the Battle Road "owing to the fact that the political issues and machinery for the Revolution are far less vivid and capable of reduction to simple terms than any of military nature."[170] Again, as difficulties befell the Battle Road proposal—including a "flurry of real estate activity" the NPS had evidently triggered after all—the BNHSC retreated into affairs unrelated to the fundamental task of proposing a stewardship schema for Boston.[171] Small wrote once again to Tobin suggesting that the commission seek another extension. By May, however, Wirth insisted the commission finish its work, noting conversations with congressmen who would "look with disfavor on further extensions."[172]

[166] Summary of 27th meeting, August 16, 1957, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec.1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[167] Small to Director, December 11, 1957, Folder 4, May 1957–March 1958, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[168] Walter Muir Whitehill, Director and Librarian, Library of the Boston Athenaeum to Conrad Wirth, May 19, 1958, Folder 5, Admin docs Mar 1958–June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[169] It is notable that although Whitehill sent Wirth, as he put it, a "confidential" letter, Wirth routed copies of his response to Small and Tobin, signaling his unwillingness to deal privately with Whitehill. Wirth to Whitehill, 11 July 1958, Folder 5, Admin docs Mar 1958–June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[170] Small to Regional Director, July 31, 1958, Folder 5, Admin Docs Mar 1958-June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[171] Small to Tobin, January 29, 1959, Folder 5, Admin Docs Mar 1958–June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[172] Wirth to Assistant Secretary, Public Land Management, May 29, 1959, Folder 5, Admin Docs Mar 1958–June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

A Plan for Boston

So, what in the end did the BNHSC propose for Boston? A quick glance of its 1961 summary report suggests a straightforward plan. First, the commission recommended the NPS coordinate management of seven national historic sites in Boston. It proposed that two of them—the Old State House and the Shirley-Eustis House—be acquired outright by the federal government. Another four—the North Square, containing the Paul Revere House; Old North Church; Faneuil Hall; and the Bunker Hill Monument—could be designated national historic sites while remaining in non-federal ownership. That, of course, was the situation already in place at Dorchester Heights National Historic Site, which itself would constitute the seventh site in the agency's constellation of Boston historic sites. And, like Dorchester Heights, other sites remaining in non-federal ownership would be at least partially managed by the NPS, insomuch as concerned preservation and interpretation, by way of cooperative agreements between the organizations which owned them and the secretary of interior. The creation of one or more historic districts under commonwealth law—such as had already been done at Beacon Hill and Lexington—would complete the picture. Capping it all off would be the acquisition of property in town for a visitor center, a coherent signage system for marking historic sites, and the creation of an advisory board to manage the fledgling park through establishment, and negotiate the contours of its constitutive cooperative agreements for several years thereafter.

Look beyond the summary, though, and the BNHSC's final report yields fascinating insights concerning the complexity of history and place-making in the mid-century United States. Consider that, as NPS bureau historian John Sprinkle explains, the NPS had not yet grown comfortable with the concept of a historic district.[173] Absent that model, then, it appears that the report's authors—namely, Small—looked to urban renewal for his inspiration. The report encourages the preservation of seven historic sites, each surrounded by a discrete historic area. The report lists eight areas in all, seven corresponding with the various sites mentioned above, and an eighth encompassing the Old Corner Bookstore, King's Chapel, and the Old South Meeting House.[174] The use of areas as an organizing principle clearly mimicked the language of urban renewal. Consider, for instance, the Faneuil Hall area, which Small imagined as including the commercial buildings along North and South Market Streets, the Union Oyster House, the Ebenezer Hancock House, and the Boston Stone "in the block of ancient alleys and lanes circumscribed by Union, Hanover, Blackstone, and North Streets."[175] The Faneuil Hall area, according to the report, was "the only sizable part of the central core of Old Boston that is practical to consider setting apart or organizing as a perpetual area of both traditional activity and historical interest."[176] And yet, the report continued, what might become of the area was entirely subject to plans then in development for Boston's new Government Center, "a project… closely allied to the objectives of urban renewal."[177] What might be done in the face of such imminent though unpredictable change? The BNHSC recommended three steps: negotiate a cooperative agreement between

[173] John H. Sprinkle, Jr., "'Worthy Remains of a Beautiful and Historic Past': The National Park Service Recognizes Historic Districts," Federal History, 11 (January 2019): 129–44.

[174] This area, though, given the integrity of its historic structures, did not figure in the BNHSC's final recommendation.

[175] BNHSC, Final Report of the Boston National Historic Sites Commission, 87th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 1961, H. Doc. 107, 7. Hereafter cited as "Final Report."

[176] Final Report, 14–15.

[177] Final Report, 15.

the Department of Interior and the City of Boston to protect Faneuil Hall; instruct the advisory board to take steps toward establishing a state historic district corresponding with the area; and, if the district did not come to fruition, instruct the board to recommend how the Department of Interior might buy up land and property toward protecting the historic area.

The BNHSC's recommendations regarding the Faneuil Hall area thus mirrored its members' conflicting attitudes concerning urban renewal. Small and Bortman, of course, were strong advocates of demolition and resident relocation. Whitehill was not. In chapter three we will see how, in the long term, Whitehill's vision in this regard came to bear considerably more on plans for a national park in Boston. With regard to the BNHSC's final report, however, it is remarkable how fully it endorsed condemnation of private property given the ferocity of reaction among Bostonians to, for instance, the West End Development Project. "The purchase of a considerable number of properties in private ownership will be necessary," the report indicated, to eliminate "adjacent or intervening structures that are incongruous intrusions [sic] or fire hazards." Doing so, it continued, is essential for "any effective program for improvement or permanent historical renewal."[178] Areas targeted for property acquisition and demolition included the North Square Area, Paul Revere Mall within the Old North Church area, and Shirley Place. Altogether the report called for the acquisition of forty-six parcels covering 2.16 total acres, most of it "largely occupied by outmoded and decaying tenements and commercial slums."[179] In the North Square, for instance, the report called for "removal of the privately owned structures that objectionably intrude."[180] The historical setting of the North End, around the Old North Church area, it contended, "was blotted out during the last century by intensive construction of brick tenements and a public school… congestion that breeds only blight and decay."[181] And only by buying up the land around Shirley Place, could the NPS restore the "magnificent setting… swallowed up by tenements for migrants from the central city" and consequently surrounded by "urban blight and decay."[182] Preserving historic Boston, according to the BNHSC, would require considerable destruction along the way.

Conclusion

Recounting the BNHSC's story—my purpose in this chapter—is vital for understanding how and why BNHP came to be. Although, as we will see in the following chapters, the Park's 1974 authorizing legislation veered in important ways from the BNHSC's recommendations, it nonetheless perpetuated core facets of the commission's vision which remain intact even today. The strength of the BNHSC's influence, therefore, demands that we ask a difficult question: was the BNHSC successful? Officially, at least, the BNHSC passed two critical thresholds of success. First, it satisfied a procedural audit by the Comptroller General of the United States which found

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[178] Final Report, 9.

[179] Final Report, 27.

[180] Final Report, 16.

[181] Final Report, 19.

[182] Final Report, 20.

no improper conduct or use of funds.[183] Second, it spawned not just one, but two national parks. The first, of course, was Minute Man NHP in 1959. The other—the one it had actually been tasked with creating—earned approval by the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments, at its 51st meeting in October 1964. The authorization a decade later of BNHP certainly speaks to the BNHSC's success.

And yet, as we've seen throughout this chapter, the BNHSC's success was not entirely unmitigated. Its membership, for instance, was temperamental and factious. In some cases, its members were so un-focused, and so un-disciplined, that the committee's ability to deliberate succumbed to rhetorical fist fights in local and national media. Incredibly, the commission's chair disparaged "the so-called extraordinary expert" and bragged that the BNHSC's report would be "more efficient and not so controversial" because it did not "get these specialists in."[184] In other instances, he and Small conspired to remove Whitehill from the committee owning to competing viewpoints. Along the way, two members died of causes related to old age, which suggests one way in which this entirely white and privileged commission was not at all representative of the communities which, in some cases, it intended to demolish. All longed for Longfellow's Boston, and all embraced ideas about history and preservation devised during the first half of the twentieth century.

The BNHSC's dysfunction, though perhaps not unique among federal commissions, was nonetheless significant insomuch as it permitted Edwin Small to exercise an extraordinary degree of influence on its work. Without Small, it is unlikely that the BNHSC would have completed any of its work. In the end, it was Small who conducted all the important research, did all the important field work, and wrote all the reports. The problem, of course, is that Small's predominance meant that his historical vision became the BNHSC's historical vision, and Small had crafted his vision during the New Deal years. In other words, although the commission's task was to devise a new plan for Boston, what it really endorsed was a refinement of a plan which had been in the works for nearly two decades. Interestingly, the most dramatic and most immediate result of the BNHSC's efforts was not a new plan for downtown Boston, but rather the establishment of Minute Man NHP, a project in which Small took special interest. Recall, after all, that Small believed the past east of Route 128 had become "irretrievable." Whether or not he realized it, pushing the BNHSC toward an engagement with the Battle Road—rather than contending with downtown—promised special rewards for Small: in 1960, Wirth appointed Edwin Small Superintendent of Minute Man.

Small's leadership also predisposed the BNHSC to endorse key principles of urban renewal which, as we will see, threatened to undermine the NPS's standing in Boston. As we saw, Small cut his teeth on Salem's early encounters with urban renewal and thus came to the BNHSC a

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[183] A cover letter introducing the document indicates that "that the commission properly administered its activities and accounted for the funds under its control." Comptroller General of the United States, "Audit of Boston National Historic Sites Commission," April 1961, Folder Audit of Boston National Historical Sites Commission [1961], Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Federal commissions had drawn increased scrutiny amid budget-minded Cold War congresses. See, for instance, Public Law 92-463, 92nd Congress HR 4383, October 6, 1972, also known as the "Federal Advisory Committee Act." This law authorized the establishment of a system of governing the creation and operation of advisory committees in the executive branch.

[184] Tape-recorded draft of meeting minutes of 15th Meeting, August 13, 1956, Folder BNHSC A2015, Box 1, Northeast Region New England Field Office—Boston, BNHSC 1955–66, National Archives at Boston, Waltham, MA. Note that this collection can be used to substitute for gaps in the Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

proponent of public-private partnership, slum clearance, and the economics of heritage tourism. His position validated a prevailing attitude among the other members that destroying buildings and removing residents was a legitimate way to advance historic preservation. Bortman, for instance, referred to city councilor Garbriel Piermonte as the BNHSC's "number one enemy" with regard to the commission's plans for the North End, noting that he had "already started talking about the outsiders coming and throwing people out of their homes and all of that." Watkins believed that people like Piermonte "lack imagination." "That's what I think too," agreed Small.[185] Tobin's characterization of these strategies as supporting "citizen renewal," sought to downplay the violence done by urban renewal to Boston's various communities. Whitehill, of course, spoke out loudly against demolition, which earned him the approbation of other commission members. What they failed to realize was that advocating for demolition and removal was a surefire way, by 1956, to guarantee resistance, not just from residents, but from state and federal politicians. Indeed, as we will see in chapter three, the BNHSC's failure to understand the politics of its own moment nearly derailed the park's path to authorization.

Finally, picking back through the BNHSC's story complicates the notion, which is common in the NPS today, that the commission set into motion the NPS's first partnership park. It is certainly true that the BNHSC envisioned a national historical park organized around seven cooperative agreements with various historical associations. That said, the model imagined by the BNHSC was not entirely new. On the contrary, the BNHSC was very much focused throughout its deliberations on the model created by Independence National Historical Park in 1948. What's more, the NPS already managed one Boston historic site—Dorchester Heights—in cooperative agreement with the City of Boston. Rather than devise an entirely new partnership template, the BNHSC rather sought to replicate the Dorchester Heights arrangement on a somewhat larger scale than what had been accomplished in Philadelphia. And the proving ground for this model was not in Boston, but rather between Concord and Lexington. Small and the BNHSC quite clearly understood Minute Man as a model for what might be done in the park. It is worth pointing out too that the BNHSC's final report did not specify the scope of cooperative agreements for the park or how they should function, beyond noting that partnership ought to guarantee to the agency right of access to the public portions of the various properties and which none of them could be materially altered without written consent from the secretary of the department of the interior. Whatever partnerships might give form to the park, then, would be the invention of its advisory board and others of the park's first-generation leaders. None of those people would be in place until 1974.

Beyond this however, what is clear is that the BNHSC understood "partnership" to mean a legal relationship between the NPS and a private organization, often with the goal of generating profit by way of heritage tourism or economic redevelopment. In other words, the BNHSC deployed a partnership language borrowed from postwar urban renewal policy, and which imagined national parks as tools for changing urban landscapes. It's a very different notion of partnership than what is common in today's cultural landscape. "Partnership" today more commonly implies cooperation with community stakeholders or programmatic relationships with public nonprofit organizations which, since 1969, have been legally required to serve their var-

[185] Tape-recorded draft of meeting minutes of 17th meeting, October 15, 1956, Folder BNHSC A2015, Box 1, Northeast Region New England Field Office-Boston, BNHSC 1955–66, National Archives at Boston, Waltham, MA.

ious publics.[186] The park's would-be partners were not bound by any obligation, for instance, to require cultural diversity among board membership or to otherwise guarantee a commitment to serving all Bostonians. In that sense, then, the BNHSC definitely did not envision a modern partnership park. As we will see, however, the park's first stewards did and their efforts would be responsible for bringing the park into conversation with people for whom Longfellow's Boston was just one part of a much more complex past.

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[186] For an overview of nonprofit corporations and their function, see Paul Arnsberger, Melissa Ludlum, Margaret Riley, and Mark Stanton, "A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective," Statistics of Income Bulletin (Winter 2008).

Chapter Three

Old History in a New Town, 1960-1974

The Advisory Board on National Parks convened at Michigan's Isle Royale National Park for its 1960 annual meeting. Far though it was from the hubbub of city streets, the board couldn't help but ponder the National Park Service's recent investments in urban places. Regional Director Ronald F. Lee reported on projects in Philadelphia, New York, and of course, Boston, as each related to the nation's rising tide of urban renewal. "Historical preservation," he explained, "is influencing redevelopment." In Philadelphia, he pointed out, the Society Hill renewal project dovetailed perfectly with the agency's work at Independence Hall, thanks in large part to Charles Peterson's "very prominent" role in making the Historic American Buildings Survey (HABS) "a part of a [sic] rehabilitation of the City." Urban renewal projects in lower Manhattan, he added, created opportunities to raise matching funds for the expansion of Castle Clinton, Federal Hall, and the Statue of Liberty. "It is amazing to see how some people respond to urban historic monuments who have never seen a wilderness park." Similar possibilities awaited in Boston, he added, particularly "as a result of what happened in Philadelphia."[187]

Lee confirmed in so many words what we discovered in chapter two, that the BNHSC had not so much imagined a new path for Boston as it had demonstrated how the Philadelphia example might be applied there, and how urban renewal pointed the way. What's not so clear, however, is whether—as Lee supposed—the Agency's preservation ethos influenced redevelopment in Boston as it so clearly had in Philadelphia. Remarkably, of the thousands of pages of meeting minutes produced by the BNHSC, not one mentions the Freedom Trail by name. It is a remarkable omission made even more so by the fact that the BNHSC's chair had himself been a leading proponent of the Freedom Trail.[188] It seems that the BNHSC, though deeply embedded within urban renewal, conceived of its work as reactive rather than proactive with regard to setting an agenda for renewal. The lone dissenter, of course, was Walter Muir Whitehill, who encouraged the BNHSC to take a much stronger hand in shaping Boston's new urban landscape. Although Whitehill failed to activate the commission, he did win the ear of someone with real power to advance preservation in Boston: hired-gun city planner Ed Logue. As we will see in this chapter, Whitehill convinced Logue—in whose papers, incidentally, the NPS is barely a footnote—to create his own historic sites commission with a visionary young staff of planners, including women, and a much broader sense of historical significance than what Small and others in the NPS had advocated for in Boston.

The agency's aloofness from Ed Logue during the 1960s raises an important question: how exactly did NPS planners translate the BNHSC's proposal into a full-blown national historical park if not in conversation with the man who, during those years, owned the future of Boston's heritage landscape? Stated otherwise, how exactly did the park's 1974 enabling legislation get made, and by whom? This chapter seeks answers by considering the park's formative legisla-

[187] Summary Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments, Isle Royale National Park, Michigan, September 17–22, 1960, 18–19, Advisory Board Files, National Register, History and Education (NRHE), NPS Washington.

[188] Bortman had served as chair of the Chamber's Committee on Historical Places.

tive history alongside remarkable changes in Boston's political and physical landscape during the years between 1960 and 1974, as well as major shifts in NPS priorities and organization. In particular, the possibility of including the Charlestown Navy Yard within the park's boundaries, alongside significant political pressure to do so before Boston's 1975 Bicentennial celebration, put the NPS in the remarkable position of opposing legislation to authorize a park it had been planning for over two decades. Indeed, as we will see, these tumultuous "pre-park" years—a useful sobriquet which appears in the park's archival collections—created a new unit whose commitment to revolutionary memory collided with other revolutions everywhere underway in modern Boston.

New Plans for a New Boston

In chapter one we explored some of the broad changes affecting the United States after World War II, and particularly those which sent heritage tourists hurtling toward Boston in unprecedented numbers. We learned too that the postwar promise of prosperity arrived unevenly, and disastrously in some cases, especially for Americans such as those who settled in Boston's West End before 1953 but who were later swept away by renewal programs devised to lure whiter and wealthier people back from the suburbs. Neither the Freedom Trail nor the national parks imagined by the BNHSC had been conceived of in conversation with the people renewal sought to remove, and thus public history-making in Boston during those years itself amounted to a kind of removal wherein anything but Longfellow's Revolution constituted an obstacle. The BNHSC, for instance, encouraged figurative removal—such as by ignoring pasts outside a narrow period of significance—and actual removal of real people, such as those living in Revere Square or those who sold meat and produce in Faneuil Hall. Much of this historical vision reflected the so-called consensus history promulgated by popular postwar American historians, such as Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Boorstin, who sought to identify a collective American experience amid the fears and anxieties of the Cold War years. Their version of collective experience, however, excluded many Americans, and many in Boston who—as we will see—were determined to refute it.

What is most stunning about the first phase of urban renewal in Boston, however, is how completely it seemed to have failed by 1959. Renewal projects then in progress—the West End especially—seemed only to create more problems. Virtually no progress had been made toward developing a new Government Center, which Mayor Hynes hoped would be a jewel in his crown. The cost of renewal had plunged Massachusetts deeper into debt, even as state legislators refused to approve a state sales tax. Work on the new Prudential Insurance building in Boston's Back Bay had stalled, as had work on a proposed convention center downtown. Jobs were down, property taxes were up, a hundred thousand people had moved out over the decade, and the city's bond rating tanked in 1959.[189] Nationally, too, the glint of postwar optimism no longer seemed so bright. The so-called Eisenhower Recession of 1958, for instance, showed that American economic growth might not be completely unfettered. Also, despite the comforts of consensus history, shared American values seemed not to be fairing so well in the war against communism, wherein the United States suffered decided failures in Korea, Cuba, and amid the degradations of Senator Joseph McCarthy's domestic terror campaign. Civil rights activists had made major strides by 1959 on behalf of African Americans, but not without enduring tragic violence which would only intensify in the years ahead.

[189] See overview in O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 139–49.

In 1959, Bostonians elected a new, and new kind of, mayor: John Collins. Collins believed in the big consensus vision of a mighty postwar United States. He had been a fierce cold warrior in the state Senate before being struck down by debilitating disease. During his convalescence, Collins studied history and urban planning, and then returned to politics in a surprisingly successful bid for mayor. Collins ran as a Republican against the Democrat John Powers, positioning himself as the anti-corruption pick and a more devoted friend to business than Hynes had been. What's more, Collins sought to create citizens' community councils and new outdoor recreational opportunities, all toward making government more responsive to community needs.[190] Most significantly, for our purposes, Collins recommitted Boston to urban renewal, but this time with a real plan for success. Going forward, Collins announced, all city planning functions would be centralized in the office of one man: Edward J. Logue. Logue had earned a reputation for his role in reshaping New Haven, CT, where he attracted substantial federal funding. Collins hoped that by making a significant investment in Logue—including by paying him more than even Collins earned—Boston might finally get the federal support it needed, and the new cityscape Collins wanted.[191]

Logue's arrival in Boston in 1960, though perhaps not evident at the time, radically shifted the terms by which planners within and beyond the NPS would have to conceive of a national historic park in Boston. [192] Bostonians first glimpsed Logue's plans in September 1960 when the office of Mayor John Collins released its ninety-million-dollar development program for the city. Logue envisioned an aggressive and wide-reaching program across ten renewal areas, six improvement areas, and three distinct planning areas in downtown alone. The program would be administered by a reorganized and "semiautonomous" BRA—now overseeing planning and renewal—with Logue at the helm. Rehabilitation, not clearance, would be a priority, though Logue warned that fighting blight would inevitably require the clearing of particularly challenged blocks, especially downtown.[193] Importantly, Logue's plan foregrounded community partnerships. Mayor Collins noted that "the whole emphasis on this rebuilding program is on neighborhoods [which will] have key partnership role in the preparation and carrying out of renewal plans. I would call it planning with [sic] people instead of planning for people."[194]

Logue's proposal made clear too, however, that planning with business would also be a priority, particularly with regard to the Atlantic Avenue waterfront area. And doing business with business in Boston meant working with the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. As we saw in chapter one, the Chamber of Commerce exercised considerable influence on matters of

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[190] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 163.

[191] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 173.

[192] See Cohen Saving America's Cities:. For a review of Logue and second-phase renewal, see Cohen, "Liberalism in the Postwar City," 140; Mark Byrnes, "Don't Forget About Ed Logue," CityLab, https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/03/dont-forget-about-ed-logue/519615 (accessed April 22, 2019); and, Cohen, "Buying into Downtown Revival: The Centrality of Retail to Postwar Urban Renewal in American Cities," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science v. 611, The Politics of Consumption/The Consumption of Politics (May 2007): 82–95. On Collins and the Government Center, see Alejandra Dean, "Notes from the Archives: Urban Renewal and Government Center," City of Boston Blog, https://www.boston.gov/news/notes-archives-urban-renewal-and-government-center (accessed April 22, 2019). O'Connor addresses Logue in Building a New Boston, 173–7, and the Government Center and matters of historic preservation throughout chapter seven.

[193] "The 90 Million Dollar Development Program for Boston," reprinted from The City Record (Boston city government newsletter) September 24, 1960, 1. In Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT.

[194] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 2.

heritage tourism in postwar Boston, particularly through its sponsorship of the Freedom Trail. Logue's evident fondness for the Chamber promised to extend that influence. "Boston is fortunate," he explained "in having a vigorous Chamber with a far deeper and more practical understanding of urban renewal than is usually the case." And it was the Chamber, he noted, which "was among the first to propose redevelopment of the waterfront area… the city should make clear that it will cooperate in every way."[195] Within months the Chamber had enlisted Logue in building "a close federation of the civic-business agencies in urban renewal… the Chamber, Beacon and the North Station Merchants. Sooner or later the Retail Trade Board will arrive, and there will be others." "Eventually," the Chamber proposed, "it might become our local "Old Philadelphia Development Corporation.""[196]

Beyond demonstrating once again how formative Philadelphia's example was in shaping Boston's heritage landscape—the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation had been responsible for creating Society Hill—this exchange demonstrates that, despite the BNHSC's work to imagine a federal role in managing Boston's historic resources, heritage matters there remained a local affair ensconced within private enterprise. Nobody associated with the NPS appears to have reached out to Logue's team until at least spring 1961. By then, however, Logue's notion of heritage tourism had already taken form. His 1960 proposal already demonstrated that influence in its homage to the Freedom Trail. Logue made the case for renewal in part by urging Bostonians to take walking tours. On one of his proposed tours, "you will see lovely squares, a beautiful cathedral, the city's first redevelopment project, the big department stores, Old South Meeting House and Faneuil Hall. You also will see some of the worst slums in the city plus enough shabby run-down commercial buildings to make you uncomfortable about the future of downtown." "If these walks discourage you," he added, "try the Freedom Trail. The obstacles today are far less than those which were faced and conquered long ago."[197]

The BNHSC had been aware of pending changes in Boston's landscape since the beginning. In September 1956, for instance, Small reported meeting with the Boston City Planning Board regarding its early plans for a new Government Center. As conceived, the project would destroy the Hancock-Marshall House, the Union Oyster House, and the Boston Stone. Small promised to monitor the situation, noting that "if the commission was interested in other periods [beyond the Revolutionary era], it would be a very serious manner."[198] Within the year, it became clear to the BNHSC that the City Planning Board and its "parochial attitude"—as Small put it—did not share its concern with historic landscapes.[199] Whitehill urged the commission to publicize its

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[195] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 7.

[196] Daniel J. Ahern, Manager, Urban Development Department, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, to Edward J. Logue, February 27, 1961, Folder 706, BRA Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce 1961, 1964, Box 169, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[197] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 5.

[198] Summary of minutes of 16th meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec. 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[199] For correspondence detailing response by NPS staff, including park planner Andrew Feil, to Boston's proposed Government Center, see Folder IV Projects and Recommended Sites, e. Boston Government Center, Box 2, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

differences with the planning board toward generating public support.[200] Lee wondered aloud whether Massachusetts's recent Historic Districts Legislation might empower a city to establish its own historic district. Small explained that "just such a bill was killed the previous week." In Whitehill's opinion, the problem was that preservation for so long had been considered a private enterprise in Boston that the city did not perceive a mandate to intervene. "The commission," he insisted, "had power to change that." Chief of NPS Regional Planning Andrew G. Feil, Jr., who attended the commission's August 1957 meeting, assured that the commission would not change anything unless it recommended a clear process. "It is not effective enough to say," he insisted, "that such and such a building should be preserved—the most important thing is to recommend how it should be done."[201]

By spring 1959, however, the commission seems to have resolved that nothing could be done about the city's planning efforts. Small wrote to Tobin that April with word that plans were in process for the new Government Center in old Scollay Square, right next to Faneuil Hall, though "any recommendations the commission might [make] prior to adoption of a definite plan would, indeed, be premature." Small noted too that the BNHSC "has been in touch continually over the last few months" with the planning firm of Adams, Howard, and Greeley, which had been retained to develop plans for the Government Center. "It goes almost without saying," Small intimated, "that any schemes that have thus far come off the draft tables will be in for hard sledding."[202] And, yet, as we saw in chapter two, Small's prediction that the Faneuil Hall meat vendors would do better to move to Quincy Market suggest he had a broader sense of what was coming.

Interestingly, what was coming appeared to include Logue's abiding concern with Boston's historic landscapes. "Its abundance of historic sites," he wrote, "offers islands of strength around which rebuilding can confidently begin."[203] And yet, what Logue meant by "historic" was not entirely clear. He announced, for instance, that he would indeed go ahead with the city's Government Center plan, but with more planning for its "fringe areas," including Faneuil Hall and the Quincy Market, which "are in daily use for their original purposes." Logue's declaration that "this is living history at its best," plunged him directly into the meat market debates which had roiled the BNHSC during the previous year. "Scornful as the purists may be of Sturbridge or Williamsburg, they help make history come alive for young and old alike. A restoration of old Boston in this area would be quite appropriate despite the shadow of the Central Artery."[204] Would Logue's vision, as Bortman hoped, sanitize the past toward enticing out-of-town tourists? Or would it, as Whitehill hoped, preserve the charm and traditions of Boston's historic streets and buildings?

Of course Logue's Government Center project was just one of several which would affect portions of the city of immediate concern to the BNHSC. In the North End, which "has a flavor and a way of life which should be preserved," Logue assured that clearance would be an "outrage." Rehabilitation would be key in the North End, and to achieve it Logue encouraged the city to work with "a broadly based and representative North End neighborhood improvement

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[200] Summary of 27th meeting, August 16, 1957, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec.1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[201] Summary of 27th meeting, August 16, 1957, Folder 7, Meeting Minutes July–Dec.1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[202] Small to Tobin, April 21, 1959, Folder 5 Admin Docs Mar 1958-June 1959, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[203] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 6.

[204] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 7.

committee."[205] Along the Atlantic Avenue waterfront, including in those portions around Long Wharf just east of Faneuil Hall, Logue anticipated working with the Chamber of Commerce to once again open "Boston's window on the world." "Who would ever believe," he added," that an ancient harborfront warehouse could be converted into apartments so attractive as to enjoy a long waiting list?" Similarly, in Boston's downtown, Logue proposed "making the retail core more attractive" by working with the Retail Trade Board, but also by "separating vehicular and pedestrian traffic as much as possible." And though the BNHSC couldn't have known it in 1960, Logue's concern with Charlestown would have considerable influence on the establishment of a national park which would ultimately span the Charles River. "Much more can and should be made of Charlestown's historic past," he argued, and the key to doing it would be working with "a representative group of Charlestown residents."[206]

Logue's 1960 proposal for urban renewal in Boston is remarkable for what it reveals about the trajectory of postwar planning. It makes clear that Logue, having learned from the examples of New York, Philadelphia, and his own work in New Haven, had in mind a distinctive set of priorities for renewal in Boston, including private-public partnership, a heritage consumer landscape, and community-led planning. They were the very same priorities, in fact, which the NPS seems to have had in mind with regard to its aspirations for a national park in Boston. As we saw in chapter two, regional officers—especially Regional Director Daniel Tobin—encouraged the BNHSC to think in these terms, as had been done in Philadelphia, rather than to simply pick and choose properties worthy of preservation. And yet, although the BNHSC's final report nodded toward partnership, it stopped short of recommending a process by which the agency might build a coalition of heritage interests throughout Boston. As Whitehill suggested back in 1957, the BNHSC had the power to change attitudes, to convince Bostonians that preservation ought not be left to private interests alone. It failed to do that, however, and in doing so, missed a vital opportunity to assert a role for the NPS in Boston at a crucial moment.

The BRA Historic Conservation Committee

The BNHSC's mixed legacy is remarkable insomuch as its failures prompted a flurry of advocacy which ultimately did achieve a public role for preservation in Boston, though not at all in the way that Tobin or Small seem to have expected. Credit for bringing all Boston's various heritage stakeholders—including the NPS—to the same table goes to Walter Muir Whitehill. Whitehill's experience on the BNHSC seems to have galvanized his concern to articulate a much broader vision of Boston's heritage landscape than what his co-commissioners had in mind. We've already seen, in his standoff with Bortman over the Faneuil Hall meat markets, a concern for historical continuity, and a disregard for crass profiteering. Whitehill also took issue with the NPS's periodization. Although the BNHSC "drew up an admirable inventory of historic sites of the Colonial and Revolutionary period," he wrote, "there has been no formal or systematic policy in regard to the preservation of buildings of the late eighteenth, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Boston."[207] And, finally, Whitehill—unlike almost everyone else involved in the park's genesis story—did not perceive the Philadelphia model as ideal. Rather, he hoped that

[205] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 7.

[206] 90 Million Dollar Development Program, 9.

[207] Draft letter written by Whitehill intended for mayor to send to prospective committee members, sometime in 1961. Folder 726, BRA Historic Conservation Committee, 1961–66, Box 171, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

Boston's renewal plans "will avoid the incongruities that have occurred in the center of Philadelphia where, through too much demolition, a sense of scale has been lost." "Buildings that should not be seen together," he explained, "have been brought together unnecessarily."[208]

With these concerns in mind, Whitehill set out early on to influence Logue's preservation sensibilities. Whitehill first engaged Logue on matters of preservation with regard to the Old Corner Bookstore. The 1713 holdout at the corner of Washington and School Streets ranked among the few colonial structures which the BNHSC reported on as having little to no likelihood of survival despite its significance. Early renewal plans targeted the site for a parking lot. Whitehill organized a grass roots campaign to save the building and in 1960, before the BNHSC even finalized its report, had managed—with the help of Beacon Hill Architectural Commission Chair John Codman—to establish the nonprofit Historic Boston, Inc. for the purpose of raising funds to purchase and protect the building.[209] Historic Boston's concern with Logue's renewal areas seem to have put one another within each other's orbits and, by late 1960, the developer and the preservationist had established a rapport. Whitehill saw in it an opportunity to make his case for historically-minded, minimally invasive renewal. That November, for instance, he shared a New York Times opinion piece with Logue wherein the author warned that ill-conceived renewal in Greenwich Village recalled the "piles of rubble" on view throughout postwar Berlin.[210] Logue returned thanks, congratulated Whitehill on Historic Boston's success, and promised to keep him abreast of the mayor's preservation concerns.[211]

He would more than make good on that promise within the year. Pressures mounted quickly on Logue to think about heritage concerns. In addition to the Chamber of Commerce, which by 1961 was urging Logue to create a version of the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation for Boston, and Whitehill himself, who had taken to writing Logue about rumors of demolition around Boston, other organizations too pressed Logue for insight into the future of the past.[212] The Mayor's Committee on North End Rehabilitation and Conservation, for instance, sought input from Logue, noting its concern with the future of the Freedom Trail.[213] The newly formed Council of the Freedom Trail, a coalition of organizations who managed historic properties along the trail, asked Logue to join its meetings. He demurred, though noted his interest "in the work

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[208] Whitehill to Charles A. Coolidge, President, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, January 13, 1961, Folder Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce Tourist Committee 1961–62, Box 9, Walter Muir Whitehill Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

[209] Whitehill discussed his role in this story in a talk titled "Neglected Assets" delivered at the fourth Citizens Seminar on the Fiscal, Economic, and Political Problems of Boston and the Metropolitan Community, Boston College, February 26, 1963, Folder Historic Sites Committee, Box 148, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA. Joe Harrington, "Both the Old and New," Boston Morning Globe, December 28, 1961. Historic Boston Incorporated continues its preservation advocacy today. See "Our Mission" at http://historicboston.org/about/ (accessed April 22, 2019).

[210] John Crosby, "Cities Are for People," New York Times, November 17, 1960.

[211] Logue to Whitehill, November 22, 1960, Folder 459, BRA Correspondence—Personal, Whitehill, Walter Muir 1960–61, Box 151, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[212] Whitehill wrote Logue, for instance, about rumors that the Charlestown burial ground was identified for removal. Whitehall to Logue, February 9, 1961, Folder 459, BRA Correspondence—Personal, Whitehill, Walter Muir 1960–61, Box 151, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[213] Frank L. Harvey, Chair of the Mayor's Committee on North End Rehabilitation and Conservation, to Logue, January 9, 1961, Folder 970, North End 1960–66, Box 190, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

that you are doing and [I] appreciate the invitation."[214] By the end of the year, however, Logue had devised a formal response. He'd sponsor a study of Boston's historic sites and he'd form a mayor's committee on cultural and historic matters to advise on questions of preservation and renewal. The person he'd pick to lead it all: Walter Muir Whitehill.

At Logue's prompting, Mayor Collins constituted a historic sites committee under Whitehill's direction, which met for the first time on November 29, 1961. The committee's responsibilities included surveying Boston's historic sites, compiling a citywide inventory, and guiding the BRA away from demolishing sites of particular significance amid its renewal activities.[215] Unlike the BNHSC, which shunted all its fieldwork onto Edwin Small, the BRA's historic sites committee seems to have relished its time exploring Boston's historic landscape. A commission newsletter reported on seeing Whitehill gleefully driving his survey team around town in a "Volkswagen bus." Its assumptions about how and why preservation should be done were different too. Consider, for instance, the committee's call for proposals for a team to survey Charlestown. BRA Project Planning Officer John Stainton attached a cover note explaining that "it rests on the basic assumption that much of the actual process of rehabilitation will be done by the people of Charlestown who in many cases have limited means and will have to carry the work on over an extended period. Thus one end product will be a guide for residents in rehabilitating their property." [216] Interestingly, the committee's Charlestown study team ultimately resolved that Charlestown should be allowed to gentrify "organically" like Society Hill in Philadelphia.[217]

Whitehill's committee then, from the beginning, conceived of preservation as a community activity. The committee also sought advice from leading professionals, including the NPS. Its first meeting included Edwin Small, and HABS founder Charles Peterson. It also included Mark Bortman and Ed Logue. Indeed, Whitehill set out to involve a broad coalition of public and private interests in his committee, with nearly forty members in attendance at the first meeting. At the same meeting, Whitehill showcased Peterson's work and spoke at length about involving HABS in Boston. For his part, Peterson discussed the work of the Philadelphia Historical Commission, which "has the power to defer the razing or removal of any building of historical interest."[218] Once again, Philadelphia models loomed large in Boston's nascent preservation policy.

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[214] Barett Williams, Secretary of the Bostonian Society and representative of the Council of the Freedom Trail, to Logue, April 29, 1960; and, Logue to Williams, May 6, 1960, Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[215] The Committee's BRA contact was W.J. Gurney. See April 4, 1962 commission newsletter, Folder Historic Sites Committee, Box 148, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

[216] "Draft Proposal for Professional Services to Carry out an Inventory and Analysis of the Rehabilitation Potential of the Historic Buildings and Areas with the Charlestown Urban Renewal Project," which includes cover note by John Stainton, Project Planning Officer, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Folder "Architectural and Topographic Survey of Charlestown, Mass 1962," Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[217] Boston Historical Conservation Committee Survey team included J. Daniel Selig and Robert H. Nylander; Abbott Lowell Cummings advised. Folder "Architectural and Topographic Survey of Charlestown, Mass 1962," Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[218] Minutes of the Boston Historical Conservation Committee, December 14, 1961, Box 171, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

What is so striking about Logue's approach to the problem of preservation in Boston, vis-à-vis Whitehill, is how much it resembled the BNHSC's own charge. And yet, significant differences reveal very different visions and priorities. Most immediately, Logue imposed no chronological limits on his committee. His concern was with the past, not just the revolutionary past. What's more, primary responsibility for coordinating the committee and conducting the preliminary study of historic sites fell to Gladys Lyons, a young planner new to Logue's team.[219] Lyon's fresh perspective contrasted with the BNHSC's membership, among whom the youngest was fifty-year old Edwin Small. It is important to note, too, that though Louise Crowninshield's role on the BNHSC was certainly important, men predominated throughout its deliberations. Not surprisingly, Lyon's preliminary survey of historic sites in the Government Center development area charted very different territory than had the BNHSC. "Other than isolated landmarks of Boston's early period," she wrote, "there is precious little left of the 17th or even 18th century, but there is still valuable evidence of the past 100 years in the Downtown area."[220] Whereas the BNHSC had sought to discover traces of Longfellow's fabled Boston, the BRA preferred a more direct encounter with the city's actual historic landscape.

And, from the outset, its approach was demonstrably more collaborative than the BNHSC's. By February 1961, Lyons had assembled a preliminary council on historic sites and coordinated meetings with I.M. Pei's architectural team and various BRA officers.[221] Later that spring, she initiated what appears to be the first official exchange between Logue's team and the NPS by writing to Edwin Small for insight regarding the BNHSC's findings regarding the Government Center area.[222] The specific reason for her letter concerned the "frightening possibility of 15–27 Union Street being demolished… for a parking lot." Small explained that the BNHSC had considered recommending that the whole block be acquired by the NPS, but after meeting with the deputy mayor in January 1960, decided that the area ought rather be designated a historic district.[223] Small noted that the 1959 Adams, Howard, and Greeley plan for the Government Center proposed a historic district encompassing the Faneuil Hall area—more or less identical to the area identified by the BNHSC—and suggested that the BRA request city council to expand it. "Without these controls," he warned, "downtown Boston is not going to become what is hoped for under the prospects that are promised through urban redevelopment and renewal."

[219] Details concerning the committee's early manifestations appear in Daniel J Ahern to Logue, November 3, 1960; and Donald M. Graham, Planning Administrator, to Logue, February 24, 1961, Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[220] Gladys Lyons, "Preliminary Report on Buildings Architecturally and/or Historically Significant Within Boston's Downtown North GNRP, with Special Attention to the Proposed Government Center Area," n.d., Folder 610, BRA Government Center, Box 162, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[221] At this early point, Richard W. Hale, Jr., who was appointed Archivist of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that year, led the committee. Donald M. Graham, Planning Administrator, to Logue, February 24, 1961, Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[222] The exchange is described in memo from Lyons to Logue regarding the Union-Marshall Streets Area, May 18, 1961, Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

[223] Small references Chapter 40C of the Laws of the Commonwealth. Small to Gladys P. Lyons, Principal Planner, BRA, May 16, 1961, Folder 610, BRA Government Center, Box 162, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

Lyon's exchange with Small, beyond demonstrating her concern to engage an array of stakeholders, reveals how much distance had separated local and federal preservation interests before 1961. In another instance, BRA planners were stunned to discover so much resistance to plans to demolish a row of early nineteenth-century commercial buildings designed by David Sears. The demolition, after all, had been proposed in the same 1959 Government Center plan which Small referred to as critical to the BNHSC's work. As Whitehill explained in a meeting, however, Boston's "historical people did not raise a ruckus about the Adams, Howard, and Greeley plan [because it] was never widely distributed or publicized."[224] The BNHSC had done its work largely in isolation from Boston's local preservation community, only loosely in conversation with the mayor's office, and barely at all in conversation with actual heritage tourists. Incredibly, as late as 1962, the BRA's Director of Administrative Management sent a copy of the BNHSC's report to his assistant with a hasty handwritten note: "What gives on this? Has city consented to this idea?"[225] The BNHSC and its report had already become, by 1962, a vague and distant memory.

Historical preservation was certainly "influencing redevelopment" in Boston, as regional director Ronald F. Lee supposed at the advisory board's 1960 meeting, but by the early 1960s at least, that influence was not coming from the BNHSC and it was not coming from the NPS. It was coming, rather, from Walter Muir Whitehill. Indeed, during 1960–61, newspaper headlines revealed widespread fears that Ed Logue would turn Boston into a "small Williamsburg."[226] It was Whitehill who pushed hard against Logue to avoid fixing Boston's heritage landscape in time, but rather to preserve its historic buildings by repurposing them for commercial purposes. It was Whitehill too who encouraged Logue to adopt a much broader model of collaborative partnership than the BNHSC had envisioned, and to remain focused on how postwar communities might experience the past in their neighborhoods. And it was Whitehill who pushed beyond revolutionary memory to encourage a much more capacious regard for the full sweep of Boston's past.

An Agency Transformed

Concerted efforts to create a national historical park for Boston began in 1951. But even a decade later the project was only just getting its feet. Conversely, Congress had authorized Philadelphia's Independence National Historical Park in 1948, only six years after Judge Edwin O.

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224 Martin Adler to Logue, May 17, 1961, regarding the meeting with Whitehill at the Boston Athenaeum, May 16, 1961, Folder 610, BRA Government Center, Box 162, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. Lyons' concern with the confusion over preservation strategies peaked in June 1961 when the risks of indecision became powerfully evident. That month, the historic Old Howard theater was inexplicably demolished just as a grass roots preservation committee had formed to save it. See O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 199–200. Its destruction, along with a suspicious fire in the Bulfinch Home, prompted Lyons to plead with the BRA's Director of Administrative Management to do something to encourage protection of Boston's historic sites. Lyon's memo activated Logue, who initiated the second part of his plan to monitor heritage matters. See Lyons to John P. McMorrow, June 20, 1961, and Logue to McMorrow, June 23, 1961, Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

225 William J. Gurney, Research Analysist, to John P. McMorrow, Director of Administrative Management, 1962 (day and month omitted), regarding the Boston National Historic Commission Report (McMorrow's note is attached), Folder 723, BRA Historic Sites 1960–61, Box 170, Series VI, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

226 "Small Williamsburg Envisioned to Help Hub Keep Individuality," Boston Traveler, March 9, 1961. Many more examples included in scrapbooks, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

Lewis organized the Independence Hall Association to make the case. What was the problem in Boston? Why couldn't the NPS, unhindered by war and with the support of a federal commission, advance the cause of a park which it had been informally planning since the New Deal? As we have seen, some of the difficulty owed to the particularities of Boston's mnemonic landscape and its deeply rooted and very private heritage infrastructure. The NPS sought to extend its influence through the BNHSC, but understanding the needs of its would-be partners in Boston, earning their trust, and understanding local Boston politics would require considerably more street-level investment. It appears that the NPS could not fully grapple with the extent to which 1950s Bostonians had already set into motion—through first-phase renewal, including the Freedom Trail—their own version of a profit-driven heritage landscape.

The NPS was caught up during those years in its own changes, transformations which simultaneously increased and complicated its prospects for success in Boston. In fact, even as John McCormack first called for a commission to investigate the possibility of a park in Boston, the NPS appeared to be on the ropes. It had survived the war years by trimming operations, accommodating federal demands for wartime harvesting of natural resources, and otherwise defending itself by insisting on the patriotic value of a NPS.[227] Postwar spikes in visitation, however, outpaced funding levels and wreaked havoc throughout the system. Bernard DeVoto famously demanded in 1953 that Congress shutter the parks, lest they be used up for good. It fell to Conrad Wirth, appointed Director of the NPS in 1951, to contend with the agency's problems. It was Wirth, for instance, who led a major reorganization of the NPS in 1954 which added the entirely new Division of Interpretation headed by former chief historian, and Small's old boss and close friend, Ronald Lee. The new division signaled Wirth's concern to educate and entertain a new generation of visitors. But it also promised to link the NPS directly with urban renewal, a direction Lee had previously pushed toward taking advantage of preservation opportunities in St. Louis and Philadelphia.[228] And it was Wirth, most famously, who convinced Congress to invest nearly a billion dollars into Mission 66, an agency-wide modernization campaign. Mission 66, which promised to update and expand operations in time for the agency's 1966 fiftieth anniversary, thus formed the institutional backdrop for the NPS's work in Boston.

And, yet, the Boston project was not entirely of Mission 66. The process of creating the BNHSC, for instance, began before Mission 66, and the commission received its funding directly from Congress, not from Mission 66 monies. That said, Mission 66 funding did reactivate the National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings, which in turn provided support through the Boston field office to assist with Small's work on behalf of the BNHSC. Charles Peterson's entry into the park's story in 1961, by way of his involvement with Whitehill's committee, signaled the arrival of Mission 66 influence. And, of course, Lee's influence from the beginning of conversations about Boston ensured a strong willingness there to bring preservation into conversation with urban renewal. The BNHSC's membership, however, did not fully reflect the forward-looking sensibilities of Wirth's Mission 66 vision, nor was it capable of imagining the scale of public engagement and organizational change which the new director sought to explore in his new agency. The park was thus caught up in a transitional moment, wherein old and new ideas about park planning collided, leaving nobody in the NPS quite sure how to implement the BNHSC's recommendations.

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[227] For an overview of the agency's wartime survival strategies, see Janet A. McDonnell, "World War II: Defending Park Values and Resources," The Public Historian 29, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 15–33.

[228] Ethan Carr, Mission 66: Modernism and the National Park Dilemma (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press in association with Library of American Landscape History, 2007), 177–84.

This, then, was the setting against which, on March 20, 1962, US Representative and former BNHSC member Thomas Phillip "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., representing what was then Boston's eleventh district, introduced H.R. 10836 into the second session of the 87th Congress.[229] The bill, which O'Neill hoped would permit authorization of a new park unit as proposed in the BNHSC's report, died almost immediately. The busy House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs couldn't manage to schedule hearings and, even if it had, the secretary of the interior had not yet reported on the bill. Nonetheless, looking back today at the bill is instructive insomuch as it reveals how readily Bostonians would have perceived it as akin to first-phase renewal strategies, particularly after the arrival of Ed Logue. Beyond simply identifying properties which the government would accept by donation—the Old State House and the Shirley-Eustis House—H.R. 10836 authorized the federal government to acquire, by purchase or donation, land surrounding the Paul Revere House, Old North Church, and the Shirley-Eustis House. Once it had, and as soon as cooperative agreements could be worked out with relevant stakeholders, the secretary of the interior could establish the so-called "Boston National Historic Sites," which would include the acquired properties along with Faneuil Hall, Dorchester Heights, and Bunker Hill. Each site would be designated a national historic site if not already so-designated. And the entire unit would be overseen by a five-member Boston National Historic Sites Advisory Board, including the president of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and various appointees selected by the secretary, the governor, and the mayor, for a period of ten years.[230]

It is remarkable in retrospect that O'Neill would not have expected resistance to his bill, as proposed, given its authorization of federal land acquisition. In the North End, for instance, as we saw in chapter two, city councilor Garbriel Piermonte had already made clear his disdain for land grabs associated with renewal. And yet, neither O'Neill nor the NPS seemed at all worried. On the contrary, when O'Neill reintroduced the bill a year later as H.R. 392, Regional Director Tobin anticipated "no major conflicts… from the acquisition for development and renewal purposes of certain privately held commercial and residential properties."[231] Indeed, regional officers noted on a draft of the previous year's bill their interest in requesting even more authority to purchase land for office and administrative buildings.[232] However, advisers to John F. Collins saw in the bill an opportunity for the mayor to earn political capital by opposing federal land grabs in north Boston. The bill, they estimated, would displace over ninety families, three stores, and a "very active bakery" near Old North Church and North Square. "The interesting thing about this bill is that… nobody seems to be very strongly in favor of it." "One member of the com-

[229] The eleventh district became the eighth district in 1963.

[230] US Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites and for Other Purposes, H.R. 10836, 87th Cong. (1962), BNHP Archives, box 1, Folder: Early Legislation 1962, 1963, 1965, 1974.

[231] Regional Director Tobin to Director, NPS, April 1, 1963, Folder Preliminaries, Memoranda from 1960s, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. A Bill to Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; and for Other Purposes, H.R. 392, 88th Cong. (1963).

[232] US Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites and for Other Purposes, H.R. 10836, 87th Cong. (1962).

mission," the report continued, "had no knowledge of the implications [that families would be dispossessed] of the bill." North Bostonians, it seemed, "believe that the Boston Redevelopment Authority is responsible," and even the BRA "is not in favor of this Bill." The advice to Collins was clear: here was "a splendid opportunity for the mayor to take a strong and active position as a defender of the people of the North End." Doing so "would demonstrate his concern for people's homes" and offset "some of the negative publicity which has been stirred up against them in Roxbury and Charlestown."[233]

The advice to Collins demonstrates what should have been clear from the beginning: the proposal to create a national park in Boston was, in both perception and actuality, deeply entwined within urban renewal efforts there, and advanced precisely the sort of clearance agenda which Logue had worked so hard to ward against. Although the agency's language put clearance into different terms—the regional director conceived of it as purchasing "46 parcels over 2.16 acres" rather than evicting over ninety families—it was well aware that the development of Old North Church National Historic Site, for instance, "is further tied into a proposal by the city to enlarge the Paul Revere Mall."[234] As we witnessed at the outset of this chapter, however, it was precisely this relationship between park development, preservation, and urban renewal which the NPS sought to encourage during the Mission 66 years, and which the secretary of the interior readily endorsed in the case of Boston. By the end of May 1964, Interior had reported favorably on H.R. 392, estimating that $500,000 would be required for land purchases, $5 million for a visitor center and parking facilities, and $475,000 annually for management costs.[235] When the Advisory Board on National Parks finally endorsed the proposal and voiced support for O'Neill's bill at its October 1964 meeting, it justified the plans by noting the "urgent need to preserve for the present and future generations of Americans the outstanding portions of the nation's historical heritage situated in Boston and its environs and because of the transcendent importance of the historical values represented by these seven sites."[236]

As Collins' advisers anticipated, however, not everyone was convinced. Senator Edward M. Kennedy's office, which had not yet become involved in the legislation, responded to a concerned constituent who inquired about its fate. "It seems that this bill," an assistant respond-

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[233] The memo is unsigned, thereby obscuring who the advisers are in this case. The memo arrived in Collins' office by way of O'Neill's office, which raises the possibility of O'Neill working against his own bill. "The attached copy of a memo has been sent to Henry A. Scagnoli at his request. Messrs. Jacoby and Lombard discussed this with him recently, and we were unable to locate the original memo in your files or Mary Callanan's. Attached is copy of memo to mayor dated 5 March 1963." James A. Travers, Youth Activities Bureau, to John H. O'Neill, Jr., June 6, 1963, Folder Historic Sites Committee, Box 148, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

[234] Regional Director Tobin to Director, NPS, April 1, 1963, Folder Preliminaries, Memoranda from 1960s, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[235] John A. Conner Jr., assistant secretary of the interior, to Aspinall, May 20, 1964, regarding H.R. 392, Folder NPS Memos on BNHP Legislative Support Data, 1963–74, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Also see Conner to Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall, Chair, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, May 20, 1964, Folder Preliminaries, Memoranda from 1960s, Box 1.

