Civil War Defenses of Washington Historic Resource Study

OFFICE CHIEF ENGINEER ARMY OF POTOMAC,
Washington, D.C., December 10, 1861.

General J. G. TOTTEN, Chief of Engineers, &c.:

SIR: The resolution of the House of Representatives of July 8, of which the following is the tenor–

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested to furnish this House, as soon as practicable, plans and estimates, to be prepared by the Engineer Department, for completing the defensive works on the south side of the Potomac, near this city; and also to report upon the expediency of constructing similar Works of defense on the northern side of this city, with estimates for the same, so as to reduce to a minimum the number of troops required for the protection and defense of the capital–

having been submitted to me in July last, I now make the following statement:

At the time when the resolution was referred to me I was attached to the headquarters of Brigadier-General McDowell as chief engineer, and a few days thereafter I was in the field engaged in the campaign of Bull Run. Previous to this movement the army of Washington, yet weak in numbers and imperfectly organized. under General Mansfield, had crossed the Potomac and occupied the south bank from opposite Georgetown to Alexandria.

The first operations of field engineering were, necessarily, the securing of our debouches to the other shore and establishing of a strong point to strengthen our hold of Alexandria. The works required for these limited objects (though being really little towards constructing <ar5_679>a defensive line) were nevertheless, considering the small number of troops available, arduous undertakings. Fort Corcoran, with its auxiliary works, Forts Bennett and Haggerty, and the block-houses and infantry parapets around the head of the Aqueduct, Forts Runyon, Jackson, and Albany (covering our debouches from the Long Bridge), and Fort Ellsworth, on Shooter's Hill, Alexandria, were mostly works of large dimensions. During the seven weeks which elapsed between the crossing of the Potomac and the advance of General McDowell's army the engineer officers under my command were so exclusively occupied with these works (all of which were nearly completed at the latter date), to make impracticable the more general reconnaissances and studies necessary for locating a line of defensive works around the city and preparing plans and estimates of the same.

The works just mentioned on the south of the Potomac, necessary for the operations of an army on that shore, were far from constituting a defensive system which would enable an inferior force to hold the long line from Alexandria to Georgetown or even to secure the heights of Arlington.

On the retreat of our army such was our situation. Upon an inferior and demoralized force, in presence of a victorious and superior enemy, was imposed the duty of holding this line and defending the city of Washington against attacks from columns of the enemy who might cross the Potomac (as was then deemed probable) above or below.

Undecided before as to the necessity, or at least the policy, of surrounding Washington by a chain of fortifications, the situation left no longer room to doubt. With our army too demoralized and too weak in numbers to act effectually in the open field against the invading enemy, nothing but the protection of defensive works could give any degree of security. Indeed, it is probable that we owe our exemption from the real disaster which might have flowed from the defeat of Bull Run–the loss to the enemy of the real fruits of his victory–to the works previously built (already mentioned), and an exaggerated idea on his part of their efficiency as a defensive line.

The situation was such as to admit of no elaborate plans nor previously-prepared estimates. Defensive arrangements were improvised and works commenced as speedily as possible where most needed. A belt of woods was felled through the forest in front of Arlington and half. sunk batteries prepared along the ridge in front of Fort Corcoran and at suitable points near Fort Albany, and a battery of two rifled 42-pounders (Battery Cameron)was established on the heights near the distributing reservoir above Georgetown to sweep the approaches to Fort Corcoran.

Simultaneously a chain of lunettes (Forts De Kalb, Woodbury, Cass, Tillinghast, and Craig) was commenced, connecting Fort Corcoran and the Potomac on the right with Fort Albany on the left, and forming a continuous defensive line in advance of the heights of Arlington. The wooded ridge, which lies north of and parallel to the lower course of Four Mile Run offered a position from which the city, the Long Bridge, and the plateau in advance of it could be overlooked and cannonaded. While our external line was so incomplete, it was important to exclude the enemy from its possession. Access to it was made difficult by felling the forest, which covered it (about 200 acres), and the large lunette (Fort Scott) was commenced as soon as the site could be fixed (about the middle of August). The subsequent establishment of our defensive line in advance throws this work into the same category with Forts Corcoran, Albany, Runyon, &c., as an interior work, or second line, but it <ar5_680>is nevertheless an important work, as, taken in connection with Forts Richardson, Craig, &c., it completes a defensive line for Washington independent of the extension to Alexandria.