[236] See Agenda, 51st Meeting, Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments, Washington DC, Shenandoah National Park, Blue Ridge Parkway and Great Smoky Mountains National Park, October 5–14, 1964, NPS Bureau Historian's Office. Thanks to John Sprinkle for sharing this. Note too that attached documents from the 1960 meeting include review of Theme X, "The War for Independence," which was included also to first round legislative materials in support of the bill.

ed, "has stimulated a good deal of local controversy—particularly because of its rather broad and sweeping provisions."[237] O'Neill encountered pushback from within his own district. The mayor's Committee for North End Rehabilitation and Conservation—an organization born of Logue's insistence on community involvement in renewal planning—demanded that O'Neill oppose his own bill. "We have no choice but to fight," explained committee chair Guy A. Beninati, "to protect the 96 families and 6 businesses. Certainly our cause is right and just." O'Neill ought to protect the "living present," he argued, which "in no way affects the continuation of the existence of the historic sites which mark our glorious past." What most concerned North Enders, according to Beninati, was the threat of "further inroads [from] future urban renewal or highway activity. The whole future of the North End community is tied into this constant nibbling at the perimeter and the heart of this vital, viable, happy community."[238] O'Neill responded within days. "As you know, I was a member of the Boston National Historic Sites Commission which made the original study." "In fairness to other Members of that Committee," he explained, "it is necessary for me to act as sponsor of the measure."[239]

Sponsoring the bill, however, did not equate to rushing it. O'Neill let Beninati in on a bit of congressional maneuvering which would ease concerns in the North End, at least for the short term: "I have an agreement with Chairman Aspinall of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that no action will be taken during the 89th Congress which will cover the years 1965 and 1966."[240] It's hard to know what to make of O'Neill's deal with Aspinall. Was he, indeed, concerned about the legislation, enough to stall it pending further review? Could it have been O'Neill who was the BNHSC member Collins' advisers mentioned, the one who hadn't realized that the proposed NPS unit would result in evictions? Had O'Neill shared the same news with Bortman and Small, who gathered at his office a few months earlier to discuss legislative strategy? If nothing else, O'Neill's deal provides some explanation for why progress toward authorizing a new park ebbed and flowed in the following years. For instance, O'Neill did introduce new

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237 E. Winslow Turner, Legislative Assistant to Sen Edward M. Kennedy, to Frederick J. Bradlee, November 30, 1964, Folder NPS Memos on BNHP Legislative Support Data, 1963–74, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

238 Guy A. Beninati, Chair, Mayor's Committee for North End Rehabilitation and Conservation, to O'Neill, February 26, 1965, Folder 27, Box 6, Subseries D, Series 3, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

239 O'Neill to Beninati, March 1, 1965, Folder 27, Box 6, Subseries D, Series 3, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

240 O'Neill to Beninati, March 1, 1965, Folder 27, Box 6, Subseries D, Series 3, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

legislation in 1965: H.R. 5607 on March 1, 1965, and H.R. 8391 on May 24, 1965.[241] This time the bills got lodged, though Aspinall's committee delayed hearings for an entire year. In January representative John McCormack, who had proposed the legislation which created the BNHSC a decade earlier, petitioned the chair of the subcommittee to schedule a hearing, evidently unaware of O'Neill's deal. "Every member in the House and Senate from Massachusetts," he wrote, "favors a Bill being reported out along the lines of [5607 and 8391]."[242]

When the committee finally did schedule hearings—preliminary hearings before its Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation—for April 25, 1966, Bortman, Small, and Harvard historian and Bunker Hill Association President Charles Elliot traveled to Washington, DC to speak as witnesses. O'Neill did not attend, but did submit a statement. The subcommittee, chaired by Roy A. Taylor (D, North Carolina), included Aspinall, Wyatt, Harold T. Johnson (D, California), David S. King (D, Utah), and Richard C. White (D, Texas). The first statement made on the bills' behalf was the secretary of the interior's, transmitted to the House that March. In it the secretary summarized the work of the BNHSC, noted its findings, and justified federal involvement by explaining that the various sites' "general state of repair and/or interpretive potential has not been accomplished along lines that are in keeping with their great historical value."[243]

O'Neill's statement followed suit. "The scope and expanse of" preservation, he argued, "are beyond the reach of local groups or are too much for them to handle." The NPS, he insisted, would "stem the tide of severe criticism" levelled by visitors at Boston's heritage sites. Interestingly, O'Neill—immediately after submitting his written statement, and before the hearing—requested that Aspinall redact an entire paragraph concerning how Boston had been criticized for being unable to manage its own historic sites. He asked too that a Boston Globe editorial he had included be removed from the record. The editorial, written by a tourist recently disappoint-

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241 Bortman, responding to "sources he has not revealed to us," convinced O'Neill to omit the BNHSC's recommendation that the Boston Historical Society's president be given a special role in the proposed advisory board. Small, now superintendent of Minute Man National Historical Park, to Regional Director Ronald F. Lee, December 29, 1964, Folder Preliminaries, Memoranda from 1960s, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 5607, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 1, 1965; and, US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 8391, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May 24, 1965. The reason for the reintroduction is unclear, as both bills are identical.

242 McCormack to Ralph Rivers, January 31, 1966, Folder 27, Box 6, Subseries D, Series 3, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

243 Secretary of the interior to Aspinall, March 11, 1966, included in transcript of hearings on US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 5607, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 1, 1965; and, US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 8391, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May 24, 1965.

ed by his experience along the Freedom Trail, described finding "nothing but a disgrace to our American Heritage. I wonder how long it has been since your civic leaders have viewed what visitors to your city come to see?"[244] Aspinall omitted the paragraph, but left the editorial intact.

That's not all O'Neill withheld. An early draft of his statement suggests that O'Neill had also considered pitching agency involvement more directly as an investment in urban renewal. The sentiment comes through briefly in the conclusion to O'Neill's statement, wherein he notes that an NPS unit in Boston would contribute "to the complete city landscape that will make up the renewed Boston."[245] In his draft statement, however, O'Neill explored more fully the linkages between federal preservation and urban renewal:

> Generally speaking, the same problems of neglect and blight being encountered today in broad programs of urban renewal are to be faced no less in more limited and specific endeavors to preserve and maintain historic monuments, architectural survivals, and their immediate surroundings, which should form, to be sure, notable parts of the same environment. . . . Among our cities, Boston is no exception in this respect and severe criticism of conditions has been continually voiced by visitors, from both far and near, who are mindful of the importance of the American Revolution in our history.[246]

Although the full contours of this argument did not enter into O'Neill's statement to the subcommittee, his recognition that the bill would prompt real estate purchase and clearance in the North End did. But unlike the mayor's Committee for North End Rehabilitation and Conservation, which reckoned impact in terms of families and business, O'Neill simply noted that "some 39 parcels occupied for the most part by tenements and covering slightly more than two acres will be involved."[247]

Bortman came next, delivering his statement to the subcommittee in person. Well aware of his audience, the former BNHSC chair pitched federal preservation of sites associated with early debates over tax policy and independence as a rare opportunity to "pay tribute to our law-

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[244] Robert B. Phillips, Evergreen Park, Ill., "A Tourist's Memories," Boston Globe, August 12, 1965.

[245] Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. to Wayne N. Aspinall, April 25, 1966, included in transcript of hearings on US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 5607, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 1, 1965; and, US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 8391, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May 24, 1965.

[246] The draft statement is in Folder 43, Box 6, Subseries D, Series 3, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

[247] Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. to Wayne N. Aspinall, April 25, 1966, included in transcript of hearings on US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 5607, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 1, 1965; and, US Congress, House, To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for Other Purposes, H.R. 8391, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May 24, 1965.

makers." He noted Congress's success in work with the NPS to establish Minute Man National Park, just years before and, "which entailed the taking over of a tremendous amount of land without one protest or without anyone complaining about dispossession or anything else." This, of course, was not true, as we learn in Joan Zenzen's administrative history.[248] She advanced the argument made both by the secretary and O'Neill, that Boston could no longer manage on its own, though in somewhat different terms. The buildings "being presented to the nation," she explained, "have been in the excellent care of people, patriotic normally but devoted to the beginnings of our country. But they are dying out." Elliot lodged a final statement, prepared for the occasion, on behalf of the Bunker Hill Monument Association. He too endorsed the notion that Boston could not manage its sites alone, noting specifically how neither his association nor the MDC had "the authority [or] the funds to provide any 'interpretive' service to the thousands of visitors." Elliot went so far as to request that O'Neill's bill be amended so as to include Bunker Hill as an area to be outright acquired by the secretary. The Massachusetts General Court's Joint Resolution 2981, approved just weeks before Elliot noted, endorsed this option in the case that Congress agreed.

Together, then, the supporters of H.R. 8391 presented to Congress a two-pronged argument in favor of a federal preservation role in Boston's heritage landscape: Bostonians either weren't able to or weren't interested in doing it themselves; and, preservation was an extension of urban renewal projects already endorsed by Congress. How, then, did the subcommittee respond? Though receptive to the witnesses, and especially to Bortman's heartfelt endorsement of the plan, the subcommittee raised several points of concern. The congressmen expressed real confusion, for instance, about the nature of the cooperative agreements: exactly who was getting what money to do what? Aspinall led this line of inquiry, and wondered whether federal money would be invested in restoring buildings not fully in federal ownership. Additionally, he wondered why Boston's historic sites required federal protection when others did not. "Mt. Vernon is not a national shrine," he pointed out, adding that "these people have operated this with the same sense of zeal and patriotism in their own localities as well as many other places of the United States." Johnson put an even finer point on the issue: "How are these historical sites maintained now—through admission charges?" The answer, as Bortman explained, was "no," save for the Paul Revere House and the Old South Meeting House, which was not included in the bill. "How," Johnson chided, "would you pay for these otherwise?"

The subcommittee's second concern related to the matter hinted at in O'Neill's op-ed, the problem of Bostonians' seeming indifference to their own historic sites. Aspinall asked that Elliot evaluate the author's concerns for the subcommittee. He did so by confirming that the same problems—vandalism, theft, inadequate security—were endemic at Bunker Hill, because "the Commonwealth and the City of Boston are not taking the kind of care, which the Bunker Hill Monument Association would like to see." Aspinall, who had evidently visited Dorchester Heights, confirmed the same there. "I sometimes wonder if the local people take an interest in such things as this... if they do not, how can we expect the Federal Government to come in and furnish the funds and the necessary guardianships of these properties." Aspinall was "puzzled" by the testimony. Why would the federal government invest in historic sites most people in Bos-

[248] Joan Zenzen explains that, during planning for the Minute Man National Historical Park, the "NPS definitely experienced loud and vociferous reactions to NPS buying land... I interviewed one woman whose husband had built their house with steel supports. He had then been stricken with polio and worked out of their house. NPS wanted the land and forced them out.... The woman, many years later, was still fuming." Joan Zenzen, email to Seth C. Bruggeman, January 27, 2018.

ton seemed uninterested in? King agreed. There is no vandalism in Williamsburg, Virginia, he offered. "I am curious to know why there should be that great difference between the experience in Williamsburg and in Boston," especially since nearly everyone in Williamsburg is a tourist and thus "you do not have quite the local pride that you have in Boston." "It is the local people who are not appreciative," Elliot explained, along with "our present problems of the education of our youth and the so-called juvenile delinquency problem." In his opinion too, there was a problem of leadership. "What you are saying," Aspinall quipped, "is that we do not have any modern Samuel Adams… in Boston." Elliot rejoined, "we have a Mark Bortman, instead."

Having traveled to Washington to make a case for the unparalleled significance of Boston's heritage landscape, Bortman, Elliot, and O'Neill had done quite the opposite. On the one hand, they argued that historic preservation in Boston should be thought of as just another aspect of urban renewal, which powerfully undersold the uniqueness of the partnership model which the NPS had been hoping to demonstrate ever since the early days of the BNHSC. On the other hand, they managed to obscure whatever meaning these sites might have had for people other than those who already valued them. Elliot's petulant condemnation of juvenile delinquents and his fashioning of plastics magnate Mark Bortman into a modern-day Sam Adams are particularly noteworthy. An unconvinced public, as King put it, was "not something that the Federal Government can do very much about, is it?" More significantly, in hindsight, it is clear that what worried Elliot was not just vandalism, but rather the inability of people like him and Bortman to control how the people of Charleston understood the past. And why would Charlestonians care about an old monument when what mattered far more in their daily lives was the destructive uncertainty of urban renewal? Perhaps if Elliot had chosen Whitehill to be his Sam Adams, or if Small were permitted to testify, the H.R. 8391 hearings might have proceeded differently. Clearly, however, the political, class, and no doubt racial anxieties which ran through those April hearings obscured a path to authorization. O'Neill's bill never made it out of committee.[249]

Turning Points: The Bicentennial and the Charlestown Navy Yard

Efforts to create a national historical park in Boston had all but failed by 1966. As the disastrous H.R. 8391 hearings reveal, the NPS had put its chips on the wrong advocates. O'Neill, Bortman, and Elliot might have convinced Congress a decade prior, but by 1966 preservation sensibilities had evolved amid a shifting political landscape and increasing professionalization. Indeed, that same year, Congress—which had been prodded by the incalculable damage done to urban historic structures by urban renewal—passed the National Historical Preservation Act which, once signed into law, radically expanded federal authority to document and protect historic sites, and to expand notions of significance beyond the long shadow of privileged white men. Whitehill had already urged Logue toward more usable pasts, and the NPS would have done well to secure his advocacy, but it did not and Whitehill had already moved on to new projects such as advocating for the creation of a city Landmarks Commission.[250]

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[249] This is to say that neither the Congressional Record, nor the bill file associated with H.R. 5607, 89th Congress at the National Archives indicates that a final vote was taken or that a formal committee report issued. My thanks go to Judith Adkins, archivist, Center for Legislative Archives, NARA, for confirming so much. See Adkins, email to Seth C. Bruggeman, January 19, 2018.

[250] Whitehill had faded out, though, and his committee it seems had stopped meeting by 1964. The Landmarks Commission was established in 1969 as an advisory group and then lodged within the BRA during 1973–74 with the purpose of establishing restoration policies. For further details, see Folder 37, Box 7, Mayor Kevin White Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

Small might have also been a more effective advocate, but he seems to have lost his appetite for the fight. Since being appointed Superintendent of Minute Man in 1961, Small had developed a reputation as a "weak leader"—he never moved his office from Boston—and, what's more, had compromised his own credibility among colleague by profiting from the rental of homes to Air Force personnel.[251] His path also shifted as did the agency's broader efforts after Mission 66 to streamline operations and centralize expertise. In 1964, Lee appointed Small acting superintendent, in addition to his responsibilities at Minute Man, of the new Boston Sites Group. As Lee explained it, "grouping several areas in metropolitan Boston in one field unit for administrative purposes and assigning administration and management to one single field organization will be in the interest of efficiency and economy."[252] The Boston Sites Group was one of several administrative units of its type created under the directorship of George Hartzog, who assumed leadership in 1964 and who had a particular concern for expanding urban parks. Hartzog sought to maximize efficiencies in Boston, but was also concerned that urban settings with numerous units ought to have one person be able to speak for the NPS. Small led the Boston Sites Group for a year before shifting paths once again, and becoming a project coordinator first in the Boston Sites Group and then in Region V (a predecessor to the Northeast Region) where he would finish out the remainder of his career by proposing new units—including the John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Saugus Iron Works National Historic Sites—and advising others.[253]

It is worth dwelling briefly on the formation of the Boston Sites Group for what it reveals about the agency's new directions in Boston, and nationally, on the heels of Mission 66. Back in 1955, when the BNHSC was formed, the NPS still functioned more or less as it had since the New Deal, wherein groups of specialists accrued in individual parks. During Mission 66, however, Wirth and others reimagined the agency's organizational structure in ways reflecting the corporate logic of its private-sector partners. It is noteworthy that Hartzog initiated the creation of the Boston Sites Group given his previous experience as superintendent of Jefferson Expansion, which, like the Boston park, evolved with close ties to postwar urban renewal programming.[254] Indeed, just as Mayor Collins consolidated all facets of planning and development under Ed Logue, the NPS consolidated oversight for all its National Historic Landmarks in the Boston area—including the Beacon Hill Historic District, the Paul Revere House, Lexington Green, Old North, Old South, and many others—into one office. The authors of the Salem administrative history observe that the creation of the Boston Group "foreshadowed the creation in the next decade of the Boston National Historical Park [and] set the administrative groundwork for the new regional structure created in 1973."[255] Certainly the Boston Sites Group did anticipate a re-

[251] Summary of interview with Maurice L. Kowal, Chief of Area Services, Minute Man National Historical Park, January 20, 1981, contained within binder located in Box 1, 1989 Administrative History Records, MIMA 76679, Minute Man NHP Archives, Concord, MA.

[252] Lee, Regional Director, Northeast Region, to Superintendent, Minute Man National Historic Park, August 28, 1964, cited in Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 108.

[253] Summary of telephone interview with George Hartzog, January 23, 1981 contained within binder located in Box 1, 1989 Administrative History Records, MIMA 76679, Minute Man NHP Archives, Concord, MA.

[254] For more on the origins of Hartzog's urban commitments, see George B. Hartzog, Jr. Battling for the National Parks (Mt. Kisco, NY: Moyer Bell, 1988); and, Kathy Mengak, Reshaping Our National Parks and Their Guardians: The Legacy of George B. Hartzog (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), chapter six.

[255] Chase-Harrell, et al., Administrative History of the Salem Maritime National Historic Site, 108.

distribution of regional authority, but it did not foreshadow Boston National Historical Park so much as it responded to a management challenge created and then left unsolved by the BNHSC.

What the Boston Sites Group did foreshadow, however, was the possibility of putting organizational efficiencies on par with historical significance and profit as a justification for park building. Indeed, all three concerns came into sharp relief very quickly in Boston as a result of two remarkable failures. Bostonians learned of the first in 1968 when Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford endorsed a plan to consolidate the city's naval shipyards in South Boston.[256] The Charlestown Navy Yard, newspapers reported, would close its doors after nearly one hundred and seventy years of operation.[257] Although the Navy Yard would not officially close down until 1974, news of its fate raised critical concerns in Charlestown especially where residents' campaigns against urban renewal depended, in part, on the economic stability created by shipyard jobs. Others, however, sensed an opportunity at the Navy Yard related to news of a second failure: Boston had lost its bid to host the nation's Bicentennial. When the Bicentennial World Exposition Commission announced in 1970 that Philadelphia would host the nation's 200th birthday party—which planners imagined as one part of an even larger world's fair called Expo 76—it suggested that Boston could nonetheless receive federal support for Bicentennial programming so long as "it could work in some permanent facilities of benefit to the city." BRA Director John D. Warner floated an idea almost immediately: a bicentennial-themed "national historic park [with] a naval-marine museum on the site of the Charlestown Navy Yard." The Boston Globe anticipated that Warner's plan "would be an enormous fillip to Boston's Freedom Trail."[258]

The BNHSC, of course, had not considered the Navy Yard in its plans for a national historic park. After all, the Navy Yard was established in 1800, well beyond the revolutionary period of significance identified by the BNHSC. The BRA, however, was never so concerned with chronology. The prospects of acquiring federal land for private development, as New York City had done when the government sold off its defunct Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1968, prompted a broad view of Bicentennial programming. USS Constitution, Warner suggested, could "be backed up by an historic park detailing Boston's part in the Revolutionary War with special emphasis on American seapower [sic] through the centuries."[259] Taking his cues from Logue's renewal strategy, Warner promised to "bring residents of Charlestown into formal discussions" and to only use half the Navy Yard for a national historic park. The other half, he suggested, would attract industrial development "which would provide jobs." Stitching it altogether would be a transportation system, such as a water ferry, since "Boston simply has not capitalized on its waterfront and water views."

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[256] Stephen P. Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, Volume 1 (Boston: Division of Cultural Resources, BNHP Archives, National Park Service, 2010), 313.

[257] The events and circumstances leading to the Navy Yard's closure are expertly recounted in Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, chapter two, and especially 178–277.

[258] The BRA had been planning diligently for Expo 76, in part owing to Kevin White's strong support for it. As conceived, Boston's Expo 76 would create a massive floating city connecting Columbia Point in Dorchester to Thompson Island. Key among its opponents was state Senator John Joseph Moakley who worried about its environmental impacts. This is key context for the genesis of Boston Harbor National Recreation Area. For an overview of Expo 76 in Boston, see Mark Arsenault, "Dreams and Doubts Collided in Plans for Global 'Expo,'" Boston Globe, April 19, 2015. For a broad overview of relevant planning activities and, see the David C. Harrison Papers, 1963–1975, State Library of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. Quotes are from Ian Menzies, "Role for Boston and Charlestown in Expo '76," Boston Globe, September 9, 1970.

[259] Ian Menzies, "Role for Boston and Charlestown in Expo '76," Boston Globe, September 9, 1970.

Within just months, Warner had refined his plan into what he termed "Prologue '75," a fifty-six-million-dollar redevelopment plan wherein just more than half would come from federal sources. In addition to the "national naval park" Warner imagined for the old Navy Yard, his plan now extended to the Freedom Trail which would be "rejuvenated" with a network of "urban commemorative walkways" leading out "like spokes" from the Government Center to various "perception center[s]" located around town, wherein visitors might learn more about topics including the Boston Tea Party and clipper ships.[260] Warner even imagined a perception center at Liberty Tree Park, near Essex and Washington streets. The weight of his vision, however, still settled on the Navy Yard, where he now wanted to display ships "from every period in U.S. Navy history." Warner also promised ten acres for parking, an extension of Bunker Hill Street under the Mystic River Bridge to the Navy Yard, and a whole network of walking trails connecting historic sites and plazas throughout the area.[261]

Warner's proposal set off a planning frenzy, initiated by the BRA, but soon to involve the Navy and, of course, the NPS. The details of these early visions are examined at length in the park's exhaustive 2010 Historic Resource Study wherein Steve Carlson demonstrates how, between 1971 and 1973, plans advanced by each organization—though sharing much in common—predictably favored particular goals. BRA plans, for instance, highlighted opportunities for private investment, including restaurants and marinas.[262] NPS planners stressed preservation priorities consistent with the Navy Yard's 1966 National Historic Landmark designation. And the Navy, of course, sought protections for USS Constitution, which it insisted must remain under the protection of the Navy in perpetuity, regardless of plans elsewhere in the yard. Correspondence indicates that although each of the parties remained in conversation during these years, the Navy and NPS spoke most frequently with a common voice, and often bristled against the BRA's concern for private development.[263] This dynamic may explain why the final 1973 study angered NPS historians who perceived its boundary proposal—which omitted, for instance, Dry Dock 2 and the historic Ropewalk building—as too narrowly conceived around USS Constitution and the early republic, given the Navy Yard's significance well into the twentieth century.[264]

[260] By "perception centers," Warner meant to suggest kiosks from which visitors could variously perceive Boston's past.

[261] Robert F. Hannan, "Hub to Revise Historic Sites," Boston Herald Traveler, December 10, 1970.

[262] The BRA also sought to develop in and around Bunker Hill, including plans related to the Library Archive Building on Monument Square. See two alternatives in Folder Proposals for BNHP Prepared by Boston Redevelopment Authority [1970–1973], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[263] Kenney sent the BRA's plan for a National Historic Park to the Admiral R.E. Rumble, Commandant of the First Naval District. Rumble approved it, but explained that the Navy was already working in partnership with the NPS, adding that "at the same time I recognize that if we are to succeed in this endeavor we must also work closely with the City of Boston, principally through your agency, the BRA." Rumble indicated that he had already worked with BRA agents including Phil Zeigler, Marcia Meyers, and Marc Older. He suggested that Kenney meet with Rumble and Albert Benjamin of the NPS to discuss the matter. R.E. Rumble to Robert T. Kenney, Director, Boston Redevelopment Authority, November 30, 1973, Folder Navy Memos on BNHP Legislation 1973-74, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[264] Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 197–99.

If the contest of plans triggered by Warner's Bicentennial aspirations hadn't produced consensus, it did rejuvenate the legislative march toward authorization.[265] On January 4, 1973 Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced S. 210, legislation to establish a Boston National Historical Park. That April, the Navy officially declared its intent to shut down the Navy Yard within the year;[266] pressure was mounting to do something. Northeast Regional Director Chester Brooks wrote to Director Ronald H. Walker regarding the Navy's announcement. "Considerable pressure is being generated," he noted, "to have the property put to use for commercial and industrial purposes." Brooks reminded Walker of the National Park Service's responsibility to the Navy Yard by virtue of its status as a national historic landmark, suggesting that it be added to the NPS system as a separate unit. Including it with legislation for the park, he warned, introduced too many contingencies.[267] Brooks noted that Kennedy's bill called for a study to be made of the Navy Yard to determine the feasibility of including it in the park, and which the NPS "had not previously undertaken any study of the Naval Shipyard which would relate to its suitability for park use. This study of the Shipyard is now planned to determine feasibility."[268]

Political pressure mounted while planners awaited Brooks' study. That May, O'Neill and Kennedy reintroduced bills in the House and Senate.[269] Kennedy wrote directly to Secretary Roberts C. B. Morton, explaining that "there is a great deal of concern that additional efforts will be needed to preserve and protect both of these historic resources (yard and USS Constitution)

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[265] O'Neill reintroduced legislation in the house to authorize the establishment of the park in 1972, while Edward Kennedy followed suit in the Senate. This legislation evidently died early on, though it is unclear why in the Congressional Record, and access to the Edward Kennedy archive is currently unavailable. US Congress, House, full title unavailable, H.R. 16745, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in House September 20, 1972. US Congress, Senate, full title unavailable, S. 4009, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in Senate September 20, 1972.

[266] Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 180.

[267] Northeast Regional Director Brooks to Director, April 27, 1973, Folder NPS Letters and Memos RE: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[268] See position paper titled "Boston Naval Shipyard," attached to Chester L. Brooks, Director Northeast Region to General Superintendent, Boston Group Chief, New England Field Office, May 2, 1973, Folder Initial Transition Navy Yard to NPS/Planning Factors [1973–1976], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. This folder contains a range of documents relating to the transfer conversation. Included are materials demonstrating the BRA's eagerness to take over the Navy Yard, and how the NPS and others insisted that it recognize provisions put forth in the National Historic Preservation Act regarding disposition of the yard in accordance with Section 106. Evident too is pressure exerted by desires to prepare for the Bicentennial. The NPS had conducted a study of the Shipyard in 1971, and so it had been considering this future. The NPS and Navy generally agreed on the disposition of the site, though encountered some friction regarding who would handle interpretation and how to conceive of the USS Constitution Museum Foundation. The larger concern, however, related to the challenge of managing the BRA and MDC, which both wanted a hand in developing the area.

[269] US Congress, House, A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, H.R. 7486, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May, 3, 1973. US Congress, Senate, A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, S. 210, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., introduced in Senate January 4, 1973. The lead in Kennedy's office was Mary Murtagh who prepared this S. 210 as "a holding action prior to the passage of the Boston National Park legislation." Chief New England Field Office, Albert J. Benjamin, to regional director, May 4, 1973, Folder Initial Transition Navy Yard to NPS / Planning Factors 1973–76, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

after the closing [of the yard].” He hoped that Morton might suggest ways to make it happen.[270] MDC and BRA leadership piled on during testimony before the Senate Committee of Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation concerning Kennedy’s S. 210. MDC chair, John Sears, dismissed any possibility that his organization could adequately prepare the Bunker Hill Monument for the city’s Bicentennial celebration. Constant budget cuts and responsibility for numerous historic sites and thousands of acres of public land tied his hands. “I know as I stand here today,” Sears testified, “that I cannot make significant improvement to Bunker Hill until the next budgetary season… In short, and bluntly; I have just been defeated in my last clear chance to improve Bunker Hill in time for its Bicentennial.” “If the Park Service were to take over Bunker Hill,” he added, “the battle would resume its rightful place, whereas today it is lost in admiration for the monument.”[271]

BRA head Robert T. Kenney also strongly endorsed S. 210. “The BRA views the proposed act,” he explained, “as one which shores up on-going efforts and commitments to improve the quality of the city while preserving its historic character.” Kenney emphasized how the park would align Faneuil Hall, for instance, with the BRA’s restoration work on the north and south market buildings which, he was keen to point out, grew out of “the first urban renewal project in this city.” The problem, from Kenney’s perspective, was that “urban renewal funding is being phased out and that… restoration projects may be coming to an end.” “The private sector,” he added, might not always “respond in an enlightened manner to historic preservation” owing to the whims of the economy. Kennedy’s law would hedge against that tendency: “it is cognizant that tourism is a mainstay of this city’s economy and that tourism is strengthened considerably by preservation of the historic sites which attract so many people to Boston.” It was precisely this function of historic preservation, “as a means to augment the city’s economy,” Kenney explained, which animated the BRA’s particular concern to repurpose the Navy Yard.[272]

The problem with all this, of course, was that the research supporting the BNHSC’s 1961 proposal—the proposal S. 210 sought to implement, and which encompassed surveys and lists compiled by Edwin Small beginning in the 1930s—was terribly out of date by 1973. In its testimony before the subcommittee, the Department of the Interior recounted the 1961 proposal and explained that studies of the Navy Yard had only just begun in June, and would require until January to complete. “We will want to reflect [on] the results of that study in any recommendation we make on” S. 210. The department thus deferred recommending action on the bill despite agreeing “that Boston… will play a major role in the commemoration of the Bicentennial.”[273]

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[270] Edward M. Kennedy to Rogers C. Morton, May 8, 1973, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park (“pre-park” generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[271] Transcript of testimony from John Sears, Chair of the MDC, Folder Testimony Given Before the Senate Committee of Insular Affairs [Robert T. Kenney, September 10, 1973], Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park (“pre-park” generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[272] Transcript of Testimony of Robert T. Kenney Before Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, September 10, 1973, Folder Testimony Given Before the Senate Committee of Insular Affairs [Robert T. Kenney, September 10, 1973], Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park (“pre-park” generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[273] Statement of Witness for Department of the Interior before the subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, regarding S. 210, Folder Testimony Given Before the Senate Committee of Insular Affairs [Robert T. Kenney, September 10, 1973], Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park (“pre-park” generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Secretary of the Interior Morton wrote directly to Representative Henry M. Jackson, chair of the committee, to reiterate his desire that S. 210 be deferred. "Cost estimates will have to be updated, and changes that have taken place in the area since 1961 may require revision of some recommendations." "New studies are underway," he assured, "and should be completed within fiscal year 1974."[274] But it didn't work. The Senate passed S. 210 on December 7, 1973.

House testimony concerning H.R. 7486 followed similar themes, and with shared concern for the coming Bicentennial. "We do have to make the point," insisted Sears, "that for Boston the Bicentennial focusses on 1975, rather than 1976. We must get going at top speed in order to be ready." "This will," he added, "be America's last real occasion, for many years to come, to refresh its own spirit."[275] Kenney reiterated Sears' concern with meeting the Bicentennial deadline. "It would be regrettable, indeed, if Boston marked the beginning of the bicentennial year 1975 as the 20th year of waiting for this Park." Kenney had confused 1955, when President Eisenhower commissioned the BNHSC, with the year "the Boston Historic Park was first proposed to Congress," but his point still stood. Kenney's concern, however, hinged primarily on the Navy Yard. Failing to create a national park in Boston, he warned, might result in having to move USS Constitution, "that would have the same emotional overtones as moving the Statue of Liberty to London." And, of course, the city had "already invested $56 million in an urban renewal program in Charlestown… we foresee further opportunities for new development."[276] O'Neill echoed previous testimony, recognizing too that the Bicentennial demanded action, though being sure to emphasize that the bill did not grant confiscatory rights to the government. He had learned a hard lesson, it seems, from earlier versions of the bill. Interestingly, O'Neill turned to a final theme which hadn't surfaced in congressional hearings since the contest over whether to commission the BNHSC, two decades before. "Our historical monuments," he argued, "can provide a kind of stability and security offered by no other medium. If Americans can look to their past with dignity and pride, they are more likely to endure the travails of the future. This can best be accomplished under the auspices of the Federal Government."[277]

A Crisis of Possibility

The NPS had found itself in a remarkable position during the spring of 1974. After having advocated for a national park in Boston for over two decades—longer, if we count Small's explora-

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[274] Secretary of Interior Horton to Rep. Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, October 4, 1973, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[275] Statement of John W. Sears, Metropolitan District Commissioner, on behalf of Governor Francis W. Sargent and the MDC of Massachusetts, to the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 7486, the Boston National Historic Park Bill, January 28, 1974, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[276] Statement of Robert T. Kenney, Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority before the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, May 30, 1974, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[277] Testimony presented by Thomas P O'Neill, Jr., Member of Congress, 8th District, Massachusetts, to the subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 7486, May 30, 1974 Folder NPS Letters and Memos RE Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

tions during the 1930s—the agency suddenly got what it wanted, in spades. The BRA's urban renewal campaign, a postindustrial turn in Charlestown, and eagerness everywhere to profit from the nation's Bicentennial celebration put massive pressure on the agency to act. Congressional bills S 210 and H.R. 7486 defined just one front in the political campaign to make it do so before the Bicentennial. Even as those bills circulated in Congress, Kennedy and O'Neill introduced additional bills, to authorize establishment of Boston Naval Shipyard Historic Site.[278] The intent of this legislation was to protect USS Constitution, permanently assigned to Boston in 1954 by Public Law 83-523, from whatever mix of private and public development might result from the other pending legislation. The trick to all this, of course, was that even though the NPS had finally found the political will to advance its plans in Boston, what was being proposed was not its plans. The various bills were proposing to create an amalgam of the BNHSC's 1961 report and the BRA's 1971 plan for redeveloping the Navy Yard. The NPS requested that Congress defer long enough at least for the agency to work up reasonable cost estimates, but patience was scarce in the face of the looming Bicentennial. Chair Taylor requested a commitment from the Department of the Interior by March 1, 1974, but realizing that wouldn't be possible, asked that at least a draft of the type of cooperative agreements being considered be presented to him by March 1, 1974. Of course, the BNHSC had only vaguely described what these might entail, and nobody had any sense after more than a decade of whether or not the would-be partners might agree. NPS Associate Director of Legislation Richard C. Curry wrote to the Deputy Director that an "entire proposal cannot possibly be in place by that time."[279] He realized that if the committee acted without at least updated cost figures, it would condemn the NPS to utter failure in Boston: "we are living on borrowed time."[280]

The NPS did manage to pull together a plan in time for the June 1 deadline, and included within it an alternative two-year program geared only toward preparing for the Bicentennial.[281] The plan, however, only brought into focus problems which had lingered unresolved since the days of the BNHSC. North Atlantic Regional Director Jerry D. Wagers railed against it in a memo to the Associate Director of Legislation. "We… have serious reservations about the total package as it has evolved up to this point." "Sites of lesser national significance," he pointed out, "are intermingled… with sites of unquestioned national significance." Wagers worried too about the vagueness of the proposed partnership model. "We are concerned that the type of park proposed represents a significant departure from usual park proposals in that it depends on a

[278] Kennedy introduced S. 2915for himself and on behalf of fellow Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke. US Congress, Senate, Bill to Authorize Establishment of the Boston Navy Shipyard Historic Site, S. 2915, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced January 29, 1974. US Congress, House, Bill to Authorize Establishment of the Boston Navy Shipyard Historic Site, H.R. 12359, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced January 29, 1974.

[279] Richard C. Curry, Associate Director of Legislation, to Deputy Director, February 26, 1974, Folder NPS Letters and Memos RE Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[280] Curry to Regional Director, February 27, 1974, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Curry suggested another strategy would be to provide figures for a much earlier date for a less-than-full-park option, with the intent of doing it well rather than doing a full park poorly. His conviction was that there was no way to accomplish implementation of a reasonable park concept in time for the Bicentennial.

[281] The plan and related materials appear in Folders NPS Proposals for Parks [Management, Acquisition, 1974–75] and Legislative Support Data 1974 For BNHP, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

somewhat loose confederation with a variety of different site owners." Wagers suggested that the plan ought rather focus on only "the most significant sites"—Faneuil Hall, the State House, Old South, and a visitor center—and put the others into "a second category for further study." What's more, Wagers recommended that the agency dismiss plans for the Navy Yard altogether. Without a considerably larger appropriation, he wondered, what could the NPS do at the Navy Yard which the Navy wasn't already doing? "It could be a number of years," he warned, "before the shipyard would be more than an embarrassment and a liability to the National Park Service." Wagers recognized that because "there are a number of major interests that are pushing for a National Park at the Naval Shipyard… it may not be possible to untrack the park proposal at this stage." Even so, "it seems questionable to us," Wagers concluded, "to accept a situation fraught with difficulties."[282]

Wagers' letter hit its mark. Later that month, when the Department of the Interior officially reported on H.R. 7486, the assistant secretary of the interior wrote to the chair of the subcommittee explaining that the department recommended against the house bill and, of course, against enacting the bill already passed in Senate. NPS reports, he explained, estimated $14 million to get the park off the ground, whereas the proposed legislation contained just under $8.5 million. And none of the properties included, he noted, were in immediate danger of collapse or deterioration. What's more, since 1935 the NPS had all the legal authority it needed to support interpretation at national historic sites. It did not need new legal authority to engage those sites identified in the legislation. And besides, the proposed legislation did not clarify how partnerships would work, which would complicate any effort to do coordinated interpretation, let alone create a central visitor center. "If the purpose of the legislation is to provide federal financial assistance in time for the properties to be brought to National Park System standards by the Bicentennial," he continued, recognizing the political pressure put on the NPS in Boston, "we have great doubts as to whether, in view of the costs indicated above, this can be accomplished."[283]

A team of representatives from the department returned to make the case when hearings resumed in May 1974.[284] Its position, of course, was not to abandon Boston's historic sites, but rather to support them with means other than traditional federal land management functions. Specifically, the department argued that the sites identified in H.R. 7486 could be much better supported through the matching grant program authorized by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA). Under NHPA, the federal government could award preservation grants matching state and local contributions wherever need was demonstrated. Grant money, moreover, would not be subject to system-wide maintenance priorities as would funds allocated to an NPS unit. And besides, Deputy Assistant Secretary Curtis Bohlen pointed out, except for the MDC at Bunker Hill, none of the other stewards wanted "to transfer ownership… to the Federal Government. On the contrary, all the owners preferred to retain title." Interpretation could easily be handled under authority of the Historic Sites Act of 1935, which allowed the NPS

[282] Undated memo from Jerry D. Wagers, Director, North Atlantic Region, to Associate Director Legislation (this appears to be a draft with edits); revised memo sent on May 1, 1974. Both appear in Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[283] Assistant secretary of the interior to Chair James A. Haley, May 28, 1974, Folder NPS Letters and Memos re: Legislation, 1964–1978, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[284] DOI represented by Curtis Bohlen, deputy assistant secretary for fish, wildlife and parks, and accompanied by Ernest Connally, associate director for professional services; Richard Curry, associate director for legislation; and Jerry Wagers, regional director, North Atlantic Region.

authority to do the sort of interpretive work called for in H.R. 7486. And, finally, the department saw no need to intervene at the Navy Yard when the US Navy was already obligated by Public Law 83-523 to remain there and protect USS Constitution. Authorizing a national park in Boston, Bohlen argued, would "not only [fail] to take advantage of the existing assistance programs, but by increasing the backlog it makes achieving the needed objectives highly unlikely in the near future."[285] In other words, considering the challenges facing the NPS in 1974, creating a new unit in Boston might do more harm than good. "I think perhaps what we are doing is unfairly raising expectations in the minds of the citizens of Boston that we can't fulfill."[286]

The Subcommittee balked. Since their last meeting in January several members had visited Boston and toured the various sites proposed for inclusion under H.R. 7486. For them it had no doubt been a patriotic reprieve from the daily morass of national politics, which lingered still in the aftermath of a paralyzing oil crisis, the nadir of President Richard Nixon's Watergate Scandal, and an abysmal war in southeast Asia. Returning to discover that the department opposed H.R. 7486 provoked outrage. Chair Taylor ridiculed the notion that the Navy be responsible for interpretation in the Navy Yard. "Well, why not return all military parks to the Department of Defense," he chided, "that is where they came from."[287] He dismissed NPS cost proposals as inflated. "We attended church services [in the Old North Church, and] it appeared to me that it was in excellent condition." "Why," he insisted, "should $325,000 be spent at that church?"[288] Teno Roncalio of Wyoming noted that the Interior had recently opposed the addition of several new units before asking, "does the department favor the creation of any new parks anywhere in this country and if so, where?" Paul Cronin of Massachusetts had the strongest words. "The Department of the Interior, most particularly the Park Service, has completely failed to plan so far as the Bicentennial is concerned." "I don't think," referring to Bohlen's concern about fairness "that the Department has been the least bit fair to the citizens of the United States of America in its planning for the Bicentennial."[289] Bohlen pushed back, noting that the NPS labored under strict spending restrictions imposed by President Nixon's Office of Management and Budget. "If this bill passes," he warned, the budgets of all the other areas—including Cape Cod National Seashore, Minute Man National Historical Park, and Acadia National Park—would have to be cut. "They are all going to have… to put some of those resources into this area."[290]

The subcommittee would not be moved. Testimony from the US Navy, including from Rear Admiral Richard E. Rumble, as well as from the BRA and various other local and state politicians piled on. In each case, and particularly in a caustic presentation by the BRA's Bob Kenney, testimony portrayed the NPS as a penny-pinching delinquent seeking to avoid what—amid the time-worn symbols of Longfellow's Revolutionary Boston—amounted to a sacred historical re-

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[285] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 8.

[286] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 20.

[287] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 11.

[288] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 12.

[289] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 34–35.

[290] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 57.

sponsibility. A national park, they argued, necessarily followed from the march of Bicentennial planning. It was anticipated by the ongoing work of urban renewal, and the rebranding of Boston as a heritage destination. "Don't you see some advantage in placing it all in the hands of the National Park Service," Taylor asked, and having "one unified type of advertising, maybe one fee for the entire tour, bringing it up to Park Service standards?" Creating a national park in Boston, what's more, would offset the economic impact of a shuttered Navy Yard. "The city," Kenney pointed out," is struggling with the closing of the naval base with cost 5,000 jobs… We feel that there is no question that the Charlestown Navy Yard Park should be included."[291]

Correspondence suggests a tense mood back in Boston. In a letter to the secretary of navy, for instance, Rumble explained that "right now the Washington Headquarters of the National Park Service feels that they are being overwhelmed with USS Constitution and Boston Navy Yard Historic Site—more so than at any of the other proposed Sites in the Boston Park System. We (the local Park Service representatives and myself) don't agree."[292] Nor did Congress. That July the committee reconvened for a mark-up session wherein it haggled over amendments to the legislation. In the end, it made three major changes: the Charlestown Navy Yard would be included in the legislative package, though with a separate budget line; funding for Charlestown would be set at eight million dollars fewer than the NPS cost estimate; and the federal government would retain limited right to eminent domain only so far as it might be needed to acquire a suitable visitor center in downtown Boston.[293] With that, the committee reported favorably to the House on H.R. 7486 with amendments.[294] The House officially amended and passed S. 210 in lieu of H.R. 7486 on August 5 and, on September 18, the Senate approved the revised S. 210 without debate. Finally, on October 1, 1974, Public Law 93-431 authorized the establishment of Boston National Historical Park.[295] This legislation did not create the park as it exists today. As we will see, Dorchester Heights would not be added until 1978.[296] It did, however, lay out its broad contours and set into motion the planning which would soon establish a national park in Boston.

Conclusion

Recounting the park's rocky path to authorization during 1960 to 1974 forces us to contend with a hard truth: by most measures, Congress's addition of the park to the National Park System constituted a significant failure for the NPS. Most immediately, the agency failed to prevent Congress from compelling it to include a unit which it did not consider suitable for inclusion. In other words, Congress bullied the park into existence, not out of a prevailing concern for the

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[291] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 77–78.

[292] Rumble to J. William Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, June 18, 1974, Folder Navy Memos on BNHP Legislation 1973–74, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[293] For details regarding changes and compromises in final document, see US Congress, House, Mark-Up Session: H.R. 7486, To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 10, 1974.

[294] US Congress, House, A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, H.R. 7486, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May, 3, 1973., Congressional Record Daily Digest, July 10, 1974, D 497.

[295] 88 Stat. 1184.

[296] Dorchester Heights added by National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-625, US Statutes at Large 92 (1978): 3467–3550.

agency's mandate, but rather to satisfy the political agendas of representatives concerned to lure jobs, tourists, and federal monies to Boston amid the national Bicentennial celebration. The park was certainly not unique in this regard. On the contrary, the park's story was among only the first of many caught up in an era of so-called "park barrel politics" wherein, as Associate Director for Planning and Development Dennis Galvin put it, "our formal testimony on the Hill has no credibility any more. We've lost control of the agenda."[297]

What is special about the park's story, however, is that it shows us how the NPS was in many regards complicit, even if unwittingly, in creating the circumstances which allowed ultimately for the erosion of control described by Galvin. In Boston the problem had everything to do with the agency's posture toward urban renewal. Since as early as the BNHSC's deliberations, the NPS—by way of Tobin and Small especially—had conceived of the park in terms of urban renewal. There were other ways, as Whitehill argued, to imagine what a national park might look like in Boston, but the agency was steadfast in its commitment to renewal strategies. For that it lost considerable trust among the people of Boston. As Whitehill explained in a 1975 interview, the NPS's early endorsement of demolition and removal in Boston effectively prevented it from accomplishing anything given the scale and intensity of resistance from Bostonians who were well aware that their own lives were at stake. "The North Enders just plain didn't like it," he noted, "and I think Charlestown was not very pleased with it either."[298] Moreover, aligning itself with urban renewal signaled the agency's willingness to advance priorities—economic stimulus, "slum clearance," downtown revival—which were neither appropriate nor advantageous to its mission. In the wake of Mission 66, which oriented the agency even more fully around profit-based private partnerships, it is no wonder that Congress considered economic stimulus on par with historical significance as reasons for authorizing a national park in Boston. The NPS had not "lost control of the agenda," as Galvin supposed, so much as its leaders had traded it in after World War II in hopes of saving a struggling park system. The park's decades-long path to authorization demonstrated just how much had been lost in the bargain.

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[297] David Foster, "'Park Barrel' Politics Seen as Redefining 75-Year-Old National System," Los Angeles Times, October 13, 1991. Also see Ridenour, The National Parks Compromised: Pork Barrel Politics and America's Treasures (Merrillville, IN: ICS Books, 1994).

[298] Whitehill is quoted in Charles Davies and Dennis Frenchman, "Boston National Historical Park: Images of a Planning Process Slide-Tape Transcript," August 29, 1975, Folder BNHP: Images of a Planning Process, Aug. 29, 1975, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Chapter Four

Planning a Park for "Modern Boston," 1974–1976

"Walking down Congress Street," just months after Boston National Historical Park had been authorized, Park Historian Mary Holmes encountered an "excited Bostonian who recognized my ranger uniform and wanted to know… where's the park?" Both of them, of course, were standing in the park, but the park authorized by Public Law 93-431 barely resembled what most Americans had come to recognize as a national park by 1974. The agency's iconic nature parks had, by the mid-1970s, attained new heights of popularity among young white Americans distrustful of modernity and activated by the new environmentalism.[299] Urban parks, however, like Philadelphia's Independence National Historical Park and Saint Louis's Gateway Arch National Park (formerly Jefferson National Expansion Memorial), were still a novelty, and Boston's partnership model even more novel besides. For Holmes, reorienting visitors to the urban partnership park would require demonstrating how it could "help us understand our present lives." "Let us not forget, in our enthusiasm for resources," she warned, "that [they help] explain modern Boston and modern America."[300]

This chapter responds to two questions imbedded in Holmes' observation: what exactly did it mean in 1974 to "explain modern Boston and modern America;" and how could Boston's fledgling park achieve it? Answering the first question requires that we take stock of a remarkably fraught moment in Boston history. The years immediately surrounding the park's authorization were framed by two deeply related though seemingly contradictory events. On one hand, the 1974–76 race riots—triggered during by the desegregation of Boston's public schools—threatened to tear the city apart. On the other hand, the 1975–76 United States Bicentennial celebration sought to unite Americans in consuming the kind of revolutionary memory which ran all through Ed Logue's New Boston. These events provide the crucial context for understanding an evolution in Boston's heritage landscape during these years which had particular bearing on the Freedom Trail and its claim on the city's historical imagination. I dwell on those transformations in part I. In part II, I turn to the planning process which produced the park's first General Management Plan (GMP), and consider too the basic chores of establishment which occupied the park staff during the park's first year.

Weighing both parts together raises critical questions about the agency's capacity during the late-1970s to build a partnership park in conversation with stakeholders who, in some cases, approached one another across gaping political and ideological divides. We discover that rendering the park comprehensible to visitors, and contending with the complexity of Boston's urban landscape, did—just as Holmes predicted—concern planners during the park's first years. At issue is whether it concerned them enough.

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[299] Consider, for instance, that NPS units hosted just less than eight million recreational visits in 1970. By 1976, the number had climbed to nearly thirty-three million. National Park Service, "Visitation Numbers," https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/visitation-numbers.htm (accessed April 26, 2019). That same year, the top grossing independent film in the United States was Grizzly, which takes place in a fictional National Park wherein uniformed rangers fight to protect young parkgoers from a bloodthirsty bear. Wikipedia, "Grizzly," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grizzly_(film) (accessed April 26, 2019).

[300] Mary Holmes, "But Where's the Park?," The Broadside (Summer–Fall, 1977).

Part I: Race, Memory, and the NPS in Boston, ca. 1974

Holmes' contention that the park's success hinged on explaining "modern Boston and modern America" implied much more in 1974 than simply reflecting on the legacy of the American Revolution. Indeed, the years encompassing the park's path to authorization—presumably what Holmes meant by "modern Boston"—had put Bostonians through a tumultuous period of transformation. As we learned in previous chapters, much of Boston's physical change during those years owed to the city's enormous investments in urban renewal and related programming tied to road and highway construction. Beginning during the 1950s, and spearheaded by Mayor John Hynes, urban renewal initiatives ripped Boston apart—literally in the case of the West End and construction of the Central Artery—before stitching it back together around new buildings, new people, and new ways of imagining Boston's past and future. The Freedom Trail (itself a product of urban renewal) became an emblem of Boston's transformation, a carefully-crafted historical introduction to a new story of progress written by Ed Logue and Mayor John Collins along the waterfront, in and around the Government Center, and throughout the financial district. A central finding of this current study is that the NPS eagerly sought to involve itself in the telling of this new progress narrative of Boston, so much so that it imagined historic preservation as a means by which to facilitate, as Regional Director Daniel Tobin put it, "citizen redevelopment."[301]

The problem, of course, was that the progress narrative endorsed by the NPS conceived of progress so narrowly as to ignore tens of thousands of Bostonians for whom urban renewal meant anything but. The West End debacle, of course, had become the stuff of nightmarish legend among working-class and nonwhite neighborhoods encircling Boston's increasingly prosperous downtown. By the late 1960s, their fears of removal and disinvestment had become a reality. The BRA had only ever relocated five hundred families, despite its displacement of thousands. Its South End Renewal projects, which destroyed the ethnically and racially diverse New York Streets section, had only rehoused twenty-five families in new South End units between its 1956 beginning and 1968. By the late 1970s, Boston had become known nationally for urban displacement and racial anxiety, thanks in part to Richard Broadman's film documentary, Mission Hill and the Miracle of Boston (1978), which captured the story as it played out in the Parker Hill section of Roxbury.[302] In the end, although renewal had promised the expansion of city services—including police and fire protection and road repair—into development districts, most of it never moved beyond the downtown business and financial districts.[303] The problem was not exclusive to Boston, of course, but the pitting of ethnic white and black Bostonians against one another and against developers raised deep wells of anxiety which had festered there among decades of corrupt politics and economic decline.

Throughout these years, the degradations of urban renewal exacerbated inequities in Boston which civil rights activists across the nation had brought into focus during the previous decade.

[301] Summary of Minutes of Sixteenth Meeting, September 24, 1956, Folder Meeting Minutes July–Dec 1956, Box 1, Boston National Historic Sites Commission Records, 1956–1960, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[302] Mission Hill and the Miracle of Boston, directed by Richard Broadman, Boston: Cine Research, in cooperation with CD Film Workshop, 1982.

[303] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 234. O'Conner cites John Hull Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). For more on renewal in the South End, see Violet Showers Johnson, The Other Black Bostonians: West Indians in Boston, 1900–1950 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); and, Russ Lopez, Boston's South End: The Clash of Ideas in a Historic Neighborhood (Boston: Shawmut Peninsula Press, 2015).

Inspired by the national civil rights struggle and encouraged by its victories—including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Open Housing Act of 1968—Bostonians increasingly applied direct action to problems associated with urban renewal. Thomas H. O'Conner notes that "black residents used street parades, sound trucks, protest marches, and public demonstrations" to insist that the BRA recognize the needs of impoverished neighborhoods.[304] The effectiveness of postwar social movements also inspired working Bostonians to organize within their own communities. Community development corporations, advisory groups, and various other neighbor coalitions resisted BRA plans in Roxbury, Mission Hill, Dorchester, Chinatown, and as we have seen, the North End and Charlestown.[305] As a result, Boston's growing spate of community organizations managed, by the late-1960s. to get a seat at the city's planning table. According to Lawrence Kennedy, "no longer could planning be done exclusively in corporate board rooms and government offices… It now had to take into account the wishes of ordinary citizens."[306] The NPS and the BNHSC had nodded casually toward community engagement, of course, but the "ordinary citizens" they engaged before 1974 primarily consisted of Boston business people and heritage boosters, whom were white and embedded in deep webs of privilege. The weight of Kennedy's observation, as we will see, would factor significantly in the park's path to establishment.

The NPS's fortunes in Boston would also hinge on recognizing the deepening racial contours of inequity and dissent across the city. Boston's African American population had itself transformed significantly during the years leading to authorization. Between 1950 and 1960, the decade during which the BNHSC devised a plan for what would become the park, Boston's African American population grew by sixty percent. The growth owed in large part to a wave of southerners looking for opportunity in the north's postwar industries. The new arrivals also included middle-class Americans eager to study in Boston's universities or seek work in its burgeoning military and high-tech economies. The confluence of these groups amid the high tide of social activism reactivated Boston's black civil rights community in a way unseen since the early decades of the twentieth century.[307] By 1963, new civil rights organizations—the Emergency Public Integration Committee (EPIC) and the Boston Action Group (BAG)—appeared in Boston alongside older reenergized organizations—the NAACP and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)—in collective direct action such as against companies like Wonder Bread, Sears, Roebuck & Company, and Trailways Bus Company, which refused to hire African American drivers.[308] Elsewhere, black parents organized to demand better access to education and to fight de facto segregation in schools. By 1969, grassroots community organizers had managed to distribute over a thousand students of color among better-funded primarily white Boston schools by taking advantage of open enrollment policies.[309]

The problem of school segregation, which persisted in Boston despite the US Supreme Court having ruled it unconstitutional in 1954, reflected—and, in fact, compounded—the same kinds

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[304] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 234.

[305] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 235.

[306] Kennedy as quoted in O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 235.

[307] Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, 40–41.

[308] Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, 42–43.

[309] Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, 47–59.

of systemic inequality which ran though all facets of urban renewal.[310] By the time that the park began down its path to authorization, these and other nested problems had grown worse amid a calamity of US foreign and domestic policy. The Vietnam War, which disproportionally impacted poor and nonwhite Americans, drove up inflation and forced cuts in precisely the kind of social programs which sought to ameliorate poverty. The resulting anxiety which seemed everywhere present in the United States by the late 1960s appeared in Boston too, and often at historic sites associated with the park campaign. The NAACP staged Freedom Sunday rallies at Faneuil Hall in 1964, while the Old State House proposed a "Freedom Trail of Negro History." Activists rallied at Old South Meeting House in 1969 in support of Puerto Rican Independence. Vietnam Veterans Against War staged an antiwar rally at Bunker Hill in 1971 despite the MDC refusal to grant it permission. A year later, 1,500 antiwar protesters converged at the Navy Yard, where one heckler yelled "go back to Cambridge, why don't youse? Charlestown takes care of itself." Even at the height of the 1973 legislative campaign to authorize the park, pro- and anti-abortion rights advocates clashed at Old North Church.[311] Just these few examples illustrate the extent to which Bostonians, even by the late twentieth century, lived with their past. In this light, Holmes's urging that the park explain "modern Boston and modern America" reflected a concern that the NPS not simply engage the present, but that it do so in a way which sustained its partners' long-term investments in a usable past.

In 1974, however, the year of the park's authorization, the NPS's most widely visible entanglement with "modern Boston and modern America" was just beginning to unfold at Dorchester Heights. The NPS added Dorchester Heights to the National Register of Historic Places in 1966, but it had not been included in the park by Public Law 93-431. The law did, however, list the site among one of five areas which could be included under appropriate circumstances without additional congressional action. As we will see, with considerable encouragement from Massachusetts 9th Congressional District US representative John Joseph "Joe" Moakley, the park did expand to include Dorchester Heights in 1980. But what put a national spotlight on Dorchester Heights beginning in 1974 was neither the NPS nor the war monument, but rather its location adjacent to South Boston High School. Occupying about a third of Thomas Park, South Boston High School became a focal point of a citywide school busing crisis triggered by court-mandated desegregation of the Boston school system beginning in 1974. Orders to exchange one half of South Boston's predominantly white sophomores with one half of Roxbury High School's predominantly African American students inspired months of protest, counterprotest, and numerous incidents of racial violence at the school—including a stabbing—all with the Dorchester Heights Monument as a backdrop. The park's first superintendent, Hugh Gurney, visited South Boston High School in 1975 to discuss its interface with Dorchester Heights. It was the first time

[310] It is worth noting that the debate over school desegregation in Boston had been raging since the 1850s and had always been tied to revolutionary memory. See Hilary J. Moss, "The Tarring and Feathering of Thomas Paul Smith: Common Schools, Revolutionary Memory, and the Crisis of Black Citizenship in Antebellum Boston," The New England Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2007): 218–41.

[311] Robert Levey, "N.E. Freedom Rallies," Boston Globe, April 27, 1964; Jane Harriman, "Exhibit Own 'Freedom Trail,'" Boston Globe, February 10, 1964; N.a., "300 Trek Hub's Freedom Trail to Protest War," Boston Globe, August 10, 1969. Correspondence concerning the 1971 Bunker Hill incident is in Metropolitan District Commission, Folder Bunker Hill Monument, Yellow Tab Subject Files, Secretaries Office, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Boston, MA. John Wood and Peter Cowen, "1500 Antiwar Protesters in Boston March to Navy Yard," Boston Globe, May 14, 1972; Carmen Fields, "Baird's Pro-abortion Protest Broken Up at North Church," Boston Globe, December 31, 1973.

he had been required to pass through a metal detector. "That was my introduction," Gurney recalls, "to inner-city schools."[312]

Dorchester Heights was not the only the park affiliate to appear in the national spotlight cast by Boston's school busing crisis. Indeed, busing protests and related violence continued for years across Boston. Stanley Forman captured one particular incident in a 1976 Pulitzer-winning photograph which shocked Americans with its portrayal of "a young, white man [Joseph Rakes] lung[ing] at a black man [Ted Landsmark] with the sharp point of a flagpole, with the American flag attached."[313] Seen at center in the background of Forman's photograph is the Old State House. Gurney recalls the image "going viral" in and beyond Boston. In 1976, Ebony magazine recalled the incident, wherein "white demonstrators within sight and sound of Faneuil Hall [yelled] 'we got ourselves a nigger!'" "Do the people of Boston," it wondered, "understand what Bostonians were fighting for 200 years ago?"[314] It was precisely the question which the park promised to answer, though by 1976, as we will see, how and whether it could was still a matter of debate among a planning team flown in two thousand miles from the NPS's Denver Service Center to set the park's path. One way or the other, it was very clear by 1976 that no matter how it proceeded, the park would be a product of the place and politics which produced it, a fact—as Mary Holmes' insight suggests—which was not lost on the park's first managers.

The Freedom Trail and Boston's Gas Lamp Renaissance

The years leading to and encompassing the park's authorization had plunged Boston into a tumult of racial, political, and social discord. And yet, for some Bostonians, the dream of urban renewal—as evidenced by clean streets and lively commerce—had indeed begun to materialize. By 1965, the coexistence of these parallel worlds was evident in the Boston Globe, for instance, wherein reports of antiwar protests and escalation in Vietnam might be interspersed with articles like Joe Harrington's survey of gas lighting in Boston. Boston was experiencing a "gas lamp renaissance," Harrington explained, spearheaded in Beacon Hill, Newton, and other tony neighborhoods in and around Boston. Some Bostonians, it seems, preferred the late nineteenth-century gas lighting technology to electricity for its gentle light, even going so far as to install stylized colonial fixtures near historic sites, including Paul Revere's house, which appeared in a photograph accompanying Harrington's article. "Some residents of the North End… claim [the gas lamps] do not shed sufficient light for the area," he noted, "though they have proved very popular with tourists taking photographs."[315]

What Harrington described, of course, were early ripples in a rising tide of gentrification which would wash over Boston during the next decade and well beyond. Urban renewal had indeed begun to attract new and new kinds of people to Boston. In the South End, for instance, white middle-class "urban pioneers" began buying up and restoring century-old town houses as early as 1962. These new arrivals discovered in the old immigrant South End the possibility of living affordably, close to downtown, and in neighborhoods which eschewed the racial ho-

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[312] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[313] National Public Radio, "Life After Iconic 1976 Photo: The American Flag's Role in Racial Protest," September 18, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/09/18/494442131/life-after-iconic-photo-todays-parallels-of-american-flags-role-in-racial-protes (accessed April 26, 2019). See also Louis P. Masur, The Soiling of Old Glory: The Story of a Photograph that Shocked America (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).

[314] N.a., "The Bicentennial Blues," Ebony 31, no. 8 (June 1, 1976): 152. Thanks to Mitch Kachun for this reference.

[315] Joe Harrington, "Gas Lamp Renaissance," Boston Globe, October 24, 1965.

mogeneity and cultural sameness of postwar suburbs. In many cases, the urban pioneers found common cause with their immigrant and working-class neighbors of color in resisting the Boston Redevelopment Authority's (BRA) renewal plans, which sought to divide the South End and displace thousands of low-income residents.[316] Indeed, coalition politics in the South End held the BRA at bay for well over a decade, and sometimes captured widespread attention as in 1968 when residents erected a plywood tent city to raise awareness of the need for affordable housing in Boston. In the end, though, and despite these successes, statistics reveal the true impact of gentrification on the South End. During 1960 to 1980, 25,000 poor and working-class South Enders—half African American—were displaced by renewal, replaced in part by 19,000 new white middle-class residents. The South End's historic nineteenth-century architecture had been preserved. But, as Jim Vrabel puts it, "if people make a neighborhood, an argument can be made that [the South End] was replaced."[317]

If anyone was in a position to benefit from Boston's Gas Lamp Renaissance, it was the progenitors of the Freedom Trail. As we learned in chapter one, the Freedom Trail concept championed by Old North Church rector Robert M. Winn and newspaper man William Schofield in 1951 evolved rapidly, though informally, in subsequent years. In 1957, the Boston Advertising Club made promotion of the trail a pet project, placing it under the supervision of its Public Service Committee, which then consisted of club President Phil Nutting, past President Richard Berenson, and Robert Friedman, soon-to-be-appointed project manager. The Advertising Club formalized a standalone Freedom Trail committee in 1958 and then, in 1960, established a joint Public Service committee with the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce to manage the trail. Recall from chapter three that these were heady days for the chamber, buoyed as it was by Ed Logue's pro-business renewal aspirations and his fondness for the Freedom Trail. Investing in the trail meant investing in a future for Boston tied to urban renewal.[318]

The committee had achieved a great deal by 1965. Co-chair Robert Friedmann noted how frequently the trail appeared in tourist guides. The "increase in visitors," he observed, "speaks for itself." And, yet, problems—which Friedmann considered "the results of this tourist influx"—remained.[319] Tourists still complained, for instance, about untoward sights along the trail. We cannot know exactly what Donald A. Armistead and his family witnessed in Copp's Hill Burying ground because Armistead would "not go into further detail" about the "gross, callous and flagrant disrespect" perpetrated "almost daily by children, teenagers, and some adults, weather permitting." Mrs. Jack Gold reported the same, noting a "half dozen boys... making themselves at home in the historic spot smoking and setting small fires." D.K. Benson, a missile avionics engineer from California, complained to Mayor Collins about the "difficulty in following the trail due to the very poorly marked route." Benson proposed a novel solution: "May I suggest a painted stripe on the sidewalks to follow and thus ease the problem for others who will be coming

[316] In this way, Boston experienced the same waves of early gentrification documented, for instance, by Suleiman Osman in Brooklyn, New York. See Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity in Postwar New York (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[317] Jim Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, 110. Vrabel's statistics appear throughout chapter ten.

[318] For details concerning the Freedom Trail Foundation's organizational genesis, see unsigned letter (probably Robert F. Friedmann or someone else affiliated with Friedmann & Rose, Inc.) to Fred Davis, December 5, 1996, Freedom Trail Foundation Offices, Boston, MA.

[319] Friedmann's comments appear in Minutes of the Meeting, July 15 1965, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, Freedom Trail Foundation, Folder Office Files: Freedom Trail 1965, Box 253, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

later."[320] Whether or not Benson deserves credit for imagining what is now the Freedom Trail's iconic red line is unclear. That a missile designer from California proposed it, however, captures precisely the Cold War moment which defined heritage tourism in postwar Boston.

Visitor comments like these encouraged Berenson and Freidman to advance the Freedom Trail's fortunes. In 1964, under their leadership, the joint committee incorporated to form the nonprofit organization which still operates today as the Freedom Trail Foundation. Friedmann was the foundation's first president, with Berenson as the treasurer and the mayor as honorary chair. Just a year later, the mayor constituted a Freedom Trail Commission, lodged within the parks department, and with Berenson as the chair.[321] The act which established the commission charged it with "designat[ing] a route… not over three miles in length, along which persons may walk and pass not less than twelve historic places."[322] Berenson and Friedman, it seems, had devised a business strategy à la Ed Logue's New Boston: their Freedom Trail Foundation would harvest private capital through fundraising and charitable programming, while the Freedom Trail Commission would manage what facets of public policy—such as relating to sidewalk repair, signage, and street cleaning for instance—related to goings-on along the trail.

The genesis of these organizations, almost simultaneously, owed to a deal—likely brokered by Berenson—to create a Freedom Trail Information Center on Boston Common, attached to the subway entrance at Park and Tremont Streets. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) and the Boston Parks Department pledged to pay for the building, while the Chamber of Commerce promised to staff it and keep it equipped with maps and other items provided by the Freedom Trail Foundation. A press release explained that "young women in blue and gold colors" would meet there with 700,000 visitors annually and distribute "Freedom Trail Booklets donated by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. and information on the New Boston." In 1966, after a year of operation, the Boston Globe reported considerable activity at the new center. "The girls often enjoy just chatting with tourists, many of whom return later for more talk or to ask for a date. "I fell in love this summer because of my job," one attendant confided.[323]

And yet, incorporation wasn't a cure all. Visitors still grumbled about conditions. In 1967, for instance, Wilma Little from Richmond, Indiana complained to the governor that the courtyard of Old North Church "was filled with dirty old men that looked like New York's bowery. We had to step over human body waste in order to read some of the plaques."[324] Visitors complained too about erratic and inconsistent hours of operation at the various sites they encountered along the

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[320] Daniel Waller to Mayor John Collins, August 20, 1965, Folder Office Files: Freedom Trail 1965, Box 253; Donald A. Armistead to Mayor John Collins, September 7, 1962, Folder Office Files: Department of Public Works, Freedom Trail Commission, 1962–64, Box 80; and D.K. Benson to Mayor John Collins, July 19, 1965, Folder Office Files: Department of Public Works, Freedom Trail Commission, 1962–64, Box 80, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

[321] Unsigned letter (possibly Robert F. Friedmann or someone else affiliated with Friedmann & Rose, Inc.) to Fred Davis, December 5, 1996, Freedom Trail Foundation Offices, Boston, MA.

[322] An Act Providing for an Official Designation and Delineation of a Freedom Trail in the City of Boston. 1965 Mass. Acts 33, ch 625. January 1965.

[323] Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, Freedom Trail Foundation, Minutes of the Meeting, July 15, 1965, Folder "Office Files: Freedom Trail 1965," Box 253, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA. Cathleen Cohen, "Freedom Trail Booth A Multi-Purpose Room," Boston Globe, October 2, 1966; "Public Gets Chance to Buy Freedom Trail Shares," Boston Globe, July 16, 1965; Sara Davidson, "Ground-Breaking This Week: Plan Common Tourists Booth," Boston Globe, September 26, 1965.

[324] Wilma Little to John A. Volpe, September 27, 1967, Folder Department of Public Works Freedom Trail Commission 1965, Box 80, Mayor John F. Collins Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

trail.[325] Berenson responded to many of them himself, insisting that their inconveniences resulted from Freedom Trail being a "living trail," which is precisely—as he explained—what made it unique, unlike "cold, austere monumental places, such as Independence Hall." Indeed, insisting on keeping the Freedom Trail open and accessible, to tourists and investors, proved a successful strategy. By 1966 the foundation began running full-page ads in the Boston Globe advertising "subscriptions" to the Freedom Trail with five dollar junior shares, ten dollar senior shares, and twenty-five dollar corporate shares.[326] Increasingly, in the run-up to the Bicentennial, the foundation sponsored speaking events, charitable dinners, film premiers, concerts, and anything else which might raise money for the trail while also boosting interest in it. Locally, at least, the impact was real. Bostonians came to appreciate the trail as a community asset. Not only did kids fall in love at its information center, but "young mothers… change diapers, tourists bring their lunches in and young couples agree to meet there."[327]

A Walkway to the Sea and Boston's Festival Marketplace

Despite evident success along the Freedom Trail, a deep irony within Harrington's so-called Gas Lamp Renaissance bore profound significance for the park: the industrial largess recalled by turn-of-the-century gaslights had all but vanished. Despite brief periods of growth during the World Wars—and a long, devastating decline between them—Boston's traditional goods-producing mill economy was moribund by the 1950s. In its place appeared new kinds of industries: finance, health care, computers, service providers, and durable goods manufacturers. These new sectors favored professional and technical specialists over blue-collar laborers. They also created considerable demand for highly unskilled labor, thereby exacerbating class disparity throughout Boston. Other problems lurked too. Though federal defense spending poured into these new industries during the immediate postwar decades, de-escalation in Vietnam and contractions in the nation's space program triggered precipitous job losses during the early 1970s. And it was the sudden reversal in federal spending which triggered another seismic change: in 1973, President Richard Nixon announced his decision to close the Charlestown Navy Yard. The Navy Yard had sustained nearly fourteen thousand employees just a decade before; by 1970 five thousand people still worked there.[328] A quarter of them had accrued enough seniority to retire. Younger employees had opportunities to transfer to the nation's other Navy Yards, or find new work in private industry. But middle-aged workers like fifty-six-year old John I. Beach readily understood that "no private company is going to hire me… and there aren't enough government jobs to go around."[329] Like Boston itself, Navy Yard employees found themselves caught up in an era of economic transition which left few options for people in the middle.

The nagging dichotomies which typified Boston's transformations during the 1960s and 1970s reshaped the city's political landscape too. John Hynes, and John Collins before him, had dominated mayoral politics for nearly two decades by reinvesting in Boston's downtown. Urban renewal made sense then because it promised to reverse decades of downtown disinvestment by the four-term James Curley administration, which favored Boston's ethnic neighborhoods. By the late 1960s, as we've seen, the tides had reversed again. Urban renewal's excesses in down-

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[325] Ken Botwright, "Those 'Blue' Sundays on the Freedom Trail," Boston Globe, July 9, 1966.

[326] Display ad 152, Boston Globe, February 6, 1966.

[327] Cathleen Cohen, "Freedom Trail Booth A Multi-Purpose Room," Boston Globe, October 2, 1966.

[328] Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson, The Boston Renaissance: Race Space, and Economic Change in an American Metropolis (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 200), 59–66.

[329] John Wood, "At the Yard, 'It's Too Late to be Crying,'" Boston Globe, May 8, 1973.

town—such as the wholesale replacement of Scollay Square with the new modernist Government Center—and especially the BRA's insistence on profiting from displacement in the West and South Ends, focused the 1967 Boston mayoral campaign on the concerns of residents determined to resist renewal everywhere else. Kevin White, who won that election, did so in part by assuring voters a greater role in city politics for Boston's neighborhoods. Sure enough, once elected, White opened new city offices throughout Boston, invested in infrastructure and capital improvements beyond downtown, and made himself and the police more present in Boston's African American communities.[330]

And yet, despite all this, White remained powerfully committed to urban renewal and downtown's business set. In fact, it was White who oversaw the final transformation of Boston's downtown renewal district into the heritage consumer landscape which frames how virtually all park visitors experience the park to this day. The Government Center had been completed but the portions of downtown circling it remained unplanned for, including historic Faneuil Hall and, to its east, the three neoclassical granite buildings of Quincy Market, built 1824–26. As we saw in chapter three, Walter Muir Whitehill had convinced Ed Logue to protect portions of Boston's historic landscape, but by 1969 when the BRA received a federal preservation grant for Quincy Market, it still had no plan for these buildings.

Architect Roger S. Webb and his newly formed Architecture Heritage Foundation had set to work on a preservation plan in 1966. So had competing architect and restaurateur Benjamin Thompson, whose vision included folding all the buildings into a distinctive retail experience. Thompson engaged James Rouse who had gained notoriety for his pioneering designs of shopping malls and planned communities. Together with Thompson, Rouse reimagined the Faneuil Hall and Quincy Market areas as what they termed a "walkway to the sea," a transitional area between the waterfront and the Government Center wherein locals and visitors alike would shop, dine, and imagine themselves as part of historic Boston. Between 1972 and 1973, just as the political fight over the park heated up, so did the competition between Webb and Rouse to win Mayor White's favor. The BRA initially sided with Thompson, but city council sided with Rouse, who bundled his proposal with $500,000 for Bicentennial programming. In the end, White opted for Rouse, who he claimed had "won my heart and mind." With that, Rouse set to developing the nation's first festival marketplace, portions of which opened to great fanfare during August 1976.[331]

The Bicentennial in Boston

Rouse's offer of Bicentennial funding reminds us just how deeply concerns over planning the nation's two hundredth birthday celebration seeped into the nation's economic, cultural, and political landscape. Indeed, in a letter to one of the architects managing the Faneuil Hall project, White complained about slow progress on "one of the most important restoration projects in America." "What you may not be aware of," he grumbled, "is the importance this project plays in Boston's Bicentennial celebration, and the interest and time that I have devoted to guarantee its successful completion before the summer of 1975."[332] White's missive reminds us that if urban renewal created the overarching framework for gentrification in Boston, then it was the national

[330] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 267–68.

[331] O'Connor, Building a New Boston, 270–79. The quote appears on 276.

[332] Kevin White to Burgess & Blacher Architects, n.d. (ca. July 1973), Folder 6 Correspondence: BRA 1973 July–1974 December, Box 2, 0245.001 General Correspondence, 1969–1975 B, Mayor Kevin White Papers, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

Bicentennial celebration which activated it. We've already seen in chapter three how Congress bullied the park into existence, not out of a prevailing concern for the agency's mandate, but rather to satisfy the political agendas of representatives working to lure jobs, tourists, and federal monies to Boston amid the national Bicentennial celebration. Rouse's development campaign demonstrates how Bicentennial concerns literally reshaped, up until the very last minute, the historic landscape which Congress authorized the park to manage.

In other ways too, Bicentennial build-up had already set the stage for park planning, even in ways not immediately evident to the NPS. Bicentennial planning in Boston had, after all, been orchestrated by the same people who set out after World War II to create a profitable heritage landscape. The Chamber of Commerce initiated Bicentennial planning with the city in 1962, having been inspired that year by a visit to the World's Fair in Seattle, Washington. The Chamber applied to the Bureau of International Expositions that November and, in 1963, organized the World Freedom Fair, Inc. to coordinate—in partnership with the BRA—all planning activities associated with the Bicentennial and a World's Fair for Boston. By 1966, World Freedom Fair, Inc. operated its own office with six employees. Importantly, the organization's staff included two BRA planners appointed specifically for the job, showing once again how thoroughly the Logue model of private-public partnership had infiltrated Boston's civic landscape during the 1960s. The Freedom 75 group, as it had become known, even reached out to Walter Muir Whitehill for support. Whitehill dismissed the project as "hucksterism" and sent a copy of his grumpy "Celebration versus Cerebration" essay instead.[333]

Boston's World's Fair aspirations, as we learned in chapter three, succumbed in 1970 to the whims of federal Bicentennial planning. It was a great disappointment to BRA planners who had been planning diligently for Expo 76, in part owing to Kevin White's strong support for it. They had conceived of a massive floating city-of-tomorrow connecting Columbia Point in Dorchester to Thompson Island. Modular communities, floating gardens, and a massive glass dome all pointed to a futuristic next chapter for urban renewal. The project's potential environmental impact on Boston Harbor, however, drew staunch opposition including from Massachusetts state senator John Joseph Moakley, who opposed it even before learning of the World Exposition Commission's decision against a World's Fair in Boston. It was precisely this showdown over the harbor and the future of its islands which would lead to establishment in 1996 of the Boston Harbor National Recreation Area.[334]

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[333] Chronology detailed in James I. F. Matthew (deputy director general manager) to Henderson Supplee, Jr., June 22, 1966, Folder 20 1975 World Freedom Fair, Inc.—Weekly Reports September–December 1966, Box 2, David C. Harrison Papers, 1963–1975, State Library of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. Regarding BRA appointments, see Harrison's draft BRA report, February 24, 1967, Folder 27 1975 World Freedom Fair, Inc., Box 2, David C. Harrison Papers, 1963–1975, State Library of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. David C. Harrison to Walter Muir Whitehill, September 26, 1966, Box 2, David C. Harrison Papers, 1963–1975, State Library of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. For the essay, see Walter Muir Whitehill, "Cerebration versus Celebration," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 68, no. 3 (July 1960): 259–70. Harrison's response perfectly encapsulates the neoliberal heritage profit model championed by Logue et al.

[334] For an overview of Expo 76 in Boston, see Mark Arsenault, "Dreams and Doubts Collided in Plans for Global 'Expo,'" Boston Globe, April 19, 2015. For a broad overview of planning activities, see David C. Harrison Papers, 1963–1975, State Library of Massachusetts, Boston, MA. Quotes from Ian Menzies, "Role for Boston and Charlestown in Expo '76," Boston Globe, September 9, 1970. Moakley's opposition to Expo 76 is discussed in Laura Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley to Historical Preservation in Boston," unpublished report (2005), Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 1–2.

Image 4: A guide to the Freedom Trail distributed in Boston ca. 1964 showcases postwar renewal. See the John Collins Papers, Box 80, Boston City Archives.

The BRA's planning did pay off, however, insomuch as it laid the groundwork—in its Prologue 75 proposal—for a whole host of local Bicentennial programming, including a Navy Yard heritage experience and an expanded Freedom Trail. White assigned responsibility for coordinating these activities to the Mayor's Office of the Boston Bicentennial, which he established in 1972. True to form, the city's new Bicentennial office then immediately created Boston 200, a nonprofit corporation charged with operating Boston's Bicentennial programs. Its director, Katharine D. Kane, played a pivotal role in shaping Boston's Bicentennial experience and, as we will see, figured significantly in early conversations with NPS planners about the shape of the park. Under Kane, Boston 200 advanced two major interpretive initiatives which largely defined the visitor experience of Boston's bicentennial heritage landscape. The first, "Citygame," encompassed three exhibits arrayed across the city which sought to focus Bicentennial tourists on "the city itself… Boston's cultural and educational institutions, its fascinating ethnic neighborhoods, its historic areas, and its citizens themselves become the basis for celebration." The first of Citygame's exhibits, "The Revolution: Where it all Began," moored visitors in a revolutionary past. The second two—"The Grand Exposition of Progress and Invention," and "Where's Boston: Visions of the City"—explored the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[335]

Tying it all together was Boston 200's second interpretive initiative, a series of eight neighborhood discovery trails and a Black Heritage Trail. Six of these—Charlestown, Waterfront, Beacon Hill, South End, Cambridge, and Back Bay—expanded the Freedom Trail concept into adjacent neighborhoods by equipping tourists with maps highlighting important historic sites along the way. The pioneering Black Heritage Trail, which ranked among the first publicly-funded walking tours of African American history in the United States, primarily chronicled Boston's nine-

[335] For the details of Boston 200's genesis, and an overview of its programs, see Boston 200 Corporation, Boston: The Official Bicentennial Guidebook (New York: Dutton, 1975), US Government Documents, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. Quote appears on 99.

Image 5: Mayor John Collins (seated at center) swears in members of the Freedom Trail Commission, including (from left) trail originator William Schofield, Public Works commissioner John F. Flaherty, Parks and Recreation commissioner William J. Devine, Traffic and Parking commissioner Thomas F. Carty, and Richard Berenson. Photo appeared in the February 1966 edition of Report, the newsletter of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. John Collins Papers, Box 239, Boston City Archives.

teenth-century black community and mostly followed the path still marked today.[336] And, finally, Boston 200, in partnership with the Freedom Trail Foundation, radically expanded Boston's favorite historical footpath. The Boston Globe reported that "now there are 2 Freedom Trails to follow." Former US Senator Leverett Saltonstall, who had since replaced Friedman as president of the Freedom Trail Foundation, explained that the trail had been expanded into a North End Loop and a Downtown loop. "City workers have erased the old Freedom Trail," the Globe reported, "and have painted new red lines along downtown sidewalks marking the two loops." Saltonstall explained that the change was intended to ease tourist congestion during the busy Bicentennial season. What's more, for the first time in history, all the Freedom Trail sites had begun to coordinate their hours "for tourist convenience."[337]

The Bicentennial years—which formally began in Boston during 1973 in connection with the centennial of the Boston Tea Party—thus nourished the park's partner sites like never before and significantly strengthened the Freedom Trail's hold on the city's popular historical imagination. It also produced, in many cases, thoughtful and innovative programming. Historian M.J. Rymsza-Pawlowska recounts how the Citygame exhibit, "The Revolution: Where it all Began" (staged by Boston 200 in the Old Quincy Market), deployed all matter of innovative interpretive strategies to confront modern visitors with the emotional weight of choices made by the revolutionary generation.[338] Boston 200 also sponsored performances of "We've Come Back For a

[336] According to John Sprinkle, an earlier publicly-funded Black History walking trail may have operated in Harlem beginning in the late 1960s.

[337] Trail maps and route descriptions appear in Boston 200 Corporation, Boston: The Official Bicentennial Guidebook (New York: Dutton, 1975). On the two Freedom Trails, see Mary Meier, "Now There Are 2 Freedom Trails to Follow," Boston Globe, May 30, 1975.

[338] M.J. Rymsza-Pawlowska, History Comes Alive: Public History and Popular Culture in the 1970s (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 98–105.

Little Look Around," a joint project of the NPS and Temple University, wherein student actors imagined, on stage and in conversation with Bicentennial audiences, what would happen if Benjamin Franklin returned to experience the 1970s United States. Audience engagement seems to have been a key facet of Boston 200 programming. Its walking trails, for instance, had been developed in conjunction with an NEA-funded bicentennial discovery network project to study Boston's neighborhoods and the reactions of people who might tour them. The Boston City Archives contains folders of handwritten feedback from school children taken on prototype tours around the city, including in Charlestown where one student just couldn't fathom how she could "acquire an understanding of the significant (if any) role that Charlestown played in the formation of the United States today by just finding out the difference between a federalist [sic] building and a victorian building."[339] Her misgivings notwithstanding, bicentennial era programming cemented the Freedom Trail's grasp on Boston's historical imagination, so much so that in 1976 the NPS included it on its new and growing list of National Recreation Trails.[340]

Elsewhere, Bicentennial programming channeled the anxieties of the period. Activists representing the entire spectrum of American political concerns gathered in Boston for a 1973 Boston Tea Party reenactment, where members of the People's Bicentennial Commission stole the show by rowing around the harbor wearing a giant Richard Nixon mask and royal robes emblazoned with oil company logos.[341] Tammy Gordon argues that the Bicentennial celebration expressed a shifting American zeitgeist, one wherein distrust of government spawned a new sense of individualism alongside renewed faith in the market to bolster democracy. Ellen Goodman captured that sensibility in Boston, observing at the time that though "the buycentennial [sic] burgers and red, white and blue ice cream bars had come and gone… we have more trees, an expanded Afro American museum, a renovated nineteenth-century marketplace, a water fountain here, and a historical marker there." "In Boston," she concluded, "we have seen a Bicentennial that enriched rather than ripped off our heritage."[342]

Goodman's conflation of heritage, profit, and urban progress recalled a long tradition in Boston, detailed in chapter one, of linking revolutionary memory to economic growth. Hers was precisely the same sentiment which encouraged renewal efforts during the 1820s, colonial revivalism during the 1870s, and "slum clearance" during the 1950s. It is this facet of revolutionary memory, in fact, which explains why it has prevailed in Boston since the 1820s. Traditional icons of revolutionary memory, such as Paul Revere, fit easily into modern notions of entrepreneurial citizenship. Bicentennial programming, as Gordon shows us, made the connection even more overt, reinforcing at every turn the idea that wealth (or the quest for it) and consumerism are predictors of virtuous citizenship. Consider, for instance, the Bicentennial Birthday Book campaign, wherein the City of Boston issued a catalog of gifts to the city, ranging from bike racks to play-

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[339] Regarding the play, see materials in Folder 6 Festival American: Take a look Around/National Park Service, Box 15, Boston 200 Collection, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA. Feedback from students of Buckingham Brown and Nichols School after November 12, 1974 tour of Charlestown, Folder 8: Task Force Projects: Education: Walking Tours Kids' Reactions 1974, Box 6, Boston 200 Collection, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

[340] Files concerning the Freedom Trail's dedication as a National Recreation Trail appear in Box 15, Boston 200 Collection, Boston City Archives, West Roxbury, MA.

[341] Rymsza-Pawlowska, History Comes Alive, 139–42; Tammy S. Gordon, The Spirit of 1976: Commerce, Community, and the Politics of Commemoration (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 76–77.

[342] Goodman cited in Gordon, The Spirit of 1976, 113.

grounds, that ordinary citizens might purchase by way of expressing their patriotism.[343] Against this backdrop, it is hardly any surprise at all that legislators dismissed NPS concerns which, as proposed, the park was neither historically cogent nor practically feasible. Amid the consumerist rhetoric of bicentennial fervor, and given the NPS's eager embrace of urban renewal, Congress readily confused the pursuit of profit with the work of history. Indeed, by the time NPS planners arrived in Boston to imagine a new national park, much of the imagining had already been done for them by the Bicentennial and its boosters. History in Boston meant a robust Freedom Trail which, though occasionally capable of confronting difficult pasts, equated old stories about revolutionary memory with modern notions of progress, profit, and privilege.

The New History and a New NPS

This conflation of Revolutionary memory and modern American capitalism showcases a remarkable irony at play in the park's intellectual genesis. At exactly the same time that planners and politicians butted heads over the park's authorizing legislation, and with it the park's historical contours, American historians had ignited a firestorm of revisionist revolutionary historiography. The spark, it turns out, was a probing debate about the causes of the Revolution: was it really about power, or were ideas at is core? If it was about power, then was it economic or political power? If it was about ideas like liberty and virtue, then how did Americans end up so beholden to market forces by the middle of the next century? What about people with no consumer or political power? How did women, the poor, and the enslaved experience the Revolution? How did they make claims to citizenship? All these questions had been presaged by the same concerns—civil rights, war, class strife, Watergate, the Bicentennial itself—which had set the United States on edge after World War II. The 1960s saw volumes of top-shelf scholarship pour out of American universities, which dismantled the consensus history which had very much lodged itself in the BNHSC's vision of Longfellow's Boston. And yet, remarkably, none of this new scholarship seems to have found its way into official conversations surrounding the park's authorization—even though many of its leading figures, most notably Alfred Young, staked their claim in Boston within spitting distance of the Freedom Trail.[344] It is doubly ironic perhaps that Young, who had by 1974 already established himself as an authority on radicalism among working people in Revolutionary Boston, was ideally suited to counter the bicentennial era's conflation of citizenship and consumerism.

A third irony, then, is that at exactly the same time, young historians—weaned on precisely the work Young and his colleagues advanced during those years—were seeking out NPS jobs in surprising numbers. They did so because, by the 1970s, the number of baby boomers seeking university jobs vastly outnumbered the number of undergraduate students studying history in American universities. As Cathy Stanton and others have pointed out, this first-wave job crisis in university history departments not only prompted a significant investment in public history training within the academy, it also propelled a generation of progressive historians into public-sector history professions. Many young historians who did sign on with the NPS, however, found themselves caught up in mountains of compliance work created by preservation legislation in the late 1960s. In these cases, though the NPS employed historians, newly-hired historians did not necessarily have opportunity to shape interpretation or contribute to arguments about

[343] Gordon, The Spirit of 1976, 114–15.

[344] There are many overviews of the turn in Revolution historiography, including John Selby, "Revolutionary America: The Historiography," OAH Magazine of History 8, (Summer 1994): 5–8.

significance.[345] Others, however, did have a profound impact on NPS history programming, as evidenced in Stanton's study of Lowell. And, as we will see, they would have a significant impact at the park too, but not at the outset. On the contrary, planning for the park remained very much within a consensus framework during the Bicentennial years despite the presence in Boston and beyond of a growing corps of young innovative historians with a particular talent for challenging old ideas about the Revolution in American memory.[346]

That trained historians did not figure more prominently in the park's planning saga, despite their availability, also reflected agency-wide realignments during the turbulent 1970s. The Bicentennial era was a difficult one for the NPS. The spring 1974 park hearings (H.R. 7486, S. 210) before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, detailed in chapter three, reveal just how hard they were. Why was it that the agency had such an adversarial relationship with Congress in Boston at a time that, from all outward appearances, the NPS seemed more popular than ever? As we have seen, one reason concerned the legacy of Mission 66. Under Conrad Wirth, the NPS had embraced profit-based private partnership as a strategy to cope with crumbling infrastructure and dated programming. The BNHSC endorsed this model by linking the park to urban renewal. By putting economic stimulus on par with historical significance as a rationale for authorizing new units, however, the NPS effectively devalued historical arguments—and, consequently, historical expertise—in its deliberations. Thus Associate Director for Planning and Development Dennis Galvin's lament that "we've lost control of the agenda."[347] It was the NPS, after all, that had surrendered the agenda by elevating the expertise of pundits, politicians, and developers as it had in staffing the BNHSC. How could Galvin and others suddenly resist a course correction that agency leaders had themselves introduced? Congressional ire over NPS insistence that the park not be authorized reflected this collision of expectations and foreshadowed a new era of what would come to be known as "park barrel politics."

But on the ground too, neoliberal trends in in federal policy making in the 1970s—toward smaller government, fiscal austerity, deregulation, and private-sector investment—created immediate challenges for an agency which had come of age amid the big-government largesse of the New Deal. We saw several of these problems aired during the 1974 spring hearings. How, for instance, could the NPS pay for the park amid strict spending restrictions and hiring ceilings imposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an office created by President Richard Nixon in 1970 precisely for this purpose? Remarkably, the subcommittee seemed not to understand that no matter how much money Congress appropriated, OMB restrictions limited what could be spent. The impossibility of reconciling congressional expectations with the agency's mandate in these circumstances deeply complicated the park's path to authorization. Similar battles played out elsewhere in the system. During the same period, for instance, the NPS opposed authorization of two other large urban units—Cuyahoga Valley Recreation Area be-

[345] For a broad engagement with this problem and others concerning history in the NPS, see Anne Mitchell Whisnant, Marla R. Miller, Gary B. Nash, and David Paul Thelen, Imperiled Promise: The State of History in the National Park Service (Bloomington, IN: Organization of American Historians, 2011).

[346] On the job crisis in history, see Robert B. Townsend, "History in Those Hard Times: Looking for Jobs in the 1970s," Perspectives on History: The News Magazine of the American Historical Association, September 1, 2009, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/september-2009/history-in-those-hard-times-looking-for-jobs-in-the-1970s (accessed April 26, 2019). On the confluence of progressive historians, the job crises, and NPS careers, see Stanton, The Lowell Experiment, 8–16, 139.

[347] David Foster, "'Park Barrel' Politics Seen as Redefining 75-Year-Old National System," The Los Angeles Times, October 13, 1991. Also see Ridenour, The National Parks Compromised.



Image 6: The disproportionate costs associated with managing the Navy Yard appear in "Minimum Requirements for Operation of Boston National Historical Park," May 23, 1975. Boston National Historical Park Archives.

tween Akron and Cleveland, Ohio, and Santa Monica Mountains Recreation Area outside Los Angeles, California—to no avail. So, while the bicentennial put a spotlight on the NPS during the 1970s, and brought considerable attention to Boston, it also saddled the agency with a crippling unfunded mandate for growth.[348]

Part of the problem owed to the agency's own inconsistencies. George Hartzog, who encouraged growth during his stint as director (1964–1973), altered NPS organizational structure an astounding seven times. The tumult of presidential politics after Watergate introduced more directors with mixed agendas. Ronald H. Walker replaced Hartzog in 1973; Gary Everhardt replaced Walker in 1975, William J. Whalen replaced Everhardt in 1977; and Russell Dickenson replaced Whalen in 1980.[349] The NPS's position in its showdown with Congress during these years was clearly weakened by its inability to articulate a clear and consistent vision. So too was it affected by the shift under these directors toward what Russ Olsen refers to as a "philosophy of decentralizing decision making to regional cities."[350] Decentralization figured significantly in the park's planning saga. It did so most directly by way of changes in the system's regional structure. Almost immediately upon taking charge in 1973, for instance, Director Walker eliminated the Boston Sites Group and divided the Northeast Region—which had been headquartered in Philadelphia—into a North Atlantic Region, headquartered in Boston, and a Mid-Atlantic Region, headquartered in Philadelphia. What is more, even before Walker's transitions, the NPS

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[348] Tammy Gordon summarizes this scenario in The Spirit of 1976, 105–07.

[349] On NPS resistance to unit authorization and the succession of leadership, see Barry Mackintosh, The National Parks: Shaping the System (Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, 1991), 57–59.

[350] Russ Olsen, "Administrative History: Organizational Structure of the National Park Service, 1917 to 1985," September 1985, https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/olsen/adhi-a.htm?fbclid=IwAR0D2VrmjDMeddNAvaTDn10vcgDKdT4EhhWRPh0BuVVcy6HG0CwOf_ga1Us (accessed April 26, 2019).

had, under Hartzog, moved toward a system of decentralized planning and interpretive services. Although deliberations over the park before the 1973 legislative drive had remained predominately in local hands, responsibility for planning after authorization would shift to the Denver Service Center, through which the NPS routed all planning activities beginning in 1971.[351] Amid these changes, then, the agency's presence in Boston had grown simultaneously stronger and weaker. A seeming contradiction which, in many ways, characterized the complex negotiations surrounding the park's authorization and which—alongside decentralization and the allure of private partnerships—threatened serious history making at every turn.

Part II: Planning a Modern Partnership Park, ca. 1974

My purpose so far in this chapter has been to demonstrate just how complex and confusing Mary Holmes' "modern Boston" really was at the time of the park's authorization. It was home, on one hand, to scores of Bostonians for whom the promises of urban renewal—indeed, the promises of American democracy as enshrined along the Freedom Trail—had turned out to be lies. On the other hand, it was home also to scores of Bostonians whose prosperity seemed to align perfectly with the trail's fortunes. People whose fate hung somewhere in the middle worried about factory closings, agonized over their children's education, rallied against political opponents, and confronted violence in the streets. Boston was privileged during those years with a corps of young historians who understood the origins of these problems. And yet, their quiet insight could hardly break through the din of patriotic nationalism promulgated by a federal government concerned to boost consumer spending. At the same time, the NPS—perhaps the one federal agency capable of shining a critical light on the nation's 200th birthday—found itself embroiled in its own legitimacy crisis. A radical redistribution of expertise, sharp spending limitations, and the politicization of unit authorization called into question the agency's mandate. What, under these circumstances, could the NPS bring to a city like Boston where the heritage landscape—indeed, the very meaning of history itself—had been forged more than a century before, and powerfully re-inscribed by the BNHSC, the Freedom Trail Foundation, Boston 200, and the park's very own authorizing legislation?

An awful lot, according to the park's Denver Service Center (DSC) planning team. Because the park represented, from its view, "an entirely new character of park, as well as an entirely new character of park management," the planning team had approached its challenge "in a spirit of cooperation and venture." It set as its goal the "structuring of a park and park organization that will reflect the unique character of the culture that produced the sites." And, of course, it sought to imagine a park "with the thought of sharing responsibilities, costs, and operations… with all concerned organizations and interested citizens." Ultimately, the planning team set out to create a park which would be "sensitive, in all instances, to the needs and requirements of the community, its people, and the organizations" responsible for preserving its constituent sites in the first place.[352]

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[351] The Denver Service Center was established November 15, 1971. See chart 30 in Russ Olsen, Administrative History: Organizational Structures of the National Park Service, 1917–1985 (1985), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/olsen/images/adhi30.jpg (accessed April 26, 2019). For details regarding individuals service centers, see "Service Centers," in Harold P. Danz, Historic Listing of National Park Service Officials, May 1, 1991, https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/tolson/histlist11.htm?fbclid=IwAR1hjkzqtRDw_E9rL5LIVKPos9Va8OsjxQ3OhQyq2obJ9XFwBXuwkuxgvEs#d (accessed April 26, 2019).

[352] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP Archives, revised draft June 23, 1975; 1, Box 30, RG79; NPS Division of Interpretive Planning (entry P417); NARA, College Park, MD.

But could the planning team achieve such lofty goals given the particularities of the park's path to authorization? The park had been authorized, after all, against the wishes of the NPS, without adequate area studies, and in a rush to capitalize on the bicentennial. Expectations were high that the NPS would play a key role in welcoming hundreds of thousands of celebrants to Boston. And then, of course, there was the matter of the Navy Yard, a last-minute legislative addition which largely confounded the agency's intent to tell the story of the American Revolution in Boston, and which created immediate management concerns by merit of its sheer size and complexity. The park welcomed its first superintendent, Hugh Gurney, in June 1975.[353] But it needed so much more: a visitor center, more staff, an advisory commission, interpretive programs, and on top of it all, it would need to negotiate complex cooperative agreements with five different historic sites, and all from scratch. This is to say nothing of the even more oblique challenges associated with community engagement and stakeholder relations. The NPS would now have a hand in managing properties in portions of Boston where residents had been struggling for years against the whims of urban renewal and ravages of social and racial inequality. The Washington Office urged that "cooperative agreements should be the first order of business as this time," but clearly at stake in the park's first days would be the possibility of creating a park which would be meaningful to neighbors as well as tourists.[354]

Devising and Considering Alternatives

Minutes from the park's first formal meeting after authorization indicate that finding common ground—and making sense of what Public Law 93-431 actually stipulated—was a challenge from the outset. Forty-one NPS officials, park planners, and park constituents gathered on the morning of November 21, 1974 in Room 927 of the John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse to discuss next steps and respond to draft management objectives circulated in advance by the NPS.[355] Federal/state Liaison Jack Benjamin introduced the meeting, noting that the campaign to authorize the park had "been a long, hard process," so long in fact that he "wasn't sure exactly when the idea was born." NPS Deputy Director David A. Richie spoke next, thanking everyone for their efforts, but then immediately turned to a concern which lingered throughout the meeting. "The NPS is worried," he explained, "about the expectations of many people that money would come with passage of the legislation." Richie noted that the normal appropriations process would not play out until July, well after the beginning of Bicentennial festivities. "We had hoped to be able to divert some of this year's funds to begin significant Bicentennial projects this year," he added, but "we have been advised recently that no longer can this be expected." Although the NPS, in Richie's words, was "optimistic for the future," by late 1974 it was "restrained in what we can offer and what we can hope to accomplish."[356]

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[353] "The Boston Beacon," Boston National Historical Park newsletter, December 10, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[354] Acting Associate Director, Legislation, to Regional Director, North Atlantic Region, October 10, 1974, Folder BNHP Resource Management Records, BNHP Legislation [Activation Memos, newsletters, 1974–1977], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[355] The NPS invited local media to witness the meeting. See news release, "Meeting set to Begin Planning for BNHP Archives," November 18, 1974, Folder BNHP Planning 1974, 1982, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[356] Meeting minutes, November 21, 1974, Folder BNHP Planning 1974, 1982, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Despite having been warned of this likely predicament by the NPS throughout the 1973–74 legislation drive, the park's partners lashed out. BRA Director Robert T. Kenney suggested that the NPS join in organizing an effort to convince Senator Edward M. Kennedy to advance a supplemental appropriations bill. Richie reminded Kenney that, regarding budget matters, the NPS reported to the OMB and since the OMB was lodged within the executive branch, the NPS could not encourage the Senate or anyone else to act against it. Gail Rotegard, second in charge at Boston 200, shared her understanding that cooperative agreements would have to be signed before Congress would consider supplemental appropriations. Richie explained that agreements would be needed to fund rehabilitation work at the various sites, but that they were not necessary to fund other projects, including interpretation. Jack Benjamin urged that "it is critical to get staff on board… to get the necessary technical and professional support at the sites." One after another, however, representatives of the park's constituent sites insisted that what they wanted, and expected, was money. The Bostonian Society needed money to preserve the Old State House, the city needed money to repair Faneuil Hall. William Osgood, representing the Paul Revere House, suggested that perhaps the NPS could "help in identifying the problems," even if it was not in a position to pay for solutions. But First Naval District Commander Thomas Coyne and Lewis Whittemore, representing the Ancient and Honorable Artillery, brought the discussion back to money, insisting that the sites needed money to manage buildings and collections.

Beyond money, the park's constituent sites worried too over the nature of cooperative agreements. Old North's vicar, Robert W. Golledge was solely concerned, as he put it, with "developing a relationship with the National Park Service." Old South's Robert C. Dean argued with Benjamin about the legislation's requirements regarding cooperative agreements, and the BRA wondered what had become of verbal agreements made with the NPS before authorization. "Those agreements," Benjamin responded, could be used "as options." Rotegard suggested that Boston 200 should represent the various sites going forward, though the NPS insisted on dealing individually with its partner sites. Richie noted too that the planning process should be "available to any of the interested public in Boston." Benjamin reminded everyone that this "is a new process and maybe the first time that PLANNERS in preparing management objectives have attempted to get everyone involved." Richie noted that, beyond the challenge of attempting a new kind of planning process, the park faced another problem: "no new area study was done for the park as a whole [before authorization]—this is unfortunate but true. Because of this, we do not have a basic planning take-off point that we normally have." As the meeting wound down, it became increasingly clear that each of the sites had its own unique concerns, that almost everyone had different ideas about what Public Law 93-431 promised, and that some among the site representatives perceived—correctly or not—that the NPS had not been entirely forthright, before authorization, about the meanings and possibilities of federal partnership in Boston.

Disagreements and misunderstandings notwithstanding, the meeting constituted a critical first step—specifically, the preparation of a Statement for Management—toward developing a GMP for the new park. The planning team invited site owners and other stakeholders back for meetings during February 3–7, 1975 to discuss a revised thirteen-page draft statement of objectives for planning and management.[357] The revised draft clearly responded to the concerns voiced by site owners at the previous meeting. Portions concerning cooperative agreements with

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[357] Meetings noted in Gurney to Regional Director, March 14, 1977, Folder BNHP Resource Management Records, BNHP Legislation [Activation Memos, newsletters, 1974–1977], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

constituent sites carefully emphasized that the NPS sought to "achieve a common set of standards while at the same time maintaining the diversity and variety of the individual site." They expressed a concern to protect the sites' ability "to contribute funds," and the NPS's intent to compile a "management inventory" of tasks the agency could assist with immediately "within the limits of the legislative authorities and congressional appropriations." All these provisions responded directly to concerns expressed at the park's start-up meeting, just months before.[358]

More broadly, the draft objectives reveal emergent concerns which would, in the following years, consume administrative energies. The Navy Yard, of course, figured prominently. Completing land transfers in and around the yard was a priority, as was determining how to manage parking and traffic flow, including a "bicycle trail connecting all sites." Concern for managing Section 106 procedures and developing a reuse plan for the Navy Yard also show the extent to which park planners understood early on the magnitude of their work in Charlestown. More broadly, the draft management objectives restated Public Law 93-431's interpretive focus on the "American Revolution and the founding and growth of the United States." Indeed, it is within this document that we see the first official NPS expression of concern to cooperate with sites on the Freedom Trail, and specifically, the Freedom Trail Foundation. That said, the draft management objectives also identify a parallel interpretive path for the Navy Yard, which would be "interpreted in line with the significance of the site and its contribution to the development of the United States Navy and Naval technologies, its environmental relationship to Charlestown and Boston and the USS Constitution." From the outset then, it was clear that the NPS conceived of the Navy Yard and its downtown sites as separate entities, physically and intellectually.

Throughout spring 1975, the park's planning team mulled over responses to its proposed management objectives toward completing the next step in the GMP process, environmental assessment, wherein various ways to configure a park—"alternatives" in planning parlance—are imagined and circulated for comment. In early February, Regional Director Jerry Wagers announced two public meetings, one at Faneuil Hall on the tenth and another on the eleventh at the Kent School in Charlestown. The purpose of these meetings, according to Wagers' announcement, was to "insure that a broad segment of the public has an opportunity to become aware of the proposed park and to express any concerns… which might otherwise be overlooked by our planners."[359]

Devising park alternatives required the added work of assessing base-level operational requirements, a task bypassed and thus remaining from the rush to authorization. A statement of minimum requirements for operation issued by the planning team in May reveals just how much work needed to be done to get a park up and running in Boston, regardless of the alternatives, which were then still in development. It also reveals the disproportionate costs associated with the Navy Yard (see graph on page 98). The planning team estimated that minimum operations would require a total of $1,267,000. Of that, nearly half would be required for structural main-

[358] See draft statement of objectives for planning and management, February 3, 1975, Folder BNHP Planning 1974, 1982, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[359] Regional Director Jerry Wagers to "All those interested in the BNHP Archives," February 3, 1975, Folder BNHP Planning 1974, 1982, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Although it is unclear during what meetings they were taken, handwritten notes evidently compiled during discussion of alternatives appear in Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, College Park, MD. Thanks to Jay Driskell for assisting with acquisition of these materials.

tenance and other maintenance contracts associated with the Navy Yard. Key contract work included installation of HVAC systems, the addition of boundary fences and safety rails, cleanup throughout, landscaping around USS Constitution, and installation of exhibits. The remaining funding, as apportioned by the planning team, would pay for a full battery of professional support personnel who would be assigned to assist partner sites with maintenance, security, and interpretive planning throughout the park. Bunker Hill needed paint and roof repairs, as did Faneuil Hall. The Old State House needed paint too, inside and outside, as well as plaster repair. Beyond all this, Old South's brick steeple and roof needed extensive repairs. All this work, planners realized, would need to be completed by May 1976 to accommodate Bicentennial visitors. The planning team worried about interpretation too, but clearly recognized that first-year activities would revolve around maintenance and cleanup.[360]

During July 19–20, 1975, the planning team circulated its draft environmental assessment.[361] Boston National Historical Park, they asserted, was a brand new type of park and, therefore, had required an entirely new approach to planning. In this case, it meant planning "in a spirit of cooperation and venture, with the goal of structuring a park and park organization will reflect the unique character of the culture that produced the sites." It meant also "sharing responsibilities, costs, and operations… with all concerned organizations and interested citizens." The proposed alternatives, therefore, sought to be "sensitive… to the needs and requirements of the community, its people, and the organizations," which had preserved the park's constituent sites in the first place.[362] In every instance, "maximum participation by site owners and the public in the planning and decision making process is earnestly solicited." It was this facet of the planning process, according to the report's authors, which constituted "new planning procedures," so new in fact that the report included a visualization of its engagement strategies. In other words, it was the extent to which planners engaged various non-NPS stakeholders in the development of the park's draft alternatives which distinguished this process from any others that had preceded it.[363]

What, then, had this process of radical public engagement revealed about the significance of the park's constituent sites and their meanings? The draft assessment proposed three levels of significance, intended as frameworks for interpretive programming: global, overarching super themes; central themes derived more specifically from the "American experience"; and site themes concerning the particularities of each historic structure and its associated characters. Interpretation, the planners indicated, should link together multiple themes, but should always be "bound together by the idea of revolution." Super themes and central themes, the planners suggested, should focus on the significance of the Revolution, philosophical radicalism (including

[360] "Minimum Requirements for Operation of Boston National Historical Park," May 23, 1975, Folder BNHP Planning 1974, 1982, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[361] My chronology of the review process is based on Gurney to Regional Director, March 14, 1977, Folder BNHP Resource Management Records, BNHP Legislation [Activation Memos, newsletters, 1974–1977], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[362] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP Archives, revised draft June 23, 1975, Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, College Park, MD, i.

[363] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP Archives, revised draft June 23, 1975, Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, College Park, MD, ii.