The defense of Alexandria and its connection with that of Washington was a subject of anxious study. The exigency demanding immediate measures, the first idea was naturally to make use of Fort Ellsworth as one point of our line, and to connect it with Fort Scott by an intermediate work on Mount Ida. An extended study of the topography for several miles in advance showed that such a line would be almost indefensible. Not only would the works themselves be commanded by surrounding heights, but the troops which should support them would be restricted to a narrow space, in which they would be overlooked and harassed by the enemy's distant fire. The occupation of the heights a mile in advance of Fort Ellsworth, upon which the Episcopal Seminary is situated, seemed absolutely necessary. The topography proved admirably adapted to the formation of such a line, and Forts Worth and Ward were commenced about the 1st of September, and the line continued simultaneously by Forts Blenker and Richardson to connect with Forts Albany and Craig. Somewhat later the work intermediate between Blenker and Richardson–filling up the gap and having an important bearing upon the approaches to Forts Ward and Blenker and the valley of Four Mile Run–was commenced.

The heights south of Hunting Creek, overlooking Alexandria and commanding Fort Ellsworth, had been always a subject of anxiety. The securing to our own possession the Seminary Heights, which commanded them, diminished materially the danger. As soon, however, as a sufficient force could be detached to occupy those heights and protect the construction of the work it was undertaken, and the large work (Fort Lyon) laid out and commenced about the middle of September.

Previous to the movement of the army defensive measures had been taken at the Chain Bridge, consisting of a barricade (bullet proof, and so arranged as to be thrown down at will) across the bridge, immediately over the first pier from the Virginia side, with a movable staircase to the flats below, by which the defenders could retreat, leaving the bridge open to the fire of a battery of two field guns immediately at its Maryland end, and a battery on the bluff above (Battery Martin Scott) of one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer and two 32-pounders. As even this last battery was commanded by heights on the Virginia side, it was deemed proper, after the return of the army, to erect another battery (Battery Vermont) at a higher point, which should command the Virginia Heights and at the same time sweep the approaches of the enemy along the Maryland shore of the Potomac.

During the months of May and June the country between the Potomac and the Anacostia had been examined mainly with the view of obtaining knowledge of the roads and defensive character of the ground, not in reference to locating field defenses. At the period now in question there was apprehension that the enemy might cross the Potomac and attack on this side. Of course what could be done to meet the emergency could only be done without that deliberate study by which a complete defensive line would best be established. The first directions given to our labors were to secure the roads, not merely as the beaten highways of travel from the country to the city, but also as in general occupying the best ground for an enemy's approach.

Thus the sites of Forts Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Slocum, Totten, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Lincoln were rapidly chosen, and works commenced simultaneously at the first, second, third, and sixth of these <ar5_681>points early in August.. The others were taken up as speedily as the clearing of the woods and the means at our disposal would admit, and the gaps in the line afterwards partially filled up by construction of Fort Gaines, Forts De Russy, Slemmer, and Thayer. The works mentioned are at this date essentially completed and armed, though there is still considerable to do in auxiliary arrangements. Our first ideas as to defensive works beyond the Anacostia contemplated only the fortification of the debouches from the bridges (Navy-Yard Bridge and Benning's Bridge), and the occupation of the heights overlooking the Navy-Yard Bridge. With that object Fort Stanton was commenced early in September. A further examination of the remarkable ridge between the Anacostia and Oxen Run showed clearly that, to protect the navy-yard and arsenal from bombardment, it was necessary to occupy an extent of 6 miles from Berry's place (Fort Greble) to the intersection of the road from Benning's Bridge (Fort Meigs).

Forts Greble and Carroll were commenced in the latter part of September, and Fort Mahan, near Benning's Bridge, about the same time. Forts Greble and Stanton are completed and armed; Forts Mahan and Carroll very nearly so. To fill up intervals or to sweep ravines not seen by the principal works, Forts Meigs, Dupont, Davis, Baker, Good Hope, Battery Ricketts, and Fort Snyder have been commenced, and it is hoped may be so far advanced before the winter sets in as to get them into a defensible condition. The occupation of the Virginia shore at the Chain Bridge was essential to the operations of our army in Virginia. It was only delayed until our force was sufficient to authorize it. General Smith's division crossed the bridge September –, and Forts Ethan Alien and Marcy were immediately commenced and speedily finished.

A few weeks later (September 28) the positions of Upton's and Munson's Hills and Taylor's Tavern were occupied and Fort Ramsay commenced on Upton's Hill. The enemy's works on Munson's and the adjacent hill were strengthened and a lunette built near Taylor's Tavern.