"today's" philosophic radicalism), and a consideration of the "dynamics of change." Site themes should showcase familiar stories from Boston's revolutionary past. The Old State House "will emphasize Boston's role in independence," and "free speech during the revolutionary period, as well as in today's world." Faneuil Hall too would foreground free speech and "local citizen participation in government." Old North, because it "supported the lanterns," would focus on the Revolution and "the idea of ongoing growth and change." Bunker Hill "represents the armed expression of revolution," and offered opportunities to examine "American's tradition of honoring." And, finally, the Navy Yard, because it "was the landing area for the first attack on Bunker Hill," would "reflect the growth of the nation it served," and also prompt a consideration of navy technology, and the history of Charlestown. The draft assessment entirely omitted mention of USS Constitution.[364]

The four alternative proposals for what the new park might actually look like were of primary concern to reviewers of the draft environmental assessment. The first alterative proposed limiting NPS involvement to an advisory capacity, and abandoning the concept of a central visitor center, thus leaving the seven affiliate sites to manage on their own though with some coordinated marketing and interpretation. Alternative two proposed a central visitor center and transportation hub in the Navy Yard, and required that each site have an equal role alongside the NPS in sustaining management, operations, and interpretation. A third alternative, described as "a park that interacts with the larger community and is an active part of that community," imagined a visitor hub in downtown Boston. The NPS, in this case, would liaise with the city to provide information, transportation, and "support in achieving other community goals." The NPS would also assume most interpretive and financial responsibilities, while sharing management and operations with the sites. Finally, alternative four imagined the same configuration as alternative three, but proposed centralizing sales of items from all the various sites' gift shops in the NPS visitor center.[365]

The team shared its alternatives with the North Atlantic Regional Office, which then distributed it to site owners for review during October 1975. Reactions, insomuch as they are retrievable in NPS records, were mixed. William B. Osgood, who had attended the park's start-up meeting, so surprised the NPS with his "direct and unfavorable response," that regional Chief of Interpretation James Corson raised it in his response to the preliminary alternatives.[366] Corson had attended most of the planning meetings along with the site managers and, although he perceived much which was good about the alternatives, he noted too that "on the negative side there is also a lot to be said." Most significantly, from Corson's vantage point, the planners had simply not fully grappled with the scale and depth of local interests. Encouragements, for instance, to relocate the Bostonian Society from the Old State House—evidently what angered Osgood—demonstrated "so little apparent comprehension of the facts both psychological and actual." The alternatives, he continued, were "based upon an assumption that it is o.k. for us to be egocentric and defensive about our interests… because all the others will be glad to have

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[364] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP, revised draft June 23, 1975, Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, College Park, MD, 1–7.

[365] Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP, revised draft June 23, 1975, pp 9–12; National Park Service; Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service; Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30; NARA, College Park, MD.

[366] Osgood was a senior trust officer at the State Street Bank and Trust Company and, though identified with the Paul Revere House during the park's first meeting, he was also a stakeholder in the Old State House. Osgood was not the only individual who was involved with multiple sites.

us take their burdens over." But functions which the planners perceived as burdens to the sites, such as distributing tourist information or managing gift shop sales, were precisely what sustained Boston's downtown heritage landscape. What message would the NPS be sending if it centralized those functions in a visitor center located way across the river in Charlestown? "If we will ever have a park," Corson noted, "we must reassure and serve."[367]

The planners might have avoided these missteps had they consulted with the Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission (BNHPAC). The commission's first meeting, to consider the draft alternatives, was not even scheduled until December 8, 1975. Recall that Public Law 93-431 stipulated that the park be managed in conversation with an advisory commission for its first decade. As we learned in chapter two, the park had been born of the work of another advisory commission, the BNHSC. Much had changed, however, with regard to the conduct of federal advisory commissions since those days. In fact, the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 laid out clear guidelines intended to guarantee that independent advisory commissions were just that—independent—and that they include a variety of perspectives. The new guidelines produced an advisory commission very different from the one which first imagined the park. As of the first meeting, six of its members had been appointed, three by the governor and three by the mayor. They included Byron Rushing, an African American civil rights activist and president of Boston's Museum of African American History; Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs Evelyn F. Murphy; Katherine Kane, former director of Boston 200 and then deputy mayor; urban planner and Charlestown community advocate Maurice O'Shea; and Guy A. Beninati, a history teacher at Boston Latin and president of the North End Union.[368] The commission's chair, installed by the governor, was none other than Richard A. Berenson. The park's advisory commission, then, unlike its predecessor, did include members who actually represented the communities the park stood to affect most. Berenson's leadership, however, recalled Mark Bortman's leadership of the BNHSC, and by extension, the significant influence wielded by the Boston Chamber of Commerce ever since the Logue days.

For its part, the advisory commission did not know how to respond to the agency's preliminary alternatives at its first meeting. Most members still could not quite grasp the process. Several wondered how they could evaluate alternatives without having site representatives present. Indeed, how could alternatives be evaluated at all without first firming up cooperative agreements? Berenson explained so much though added that everyone agreed "that a strong city-oriented Visitor Center is very desirable."[369] That seems to be the extent of the advisory commission's input on the draft alternatives since, by its next meeting on April 14, 1976, park planners had already issued a final revised set of alternatives reflecting feedback from site owners and various

[367] James Corson, Chief of Interpretation North Atlantic Region, to the park master planners, December 8, 1975, Folder BNHP Planning, 1973–1978, Box 1, BNHP Resource Mgmt. Records, Supt Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[368] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 8, 1975, Box 1, Folder 3, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[369] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 8, 1975, Box 1, Folder 3, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

city and state agencies.[370] Although it is unclear from the archival record how the revised alternatives compared to the previous round, a summary by Gurney in a letter to the regional director suggests at least one major difference: the insertion of a new alterative, the first alternative, which allowed for the possibility of no action at all. The remaining four alternatives, therefore, aligned with the alternatives first proposed in June.

In the same letter, Gurney summed up responses to alternatives one and two as primarily negative, though most people recommended specifically that the Bostonian Society retain its active involvement in operations at the Old State House. Most respondents also indicated that they expected a more extensive role for the NPS at all the partner sites. A minority of voices endorsed the third alternative, but most stakeholders disliked the possibility of situating the park's primary interpretive center at the Navy Yard, removed as they perceived it from the "more significant Revolutionary War shrines." For his part, Gurney suggested that a satellite visitor center be considered for Charleston, since many park visitors started at USS Constitution. Alternative five generally lacked support as it tended to exclude existing site owners from participation in programs and local citizens from use of the sites. It would also lead to development of an entirely new transportation system instead of modifying existing systems. Eagerness to leverage Boston's public transit explained, too, why almost everyone supported having a large central visitor center downtown, where park information, interpretive content, and city guides might be shared broadly. In Gurney's estimation, support for alterative four was practically unanimous.

The advisory commission endorsed alternative four as well, though with significant reservations and with important recommendations. Indeed, the advisory commission took its review function seriously, charging a subcommittee with devising a position statement. The statement is a critical park document insomuch as it demonstrates an early and clear statement of what park neighbors believed to be the real value of an NPS partnership park. Alternative four, in the commission's judgement, "appropriately highlights the unique urban character of the park, and can best draw on the rich resources of local pride and traditions of use and involvement." It worried, however, "that the assessment seriously neglects transportation," and insisted that the NPS study transportation and mobility issues in a comprehensive way. Additionally, the commission sought to complicate NPS ideas of who constituted the park's community. Boston, it argued, was composed of many kinds of communities, and thus more care was needed to define how the park might serve them all. At issue, for instance, was access to open space. The commission called for open public spaces to be made available proximate to all the park's sites, and especially at Bunker Hill. What's more, the commission proposed that "an informal group of community advisors" be called upon to ensure that NPS programming remain meaningful to all park neighbors. Priority, for instance, should be given to the young and the elderly, considering their preponderance in all areas touched by the park.

In its endorsement of alternative four, the advisory commission made some very specific recommendations about the park's interpretive direction which bring us full circle to Mary Holmes concern that the park "explain modern Boston and modern America." "The Super theme Revolution is seen as appropriate only," the commission concluded, "if the Boston story is fully and

[370] Although various versions of the draft and revised alternatives exist, it is unclear which drafts are which—many are partial—thereby complicating possibilities for understand the evolution of this document. The most complete collection of materials is in Master Plan Alternatives for BNHP, revised draft June 23, 1975, Folder Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, Division of Interpretive Planning, Entry P417, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, College Park, MD, but even it is not complete and further complicated by handwritten corrections. Clarifying this record set is a top priority for understanding the genesis of the park's first management plan.

clearly told." The commission worried that the planning team's focus on living history, Bicentennial America's interpretive mode du jour, threatened to obscure a "much more important" focus on social and political issues. The commission preferred that the park build capacity "to make these issues, which dominated town life before and during the Revolution, come alive for the visitor." And it recommended that it do so by ensuring that "scholars from Boston area universities be involved in the further development of interpretive themes and exhibitions."

In its final assessment, the commission warned that the NPS ought to stop putting the horse in front of the cart. Just as actual historians needed to be involved in interpretation from the start, so did the commission need to be consulted before the NPS advanced such major decisions as where to put its visitor center. "The Commission members felt strongly that many decisions already made, such as the Visitor Center choice, will have a shaping influence on the Park, and they are concerned that Park Service commitments may have precluded certain options." Because alternative four placed so much emphasis on integrating park functions with an urban community center, the report concluded, it must involve commission members "who are both representative of a broad spectrum of local groups and residents of communities affected by the park. They can play a key role in realizing a goal of a park which is truly involved with the community and reflective of its richness."[371]

A Year in Review

In hindsight, the advisory commission's statement is remarkably prescient insomuch as it grasped key challenges—the decentralization of NPS expertise, the absence of scholars in interpretive planning, reductive bureaucratic notions of "urban" and "community"— which, as we saw in part I, would increasingly plague the NPS system-wide during the late 1970s. Its awareness of these problems, in fact, is so remarkable that it raises even more questions about the agency's effectiveness during 1974–75 in making sense of the Boston we explored in part I, and for which the NPS was tasked with designing a national park. Were planners concerned with Boston's racial turmoil? Were they sensitive to its history of urban renewal? Did they know how many people had been forcefully removed from portions of the city which the NPS would now be responsible for interpreting? Answering these questions is difficult, but we are fortunate to have some insight, owing to the presence of Dennis Frenchman at the park's first meeting. Frenchman, representing MIT's Department of Urban Studies and Planning, had set out that year with his research partner, Charles Davies, to make a case study of the park planning process. Over the following year, Frenchman and Davies interviewed project principals, including park

[371] Includes 1977 Special Subcommittee of the Advisory Commission Statement of Support for Alternative Four. Folder BNHP Resource Management Records, BNHP Legislation [Activation Memos, Newsletters, 1974–1977], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. At the December 7, 1976 meeting, the Commission agreed that formal public review of the Environmental Assessment was not necessary, given that "the Commission and the site owners had been given ample opportunity to express their views and since the Commission and those involved with the specific sites represented the interested public." Gurney to Regional Director, March 14, 1977, Folder BNHP Resource Management Records, BNHP Legislation [Activation Memos, Newsletters, 1974–1977], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

neighbors, about the challenges of planning an urban park. Their interviews are invaluable for what they reveal about the circumstances under which the park was conceived.[372]

Most immediately evident in their findings is the commitment of agency planners to build an effective park, even despite the agency's efforts to derail authorizing legislation just a year earlier. Dennis Galvin, for instance, who had railed against congressional indifference to agency testimony, was now eager to "make a more coherent experience for the visitor" among "a series of isolated structures." "What we've got to do," he cautioned "is to make certain that our decisions do not have adverse impact on the community." Regional Park Planner Charles Clapper agreed that "the feds can't move in and just take over." "The level of cooperation that we've got to deal with here makes it different [than other parks]," he added, "I think there's an opportunity here for a new kind of relationships between the federal government and the state government and the local governments, and private landowners."[373]

Building those relationships, however, would require overcoming decades of entrenched concern and, in some cases, animosity. In Charlestown, for instance, where the NPS would now have responsibilities at the Navy Yard and the Bunker Hill Monument, many residents agreed with their neighbor Helen Myers that "we're an afterthought on [sic] the city." "We're like a passageway between suburbia and Boston," she explained, "they circle us with the expressway… and the Mystic River Bridge… only because it was the most convenient way." Another neighbor, Patricia Ward, worried that the NPS might limit neighborhood access to Bunker Hill, which was "the only green area in the town." "A lot of things that are done in Charlestown aren't done for Charlestown people; they're done for outsiders." Vincent Strout, president of the Bunker Hill Monument Association, dismissed Ward's notion that Charlestown's children should be able to play at Bunker Hill. "We did not envision it as a playground for young children, or as a walking place for dogs, or as a football field, or as an after-hours trysting place for lovers; and this is what is has become." Douglas P. Adams, however, pushed back: "Strout doesn't live here, hasn't for fifteen years, did you know that? These people can come in and say that they represent such and such and so-and-so, and the Park Department can believe it if it wishes, but it will be fooling itself if it does."[374]

The NPS recognized, as Galvin explained, that building relationships with community stakeholders would be key to the park's success. Its encounters in Charlestown, however, revealed that identifying who actually represented those voices might be just as difficult. It was a problem which, by 1975, had been exacerbated by the agency's own internal realignments. As Deputy Regional Director David Richie explained, the centralization of planning function in Denver, over two thousand miles away, had created real barriers to actual community-based problem solving. Planners "come in for bits and pieces," he explained, "but they're not really well-oriented and connected and integrated into the whole scene." Cam Hugie, the Denver Service Center Planning Team Captain assigned to the park, seemed to confirm that impression. "We haven't had the people of Boston really get involved that much," she observed, "they haven't seemed to want to." Hugie explained that "we're kind of dealing with the people of Boston along with the owners of the sites, because in many cases they are the same." Her impression, of course, was completely

[372] Charles Davies and Dennis Frenchman, "Boston National Historical Park: Images of a Planning Process Slide-tape Transcript," August 29, 1975, Folder BNHP: Images of a Planning Process, Aug. 29, 1975, Box 2, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[373] Davies and Frenchman, 2-3.

[374] Davies and Frenchman, 3-6.

inconsistent with how residents of Charlestown, as Frenchman and Davies showed, related to the Bunker Hill Monument Association. Nan Rickey, a member of the Denver Service Center's planning team assigned to interpretation at the park, expressed her concern to "respond to community needs as the community expresses them. And by community I mean not only the average person, but also the people who have cared for these buildings all these years and people who occupy them now." That these groups were, in many regards, mutually exclusive, was not immediately evident it seems to the DSC planning team.[375]

Challenges too appear to have grown up early on around the park's interpretive direction. The park's authorizing legislation had largely committed the park to an engagement with Boston's revolutionary past. Vincent Strout agreed, and imagined "the various sites as an object lesson in American history." But planners found stringing together the seven sites to be a challenge. Rickey was "interested in not being limited in the interpretation." "It's difficult," she noted," to do an overall interpretive job." She worried that other than Old North Church, the sites "don't speak to the larger issues that I would like to see communicated." Robert Golledge, the vicar of Old North, worried too that the NPS might focus too narrowly on the site's history at the expense of modern uses. "I don't want any Smokey Bears giving the interpretation here," he quipped, evidently not realizing Smokey Bear's affiliation with the US Forest Service. Golledge worried too that his customary funders might withdraw, assuming—wrongly, of course—that NPS funding would replace their contribution. "It's not always the way things are, it's the way people think they are that really affects you." William Osgood appeared too in Frenchman and Davies' interviews, and expressed his hope "that the Park Service will not so emphasize the eighteenth century. I am very much against… trying to freeze history." Osgood hoped that the NPS would expand interpretation beyond the seven sites to include the entire city. "I want [visitors] to take away a feeling of [the city's] past, but also of its present, and of its future." Walter Muir Whitehill warned that sites like Old South had "been the scene, for nearly a century, of various activities which the Park Service could not readily carry on." "If there is any attempt to tell hundreds of thousands of lunkheads what they're about," he added, "that's got to be done in a separate information center, somewhere else."[376]

Frenchman and Davies's study, then, largely confirms what the advisory commission had intimated in its assessment of the park's planning alternatives. Agency planners, flown in from across the country, had very little sense of what really concerned the park's actual stakeholders. Indeed, they barely seem to have understood who the stakeholders were. What's more, as late as winter 1975, it was very clear that the park's planners, its historic site partners, and its immediate neighbors all had different ideas about what the park should be about. Galvin summarized the concern in a simple question: "What are the central themes?" By the summer of 1975, nobody seemed to know. Galvin and others in the planning team had begun to discuss freedom of speech and the expression of rights as a unifying theme. There was also an interest in how park resources communicated the physicality of Boston's evolution over the long eighteenth century. The Navy Yard, of course, complicated the situation, and Galvin suggested that the park might tell the story of how one city transitioned from a preoccupation with intellectual ferment during

[375] The NPS had done considerable outreach in and around Charlestown before authorization. For details, see Folder Initial Transition Navy Yard to NPS / Planning Factors 1973–76, Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. With regard to the BRA's interests in and planning with Charlestown, see O'Conner, Building a New Boston, 217–19. Davies and Frenchman, 6-10.

[376] Davies and Frenchman, 12-13.

the late eighteenth century toward a broader sense of national enterprise embodied by the Navy Yard's nineteenth-century saga. For her part, Rickey had begun to conceive of the park as "a series of beads on a very strong cord, the beads being the sites and the cord, maybe, being the federal involvement—rather invisible, as cords very often are when pearls are strung in a necklace." Not unlike the BNHSC before it, the park's planning team had come up against a central tension: would the park organize itself around a coherent story about the past, or would its network of relationships itself be the message? By 1975, the park's planners concluded, almost entirely on their own it seems, that these options were mutually exclusive.

Finally, complicating every facet of the 1974–75 planning conversation were protracted delays in congressional appropriations for Boston's new national park. As agency officials warned during hearings over H.R. 7486, authorizing a new park in no way guaranteed timely or adequate funding for the work which needed to be done in Boston, especially in time for the Bicentennial. It should have come as no surprise then when the Department of the Interior's appropriation bill, H.R. 8773, stalled that year amid complex negotiations over mining rights in the parks, concessions, wildlife conservation, and American Indian tribal rights.[377] Few of these issues, of course, directly concerned the park, which did not figure at all in house debate. And yet, in Boston, anxiety mounted over funding delays. Letters poured into Congressman Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill's office from constituents pleading with him to intervene. Boston Globe publisher Davis Taylor wondered if "without ruffling anyone, you could tell me whom... I might see who could expedite" work around Constitution. Mayor White complained that forcing the appropriation had "been a low priority matter for the Park Service," and that its negligence "will effectively stop the efforts underway in Boston to plan for the park." BRA Director Robert T. Kenney had clearly learned from the park's start-up meeting, and now understood that the "administration," and not the NPS, was responsible for the delay. He was, nonetheless, "very concerned" that if long-range planning doesn't start, "the park will languish." Even the MBTA petitioned O'Neill, hoping that he might move things along in time for its debut of an Orange Line extension to Sullivan Square.[378]

None, however, worried more than Katharine D. Kane. Kane wrote to O'Neill about her understanding that H.R. 7486's $27 million authorization would "assure that the expertise and assistance of the NPS would be devoted to these key sites during the high bicentennial vision period." Its "promise," she continued, has "made it difficult to privately raise even small amounts of money for these projects—leaving them essentially without financial and technical assistance for the upcoming period of great visitor attention and use."[379] Kane's letter is significant in that it demonstrates the extent to which the legislative process leading to the park's authorization, and

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[377] The conference report on HR 8773, wherein these negotiations are summarized, is US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for Department of Interior and Related Agencies, 94th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 94-701, Washington: GPO, 1975.

[378] For various appeals, see Folder 5: Appropriations Committee, Boston National Park, March–November 1975, Box 4, Subseries A, Legislative Files, Series III, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA. These include Joseph Fraser Conlan to O'Neill, February 27, 1975; Thomas F. Carty, staff advisor, and Andrew C. Hyde, design coordinator, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, to O'Neill, March 3, 1975; Davis Taylor, Publisher, Boston Globe, to O'Neill, April 25, 1975; Mayor Kevin H. White to O'Neill, April 25, 1975; and Robert T. Kenney, Director BRA, to O'Neill, May 16, 1975.

[379] Katharine D. Kane, Director Boston 200, to O'Neill, March 12, 1975, Folder 5: Appropriations Committee, Boston National Park, March–November 1975, Box 4, Subseries A, Legislative Files, Series III, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

its politicization by bicentennial boosters, had miscast the agency's mission and responsibilities, and implied a promise—as Kane put it—which was neither realistic nor responsible. O'Neill, however, had been instrumental in making the promise, and so he set to finding a way to realize it. He wrote, for instance, to Sidney R. Yates, who chaired the Subcommittee on the Interior House Committee on Appropriations, warning that "the National Park Service will attempt to tell your Committee that the funds, even if appropriated, cannot be reasonably expended. This is not the case." O'Neill conveyed Kane's concerns about fundraising and suggested that the NPS could actually get the job done for as little as $4 million. "I am very hopeful that you… will be able to make these funds available as soon as possible," he added, "in light of the large number of people who are planning to visit these sights during the summer of 1975."[380] Despite his efforts, H.R. 8773 only passed in the house on July 23. It lingered in the Senate until November and then only advanced to conference in December, becoming law later than month.[381] In the end, after the NPS divvied up its cut, the park received $2,267,000 with an extra $159,000 for a transitional period during July to September 1976.[382] The park, then, would have to get its legs on a budget.

A National Park with Local Roots

Completion of the planning team's environmental assessment, flawed though it may have been, satisfied a final step toward drafting the park's first GMP. What's not evident in the environmental assessment, however, or Frenchman and Davies' interviews with its principles, is the significance of the work already being done on the ground in Boston and behind the scenes by NPS staff and committed partners to build durable community partnerships which paved the way for establishment. Most significantly, whereas the park's DSC planners were largely detached from the realities of heritage concerns in Boston, its first superintendent—Hugh Gurney—already had his ear to the ground. Gurney was the perfect pick for a Revolutionary War park, which confirms that the park's meanings had in some ways already been settled. He had first worked for the NPS during college as a seasonal park ranger historian at Colonial National Historical Park in Yorktown, Virginia. After earning an MA in history at the University of North Carolina, Gurney returned to work with the NPS at Morristown National Historical Park in Morristown, New Jersey. A succession of appointments followed: Harpers Ferry National Historical Park; Saint-Gaudens National Historical Site; Perry's Victory National Monument, where Gurney first served as a superintendent; and finally, a superintendency at Saratoga National Historical Park, with responsibility for five different units. Altogether, before arriving at the BNHP Gurney had spent about twelve years with the agency, learning to manage historical sites associated with military history, its memory, and especially colonial and revolutionary pasts.[383]

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[380] O'Neill to Sidney R. Yates, chair, Subcommittee on the Interior House Committee on Appropriations, March 20, 1975, Folder 5: Appropriations Committee, Boston National Park, March–November 1975, Box 4, Subseries A, Legislative Files, Series III, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.

[381] Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Public Law 94-165, US Statues at Large 89, (1975): 977–1001.

[382] These figures are from house decision on H.R. 8773 (not final law), as reported by O'Neill to Kane, July 25, 1975, see Folder 5: Appropriations Committee, Boston National Park, March–November 1975, Box 4, Subseries A, Legislative Files, Series III, Tip O'Neill Papers, Burns Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA. The transitional period reflected the change of the federal fiscal year from July 1 to June 30 to October 1 to September 30 starting with fiscal year 1977.

[383] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

But beyond being committed to the interpretation of revolutionary pasts, Gurney was also mindful of Boston's complex community structure and its recent history. He grew up near Boston and, as a child, cherished riding the elevated railway to and from his grandparents' house in Medford. Later, while studying history at Tufts, Gurney worked part-time for an Italian American import/export business, for which he ran bills of lading all throughout Boston's North End. The experience gave Gurney an insider's knowledge of the North End's ethnic fabric, and confronted him with urban renewal all the while. What's more, Gurney was fully aware from the outset that managing the park would be difficult. He had visited the site for a superintendent's conference before hiring on and had toured the Navy Yard with Jack Benjamin, who by then had been appointed to oversee the transition.[384] It was Benjamin, in fact, who Gurney credits with helping him get established. Benjamin took Gurney around the city, introducing him to the park's principal stakeholders—historic site managers, the BRA, city hall, and the Navy—and sat in on meetings until Gurney got his legs. Like Galvin's willingness to make the best of a difficult situation at the park, Benjamin's help typified just one of many instances wherein the park's early success relied on the commitment of a few passionate staffers.

According to Gurney, the most pressing issue facing him upon arrival was the disposition of the Navy Yard. The park's authorizing legislation set January 1 as the date by which the NPS would be responsible for management of the facility, though many questions about the transfer remained unanswered. As we have seen, for instance, the park planning team had yet to determine exactly how to make sense of the Navy Yard within the park's broader interpretive mandate. The NPS, as Gurney puts it, "had not thought it through," and most people involved did not have an opinion. Gurney recalls that the decision to preserve the Navy Yard as an industrial site, rather than as a stylized nineteenth-century mixed-use leisure space—as the BRA proposed—owed to Regional Assistant Director for Planning Ross Holland's insistence that the facility's twentieth-century history be showcased. The BRA's proposal had been tied to plans to construct the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in the Navy Yard. Holland and Gurney traveled to Washington, DC by request of the Interior Department to meet with representatives of the Kennedy Library project. Holland spoke bluntly: "If you put this in the Navy Yard, it's just like dropping a bomb!" The Kennedy Library representatives, who hadn't expected any opposition to their plans, were startled and quickly withdrew the proposal. When Gurney and Holland returned to Boston and reported on the meeting, Regional Director Jerry Wagers was astounded: "You really said that, Ross!?" It was the intensity of Holland's vision, Gurney explains, and his insistence that the Navy Yard be appreciated for its twentieth-century significance, which formatively shaped the Navy Yard's first GMP and its interpretation ever since.

But of the scores of meetings Gurney recalls from his first days at the park, most of those concerning the Navy Yard had to do with practicalities. All the yard's buildings, for instance, were heated by steam generated at a central power plant. What would happen to the buildings if the Navy shut down the power plant on January 1? Gurney and others, fearful that resources might deteriorate quickly, managed to convince the Navy to run the plant through spring. This type of frequent, though informal, negotiation was typical of the Navy Yard transition, and reveals ground level concern both within the Navy and the NPS to ensure the integrity of historical resources throughout the facility. It was the Navy, for instance, that inadvertently designated Building 125 as collections storage by choosing it as a staging space for anything its team discov-

[384] Gurney had taken the tour and then, later, saw the vacancy notice for the new superintendent position. Gurney applied and got the job, though it turned out he was a second pick after the top choice turned it down. Gurney thinks it may have actually been Benjamin.

ered during the transition process which might be of historical significance. Gurney appreciated the Navy's efforts in this regard, and in fact, relied on them during the park's lean early years.[385]

Importantly, Gurney's reliance on former Navy staff continued beyond transition too. He hired longtime Navy Yard Chief of Maintenance Maynard Spekin, for instance, to serve as the park's chief of maintenance after transition. Bringing Spekin aboard was a managerial masterstroke. Most obviously, Spekin brought to the park an intimate knowledge of the Navy Yard and its operations. Beyond that, however, Spekin's deep familiarity with Boston made him an essential problem-solver. When the Queen of England arrived at the Navy Yard for a Bicentennial visit, it was Spekin who magically turned up yards of red carpet for her disembarkation. It was Spekin too who assembled the park's crack maintenance crew, and largely from the ranks of laid-off Navy Yard workers, including Dave Rose, who would succeed Spekin as chief and whose knowledge of the yard would prove essential in dealing with years of deferred maintenance as well as with Navy Yard workers who remained as part of the maintenance staff for USS Constitution and who did not necessarily grasp the Park's mission in Boston. When diversity quotas figured in hiring priorities—if the park "needed more black faces," as Gurney puts it—it was Spekin who would find a "fantastic black carpenter."[386] Spekin's ability to liaison between the park and its constituent communities, especially in Charlestown, and specifically by helping local laborers transition into NPS jobs, contrasted considerably with outreach done by the planning team which, as we saw above, "haven't had the people of Boston really get involved that much." The Navy Yard's transition into NPS ownership was a very visible metaphor during the 1970s for Boston's broader transition into a postindustrial economy. People like Spekin eased the transition and demonstrated to locals how the NPS could be part of the solution, even if it may have also been part of the problem.[387]

Locally, Gurney relied on the remarkable influence of Richard Berenson who, as he puts it, "would go to bat for the park, and had the ability to do it."[388] The governor had appointed Berenson to chair of the park's advisory commission pursuant to Public Law 93-431. Gurney perceived immediately that Berenson had more than a casual relationship with Mayor Kevin White and various city hall staffers. "For a lot of people," according to Gurney, "a word from Richard Berenson was all it took." Gurney recalls that if the sidewalks needed repair or the Freedom Trail's painted red stripe had faded, Berenson would invite Gurney and the head of Boston Public works to have lunch at the Harvard Club where it was "yes, Dick, we'll get right on it." Gurney met frequently with Berenson, up to twice a month, about all matter of issues related to the park, and especially its reliance on city services. Berenson's status, Gurney explains, made challenging problems manageable. "He was one of the reasons that we were as successful as we were."

The case of the park's downtown visitor center demonstrates too how local connections—including Berenson's—eased the park's path to establishment. Tom Coleman, a property acquisition specialist with the regional office, visited Gurney in Boston shortly after he arrived there for duty. Coleman explained that he was shopping around for a suitable visitor center building, but was unsure of where to locate it and so requested guidance from Gurney. Gurney dismissed one

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[385] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[386] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[387] Gurney's recollections of Maynard Spekin are recorded in my notes taken during an unrecorded conversation on July 12, 2017. Details regarding the Queen's visit, and Spekin's role therein, appear in Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017. Thanks to Steve Carlson for his observations concerning Dave Rose.

[388] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

option, an empty second floor in a BRA-owned building adjacent to the Union Oyster House. It was too far from the Freedom Trail, he argued. Coleman returned a month later having identified the Easton Building (15 State St.). Gurney liked it. The location was right, situated adjacent to the Old State House, where Gurney knew that the city had plans to close State Street to foot traffic.

What made the building even more attractive, however, was its owner. Ned Johnson, a partner in Fidelity Investments, was an old Bostonian who wanted the building protected from demolition. Dennis Galvin caught wind of the situation and worked with Coleman to cut a deal with Johnson: if Johnson was willing to pay for extensive renovations before the NPS purchased the building, then the NPS would be able to cover those costs in the purchase price and also move the newly formed North Atlantic Regional Office into the building, further protecting it from inappropriate development. Johnson agreed. As we've seen, this was precisely the kind of backroom dealing that the advisory commission worried about, and it is worth wondering how Berenson addressed the issue privately with people on either side of the issue. However, it was a boon for Johnson, a problem solved for Gurney, and for the regional office it was an opportunity to get situated without having to wait years for another appropriation to pay for remodeling. It also turned out to be a good opportunity for Berenson: in the end, the Easton Building included offices alongside the NPS visitor center for use by the Boston Convention and Visitors' Bureau. "I'm sure that was because of Berenson," Gurney recalls, "making sure we were tied in."

Finally, though Gurney found himself instantly caught up in Navy Yard concerns, real estate deals, staffing, and the business of forging local relationships, there was the matter too of articulating cooperative agreements with the park's five non-federal contributing sites. How to do it, however, was anyone's guess. Public Law 93-431 mandated that cooperative agreements be negotiated between the park and its partners, but neither it nor the BNHSC before it had provided any specific guidance regarding process or content. Gurney called on his own experience and found models in agreements which had been in operation at sites he previously supervised. They included, for instance, an agreement between Saratoga and a nearby historic house museum, and one which he had discovered in use at Hampton National Historic Site in Maryland. For the most part, however, Gurney recalls cutting the agreements more or less from whole cloth. His partner in doing so was a Boston attorney named Jason A. Aisner who had become involved in the campaign to fund the USS Constitution Museum, and who took a personal interest in helping Gurney get the park up and running. Aisner, according to Gurney, played a pivotal role in imagining the contours of the park's cooperative agreements, and was specifically involved in drafting agreements with the Constitution Museum and Old South.[389] These early documents, whose genesis we will trace in chapter five, provided the structure for a partnership model which would prove influential beyond even the park. They became the templates, as Gurney recalls it, for cooperative partnerships at Lowell and other units besides.

Conclusion

The Boston National Historical Park was gradually conceived of over nearly a half-century by a mixed cast of politicians, heritage boosters, federal advisory commissioners, and numerous well-known and not-so-well-known NPS personalities. It was designed, however, in just a few short months by a handful of career planners in Denver, Colorado. I have sought in this chapter to capture the strange suddenness of that moment, and the impossibility of the task demanded

[389] Gurney's recollections of Jason A. Aisner are recorded in my notes taken during an unrecorded conversation on July 12, 2017.

by Congress and put upon the planning team. It was, in critical ways, the park's formative moment. It was a moment in which new ways of imagining park partnerships were put into place without clear guidance for making them work. It was a moment in which mischaracterizations of key stakeholders and vague notions of community ignored the reality of lives lived for generations in adjacent neighborhoods. It was a moment wherein misconceptions about federal funding and the government's responsibilities to partner sites were left to linger on. And, finally, it was a moment wherein old ideas about the Revolution and its meanings—ideas underlying the very race and class anxieties which ripped Boston apart during the 1970s—were left intact. The planning team, of course, should not bear all the blame for these missteps. Its inability to manage an impossible task was symptomatic of a difficult turn in the agency's own institutional history, one from which it is not clear the NPS ever fully recovered. As we will see in subsequent chapters, though, that formative moment echoes throughout the park's administrative history and presumably will continue to do so until reckoned with.

And yet, as we have also seen, solutions to problems embedded in the park's hasty planning process appeared almost immediately in the work of a mixed cast of agency staff, private citizens, public servants, and concerned neighbors who took it upon themselves to build a park that could work. It was Gurney, for instance, who calmed William Osgood after that contentious first meeting.[390] It was Berenson who turned the gears at city hall. It was Spekin who ensured good will for the agency in Charlestown. And, as we will learn in chapter five, it was advisory commission members like Byron Rushing who insisted that the park be accountable not just to the park's stakeholder communities, but to history as well. The park's early success, then, seems to have pivoted on the hard efforts and sincere commitments of a dedicated corps of Bostonians. But why then did Boston need a national park if Bostonians were adequately situated to "explain modern Boston and modern America" on their own? Was it, as site managers expected from the outset, all about money? Though it had taken a half-century to create a national park in Boston, its purpose was hardly more settled after the bicentennial than it had been at the outset.

[390] See Osgood to Hugh Gurney, January 23, 1976, Folder BNHP Planning, 1973–1978, Box 1, BNHP Resource Mgmt. Records, Supt Files, Staff Meetings and annual reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Chapter Five

One Park, Many Partners, 1976–1986

The nation's Bicentennial celebration officially ended on July 4, 1976. The wave of patriotic tourism it set into motion, however, surged for years, bringing scores of new heritage tourists to Boston. They included Charles Battles, a twenty-six-year-old history teacher from Pennsylvania who, along with his wife, chaperoned a dozen high school students on a four-day tour of historic sites in and around Boston during November 1977. Battles and his group visited the Bunker Hill Monument one Monday afternoon before walking to the intersection of Bunker Hill and Lexington Streets to await the bus to downtown Boston. Just before the bus arrived, however, five men sprung from a parked car and set upon Battles and his students with golf clubs, axe handles, and hockey sticks. Several of the children ran, but four others and Battles himself suffered beatings severe enough to put them all in the hospital. The attack lasted an excruciating five minutes, and continued even after the bus arrived. One bystander reported that it "was the worst thing I ever saw. It was vicious."[391]

What had triggered the attack? By all accounts it was unprovoked. Police explained that "there was only one apparent motive… race prejudice."[392] Battles and his school group were black; the attackers white. It was the latest incident in a rash of racial violence endemic across Boston that year. White and black girls had come to blows at a South Boston school just weeks before, setting off mobs of white protesters. In Dorchester too, "gangs of white youths" attacked Hispanic and Haitian neighbors.[393] But what set the Bunker Hill incident apart was its raw savagery and its patriotic backdrop. Reflecting on the event, Mayor Kevin White worried that "we still have a virus here, and that virus is ugly. And that virus keeps acting up, and this time it was worse than Landsmark." White, of course, was referring to the now-famous attack on Theodore Landsmark, immortalized by Stanley Forman's famous 1977 photograph showing the incident unfold within eyeshot of the Old State House.[394] Jane Edmonds, of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, explained that we "feel the Freedom Trail belongs to all of us." She agreed with one of Battles' students who "believes that if black people can't go to the Bunker Hill Monument, then maybe all the historical monuments should be moved to a neutral site."[395]

The events of November 1977 make powerfully clear that, three years after Congress authorized Boston National Historical Park, issues of race and memory remained deeply entwined within its boundaries. Police arrested three men in conjunction with the Bunker Hill attack, each of them identified by Battle's students. In December, however, an all-white jury acquitted them, and the investigation closed despite demands that Boston police, or perhaps even federal investigators, continue the search. "It's impossible," Battles lamented, "for Blacks to achieve any

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[391] Peter Kadzis, "Black Group Attacked in Charlestown," Boston Globe, November 15, 1977.

[392] Kadzis, "Black Group Attacked in Charlestown."

[393] Kadzis, "Black Group Attacked in Charlestown."

[394] Kadzis, "Black Group Attacked in Charlestown." See also chapter four, pp. 183–82.

[395] Arthur Jones and Alexander Hawes, Jr., "Byrne to Seek Indictments Today in Charlestown Attack on Blacks," Boston Globe, November 16, 1977.

type of legal success in Boston."[396] Superintendent Hugh Gurney raised the matter of "racial incidents" at a meeting of the park's advisory commission in May 1978. Overall, however, conversations about the park's path to establishment clung more closely to operational concerns and to the difficulties of imagining a future for the Navy Yard than they did to bridging the deep divide between patriotic memory and structural inequality for which the park was ground zero.[397]

Whereas in the previous chapter my purpose was to shed light on the park's formative first years, my intent here is to explore the subsequent evolution of managerial strategies which ultimately set the stage for how and why the park functions as it does today. Getting those strategies into place, it turns out, was complicated significantly by several fundamental changes to the park's core structure including the addition of the Dorchester Heights Monument in 1978 and authorization of the Boston African American National Historic Site in 1980. Additionally, complex and sometimes contentious conversations concerning a GMP for the Navy Yard, not to mention the practical challenges of making the Navy Yard safe and accessible for visitors, continued to create administrative and intellectual hurdles for the young park. A key question, then, concerns how well the park's public-private partnership model prepared it for a future wherein bicentennial era sensibilities no longer defined Americans' experience of the past. How well was it prepared to do history in a park where the historical stakes were not yet entirely evident? And how well was it prepared, we must ask, to contend with history in a place where a dozen young Americans could still be beaten publicly at a national historic site because of the color of their skin?

The Path to Establishment

As we saw in chapter four, the bicentennial years revealed all the many possibilities and challenges awaiting the park's management team. NPS and BRA planners, park staff, the advisory commission, and a whole host of neighbors and advocates worked with one another, sometimes productively and sometimes not, to make sense of the agency's role in Boston. Several significant developments ushered the park toward establishment. On November 17, 1976, for instance, the MDC transferred ownership of the Bunker Hill Monument to the NPS. The MDC, of course, had been trying to unload the monument for years, stymied as it was by budget shortfalls and public discord. The park, however, framed the transfer as a victory for its partnership model. It was, according to the park's newsletter, "the culmination of cooperative efforts between federal, state, and local organizations whose common interest lies in the continued preservation and interpterion of this important part of our national heritage."[398]

Critical too was the addition of Dorchester Heights to the park's slate of sites. On November 10, 1978, Congress added Dorchester Heights National Historic Site to the Boston National Historical Park by way of Public Law 95-625, the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978. It was a remarkable moment for the entire park system. The Omnibus Act of 1978 emerged from

[396] James M. Hammond and George Croft, "Three Men Innocent in Charlestown Assault Case," Boston Globe, December 7, 1978; "Beating Investigations Should Continue," editorial reprinted from the December 14, 1978 issue of the Charlestown Patriot in Boston Globe, December 19, 1978; N.a., "Charlestown Case Reopening Asked," Boston Globe, January 27, 1979. Battles is quoted in Timothy Dougherty, "Pottstown Students Not Surprised by Outcome of Boston Trial," The Philadelphia Tribune, December 12, 1978.

[397] Gurney cited in Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[398] "Bunker Hill Joins the National Park System," The Broadside 2, no. 1 (April 1977): 2.



Image 7: Boston National Historical Park's staff structure and hierarchy during approximately 1981, as recalled by Stephen P. Carlson.

the largest parks bill in history, and was responsible for the creation and expansion of dozens of units across the nation. It was also notable for catalyzing concerns about congressional "park barrel politics."[399] In Boston, however, PL 95-625 primarily made legal changes which had already been agreed to. It granted authority to the NPS, for instance, to receive Building 107 in the Navy Yard from the BRA. It also authorized the NPS to acquire the small portion of land owned by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) where plans called for construction of a road connector between Water (now Constitution) and Chelsea Streets. And, most significantly, it included Dorchester Heights within the park's management dossier. It was an especially remarkable moment for those few people who recalled that the political campaign to authorize a national park in Boston had begun, after all, at Dorchester Heights. Indeed, eighty-nine-year-old retired congressman John McCormack—the man who started that campaign—personally

[399] See, for instance, "Omnibus Parks Bill," CQ Almanac 1978, 34th ed., 704–07, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal78-1236901(accessed May 8, 2019).

attended the ceremonies on March 8, 1980, during which the city formally transferred the monument to the NPS.[400]

It was not McCormack, however, that got Dorchester Heights into the omnibus bill. The person responsible for introducing that legislation was congressman John Joseph (Joe) Moakley, who joined McCormack on the stage that day. Moakley, a native of South Boston, had worked up through the ranks of state and local government. During 1953–61, he served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives for the seventh Suffolk District. He won a bid for state Senate in 1965, and represented the fourth Suffolk District until 1971. That year, Moakley ran against School Commission Chair Louise Day Hicks, Boston's arch school segregationist, to represent the ninth district in the US House of Representatives. Hicks won in 1971, but lost to Moakley in a rematch the following year. Joe Moakley thus began in 1973 what would be a nearly thirty-year career in Congress. Before Hicks, Moakley's seat had belonged to McCormack. Moakley biographer Mark Robert Schneider notes that McCormack had "rounded up the votes" to pass the New Deal legislation which, in many ways, defined Moakley's boyhood years in Boston. It was only fitting then that Moakley carry on the tradition of supporting Bostonians, and their national park, begun by his predecessor.[401]

It wasn't the first time that Moakley had involved himself in the conversation about a national park in Boston. He had jumped immediately into the heritage fray in 1973 when the Navy announced its plans to shutter the Navy Yard. Two issues struck Moakley as particularly worrisome: the threat of lost jobs and the possibility of USS Constitution being relocated. As we saw in chapter three, worries about Constitution faded when the Navy reaffirmed its commitment to Public Law 83-523 (1954), the product of a legislative drive also by McCormack which eventually mandated perpetual preservation of the ship in Boston. In 1973, Moakley joined with James A. Burke and O'Neill to introduce HR 7486 alongside Senator Edward M. Kennedy's S. 210, thus cementing McCormack's legacy, and initiating what would be the final push toward authorization of the park in 1974, and of course, the addition of the Navy Yard to a unit which had been imagined since the New Deal as being solely situated in downtown Boston. Like the others, Moakley advocated for authorizing the park in time for the Bicentennial, and was instrumental in getting Boston designation as an official American Revolution Bicentennial City in January 1974.[402] As we will see, especially in chapter six, it would not be the last time Joe Moakley proved critical to the park's success.

What finally poised the park for establishment, however, was the completion of its two-volume GMP in 1979. All the planning and wrangling and deliberation had finally come to an end, almost. There still was the matter of a GMP for Dorchester Heights. That would be volume three. And, as we will see, volume two—the Navy Yard's plan—required revision almost immediately, a process which would take another seven years to complete. Completing the core plan, however,

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[400] The legal transfer occurred on September 8, 1980. Anthony J. Yudis, "Park Service Due to Receive Historic Dorchester Heights," Boston Globe, February 19, 1980. Thomas P. Winn, "A Proud Day for Heights," Boston Globe, March 9, 1980. Regarding the connector, see Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 3, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[401] On Moakley's New Deal childhood, see Mark Robert Schneider, Joe Moakley's Journey from South Boston to El Salvador (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013), 61.

[402] Laura Muller discusses the relationship between Moakley and McCormick in Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," unpublished paper in Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 4–6. The Bicentennial designation is discussed in Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," 9.

was the critical last step toward establishment, and as we saw in chapter four, not at all an easy step. In his 1979 annual report, Superintendent Gurney recalled, as if to exhale, that it had been "an enterprising year for Boston National Historical Park."[403]

A Working Park

All the while, key facets of park operations had begun to emerge from the vagaries of planning. Most significant, perhaps, was the building up of core park staff. Hugh Gurney, of course, had reported for duty in June 1975, and had settled into a home with his wife in Ipswich. By January 1976, Gurney had hired eight other people. By December, the park employed sixty-four people.[404] Their profiles are suggestive insomuch as they reveal how the park's various divisions developed distinct personas early on. Protection, for instance, drew heavily from local communities. Frank Montford transferred from the regional office to be protection chief. He supervised Dany Lynch and Bill Fitzgibbons, both residents of Charlestown, and Elmer Chapman, who had worked in the Navy Yard before its closure.[405] Protection's lone outsider, Judy Myzel, came to the park from Penn State University. Interpretation, however, skewed toward Philadelphia. Chief of Interpretation Dave Dutcher transferred from Independence National Historical Park, as did Frank Hadden. Bon Londorf, who was from Philadelphia, came to the park after graduating from Kenyon College. Interpretation's one local hire was John Cook, from nearby Watertown, who came to the park from Minute Man National Historical Park, and who was then President of the Military Collectors of New England.[406] Though certainly not unique in this regard, it is clear that the park conceived of different aspects of its operations as having different relationships to locality.

Interestingly, given the complexity of historical issues at play in the park's planning saga, hiring staff with history training does not appear to have been a priority. Gurney, of course, had earned an MA in history, but by 1974 his professional competencies lay primarily in park management. Victor Jorrin, who had already been working on Navy Yard projects with the regional office, signed on as the park's historical architect, but as a preservationist was concerned to advocate for significance rather than to interrogate it. And the park's first historian, Mary Holmes, who we met in chapter four, had trained in Johns Hopkins' MA program for teachers. She came to Massachusetts in 1971 to develop educational programming for the Essex Institute, in Salem, and then worked with Boston 200's visitor services division during the Bicentennial years. Others tasked early on at the park with confronting complicated pasts, especially curators Arsen Charles and, later, Peter Steele, brought training in exhibit development and museum practice, but again had not prepared specifically to wade through the intertwined histories of race, class, gender, memory, and urban change which contextualized every aspect of the park's story.[407] As

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[403] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[404] "The Boston Beacon," Boston National Historical Park newsletter, December 10, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[405] Steve Carlson notes that Ed Locke and Frank Wilson also transferred to NPS Protection from the Navy Yard, and that both later ended up in the maintenance division aboard USS Cassin Young.

[406] "The Boston Beacon," Boston National Historical Park newsletter, December 10, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[407] Steele held a BA from Yale University and MA in History Museum Studies from the Cooperstown Graduate Program. He began his NPS career as a curator in New York City and then at Sagamore Hill before coming to Boston. See "Park Names new Deputy Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent," The Broadside (Winter 1991): 1.

we learned in chapter four, top-shelf historians with precisely those qualifications were everywhere seeking jobs during those years. None, however, found their way to the park, as we will see below, until Paul Weinbaum arrived in 1981.

Throughout the 1980s, the park's employee ceiling allowed the superintendent to keep between sixty and seventy employees on staff at any given time. It was a big workforce, but still hardly large enough to manage the scale of labor necessitated by a sprawling park and, of course, an impossibly demanding Navy Yard. As administrative officer Bob Pribula put it during one squad meeting, "the park has a problem in being able to do all of the [maintenance] projects listed because we do not have staff to supervise them properly."[408] From the beginning, then, the park struggled to align the size of its staff with the scale of its responsibilities. Gurney at least found in this challenge an opportunity to diversify his workforce. He made "much effort" to recruit seasonal applicants "of diverse backgrounds" from local schools and organizations. By 1978, Gurney reported that "our summer staff proved very effective… and we were pleased with the outcome of our efforts."[409] Gurney clearly imagined possibilities in NPS employment to provide all matter of life training. "We [try] to give our laborers," he explained, "a lot of experience in general maintenance which should help them in the future, whether it be working in our Park or civilian employment." He thought it important also to "help them develop good work habits such as getting to work on time, staying on the job, [and] being dependable."[410]

Whereas a growing staff revealed signs of life within the park, its new visitor center signaled outwardly that the NPS had come to Boston. The proposed visitor center in the Easton Building had begun to take shape by spring 1977. Its "purpose and objectives," according to the park, were "to provide an information and orientation center for visitors to the Freedom Trail and the Historic Sites" where visitors might encounter fuller interpretation. The visitor center would not serve food, but it would be designed intentionally to accommodate as many kinds of visitors as possible, including people with disabilities. David Sasanelli had been put in charge of designing exhibits for the building, with input from the then only seven-year-old Harper's Ferry Design Center.[411] At a meeting of the advisory commission, Guy Beninati noted that it would be critical to plan landscaping at the visitor center "in keeping with the new image of the area." Beninati was referring to the city's plans to create a pedestrian-only mall on State Street surrounding the Old State House, plans which had been made possible by two public works bills totaling six million dollars which President Jimmy Carter had just signed into law.[412] Later, the advisory commission debated who ought to narrate the visitor center's orientation film, variously suggesting "a young boy, a cab driver, the mayor, [or] someone with a distinct 'Boston' flavor to his speech."[413] It was a debate that presaged concerns among the advisory commission that "somewhere along the way," as Francis

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[408] Squad Meeting Minutes, September 8, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[409] 1978 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[410] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[411] See Harpers Ferry Center, "Our History," https://www.nps.gov/subjects/hfc/our-history.htm (accessed May 8, 2019).

[412] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[413] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Kolb put it in 1981, the park "seems to have lost its identity." The visitor center, as Kolb and others saw it, was the place where the park's focus might be brought more squarely back to the city.[414]

The park celebrated the grand opening of its new visitor center on April 19, 1978, the anniversary of the Battles of Lexington and Concord.[415] During its first year, as Gurney put it, "the Visitor Center took on the character of a regional and national source of information as well as being there to serve Boston." A decision had been made to concentrate all visitor services on the first level, which improved the agency's visibility in Boston, but also freed up the second level for educational programming and other activities. Beginning in 1978, for instance, the Department of Environmental Management equipped the visitor center with an exhibit concerning the Harbor Islands, including a slide show which Gurney reported running "instead of the Freedom Trail."[416] A local school program called "Boston Voices" turned the second level into a theater briefly during 1979. Over time, the visitor center came to be seen as a community resource. In 1981, for instance, park management agreed to allow the Guardian Angels—a volunteer organization committed to crime prevention—to use the visitor center's restrooms at night.[417] It did, at least, until 1981, when the Eastern National Park and Monument Association paid for a major renovation of the visitor center and opened a sales desk on the first floor. When the NPS reconceptualized the visitor center as a space for generating profit, it ceased functioning as an informal community space. In Gurney's 1981 report he noted that the sales desk, staffed by park interpreters and volunteers, generated a "lively and profitable interest" among visitors.[418]

Orienting visitors to the new national park was one matter. Helping them travel it was another challenge entirely. Ever since the battle over authorization, planners and pundits had worried about the problem of transportation in and between the park's contributing sites. Many visitors would be willing to follow the Freedom Trail between all the various units. But what about during bad weather? And what about visitors whose bodies would not permit miles of circuitous rambling through Boston's busy streets? Boston 200's Gail Rotegard worried about families with children, and proposed support for day care centers for the children of Freedom Trail travelers.[419] Then too there was the issue of park staff who'd have daily obligations on both sides of the Charles River. The park undertook a transportation study during 1977 which proposed that the NPS provide a shuttle service. That possibility collapsed, however, among strict agency-wide guidelines introduced that year concerning transit in parks. The advisory commission petitioned

[414] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 5, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[415] 1978 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[416] 1978 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[417] Squad meeting minutes, November 24, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[418] 1981 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[419] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Congressman O'Neill and Senator Kennedy for support.[420] In the meantime, however, the park looked reluctantly to Boston's private operators, who charged notoriously high rates and often for unpredictable service.

The advisory commission dwelled on the issue of transportation at length, such as during its May 1978 meeting, and considered a range of ideas including the possibility of water transport, which the park experimented with between June and September with good results. By fall, the park had acquired a barge from the Environmental Protection Agency to assist in a nascent water transport plan.[421] Within the year, it appeared that water transport was not only practical, but critical for breathing life into an otherwise moribund industrial space. Gurney reported that, throughout 1979, a water shuttle ran between Lewis and Long Wharves, and then landed at the Navy Yard with a new load of visitors every half hour. "The Charlestown Navy Yard's waterfront," he exclaimed, "was bustling."[422] By May 1981, however, a second transportation study confirmed what many on the advisory commission had feared. Seeing as how more than half the park visitors arrived by car it appeared "just not possible to convert everyone to public transportation." The report suggested that the park work with what resources it already had, perhaps by printing a comprehensive guidebook, better directional signs, and by creating a 'gateway' site which could serve as the park's front door.[423]

But would visitors know what it was a gateway to? The park still struggled with the problem of explaining to its public what—and where—exactly it was. In the first years after authorization, the park sought to increase public awareness by running radio spots and plastering city busses with signs and fliers. Uniformed rangers distributed park literature at busy points along the subway system and answered whatever questions passersby might have.[424] At a meeting of the advisory commission in 1977, Rotegard suggested that the park consider how city organizations and friends groups—like those that Independence National Historical Park had cultivated in Philadelphia—could "aid a park such as BNHP." Might it be possible, she wondered, to leverage the "widespread enthusiastic support" which Boston 200 had amassed during the Bicentennial? Gurney thought so, and agreed that Friends organizations could be especially useful for providing funding that the city might not be willing to make available.[425]

Finding community partners beyond the park's contributing sites thus became a priority. By late 1977, for instance, the park debuted its Historic and Urban Environmental Studies (HUES) program, developed in partnership with the Boston University Urban Environmental Studies

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[420] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. According to the Commission's minutes, US Senator Harrison A. Williams (NJ) advanced a bill in 1978 to allow the NPS to subsidize transportation. See Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Note that the park did institute an employees-only shuttle between the Navy Yard and the Easton Building.

[421] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 3, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[422] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[423] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 5, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[424] 1978 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[425] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Program. The partnership had been put in place by a cooperative agreement between the park and the Human Environment Institute of Boston University signed in January 1977.[426] HUES sought to educate children in grades five through twelve about Boston's urban environment by involving them directly in hands-on learning exercises. The program, directed by Ellen Fineburg and Peter Holloran and housed in the Navy Yard Marine Barracks, specifically engaged students in the greater Boston school system with an eye toward balancing participation across inner-city and suburban schools. In 1979, for instance, HUES staged a career education program for all for all the inner-city District Three middle schools and a magnet program for suburban Dorchester and Arlington students."[427]

Similarly, by 1981, the park had begun exploring ideas—including essay and drawing contests for local kids—for facilitating engagement between the park and its neighbors. The park's advisory commission communicated, for instance, with the Boston School Commission, through which it requested support to develop curriculum which would make the "Freedom Trail sites more meaningful to the children who visit." That year, Cynthia Kryston began assembling an educational program for the park with input from all the various sites along the Freedom Trail, and hoped to find a partner within the public school system to help her along. The theme was "community," and reflected Kryston's hope that more Boston school kids might visit the site at a time when ninety percent of school visits came from outside Boston.[428]

The advisory commission constituted its own education sub-commission in 1982, which debuted a plan in December to engage Boston students with an art poster, essay, and oratory contest. The NPS refused to assist with the printing costs associated with the project, so the commission sought solutions with Boston School Superintendent Spillane.[429] By May 1983, the John Hancock Life Insurance Company had contributed $16,000 in support of the contest. At the same time, however, advisory commission member Maurice O'Shea, who spearheaded the effort, had become acting president of Bunker Hill Community College, leaving planning for the contest at a standstill.[430] Within the year, however, the commission was back on track and had field tested five site-based educational curricula designed for fourth graders. "We have almost a tiger by the tail here," Berenson declared, noting the possibility of five thousand student visits during the 1984–85 school year.[431] Indeed, by summer 1985, the education program appeared

[426] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[427] "What's Happening in the Park," Boston National Historical Park Newsletter, October 11, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Ellen Fineberg, "HUES Program Now Underway," The Broadside 3, no. 3 (Winter 1978). 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For more on HUES, see Memorandums of Agreement with Boston University's Human Environment Institute, Folder COI NPS NARO/NERO, CRM Division Records 1931–1995, Box 18, RG 79 National Park Service, NARA, Waltham, MA.

[428] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 5, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[429] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[430] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 24, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[431] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 12, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

wildly successful, so much so that the school department agreed to fund all transpiration costs for the coming school year.[432] And for the first time, it had a name: People and Places.[433]

Partnership along the Freedom Trail

Firming up relationships with contributing sites remained a top priority as well. Gurney recalls the park's early relationship with its partnership sites as overwhelmingly positive. "People were favorably disposed toward us," he recalls. In planning conversations during fall 1975, Regional Chief of Interpretation James Corson had worried that the NPS might be perceived by its community stakeholders—especially sites along the Freedom Trail—as a competitor. From Gurney's perspective, at least, there was no sense of competition between the NPS sites and others along the trail, in part because the park was careful to include all the sites in its visitor pamphlets. More significantly, Gurney recalls that the park got along well with its neighbors because Dick Berenson worked hard to encourage cooperation. At BNHPAC meetings, for instance, Berenson ensured that representatives from all the sites and other contributing organizations—including, for instance, the convention bureau, public works, and the MDC—involved themselves. "We had probably more people sitting around the room to assist," according to Gurney, who recalls that "Dick could turn to whoever and get a response."[434] In this light, it is not surprising that the park's partner sites were much less frequently mentioned by name in monthly squad meeting minutes during these years than were the Navy Yard, Dorchester Heights, and no end of personnel and compliance issues.

What is more, by spring 1976, the NPS had just about completed drafting its first cooperative agreement between the park and a partner site, in this case the Old South Meeting House. It was an agreement, Gurney noted, which the park intended to use as a model for other sites.[435] And so it did. By late 1978, draft agreements had been worked out with the Old North Church, the Paul Revere Memorial Association, the Bostonian Society (Old State House), Faneuil Hall, and the Greater Boston Convention and Tourist Bureau. The agreements with the Tourist Bureau, the Paul Revere Memorial Association, and the Bostonian Society went into effect by the end of the year. The NPS signed its agreement with the city regarding Faneuil Hall in 1981.[436] In some cases the agreements produced immediate outcomes. The Bostonian Society, for instance, re-

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[432] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, June 13, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[433] Mention of "People and Places" first appeared in Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For an early profile of the new program, see Paul Hirshson, "City Life: Taking Hold of History," Boston Globe, April 10, 1984, 17.

[434] Quotes are from Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[435] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April and May 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[436] 1981 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Drafts of several cooperative agreements—with the Greater Boston Convention and Tourist Bureau, the City of Boston, the Old South Association, the Bostonian Society, and the Paul Revere Memorial Association—appear in the appendix of the park's GMP. BNHP, General Management Plan, Volume 1 (1980), report on file, National Park Service, Denver Service Center, Denver, CO.

ceived a new library "in accordance with their Cooperative Agreement."[437] In other ways, too, the park had an immediate influence on its partner sites. By the end of 1978, for instance, historic structure reports had been completed for Faneuil Hall, Old South, and Bunker Hill. The HABS program came to the Paul Revere House in 1979, bringing with it a team of architects, historians, and of course, new prospects for preservation funding.[438] That same year, even before it had signed a cooperative agreement with the city, the NPS inspected electrical and plumbing systems in the Old State House, aided with minor repairs, and repainted the Bostonian Society's third-floor office in preparation for its grand reopening. At Old South, all matter of work was in progress by 1979: new wiring for exhibits, extensive electrical repair throughout the building, repair of broken glass, and certainly many other items beyond.[439] The park's Section 106 files confirm that though compliance actions focused primarily on projects within the Navy Yard during the park's first years, by 1979 all manner of NPS projects were in motion at the Old State House, Old South, the Paul Revere House, and at the Bunker Hill Monument.[440] All of it made an impact. By the end of 1981, Gurney reported that "since the Park Service presence has been downtown… the sites themselves have expanded their hours and their programs noticeably."[441]

This is not to say that there were not problems to contend with. The anxieties detailed in chapter four which MIT's Dennis Frenchman had documented in Charlestown concerning the agency's role there appear to have continued through the Bicentennial. Gurney still wondered about how to best handle the Bunker Hill Monument. There was "some feeling," he explained to the advisory commission, that as a monument its grounds should not be treated as a public space "as it is now for the people of Charlestown." O'Shea fired back that Charlestown needed public space and that it would be "a mistake to take it away," and that "the NPS also feels the community is important."[442] Concerns about conditions elsewhere along the Freedom Trail also worried the advisory commission. Some members noted in 1981 the presence of sleeping "vagrants" in parks, and the prevalence of vandalism and litter in cemeteries along the trail. Berenson sought to encourage a city-sponsored program wherein Freedom Trail storefront owners might be convinced "to take care of their own 'front yards.'" What was clear, though, was that the Freedom Trail required a substantial financial investment though the "possibility [for funding] is dim."[443] The situation only worsened during the following year. At its April 1982 meeting, the commission agreed that cleanliness and maintenances had worsened alongside an overall "deterioration of city services." Charlestown neighbor Pamela Brusic apologized for admitting that locals "re-

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[437] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 3, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. 1978 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[438] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[439] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[440] Section 106 files, BNHP, Charlestown, MA.

[441] Squad meeting minutes, November 24, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[442] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[443] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 27, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

fer to the grounds [of the Bunker Hill Monument] as the 'Bunker Hill dog bathroom.'" Gurney pledged the park's support for the city's trash pickup campaign, but admitted that he'd need funding for tools and other supplies in order to help out.[444]

The advisory commission's concerns regarding the Freedom Trail reflected a shifting dynamic in Boston's heritage landscape which became increasing evident during the 1980s. Up to and throughout the Bicentennial years, Dick Berenson had exerted a quiet though powerful influence over goings-on along the trail. As Gurney indicates, a word from Berenson in city hall went a long way toward fixing everyday problems along the trail. Increasingly, though, during the 1980s, Berenson's backroom influence was not enough to ease all the park's bureaucratic complexities. In March 1981, for instance, the Freedom Trail Commission worked around Berenson and called directly upon Chief of Interpretation Frank Hadden at the last minute to work up a laundry list of projects needing done along the trail. The commission reviewed the list at a meeting and pledged to fund all maintenance along the trail that year.[445] Though seemingly inconsequential, this scenario concerned Gurney who clearly perceived a need to better prepare park staff to manage its relationship with the Freedom Trail and its various authorities. Within the year, Gurney announced his desire for a "top level management person to visit each site on a regular basis." "The assignment would be of considerable importance," he pointed out, "and would require that the person be available as the park's contact/liaison with site managers."[446]

In other regards, too, the park sought to bring collaboration with its constituent sites into the open, rather than continue to manage challenges along the Freedom Trail in case-by-case negotiations. BNHPAC, for instance, discussed for the first time during spring 1983 the possibility of selling a unified ticket for all the park sites. Although the NPS had no model for such an arrangement, the commission hoped to launch a one-year pilot toward encouraging unity among the sites.[447] At first, the NPS expressed support for the idea. Later that year, however, the agency confronted a "congressional moratorium on charging fees," wherein parks could only charge entry fees for special services. What's more, regulations prohibited federal employees from collecting money on behalf of private groups, thereby making it impossible for NPS staff to sell tickets for several of the park's contributing sites.[448] A series of meetings over the following year seemed not to have provided any alternatives, and during spring 1984 the commission discussed the possibility of a four-site ticket.[449] In this way, and as would become increasingly clear over time, the park's ability to intervene along the Freedom Trail hung—sometimes precariously so—in the balance between agency policies and partner needs.

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[444] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 29, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[445] Squad Meeting Minutes, March 3, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[446] Squad meeting minutes, April 6, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[447] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 24, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[448] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 29, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[449] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 12, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Interpretation After the Bicentennial

Nowhere was this balancing act more evident during the park's first decade than in the work of its interpretive staff. NPS interpretation got off to a late start in Boston: the park had been authorized, after all, amid the Bicentennial celebration, which produced possibly the nation's largest-ever coordinated interpretive event. Planners could put off interpretive decisions, in other words, because the park wouldn't be immediately expected to generate its own interpretive momentum. But even without the Bicentennial, it was evident from the beginning that the contours of heritage interpretation in Boston would be bound by the partnership model to follow the Freedom Trail. As Nan Rickey explained it in a 1974 interpretive proposal, the park had been conceived of as a "confederation" and, therefore, interpretation would necessarily depend upon and evolve along with the outcome of cooperative agreements. The plan which Rickey and her team envisioned in 1974, therefore, was "not intended for accomplishment in time for the Bicentennial." "There is greater interest," they determined, "in the federal presence after the Bicentennial."

Unable to anticipate the precise nature of that post-Bicentennial federal presence, however, Rickey proposed a schematic approach to interpretation predominated by printed park guides and audiovisual programs concerning "the significance of the Revolution," and "the men of the Revolution." Because Dorchester Heights and Bunker Hill were already slated for federal ownership, Ricky proposed exhibits for those sites: "Siege of Boston" at the former, and "British and Americans who Fought Here" at the latter. More specifically, Rickey recommended that a coordinating curatorial position be established at the park to facilitate object conservation and cataloging across the various sites. Once that work was complete, she suggested, collections management could be easily sustained thereon through contract labor readily available in Boston.[450]

Despite its interpretive holding pattern, the park was at least perceived as making a positive impact on interpretive goings-on in and around Boston. BNHPAC noted, for instance, that interpretation at the Paul Revere House had been "below standard… but now with Park Service technical assistance, is much improved."[451] BNHPAC also involved itself in reviewing a new route for the Freedom Trail, which was planned to begin at Boston Common and end at the Navy Yard. In a rare commitment of city resources, the Boston Traffic Commission pledged to install new signs along the trail, reflecting no doubt Berenson's influence but also some faith in the agency's stewardship. The Council of Historic Sites, at least, "declared [through Berenson] their appreciation for what the NPS is doing."[452]

Meeting minutes reveal that by the end of 1977, however, that some among the interpretive division worried that "operations seem to be moving slowly." Others explained away the lull as owing to a drop off in visitation since the Labor Day holiday.[453] By spring 1977, park man-

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[450] Nan V. Rickey, Interpretive Planner, Division of Planning, Denver Service Center to Team Manager, Northeast Team, Denver Service Center, February 27, 1974, File Boston National Historic Site, Box 30, RG79 National Park Service, NPS Division of Interpretive Planning (entry P417), NARA College Park. Also see David Wallace's (HFC) summary of state of collections at various park sites, prepared for Rickey, in Harpers Ferry Center Manager to Denver Service Center Manager, March 5, 1975, Box 30, RG79 National Park Service, NPS Division of Interpretive Planning (entry P417), NARA College Park.

[451] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[452] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[453] "What's Happening in the Park," Boston National Historical Park newsletter, October 11, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

agement noticed a precipitous decline in visitation at all sites except for Faneuil Hall, which benefited from its proximity to the new festival marketplace. Among the major reasons given by BNHPAC for the drop off was "post-centennial backlash." O'Shea suggested that it was time to move beyond the "monumental stage" at the park's various sites, and into a "living history" stage. O'Shea indicated that the Museum of Science and the Aquarium had been "extremely successful" in their use of first-person interpretation. Gurney suggested that the park ought to bring back visitors "who hadn't been in the city for years as a tourist" by emphasizing community involvement. Seminars and other interactive activities at the sites, Gurney explained, might just bring people back who had not visited since the days of the Bicentennial. Berenson shared that the Tourist Development Council thought it was time to "reverse the way Boston has always been advertised, with the emphasis on History," and instead emphasize the "New Boston" and its opportunities for entertainment.[454]

What O'Shea and the others had in mind was a deeper investment in precisely the kind of experiential history that Boston 200 had pioneered in Boston and which had become popular across the nation during the 1970s.[455] During the following year, as visitation rates stabilized, the park deployed two groups of roving interpreters along the Freedom Trail, while increasing tours at Bunker Hill, the Navy Yard, Faneuil Hall, and Sam Adams Park.[456] It appeared to pay off. By the end of the year, Dutcher reported that summer 1978 visitation figures "had broken all records." Bunker Hill, he added, experienced a sixty-two percent increase over the previous year.[457] At the same time, visitation spikes raised concerns about whether or not costumed interpretation adequately communicated the agency's presence along the Freedom Trail. James Corson, regional director of interpretation, raised the issue during a fall 1978 BNHPAC meeting. Corson recommended that the park develop a film and bookstore for its new visitor center along with musical performances and programming for children.[458]

By 1979, however, costumed NPS interpreters had become a fixture along the Freedom Trail. The park's newsletter, for instance, profiled Sarah "A proud Bostonian" from 1811, played by Park Ranger Sue Gochenour. "Sarah speaks from another era," it explained, "she speaks of her city and its romance with the sea," as well as the threat of British impressment, rumors of a second war with England, and her memories of "her father's vivid tales of the Revolution."[459] That summer, visitors might have also encountered a one-act play titled "Boston Voices" concerning the days leading to the Revolution and created by the Boston Arts Group, and performed daily on the mall in front of the Visitor Center. At Old South, local actors portrayed Cotton Mather, Susan B. Anthony, Henry David Thoreau, and others. An evening performance of sea shanties debuted in the Navy Yard in August.[460] In the Navy Yard, too, the summer of 1979 was the first

[454] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[455] For an overview of this trend, see M.J. Rymsza-Pawlowska, History Comes Alive: Public History and Popular Culture in the 1970s (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

[456] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[457] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 3, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[458] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 3, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[459] "Sarah, A Proud Bostonian," The Broadside (Spring 1979): 5.

[460] "Summer 1979, A Special Summer," The Broadside (Summer–Fall 1979): 2.

time that interpreters experimented with dividing their program into three themes concerning shipbuilding and repair, varieties of labor, and the lives of the people who lived and worked in the Navy Yard.[461]

The park became an innovator too in developing universally accessible interpretation. During 1977, special programs coordinator Ray Bloomer, who had also come to Boston from Independence and who struggled with severely impaired vision, developed training to help interpreters include handicapped visitors more fully in the park experience.[462] Bloomer later advanced to regional disability program specialist and, in 1983, returned to the park to announce that Senator Kennedy had urged the NPS to make Faneuil Hall accessible to people with mobility challenges. Faneuil Hall, Bloomer explained, ranked among the most visible public buildings in the country lacking accessibility accommodations.[463]

Overall, however, interpretation had come to be seen primarily as a tool for boosting visibility. In fall 1983, for instance, Berenson noted the problem of poor visibility at the Boston Massacre site. Gurney suggested placing a costumed ranger there.[464] Sometimes eagerness to increase NPS visibility through interpretation collided with other interests. At the commission's November 1979 meeting, for instance, Berenson argued that it would be impossible for the NPS to sponsor an information kiosk outside Faneuil Hall. A company named Bostix, he noted, "has exclusive rights to the dissemination of information in that area." Paul Keeler, who was familiar with Bostix and its products, questioned the integrity of the information it distributed. Berenson noted Keeler's concern and promised to look into it. At the very same meeting, William Osgood and Gail Seybold requested that the commission go on record with an opinion concerning the controversial demolition of a "handsome old building" at 53 State Street to make way for a skyscraper. Again, Berenson promised to handle the matter, indicating that he'd discuss it with Associate Mayor Kane.[465] These instances made clear that, though Gurney had already begun to bring decision making more fully into public view, NPS interpretation—and advocacy it seems—still very much followed prerogatives set by the Freedom Trail, particularly by way of Dick Berenson.

A Plan for the Navy Yard

That interpretation got off to a slow start in Boston reflected, too, the persistent demands put on the superintendent and his staff by the Navy Yard. Gurney realized early on that the Navy Yard would consume as much time as he would give it. Anticipating this problem, and despite having situated most of the park's staff in Navy Yard offices, Gurney chose the Easton Building for his own office because he "didn't want to get so wrapped up in the Navy Yard that I wasn't paying any attention to the other places."[466] And yet, the Navy Yard constantly clamored. There

[461] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[462] "In the Eyes of the Beholder," The Broadside 3, no. 3, (Winter 1978): 1.

[463] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 24, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[464] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 29, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[465] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 30, 1979, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[466] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

was, for instance, the problem of access.[467] Because the long reach of the Mystic River Bridge (now the Maurice J. Tobin Memorial Bridge) into Charlestown limited potential entry points into the yard, some people worried that "the Park [not be] used as a highway into the area."[468] At the same time, the proposed connector between Water and Chelsea Streets threatened to destroy the Commandant's House and its historic setting. There were concerns too about visitor services, especially the perennial problem of transportation back and forth across the river, and how the NPS might work with the BRA to provide parking and concessions.[469] And then, of course, there was the constant haggling over how to manage the daily labors necessary to sustain the yard's physical integrity. Park staff could not do it alone. During the fall of 1977, for instance, Gurney looked to a young adult employment training program to provide seventy-six eighteen to twenty-four-year-old short-term laborers to work on rehabilitating structures. It was something, he noted, that "the Carter administration is anxious" to accomplish.[470]

All these concerns were intensified by a lingering question: what was the Navy Yard about? It was a question, as we've seen, left unanswered by Congress amid the rush to authorization in 1974. The BRA had initially sought to create there a stylized nineteenth-century residential and commercial district. As we saw in chapter three, however, Regional Assistant Director for Planning Ross Holland argued forcefully that the facility's twentieth-century history be showcased. After authorization, these camps shifted and evolved. On one hand, there were those like USS Constitution Commander Martin who favored the "historical setting" rather than the "industrial character" of the Navy Yard. In hindsight, of course, it is clear that the Navy Yard's industrial character ranked among its key historical assets. But at the time and amid the waves of deindustrialization then washing across the nation, Martin clearly sought to imagine a past more dignified than what he perceived amid the Navy Yard's shuttered buildings and abandoned machinery. He proposed that many of the yard's buildings—including Hoosac Stores—be removed, and that its pavement be replaced with grass and cobblestones "in keeping with the period," by which Martin presumably referred to the early republic. Others, including Gurney, proposed alternatives to demolition, such as using the Navy Yard's large industrial buildings for parking from which shuttles might distribute visitors among the Park's various sites.[471]

For its part, the BRA had come to appreciate the Navy Yard's industrial character. Marsha Myers, a BRA preservation planner, attended the December 1976 meeting of the BNHPAC and explained that the "entire shipyard is an historical landmark and the problem is how to use it and also preserve its history." "The industrial character of the yard," she insisted, "must be preserved." Myers explained that the BRA was particularly concerned to maintain the Ropewalk and Chain Forge, which had not been originally included within NPS boundaries. It hoped, however, that the NPS would shoulder most of the costs associated with preserving the Ropewalk, seeing as

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[467] For a detailed consideration of user access in the Navy Yard, including with regard to the Chelsea Street connector, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 215–22.

[468] Richard Berenson quoted from Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April (or May) 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[469] See discussions regarding transportation and concessions in Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Also, Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 222–24.

[470] Gurney refers to it as the park's "YACC program." Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[471] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

the city could not afford it.[472] And yet, within months, it became clear to the BRA that restrictions associated with the buildings' landmark status would make them "difficult to market," raising considerable questions about who, ultimately, should be in control.[473]

By December 1976, NPS planners had devised five alternatives for the Navy Yard. The first alternative would leave park boundaries intact, allowing the "surplus area of the Yard [to] remain derelict, a desolate area, perhaps become industrial." The second would expand boundaries to include the entire yard, though it would not allow access to surplus regions owing to the financial impossibility of rehabilitating all the buildings therein. Alternative three sustained current boundaries, but permitted access to Water and Chelsea Streets at the cost of some planned green space. The fourth alternative would allow the NPS to take over portions of the yard owned by the BRA, including the Ropewalk. Finally, alternative five would not expand NPS boundaries, but would increase cooperation with BRA toward preserving the Ropewalk and other buildings.[474]

On April 5, 1978, BNHPAC staged an open meeting wherein it hosted the DSC planning team, various park staff, and numerous Charlestown residents, for the purpose of gathering public comment on the agency's plans for the Navy Yard.[475] Gurney introduced the session with an overview of the Navy Yard, its history, and its key management challenges, including the problem of transportation. David Weiner presented the BRA's plan for the Navy Yard, which included one hundred acres of new development, a sixteen-acre public park, a historical monument, and thirty buildings slated for conversion into mixed-use housing, offices, and commercial space. The remaining fifty-eight acres, according to Weiner, would be developed into twelve hundred units of housing. The whole project would require up to ten years to complete, and would cost private developers about one hundred million dollars.

During the second part of the meeting, for which there are no minutes, seventeen attendees—a mix of local residents and representatives of stakeholder organizations—filled out survey forms devised by the planning team to gauge public interest in various alternatives for the Navy Yard. Questions concerned traffic and parking, public transit, interpretation and historical themes, resource management, public facilities, boundary enlargement, and commercial activities within the yard. Responses reveal a sophisticated concern for the intersections between history, memory, and the likely impacts of Navy Yard development on Charlestown and its people. Regarding commercial activity, for instance, most respondents worried that commercial development be done "properly." One person insisted that there was "NO room for a McDonald's," and yet respondents did not entirely disparage commercial development given their overall support for controlled shipbuilding and repair in the yard. Similarly, survey respondents were concerned that the site appear as an industrial and educational space, though they also expected that the Navy Yard would provide recreational activities and public events such as concerts. Most respondents worried about increased traffic in Charlestown—and widely supported public transit options—though responses were divided over preference for public access to the yard via gate

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[472] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[473] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1977, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[474] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[475] Berenson acknowledged several locals by name, including Mary Colbert, Gus Charbonnier, Gloria and Jim Conway, and Vicki Olken. See Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 5, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

one or gate four. Many hoped to keep the park free of vehicles entirely, and to locate parking under the Mystic River Bridge. Nearly everyone believed that the NPS should be responsible for managing the entire area, though the group was divided over how much of the Navy Yard should be owned by the federal government.[476]

What is most interesting about the surveys is what they reveal about how the Navy Yard figured in the historical imagination of its neighbors. Though some people thought about the Navy Yard's significance as an ongoing process which deserved interpretative attention in all periods, most of the surveys indicated an emphasis on the long nineteenth century, which ended with the close of World War I. Many of the suggestions for the park's continued significance emphasized the role which interpretation played in crafting patriotism and portraying national development. However, by connecting locations such as the Ropewalk, Chain Forge, and the Commandant's House with pivotal events such as the World Wars, respondents also conveyed their understandings of the Navy Yard as an essential part of the global warfare of the twentieth century. And yet, when asked more specifically about building restoration, respondents overwhelmingly expressed interest in adhering to a turn-of-the-century aesthetic. Included in this ideal was the function of the Commandant's House. Many believed it best for this space to be filled with revolutionary era furnishings and to be opened for tours and possibly social events. The surveys also showed a desire to bring in vessels other than USS Constitution and an almost unanimous rejection of moving Constitution from its location toward portraying the site as an authentic and "functional" Navy Yard.

With regard to the look and feel of the site, respondents concerned themselves with authenticity and cohesiveness both as a historical site and as a piece of the Greater Boston area. While there was little agreement as to which historical period would shape the look of the site, many argued for the inclusion of green spaces and general cleanliness in a space which showed elements of all periods of the site's use. In addition to the inclusion of an interpretive center within the park, the responses also showed support for a walking trail between Bunker Hill and the Navy Yard and for developing an oral history project about the influence of the Navy Yard during its active years. Support for these plans show the degree to which the respondents felt that the Navy Yard fit into the larger historical milieu of Boston.[477]

Within just days of the public meeting, the NPS pushed forward with its plans for the Navy Yard. On April 17, for instance, North Atlantic Regional Director Jack Stark wrote to the office of legislation seeking authority to grant boundary easements that would create access to and across BRA portions of the Navy Yard, especially from Gate 4 across the yard to First Avenue. At the same time, Stark requested authority to insist that, in exchange for the easement, the BRA convey Building 107 to the NPS for use as a maintenance facility. Finally, Stark wanted permission to insist that the BRA remodel Building 107 before conveying it to the NPS.[478] The BRA, of course, was anxious to initiate its project, and it is clear that the NPS saw an opportunity for leverage in

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[476] "Charlestown Navy Yard Public Response Form, Planning Issues and Concerns," packet of forms included with Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 5, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[477] "Charlestown Navy Yard Public Response Form, Planning Issues and Concerns," packet of forms included with Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 5, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[478] North Atlantic Regional Director Jack Stark to Chief, Office of Legislation, April 17, 1978, Folder NPS Memos on BNHP Legislation [1974–1978], Box 1, Resource Management Records, early 1970s–1980s park ("pre-park" generally), BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

its eagerness to begin. Finally, by May, planning had begun toward acquiring and interpreting a new ship for the yard: USS Cassin Young.[479]

Clearly the public meeting had been a success, at least from Gurney's perspective. He reported to the advisory commission that more than one hundred people had attended the meeting and that it was widely covered in the media. Reaction to the plan, he explained, "was fairly positive." The BRA's David Weiner agreed, and appreciated how well the event had gone over. Not everyone, though, was so sure. O'Shea pushed back against Gurney and Weiner's appraisal, arguing that "from the point of view of the citizens of Charlestown that may not be the case." "There was a real feeling," he said, "that the meeting was run in a somewhat patronizing way." People worried that the plan might not come back "to the people of the communities" for additional input before finalization. O'Shea added that their "concern was not noted in the minutes of the meeting." Beninati sounded a note of concern too, suggesting that changes to the Navy Yard might have impacts on the North End though there were no plans to consult its residents. Dutcher suggested that the problem might be alleviated by distributing The Broadside, the park's internal newsletter, to all its various neighbor communities. Rotegard and Gurney noted that the park had just hired a permanent community liaison whose job it would be to facilitate ongoing exchange.[480]

Tensions too between the NPS—specifically the DSC—and the BRA had grown more acute by spring 1978. Amid efforts by the NPS to accommodate public feedback, particularly as it regarded traffic and access to greenspace in the Navy Yard, as well as the agency's own preservation mandates, the BRA's Weiner "plead[ed] for some sanity in the planning process." Continual changes to NPS alternatives not only demonstrated a lack of faith in BRA planning efforts, he insisted, but it also undermined the city's ability to secure committed redevelopment dollars. Some of the DSC team's alternatives, Weiner went on, were "ridiculous and disrespectful to [BRA] planning process." Beninati agreed with Weiner, and demanded that the park be thought of as a living thing, not a museum, which should be open to all Charlestown. Others on the commission agreed, with Commander Martin once again taking a stand against what he perceived to be a "macadam desert." By the end of the meeting, the commission agreed to support the first alterative, though not without registering its frustration with a set of alternatives which failed to recognize the "history of community planning and agreement." What's more, the commission agreed that the DSC had been too heavy-handed and that, going forward, final decisions should be made between the BRA and the park alone.[481]

DSC planners went back to the drawing board. They returned a year later for the BNHPAC's May 1979 meeting, during which DSC planner Doug Faris introduced three new Navy Yard alternatives. Each alternative proposed the Water-Chelsea Connector as a main point of access, and each included a gate designed for pedestrians. In each case, too, the alternatives imagined expansive boundaries for the NPS, none of which had been previously negotiated with the BRA. Alternative one proposed a "monument restoration approach," wherein demolition and reconstruction would be used to return the yard to how it might have appeared in about 1910, including with a trolley system. A second alternative proposed three "time zones": a historical monument

[479] USS Cassin Young is first mentioned in Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[480] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[481] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

zone, a residential zone approximating the yard during the 1940s, and an "industrial character zone" keyed to 1973. Alternative three sought to create a "community oriented urban park," with historic buildings adapted for mixed-commercial use befitting the needs of neighbors and, ultimately, a new generation of residents. Both alternatives two and three included a bus system.[482]

Initial responses to the new alternative were decidedly mixed. O'Shea expressed the advisory commission's preference for a combination of alternatives two and three, and supposed that in this case the commission's voice approximated the public's. The BRA's Paul Kelly was clearly nonplussed. The BRA, he insisted, would have to have a fourth alterative, one with a considerably smaller boundary expansion. From Kelly's perspective, the BRA could not "go along with" any of the alternatives as proposed. O'Shea agreed that, in public meetings concerning the Navy Yard, participants hoped that as many buildings as possible would be made available for development "and to the tax rolls." Victor Jorrin wondered whether it would appease the BRA if the DSC proposed a fourth alterative allowing cooperative use of Building 123 and Dry Dock 2. Kelly wouldn't commit, noting that it "would depend" on the uses.[483]

The Navy Yard tug-of-war evidently proved too much for the NPS. At the next meeting, in November 1979, a decision was announced without any further discussion: the Navy Yard would be preserved overall as it appeared in 1973, though the NPS would acquire several buildings from the BRA which it would then restore to their 1910 appearance. What's more, the planning process would thereafter remain in Denver, where Gurney and Dutcher would travel that winter to help write the final draft.[484] Clearly the DSC did not share BNHPAC's belief that decisions about the Navy Yard ought to be settled by the park and the BRA alone. So far as concerned collaboration on volume two of the park's GMP, the conversation was over.

But even after the agency approved the park's plan, conversation continued about planning problems in the Navy Yard. When the commission regathered in April 1980—at a meeting attended by Regional Director Richard Stanton—Faris reiterated what the DSC had decided with regard to the Navy Yard plan. Berenson inquired about the Ropewalk and Chain Forge buildings. Gurney explained that negotiations with the BRA had gone on for years, and that the BRA seemed willing to transfer the Ropewalk to the NPS, but only with a promise of quick rehabilitation.[485] The BRA's Marcia Myers asked for an interpretive plan which included a "lively experience" for visitors, including in areas surrounding the yard. Gurney noted that, with regard to all these matters, appropriations would be an issue, and that the BRA should share whatever ideas it had immediately so that the NPS could work out a plan and avoid another "stalemate."

Negotiations between the NPS and BRA concerning the Ropewalk continued for years in fits and starts. Uncertainty about the disposition of the property sometimes led to mishaps such as

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[482] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 3, 1979, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[483] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 3, 1979, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[484] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 30, 1979, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[485] The Omnibus Bill of September 8, 1980 permitted the NPS to negotiate acquisition of the Ropewalk and Chain Forge, but did not allocate money for purchase. The NPS hoped that the BRA might donate the buildings.

in 1981 when a BRA contractor began demolishing the building, unaware of its significance.[486] When the NPS and BRA did meet about the Ropewalk, old disagreements persisted about whether the Navy Yard should be an industrial site or a historic one. At the Advisory Commission's April 1982 meeting, for instance, yet another conversation about the Ropewalk segued into conversation about the possibility of razing Hoosac Stores.[487] The building—which was then without plumbing, heat, and other utilities—had been the subject of a 1981 legal inquiry by the US attorney's office concerning the right of a tenant to remain there. The Interior and Justice Departments decided for the tenant and issued a special use permit to that effect. It was owing to the building's usability, demonstrated by these circumstances, Peter Steele countered, that Hoosac Stores was precisely the kind of building which should be rehabilitated.[488]

Amid all this, construction of the Chelsea-Water Street Connector dragged on throughout 1982, slowed by the archeological discovery of various colonial and Native American artifact deposits.[489] The operation became cumbersome and intrusive. BNHPAC noted that it had adversely affected the Navy Yard throughout 1983 and threatened to do so through the coming summer owing to a terrible traffic snarl and confusing signage. Threat became a reality in 1984 when a construction contractor failed to make good on a promise to direct traffic, requiring that park staff implement an impromptu emergency detour.[490] USS Constitution Commander Herman Sudholz noted that problems like this resulted from poor coordination between Massport, Hoosac Pier, the City of Charlestown, the NPS, and other stakeholders. "There is no long range scheme [or] time table for this whole area of the city," he noted, adding that "somebody must sit down and say how are we going to do this thing." Berenson agreed, noting that the commission typically relied on "Grandpa BRA" to fix these kinds of problems, but that "BRA is just not up to it." What was worse, from the commission's perspective, was that the connector project intensified the Navy Yard's perennial struggles with access and parking. Sudholz noted that parking for residents and employees in the Navy Yard remained a "major issue."[491]

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[486] Squad Meeting Minutes, March 3, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. On the Ropewalk's long preservation saga, See Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 244–246.

[487] Note that, within the advisory commission's minutes, the building is referred to as the "Chocolate Factory." The name was common then because the building's last owner had been a candy company that used it for storage. Steve Carlson and Paul Weinbaum eventually succeeded in changing the name to the more historically appropriate "Hoosac Stores."

[488] See Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 29, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.; and, Squad Meeting Minutes, June 2, 1981. Interior acquired the building on June 9, 1981, as reported in Squad Meeting Minutes, June 23, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For more concerning the park's approach to Hoosac Stores, see Sean Hennessey, "Hoosac Stores Developers Sought," The Broadside 3 (1999): 10.

[489] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[490] 1984 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[491] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 12, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

By April 1984, it was clear that the connector project had exacerbated the tendency among visitors to dwell in the Navy Yard only briefly.[492] For many, there was hardly any incentive at all. Accessibility issues, for instance, remained "a big concern." The superintendent noted in his annual report that work on rest rooms and access ramps is "even more important because there are so few facilities along the Freedom Trail."[493] Adding to the problem was the North Area Task Force Project, the so-called "Big Dig," which would inevitably complicate access to and parking at the Navy Yard. The commission had entered into frequent conversation with the State Department of Public Works regarding the project, which according to the commission, stood to "literally change the face of Charlestown" and is "a very, very complicated project… there's no question that we're going to be impacted."[494]

Amid all these difficulties, and given so many physical changes within the yard since 1980, it had become clear that the original GMP was inadequate to its purpose. Under the leadership of a new superintendent (John Burchill, who had added to the staff an assistant superintendent for planning and development, John Debo), the park proposed a revised plan for the Navy Yard in 1986. BNHPAC reviewed it that spring. The plan called for improvements in three areas "compatible with the historic scene" to provide visitors with food, water, shade, seating, and other services. The plan also committed the NPS to allowing development of the Ropewalk and Chain Forge with private funding, though it required that developers provide exhibit space and interpretive facilities while sustaining the "historic character and fabric" of the buildings.[495] The park's encouragement of private investment in historic structures, which will return as an important theme in chapter six, signaled an important turn that recalled Boston's mid-century urban renewal campaigns. Most immediately, however, it pointed to an anxious awareness that "the Navy Yard suffers from a lack of appropriate development [and that] key historic resources are deteriorating."[496]

Whither History?

As the Navy Yard story makes clear, park managers found themselves confronted time and time again with complex historical questions. Some of these questions, of course, concerned the revolutionary past, but the majority by far related to matters of race, class, memory, and urban change during the last century. It is truly remarkable, in this light, that a national historical park of this scope and complexity did not seek early on to more fully engage trained historians in these discussions. It certainly benefited from the insights of people with expertise in historic preservation, architecture, material culture, archeology, and other history-adjacent fields. But, if archival records are any indication, it does not appear that professional historians with historiographical sophistication and an ability to understand the park in broad geographic and chronological context had any significant role in shaping the park during its first years. It's a remarkable

[492] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 6, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[493] 1984 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[494] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[495] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 29, 1986, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[496] National Park Service, Final Revised General Management Plan, Volume II (February 1987).

situation, though not at all surprising. Others have documented how the agency's investments in historic preservation since 1966 have ever-increasingly focused NPS historical expertise on matters such as compliance research and Register nominations. Conceptualizing a unit's historical meanings, and communicating with visitors about those meanings, has consequently become the work of interpretive staff and resource managers who may or may not have expertise in historical method and content.[497] As of 1980, the park employed staff members with a great depth of knowledge concerning immediate concerns, such as how to sustain colonial architecture and even how to preserve a battleship, but none it seems had the breadth of knowledge to craft a convincing historical narrative encompassing it all.

This is not to say that the park was not interested in doing history. On the contrary, the park briefly employed oral historian Judy Dunning during 1977 to design an oral history project for the Navy Yard. Dunning, who would later earn notoriety for a similar program supporting the Rosie the Riveter WWII Home Front National Historical Park in Richmond, CA, trained ten interpreters to conduct interviews with people who had worked at the Navy Yard before its closure.[498] Only a few months later, Curator Peter Steele began planning a special exhibit for summer 1978 featuring artifacts and photos gathered from informants.[499] The project that Dunning designed not only legitimized the arguments of those who had long supported embracing the Navy Yard's industrial past, it generated content which continues to buoy Navy Yard interpretation today.

Doing oral history, however, is not the same as thinking historically about problems of park management. There is very little evidence of any historical thinking as regards park management during its first decade. Historical matters, for instance, rarely figured at BNHPAC meetings, perhaps because park historians rarely participated in the meetings. Squad meeting minutes too are silent on matters of history until 1981 when Frank Montford announced that Paul Weinbaum had been hired from Statue of Liberty National Monument to fill the historian's position.[500] Weinbaum gradually contributed more and more during subsequent meetings, usually in connection with the various National Register nominations, including a particularly complex project related to Hoosac Stores, which he had been tasked with.[501] He became even more present in monthly meetings after a reorganization of meeting protocol during 1982, after which routine

[497] On the siloing of history and interpretation, see Anne Mitchell Whisnant, Marla R. Miller, Gary B. Nash, and David Paul Thelen, Imperiled Promise: The State of History in the National Park Service (Bloomington, IN: Organization of American Historians, 2011).

[498] "Digging at History's Grassroots," The Broadside 3, no. 3 (Winter 1978): 1. On Dunning's work and life, see Ann Lage, "Remembering Judith Dunning, Oral Historian of the Richmond Community," University of California Berkeley Library Update, https://update.lib.berkeley.edu/2016/10/26/remembering-judith-dunning-oral-historian-of-the-richmond-community (accessed May 8, 2019); and Paula Span, "Physician Aid in Dying Gains Acceptance in the US," New York Times, January 16, 2007.

[499] Michael Wurm, "Anatomy of a Navy Yard," The Broadside 4, no. 3 (Spring 1978), 1.

[500] Squad Meeting Minutes, June 30, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Weinbaum reported for duty on August 23.

[501] Squad meeting minutes, December 14, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

reports concerning historical tasks reveal greater detail about the range of activities requiring historical insight.[502]

Weinbaum's case is an important one and is worth dwelling on toward understanding how history did and did not figure during the formative years of one of the agency's foremost history units. At the time of his hire, the historian's position was managed by Frank Montford, division chief for planning and historic preservation. Montford had previously been chief of protection and was not trained in any particular way to oversee or implement history projects. "He knew he needed a historian because it was on his organization chart," as Weinbaum explains it, but "he didn't know what a historian did."[503] Weinbaum, who had earned a Ph.D. in history from the University of Rochester, worried that his specialty in antebellum United States social history might not have prepared him adequately to work at a park concerned primarily with histories of the Navy and the American Revolution. Colleagues Weinbaum had met while working for the NPS at the Statue of Liberty assured him that it wouldn't matter and, as it turned out, they were right. The role of park historian, as Montford and others in the agency then conceived of it, was to generate data for historic structures reports. Weinbaum, then, was hired to write histories of buildings. The Navy Yard, of course, had no end of buildings.[504]

Weinbaum's first major responsibility, then, was to compile a history of Hoosac Stores.[505] Because the NPS had acquired the property with its authorizing legislation, it sought to retain it, though under circumstances amenable to the agency's preservation mission. The NHPA provides to the NPS a leasing authority wherein publicly-owned historic buildings can be let to private tenants who agree to perform approved maintenance and, in some cases, rehabilitation.[506] To be eligible, however, properties must be included on the National Register of Historic Places. The park had a tenant for its Hoosac Stores property, but it had not yet been able to make a convincing argument for adding the building to the Register. Weinbaum studied the problem, in part by conferring with regional historian Dwight Pitcaithley, who explained how cultural resource managers conceive of significance with regard to Register nominations. With that, and having dug through the archival record, it occurred to Weinbaum that the building's significance had much less to do with architecture than it did with trade. This was an epicenter of Boston's global trade network, after all, and by researching the railroad and steamship companies which moved freight through the stores, Weinbaum demonstrated how powerfully the building figured in the story of American economic growth.[507] In so doing, Weinbaum made quite clear that unlike cultural resource managers, who are masters of data, historians are masters of context. By 1981, context was precisely what the park needed.

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[502] Squad meeting minutes, September 21, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 09/1982–02/1983, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[503] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

[504] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

[505] See Paul O. Weinbaum, Hoosac Docks: Foreign Trade Terminal, A Case Study of the Expanding Transportation System Late in the Nineteenth Century, Cultural Resource Management Study No. 11. (Boston: GPO, 1985).

[506] See, for instance, US Department of the Interior, Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, "NPS Historic Leasing," https://www.doi.gov/ocl/nps-historic-leasing (accessed May 8, 2019).

[507] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011, 12. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

Weinbaum had achieved his goal, so much so that Pitcaithley encouraged him to seek designation for two more buildings—an entire district—contributing to the Hoosac Stores story. He did, and in 1985 the secretary of the interior added all three buildings to the National Register.[508] In the meantime, however, the park had lost its tenant for Hoosac Stores and Weinbaum suddenly perceived that his accomplishment had not earned him good will within the park. Hoosac Stores had rather become "an albatross," in part because the NPS was now responsible for costly NHPA Section 106 compliance.[509] The BRA would carry that responsibility at the second building. From the perspective of his division, which included preservationists and planners, Weinbaum had created more work for staff who were already spread too thin. And, yet, Weinbaum had uncovered a goldmine of content for park interpreters. But owing to the park's internal organization, which mirrored the agency's structural segregation of historians and interpreters—a tradition introduced by Mission 66 era reforms—the historian and the interpretation staff had no functional relationship with one another.[510] Weinbaum thus found himself in the peculiar position of being criticized for doing good history.

Weinbaum's experience makes clear that, from the beginning, the park had a history problem. Not only did its managers misunderstand history and, therefore, fail to value it, its organizational structure prevented good history from reaching the public. The obstruction occurred in at least two ways during Weinbaum's tenure. First, project collaborators not inclined toward social history might simply erase Weinbaum's contributions. Weinbaum had been tasked, for instance, with writing the history section of a historic structure report for Building 28. His research uncovered remarkable insights. It turned out, for instance, that would-be Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once intervened in a labor dispute at Building 28. Even more significantly, Weinbaum discovered that during World War I, the Navy had to physically alter Building 28 to prevent men on the first floor from harassing women on the second floor through loosely fitted floor boards. The building's architecture, Weinbaum showed, was an index of early-century gender discord. These were revelatory discoveries, and could have prompted truly progressive public history at the Navy Yard during the 1980s. Weinbaum's collaborators, however, considered his history irrelevant to the purpose of the report and summarily dismissed it.[511]

A second and perhaps even more problematic obstruction concerned engagement with historical content within the Division of Interpretation. Although the park's historian had no formal relationship with interpreters, Weinbaum nonetheless took it upon himself to share research with the division he thought might advance the park's interpretive agenda. In one case, Weinbaum shared the results of a pioneering project concerning Faneuil Hall and public memory. Even before Alfred Young's important work on revolutionary memory in Boston had reached wide circulation, Weinbaum posed a critical question: when did the phrase "Cradle of Liberty" become associated with Faneuil Hall? Weinbaum could not answer the question definitively, but what he discovered was just as important. It appeared that the phrase had not entered into com-

[508] See Weinbaum, Hoosac Docks: Foreign Trade Terminal, A Case Study of the Expanding Transportation System Late in the Nineteenth Century; and United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form, https://npgallery.nps.gov/AssetDetail/NRIS/85002339 (accessed September 3, 2109).

[509] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011, 13. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

[510] See and/or include Steve's organizational chart.

[511] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011, 16. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

mon use until the 1820s, long after the revolutionary era during which most people—including the park's interpreters—presumed it had. In hindsight, the significance of Weinbaum's discovery is clear. As we learned in chapter one, Boston's revolutionary memory was largely contrived, beginning during the 1820s, by Whigs and, later, abolitionists who variously struggled to set a political and moral agenda for the nation. This is to say that the Freedom Trail's prevailing historical narrative is loosely based on ideas about the Revolution which came into being long after the Revolution ended. Weinbaum shared his discovery with the park's interpreters, but as he recalls, "they didn't want to hear it!" According to Weinbaum, "nobody in the city of Boston wanted to hear me say that. I was not popular with the interpreters. I told the truth."[512]

Weinbaum's revelation concerning the "Cradle of Liberty" confirmed a problem which careful observers would also have had seen in the agency's tense negotiations in Charlestown over plans for the Navy Yard and, to a lesser extent, at the Bunker Hill Monument. All these sites, though historically significant, had accrued considerably more meaning among Bostonians for their mnemonic value. In the same way that Faneuil Hall—as Weinbaum demonstrated—had become significant for how it was remembered by antebellum Americans, so had Bunker Hill become significant during the same period as a way of remembering the revolution. The Navy Yard too had become a nexus of memory among Bostonians struggling to understand a shifting economy. Considering why these sites had been remembered, how, and by whom, as Weinbaum demonstrated, had the power to reveal deep currents of cultural politics in Boston. Was it just a coincidence that Faneuil Hall's abolitionist history had, over the decades, been obscured by its revolutionary history? Might it not have been important to confront that history in a city and at a time when, just years before, black children had been beaten publicly for visiting Bunker Hill? Was this not the job of the national historical park in which they were beaten?

Race, Memory, and Dorchester Heights

It is clear that, from early on, the park's inability to foreground history, and its unwillingness to plumb memory, enabled a remarkable indifference to the long and complicated history of race in Boston. A critical finding of this study is that, with one important exception, neither matters of race nor regard for African American history figured significantly in any of the official conversations associated with the creation and management of a national park in Boston before the bicentennial. This is to say that, for twenty-five years, nobody within the NPS or any of its partner organizations in Boston thought to insist that the experience of black Americans be considered essential in our national retelling of the revolutionary saga. During exactly the same years, as we've seen in previous chapters, developers removed black families from Boston's historic neighborhoods, forcing them to the periphery, while white Bostonians terrorized black Americans with public intimidation and violence. The NPS, alongside Boston's public and private power brokers, thus participated in a systematic citywide program of racial erasure for much of the twentieth century. Decades of scholarship show us that this is neither a surprising nor unique story. But Boston's complicity in nationwide efforts to marginalize black people cannot be allowed to obscure the fact that the park was born of, and not just amid, a scorching cauldron of race hatred and violence.

The painful confluence of race and memory, illustrated so powerfully by the stories of Ted Landsmark and Charles Battles, was everywhere on display in Boston during the 1970s. Ignor-

[512] Paul O. Weinbaum, interview by Louis P. Hutchins and Lu Anne Jones, Norwood, MA, February 8, 2011, 19–20. Contact NPS historian's office regarding usage permissions.

ing it required intent and, by May 1978, it appears that Hugh Gurney was no longer willing to choose ignorance. That May, he raised the specter of Charles Battles (whose attackers had been acquitted earlier that year) before the BNHPAC. Since then, both NPS and Navy personnel had suffered sporadic instances of abusive racially-charged language and threats. Gurney pledged to protect "minority visitors" and employees from subsequent attacks, and announced that he had initiated conversations with Charlestown community organizations about ways to move forward. He also announced his intent to increase police protection in and around the Navy Yard during summer months.[513] Problems persisted, however, and the advisory commission lamented that the "security of and access by minorities" had been a real problem since the park's inception. That problem extended to park work spaces too. Frank Montford reported, for instance, that equal opportunity posters in Building 109 had been defaced. Montford admonished staff that "under no circumstances should items posted on bulletin boards be tampered with," but there seems to have been no mention of the circumstances surrounding these specific posters.[514] Reports suggested that Deputy Mayor Jones might involve himself in addressing the problem, and both Gurney and Berenson stressed education and business outreach as salves, but clearly decades of removal, mistrust, and violence had lodged themselves deep within the park's genesis story and were not going to vanish anytime soon.[515]

Indeed, contending with race violence was a fact of life for park staff. During July 1981, for instance, NPS interpreters leading a Freedom Trail walk intervened in "a potentially serious racial incident" at Paul Revere Mall when they protected "blacks… who were being heavily harassed by local youths." Gurney noted Revere Mall as a frequent problem area with "heavy drug traffic," and deferred to Berenson who, as usual, pledged to take up the problem with the city.[516] The park considered stationing a combination of black and white interpreters at the mall, which "has been a serious trouble spot for both minority groups and employees," but the inclination to let Berenson handle the problem typified the park's typically laissez-faire approach to problems of racial violence.[517] It was an approach which clearly did not work. By 1982, despite working with the Boston Commission, Gurney reported continued difficulties, including constant efforts to remove graffiti from Augustus Saint-Gaudens' famous 1897 Memorial to Robert Gould Shaw and the Massachusetts Fifty-Fourth Regiment at 24 Beacon Street. The "poor reputation the City has in the area of race relations," he said, "is still deserved."[518]

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[513] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[514] Squad Meeting Minutes, January 1, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[515] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 5, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[516] Squad Meeting Minutes, July 14, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[517] Squad meeting minutes, December 14, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[518] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 29, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For more regarding the Park's work with the Boston Committee, see Squad meeting minutes, December 14, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

It is worth noting that, back in 1978, the park had inherited an incredible opportunity to confront problems of race and violence head-on in South Boston. The Omnibus Act of 1978, as we have seen, had only just brought Dorchester Heights into Gurney's management dossier. And Dorchester Heights, given its location adjacent to South Boston High, had been at the center of Boston's school busing crisis just four years earlier. Busing, of course, was not the only cause of racial tension in South Boston. It was rather a symptom of longstanding tensions between the neighborhood's white ethnic Irish majority and relative newcomers, including African Americans, who arrived in increasing numbers throughout the twentieth century and, especially after World War II. Their presence meant that South Boston was a place where local memories had as much to do with battles for civil rights as they had to do with battles with the British. It explains why Representative McCormack's campaign beginning in 1938 to secure federal recognition for the monument and for South Boston's Evacuation Day parade—the campaign, in fact, which paved the way for the national park—sought so aggressively to cast South Boston's history as white Irish history. The monument and the holiday, which conveniently coincided with St. Patrick's Day, had after all been contrived together amid a wave of early twentieth-century patriotic white nationalism. The message then, as well as in 1938, and possibly again in 1978, was clear: South Boston's history is white history.