Comprised in the foregoing categories there are twenty-three field forts south of the Potomac, fourteen field forts and three batteries between the Potomac and Anacostia, and eleven field forts beyond the Anacostia, making forty-eight field forts in all. These vary in size from Forts Runyon, Lyon, and Marcy, of which the perimeters are 1,500, 937, and 736 yards, down to Forts Bennett, Haggerty, and Saratoga, &c., with perimeters of 146, 128, and 154 yards. The greater portion of them are inclosed works of earth, though many–as Forts Craig, Tillinghast, Scott, &c., south of the Potomac, and Forts Saratoga, Gaines, &c., on the north–are lunettes with stockaded gorges. The armament is mainly made up of 24 and 32 pounders on sea-coast carriages, with a limited proportion of 24-pounder siege guns, rifled Par-rott guns, and guns on field carriages of lighter caliber. The larger of the works are flanked, but the greater number are not, the sites and dimensions not permitting. Magazines are provided for one hundred rounds of ammunition, and many of the works have a considerable extent of bombproof shelter, as Forts Lyon, Worth, and Ward, in the bomb-proofs of which probably one-third of the garrison might comfortably sleep and nearly all take temporary shelter. In nearly all the works there are either bombproofs like the above, or log barracks, or blockhouses of some kind.

It would be impossible to go into any details about these constructions. I am in hopes ultimately to be able to deposit in the Engineer Office drawings of each work with sufficient detail for most purposes. <ar5_682>The accompanying sheets, Nos. 1 and 2, will exhibit the general location and bearings of the works.(*) The tabular statement herewith will show the perimeters, number of guns, amount of garrison, &c.(+)

It should be observed that most of the works south of the Potomac, having been thrown up almost in the face of the enemy, have very light profiles, the object having been to get cover and a defensive work as speedily as possible. The counterscarps of all the works, with few exceptions, are surrounded by abatis.

It is impossible, at present, to indicate the exact extent of forest cut down. (The drawings herewith represent the forest as it existed before the works were commenced.)(++) The woods in advance of Forts Worth, Ward, and Blenker have been felled; all surrounding and between the next work on the right and Fort Richardson; all the wood on the ridge on which is Fort Scott–a square mile probably–in advance of and surrounding Forts Craig, Tillinghast, and Woodbury, besides large areas north of the Potomac, &c. This fallen timber (most of which still lies on the ground.) rendered an enemy's approach to the lines difficult. The sites of Forts Totten, Slocum, Bunker Hill, Meigs, Stanton, and others were entirely wooded, which, in conjunction with the broken character of the ground, has made the selection of sites frequently very embarrassing and the labor of preparing them very great.

The only case in which forts are connected by earthworks is that of Forts Woodbury and De Kalb, between which an infantry parapet is thrown up, with emplacements for field guns. The construction here was suggested by the fact that this was on one of the most practicable and probable routes of approach for the enemy. Infantry trenches have, however, been constructed around or in advance of other works, either to cover the construction (as at Fort Lyon), or to see ground not seen by the work (as at Forts Totten, Lincoln, Mahan, &c.).

The works I have now described do not constitute a complete defensive system.

We have been obliged to neglect much and even to throw out of consideration important matters. We have been too much hurried to devise a perfect system, and even now are unable to say precisely what and how many additional points should be occupied and what auxiliary arrangements should be made.

It is safe to say that at least two additional works are required to connect Fort Ethan Allen with Fort De Kalb.

The necessity of protecting the Chain Bridge compelled us to throw the left of our northern line several miles in advance of its natural position, as indicated by the topography to the sites of Forts Ripley, Alexander, and Franklin. Between these and Forts Gaines or Pennsylvania one or two intervening works are necessary.

Between Forts Pennsylvania and De Russy at least one additional work is necessary.

Fort Massachusetts is entirely too small for its important position. Auxiliary works are necessary in connection with it.

Small tetes-de-pont are required around the heads of Benning's and the Navy-Yard Bridges.

Between Forts Mahan and Meigs one or more intervening works and between Forts Du Pont and Davis another work of some magnitude are required, the ground along this line not being yet sufficiently known. A <ar5_683>glance at the map will show it to be almost a continuous forest. It is not deemed necessary to connect the works by a continuous line of parapet, but the intervening woods should be abatised and open ground traversed by a line of artificial abatis, and infantry parapets, half-sunk batteries, &c., placed so as to protect these obstructions and to see all the irregularities of the ground not now seen from the works. Considerable work is also required in the way of roads, the amount of which I cannot state with any precision. Several miles of roads have actually been made. The works themselves would be very much strengthened by caponieres in the ditches, additional internal block-houses, or defensive barracks, &c.

The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles, including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole, requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrisons.

The number of guns, most of which are actually mounted, is about four hundred and eighty, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works.

The total garrisons for all the works (one hundred and fifty-two in number) of the lines of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men; and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of work of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Torres Vedras.

The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe. when the amount of bomb-proof shelter in ours is considered, more labor per yard of perimeter; but the latter lines involved a greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scraping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, &c., than we have had occasion to make.

The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with five hundred and thirty–four pieces of ordnance (12, 9, or 6 pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with four hundred and eighty pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, 24-pounder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrott), with a few field pieces and howitzers. As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with that of the famous lines mentioned; in weight of metal more than doubles it.