The NPS thus had a remarkable opportunity in 1978 to change course, to reimagine Dorchester Heights as inclusive of all Americans. Certainly it had the tools to do it. The park's nascent oral history program could have documented how and why different kinds of people had experienced the monument since its dedication less than a century before. The DSC could have repeated in South Boston the community engagement model it experimented with in Charlestown. Gurney could have appointed an African American site manager toward signaling a new era. It seems, though, that bereft of historical context and without concern for the politics of memory, the park took a very different approach to Dorchester Heights. In April 1979, when the park assumed responsibility for Dorchester Heights, Gurney put Vincent Lombardi, a white protection ranger, in charge of the unit along with a crew of six maintenance staff.[519] Lombardi immediately set his crew to cleaning up "years of litter and broken glass [and the] hazards of dead trees and stumps."[520] South Boston councilman Ray Flynn and Senate President William Bulger applauded the effort, hoping that the increased NPS presence at Dorchester Heights would "help develop civic pride [and] further help in combatting vandalism at the Monument."[521]

Having cleaned the site, and after establishing a security protocol there, Lombardi prepared to develop a GMP for the new unit. To get ready, he enrolled in a course on urban parks management wherein participants visited South Boston to meet with community leaders concerning the challenges of managing Dorchester Heights. He and his team were "able to see first hand the difficulties minorities might encounter as they attempt to visit a National Historic Site which has

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[519] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[520] 1979 Annual Report, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[521] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 30, 1980, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

been set aside for the enjoyment of all citizens."[522] Squad meeting minutes from this period shed light on Lombardi's evolving approach to planning. He hoped, for instance, to directly engage neighbors in planning rather than utilize the DSC, suggesting perhaps the extent to which park management had grown weary of decentralization during its previous planning forays.[523] He worried too that "perhaps too much emphasis is being placed on racial problems when writing the GMP—it may exacerbate the problem as it focuses on it."[524] Getting Dorchester Heights into shape, in Lombardi's view, was primarily a matter of reducing crime and encouraging positivity. Picking up trash from the monument grounds, after all, "takes up a good deal of staff time." There too was the constant problem of dogs running loose. And then too there was the constant threat of violence. "An employee was unhurt," according to Squad Meeting Minutes, "when a homemade explosive device that was thrown at him did not explode."[525]

For its part, the advisory commission suggested that Lombardi call a public meeting to discuss "appropriate use" of the park, and possibly even host a farmer's market there "as it once was." Lombardi did stage a community meeting during the summer of 1981, at which he reported "lively" conversation among eighty attendants. "The main issue," it seemed, "was night security—neighbors object to kids drinking, being nuisances at the Monument in the evenings." Lombardi suggested that everyone petition Congressman Moakley for support. Ray Flynn, who attended the meeting, wondered why the NPS did not provide security all night at the monument just as it did at Bunker Hill. Lombardi argued that the best way to combat misuse of Dorchester Heights was to promote appropriate use, suggesting that concerts and farmers markets were excellent tools for dissuading loitering. It turned out too that neighbors felt let down by the Boston Police Department, which they claimed was not responsive to their calls. Lombardi insisted that the park seek possibilities to amend its legislation to establish concurrent jurisdiction with the police at Dorchester Heights.[526]

Contending with Dorchester Heights brought park staff increasingly into conversation with South Boston's white political leadership. During 1981, for instance, Lombardi and Gurney met with Flynn—and Berenson, of course—to discuss ways to improve access among black Bostonians to South Boston. Flynn recommending forming a Thomas Park resident group to help with the problem.[527] Overall, however, Lombardi reported that "the whole tone of the site changed dramatically in that people living around the heights enjoy coming there in the evenings," where-

[522] Squad Meeting Minutes, April 28, 1980, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[523] Squad Meeting Minutes, April 28, 1980, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[524] Squad Meeting Minutes, January 27, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[525] Squad Meeting Minutes, June 2, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[526] Squad Meeting Minutes, June 30, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[527] Squad Meeting Minutes, March 3, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

as before transfer to the NPS, "site neighbors were afraid to be there at night."[528] And yet, one stubborn problem persisted. Despite all his efforts to make the unit safer, Lombardi remained "unable to attract minorities to work at the site."[529] According to him, the problem owed to people having "heard so much about the scarcity of jobs that they may feel there is no use in applying."[530]

But clearly other challenges complicated the possibility of diversifying staff at Dorchester Heights. Key among them no doubt was the fact that white supremist and racial violence were endemic throughout South Boston. During the same year Lombardi wondered why black Bostonians wouldn't work at Dorchester Heights, three black families who lived just down the street from the monument surrendered their public housing after enduring constant assault—including a fire bombing—and threat of violence from their white neighbors. Indeed, the NAACP scheduled its annual meeting that year to take place in Boston so it could raise awareness of the problem.[531] Gurney blamed the "news media [for being] very negative during the NAACP Convention," but lauded his staff for offering support at "potential trouble spots," including Paul Revere Mall, Bunker Hill, and the Charlestown Bridge.[532] But even constant vigilance couldn't prevent incidents at Dorchester Heights such as one "including a 'molotov cocktail'" and another involving the uprooting of a new tree.[533]

Increasingly the agency's presence in South Boston invited scrutiny from some neighbors. A change in security detail, for instance, triggered a sudden backlash among one group of residents, so much so that Berenson convened a special hearing at the Advisory Commission's April 1984 meeting. James DiPerri, Vice President of the South Boston Residents Group, worried about how the "planning and the maintenance of Dorchester Heights has been dramatically changed from the condition it was in when it was opened by the federal authorities back a few years." "All that has been gained may be lost," he warned, adding that "the community is very disturbed." That the new plan had been implemented without community input also worried DiPerri. "If there are any problems at the site," he explained, "it becomes a problem for the neighborhood." What's worse, nobody in charge at the monument was easily accessible to its neighbors. DiPerri requested on behalf of the residents group that the commission help convince the park to resume previous staffing levels. Bereneson and Gurney explained the changes, and Gurney provided a phone number to call in the case that DiPerri could not locate the site manager.[534]

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[528] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, October 27, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[529] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[530] Squad Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–5/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[531] Luix Overbea, "Boston Wrestles with Racial Tensions as NAACP Convention Approaches," The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1982.

[532] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[533] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[534] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 12, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Clearly, by the mid-1980s, the park struggled to find a way to contend with issues of race and violence at Dorchester Heights. But what is perhaps most remarkable about the park's errand in South Boston is that it was just one of two simultaneous forays into complicated histories of race and power in Boston. The other, which the park intentionally conceived of as concerning black history, was considerably more successful. Its success had everything to do with Byron Rushing. Rushing, like so many African Americans during the 1960s, came to Boston for an education. While studying at Harvard, Rushing became involved in Boston's burgeoning civil rights movement, which cultivated his interest in black history. Around 1970, Rushing learned that a building on the north slope of Boston's Beacon Hill—originally built in 1806 as an African church—was up for sale and that a fledgling African American historical association sought to purchase it. Rushing helped the organization raise money to buy the building and, once it had, agreed to become its first executive director. So was born Boston's Museum of Afro American History, where Rushing worked from 1972 until 1984.[535]

It was Rushing who was the only person to formally insist, before the bicentennial, that a national historical park in Boston must contend with histories of race and enslavement. As Rushing recalls it, his involvement began when he was invited by Senator Kennedy to testify in public hearings concerning the proposed park. Rushing testified that "the definition of revolution was too narrow for the park. And that they had to understand that the period that they're talking about was really for all intents and purposes revolution for white people. Because for the period they're talking about, black people, most black people, were enslaved."[536] Rushing's testimony hit its mark. A few weeks later, one of Kennedy's staff called Rushing and asked if he'd want the African Meeting House included in the proposed park. Rushing demurred, but indicated his interest in considering the possibility after the park was established. With that, Kennedy's office recommended that Rushing be included on the Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission.[537]

Rushing's appointment to the commission, in hindsight, was one of the most important turns in the park's story. Rushing, alongside Beninati and O'Shea, advocated for a much more capacious approach to community engagement than the park's progenitors had ever imagined. And it was Rushing, of course, who insisted that the NPS confront African American history in Boston. It was at the same meeting, in fact, that Gurney first raised the issue of racial violence, that Rushing introduced his work on Boston's Black Heritage Trail.[538] The possibility of creating a Black Heritage Trail, Rushing explained, had emerged from a research project concerning the history of African Americans in Boston and in New England.[539] Rushing and his team at the museum had identified sixteen individual buildings—including the African church—which together constituted "the largest concentration of pre-Civil War Black history sites anywhere in the United

[535] Byron Rushing, interview by Laura Muller, John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-062, November 18, 2005, John Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 3.

[536] Byron Rushing, interview by Laura Muller, John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-062, November 18, 2005, John Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 4.

[537] Byron Rushing, interview by Laura Muller, John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-062, November 18, 2005, John Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 4.

[538] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1978, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[539] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 10, 1980, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

States."[540] When Rushing returned to join the April 1980 meeting, he reported that authorizing legislation to create a Boston African American Historic Site was already before Congress. Regional Director Stanton added that he was very optimistic the bill would pass.[541] He was right, Congress authorized the Boston African American National Historic Site in PL 96-430 (1980).

Although detailing the genesis of PL 96-430 is beyond the scope of this report, it is worth noting that the law's rough outlines mirrored the park's own partnership model. Gurney recalls having encouraged Rushing to think of the park's authorizing legislation, and its reliance on cooperative agreements with site owners, as a model for the new unit. A key difference, however, is that Boston African American Historical Site would have to wait years until receiving its budget allocation from the NPS. Rushing was stunned to discover that authorization had not delivered funding. He contacted Congressman Moakley, who he had known for many years, and asked for help. Rushing recalls that Moakley went to the "chairman of the budget committee and was able to get us bumped up. The Park Service was not happy about that."[542] Gurney recalls the same incident quite differently. One day in January 1980, the park received a call from the office of US Representative (IL) Dan Rostenkowski, the then-powerful Democratic chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. An aid from Rostenkowski's office, it turned out, was coming to town and hoped to tour sites associated with Boston's African American history. Gurney, who couldn't reach Rushing in time, met with the aid and lead him on a tour of the Chain Forge, Ropewalk, and the African Meeting House. What's more, Gurney shared a million-dollar list of preservation needs Rushing had compiled for the meeting house. Gurney thought nothing of it until that November when he discovered that, tucked into Congress's 1981 Interior appropriation bill, was one million dollars earmarked for restoration of the African Meeting House. The bill even included a detailed job list. The Washington Office was furious with Gurney given that Interior had not itself included this money in its annual budget. Gurney, however, was grateful for it.[543]

Management of the new unit, as it had with Dorchester Heights, fell to Gurney.[544] And, as he had done at Dorchester Heights, Gurney appointed a site manager, Dorthea Powell, who he hired from the regional office. Thereon, although Gurney was officially in charge, Powell worked

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[540] "A New National Park Comes to Boston," The Broadside (June 1981): 1. The core of the site is the African Meeting House, which is the oldest black church in New England. Other sites include the Charles Street Meeting House (1876–1936), the Abiel Smith School, Saint-Gaudens 54th Regiment Monument, the home of abolitionist Lewis Hayden, the home of the nation's first published black historian (William C. Nell), the George Middleton house, the home of state representative John J. Smith, home of inventor and dentist George Grand (which though identified in the site's legislation, is actually a later building as documented in the National Register nomination for Boston African American NHS), the Joseph Scarlett House, the Smith Court Residents, the John P. Coburn House and Coburn's Gaming House, and the Phillips School, which was integrated in 1855 only to be segregated in 1880.

[541] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 10, 1980, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[542] Byron Rushing, interview by Laura Muller, John Joseph Moakley Oral History Project OH-062, November 18, 2005, John Joseph Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 8.

[543] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[544] NPS signed a cooperative agreement with the Afro American Museum in September 1981. See Squad Meeting Minutes, September 8, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

most directly with the unit's immediate stakeholders.[545] Powell set to work with Rushing and others on assembling a brochure, while Gurney helped carve out office space in the Smith School, hired several interpreters, and initiated work on a historic structures report. Unlike Dorchester Heights, however, plans for the Boston African American Historical Site grew almost entirely out of a singular focus on historical research. The unit had emerged, after all, from Rushing's research project concerning Boston's black history. That precedent continued into the fall of 1981, for instance, when the site hosted a historiography planning conference wherein staff from the Washington office, from the regional office, and from the park gathered along with Byron Rushing to create the framework for a "bank of research on Beacon Hill's Black community."[546] The NPS had thus launched two new initiatives during the late 1970s to assert itself in matters of race and memory in Boston: one born of a critical interest in the past, the other concerned primarily with law enforcement. The imprint of those founding moments remains evident today.

Conclusion

We began this chapter with a question: how well was the Boston National Historical Park prepared to contend with history in a place where history had rendered people like Charles Battles and Ted Landsmark vulnerable to the United States' worst instincts? The answer, this chapter suggests quite clearly, is that the park was not at all prepared. In every regard it lacked the expertise, the resources, and the focus necessary to understand, let alone contend with, the complexity of Boston's historical milieu. Of course the park's authorizing legislation did not overtly commit its staff to thinking about issues such as race and power during the last century. And yet its partnership mandate necessitated cooperation with organizations—including schools, cultural nonprofits, and even briefly the Guardian Angels—for which race and power were the prevailing concerns of the day. Without clear guidance, then, the choice of whether or not to engage these issues, and at what length, fell time after time to the park's superintendent. We see in this chapter how significantly his choices depended on matters of funding, human resources, agency prerogatives, and the perpetual problem of making the Navy Yard accessible and meaningful. We see too that, had it not been for the BNHPAC, the superintendent's choices could have been very different. How would the story change, we might wonder, were there a different superintendent and a different slate of advisers? Chapter six will answer precisely that question.

In the meantime, however, it is worth noting that none of these problems were unique to Boston National Historical Park during the late twentieth century. By those years, for instance, it was rare for any national park to have a staff historian, let alone one as thoughtful and exacting as Paul Weinbaum. It is nonetheless important to document the park's challenges, common though they may have been, toward illustrating how administrative problems—no matter how seemingly inconsequential—so frequently equate to frontline intellectual problems. In Boston, as we have seen, an early and persistent problem with publicity translated readily into an interpretive problem. A poorly managed planning process in Charlestown translated into a difficult community engagement problem. And, in so many respects, the park's history problem was also a race problem. It is evident from the park's archival record which, during its first decade, the superintendent and division officers perceived all these challenges as management problems which, to a greater or lesser degree, could be dealt with by adjusting the number and format of monthly

545 Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

546 Squad Meeting Minutes, September 29, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

meetings or by taking any number of leadership courses offered by the NPS. Going forward, we will see that looking inward for solutions could not, by definition, solve critical challenges facing the agency's first partnership park.

Chapter Six

Managing Growth in the New Economy, 1982–2000

It appeared atop the editorial section of The Boston Globe on Monday morning, August 13, 1984: "USS Constitution Disgraced." In just a handful of paragraphs, the newspaper's editorial staff excoriated the NPS: "The National Historical Park," it inveighed, "is a national embarrassment, while its surroundings are a disgrace." At issue was the impossibility of accessing USS Constitution without "a 20-minute endurance hike… along heavily congested streets." And for what? Even if you could reach the ship, it would mean "standing and baking in line along the edge of its pier for perhaps a half-hour [because] there are no benches." Constitution, Cassin Young, the USS Constitution Museum, and the Boston Marine Society Museum were all worth visiting, for sure, as was the adjacent city park. "Getting around," however, meant "a hot and dirty trudge across acres of asphalt… not unlike a trip to the parking lot of a suburban shopping mall." Worse yet, the NPS meant it to stay that way, "the official explanation [is] that they want the Navy Yard to look as it did… in 1973." The Globe was incredulous. What the park needed was a water-taxi, a shuttle bus, benches, some shade, and perhaps, some imagination. Otherwise, it concluded, "the park is an insult, to the great ship that is berthed there and to the great maritime traditions of the city."[547]

The next morning, Superintendent Hugh Gurney opened his monthly squad meeting by asking if any of the division heads would like to begin with a "start-off question." Donna Robertson did. "What will be the repercussions," she wondered, "of the article written in the Boston Globe about the disgrace of Boston National Historical Park?"[548] According to her, "they really "socked it" to us; made us look entirely at fault." Dorthea Powell noted that, ironically, new benches were already on their way to the park. Victor Jorrin "feels there is no justice." According to Frank Montford, the Globe had sent someone to talk with "the people at the Museum," presumably meaning the Constitution Museum, as well as the BRA and Chief of Interpretation Lou Venuto, but clearly neither he nor the rest of the division chiefs felt the park had been treated well. Only Gurney suggested that "we are not entirely without blame." The park was, after all, "accountable for not having ordered the benches long ago."[549]

Just about a month later, Hugh Gurney announced his retirement.[550] Whether or not the Globe's criticism had any bearing on Gurney's decision to leave, it did signal several problems

[547] "USS Constitution Disgraced," Boston Globe, August 13, 1984.

[548] Squad Meeting Minutes, August 14, 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[549] Squad Meeting Minutes, August 14, 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[550] His last day at the Park would be September 14, 1984. Squad Meeting Minutes, September 11, 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

which had remained devilishly persistent throughout his tenure.[551] There was, for instance, the difficulty of getting around a park which spanned over forty acres of busy downtown Boston. Then too was the problem of the massive Navy Yard and its tendency to confound visitors and exhaust staff. Evident also in the Globe's critique was confusion regarding what the national park really was and who was responsible for what. What was the Navy's role in all this? Who was actually in charge of the visitor experience aboard Constitution? And why should Constitution, just one among several partners sites, be the locus around which to evaluate the National Park's Service's work in Boston? The park's staff was right to be outraged. And yet, Gurney's response revealed his understanding that, fair or not, the Globe's critique signaled a critical problem of perception: if its public perceived the park to be a disgrace, then how could it be anything else?

My purpose in this chapter is to understand how and why public perception of the park changed so dramatically in the years after Gurney's departure. Indeed, by the late 1990s, the park had tapped into millions of dollars of congressional funding, staged blockbuster preservation projects, and appeared as co-sponsor of all matter of civic programming. All this raised the park's public stock and points to Gurney's successor, Superintendent John Burchill, as being responsible for the park's renaissance during these years. But here too are problems of perception. As we will see, Burchill's arrival coincided exactly with important changes in Boston's political and economic landscapes, changes which fundamentally reoriented the city's economy around a burgeoning white upper class. Entertaining this new demographic, and reinforcing its ideas about nation and progress, became a cornerstone of Boston's new economy during the 1990s. Burchill met the demand by investing more than ever in the Freedom Trail. If this was success, however, it was only partial. As historian Al Young observed in another Globe feature, the Freedom Trail had become, by 2004, "a victim of its greatest successes."[552] Renewed enthusiasm for the old familiar icons of Longfellow's historical imagination, he argued, had once again obscured actual history. In other words, though the park had certainly expanded its capacity to serve heritage tourists, it was still unclear—even two decades past authorization—whether the park was able or willing to serve the historical needs of all Americans.

Rise of the New Old Boston

The fate of Boston National Historical Park has always hung in the balance of city politics. Some observers might conclude that because the city has rarely contributed direct funding to matters of historic preservation and interpretation—a tendency, in fact, that has defined Boston's heritage landscape since the nineteenth century—that there is somehow a disconnect between the park and city hall, cooperative agreements notwithstanding. As we have seen, however, city politics have exerted considerable influence on the park's fate ever since it was first imagined by John McCormack and Edwin Small during the 1930s. And because Boston city politics have vacillated so wildly since the collapse of Mayor James Michael Curley's political machine in 1950, so has the story of the park. Whether the politics of urban renewal, the politics of school desegregation, the politics of deindustrialization, or Boston's ubiquitous politics of class, ethnicity, and religion, city hall's political orientation has largely set the tone for the park's planners and its managers. We know from dozens of park histories that local politics bear influence on all NPS units. Urban parks, however, may be distinctive in this regard, and Boston a special case therein.

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[551] Steve Carlson recalls speculation within the park that Gurney's inability to please USS Constitution's various stakeholders prompted his departure. See Stephen P. Carlson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, March 1, 2019.

[552] Alfred F. Young, "The Trouble with the Freedom Trail," Boston Globe, March 21, 2004.

The transition from Gurney to Burchill in 1984 suggests that what has made the park special is the suddenness of shifts in managerial strategies necessitated by Boston's mercurial political milieu. Gurney, for instance, had assumed leadership amid Kevin White's campaign for reelection in 1975. Although White had come into office as a champion of civil rights and an advocate for community engagement—themes which clearly shaped expectations for the park and its advisory commission—his mayoral victory in 1975 marked a turning point wherein White shuttered the "little town halls" he had established throughout Boston's neighborhoods, and rather turned his attention almost exclusively to downtown economic redevelopment. White's turn inward, and his return to the sort of machine politics which characterized his predecessors, triggered other changes which shifted the ground beneath Gurney's feet. A citywide tax referendum, for instance, drastically reduced city tax revenue just as the United States plummeted into the 1979 energy crises, and then a prolonged global economic recession which triggered austerity measures throughout Gurney's remaining time in Boston.[553] Gurney had worked diligently, if not always successfully, to embrace community engagement—including around matters of racial violence—and to leverage the bicentennial era's financial and patriotic largesse. Neither of those resources were in ready supply in Boston by 1984.

What's more, it was unclear what Boston's decades-long investments in urban renewal had achieved for the city by the early 1980s. Rouse's Faneuil Hall Marketplace development project was clearly a success for well-heeled heritage tourists, and cities across the United States had already begun to mimic its example, but statistically Boston had not yet rounded whatever corner Ed Logue and the Chamber of Commerce had aimed for. The city's population, for instance, was still declining. And tangles of traffic still mired motorists and pedestrians all across town, so much so that plans for a new development project, this one aimed toward routing traffic beneath Boston, began circulating in 1982. Incredibly, the city which had invested so much effort in reinventing itself after World War II, and which had displaced so many people to make it possible, appeared by 1982 in a prominent study of threatened American cities. The report's authors ranked Boston in graver danger even than Detroit, Michigan, which by then had become a disastrous symbol of the United States' postindustrial collapse. It comes as no surprise, then, that also in 1982, attendance at the park dropped six percent despite a concurrent nine percent increase across all NPS urban parks. The park had always been subject to the whims of Boston's political and economic directions, a fact which surely weighed on Superintendent Gurney as he approached a decade of service in Boston.[554]

And yet, remarkably, as soon as Gurney left, the park's fortunes appear to have changed again. Certainly his replacement, Superintendent John Burchill, had something to do with the shift. But it's worth noting that, once again, statistics tell a compelling story which, in this case, began even before Burchill arrived. For instance, whereas city growth was down 1.29 percent in 1980, it rebounded over the decade, climbing to 0.2 percent in 1990.[555] What caused the change? Urban economists Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson identify a "triple revolution," wherein during a short period, Boston welcomed a sudden influx of immigrants, its economy pivoted sharply to a so-called "mind-based" economy, and growth in surrounding regions leveraged

[553] See Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, chapter 20, for an overview of these years.

[554] Visitation figures appear in Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1980, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. On Boston's ongoing decline, including the 1982 report and statistics, see introduction to Bluestone and Stevenson, The Boston Renaissance.

[555] Data taken from http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/boston-population/ (accessed September 3, 2019).

Boston's access to a powerful northeastern metropolis. These changes benefited the park significantly insomuch as they increased its access to private and public investment, while attracting throngs of affluent visitors and residents to downtown. But not everyone benefited equally from Boston's transformation. On the contrary, the particularities of its triple revolution sent downtown real estate costs skyrocketing, triggering new depths of ethnic poverty and reactivating the kind of residential segregation which activists struggled against all throughout the twentieth century.[556] In other words, Boston's urban crisis did not disappear so much as it transformed.

And it transformed in a way which, by all appearances, seemed to have achieved the goals of urban renewal. The sudden influx of wealthy, young, white residents, for instance, triggered a wave of gentrification.[557] New stores, cafes, restaurants, and housing, often featuring adaptive reuse of old buildings, suggested new life for the old city. Though less visibly, even Boston's black residents participated in the economic upturn, so much so that it seemed old battle lines between black and white residents might be fading. Boston's new mayor, former city councilor Raymond Flynn, certainly confirmed that impression when he won office in 1984. Reacting against White's turn away from Boston's neighborhoods, Flynn positioned himself as a populist mayor concerned about working people and willing to talk critically about race. Doing so, of course, was much easier amid Boston's newfound economic prosperity. And, too, the new immigrants partly responsible for Boston's turnaround, especially low-wage workers from Asia and Latin America, lacked the political capital to make visible how unevenly distributed the new prosperity really was. In fact, the shift to a federal block grant system beginning in the late 1970s removed much of the community engagement which had been a feature of late-phase urban redevelopment, making it harder for otherwise disenfranchised populations to have any say in city politics.[558] Taken together, as historian Jim Vrabel puts it, these changes created a passive political climate in Boston which was largely opposed to early renewal strategies—such as demolition and displacement—though primarily oriented around the needs of prosperous young white newcomers. It was a prime opportunity for the NPS, whose rustic charms appealed powerfully to this demographic, to generate popular support among people for whom history and consumerism seemed natural partners.

The NPS in an Age of Austerity

This is not to say that all was well for the national parks in 1984. On the contrary, the National Park Service was still finding its way amid a significant political shift in Washington, DC. The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 finally extinguished what remained of the New Deal era progressivism which had buoyed the NPS for much of the twentieth century, and which had manifested, even during the Carter administration, in Gurney's wholehearted embrace of worker training programs. Most significantly for the NPS, Reagan's choice of James G. Watt to direct the Department of Interior reversed a generation of funded growth throughout the system. Watt insisted the parks ought to pay for themselves and that, until they could, the agency's

[556] Bluestone and Stevenson, The Boston Renaissance, 1–16.

[557] For examples of gentrification in Charlestown at this time and statistics concerning its impact, see various articles included in a special issue of the Boston Globe, January 4, 1982.

[558] The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 established the Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) which began in earnest the focus on redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and properties, rather than demolition of substandard housing and economically depressed areas. On this, and concerning Flynn's positioning regarding race, See Vrabel, A People's History of the New Boston, chapter 20.

priority ought to be nourishing recreation in the so-called "crown jewels"—large iconic nature parks like Yosemite and Grand Canyon—while encouraging private partnership and a customer-service model everywhere else. Watt's mandate, of course, conflicted with the Organic Act of 1916, which committed the system to ensure that all its resources remain safe and accessible to everyone. Employee morale suffered system-wide during these years, especially as threats to the power of the agency's director resulted in politicization of its leadership and an expectation that the agency should do considerably more with substantially less funding.[559]

At first it seemed that Watt's appointment might not be entirely disadvantageous for the park. At a May 1981 meeting of BNHPAC, members discussed the new Secretary of Interior and how his policies might affect their work. Steven Lewis, from the regional office, summarized the state of affairs and explained that the park's partnership configuration made it "very sympathetic to the policy direction of this administration."[560] At the same time, the effect of Watt's austerity regime became almost immediately evident. Funding for operations in 1981, for instance, could barely cover pay raises. Staff considered ways to minimize costs such as by reducing evening hours at the visitor center and at Bunker Hill, and by closing the Navy Yard at night.[561] Even beyond Watt's resignation in 1983, federal cost cutting strategies during the Reagan years created considerable stress system-wide. Burchill worried, for instance, that the introduction of federal budget limitations by way of the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Balanced Budget Act would "be a real challenge to the Park."[562] He was right. During fiscal year 1986, the new law cost the park $360,000 in funding.[563] But funding shortfalls weren't the only problem. Austerity measures triggered a wave of complications throughout the agency. Staff meeting minutes from these years, for instance, show evidence of considerable turmoil within the regional office. In April 1987, for instance, the regional office announced that "due to numerous employee transfers and resignations, this office is experiencing an extreme back-up in processing" routine paperwork. The NPS detailed staff from Gateway National Recreation Area and Statue of Liberty National Monument just to help clear the backlog of paperwork.[564]

In hindsight, the Watt years triggered what might be termed a managerial turn in NPS history. This is to say that, after 1980, approaches to solving the agency's most dogged challenges—underfunding, understaffing, and overuse—increasingly foregrounded cost-sharing; fiscal efficiencies; work-flow routinization; and beginning in 1987, computerization and data centralization. As we will see, all these strategies had impacts in Boston. In some ways, the managerial turn

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559 Documents and analysis concerning these changes appear in Lary M. Dilsaver, America's National Park System: The Critical Documents (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), chapter 8, https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/anps/anps_8.htm (accessed September 3, 2019).

560 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 5, 1981, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

561 Squad Meeting Minutes, January 1, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

562 Staff Meeting Minutes, January 6, 1985, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

563 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 29, 1986, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

564 Katie Gavan's report appears in Staff Meeting Minutes, April 15, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

shifted power away from parks and into regional offices. The 1987consolidation of all agency financial services, for instance, had precisely this effect.[565] In other ways, the managerial turn's concern with self-study generated considerable insight into the problems which the NPS would have to contend with if it were to survive into the new century. A series of reports, including the 1992 Vail Agenda, laid bare just how dire the agency's situation was at the end of the twentieth century.[566] It was the 1992 report, in fact, which prompted a significant agency-wide reorganization in 1994, the first time NPS organizational structures had been comprehensively reworked since the New Deal era.[567] As the park understood it, the reorganization implemented changes which had emerged amid the managerial turn. An article in The Broadside explained that the change sought primarily to reduce full-time equivalencies, to reduce management levels and personnel overhead, and to fix a failing system infrastructure.[568] This, at least, is how the BNHP experienced the 1994 reorganization. In many ways, by merit of its partnership model, BNHP had become a seedbed for just this kind of managerial experimentation. For that reason, and owing to expanded concern for urban parks during the 1990s, BNHP would—by the turn of the century—become an incubator for NPS professionals throughout the system.[569]

Managing the Managerial Turn

Back in 1982, however, if we are to take the Globe's word for it, the agency's work in Boston was anything but a model. How then do we explain the park's reversal of fortunes by the end of the following decade? Before answering that question, it is important to take stock of just how much the park had actually accomplished under Superintendent Gurney, newspaper editorials notwithstanding. We learned in chapter five how dynamic the park had become during those years, but it's worth restating that—despite its difficult legislative genesis and the Bicentennial's long shadow—the park had fully come into its own by 1982. That year, for instance, the park welcomed 1.7 million visitors: about 870,000 in the so-called "south district," which referred to the downtown sites; 800,000 in the Navy Yard; 101,000 at Bunker Hill; and 19,000 at Dorchester

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565 For an explanation of how the change meant that "parks have less control over handling of expenses," see Associate Director, Policy, Budget and Administration, to Field Directors, May 8, 1987, in Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

566 For an overview of these, see Janet A. McDonnell, "Reassessing the National Park Service and the National Park System," The George Wright Forum 25, no. 2 (2008): 6–14.

567 Importantly, the NPS had also failed a federal audit during 1991, which set the stage for a byzantine structure of new spending guidelines.

568 Sandy Brue, "What's all this Talk about Restructuring?," The Broadside (Autumn 1994): 14.

569 On the rise of interest in urban parks, see Mackintosh, The National Parks: Shaping the System (Washington DC: US Department of the Interior, 1991), 71–78. The turn toward a concerted effort to think about interpretation in urban contexts is signaled in Assistant Director, Interpretation, to Regional Directors, September 10, 1987, at http://npshistory.com/publications/interpretation/urban-parks-interp-1987.pdf (accessed September 3, 2019). In 1989, Burchill noted that "Boston's staff are sought after and competing very well for positions throughout the Service which is a sign of a healthy organization." See Staff Meeting minutes, September 12, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Heights.[570] And it did this while developing new management plans, innovative interpretation, and managing sites which had only been added to the park's dossier since authorization. That it achieved all this amid the degradations of Watt's leadership is remarkable and speaks powerfully to the importance of Gurney's early vision.

Even more remarkable, perhaps, is how effectively the park developed Navy Yard programming, despite how awkwardly the site fit into the park's broader concern with revolutionary pasts. A case in point is the popularity of USS Cassin Young.[571] In June 1978, the NPS acquired Cassin Young for repair and indefinite exhibit at the Navy Yard. The ship, built in 1943 and deployed during World War II and the Korean War, had been repaired at Charlestown during the 1950s. Since then, the Navy had put it into reserve at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in the so-called mothball fleet. This time around, the ship was put in at Boston's Dry Dock 1 in October 1979 for sandblasting and repainting. Dry Dock 1 itself had only just been designated a National Historical Engineering Landmark by the American Society of Civil Engineers. Park Ranger Linda Canzanelli observed that, together with the Navy Yard and Constitution, Cassin Young would "tell the story of naval shipbuilding and the development of the United States Navy."[572]

The ship's path to Boston was not entirely certain. Indeed, the question of whether or not to bring Cassin Young to the Navy Yard hit right at the heart of the complex debates which had developed in connection with the GMP process. Gurney, along with Peter Steele and Ross Holland, supported acquisition of the Cassin Young. Denis Galvin, however, who by then served as regional assistant director of operations, vehemently opposed it.[573] Gurney recalls that Holland was the strongest advocate for the Navy Yard's historical value, and was adamant that it be preserved as an industrial site.[574] Maintaining the ship in real time for visitors in Dry Dock 1 certainly showcased the site's industrial character.[575] Cassin Young ended up being a popular addition, though it was itself difficult to manage. By fall 1981, for instance, vandalism had become a problem aboard the ship. Despite the presence of interpreters, the number of visitors and size of the ship meant that plexiglass shields, ropes, and other barriers were required to curtail inappropriate behavior. Again, however, numbers tell the story. In 1982, 180,000 of the Navy Yard's 800,000 visitors toured Cassin Young.[576] It and the visiting ships program, inspired in part by the Queen of England's visit aboard HMY Britannia in 1976, remain among the most popular facets of Navy

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[570] Figures included in "Year-round Interpretive Duty Stations," attached to Gerald E. Swofford, Chief of Visitor Services, to Hugh Gurney, April 22, 1983, in Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[571] For an overview of Cassin Young's arrival in Boston, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 250.

[572] Linda Canzanelli, "Welcome Commission the U.S.S. Cassin Young," and n.a., "Dry Dock Number One Receives Landmark Status," The Broadside (Winter 1979): 3–5.

[573] Hugh Gurney, unrecorded telephone interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, July 12, 2017.

[574] Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

[575] Squad Meeting Minutes, November 17, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[576] Figures included in "Year-round Interpretive Duty Stations," attached to Gerald E. Swofford, Chief of Visitor Services, to Hugh Gurney, April 22, 1983, in Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Yard programming.[577] It was aboard Cassin Young as well that the park developed a powerful Volunteer in Parks (VIP) program which maintained the ship to Navy standards and, over time, expanded also to support the downtown visitor center.[578]

Other aspects of the park's success during the 1990s also originated during Gurney's superintendency. The possibility of revitalizing the area surrounding Hoosac Pier, for instance, first came before BNHPAC during its April 1982 meeting, when news arrived that Massport was considering the area for its purposes.[579] Anne Myers assured the commission that Massport would provide parking for the resulting commercial development so as not to "throw a lot of cars into a community that already has a problem."[580] A year later, park planner Deborah Szarka reported that preliminary plans for the area had been completed and that work would begin during summer 1983. The plans called for two new redbrick buildings including surface parking, a restaurant, and office space. What's more, an extant warehouse would be nominated for the National Register and could potentially provide "curatorial functions for the park." Szarka noted that "many groups" had expressed a desire for large public spaces on the pier, which the NPS considered "commendable."[581]

It was also during spring 1982 that the park and BNHPAC first took up the problem of the Commandant's House, and whether to treat it as a house museum or as a working building. The house had functioned as both for the previous six years and concerns arose about the evident wear it had suffered as a result. Curator Peter Steele argued that the building should be treated as a historic house museum wherein all social functions would be prohibited. Gurney noted that, despite inevitable pressure from local organizations, the time might be perfect for Steele's proposed change. Just that year, newspapers reported outrage over accusations that Interior Secretary Watt had misspent public funds on expensive social functions at the historic Arlington House atop Arlington Cemetery in Washington, DC. "After debacles such as at Arlington House, with Secretary Watt, the public may better understand why the National Park Service would take such a stand."[582] A the same time, the Charlestown Historical Society had previously hosted events in the house and wished to again. After considerable debate, Berenson constituted a subcommittee to examine the problem.[583] At the following meeting it was announced that a comprehensive plan for use of the Commandant's House would be scheduled.[584]

But even though the park had achieved considerably more in the Navy Yard than the Globe had credited it for in 1982, there were still signs of problems already emerging within the park's

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577 Hugh Gurney, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, September 1, 2017.

578 See The Broadside for frequent mentions of the park's VIP program.

579 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 29, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

580 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

581 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, May 24, 1983 and November 29, 1983, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

582 Squad Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. See Mary Battiata, "GAO Says Watt Should Pay Part of Party Costs," The Washington Post, February 25, 1982.

583 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, April 29, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

584 Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1982, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

managerial structure. Even before Watt's appointment, Gurney dwelled at length on how best to manage his staff. On April 21, 1980, the day the park's reorganization went into effect, Gurney announced that he would hold "squad meetings" each week with the four staff members directly under his supervision: the chief of visitor services, the administrative officer, the chief of planning and historic preservation, and the Dorchester Heights site manager. Gurney then distributed meeting minutes among the division chiefs with instructions to share them with other employees "for the efficient dissemination of information to all employees."[585] That Gurney preferred staff meetings be called "squad meetings" speaks to a military style team-building sensibility which runs throughout early minutes. This preoccupation with military culture even impacted the advisory commission where, for instance, attendees began the December 7, 1976 meeting with a moment of silence in remembrance of "those who died at Pearl Harbor."[586]

After a few years, it seems that park staff sought more and different kinds of ways to engage one another. In late 1981, for instance, non-supervisory staff requested an opportunity to meet at least once without supervisors present. Their request came in conjunction with planning for a park-wide general staff meeting slated for January 1982. Meetings wherein all employees had an opportunity to encounter one another at once were rare at the park. Vince Lombardi suggested that the 1982 meeting might be used to orient staff to the park's various preservation functions given that "many employees do not understand how the preservation center really operates."[587] That they did not reveals a considerable day-to-day distance between divisions, and also illustrates the priority placed by management on preservation over other functions such as history and interpretation.

There are other signs, too, that, by 1982, staff meetings might not have been functioning as well as possible. During these years, the park engaged a management consultant to recommend ways to boost efficiency and morale. The consultant's recommendations included creating "a pervasive climate of acknowledgment [that] can make monetary rewards and official awards seem less important than is usually supposed. There are entire voluntary systems where acknowledgement and the experience of personal growth are the only rewards—and people work long and hard to get them." Staff might also, he suggested, pay out of their own pockets to participate in Werner Erhard's controversial Erhard Seminars Training to help them more fully appreciate their potential.[588] What's more, a curious entry in one set of squad meeting minutes indicates that, in light of the consultant's recommendations, there should be "no more zingers." "If someone should slip and zing someone else" the minutes continue, "the zinger must pay the

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[585] Squad Meeting Minutes, April 21, 1980, Folder BNHP Annual Reports 1978–1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. These minutes include detailed instructions from Gurney about how to manage divisions.

[586] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 7, 1976, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[587] Squad Meeting Minutes, December 1, 1981, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[588] Bob Norris (unclear who this is) to "Superintendent's Squad," September 15, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 09/1982–02/1983, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Note that the letter begins with "To the Squad, all hail!," which indicates the pervasiveness of squad culture at the Park.

zingee two compliments."[589] At the same meeting, the superintendent's secretary explained that "she felt somewhat at a disadvantage being asked to join the discussion of the new squad format, which is an outgrowth of the participatory training session, since she did not attend the session and had no idea what the others were talking about." Perhaps unsurprisingly, she announced at the same meeting that she intended to leave the park at the end of the month.[590]

Minutes from subsequent squad meetings reveal an almost obsessive preoccupation with making meetings more efficient, including by designating a time keeper to limit how long staff might discuss any one issue. The source of the time pressure, according to the minutes: new financial and compliance regimes, wherein the necessity of updating performance standards and conducting appraisals seemed to eclipse all other responsibilities. The proliferation of assessment responsibilities and constant threat of budget shortfalls created real anxieties. During a November 17, 1983 squad meeting, for instance, the deputy superintendent reported that "morale is a problem especially in light of A-76. Some bad rumors are going around. Problem is that the accurate information is no better than the rumors."[591] Gurney sought to improve the situation by adjusting meeting formats, but his efforts proved largely ineffective and, over time, revealed an even more significant underlying problem. During a March 1, 1983 squad meeting, discussion turned to the problem of cooperation and a need "to work more closely together as one park, not as individual divisions."[592] It was the segregation of park staff into discrete units—the Dorchester Heights crew, the Navy Yard staff, Bunker Hill rangers, and the downtown cohort—which seemed to be creating the problem. In other words, those features which made the urban partnership park so unique had, in this case, nurtured discord among its staff.

No matter how Gurney addressed it, the problem continued to intensify. At a January 1984 squad meeting, the superintendent and division leaders brainstormed what might be causing it. Suggestions included that bad morale "may be a reaction against maintenance," though in what way exactly is not clear. "Unequal treatment on training [and] leave charges," emerged as a possibility too. Numerous suggestions concerned problems associated with inconsistent response from superiors to staff who arrived late to work or stayed longer than necessary. A culture of surveillance and "note taking," it seems had emerged. But also, and perhaps more importantly for this study, it seems that "people do not feel they work for [the park, but] just their unit, such as Bunker Hill."[593] By spring 1984, the superintendent's weekly squad meeting was collapsing.

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[589] Squad Meeting Minutes, May 11, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[590] Squad Meeting Minutes, May 11, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[591] Squad Meeting Minutes, November 17, 1983, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984 BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. "A-76" refers to OMB Circular A-76. For details, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A76/a076.pdf (accessed September 3, 2019).

[592] Squad Meeting Minutes, March 1, 1983, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[593] Squad Meeting Minutes, January 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Gurney asked his division heads why the meetings were no longer productive and wondered that perhaps the management consultant had not been effective after all.[594]

In a last-ditch effort, Gurney asked division chiefs come to squad meetings with a question which might encourage convivial discussion among the group. It was precisely this impulse which encouraged Donna Robertson to ask about the Globe article in 1982. And though it is uncertain whether Gurney perceived it, the questions and answers revealed a deep sense of divide among his staff over some of the most important issues concerning the park. At the conclusion of a May 1984 squad meeting, for instance, chief of planning and historic preservation Frank Montford asked: "What do you feel is the most abused historical object in the Park?" Most everyone present answered in turn: Bob Pribula worried about Bunker Hill, Jerry Swofford named the Old State House, Montford picked the Navy Yard, and Gurney chose Faneuil Hall. Neither Deputy Superintendent Wendell Simpson, Simpson's secretary (Donna Robertson), nor Dottie Powell registered a response.[595] A month later, Wendell Simpson asked "what is the main resource in the Park that should be the primary interest as far as historic preservation?" Once again, a round of answers: Pribula identified the "Red Line," Swofford picked USS Constitution, Paul Weinbaum named Faneuil Hall as did Powell, and Gurney and Simpson named the Old State House.[596] Remarkably, by 1984, the park's staff did not appear to share a common vision, a common sense of purpose, or even a fundamental knowledge of what one another did. Just a few months later, Gurney retired, leaving the park and the NPS for good.

A New Superintendent for a New Era

The NPS appointed Gurney's replacement, Superintendent John Burchill, on October 1, 1984. Unlike Gurney, who had grown up on Boston's periphery, Burchill was born in Boston and had grown up in West Roxbury. Also unlike Gurney, Burchill had no history training. In 1961, he earned a BA in business administration from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and then graduated from Suffolk University Law School with a JD in 1967. He began his career as an attorney for the Army Corps of Engineers, and then transitioned into a series of positions in the NPS including at Cape Cod National Seashore, Big Cypress National Preserve, Yosemite National Park, Yellowstone National Park, and Lowell National Historical Park.[597] Whereas Gurney's experience had prepared him to lead a Revolutionary War history park, Burchill's experience had clearly prepared him to run an urban partnership park. That's precisely what he had done as superintendent of Lowell National Historical Park where, beginning in 1981, Burchill worked with US Senator Paul Tsongas to secure $12,500,000 for the restoration of the Boot Cotton Mill.

Just as Edwin Small's work in Salem anticipated his urban renewal vision for a national park in Boston, so did Burchill's experience of urban renewal in Lowell lay the groundwork for his management strategy in Boston. Lowell National Historical Park had emerged, shortly after its

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594 Squad Meeting Minutes, April 24, 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

595 Squad Meeting Minutes, May 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

596 Squad Meeting Minutes, June 1984, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

597 Sean Hennessey, "In Memoriam: John J. Burchill," The Broadside 2 (2002): 1.

authorization in 1978, as a jewel in the agency's small crown of urban parks. It was the vanguard, as Cathy Stanton explains it, of Lowell's culture-led redevelopment program and it modeled a decentralized park which, not unlike Boston, anticipated the heritage areas which are common today.[598] As Sean Hennessey explained it, Burchill "formed coalitions and partnerships with business and civic leaders and with the Lowell Plan… which spurred further development and attracted new business to the City of Lowell." [599] The Lowell Plan, an organization formed at Tsongas's urging in 1979, functioned as "a kind of business-sponsored think tank for [Lowell's] redevelopment project."[600] Working closely with private interests had, of course, become a priority during Watt's administration, and Burchill appears to have embraced it wholeheartedly during his time in Lowell. This was not, however, the sort of public-private partnership that Ed Logue championed wherein community organizations could count on a guaranteed seat at the planning table. In Lowell the notion was that public partners, such as the NPS, would guarantee a public voice simply by merit of their presence. But would the NPS really guarantee a public voice during the Reagan era? It aimed to in Lowell, Cathy Stanton argues, because a handful of so-called progressive public historians employed there by the NPS insisted that it should. Boston's staff shared neither Lowell's progressive bent nor its corps of historians, however, and so it remained to be seen just how vigorously Burchill's management style would activate, say, the voices of Boston's new immigrants.

Unsurprisingly, Burchill's appointment introduced a shift in leadership style in Boston which reflected changes in the city, changes in the NPS, and new priorities in the superintendent's office. The shift is immediately evident in the superintendent's annual reports, which beginning in 1984 demonstrate considerably more concern with performance assessment, accountability, and human resources than had been the case in previous years. Staff meeting minutes during the same period are more detailed and reveal an expanded slate of meetings. That year, for instance, the park staged evaluations of personnel management and property management procedures. It implemented new guidelines for merit promotion, and reported for the first time on the management of Official Personnel Folders (OPFs) and Employee Performance Folders (EPFs).[601] Burchill's agenda closely followed the agency's prevailing concern with financial efficiencies. He reversed, for instance, Gurney's decision to locate the Superintendent's office at the Easton Building, where the Navy Yard's distractions wouldn't be all-consuming. Burchill rather consolidated his leadership team in the Marine Barracks toward "sav[ing] the government significant time and money."[602] And it was during these years too that he set out to contend with the morale problem which harried Gurney. Almost as soon as he arrived, for instance, the new superintendent began planning the first of what would become a new tradition: annual Christmas parties. It was just one of many ways Burchill sought to encourage esprit de corps where, it seemed, there had been none.

Restructuring the BNHP's leadership team was key to his strategy. Throughout 1984 and into 1985, the superintendent worked with the regional office to develop a new staffing plan. The

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[598] Stanton, The Lowell Experiment (University of Massachusetts Press), 3.

[599] Sean Hennessey, "In Memoriam: John J. Burchill," The Broadside 2 (2002): 1.

[600] Stanton, The Lowell Experiment, 115.

[601] Superintendent Report, 1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[602] Superintendent Report, 1988, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

reorganization went into effect December 8, 1985.[603] It included the addition of a deputy superintendent, Wendell Simpson, who enforced Burchill's vision on the ground. It also included an assistant superintendent, John Debo, who "became part of the management team" with particular responsibilities for planning and historic preservation.[604] Debo, incidentally, had served as Burchill's assistant superintendent for planning and development at Lowell National Historical Park.[605] He introduced an urban affairs specialist, Carter Lowe, and in time a public relations officer.[606] Burchill also had plans for interpretation, which included a new supervisory park ranger, though they were not included in the first round of changes. It's worth noting that Burchill's reorganization took place against the backdrop of a march toward computerization, which began in earnest during the late 1980s amid system-wide changes in accounting functions.[607] In other words, Burchill was an early and vigorous champion of the managerial turn in NPS history which, during those years, transformed the agency.

This is not to say that Burchill's approach to park management was impersonal. On the contrary, if staff meeting minutes are any indication, the new superintendent appears to have reveled in throwing retirement parties, giving awards, hosting the annual Christmas party, and otherwise being at the center of an organizational community he sought to encourage from early on. Indeed, Burchill relied on his officers to extend the superintendent's gaze into all aspects of park operations. "No communication leaves the park," ordered Deputy Superintendent Wendell Simpson, "without the Superintendent's signature or his seeing it. John wants to know everything that is

[603] Staff Meeting minutes, December 9, 1985, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[604] Superintendent Report, 1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[605] Debo had also recently trained in the Departmental Management Training Program in Washington. Staff Meeting, October 9, 1984, Folder Staff Meetings10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Debo stayed on until 1988, at which point he transferred to Cuyahoga National Recreational Area. See Staff Meeting Minutes, March 15, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[606] The nature of Lowe's appointment is unclear insomuch as he arrived alongside Burchill, but did not immediately receive a title. He had, however, received his title and began reporting at staff meetings by November 1984. Carlson recalls that Carter, although on the park payroll, worked primarily for the regional office until he replaced Dottie Powell at Boston African American National Historic Site. See Staff Meeting Minutes, November 26, 1984, Folder Staff Meetings 10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[607] Superintendent Report, 1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Northeast Region purchased a battery of Wang personal computers for its units. See, for instance, Staff Meeting Minutes, August 12, 1985, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986. One such computer was installed in April 1983. Squad Meeting, April 12, 1983, Folder Squad Meetings 03/1983–09/1984. Implementation of the AFS Budget System involved struggles such as occurred when "we have been plagued by an 'unknown bug' in the program and finally got an entire new disk from region yesterday which is working." Staff Meeting Minutes, February 28, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

happening in the park."[608] Burchill sought also to make routine inspections of cooperative sites by himself or by one of his two assistants, though the practice seems to have ebbed and flowed over the years.[609] The change in managerial style was immediately perceptible to park staff. Within a month of his arrival, Deputy Superintendent Wendell Simpson observed "a noticeable change in pace," adding that "it is to our best interest to observe and adjust to the new style of management that we are experiencing, in a spirit of cooperation, as quickly as possible."[610]

Managing park staff with a combination of morale building techniques, strict oversight, and delegated authority allowed Burchill to focus his attentions on park stakeholders, and especially would-be funders. Unlike Gurney, whose schedule was almost entirely consumed by the Navy Yard and personnel issues, Burchill's schedule reveals a primarily outward-facing superintendent. Luncheon meetings, press events, meetings of historical associations, book readings, and civic events consumed his time, as did meetings at the regional office. On a very rare occasion, Burchill met with someone to discuss the park in terms of its broader historical purpose.[611] He spent the lion's share of his time building and maintaining public relations. In some cases, he mixed the personal and professional. Burchill was a member of the Irish Charitable Society, for instance, and served on the board of A Christian Ministry in the National Parks. This may explain his encouragement of staff to participate in multi-denominational Sunday services aboard USS Constitution."[612] In other instances, too, Burchill's outward-looking superintendence blurred the delicate line between public and private. Most significantly for our story, Burchill joined and eventually led the board of the Greater Boston Convention and Visitors Bureau. [613] For Burchill, it was a capacity-building strategy harkening back to his days in Lowell.

From Partnership Park to Managerial Park

On the face of it, Burchill's mingling of public and private appeared very much like a fulfillment of the park's partnership mandate. If we look more closely, however, records reveal how Burchill's public-facing leadership served just as often, if not more frequently, to consolidate the park's position within Boston and within the agency. This is to say, though the park had been authorized for the purpose of serving its partner sites, by the late-1980s the park's raison d'etre seemed rather more frequently to be its own success. The shift likely owed in part to the disbanding of the park's advisory commission, which by 1986 had completed the decade of service required by the park's authorizing legislation. And it most certainly owed to a proliferation of compliance mandates, performance assessments, and other facets of an increasingly

[608] Staff Meeting, October 22, 1984, Folder Staff Meetings 10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[609] Staff Meeting, November 26, 1984, Folder Staff Meetings 10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[610] Staff Meeting, October 29, 1984, Folder Staff Meetings 10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[611] He met, for instance, with Northeastern University's William Fowler, who the park had engaged to write a visitor guide.

[612] Staff Meeting Minutes, April 15, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[613] Sean Hennessey, "In Memoriam: John J. Burchill," The Broadside 2 (2002): 1.

bureaucratized agency: managing the park, in other words, increasingly became the purpose of managing the park. Regardless of its causes, the park's shift from a preoccupation with managing partnerships to a concern with managing itself is powerfully evident in meeting minutes. During Gurney's time, grappling with questions about the Navy Yard's historical value or Dorchester Height's significance, frequently filtered into management discussions owing to planning demands and the constant tug-of-war between the NPS and the BRA. By the mid-1980s, however, staff meetings revolved almost entirely around event planning, employee awards, Navy Yard maintenance, interactions with city services and government, personnel and finance concerns, and compliance with constantly shifting regional and agency-wide mandates.

The turn inward had considerable influence on the park's evolving relationship with its partner sites. Gurney had a direct relationship with each site owing to his personal negotiation of first-generation cooperative agreements. Since the agreements were already in place when Burchill arrived, however, he related to the sites quite differently. Consider, for instance, the park's relationship with the Paul Revere Memorial Association. As Nina Zannieri explains it, by the mid-1980s it was clear that the association was not receiving as much financial support from the NPS as others were among the partner sites. Among the reasons, she discovered, was that the association had looked to the NPS for planning services and interpretive expertise, but had never asked for direct funding. The services, however, had been so slow to materialize that the association's board largely turned away from the NPS. As Zannieri puts it, "it just took forever to get the answers that you needed." Zannieri suggested that the association ask for cash instead. It did, and for years thereon, the association "literally got a check [from the NPS] for $10,000 every year," and without any spending restrictions.[614] Staff meeting minutes confirm that on those rare occasions during the Burchill years when discussion turned to partner sites, it typically originated with the administrative officer. A typical example was a March 1987 meeting, wherein Administrative Officer Katie Gavan noted that checks had been sent to the Museum of Afro American History, the Old South Association, the Paul Revere Memorial Association, the USS Constitution Museum, and the Bostonian Society.[615] In this way, Burchill sought to routinize the park's relationship with its partner sites just as he pursued managerial efficiencies throughout the park.

The problem with this arrangement, of course, was that cutting monthly checks is a poor substitute for active partnership. And, as Zannieri makes clear, it demonstrated a willingness to default on the agency's promise of preservation and interpretive guidance, precisely those resources which the NPS insisted would become available during negotiations with the sites during the 1970s legislative campaign. Part of the problem at the Paul Revere House concerned the scale of projects Burchill was willing to help with. Zannieri explains that Burchill simply didn't have any interest in discussing small-ticket items, such as when the Paul Revere House required a $15,000 roof. His concern was to be associated with expensive, high-profile projects. "He liked being the one who delivered," she explains. On one occasion, Burchill solicited funding requests from the sites to which Zannieri responded with a laundry list of small though essential items, including toilet paper. Burchill was outraged. "I remember John feeling so insulted, because that wasn't his legacy—he was seeing his legacy to be toilet paper." Burchill's concern with his own legacy, however, seems to have sometimes jeopardized core facets of the park's partnership mandate. "The Park," Zannieri observes, "didn't know how to care if we were operating."

[614] Nina Zannieri, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, December 18, 2018.

[615] Staff Meeting Minutes, March 31, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

The park's inability to understand its partner's concerns, or its unwillingness to prioritize them, typified a management philosophy which conceived of the park's success apart from its partners. Indeed, advertising the BNHP and asserting its presence had become a priority for Burchill soon after his arrival. In 1985, for instance, he hired a public relations director whose sole job it was to raise awareness of the NPS's presence in Boston.[616] Later on, when Burchill's officers met collectively with site managers—so-called "cooperator meetings," which convened infrequently beginning in 1989—they spent as much if not more time reporting on park projects as listening to partner needs.[617] Importantly, and all the while, the park's partner sites had matured significantly since the bicentennial years. Indeed, many of them had hired their first paid executive directors during the Bicentennial, which triggered a wave of professionalization thereafter. Zannieri, for instance, had arrived in 1986 as an experienced heritage professional and in charge of public relations. In other words, whether or not Burchill perceived it, the park's partner sites were becoming increasingly better equipped to manage their own affairs and, in some cases, had begun to cultivate better trained and more forward-looking staff than NPS had available.[618] It was a crucial development, though one the park's leadership did not seem to fully appreciate in the moment.

Another important indicator of the park's inward turn during these years was Burchill's preference for consolidation. It appeared, on the surface, to serve public needs. Consolidating functions within the park could, in some cases, enhance services beyond the park. For example, by 1986 Burchill had managed to shift security services within the Navy Yard, which had been partly managed by contractors in the past, entirely to the park's protection staff. Doing so saved upwards of $30,000 per year. [619] It also encouraged a sense of comradery which Burchill leveraged toward expanding the park's footprint. Within the year, for instance, Burchill encouraged the protection division to build on its successes by becoming involved in community outreach, especially because "we have the resources available to stimulate youths in the area."[620] The suggestion took. By 1988, the protection division was in conversation with residents near Bunker Hill about establishing a neighborhood watch program, and it was considering the same for

[616] Burchill hired Margaret Micholet who, incidentally, was married to Peter Steele. Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[617] On the establishment of cooperator meetings, see Staff Meeting Minutes, July 11, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For example, during an August 16 cooperators meeting at Boston Marine Society, Peter Steele briefed the group on development, Debby Szarka commented on the CANA project, and John Piltzecker and Lee Heald discussed the People and Places program. They agreed to have meetings every two months. Staff Meeting Minutes, August 22, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[618] In 1993, for instance, the Board of Managers at the Old South Meeting House appointed Emily Curran to the position of executive director. Curran had considerable experience in museums and had studied museum leadership at the Bank Street College. "New Faces at Old South," The Broadside (Spring/Summer 1993): 3.

[619] Staff Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[620] Staff Meeting Minutes, May 26, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Dorchester Heights and Smith Court.[621] Their progress around Bunker Hill is particularly significant insomuch as it reveals how reliant Burchill's success was on changes throughout Boston. Charlestown experienced rampant gentrification during this period owing to a concentration of capital associated with Boston's new "mind" economy. Consequently, establishing a neighborhood watch program near Bunker Hill in 1988 was an entirely different proposition than it would have been in, say, 1978.

These evolving demographics in Boston's neighborhoods were one reason why, at the close of his second year in Boston, Burchill resolved "to become more involved with the city and state functions."[622] Doing so promised to turn real profits amid Boston's economic turnaround. For example, Burchill put the idea of providing a food concession for the Navy Yard to the advisory commission during its June 1985 meeting. It was part of a broader initiative to include a Visitor Center at the Navy Yard, for which several buildings had been already proposed.[623] Including a food concession, however, required additional steps such as coordinating with city inspectors and negotiating with service providers. Preservation specialist Steve Carlson managed much of it, including the renovation of Building 10 to accommodate a restaurant and serving areas. The park awarded its food service contract to Boston Concessions Group in 1988 and the so-called Shipyard Galley opened for business a year later.[624] Similarly, Burchill's willingness to cooperate with city services revived otherwise moribund conversations about public transit in and around the park. In 1988, at his encouragement, the MBTA considered several options—including a water ferry between Pier 4 and Long Wharf—before settling on a new shuttle bus service from the parking garage (Building 199) to Building 5, paid for with mitigation funds from the Central Artery north area project.[625] These were not revolutionary changes, but they reveal the extent to which the park was becoming a readily more integral part of Boston's commercial tourism infrastructure.

As a result of changes like these, the park's daily operations appeared considerably more corporate than they had under Gurney. Some of the change really was a matter of appearance. Whereas photos suggest that Gurney always wore his uniform in public, Burchill was just as likely to show up in a business suit. But much of the change had to do with Burchill's consolidation campaign, which touched every facet of park operations.[626] To be fair, it was Gurney who had

[621] Staff Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[622] Staff Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[623] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, June 13, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[624] Staff Meeting Minutes, October 12, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989; and Staff Meeting Minutes, July 11, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[625] A third option was bus service from the Navy Yard to downtown, using private funds and ticket sales. Staff Meeting Minutes, August 23, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. The new service began on October 11. Staff Meeting Minutes, October 12, 1988, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[626] For a detailed overview of the dispersal and consolidation of staff offices over time, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 224–25.

initially considered consolidating all Navy Yard staff into a single building and even including a park library at the site. It was Burchill, however, who sought to consolidate all park staff in the Navy Yard. The acquisition of Building 107 from the BRA by way of Public Law 95-625 (1978) got the ball rolling. Staff consolidated artifact and records storage in Building 107. This was done, in part, with help from a service-wide historic accountability project.[627] Maintenance also moved into Building 107 in 1987, "resulting in increased efficiency and better communication with the Maintenance personnel," and also freeing up Building 10 for the food concession.[628] Administration moved into the Marine Barracks from Building 109 in 1989.[629]

Finally, Burchill's years as superintendent coincided with a dramatic change in staffing. Indeed, almost as soon as he arrived, key members of the park's first-generation management team left Boston for other opportunities within and beyond the NPS. Vince Lombardi, who had figured so prominently at Dorchester Heights, left in 1984 to become operations manager at Strawberry Banke Museum in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.[630] Victor Jorrin, longtime historic architect for the park and for the region, departed in 1985 for the Women's Rights National Historical Park in Seneca Falls, NY. Chief of Interpretation Lou Venuto left in 1985 too, and transferred to Edison National Historic Site. Administrative Officer Bob Pribula and Deputy Superintendent Wendell Simpson rounded out a key batch of important first-generation departures in 1986, as did Frank Montford in 1991.[631] Debby Szarka, who had coordinated planning at the park for years, left in 1990.[632] Simpson would return briefly but went on to become Superintendent of Canaveral National Seashore in Florida. His departure prompted the hire of John C. Benjamin from Grand Canyon, and also resulted in the promotion of curator Peter Steele to assistant superintendent for planning and development.[633] Navy Yard Supervisory Park Ranger Bill Foley signed on in March 1986 and, in just a few years, would become chief of interpretation. In December 1986, Tony Tommell, supervisory park ranger for interpretation at Faneuil Hall and Dorchester

[627] In 1978, for instance, the BNHP acquired all the equipment remaining in the Navy Yard's forge shop, which had previously belonged to the Smithsonian Institution. In 1984, accessioning began in preparation for the creation of new storage for collections. Until that point, the Navy Yard artifact collection—which had first been assembled by the Navy during shutdown—remained where the Navy put it, in Buildings 125. See 1978, 1984, and 1988 Superintendents Reports, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Also, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Sites Report.

[628] Staff Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[629] Staff Meeting Minutes, January 17, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[630] Staff Meeting, January 7, 1985, Staff Meetings 10/1984–05/1985, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[631] "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside (Spring 1991): 7.

[632] "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside (Winter 1991): 4.

[633] Jorrin departed on May 3, 1985, Bob Pribula resigned January 4, 1986, Lou Venuto transferred to Edison National Historic Site on September 23, 1985, Wendell Simpson left in November 1986 and John Debo assumed the duties of the deputy superintendent. See Staff Meeting Minutes, various, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. "Park Names New Deputy Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent," The Broadside (Winter 1991): 1. On Foley, see Staff Meeting Minutes, March 31, 1986, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Heights, hired on from the US Marine Corps museum in Quantico, VA.[634] And, significantly, Curator Arsen Charles retired in 1995, after having served at the park nearly twenty years, and having invested mightily in building up the Navy Yard's artifactual collections.[635]

Burchill's leadership thus created opportunities for new voices to join the park, and also for a select few familiar voices to speak even louder.[636] Importantly, in coming years, many of those new voices would—like Burchill himself—come to the park from Lowell. Celeste Bernardo in interpretation, Peter A. Promutico in administration, and Marty Blatt in cultural resource management all arrived at the BNHP during the 1990s from Lowell. Though Boston's authorization had preceded Lowell's, and presumably inspired it, it appears that the flow of influence had reversed itself under John Burchill.

Preserving Icons of the Freedom Trail

Richard Berenson introduced Burchill to the advisory commission in December 1984. Just as soon as he did, Regional Director Steven H. Lewis warned the commission that funding for park projects had grown thin and that "we must all look for new ways of doing things that do not require appropriated funds."[637] In hindsight, it seems that Burchill took up Lewis's warning as a singular focus for his superintendence. That he had to reflects, in part, agency-wide funding limitations set against a precarious national economy. Recruiting seasonal staff, for instance, had become increasingly difficult with the rise of housing costs in gentrifying Boston. Gurney had tried to fix the problem in 1983 by renovating the second floor of the Marine Barracks into dormitory housing.[638] The problem intensified, however, and by 1988, Burchill was reporting major staff shortages. The park simply couldn't fill lapsed positions because of budget constraints which prevented the recruitment of qualified staff. It was a problem which grew particularly acute as government salaries failed to keep apace with Boston's skyrocketing cost of living.[639] What's more, a long staffing lapse in the budget division created major difficulties with implementing the agency's new centralized accounting operations division, resulting in late payments to park vendors. Turnover had become especially frequent among GS-5 protection rangers, for whom living in Boston had become a practical impossibility. Additional lapses in CRM "have severely taxed the ability of staff to simultaneously keep many major projects on schedule and of quality."

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[634] Staff Meeting Minutes, December 1, 1986, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[635] Charles, who had previously worked at the Peabody Museum after graduating from Harvard in 1942 and served abroad during World War II, invested himself especially in objects related to the Ropewalk and Forge Shop. Stephen P. Carlson, "Curator Arsen Charles Retires After 19 Years," The Broadside 3 (1995): 15.

[636] Interestingly, conversations concerning Dorchester Height's revised GMP in 1985 involved the regional office's Terry Savage who, in about fifteen years, would become the BNHP's third superintendent. Curatorial Weekly Report, June 14, 1985, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[637] Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, December 6, 1984, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[638] Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 246.

[639] Superintendent Report, 1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

Inadequate review and long waits for consultation and preparation assistance "have compromised performance… and relief is needed."[640]

Finding new streams of income had become a matter of survival. Beyond the challenges of covering operating costs and the inadequacy of salaries, there remained unresolved questions about how to support the constituent sites and, specifically, what should and should not be funded by the NPS. The agency's mandate, of course, required that it support preservation and interpretation at all the sites. But what about incidentals? This question had already become pressing under Gurney as first-generation partnership agreements came up for renewal. When the Old South agreement approached expiration in January 1982, for instance, Bob Pribula suggested at a staff meeting that "site expenses such as telephones and electricity should not be paid by the Park Service."[641] In Lowell, Burchill had dealt with similar problems by partnering with Paul Tsongas and focusing on a single blockbuster preservation campaign at the Boot Mills complex. Could the same strategy work in Boston? Certainly the park had its share of potential blockbuster preservation projects, considering that none of its most iconic Revolutionary-era structures had received significant attention since the bicentennial. But who in Boston could provide the kind of support Burchill found in congressman Tsongas? Who in Boston had the right mix of local pride and political clout to help Burchill land a big preservation victory?

At the advisory commission's November 1985 meeting, Burchill announced—after being superintendent for only a year—that proposals to fund restoration of Faneuil Hall and the Old Statehouse, as well as select properties in the Navy Yard, were already before the House Senate Conference Committee. Ted Kennedy was responsible for the Navy Yard project, but the much larger proposals—projects which could fundamentally alter the park's trajectory—owed to the efforts of Joe Moakley.[642] The suddenness and scale of the announcement must have been a surprise. Moakley's interest in the park was well established, but there had been no mention of meetings between him and Burchill in staff meeting minutes. Indeed, the first mention occurred in 1987 when "the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent met with Congressman Moakley on February 6 to discuss budget and projects at Faneuil Hall and the Old State House."[643] Clearly Burchill had been working this angle from early on, perhaps as early as that first meeting with the advisory commission. His efforts were about to pay off.

How was it, though, that Burchill found such a ready and willing partner in Congressman Moakley? We saw in chapter five that South Boston native Moakley, was willing to go to bat for the park, in part owing to its presence at Dorchester Heights, where his predecessor, John McCormack, had first proposed the idea of a national park. Moakley had also played an integral role in securing authorization for the Boston African American National Historic Site. Not only was Beacon Hill within Moakley's district, but he had developed a close and supportive working

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640 Superintendent Report, 1988, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

641 Squad Meeting Minutes, January 5, 1982 Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

642 He indicated too that the park could expect to get architectural engineering money sometime in 1986, although the Graham Rudman resolution then before Congress would limit further funds available to the NPS. Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1985, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

643 Staff Meeting Minutes, February 10, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

relationship with Byron Rushing dating back to their encounters during 1970s congressional campaigns. And, as Rushing explains it, Moakley had a real concern to advocate on behalf of black Bostonians. It just so happened that Paul Tsongas had been a key supporter of the legislation which authorized the Boston African American National Historic Site.[644] Burchill had arrived in Boston, therefore, amid a ready-made coalition of powerful park advocates with whom he already had connections, including personal ones (Burchill's cousin, Molly Hurley, worked at Moakley's Boston office). So, although Burchill and Moakley may have been "cut from the same cloth," it's clear too that Burchill had multiple points of contact with a deep network of political operatives already activated against the conservative turn in federal policy making.[645] Insisting on federal support for popular preservation projects of national significance was a great way to join that fight during the 1980s.

It is important to note too that, amid Boston's economic turnaround, the park's success aligned with Moakley's determination to create economic opportunity within the city's heritage industry. Recall from chapter five that what first sparked Moakley's interest in the proposed park was not preservation or history, but jobs. The threat of lost jobs in 1973 was what activated Moakley's preservation impulse. The possibility of monetizing gentrification is what sustained it. Back in September 1980, just as Moakley had become involved at the Boston African American National Historic Site, Ways and Means Committee Chair Dan Rostenkowski—who, as we discovered in chapter five, also played a critical albeit anonymous role in the site's genesis—wrote to Moakley encouraging him to participate in hearings concerning the extension of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Rostenkowski hoped to use Boston as a case study in demonstrating how effective tax incentives had been since the Bicentennial in encouraging the kind of heritage-themed gentrification which was quickly transforming neighborhoods adjacent to the park. Moakley did participate and eventually became so involved that he later introduced legislation to expand the tax break to multi-family rental properties. In this way, Moakley demonstrated a concern that gentrification not price working-class residents out of downtown Boston. It was a strategy which, unfortunately, did not work in the long term. It is a reminder of how deeply the park's fortunes during these years were embedded within a new economy which consistently privileged wealthy white Americans. Moakley tried to change that, but was not quite able to. As far as the NPS was concerned, though, Moakley's support for preservation tax credits and other tools of gentrification was good business. And it explains in hindsight why Burchill was so readily able to apply the lessons of Lowell's culture-led development in Boston's burgeoning new heritage economy.[646]

What Burchill discovered in Moakley, then, was a champion for the park who was willing and able to bypass the agency's budget process, just as he had to speed up appropriations for the Boston African National Historic Site. Indeed, Moakley was even willing to bypass federal process by taking his demands directly to the Interior Subcommittee on Appropriations and its chair, Sid Yates. And so he did. Beginning in 1985, Moakley began a campaign to convince the

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[644] Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," 14–18.

[645] Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," 19–20. Sean Hennessey (Public Affairs Officer, Boston National Historical Park), interview by Laura Muller, September 27, 2005, compact disc, in possession of Laura Muller.

[646] Dan Rostenkowski to Joe Moakley, September 24, 1980, and drafts of Historic Preservation Tax Incentives Act of 1981 (ultimately introduced by Moakley to 97th Congress, 1st session), Folder 66, Box 7, Congressman John Joseph Moakley Papers, Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University, Boston, MA.

Committee on Appropriations that the NPS had been negligent in Boston for not making good on its commitment to sustain its partner properties. He argued that Faneuil Hall and the Old State House especially—both, incidentally, within Moakley's district—required special attention to make them safely accessible to visitors. For two years, Moakley submitted reports and testimony insisting on the need for federal preservation funding, despite counterarguments by Interior that the scale of required work was not so great. By early 1986, the park had enough confidence in Moakley's advocacy to initiate start-up conversations concerning preservation projects at both buildings.[647] And, sure enough, by June 1987, the subcommittee approved full construction funding for Faneuil Hall and adequate design funds to move the Old South project forward. A year later, House and Senate committees approved full construction funds: $5,556,000 for Faneuil Hall; $5,280,000 for Old State House.[648]

Moakley's victory at Faneuil Hall and the Old State House triggered what must have seemed like a chain reaction of funding victories. $1.6 million materialized in 1990 for planning projects at Old South, Dorchester Heights, and Boston African American NHS.[649] In 1994, Moakley secured another $500,000 to support rehabilitation of Dorchester Heights. Later that year, he announced a $3.7 million appropriation for restoration of the Old South Meeting House.[650] This is not to mention significant appropriations secured by Kennedy for conversion of Building 28 for use by the USS Constitution Museum. There was something going on in every corner of the park it seemed. Burchill described the "scope and level of activity" like "a ball that seems to roll on and getting bigger each day." There's "a lot of activity," he added, "with a lot of opportunity for the Park."[651] And so there was. In 1992, the park celebrated the reopening of Faneuil Hall and the Old State House with considerable fanfare and lots of media attention.[652] Five years later, Dorchester Heights and the Old South Meeting House debuted new facilities with festivities of their own. And, in time for the 1997 USS Constitution bicentennial, the Constitution Museum debuted a new theater and new exhibit spaces all tied together by innovative design

[647] Staff Meeting Minutes, February 3, 1986, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1985–06/1986, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[648] Staff Meeting Minutes, August 23, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. For thorough detailing of the legislative process and Moakley's hand in it, see Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," 17–32.

[649] "Funding for Park Project Advances," The Broadside (Autumn 1990): 4.

[650] See Muller, "The Contributions of Congressman John Joseph Moakley," 31–32, on both.

[651] Staff Meeting Minutes, February 28, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[652] Faneuil Hall and the Old State House were completed and reopened during July 1992, including with a formal ceremony for Old State House on July 10. Phil Bergen, Stephen P. Carlson, and John Manson, "Faneuil Hall, Old State House Projects Completed," The Broadside (Summer 1992): 1.

and construction.[653] There was so much activity, in fact, that Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan made a special visit, the first time in the park's history. "The success of BNHP programs," he observed, "tells me that a strong unified cooperative effort has been established between the Freedom Trail cooperatives, private business, city and state officials in a joint effort to continually maintain and preserve the historical structures that has made Boston a great visitor attraction."[654]

It certainly appeared that way and, in many regards, it was. Burchill, by way of directing Moakley's interests, but also by tapping into agency resources and encouraging private giving to the charitable donations which grew up around all the park's various preservation campaigns, managed a remarkable record of accomplishment at the park in just over a decade: $1,000,000 for the Boston African National Historic Site; $13,000,000 for Faneuil Hall; $6,500,000 for the Old State House; $7,000,000 for the USS Constitution Museum; $6,000,000 for Dorchester Heights; and $7,200,000 for Old South Meeting House.[655] And, importantly, each preservation project, beyond expanding access to visitors and making Boston's historic icons safe, created new opportunities for interpretation. Faneuil Hall would include new contact areas as well as exhibit space, and a slate of new exhibits would be planned for the Old State House. [656]

What exactly might fill these new interpretation spaces, however, was not entirely clear. Content and layout planning sessions including the park, DSC, the regional office, the city, and Goody, Clancy and Associates—the firm responsible for the coordinating the project—began in 1988 and produced several alternatives.[657] The final vision, presented at a May 1990 special hearing of Boston Landmarks Commission in Faneuil Hall, proposed sustaining the building's historic function as a meeting hall, but also "resum[ing] its historic role as marketplace." [658] Faneuil Hall, it turned out, would return as a commercial space. Sure enough, over the 1994 July fourth weekend, the new Grasshopper Shops—stylized nods to the building's colonial past—opened at Faneuil Hall.[659] Burchill, who incidentally had only just been reelected director of the Greater Boston Convention and Visitors Bureau, had really spurred remarkable growth at several of the park's Freedom Trail sites. It was the kind of growth, in fact, that harkened directly back to Bos-

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[653] Construction on Building 28 was set to begin in August 1989 with four million dollars in federal funding. "The project includes structural stabilization and building work on Building 28 and the electrical substation building; construction of a connector structure, and site work. The NPS is responsible for building and site work, and the Constitution Museum is responsible for interior finishing, exhibits, and furnishings." Cost estimates rose to seven million dollars by 1993 when project actually began. Plans now included conversion of Building 22, the old electrical substation, into a 200-seat theater and public restroom, and connecting it with Building 28. This was planned to coincide with the 1997 bicentennial of the launching of USS Constitution. Stephen P. Carlson and Dave Snow, "USS Constitution Museum Expansion Project to Begin," The Broadside (Spring/Summer 1993): 1.

[654] Leo Zani, "Secretary Lujan Visits BNHP," The Broadside (Summer 1990): 1.

[655] This summary based on Sean Hennessey, "In Memoriam: John J. Burchill," The Broadside 2, (2002): 2.

[656] "Boston Architect Chosen for Faneuil Hall and Old State House Restoration Project," NPS press release, May 22, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[657] Staff Meeting Minutes, February 16, 1988 and March 1, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[658] Leo Zani, "Restoration Plans Unveiled for Old State House and Faneuil Hall," The Broadside (Summer 1990): 2.

[659] Sheila Cooke-Kayser and Vincent Kordack, "Harborfest Highlights Summer Interpretive Programs," The Broadside (Summer 1994): 1.

ton's postwar years, and the heady meat market debates which roiled Boston's heritage boosters a half-century before.[660]

Reimagining the Freedom Trail

Burchill's various development projects garnered considerable excitement among preservation enthusiasts and heritage tourists during the 1990s. They reminded onlookers that the NPS had a role downtown, a fact easily missed after years of concerted focus at the Navy Yard. They also reflected and, in some ways, advanced the park's evolving relationship with the Freedom Trail and the Freedom Trail Foundation. Under Gurney, the park had largely followed the guidance of Richard Berenson regarding matters concerning the Freedom Trail. Conversely, Burchill took a considerably more aggressive position regarding the trail and rather sought to mingle the park more directly with it. Staff meeting minutes reveal a conscious effort beginning during 1987 to "develop an association between the National Park Service and the well established Freedom Trail."[661] Interestingly, the park appears to have begun its late-80s Freedom Trail campaign in Charlestown and moved gradually toward downtown in conjunction with Burchill's preservation projects. In 1987, for instance, the park involved itself by lobbying the Charlestown Neighborhood Council to allow the NPS to take the lead in painting a new red line connecting Bunker Hill and the Navy Yard.[662] Charlestown District Chief of Interpretation Bill Foley had taken over the project by 1988, working with Joseph F. Canavan and Richard A. Dimino of the Public Improvement Commission on the line, while also taking the opportunity to encourage Revolutionary-era arms demonstrations by costumed interpreters at Bunker Hill and in the Navy Yard.[663] In this way, the park's increased engagement with the Freedom Trail crossed over also into its interpretive strategies.

Burchill's ability to involve the park more directly in goings-on along the trail reflected an important transformation then underway within the Freedom Trail Foundation itself. The Foundation had always been, as Richard Berenson, Jr. puts it, a "map publisher." It had been conceived by his father as a promotional organization, a way to encourage visitation toward generating revenue at the sites which might then be invested in preservation.[664] The Department of Interior recognized Berenson's vision in 1988 by awarding him its highest civilian honor, the Conser-

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660 Regarding Burchill's appointment, see "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside (Summer 1991): 7.

661 Staff Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

662 In coordination, of course, with the Department of Public Works. Staff Meeting Minutes, November 3, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

663 Regarding costumed battle reenactments, Foley coordinated with Commander Robert Gillen and the Charlestown militia to plan the June 18 historic demonstration. Staff Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

664 Richard W. Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, August 1, 2017

vation Service Award.[665] But, when he passed away, just two years later, a new generation of leadership sought new possibilities for the Freedom Trail Foundation.[666] Richard Berenson, Jr., then a management consultant for McKinsey and Co., undertook a pro bono consultant project on behalf of the Foundation. As he describes it, it was the first time anyone had taken an analytical approach to determining the Foundation's vision. And the results suggested that what the Foundation needed to do was to refocus its energies on getting people onto the trail and engaging them while there. In other words, whereas the Foundation had previously limited its activities to marketing and promotion, its board resolved by the late-1980s to move more broadly into programming and interpretation.[667] Its president, Warren Berg, who had experience with museums by way of his leadership of the Museum of Science Board of Trustees, understood the new direction and, in just a few years, would hire on the Foundation's first executive director to supervise the transition.[668]

In the meantime, evidence of the Foundation's new directions and its effect on the park appeared throughout meeting minutes. By early 1988, for instance, the park had become involved in "a Freedom Trail Public Relations group… formed to assist in the marketing of the Freedom Trail."[669] Toward encouraging precisely this type of engagement, Burchill had hired a public relations officer, Chris Stein, who immediately involved himself in Freedom Trail activities. Stein served as a project manager, for instance, for a partnership with the Boston Convention and Visitors Bureau to create a promotional video concerning the Freedom Trail.[670] Just a few months later, Burchill made a remarkable announcement: the city had agreed to invest $350,000 in a comprehensive design study of the trail, including interpretation, signage, maintenance, marketing, and transportation.[671] It was an important commitment from the city, and a boon to a park for which funding shortfalls constantly loomed. NPS activity along the trail expanded almost immediately. Group reservations for Freedom Trail interpretive tours increased. The park introduced additional ninety-minute Freedom Trail tours on the weekends, and expanded operations

[665] Regarding the nomination, see Staff Meeting Minutes, May 17, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Berenson received his award at a ceremony in Washington, DC on September 13. "Mr. Berenson has helped shape and form the Freedom Trail concept here at Boston and was instrumental in seeking the establishment of the Boston National Historical Park and was the Chair of the Park advisory commission from 1974–1986." Staff Meeting Minutes, August 23, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[666] Edgar J. Driscoll, Jr., "Richard Berenson, 81; Civic Leader Who Guided City's Freedom Trail," Boston Globe, April 4, 1990.

[667] Richard W. Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, August 1, 2017

[668] Obituary for Warren Berg, Boston Globe, August 29, 2016. The organization's first executive director was Fred Davis.

[669] Staff Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[670] Staff Meeting Minutes, April 19, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[671] Staff Meeting Minutes, March 21, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, and Staff Meeting Minutes, May 9, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

even further by adding two weekday tours to the schedule.[672] The park and the Foundation had become so intertwined, in fact, that in 1992 when the Foundation hired its first executive director, Fred Davis, he moved its offices into the basement of the Commandant's House.[673]

Davis's hiring marked another important shift in an organization which once was primarily focused on fundraising and promotion. It, like so many other heritage organizations in Boston during the 1980s, had taken a decided step toward professionalization. Indeed, the shift had already been initiated under Warren Berg. In 1990, for instance, the Foundation secured funding to hire a part-time coordinator to manage the "People and Places" school program. [674] Candace Lee Heald, who was hired for the position, arrived with degrees from Brown University and the University of Delaware.[675] Nancy Grey Osterud, who replaced Heald three years later, earned a Ph.D. in American Civilization from Brown.[676] This was a far cry from the Foundation's early days amid the swank men's clubs of mid-century Boston. The Foundation had rather concentrated on becoming a modern cultural organization with real investments in highly-trained staff specialists. In Osterud, it had even hired a prominent feminist historian. By the 1990s, then, the Foundation had embraced an operational model wherein the qualifications of its staff approximated and, in some cases, surpassed those of their colleagues in the NPS.

The confluence of all these factors—the city's draft Freedom Trail study, reorganization within the Foundation, Berenson Jr.'s analytic approach, not to mention Boston's economic transformations and the completion in 1992 of Burchill's preservation projects at the Old State House and Faneuil Hall—prompted the NPS to intervene in the Freedom Trail in a way which it had never done before. By summer 1995, park staff had begun working with a private consultant team to develop a comprehensive Freedom Trail planning study. The study proposed to develop "a vision of what the Freedom Trail stands for, its educational and economic values, and the role it should play in the life of Boston and the nation." It would be developed, moreover, "through an interactive process with involvement from the public, local government agencies, private organizations and business interests as well as the cooperating agencies along the Freedom Trail."[677] The NPS unveiled the result at a public debut in May 1996: a forty-page report titled "The Freedom Trail: A Framework for the Future." Mayor Thomas Menino attended the event and announced a $500,000 challenge grant to re-mark the trail in red brick, to add bronze medallions in front of all its historic sites, and to install a new batch of Freedom Trail signs. Moakley threw

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672 Staff Meeting Minutes, March 21, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

673 "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside (Winter 1992): 7.

674 "People and Places" reached a major milestone in 1991, when the Freedom Trail Foundation and the park won a two-year $150,000 NEH grant to sponsor local history workshops and an annual three-week summer institute for Boston teachers. Lee Heald, "People and Places Program Wins NEH Grant for Summer Teacher Institute," The Broadside (Spring 1991): 1.

675 Following her departure from her position directing the People and Places program, Heald successfully wrote a grant funding AHA! New Bedford, a local nonprofit for promoting Art, History, and Architecture, and has served as their director since 2007. Additionally, in a testament to how closely the Boston National Historical Park and the Freedom Trail Foundation operated during the late 1980s and 1990s, Heald married William Fuchs, an NPS employee, in 1991.

676 John Piltzecker, "People and Places Program Welcomes a New Coordinator," The Broadside (Spring/Summer 1993): 7.

677 The project was led by David Dixon/Goody Clancy, Planning and Urban Design, a division of Goody Clancy & Associates. Ruth Raphael, "Freedom Trail Planning Underway," The Broadside (Summer 1995): 12.

his hat in too and, with Congressman Chester Atkins, secured $500,000 in appropriation for Freedom Trail planning.[678] What's more, Menino pledged an additional $15,000,000 over five years for street improvements and the renovation of facilities along the trail. All would be done in 1997, just in time to celebrate USS Constitution's bicentennial.[679] It was a stunning gesture, and the biggest single city investment in the Freedom Trail by the city since its commitment of support for the Boston Common visitor center two decades before.

So what was it about the report that so persuaded Mayor Menino to make this remarkable investment? Most clearly the report laid out a broad concern with the health of Boston's heritage economy. Although overall visitation to Boston had been up in recent years, historic sites along the Freedom Trail had not seen a proportional uptick. In other words, tourist dollars were not penetrating Charlestown or downtown as fully as they might. The report's authors noted a wide range of reasons they might not be. Boston was a different town than it once had been, with a considerably more diverse population. Its residents and a new generation of visitors had a greater appetite for complex histories that refused the consensus claims of postwar historians, claims the report indicated where still readily evident along the trail. There too was the problem of unhospitable stretches of trail, especially between the North End and Charlestown, on which pedestrians felt unmoored or even unwelcomed. And then there was the problem of preservation. Congress had, through the NPS, invested considerable preservation monies, but that funding would not last and it was evident that some amount of revenue would be necessary to maintain the trail's iconic sites.[680]

But what made the report even more compelling was its suggestion that the trail, so long thought of as just a line, might rather be thought of as a story. Telling that story and making it available to visitors made powerful sense. Doing it would require, according to the report, a new dedicated visitor center, living history programs, an audio tour, expansion of the already successful "People and Places" program, and maybe even a sound and light show on Constitution Avenue. It would also require the establishment of a Freedom Trail Task Force, including representatives from the constituent sites, the tourism industry, the city, the NPS, and other private and public organizations. This is to say that, for the first time since Ed Logue, a plan to coordinate public and private investment along the Freedom Trail seemed to be in place. And, within months, it appeared to be working. A partnership program produced the so-called "Hit the Trail! Passport" in 1996 to coordinate visitor experience across the various sites.[681] By 1997, the city had begun replacing faded old portions of the Freedom Trail's iconic red trail with brick.[682] And the Freedom Trail Foundation had hired a new executive director, Linda C. McConchie, to make good on the trail's new plan. Like its other recent hires, McConchie brought to her job a wealth of specialized experience as an independent consultant, a special events coordinator for the governor's office, and as executive director for the Salem witch trial tercentenary. Having hired her, the Foundation announced its plans to relocate its offices to the Old Corner Bookstore, signaling a new era for the organization and perhaps a turn toward independence from the NPS.[683]

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[678] Peter Steele, "In Memoriam: Congressman John Joseph Moakley," The Broadside 2/3 (2001): 1–2.

[679] Peter Steele, "Freedom Trail Plan Unveiled," The Broadside 2 (1996): 1–2.

[680] David Dixon and Goody Clancy, The Freedom Trail: A Framework for the Future (Boston: The National Park Service, 1996), https://irma.nps.gov/DataStore/Reference/Profile/2190259.

[681] Sheila Cooke-Kayser, "Hit the Trail! Passport Published," The Broadside 1 (1996): 1.

[682] "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside 1 (1997): 7.

[683] Stephen P. Carlson, "McConchie to Head Freedom Trail Foundation," The Broadside 5 (1997): 7.

Toward a New History in an Old Park

What makes "The Freedom Trail: A Framework for the Future" so fascinating for our purposes is how much it resembled previous arguments—made by Williams Scofield, the Chamber of Commerce, Small and Bortman, and the BRA—for investing in Boston's heritage infrastructure. All, to varying degrees, made the case primarily in economic terms. In that regard, the Freedom Trail report is no different. Unlike its predecessors, however, the Freedom Trail report does include a notably sophisticated historical argument. "The Freedom Trail," it argued, "is a unique seam between historic and modern Boston."[684] It was not a path into some authentic past, as previous boosters liked to claim, but rather a lens through which to glimpse the full span of change over time in Boston's urban landscape. And though nods to revolutionary memory and Longfellow's Boston certainly appear throughout the report, it is much more clearly focused on exploring the "legacy of the struggle for Freedom," and taking stock of how historical knowledge has changed over time. This was a considerable shift for all parties involved along the Freedom Trail, one wherein reflexivity and nuance seemed finally to have pushed back against the histrionics of postwar nationalism. Had public history along the Freedom Trail taken a critical turn by the 1990s?

In some ways it had, in other ways it absolutely had not. The answer would have varied considerably depending on where and how visitors experienced history programming. History interpretation along the Freedom Trail, for instance, remained largely invested in guided tours of Boston's revolutionary past and occasional bouts of living history. For instance, a popular summer interpretive program during these years featured a reenactment of one of the last town meetings convened in the Old South Church before the Boston Tea Party. The program began in 1981 and resulted from a collaboration between the park and the Old South Association. Costumed interpreters dramatized the event while inviting audience members to participate. Its goal was to prompt participants to wonder how "Samuel Adams [would] handle the types of characters who show up at our town meetings, especially the ardent Tories?"[685] Following national trends, costumed interpretation and other facets of so-called "living history" thrived at the park during the 1980s. At Bunker Hill especially, the NPS promoted first-person costumed interpretation of military history, and frequently showcased reenactors dressed as Revolutionary-era soldiers. Though notable for its encouragement of audience engagement, none of this programming appears to have moved far beyond content developed during the bicentennial years.

Conversely, at the Boston African American National Historic Site, visitors encountered considerably more forward-looking interpretation concerned specifically with fathoming the shifting meaning of freedom in Boston since the Revolution. The Black Heritage Trail encompassed a hive of activity during those years, thanks to investments in preservation by the NPS, Moakley, and others. These had made possible, for instance, completion of preservation work at the African Meeting House in 1987. What's more, the site's manager showcased new research, and frequent exhibits, including Smithsonian traveling exhibits, which situated the unit's interpretive themes within a broad historical context, often using art and performance to connect with visitors. Indeed, as early as 1982, programming associated with the unit had grown so robust, that park staff wondered "should Boston African American National Historic Site (BOAF) inter-

[684] "The Freedom Trail: A Framework for the Future," 4.

[685] John Manson, "A Decade of Collaboration," The Broadside (Spring 1991): 3.

preters compete with Byron's [Museum of African American History] guides?"[686] Rushing would, within the year, win election to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, where he would go on to represent the ninth Suffolk District for over three decades. His organization remained, however, and continued to guide goings-on at the Boston African National Historic Site.[687]

Glimpses of critical history could be seen too in the work of the park's various partner sites. The Paul Revere House, for instance, embraced critical social history early on and even published research concerning immigration in the North End.[688] Perhaps most remarkably, the Bostonian Society mounted a stunning exhibit at the Old State House during 1992–94 with funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The exhibit and an accompanying book, both titled "The Last Tenement: Confronting Community and Urban Renewal in Boston's West End," for the first time comprehensively grappled with the fact and legacy of urban renewal in Boston. The timing of this exhibit, coinciding as it did with a moment of considerable growth and change in Boston's urban landscape, was remarkably provocative at the time. And it reflected a longstanding effort by the Bostonian Society to reunite and empower people who had been displaced by postwar renewal campaigns. This was the best of critical history in Boston during those years, though it was not work which the park involved itself in. Indeed, no staff from the park or the regional office appear in the project's lengthy acknowledgments.[689]

But why was that? Why did the park appear to encourage critical public history only at the Boston African American National Historic Site, and not elsewhere? It is worth noting that Paul Weinbaum and several assistants were, during 1984, deeply involved with the Beacon Hill unit. As we might suspect, though, owing to the agency's bifurcation of history and interpretation, their involvement appears to have been almost entirely limited to the preparation of National Register nominations for its various sites—an incredible fifteen nominations that year alone.[690] As we learned in chapter five, much of the historical momentum atop Beacon Hill owed to the research agenda that Rushing and the Museum of African American History had built into its agenda, a tradition continued by site managers who, over time, tended to firewall their work from the park's other units.[691] Another problem, as Weinbaum explains it, owed to the narrow period of significance allowed for interpretation by most of the park's resources. In 1985, for instance, Weinbaum worked with Peter Steele, various technicians, and several consulting scholars

686 Squad Meeting Minutes, May 11, 1982, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

687 Carter Lowe was detailed to Boston African American NHS as Site Manager in February 1988. "Carter will continue urban affairs responsibilities in the Region (NARO) on a limited basis. Superintendent welcomed the executive skills of Mr. Lowe to the Site noting the Site's significant program and growth recently, as well as excellent potential for the future." Staff Meeting, March 1, 1988, Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, Folder Squad Meetings 01/1981–05/1982, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

688 Nina Zannieri, "Report From the Field: Not the Same Old Freedom Trail—A View from the Paul Revere House," The Public Historian 25, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 53.

689 Philip Bergen, "Bostonian Society Celebrates 'A Place in History,'" The Broadside (Autumn 1992): 10. Sean M. Fisher and Carolyn Hughes, eds., The Last Tenement: Confronting Community and Urban Renewal in Boston's West End (Boston: The Bostonian Society, 1992).

690 Superintendent Report, 1984, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

691 Martin Blatt discusses this tendency in Martin H. Blatt, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, February 22, 2019.

on a new exhibit for the Old South Meeting House. Weinbaum wanted very much to explore "the 20th-century history of free speech in Boston… and the role that Old South plays in that." Doing so would have introduced the kind of broad historical context which allows for critical analysis of change over time. The NPS, however, "did not feel it could tell that story extensively." That type of history, Weinbaum recalls, wasn't considered "part of the mission of the Park, as it's legislated."[692]

Except perhaps at the Boston African American National Historic Site, then, history programming in the park during these years appears to have followed rather then led trends in Boston's heritage landscape.[693] Meeting minutes reveal Weinbaum's attempts to speak with interpretative staff throughout the 1980s about aspects of the park's history which might encourage more innovative perspectives on the past.[694] Overall, however, these efforts appear to have had little affect. Interpretation remained largely focused on finding new ways to deliver old ideas about revolutionary pasts. This is not to say that the park did not value interpretive method. On the contrary, during these years interpreters explored all matter of ways to engage visitors. In the Navy Yard, an innovative costumed interpretive program featuring Rosie the Riveter explored labor and women's history. Along the Freedom Trail, Ranger Matt Grief used puppetry to reach new audiences. And the park's tradition of accommodating visually impaired visitors expanded during these years to include other vectors of disability.[695] Despite this, however, the content of interpretation remained squarely focused on narrow periods of significance which largely excluded any possibility of complicating the recent past, thinking broadly across chronology as Weinbaum had hoped to do at Old South and at Building 28, or reaching audiences such as those among Boston's newest immigrants whose stories were not at all reflected in the park's historical narrative.

Weinbaum had at least managed to influence what the superintendent believed to be the role of a historian at the park. When he left to permanently join the regional office, the park sought to replace Weinbaum with someone who, beyond managing Register nominations, could also contribute to the development of permanent exhibits as Weinbaum had done at Old South and elsewhere. The park's preservation program had created a need for new exhibits especially in the Navy Yard, Faneuil Hall, and the Old State House. With that in mind, the park hired Louis Hutchins in 1991 to replace Weinbaum. Hutchins had earned an MA in American History from UC Berkeley, and came to the park after serving as a historian for the Historic American Engineering Record and at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History.

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[692] Weinbaum Interview, 24–25.

[693] The one facet of operations beyond Boston African American NHS wherein critical history appears to have happened during the late 1980s concerns traveling Smithsonian exhibits. For instance, a Smithsonian exhibit concerning women in the industrial workplace during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries showed in the Preble Room from mid-July to Mid-September 1988. "From Field to Factory," reserved for Black History Month in 1989, explored the Great Migration between 1915 to 1940. See staff meeting minutes, May 17, 1988, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987–04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. Staff meeting notes indicate that subsequent Smithsonian exhibits continued to be popular into the 1990s.

[694] Curatorial Weekly Report, June 28, 1985, Folder Staff Meetings 05/85–06/86.

[695] During the 1980s and 1990s, ongoing emphasis on piloting new kinds of educational programs was introduced, including the Conservation Careers Development Corps, which since its organization at the park in 1990 has brought disadvantaged teens to the park to learn more about the field of conservation and related career opportunities. See, for instance, Bill Fuchs, "CCDC Program Introduces Inner-City Youth to Conservation Careers," The Broadside (Winter 1992): 3.

Burchill particularly valued Hutchins' "skills in developing exhibits [as the park] goes forward with major new permanent exhibits."[696] Hutchins, it turns out, advised the committee that produced "The Freedom Trail: A Framework for the Future," which surely explains the report's remarkable awareness of the limitations of history-making along the Freedom Trail during those years. He did not remain at the park long, however, and accepted a curator position at Slater Mill Historic Site in 1995.[697]

At roughly the same time, the park hired Martin Blatt, who had served as chief of professional services and supervisory historian at Lowell. Blatt signed on in Boston during 1996 as chief of cultural resources and, incidentally, supervisory historian.[698] Blatt's arrival marked an important turn in history-making at the park. Unlike his predecessors, Blatt came to the park as a seasoned historian with particular interests in the histories of labor and political radicalism. He had earned his PhD at Boston University under the direction of the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Robert Bruce and Howard Zinn, whose A People's History of the United States was one of the most influential American history books of the twentieth century. Blatt had published books with scholarly presses, sat on the Board of Directors of the Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities, and had spent several years working for Governor Michael Dukakis, including on his failed 1989 presidential election campaign, all before coming to Boston. At Lowell, where he had worked during 1990–96, Blatt made important contributions to the Boott Cotton Mill Museum, which had become noteworthy for modeling critical public history.

Blatt's commitment to doing progressive history became evident almost immediately after arriving in Boston. He learned that a committee had been formed under the direction of Ken Heidelberg, site manager at the Boston African American National Historic Site, to commemorate the centennial of the Augustus Saint-Gaudens monument to Robert Gould Shaw and the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment. As Blatt explains it, the committee was in disarray and so he asserted control over its planning in partnership with the Massachusetts Historical Society's then-senior associate editor Donald Yacovone.[699] Together, the two historians devised an entirely new kind of event for the park. Theirs was purposefully reflexive and situated in a broad historical context reflecting the scholarship of that moment. It is a difference which is evident in Blatt's description of the event: "in 1897 the Monument was dedicated to Shaw. In 1997 the "rededication" transformed the monument. In this centennial the entire frame of reference was the Monument to Robert Gould Shaw and the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment. We demonstrated clearly that blacks were not passive creatures freed by President Lincoln but rather a vital force in the Union victory. The sculpture evokes the reality and possibilities of racial cooperation. Our centennial involved rededication to the ideals which the monument represents—a struggle for social justice and unity between blacks and whites to advance common ideals."[700]

But Blatt and Yacavone did not stop there. They staged, alongside the monument's formal rededication, a two-day symposium at Suffolk University showcasing important scholars

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[696] "Park Staff Appointments Announced," The Broadside (Summer 1991): 4.

[697] "BNHP News Notes," The Broadside 4 (1995): 7.

[698] Ellen M. Fusco, "Marty Blatt Joins Park Staff," The Broadside 2 (1996): 11.

[699] Martin H. Blatt, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, February 22, 2019.

[700] Marty Blatt, "Hope and Glory: Shaw/54th Monument Centennial," The Broadside 3 (1997): 1. For materials relating to Shaw programming, see Folder "Shaw/54th-Minutes Steering Comm," Box 1, BNHP Resource Management Records, Division of Cultural Resources, Chief Historian (Marty Blatt) Files, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

who contributed essays to a book published by the University of Massachusetts Press.[701] They also hosted the largest-ever gathering of black Civil War reenactors in an encampment on the Charles River, with nearly three thousand visitors. Various speakers, including Byron Rushing, addressed the crowds. Blatt and Yacavone even convinced retired General Colin Powell to deliver the event's keynote speech.[702] By way of comparison, the park hosted another commemorative event that summer, the rededication of Dorchester Heights on June 21, which Blatt did not plan. That one-day event included remarks by Congressman Moakley, and participation by a handful of white battle reenactors who created "a sense of authenticity [alongside] the artifact and model exhibit, the musket firing, and, of course, the two teams of oxen."[703] Whereas the Dorchester Heights event repeated familiar tropes from the usual playbook of Boston's revolutionary memory, Blatt's event broke entirely new ground, engaged new audiences, and earned considerable media attention for the park in the Boston Globe and beyond. It signaled an important turn toward precisely the kind of critical public history that the park had needed all along to make sense of its own genesis story, to grapple with the history of racial violence that had shaped it, and to signal that the NPS was committed to serving all Americans. It was not the kind of programming, however, that John Burchill wanted for his park. For his part, Burchill ignored the Shaw commemoration until word spread that Colin Powell and Byron Rushing were scheduled to appear. Uninterested in Shaw, and incensed that Blatt had not reserved space for the superintendent to speak at a public event, Burchill called him into his office, closed the door, and let fly: "Who the fuck do you work for… Do you work for Rushing, or do you work for me!?" In the end, Blatt and Yacavone agreed that Burchill could have a few minutes to introduce the event. What the confrontation with Burchill revealed, however, was a deep-seated hostility among park leadership to programming which shifted focus away from blockbuster preservation projects and which otherwise complicated patriotic narratives of American progress. Blatt struggled against that tendency in part by advancing many successful progressive public history projects beyond the scope of his regular duties.[704] Some of these, particularly a public art project co-sponsored with Boston's Institute for Contemporary Art and staged at the Bunker Hill Monument during 1998 by Krzysztof Wodiczko, earned national attention for the park and put it briefly at the center of important conversations about memory and citizenship.[705] Behind the scenes, however, the Wodiczko program intensified anxieties within the park concerning the meaning and uses of history. As Blatt tells it, Burchill and his chief of interpretation, Bill Foley, favored the soothing and uncomplicated reaffirmations of patriotic nationalism typified by battle reenactments and oxen teams. Theirs was a vision of the park that had underwritten Burchill's preservation successes for over a decade and which, as we've seen, had been promulgated by Boston's Whig elite centuries before.

[701] During May 28–31, 1997. Blatt (with Thomas Brown and Donald Yacovone): Hope and Glory: Essays on the Legacy of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment (University of Massachusetts Press, 2001)

[702] Marty Blatt, "Hope and Glory: Shaw/54th Monument Centennial," The Broadside 3 (1997): 1.

[703] John Manson, "Dorchester Heights Rededication Program," The Broadside 3 (1997): 2–3.

[704] Among the public history projects Blatt cites are "Changing Meanings of Freedom," Liberty Bell Center Revision, Patriots of Color study, abolitionism in black and white, Gulag, and Roots of Liberty.

[705] Sarah J. Purcell, "Commemoration, Public Art, and the Changing Meaning of the Bunker Hill Monument," The Public Historian 25, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 55–71.

Conclusion

John Burchill left the park in 2000 to become a special assistant to the regional director. "It is astonishing to me," he wrote upon announcing his departure, "that in my years as Superintendent I never had an untoward incident or encounter. There has never been any animosity, personally or institutionally."[706] This is hardly true. As we've seen, Burchill had a temper that surely caused more than a few hard feelings over the years. His choice to ignore those moments, though, is revealing insomuch as it underscores a similar attitude about the historical past. From what we can gather from his speeches and management priorities, it is clear that Burchill perceived in Boston's history a succession of selfless heroes who prevailed against great odds to make our nation, slowly but surely, a better place for everyone. It is a wrongheaded notion, of course, a fact which should have been made clear to him by his own staff and by the important public history being done all around Boston during the 1990s. It is a notion, however, that undergirded Burchill's political alliances, that wooed donors, that animated remarkably successful preservation campaigns, and which in many ways, fed Burchill's hopes for his own legacy. In other words, it was a way of thinking about the past that got results at a time and within an organization that largely eschewed history. Owing to its success during the 1990s, and perhaps also to the sudden deaths of Moakley in 2001—and Burchill himself just a year later—this era in the park's history holds a special place in park memory.[707]

In hindsight, however, Burchill's success and the parks' consequent growth, created significant challenges. As I've suggested, Burchill's attitude toward history, and his resistance to critical interpretation was deeply problematic. Even more hazardous than his own attitude toward history was his support for a chief of interpretation who also lacked a sophisticated understanding of the past. More concerning yet was Burchill's simultaneous commitment to building up and expanding the Freedom Trail Foundation's capacity to do its own interpretation. Unlike the park, which at least kept historians like Weinbaum and Blatt on staff, the Foundation had no structural requirement to include historical expertise among its staff or on its board. To make matters worse, Burchill's Freedom Trail study put the Foundation on equal terms with the park's other cooperating organizations, which had in fact begun operating as serious history organizations during this period. If the park did not value history, and it did not value critical interpretation, then what would the NPS have to offer the sites once Moakley's fundraising magic vanished? Joint educational programming like the "People and Places" program was certainly important. But what reason beyond it would there be to cooperate? It was this question, above all, that poised the park and its partners for a difficult road ahead.

[706] John Burchill, "Superintendent John Burchill Announces Departure," The Broadside 4 (1999): 1.

[707] Stephen P. Carlson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, March 1, 2019.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion: The Experience Park in an Age of Uncertainty, 2000–2013

We asked in chapter two whether or not the Boston National Historic Sites Commission (BNHSC) had been successful in imagining a national historic park for Boston. It is worth putting the same question to the park itself, and a fitting way to conclude this study. Is Boston National Historical Park a success? Defining success, of course, is a slippery challenge. It's certainly not the principal purpose of an administrative history. And yet, administrative history does provide insights not common to other tools the agency relies on to evaluate its own success. Administrative history, for instance, presents a unique opportunity to determine how well a unit stacks up against the goals of its progenitors. A unit's authorizing legislation preserves some of that intent, but as we've learned—especially in chapter three—Congress's motivations for creating a national park in Boston extended well beyond a concern with revolutionary history. A park in Boston, it hoped, would nourish national pride during hard times, it would promote heritage tourism, it would coordinate and amplify the work of park partners, and it would offset the economic effect of a shuttered Navy Yard. These, at least, were goals expressed during the park's contentious 1974 congressional hearings. Whether or not these were appropriate reasons for authorizing a national park is an important question. For our purposes, however, recalling these goals is critical for understanding the park's trajectory over time, and for making sense of how its leadership might define success going forward.

Another metric of success evident in the park's administrative history relates to a vision of failure ensconced within the Department of Interior's (DOI) opposition to the proposed park. Why authorize a park, it wondered in 1974, when the NPS already had all the authority it needed to fund preservation and interpretation under the Historic Sites Act of 1935 and the 1966 NHPA's matching grant program? Why unnecessarily subject public funding to system-wide maintenance priorities by filtering it through a new national park budget? Why insist on contractional relationships with partner organizations that seemed perfectly happy to manage on their own? And why demand for the NPS a role in the Navy Yard, when the Navy was already obligated by law to protect USS Constitution? Wasn't Congress, the Department of the Interior warned, "unfairly raising expectations in the minds of the citizens of Boston that we can't fulfill?"[708] What, in other words, would be the added value of a national historical park in Boston? It is a provocative question, one that is as worth asking in 2019 as it was in 1974. To be successful, the park must certainly provide historical value—to visitors, partners, and stakeholders beyond—which wouldn't otherwise be available in Boston.

Finally, administrative history introduces the possibility of gauging a third vector of success: self-awareness. How well, we might wonder, has the NPS understood and accounted for its own impact in Boston? The park's charge, of course, is to preserve and interpret Boston's revolutionary past and its ongoing legacy. Having done that now for nearly a half-century, the park has clearly become a character in the story that it is tasked with telling. But has it looked in the

[708] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, BNHP Archives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 20.

mirror? Has it come to terms with the necessity of self-reflexivity in administrative decisions, in interpretation, and in its relationships with partners? Has it devised ways to harness its own institutional memory toward improving visitor services and community engagement? Has it been attentive to choices its staff and partners make about which histories to tell and which to obscure? Has it paid attention to how these choices align with other histories of the American saga? Has it accounted publicly for its choices?

My purpose in this concluding chapter is to consider how these various measures of success weigh against significant developments in the park's recent past, specifically during the years after John Burchill's departure. As we learned in the previous chapter, Burchill reinvented the park as a mechanism for delivering congressional funding to those sites which most vividly recalled Longfellow's Boston. And yet, his successes coincided with the 1990s plateau in congressional appropriations for the NPS, as well as the introduction of new budgetary protocols throughout the agency which limited possibilities for the kind of workarounds that John Joseph Moakley achieved. By the early 2000s, it was painfully evident that major backlogs in operating and maintenance costs might permanently hobble the agency.[709] To make matters worse, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 subjected federal agencies—including the national parks—to new regimes of costly and inconvenient security protocols. Patriotic tourism nationwide increased dramatically after the attacks, but a coincident economic recession limited the flow of tourist dollars into gifts shops, restaurants, and other staples of heritage revenue.[710] It fell to a sequence of superintendents during the 2000s to chart a course through these troubled years. We will see that, like other cultural organizations in Boston, the Park looked toward the so-called "experience economy" for solutions.[711] Substituting experience for content, however, has given new urgency to an old question: what, exactly, is the park about?