The above applies to our works as now nearly completed, and has no reference to the additional works I have elsewhere mentioned as hereafter necessary. It is impossible to give any other statement of actual cost of the works than the total amount expended thus far. The work has been done partly by troops and partly by hired laborers, the works north of the Potomac being mostly done by the latter. The large amount of carpentry in magazine frames and doors and blindages, barrier gates, stockades, block-houses, defensive barracks, &c., has kept a large gang of carpenters all the time at work, and caused a large expenditure for lumber. The entire amount made available by the Department for these works has been $344,053.46, and this will all have been expended (or more) by the end of the present month. This would give an average of a little over $7,000 for each of the forty-eight works; but of course the real cost of them has been very unequal.

The importance of perfect security to the capital of the United States in the present state of affairs can scarcely be overestimated, and these <ar5_684>works give a security which mere numbers cannot give, and at not a tithe the expense of defense by troops alone.

It is impossible to make anything like a reliable estimate of what additional amount of funds will be required. In a letter to the General-in-Chief commanding Army of the Potomac, of December 6, I urged an immediate appropriation of $150,000, and this appropriation has been asked for of Congress by the Secretary of War.

Should the auxiliary works which I have suggested be undertaken and the scarps be revetted, I believe a larger sum than this may be judiciously expended. I therefore recommend that an additional $100,000, or $250,000 in all, be provided for the continuation and completion of the defenses of Washington. These works acquire new importance if the probability of a foreign war is taken into consideration. In view of this new importance, of the semi-permanent or possibly permanent necessity for such works, it is proper to suggest that early in the spring the scarps be protected by a timber or thin brick revet-ment, and the exterior and other slopes, where not already done, be sodded, and that wooden caponieres, or counterscarp galleries, be arranged to flank all unflanked ditches–at least of important works. The strengthening of the profiles where necessary has already been mentioned as important.

It remains with me to express my sense of the zeal and efficiency with which the officers of engineers serving with me since April have discharged their duties. To their energy and skill I am mainly indebted for the successful accomplishment of this really great work, and I feel that I have a right to say that for the safety of the capital in the hour of its greatest danger; for saving the cause of established government and the Constitution from the most serious blow the rebels could have inflicted, the country owes much to the labors of the engineers. From their great experience and constant association with me since April the services of Colonels Woodbury and Alexander have been particularly important in the laborious reconnaissances and in directing the execution of extensive lines of works.

General Wright laid out and superintended the construction of Fort Ellsworth, and General Newton, who since the 1st of September until recently had charge of the works below Four Mile Run, laid out and directed the construction of Fort Lyon.

Captains Blunt and Prime, Lieutenants Comstock, Houston, McAlester, Robert, Paine, Cross, Babcock, and Dutton have served with efficiency during the whole or part of these constructions, and the lamented Snyder lost his life from over-zealousness in discharge of his duties while in impaired health from his services at Charleston Harbor and Fort Sumter. Since the relief of Captain Prime, Lieut. H. L. Abbot, of the Topographical Engineers, has taken his place, proved himself a most energetic and valuable assistant, having completed Fort Scott and built Forts Richardson and Barnard. In carrying out so many works at the same time, and for organizing and managing the large bodies of hired laborers employed, it has been found necessary to call in the aid of civil engineers, not only because the engineer officers were too few to keep proper supervision, but because a large portion of those under my orders have been called off to other duties, such as the organization of bridge trains, the instruction of engineer troops, &c. Civil Engineers Gunnel, Frost, Faber, Childs, and Stone have rendered valuable services; also Mr. (now major of the Fifteenth New York Volunteer Regiment) Magruder. I should also express my warmest acknowledgment to Mr. James Eveleth, of your office, who, as disbursing agent and paymaster <ar5_685>of the large bodies of hired laborers, has performed an amount of duty I should hardly have expected from one individual. I could wish that the law under which he serves the Engineer Department, might be so modified in his case as to enable him to receive some adequate compensation for the extra duties he has voluntarily assumed. I should have mentioned, in connection with my statement of the amount actually expended, that the Treasury Department has advanced over $20,000 on account of the defenses of Washington, which should be refunded. I feel it my duty in this place to urge that Congress should take immediate measures to assess the land and other damages arising from these works and from the occupation of troops. In most cases the owners are ill able to bear temporarily the losses to which they have been subjected.

In conclusion, I would add that to the great importance attached to these works by the commanding general (now Commander-in-Chief), to his valuable suggestions and prompt and cordial co-operation, the present state of efficiency of the defenses of Washington is in no small degree due.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. BARNARD,
Maj. of Eng., Brig. Gen., and Chief Eng. Army of Potomac.

ORA, I, 5 (serial 5), 678-85.