New Leaders, New Challenges

Just as Superintendent Gurney's retirement had triggered a wave of staff departures and reappointments in 1984, so did Burchill's in 2000. The park's newsletter, The Broadside, captured the turnover in its "BNHP News Notes" section, chronicling frequent staff arrivals and departures. Most significantly, Peter Steel stepped in as acting superintendent beginning March 1, 2000 and managed the park until the NPS appointed Terry Savage as new park superintendent in late 2000.[712] Savage had an entirely different background than his predecessors. He first worked for the NPS beginning in 1963 as a landscape architect at Yosemite National Park. After a stint in California as a landscape architect in private practice, Savage returned to the agency with appointments in the San Francisco and Denver Service Centers. In 1978, Savage signed on as chief of planning and design for the North Atlantic Region and became associate regional director in 1992. When the agency reorganized during 1995, it headquartered the new Northeast Region in Philadelphia and appointed Savage superintendent of the new Boston Support

[709] See, for instance, Eric Pianin, "National Parks Suffering from Lack of Funds," Washington Post, April 14, 2002.

[710] See, for instance, "Living History Falls on Hard Times," Boston Globe, November 2, 2003. Big cutbacks the following year: Diane Allen, "Cutbacks Eyed for US Parks in Boston," Boston Globe, March 19, 2004.

[711] "Boston Museums Part of 'Experience Economy'," Boston Globe, October 19, 2014.

[712] Savage received his appointment on October 27, 2000, and began work in November. Peter Steele left for NERO in 2002. Terry W. Savage, "David Brouillette Appointed Deputy Superintendent," The Broadside 1 (2002): 1–2.

Office. Save for a one-year detail as Acting Superintendent of Gateway National Recreation Area in Middletown, NJ, Savage had remained in Boston since the late 1970s and was therefore intimately familiar with goings-on in the park, often working on projects for it—including the 1985 Navy Yard GMP process.[713]

Savage brought to the park a modest slate of goals, largely oriented around continuing initiatives introduced before his appointment. He hoped, for instance, to create a downtown orientation facility serving the park, the Boston African American Historic Site, and the Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area (which had been established in 1996). He sought, too, to improve visitor experience within the Navy Yard, and to implement a new park facilities user fee cost recovery program mandated by the NPS. Continuing work on an adaptive reuse program for Hoosac Stores topped his list, as did shifting the park toward environmental sustainability.[714] Savage's middling ambitions and his orientation toward park partners stood in marked contrast to his predecessors. Whereas previous superintendents had served primarily to funnel money toward the sites, Savage "flipped the equation," as Nina Zannieri puts it, hoping that the "sites could generate money for the NPS." It was an idea, she notes, that "the sites objected to."[715] In other ways, too, Savage's leadership differed from what staff had grown accustomed to. Steve Carlson notes that Savage was considerably less engaged in daily operations than Burchill had been, an observation confirmed by Savage's frequent absence in staff meeting minutes. Others perceived in Savage a lack of investment, a drifting toward retirement as Martin Blatt recalls it.[716]

It was under Savage's leadership, then, and less than a year into it, that the park experienced the dramatic and often confusing aftermath of the September 11 attacks.[717] Although Boston was not directly impacted by the attacks, various levels of mandated security protocol trickled into all aspects of federal government. The park, for instance, remained open after the attacks except for the Navy Yard; the Navy insisted upon full closure until September 29, thereafter reopening to pedestrians alone and only during business hours.[718] Six months out, the Boston Globe's Brian Mooney assessed security measures in Boston, using the park as a point of reference. He noted that although the Navy and NPS had installed a metal detector and limited access to USS Constitution, security was "less visible" at Bunker Hill, pointing to inconsistency across town and venues. Closures disrupted "Harborwalk," according to Boston Harbor Association Executive Director Vivien Li. These included at the Navy Yard, where the pedestrian path from the parking lot to Constitution was obstructed with concrete keel blocks and no trespassing signs. "The sole entry point is the main gate, and concrete barriers funnel visitors to a metal detector under a white tent and a half dozen NPS rangers and uniformed sailors."[719]

Owing to Constitution's place in public memory, the NPS designated Boston National Historical Park a special "icon park" in 2003, which intensified the security situation at the Navy Yard. In some ways, it benefited the park by drawing additional resources to Boston. The park

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[713] Stephen P. Carlson, "Terry Savage Named New Superintendent," The Broadside 3 (2000): 12.

[714] Terry Savage, "A Message from Superintendent Savage," The Broadside 1 (2001): 1–2.

[715] Nina Zannieri, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, December 18, 2018.

[716] Stephen P. Carlson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, March 1, 2019; and, Martin H. Blatt, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, February 22, 2019.

[717] For a comprehensive overview of the park's response to international terrorism since 1996, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 262, 64, 76.

[718] "September 11 Events Impact Boston National Historical Park," The Broadside 2 and 3 (2001): 5.

[719] Brian C. Mooney, "Six Months Later, Security a Way of Life," Boston Globe, March 11, 2002.

was one of just four units in the system, for instance, to be issued a bomb-sniffing dog.[720] Much more significantly, the park's security budget grew from about $750,000 to $2,000,000 as a result of the attacks.[721] In other ways, however, Constitution became a lightning rod for tensions between the Navy and the NPS. During 2002, for instance, Ship Commander Randall Neil suddenly ordered that Constitution be closed to the public beginning on October 21, the ship's 205th birthday. The NPS, he claimed, was negligent in paying for its share of Constitution's security budget. Rumors that the NPS had scheduled a staff reduction at Constitution riled Neil, who evidently couldn't reach Savage or his deputy in time to discuss the problem. The two sides did manage to patch up their differences in time to avert a closure, but the incident demonstrated how anxious both sides had grown amid the uncertainties of post-9/11 America.[722]

It also demonstrated a weakness in the park's partnership structure. As Carlson notes, ever since 9/11—and perhaps since the USS Cole bombing in 2000—balancing the Navy's need for security with the agency's need for access has created considerable management challenges, ranging from communication failures such as what occurred during 2002 to more serious matters regarding compliance mandates. 9/11 created a situation wherein, within the Navy Yard, the secretary of the interior's authority became vulnerable to the Navy's authority, an untenable situation insomuch as managing a partnership park is concerned. Carlson notes that Savage attempted to intervene where possible but never advanced the issue to a higher level of review.[723] On other fronts, the superintendent explained reductions of service as owing to the aftermath of 9/11. During 2003, for instance, the park evicted several local organizations that had been tenants in the Navy Yard for decades. They included Opera Boston, the New England Museum Association, the Wardroom Club, and the Gateway Project. The Gateway Project, a prevocational program serving disadvantaged teens, typified the kind of community engagement that the park had sought out during its early years under Gurney. Savage explained that the organization's mission is "not our mission… we've taken a huge hit post-9/11 in terms of visitation [and] this park celebrates the Revolutionary War and the struggle to find freedom in America." "Our mission," he noted, "is to educate people and preserve that heritage."[724]

Toward a New Navy Yard

As Savage's remarks make clear, how the park and its partners conceived of the agency's mission in Boston had clearly evolved in the years since authorization. Back during the days of the Boston National Historical Park Advisory Commission, supporting organizations like the Gateway Project would have seemed entirely mission-specific. Since Burchill, however, mooring the park more firmly in revolutionary memory—as the BNHSC had set out to do in the 1950s—had again taken precedence. And it had emboldened onlookers who still chafed at the Navy Yard's embrace of recent pasts. In 2000, for instance, as if pleading with whomever might replace Burchill, historian William F. Fowler opined in the Boston Globe that remnants of the late twen-

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[720] See Peter DeMarco, "Canines Sniffing Out Trouble at Popular Hub Landmarks," Boston Globe, March 14, 2003.

[721] Peter DeMarco, "Security Funding for Old Ironsides Now Expected," Boston Globe, October 20, 2002.

[722] Peter DeMarco, "Security Funding for Old Ironsides Now Expected," Boston Globe, October 20, 2002, and Peter DeMarco, "Old Ironsides to Open as Usual; Security Won't be Curtailed," Boston Globe, October 21, 2002.

[723] Stephen P. Carlson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, March 1, 2019.

[724] Savage quoted in Cara Feinberg, "In Navy Yard Switch, Teens Getting The Gate," Boston Globe, August 3, 2003.

tieth-century yard amounted to a "scar." "Why," he implored, "will [the NPS] not restore the Charlestown Navy Yard to its most important historic moment." Fowler couldn't quite settle on what that moment might be, but he didn't seem to care so long as it related to "the treasure at the pier."[725]

From the outset, however, at least since BRA Director John D. Warner floated the concept of a maritime heritage area during the 1970s, the Navy Yard had been conceived of primarily as an economic engine, a way to create jobs and generate tax revenue amid the collapse of Charlestown's actual naval industries. Though Gurney most valued the yard's military history, all three superintendents prioritized projects within the Navy Yard which foregrounded revenue and development. Under Burchill's watch, what funding flowed into the NPS's portion of the Navy Yard flowed primarily into expansion of concessions and visitor services: the Shipyard Galley, detailed in chapter six, for instance; the expansion of guest facilities in the Constitution Museum; and the opening of a new visitor center in the former Bunker Hill Pavilion in April 1997.[726] Similarly, Savage's priority in the Navy Yard was the development of Hoosac Stores. In 2001, the park requested proposals from developers interested in developing the complex. Only four responded. Of them, the NPS selected Cathartes Investments/Carpenter & Company, which proposed to develop the complex into a business hotel.[727] Whether the park conceived of the Navy Yard as a place to learn about the early republic or late capitalism made no difference to real estate developers, no matter how much people like Fowler wished it would.

What did interest developers, however, was the possibility of bringing clients into proximity with spaces which evoked the past, no matter how imprecisely. This was, of course, the magic conjured by James Rouse during the bicentennial years, and precisely the magic Congress expected the NPS would underwrite in the Navy Yard when it authorized the park's legislation. As early as 1981, advertisements promised "historic landmarks for rent," offering Navy Yard apartments for $475 to $1250 (about $1,300 to $3,500 in today's dollars) per month in the new Constitution Quarters complex.[728] As we saw in chapter six, high-end development ran rampant through Charlestown and the Navy Yard throughout the 1980s, driving up real estate prices and effectively transforming residential populations. Boston's mercurial 1990s economy triggered another bout of development and, with it, new changes. In 1994, the Brick-layers and Carpenters Charlestown Non-profit Development Corporation won $5.3 million in equity financing to convert Building 104 into affordable housing for senior citizens.[729] That same year, the Boston Globe reported that "single women are the fastest growing segment of the population in Charlestown," indicating what sociologist Will Holton termed a "second state of gentrification."[730] As the 90s drew to a close, observers noted too that Charlestown's second wave of gentrification had in-

[725] William F. Fowler, "A Better Berth in Charlestown for Old Ironsides," Boston Globe, July 23, 2000.

[726] The new visitor center opened at the Navy Yard on April 4, 1997, as a gateway to the Navy Yard District, which includes Bunker Hill. The visitor center itself is in the former Bunker Hill Pavilion, built in 1975 by the Raytheon Corporation for the Bicentennial. "The Whites of Their Eyes" played at the Pavilion for 22-years. In February of 1997, Raytheon Historical Foundation, the Park, and Massport (which owns the land) partnered to update the space. The center itself includes a bookstore run by Eastern National. For more, read Bill Foley, "New Visitor Center Opens at Charlestown Navy Yard," The Broadside 2 (1997): 1-2. For an overview of these and other visitor services during these years, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 225, 258-60.

[727] Ruth Raphael, "Developer Selected for Hoosac Stores Warehouse," The Broadside 1 (2010): 3.

[728] "Advertisement for Navy Yard Apartments," Boston Globe, June 13, 1981.

[729] N.a, "Charlestown project gets $5.3m in equity financing," Boston Globe, January 1, 1994.

[730] Ann Scales, "Charlestown Draws Single Women," Boston Globe, November 20, 1994.

troduced markedly younger people to the neighborhood, heralded by a wave of "twentysomethings."[731] Including the Navy Yard within the boundaries of Boston's National Historical Park had, at the outset, been imagined as an act of economic renewal, not as a an act of historical interpretation. And, by the 2000s, it appears to have succeeded in that regard.[732]

That it had explains Savage's enthusiasm for advancing the Hoosac Stores project, as does renewed interest in developing the long-neglected Chain Forge and Ropewalk buildings. As we learned in chapter six, conversations about redeveloping the Chain Forge building had advanced during the mid-1980s, but succumbed to bickering between the BRA, NPS, the Charlestown Preservation Society, and the Harborpark Advisory Committee. Part of the problem owed to accusations of improper relationships between proposed developers and Charlestown stakeholders who stood to benefit financially from the project. But there too were concerns about the adequacy of interpretative space allocated by developers within the building to exhibit historic equipment, a provision of the agency's agreement with the BRA.[733] This is to say nothing of problems associated with environmental remediation of a polluted industrial site. It turned out that the Navy Yard generated persistent and dangerous environmental threats, not least among them was the problem of contamination. In 1984, the superintendent committed to the removal of hazardous waste throughout the yard, but even targeted removal couldn't anticipate surprise encounters with toxicity. That year, for instance, a four-year-long rehabilitation project at Pier 2 came to a close, but not before triggering massive creosote leakage and, incidentally, a complicated encounter with the EPA.[734] Elsewhere, providing "safe living conditions for young children" required the de-leading of staff quarters.[735] A Department of Defense program saw the Chain Forge equipment cleaned and repainted beginning in 2000, and turned once again to possibilities for redevelopment in partnership with the BRA.[736] The complexity of the project, however, and the conflicting interests of its various stakeholders delayed progress until 2015, when the BRA announced its approval of plans to build a hotel in the building.[737]

The Ropewalk building presented even greater challenges to would-be developers. Long and narrow, and with limited opportunities for egress, the building did not easily lend itself to residential development. Investors floated all manner of alternative ideas, including a 1989 proposal by the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities to create an archive and collections storage facility there, with conservation laboratories and an auditorium.[738] During the 1980s, however, as Steve Carlson explains it, conversations between the NPS and the BRA about the Ropewalk suffered from disagreements about requirements set forth in the property's deed

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[731] Robert Smith, "Charlestown's Latest Immigrants—Female Twentysomethings—Are Changing the Neighborhood's Image," Boston Globe, February 22, 1998.

[732] For a full overview of housing development within the Navy Yard during these years, see Carlson, Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resource Study, 246–47.

[733] Barbara Clancy, "BRA Names Developer for Navy Yard Plan," Boston Globe, May 2, 1986.

[734] Superintendent Report, 1987. Carlson summarizes concerns regarding hazardous material remediation in Charlestown Navy Yard Historic Resources Study, 248–49.

[735] Superintendent Report, 1987.

[736] Stephen P. Carlson, "Chain Forge Shop Equipment Cleaned," The Broadside 1/2 (2001): 13.

[737] Jack Newsham, "Hotel, Restaurant at Navy Yard Site Among Projects to Get BRA Approval," Boston Globe, March 14, 2015.

[738] Staff Meeting Minutes, February 28, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 08/1987-04/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

of transfer. It was only during the early 1990s, once the NPS established use guidelines for the building, that the BRA fully grasped the difficulty of adapting the structure to other uses. It was during this period too that the BRA agreed to devote a significant portion of the renovated building to exhibit space. These negotiations, slowed by a rocky relationship between the BRA and NPS regional staff in Philadelphia, spanned the decade. All the while the building languished, even enduring a nine-alarm fire in 2002.[739] Carlson notes that the compromises necessary to allow for development—such as allowing additional exterior doors—had only just materialized when Savage began his superintendency. But even then, the building's complexities complicated development. It would take until 2016 for a Ropewalk redevelopment concept to get real legs.[740]

The Problem with History

The Navy Yard's trajectory since Burchill, then, raises a key challenge in assessing the park's success from the standpoint of its administrative history. It is clear that the park's leadership has succeeded over the years in pursuing the kind of public-private partnerships which its progenitors hoped would encourage economic renewal. But Congress also intended the park to be a steward of Boston's history. So, what about history? Has the park succeeded on that front too? Has it done good history? It's a question that returns us to Fowler's complaint that the NPS had abandoned its historical responsibilities within the Navy Yard. Though Fowler rather miscast the problem, failing to understand that Boston's recent past is no less significant than its distant past, his missive nonetheless highlights that the NPS, by the 2000s, appeared publicly to prioritize heritage experience over actual history. Doing history is a matter of asking hard questions, a way to challenge what we think we know about the past by interrogating it through multiple perspectives. The park's embeddedness in Boston's heritage consumer landscape, however, has tended more often to conceive of history as a backdrop, a charming setting for restaurants, apartments, and patriotic celebrations. Consider for instance that the New England Aquarium considered relocating to the Navy Yard in 1990.[741] The suggestion alone reveals that Bostonians had come to perceive the Navy Yard as a place to be experienced, not necessarily a place to be understood.

This is not to say that the park had abandoned good history. As we learned in chapter six, thanks to early efforts at the Boston African American Historic Site and the addition of Martin Blatt as its chief of cultural resources, leading-edge history thrived in certain corners of the park. During and after the Burchill years, however, history programming and heritage programming seem to have coexisted uneasily, and quite apart from one another. Consider, for instance, two programs run within a week of each other during June 2000. One program commemorated the 225th anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill with music, craft demonstrations, and battle reenactors. It featured a speech by acting Superintendent Peter Steele standing before local dignitaries including one former and one active USS Constitution commanding officer. Atop the stage, too, was James W. Conway, longtime champion of Charlestown military history and that year's parade marshal. Just a few days before, the park had put on another program, the so-called "Changing Meanings of Freedom" symposium, which sought to complicate our understanding of the Revolution during its 225th anniversary. That gathering brought hundreds of NPS staff,

[739] Peter Demarco, "Ropewalk 9-alarm Fire Said to be Set," Boston Globe, May 6, 2002.

[740] Stephen P. Carlson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, March 1, 2019. For details concerning the successful plan, see John Chesto, "Developer Patiently Learned the Ropes," Boston Globe, May 20, 2016.

[741] Staff Meeting Minutes, May 30, 1989, Folder Staff Meetings 05/1989–12/1989, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

university faculty, school teachers, and park neighbors into conversation to assess how well the United States had delivered on the Revolution's promise of freedom. Speakers included a who's who of the nation's leading historians, including Eric Foner and David McCullough. Byron Rushing participated, as did Al Young, and the event even featured a special exhibit alongside book sales at its gathering place, Suffolk University.

Weighed against one another, these two events demonstrate the extent to which the park conceived of heritage programming and history programming as separate and not quite equal spheres of activity. The Bunker Hill program offered little if any history at all, dwelling primarily in nostalgia for patriotic battle memories. The Bunker Hill Monument, as we learned in chapter one, has scant material connection to the Revolutionary War, but rather recalls efforts after the war to augment the reputations of a select few white men who participated in it. The symposium, conversely, had as its entire purpose the historical work of interrogating the various meanings of freedom advanced over time by all Americans concerned to advance or hinder the work of democracy. Importantly, however, it appears that the park invested considerably more of its own resources—especially staff hours—in the Bunker Hill program. It seems too that participation in each event varied by division. The Bunker Hill affair figured prominently for interpretation, which staffed the event and participated in the parade, whereas the symposium primarily occupied cultural resources, which organized it. It's worth noting too that James Conway, characterized in The Broadside as "great friend" of the park, had savagely criticized Krzystof Wodiczko's 1998 installation at the Bunker Hill Monument as "desecration of a holy site." That project, co-sponsored by the park and the Institute of Contemporary Art had modeled precisely the kind of critical engagement with the past that cultural resources sought to achieve during the later event. This is all to say that both events of June 2000, considered together, reveal a deep cultural and intellectual divide within Boston's National Historical Park, one wherein staff—and presumably their audiences—could opt, if desired, to ignore history all together.[742]

As previous chapters illustrate, disregard for and sometimes outright hostility toward critical history from within the park's own ranks was not a new problem during the 2000s. That it persisted so long is remarkable. There were signs, however, that by the 2000s, something had begun to change. Blatt's programming, for instance, had begun to have influence within the park, even if incrementally. Consider, for instance, the new list of items added to park bookstores by the Eastern National Association in 2000: a 225th anniversary of the American Revolution medallion, a 2001 NPS calendar, children's colonial Tricorn hats, a colonial girl's mop cap, and Eric Foner's The Story of American Freedom.[743] Blatt's ability to have an impact on history within the park had everything to do with his capacity to reach beyond the park. For instance, he was one of just a very few NPS historians—including Patricia West, Ed Bearrs, Robert Utley, and Dwight Pitchaithely—who have achieved professional reputations beyond the agency. He did so, in part, by playing an important role in key professional associations, including the Organization of American Historians and the National Council on Public History, of which Blatt was president during 2010–12.[744] Reaching outward, and being able to engage in scholarly discourse, allowed Blatt to bring a formidable sequence of partnerships to Boston. In 2006, for instance, Blatt put

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[742] For the comparison, see Ethan Beeler, "225th Anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill," The Broadside 2 (2000): 1–3; and, John R. Dichtl, "Freedom Gets a Forum," The Broadside 2 (2000): 3. Conway is quoted in Blatt, interview with Bruggeman.

[743] Young's The Shoemaker and the Tea Party also made the list that year. Sheila Cooke-Kayser, "What's New in the Park Bookstores?" The Broadside 3 (2000): 11.

[744] Marty Blatt, "Park Historian Participates in National Meetings," The Broadside 1 (2009): 10.

the park at the center of an international joint project to explore the legacy of Soviet forced labor camps.[745] A year later, he convened a coterie of regional historians—including park partners—at the Old State House to consider possibilities for responsibly intervening in the development of a proposed Liberty Tree Park.[746] In this way, Blatt augmented the park's capacity through creative partnerships, he earned BNHP a reputation for serious history, and he managed to bridge local and global contexts.

As Blatt points out, however, much of this work was voluntary, undertaken primarily out of a concern for doing good history. He could, it turned out, participate in productive history-making partnerships with park partners, especially the Paul Revere Memorial Association and the Bostonian Society, where smart and savvy staff sought new ways to think about the past. Within the park, however, Blatt—like Paul Weinbaum before him—had discovered that his capacity to affect history-making was substantially limited by a refusal within the Division of Interpretation to innovate. As he puts it, Blatt "couldn't get anywhere" with Chief of Interpretation Bill Foley who "was completely shut down [to] new ways of doing things." It is an impression born out by park records wherein are preserved, for instance, comments from interpretation rangers concerning the revision of a park guide book during the 1990s. Across the board, it seems, interpretive staff resisted modifications to traditional narratives, especially regarding the Bunker Hill Monument where, incidentally, Foley sustained a close working relationship with Jim Conway.[747]

Blatt's most enduring impact on park interpretation thus appears in the many permanent exhibits he was required to work on during these years. Fortunately, the park's development program had created many opportunities for retooling old exhibits and creating new ones. There was, for instance, the Voices of Protest exhibit at Old South Meeting House. Park records capture Blatt's insistence that exhibit designers work harder to capture the complexity of struggles for free speech over time, including with provocative white statues portraying icons such as Margaret Sanger and George Robert Twelves Hughes, the remarkable anti-hero of Al Young's formative scholarship.[748] There was also the new Bunker Hill Museum, a project conceived of as early as 1984, but not begun until 2005.[749] When the new museum debuted in 2007, it framed the monument not as a stagnant symbol of patriotism, but rather as a contested site of memory wherein different kinds of Bostonians vied for purchase after the Revolution. The opening of a new Navy Yard visitor center in 2008 also created opportunities to make powerful claims for the significance of recent pasts, and to demonstrate how the United States' industrial saga further complicated notions of freedom popularized during the Revolution.[750]

This suggests that, despite considerable resistance from within the park, history making there had finally begun to come into its own by the end of the new millennia's first decade. That it had

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[745] Marty Blatt, "National Park Service and Partners Present Extraordinary Exhibit: GULAG: Soviet Forced Labor Camps and the Struggle for Freedom," The Broadside 1 (2006): 3.

[746] Marty Blatt, "Liberty Tree Roundtable," The Broadside 1 (2007): 3.

[747] Folder "Ranger Comments," Box 8, BNHP Resource Management Records, Division of Cultural Resources, Chief Historian (Marty Blatt) Files, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[748] See a variety of materials in Box 6, BNHP Resource Management Records, Division of Cultural Resources, Chief Historian (Marty Blatt) Files, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA. On Young, see Alan Taylor, "Transformer," The New Republic (June 21, 2004): 32-33.

[749] On the genesis of the Bunker Hill project, see Ethan Beeler, "Bunker Hill Monument Hosts First Annual Community Open House," The Broadside (Summer 1994), 2; Sean Hennessey, "National Park Service Breaks Ground for $3.7 Million Bunker Hill Makeover," The Broadside 2 (2005): 3; and, Sean Hennessey, "Battle of Bunker Hill Museum Opens to Public," The Broadside 2 (2007) 1–2.

[750] Stephen P. Carlson, "Navy Yard Visitor Center Opens," The Broadside 1 (2008): 2.

owed to Blatt's sheer force of will. But there were other changes afoot which promised new directions. New staff, for instance, created new possibilities for interpretation. After having shaped the park's interpretive agenda for nearly a quarter century, Bill Foley moved to other duties in 2010, making way for new Chief of Interpretation and Education Inez Wollins. Wollins came to Boston with considerable museum experience and a real commitment to critical programming. In 2010 the park witnessed another pivotal staff change: a new superintendent. Terry Savage announced his retirement in 2009. His replacement, Cassius Cash, arrived in February 2010 and introduced a new set of management priorities. Cash was an entirely different kind of superintendent than his predecessors. He grew up in the South, he had come up through the Forest Service, and he was the park's first African American leader. [751] These factors contributed to an entirely new and fresh approach to matters of history. Finally, the passing of time meant the passing of longtime park stakeholders. The death of Jim Conway in 2009, for instance, signaled a massive change and dramatic possibilities for new intellectual directions in Charlestown.[752] Nina Zannieri, in an interview with the Boston Globe, proposed that it was time for a Boston history center to finally create coherence within the city's complex heritage landscape. Boston, like the park, seemed to be on the verge of a history renaissance.[753]

Lost Along the Freedom Trail

Except that it wasn't. Within the park, at least, two factors especially mitigated possibilities for an expansion of critical history in Boston. The first was a problem of organizational momentum, exacerbated by operational challenges rampant throughout the agency. Though a new division chief promised real improvements in interpretation, reversing the legacy of the previous chief required considerably more resources than the park was able or willing to invest. As Blatt explains it, the new chief "was [so] consumed with managerial and supervisory duties" that she hardly had opportunity to implement meaningful reforms. Wollins left the park just five years after assuming the post, opting to return to museum work outside the NPS. By then, however, the NPS had fallen so deeply into the organizational tumult spurred by congressional underfunding and then, in 2017, the appointment of Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke, that the park's lead interpretive position remained unfilled for years.

Wollins' departure coincided with the sudden departure of the person who had hired her, Superintendent Cash. Cash's arrival at the park had been a boon to history and interpretation, insomuch as he supported the development of critical content more than any previous superintendent. Inspired by the power of the Black Heritage Trail and dismayed by its relative obscurity, Cash sought to reorganize park programming around a new concept: "Boston's Trails to Freedom." It was an idea intended to destabilize the Freedom Trail's interpretive death grip on Boston's historical imagination. To make it work, Cash insisted that tours of both trails begin at Faneuil Hall and that more tours be run more frequently along the Black Heritage Trail. He

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[751] Sean Hennessey, "Cassius Cash Named Superintendent," The Broadside 1 (2010): 1.

[752] Consider also changes such as the closing of the Bunker Hill Pavilion which had shown "The Whites of Their Eyes" since the Bicentennial. The Pavilion had been operated since 1978 by Domenic Erbafina who worked for Eastern National. Erbafina worked for Raytheon at the Pavilion and transferred to Eastern National when Raytheon pulled out and the park took over the building as a visitor center. "BNHP News and Notes," The Broadside 1 (2009): 11. On Conway, see Bill Foley and Sean Hennessey, "In Memorium: Jim Conway," The Broadside 1 (2010): 9.

[753] See, for instance, Zannieri on need for a Boston history center in Sam Allis, "Paul Revere's Next Challenge," Boston Globe, October 16, 2010.

worked closely with partner sites, and as Nina Zannieri explains it, more honestly and collaboratively than any previous superintendent. And perhaps most remarkably, in a complete reversal from the model set by Burchill during the 1990s, Cash clarified his interpretive goals before advocating for preservation. In this case, it meant securing four million dollars in federal monies to complete restoration of the African Meeting House.[754] What also set Cash's approach apart from previous leaders was his capacity for critical self-reflection, manifest especially as a willingness to build on themes which had evolved over time within the park's history program. Trails to Freedom recalled the same theme—the contested meanings of freedom—that Blatt had urged the park toward for years. In fact, Blatt recalls that Cash's deputy superintendent, Rose Fennell, proposed that the park's name be changed to Freedom National Historical Park so that it, like Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia, might signal to visitors an overarching theme around which to organize their experience.

The Trails to Freedom concept, however, never quite achieved its full potential. Its champions, for one, did not remain in Boston long enough to see it through. Fennell, following Wollins and Cash, left the park in 2015 to become deputy regional director for the Northeast Region. Indeed, frequent and sudden staff changes have become a staple of the National Park Service's culture in recent decades, reflecting in part a system of professional advancement that favors mobility, but also speaking to the financial and programmatic uncertainty that characterizes the modern agency. Even if they had remained, however, it was clear that effecting intellectual change on this scale would take considerably more time and effort. Again, organizational momentum explains some of the problem. The park had, after all, just completed a new long-range interpretive plan in 2002 for which the bulk of planning had taken place in 1999, a decade before any of these major personnel changes had taken place. And with only a few important exceptions—including acknowledgment that the meaning of the park's sites had shifted over time—its contents did not differ significantly from themes which had been developed at the park as far back as the bicentennial. Blatt confronted this reality head-on in 2010 when he was charged with developing content for the park's new visitor center in Faneuil Hall. The park had considered moving the visitor center in the Easton Building to Faneuil Hall since 1987.[755] The decision to do it in 2010 created a rare and important opportunity to confront visitors with the new history. Blatt proposed that an exhibit explore Peter Faneuil's investments in slavery. Others insisted, however, that it would be inappropriate to discuss slavery at a contact station. In the end, they won. Blatt characterizes the omission as "grotesque," and recent calls to boycott Faneuil Hall suggest that he's not alone.[756]

Organizational momentum notwithstanding, there was a second and more profound problem which conspired to keep the park from embracing critical history during the 2000s. It was, in fact, the park's oldest problem, a problem which existed even before there was a park. That problem was, and remains, the Freedom Trail. What made the Freedom Trail freshly problematic for the NPS during the 2000s, however, wasn't the trail so much as it was the park's inability to grapple with its own history. By 2010, advocates for change within the park had come to think of themselves as in competition with the trail. For example, the NPS organized a scholar's visit in 2010 with the scholar's objective being to find a way to communicate the agency's presence more

[754] Linda Matchan, "Blazing the Other Freedom Trail," Boston Globe, May 14, 2012. For these and other insights regarding Cash, also see Blatt and Zannieri, interviews with Bruggeman.

[755] Staff Meeting Minutes, March 31, 1987, Folder Staff Meetings 07/1986–07/1987, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[756] See, for instance, the editorial "Faneuil Hall's Slave Legacy," Boston Globe, July 29, 2018.

clearly to visitors toward differentiating NPS interpretation from interpretation sponsored by less historically credible and more profit-driven organizations such as the Freedom Trail Foundation. What administrative history shows us, however, is that their goal reflected an essential category mistake: the park cannot compete with the Freedom Trail because the park is the Freedom Trail. By design and by habit, Boston National Historical Park had been conceived from the outset as a corollary to the trail, a tool for facilitating urban renewal and for generating profit within Boston's heritage landscape. Byron Rushing's observation that people used to call it the "Freedom Trail Park" wasn't so much a statement of fact as it was a diagnosis. The park's problem was that it had been designed to generate profit, not knowledge.

The fact of this arrangement was so obvious during the early years as to be taken for granted. Richard Berenson—who was, in essence, the Freedom Trail—had largely managed the park's start-up by way of his chairmanship of the advisory commission, his tutelage of Superintendent Gurney, and his backroom mastery of Boston's political channels. And Berenson, of course, had been both an agent and a product of Ed Logue's urban renewal campaign. His vision was an extension of the BNHSC's vision, though calibrated for the late twentieth century and indelibly bound up with patriotic consumerism by the Bicentennial. Save for but a brief moment, the park had always functioned within this framework. George H. Smith, who had hired on as one of the Park's first rangers, was one of the few who witnessed the park before its absorption into Boston's experience economy. "In early 1975," he recalled, "Boston was still in an era that can only be termed 'pre-tourist,'" a time during which "it was quite possible to walk the entire length of the Freedom Trail and nearly die of thirst... it was very difficult to obtain even a can of soda anywhere in downtown Boston." The Sunday after July 4, 1975, however, marked a turning point when throngs of tourists made their way to the only free attraction in downtown Boston: Faneuil Hall. "Any observer could see that this was the start of something new in Boston." But, Smith noted, that kind of focus on one historic site could "not happen again now that Boston has so expanded its visitor service infrastructure [with] countless hotels, restaurants, and historical attractions. Certainly Quincy Market is the prime example."[757] Urban renewal had ensured that Boston's heritage landscape would always already be organized around consumption.

A cooling of bicentennial passions during the early 1980s alongside widespread economic woes obscured the park's role in Boston's renewal agenda and its entanglements with the Freedom Trail. Indeed, programming during those years suggested a rising concern with social history and the history of race and abolitionism. Much of this, as we've seen however, was a result of work done by and on behalf of Byron Rushing and the Museum of Afro American History with financial support from the NPS. Internally, park history remained primarily focused on generating National Register nominations which could be leveraged toward historic leasing options in the Navy Yard. Thus the search for private investment continued and, with Burchill's arrival, expanded in all matter of new directions. His preservation campaign, elevated by Boston's new economic fortunes and achieved by Congressman Moakley's concerted fundraising, surely seemed at the time like a new direction for the park. It was, however, very much a resumption of the park's postwar raison d'etre, redolent even of the same nationalistic patriotism which fueled Cold War era park boosters like Small and Bortman. Burchill's leadership of the city's tourist commission during those years recalled even more clearly how intimately tied the park had been to the Freedom Trail from the beginning.

[757] George H. Smith, "As It Was: A Park Ranger Remembers the Early Years," The Broadside (Summer 1991): 2.

But it was Burchill's encouragement of the Freedom Trail Foundation, such as with the 1996 Framework for the Future study, which eventually intensified the sense among park leaders that they had come into competition with the Foundation. Burchill had it in mind, during the 1990s, to shift some of the weight of the park's interpretive obligation onto the foundation. He encouraged its board, for instance, to support programming in the park just as had happened at Lowell.[758] Even the park's 2002 long-range interpretive plan referred to itself as a "refinement of the [1996] Freedom Trail study."[759] The Foundation's new director, Linda McConchie, promised to deliver just that. Amid a flurry of new programing activity, for instance, McConchie debuted the Freedom Trail Players, a roving theatrical troupe and the Foundation's first foray into first-person historical interpretation. As Richard Berenson Jr. recalls, though, the initiative caused considerable tension with sites along the Freedom Trail. By performing outside near sites along the trail, the Freedom Trail Players threatened to keep visitors from actually entering the sites and paying admission fees. What's more, the initiative amounted to one of several that landed the Foundation $30,000 in debt.[760] It did, however, mark an important turn for an organization that, previously, had focused on marketing and advertising alone. And it most certainly prompted questions about what interpretation along the Freedom Trail should look like it and who was best equipped to provide it.[761]

Those questions only intensified with the appointment of the Foundation's new president. Mimi LaCamera joined the Foundation in 2005 after having served for nine years as Director of Visitor Marketing for the Greater Boston Convention and Visitors Bureau. LaCamera's lack of history credentials did not concern Terry Savage, who "look[ed] forward to working with a veteran of the local nonprofit world who has such legendary marketing prowess."[762] Berenson describes LaCamera as a skilled manager who "buckled down on economics and promotion."[763] Like McConchie, she invested in tours and expanded the Freedom Trail Players "into a significant revenue machine." LaCamera's approach, however, further soured relationships with the park's partner sites. Zannieri recalls that she "drove the sites crazy" by making decisions without any warning or consultation. Blatt confirms that the sites "were really actively hostile to the foundation." As he explains, the problem also had to do with the foundation's board, which had considerable interest in tourism and little if any interest in history. The foundation's tours, conceived primarily as performative entertainment, simply didn't pass any threshold of historical

[758] Though, as Berenson, Jr. notes, the board frustrated Burchill with its reluctance to do this. See Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman.

[759] National Park Service, Boston National Historical Park Long-Range Interpretive Plan (NPS, 2002): 2.

[760] Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman. For a summary of McConchie's other accomplishments, see Dianne Donnelly, "Freedom Trail Foundation Moves Ahead on Several Fronts," The Broadside 3 (1998): 5.

[761] The Freedom Trail Foundation has a history advisory committee that includes representation by the NPS, but Blatt notes that it has never been vigorous. Martin Blatt, interview with Seth C. Bruggeman. Consider, for instance, how by 2002 the Freedom Trail Foundation and NPS no long were working closely together on projects like the audio guide. At staff meeting, Blatt noted "that the Freedom Trail Foundation has a short turnaround schedule for the production of an audio guide to the Freedom Trail" and wondered if "the park sought or [had] been offered an opportunity to review?" Management Minutes, April 29, 2002, Folder Staff Meetings 2002, BNHP Resource Management Records, Superintendent Files, Staff Meetings and Annual Reports, BNHP Archives, Charlestown, MA.

[762] Sean Hennessey, "Mimi LaCamera Named President of Freedom Trail Foundation," The Broadside, 2 (2005): 6.

[763] Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, August 1, 2017

responsibility. And, of course, as the Foundation's tour guides became more aggressive, inevitable "turf wars" emerged with NPS guides. It was a problem made worse, Berenson notes, by the lack of a structural mechanism through which the three groups—the NPS, its partner sites, and the Foundation—could resolve their differences.[764]

But wasn't that the reason for creating a national park in Boston in the first place—to create coherence and support the work of its partners? The Freedom Trail was created, ostensibly, to keep tourists from getting lost in Boston. We've learned that its rationale was rather more firmly embedded in Boston's postwar renewal schemes. What the above episode reveals, then, is that by the 2000s, what really had been lost along the Freedom Trail was capacity within the NPS to advance the trail's purpose beyond the profit motives of its progenitors. What got lost was a historical park's potential to intervene in history.

Conclusion: Paths Forward

We have considered BNHP's origins as one the agency's first partnership parks. I argued in chapter six that, during the 1980s and 90s, agency mandates and a fickle economy made it appear at times more like a management park. During the 2000s, the legacy of Burchill's preservation campaigns, the park's relationship with the Freedom Trail Foundation, and its place in Boston's consumer heritage landscape suggests a new phase as what we might call an "experience park." Vying for visitor attention in Boston has increasingly meant finding ways to entertain people, to deliver content indirectly through visceral experiences. Some of these, like musket firing demonstrations at Bunker Hill, have been around for a long time. Some, like swing-dancing lessons in the Navy Yard, are brand new. Others, such as the park's role in rebranding the waterfront after the conclusion of Boston's Big Dig project, remind us that this will always be a park wed to urban renewal.[765]

Activities like these, which resemble projects sponsored by all cultural organizations looking to survive in an era of limited public funding, are certainly necessary. Administrative history, however, forces us to consider whether they can be enough if BNHP is to count itself a success. Recall again the suggestion, reaching back to the park's congressional authorization hearings, that to be successful, a national park in Boston must achieve something that could not otherwise be done without it. In an era of diminished funding for preservation, what can the park offer to its stakeholders that is unique? Can the park's administrative history point toward answers? I believe it can, and so I will close this report by suggesting three ways in which looking backward might help the park move forward, even in difficult times.

First, from its outset, the park's insistence on dwelling in revolutionary memory, despite its capacious authorizing language, has limited opportunities for doing good history just as it has limited possibilities for reaching audiences whose ancestors never enjoyed the Revolution's rewards. The Navy Yard has created wonderful opportunities to explore histories beyond the Revolution, but its investment in military history has tended to privilege commemorative programming and other endorsements of American nationalism that alienate stakeholders for whom American military might and expansionism are not an unalloyed good. The Trails to Freedom concept promised to intervene on both fronts, but it must be much more fully developed to have an impact. This administrative history suggests at least two historical content areas in which the park possesses unique resources that, if interpreted, could aid considerably in expanding the

[764] Berenson, interview by Seth C. Bruggeman, August 1, 2017

[765] Anthony Flint, "10 Years Later, Did the Big Dig Deliver?," Boston Globe, December 29, 2015.

Trails to Freedom concept. The first concerns urban renewal. As we have seen, there is likely no other NPS unit better poised to confront the history of urban renewal during the twentieth century than BNHP. Second, the park must work harder to confront histories of racial inequity. At least two of its assets—Faneuil Hall and Dorchester Heights—figure prominently in one of the nation's most complicated encounters with school desegregation. Not only are the stories of urban renewal and school desegregation intertwined, they are stories in which the park itself—not just the resources it manages—is directly connected. Choosing not to confront these chapters in American history, to not count them along the park's Trails to Freedom, perpetuates the marginalization that both renewal and segregation sought to institutionalize in the first place.

Second, the park must contend more forcefully with its history problem. This is a problem with a deep history, and its deep history suggests that nothing short of a structural solution will work. The park currently possesses an amazing array of source material with a thoughtful collections staff and a remarkable physical setting. But without historians, it cannot translate that material—the raw data of history—into knowledge. For that, BNHP must have staff or the equivalent—e.g. residential research fellows—with advanced training in history whose job it is to do history free from the burdens of compliance work and managerial responsibilities. Historians and interpreters must be brought into a routine and formalized partnership. And the superintendent must have regular and robust exchanges with historians who understand not just the Revolution, but also recent histories that explain the park and its place in modern Boston. The NPS, unfortunately, will not help with any of this. It has neither the resources nor the inclination, as is made clear in the Imperiled Promise report. Rather, the park must independently commit itself to this direction, and it must commit itself also to developing cooperative partnerships that leverage Boston's remarkable array of scholarly resources. By partnering with regional universities, and by giving opportunities to talented historians cast adrift by today's crisis in higher education, BNHP should commit itself to creating a center for urban history, headquartered in the Navy Yard, and staffed by residential research fellows with university funding.

Finally, the only way that BNHP can contend with the Freedom Trail is by interpreting the Freedom Trail. Until ranger tours confront the Freedom Trail head-on, they will remain indistinguishable to visitors among all the other items that can be bought along the trail. The Freedom Trail is a contrivance, a consumer experience, and it must be recognized as just that. Visitors must understand that it represents choices made for them by people over time who have sought to obscure some histories while favoring others. They must understand that the Freedom Trail is political, now and always. They must understand how separating out white and black history—just as the Freedom Trail Foundation sought to do in a controversial 2010 guide book—is, in fact, a strategy of white supremacy.[766] They must understand the difference between public institutions such as the NPS and private organizations which have no obligation to serve the public trust. BNHP was born of a decision within the NPS after World War II to obscure the line between public and private. This administrative history suggests that it was a perilous decision which, over time, did violence to history and deprived the park of a rationale beyond its own survival. Now, though, with the gift of self-awareness, the park has an opportunity to change course and do something uniquely valuable in Boston. It can start to build trust again among Americans who already understand why the Freedom Trail hasn't really been that at all. And it can educate the rest of us about the critical value of public culture, and why the NPS needs advocates like never before.

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[766] See Sam Allis, "Paul Revere's Next Challenge," Boston Globe, October 16, 2010.

Appendix A

Recommendations for Future Research

Doing administrative history for the NPS is a tricky business. Perhaps the biggest challenge, beyond those I detail in the preface, is the presumption that the final product will be just that: final. Historians understand there is no such thing as a final history. Good history is open-ended. It reveals complexity. It raises more questions than it answers. Sometimes it helps us discover that the questions we want to ask aren't necessarily the ones we need to ask. And yet the processes by which the agency commissions and manages administrative history privileges finality at every turn. Strict timelines, finite investigatory schema, and the likelihood that any given administrative history will remain the study of record for decades—all conspire against the dynamism and creativity necessary for doing meaningful history. A better model would stress questions, not coverage. It would involve multiple researchers and span varieties of historical expertise. It would be episodic and ongoing. It would, most importantly, figure administrative history as a routine function of park management, a task no less critical than keeping a budget or managing staff.

This study demonstrates precisely why administrative history must be reconceptualized as work always in progress. As originally conceived, the project presumed a chronological starting point roughly coincidental with the park's authorization in 1974. And yet, without a weighty history of the Freedom Trail, or the Boston National Historic Sites Commission, or the post-war contours of Boston's heritage landscape, none of the decisions leading to authorization—which, as we've seen, bear considerable weight on park management even today—would have been discernible in the park's history. The decision to pursue four decades of park pre-history was mine, and it did not come without costs. Boston's power brokers are famous for *not* documenting their daily business. Retrieving their machinations from the archival record is, consequently, tedious and sometimes impossible work. It takes time and diligence and a willingness to forego other research tasks. The benefit is that we can now understand how the park's prospects were delineated early on by the politics of urban renewal. We see too how those early years explain why, from the beginning, the park stumbled on matters of race and inclusivity. But because my research was moored to a fixed deadline, we don't learn as much about the how park has wrangled with these problems in the last decade. Unless opportunities arise to expand the administrative history, we may never find out.

Expanding on this study, then, is a matter of necessity. But how might we do that? What should an ongoing administrative history research program look like in Boston? I suggest several lines of inquiry—each conceivable as a discrete project—which will fill gaps in the current study while also taking up the questions it begs:

Institutional Histories of Partner Sites

Understanding the NPS's role in Boston is fundamentally impossible without understanding the histories of its partners. At the same time, compiling institutional histories of each of its many partners while simultaneously compiling an administrative history of the park has also proven to be fundamentally impossible. The scope of work is tremendous, in part because each of the

park's many partners has its own distinct and complex history as well as its own distinct and complex archival record. Institutional histories of partners sites are, however, perfect projects around which to organize thesis and dissertation research. I encourage the park to coordinate a program of partner research with any of its several outstanding regional universities, particularly those who train students in public history. Those students will learn a great deal, for instance, from examining changes in cooperative agreements with partner sites over time, and the park will discover the vital context it needs to understand its place in Boston's heritage infrastructure.

Oral History

Oral history is a fraught topic in conversations about administrative history. Parks are eager to compile oral histories, in part because recorded interviews promise an archive of memory, a seemingly unmediated storehouse of insight concerning a unit's past. From the historian's perspective, however, the value of oral history—within the context of a finite, stand-alone project—is less clear. For one, oral history is incredibly difficult to do well. It requires a significant knowledge of institutional history over time, as well as a deep understanding of a unit's place within the agency. That is, it requires knowledge which typically comes only by the end of a project. Oral history is also high-investment, low-yield research. The work of processing recordings and making transcripts may or may not be worth the evidentiary value which results. This is all to say that doing careful oral history research on the scale necessitated by an administrative history is, on its own, a project comparable in scale to an administrative history.

I have only begun to do the oral history research necessary to grapple fully with the park's administrative history. Among the many factors complicating this work was my discovery that several key figures in the park's story had already been interviewed, some on multiple occasions, by other researchers. This being the case, I suggest that the park immediately institute a two-phase internal oral history program. The first phase should involve a careful cataloging of interviews already completed and on file either with the NPS or at regional institutions (such as Suffolk University's Moakley Institute). Retreading old interviews with live informants is perilous methodological terrain for oral historians, and so the park must help avoid unnecessarily burdening researchers and interviewees.

The second phase can proceed with compiling new oral histories. I suggest again that the park partner with any of the region's many excellent graduate programs in history to develop a rapid-response oral history toolkit wherein graduate students can be deployed quickly and responsibility to perform exit interviews with staff, record conversations with key partners, and compile audio documentation of important community events and programming. These materials should be gathered routinely and not in haste such is often the case when principal figures fall ill or decline with age. What's more, a vigorous oral history program will solicit insights from ALL staff across all employment grades and should include seasonal employees as well.

Weighing Recent Pasts

My goal in the final chapters of this study was to identify, wherever possible, how the exigencies of the park's authorization saga manifest in more recent administrative concerns. I achieved it primarily by sifting through correspondence, staff meeting minutes, and various issues of *The Broadside*. There is much more, however, which could be done toward weighing the park's more recent history. This park, for instance, has produced a staggering array of reports—including archeological studies—over the last three decades. These are a record of the park's accomplishments, but they also raise questions concerning the efficacy of agency-wide compliance man-

dates. It's a critical area of investigation for the right researcher. There are also important questions to be asked about the park's relationship to other regional units, including with regard to the National Parks of Boston concept. This organizational strategy, not unlike the 1970s-era Boston Sites Group detailed in chapter three, reveals a persistent effort over time to balance organizational efficiencies against the missions of individual units. Have those efforts been successful? What does their necessity reveal about the long-term stability of the region? Of the National Park Service? These are all important questions which future researchers should wrangle with.

Boston African American National Historic Site

Just as the park's history cannot be fully understood without a detailed accounting of its partner sites, nor can it be understood without a much deeper exploration of the Boston African American National Historic Site and the Black Heritage Trail. A key finding of my study is that the park seems to have conceived of the Boston African American National Historic Site as the only space within its purview wherein visitors would routinely encounter histories of race. If this was in fact the case, then it was a tragic misstep, especially given how frequently Bostonians have needed safe spaces for focused civic dialogue about matters of race, power, and history. At the same time, in recent decades, it appears that the park has occasionally sought to subsume the historic site into the park's administrative umbrella. The prospect of a forthcoming administrative history of the Boston African American National Historic Site is heartening, and once complete, should occasion a revision of my investigation. At minimum, it should shed light on how these two units have related to one another over time and why the stories they tell seem so persistently unaligned.

Appendix B

Legislative History

"An Act Authorizing the City of Boston to Convey the Dorchester Heights Monument and Adjoining Land in the City of Boston to the United States of America for Preservation and Maintenance as a National Historic Monument," April 21, 1939, Chapter 148, 121–22.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Historical Commission for Boston and Vicinity,* 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (82 H.J. Res. 254), August 15, 1951.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Boston National Historic Sites Commission,* 83rd Cong., 1st sess. (83 H.J. Res. 122), February 17, 1953.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *To Provide for Investigating the Feasibility of Establishing a Coordinated Local, State, and Federal Program in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Purpose of Preserving the Historic Properties, Objects, and Buildings in that Area*, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (84 H.J. Res. 207), May 4, 1955.

Joint Resolution to Provide for Investigating the Feasibility of Establishing a Coordinated Local, State, and Federal Program in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and General Vicinity Thereof, for the Purpose of Preserving the Historic Properties, Objects, and Buildings in that Area, Public Law 75, 84th Congress, Chapter 144, 1st Session, S.J. Res. 6, Joint Resolution, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 69 Stat. 136 (June 16, 1955). [Authorizes Boston National Historic Sites Commission.]

"H.R. 12088, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 April 1958." This bill was passed on July 3, 1958 as *P.L. 85-499; 72 Stat. 296; 85 H.R. 12088* (text).

"HR. 4524, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 16 February 1959"

Bill passed Aug 4, 1959, as *P.L. 86-134; 73 Stat. 279; 86 H.R. 4524* (text)

Public Law 86-321, 73 Stat. 590-592. An Act to Provide for the Establishment of Minute Man National Historical Park in Massachusetts, and for Other Purposes. September 21, 1959.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *A Bill to Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites and for Other Purposes*, HR 10836, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in House March 20, 1962. [O'Neill could not schedule hearings and therefore sought to retry in 88th Congress.]

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *A Bill to Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; and for Other Purposes*, HR 392, 88th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House January 9, 1963. [Reintroduced from the previous session and, this time, scheduled. This is therefore the first effort to implement the Commission's recommendations toward authorizing establishment of Boston National Historic Sites. Interior recommended the legislation in May 1964.]

Massachusetts Senate Act No. 33, ch. 625, An Act Providing for an Official Designation and Delineation of a Freedom Trail in the City of Boston, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, January 1965.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *To provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; and for Other Purposes*, H.R. 5607, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 1, 1965.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *To Provide Federal Cooperation in a Program to Preserve Certain Historic Properties in the City Of Boston, Massachusetts, and Vicinity, Associated with the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods of American History; To Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historic Sites; And for other Purposes*, HR 8391, 89th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May 24, 1965. [This is the legislation that prompted hearings before the subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation during April 1966 and that put forth Bortman, Small, and Elliot as witnesses.]

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, HR 16745, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in House September 20, 1972.U.S. Congress, Senate, full title unavailable, introduced by O'Neil, to authorize Boston National Historical Park.

S. 4009, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in Senate September 20, 1972. introduced by Kennedy, to authorize Boston National Historical Park.

Public Law 92-463, 92nd Congress H.R 4383, October 6, 1972, also known as the "Federal Advisory Committee Act." [Authorizes establishment of a system of governing the creation and operation of advisory committees in the executive branch.]

U.S. Congress, Senate, *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, S 210, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., introduced in Senate January 4, 1973.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *A Bill to Authorize the Establishment of the Boston National Historical Park in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, HR 7486, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House May, 3, 1973. [O'Neill introduced this legislation for himself, Burke, and Moakley, to authorize establishment of the park.]

U.S. Congress, Senate, *Bill to Authorize Establishment of the Boston Navy Shipyard Historic Site*, S 2915, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., introduced January 29, 1974. [Kennedy introduced this legislation for himself and on behalf of Brooke toward authorizing establishment of a Boston Naval Shipyard Historic Site.]

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