ALEXANDRIA, VA.,
March 29, 1862.

Col. D. B. SACKET,
Inspector-General, U. S. Army:

COLONEL: Agreeably to orders, with Colonel Tyler, Fourth Connecticut Volunteers, I proceeded to inspect the following forts on the south side of the Potomac:

1. Barnard.–Armed with eight guns, as follows: Three 32-pounders; one 24-pounder barbette; one 24- pounder siege; one 30-pounder Parrott, and two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers. The armament, ammunition, parapets, slopes, and abatis in good order.

2. Fort Richardson.–Nine guns, as follows: Two 24-pounder barbette; three 24-pounder siege guns; two 30- pounder Parrotts, and two 10-inch siege mortars. One of the mortars is unserviceable from its trunnions being too large for the bed. One magazine leaks slightly. In other respects fort in good condition as to guns, ammunition, parapets, and abatis.

3. Fort Albany.–Twelve guns, as follows: Eight 24-pounder barette; two 6pounder field, and two 24- pounder howitzers. The guns and ammunition and abatis in good condition. The sides of the ditches <ar18_30> by caving in has made the parapet so thin in some places as to be of no protection from the shot of the ordinary guns used in service.

4. Fort Craig.–Seven guns: Five 24-pounder guns and two 24-pounder siege. Guns, ammunition, parapets, and abatis in good order.

5. Fort Tillinghast.–Seven guns: Three 24-pounder siege; one 20-pounder Parrott; two 10-pounder Parrotts, and one 2A-pounder field howitzer.

All of the above-named forts are just being occupied by the Fourteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, Colonel Greene. Not yet being fully in possession, the gunners could not be exercised. The armament, ammunition, parapets, and abatis of Fort Tillinghast are in good order.

6. Fort Cass.–Five guns: Two 24-pounder siege guns; two 20-pounder Parrotts, and one 24-pounder field howitzer; garrisoned by a company of Wisconsin Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant Ward. 74 strong. Guns, ammunition, parapets, and abatis in good order. Men well instructed. The captain of this company has been absent since after the battle of Bull Run on sick report, and now nominally on recruiting service, though not getting any recruits, except three, during a period of several months. Lieutenant Ward has brought the company to a very fine state of discipline and efficiency, and it would be to the interest of the service if Capt. A. J. Langworthy were discharged the service.

7. Fort Woodbury.–Five guns: Two 24-pounder barbette; two 24-pounder siege, and one 24-pounder field howitzer. This fort is not garrisoned, having an ordnance sergeant and two sentinels. The slopes are caving in. One of the magazines is flooded with water, the ammunition all being stored in the other one. The guns, ammunition, and abatis in good order.

8. Fort De Kalb.–Nine guns: One 24-pounder barbette; four 24-pounder siege; two 24-pounder field howitzer, and two 24-pounder flanking howitzers. No garrison; an ordnance sergeant and two sentinels. Slopes washing; guns, ammunition, and abatis in good order.

All of the above-named forts being now newly occupied, or the garrisons soon to take possession, will require definite instructions, which will be required in writing, as verbal instructions, If not repeated periodically, are of little weight. An artillery officer should have a general supervision of these forts, who should see that the instructions are obeyed, and he should make written reports that stated inspections are made, noting the condition of material and works and efficiency of garrison.

These works are in general good condition for field works, considering the season of the year; well armed and supplied with ammunition.

The proper manning of these works and their efficiency in case of attack will depend on the officers having the future charge of the troops occupying them. The works are good and well armed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. B. SWEITZER,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

ORA, I, 12, Part 3 (serial 18), 29-30.

Troops in the Defenses of Washington, August 31, 1862.

MILITARY DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON.
Brig. Gen. JOHN G. BARNARD.
SOUTH OF THE POTOMAC.
Brig. Gen. A. W. WHIPPLE.

14th Connecticut, Col. Dwight Morris.
16th Maine, Col. Asa W. Wildes.
1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, Col. William B. Greene.
35th Massachusetts, Col. Edward A.Wild.
9th New Hampshire, Col. E. Q. Fellows.
11th New Jersey, Col. Robert McAllister.
3d New York Artillery Battalion, Lieut. Col. Adam Senges.
4th New York Heavy Artillery (eight companies), Col. T. D. Doubleday.
10th New York Cavalry (eight companies), Col. J. C. Letomen.
12th New York Battery, Capt. W. H. Ellis.
107th New York, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh.
108th New York, Col. Oliver H. Palmer.
120th New York, Col. George H. Sharpe.
124th Pennsylvania, Col. J. W. Hawley.
125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins.
127th Pennsylvania (nine companies),Col. W. W. Jennings.
128th Pennsylvania, Col. Samuel Croasdale.
130th Pennsylvania, Col. H. I. Zinn.
132d Pennsylvania, Col. Richard A. Oakford.
Pennsylvania Engineers (one company), Capt. Henry E. Wrigley.
Wisconsin Heavy Artillery (one company), Capt. A. J. Langworthy.

NORTH OF THE POTOMAC. (*)
Lieut. Col. J. A. HASKIN.

17th Maine, Col. Thomas A. Roberts.
18th Maine, Col. Daniel Chaplin.
19th Maine, Col. Frederick D. Sewall.
17th Michigan, Col. W. H. Withington.
113th New York, Col. Lewis O. Morris.
117th New York, Col. William R. Pease.
112th Pennsylvania, Col. A. A. Gibson.
136th Pennsylvania, Col. T. M. Bayne.
137th Pennsylvania, Col. H. M. Bossert.

DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.(+)
Brig. Gen. J. S. WADSWORTH.

2d District of Columbia, Col. C. M. Alexander.
10th New Jersey, Col. William R. Murphy.
11th New York Cavalry, Col. James B. Swain.
26th Pennsylvania, Company B, Lieut. James McElwee.
27th Pennsylvania, Company F, Capt. Chauncey Spering.
135th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. David L. McCulloch.

PROVISIONAL BRIGADES.
Brig. Gen. SILAS CASEY.

15th Connecticut, Col. Dexter R. Wright.
Keystone (Pennsylvania) Battery, Capt. Matthew Hastings.

ORA, I, 12, Part 3 (serial 18), 781-82.

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1862.

Col. J. C KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL: I am informed, by Captain Sawtelle, that probably about 500 contrabands can be obtained from Fort Monroe. I desire them very much for work on the fortifications of Washington, and request that, if consistent with other requirements of the service, they may be ordered here at once. There are steamers at Fort Monroe, by which they can be brought up immediately.

As everything connected with this subject of the fortifications of Washington is left to my individual will, I take this occasion to state what I am doing, and what, I think, is required.

Before the battle of Bull Run, the idea of the fortifications of Washington was not broached, the works previous to that (Forts Ellsworth, Runyon, Albany, and Corcoran) being for special purposes. Imperfect, as a system of defense, as those works were, they doubtless exercised an important influence in deterring the enemy from following up his success by an assault upon Arlington or Alexandria, and the necessity of completing the fortification of Washington became evident. It was an immense undertaking, for the line to be held was 35 miles long, through a country extensively wooded and of intricate topography. The work was not fully inaugurated until the latter part of August, and its extension around the northern sides of the city, and over the Eastern Branch, was of later date. During, therefore, the five months of August, September, October, November, and December, the entire defensive line, 35 miles in length, consisting of about fifty different works, and mounting four hundred and forty-three guns, was, though not completed, essentially brought to the condition in which it was left when the Army of the Potomac commenced its campaign in Virginia.

It is no matter of surprise that a work which, to be thoroughly well done, required so much preliminary study and reconnaissance and which was executed under the pressure of an enemy in our front, allowing no time for such thorough study, should be found in many respects imperfect; besides, it was necessary to commence works in many cases before the woods could be cleared away enough to give that perfect knowledge of the ground essential to their best location. As the season of construction drew to a close, the sense of danger to the capital in great measure passed away, and, in making an appropriation to meet liabilities actually incurred, Congress prohibited the application of that appropriation to the commencement of any new works, although there were several gaps to be filled, and much work necessary on some parts of the line to give them any real defensive strength.

On resuming charge of these works, in August last, the condition may be briefly stated as follows:

On the south side of the Potomac there were probably works enough, and the woods had been pretty well cleared from the front. A few auxiliary batteries have been judged necessary, as well as the connection of the works by rifle-pits or infantry parapets. A remark should be made about Fort Lyon. It is a very large work, and a very important <ar28_392> one. In its location there were many conditions to be fulfilled, more than were reconcilable. There is now a most serious defect, which is, that over the readiest approach of an enemy the ground is not seen beyond 200 or 300 yards. I consider it absolutely necessary to remedy this defect, and it can only be done by building lunettes in advance, which I am now doing, or, rather, about doing.

At the Chain Bridge extensive clearing of woods, rifle pits, auxiliary batteries, &c., have been found necessary. The most defective part of the line, and it was one the most liable to attack during the recent demonstrations of the enemy–was from the Potomac to Fort Massachusetts. The left was occupied by a cluster of three small works, Alex-under, Franklin, and Ripley. The turnpikes from Great Falls, Rockville, and Brookville, uniting at Tennallytown, were commanded by Fort. Pennsylvania, and an intermediate point and road was held by Fort De Russy. The country is very broken, and was thickly wooded, the woods having been cleared only in the immediate vicinity of the works. At present the woods have been cleared. Two additional forts, several batteries, have been built and are in progress, and a road of communication is likewise in progress. From Fort Massachusetts to the Eastern Branch the line of forts might be considered complete, though it may be determined to enlarge Fort Slocum. Fort Massachusetts itself, the earliest work of this line, was entirely inadequate to its most important position. It has been extensively enlarged. The country in from of this position was more open than usual, but it has been found necessary to fell large quantities of timber. Rifle-pits and some additional batteries have been constructed. The portion of the lines over the Eastern Branch is the least satisfactory of the whole, particularly that portion from Fort Meigs to Fort Stanton. The topography was very hard to deal with, and, unfortunately, the works were located before the woods were cut. The works, serving very imperfectly the approaches, and surrounded by woods, were nearly indefensible. One of the first measures 1 took was to order a regiment there for clearing. This was to a considerable extent, done, but while my attention has been directed elsewhere, the work of clearing has been suspended. As the enemy cannot enter the city from this direction, the object of the works is to prevent him seizing these heights, and occupying them long enough to shell the navy-yard and arsenal. For this, the works must be made secure against assault, and auxiliary to this object is the construction of roads by which succor can be readily thrown to any point menaced. Some general remarks will apply to the whole line. When these works were commenced, neither field nor siege guns could be obtained in any adequate numbers; hence the only resource was to arm them with sea-coast 24's and 32's from the arsenal. It always appeared to me objectionable, and I regret that, even in the absence of other guns, I permitted so many guns of this character to be mounted. These guns can only be used upon the enemy's batteries or troops at a distance. At close quarters not only are they too unmanageable, but, with all expedients used for protection, they are too exposed to permit the men to stand by the guns. In many of the works, such as Forts Pennsylvania, Totten, Lincoln, &c., the objection is not so strong, as the artillery is mainly intended for distant action. But in others, such as Forts Ripley, Franklin, Meigs, &c., it is a most serious evil. I have not investigated the subject thoroughly, but it is probable that, many of these guns should be dismantled and it is certain that a great many emplacements should be prepared for field and siege guns. <ar28_393>

Applying these remarks to the whole line, it is probable that two hundred platforms should be made, embrasures cut, &c., for field or siege guns, which earthwork included, is alone a very considerable work.

If the enemy attack Washington, it will be with a large force and numerous artillery. He will concentrate upon the point of attack a large number of pieces that the garrison should not be exhausted or driven out by shells, adequate bomb-proof shelter should be provided. This is already done to a great extent, but there are yet probably one-half or one-third of the works where such shelter is needed. This is a heavy and expensive work. To obviate further–or rather, to prevent as much as possible– the concentration of the enemy's artillery, I am placing in secure positions, such as Fort Ellsworth and Fort Alexander, inn the heights near Battery Cameron (already constructed and armed with rifled 42-pounders, for the same purpose), 100- pounder Parrott guns, to sweep the ground where such concentrations are most likely and dangerous.

The preservation of these works is another important consideration. The winter acta severely upon these earthern scarps and exterior slopes. Much repair is now needed. It has not yet been made, owing to the pressure of other matters. Perhaps it will be best to revet all the scarps and timber. Presuming that none now doubt the necessity of maintaining an adequate defensive line around Washington, I have thrown together these remarks that the commanding general and the War Department may be better able to understand the actual condition and the requirements, that the existing defensive line shall be adequate, as well as to explain the considerable works of different kinds I have ordered since my return, and what I propose to order. I am unable to estimate what expenditure will ultimately be made, probably $100,000.

J. G. BARNARD,
Brigadier-General.

ORA, I, 19, Part 2 (serial 28), 391-93.

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1863.

Maj. Gen. S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
Commanding Department of Washington:

GENERAL: I herewith send a tabular statement(*) of armament, garrisons, &c., of the forts constituting the Defenses of Washington. Also a statement of the length of lines of rifle-pits.(*) Also a statement giving a list of batteries for field guns, indicating their location and the number of guns they will receive.(*) Drawings will be made and sent to you, which will indicate the position of these rifle-pits and batteries, as also of all the forts.

It will be seen that the total of full garrisons for all the forts is 26,725 men, of which 10,305 consists of artillerymen and 16,420 of infantry.

These garrisons are apportioned as follows:

It is a matter of some difficulty to say with any precision what additional troops are necessary to hold Washington, as it would depend much upon the circumstances and force of the attack, and also upon the condition of the Potomac.

It may be stated, in the first place, that besides the full garrisons at the Chain Bridge, there should be, when the enemy is, or can be, near enough and strong enough to attack in any force, an additional infantry force there (with some cavalry) of about 2,000 men, making, say, 3,600 in all. With this force, the rifle-pits can be sufficiently manned to resist a strong attack. Should an attack be protracted, or should an enemy appear before the position in force, about 4,000 more men, and at least three field batteries, would be required for a protracted resistance.

The rifle-pits of the position are 3,500 yards (say 2 miles) long, but here, as elsewhere, it will be never necessary to man the whole length. A considerable portion of those between Fort Ethan Allen and the Potomac, for example (behind the ravine), would be sufficiently guarded by two companies, as it is almost unassailable, and needs only to be carefully watched.

At Fort Lyon and outworks there should be permanently, I think, a force equal to the full garrisons (2,150 men), and, if the enemy's movements or positions are such that he can throw himself in force upon this ´12 R R–VOL XXV, PT IIª <ar40_178> position, 1,000 men, in addition, should be added to guard the rifle-pits about 1 mile long); and this latter number may need to be increased from the reserves in case of a prolonged attack.

The artillery garrisons of all the forts should be kept full. I have calculated for three reliefs of gunners for all the guns. This provides for contingencies, and the artillerymen are counted as part of the garrison, as all not serving guns would be subject to man the parapets in case of assault; 10,305 men are necessary for this purpose.

There should be at least infantry enough to fill up all the garrisons of all the works south of the Potomac; to supply an additional 1,000 men at Fort Lyon, and 2,000 at the Chain Bridge, and a reserve of 15,000 men, besides 2,000 or 3,000 cavalry and eight or ten batteries of artillery, making 35,000 men in all, besides cavalry and field artillery; and this is the very lowest estimate for defense, under the most favorable circumstances, as will be seen hereafter.

If the enemy was in front of Washington in force, and the Potomac was low, we might expect him to threaten both sides, and it would be necessary to have the works between the Potomac and Eastern Branch fully garrisoned.

Finally, should he establish himself in force on the north side of the Potomac, we might expect formidable assaults upon the works over the Eastern Branch, unless they were fully garrisoned. In general, however, the defenses of part of the works might be safely trusted to their artillery garrisons.

The following extract from the report of the commission ordered last autumn by the Secretary of War to report on the Defenses of Washington may be interesting:

The total infantry garrison required for their defense, computed at 2 men per yard of front perimeter, and 1 man per yard of rear perimeter of works, is about 25,000. The total number of artillerymen (to furnish three reliefs for each gun) required is about 9,000. It is seldom necessary to keep these infantry supports attached to the works. The artillerymen, whose training requires much time, having learned the disposition of the armament, and computed the distances of the ground over which attacks may be looked for, and the ranges and service of their guns, should not be changed; they should remain permanently in the forts.

The 25,000 infantry should be encamped in such positions as may be most convenient to enable them, in case of alarm, to garrison the several works, and a force of 3,000 cavalry should be available for outpost duty, to give notice of the approach of any enemy.

Whenever an enemy is within striking distance of the capital, able by rapid march to attempt a coup de main, which might result in the temporary occupation of the city, the dispersion of the Government, and the destruction of the archives, all of which could be accomplished by a single day's possession, a covering army of not less than 25,000 men should be held in position, ready to march to meet the attacking column. Against more serious attacks from the main body of the enemy, the capital must depend on the concentration of its entire armies in Virginia or Maryland. They should precede or follow any movement of the enemy seriously threatening the capital.

You will observe that from Hunting Creek north to the Potomac there are about 11,000 yards of rifle-pits. As observed elsewhere, it will never be necessary to man the whole at once. Take that part between Hunting Creek and Four-Mile Run, for example. There are 5,100 yards of rifle-pits connecting the works, but the actual front before which the enemy could arrange his line of battle will not be more than 2,100 yards. He will not mass his men in the valleys, or on the slopes of the valleys of these streams, where they would be seen and cut up by plunging and crossfires of our forts. He may try their flanks with small columns, favored by darkness, &c., and they would be resisted by the fire of the forts, and by a few men holding the pits until reserves could be brought up. <ar40_179>

Let it be supposed that the total of 35,000 men were provided, and that the enemy attacked our lines on the south side; of these 35,000, there would be appropriated as artillerymen for all the works, 10,300; for complement of infantry, to make up full garrisons for all the works south of the Potomac, 7,000; for additional supports to Fort Lyon and Chain Bridge position, 3,000; making a total of 20,300. This force would hold our two flanks at Fort Lyon and the Chain Bridge strongly, and would distribute along the line of forts from Ellsworth to Corcoran, as artillerymen and supports, 8,045 men, of which the infantry supports would be posted near the works, and need not be shut up in them except in case of actual assault. There would remain 15,000 men, of which 4,000 might be in reserve at Arlington, 2,000 men where the Military road crosses Four-Mile Run, and 4,000 or 5,000 near the toll-gate, on Alexandria and Leesburg turnpike, leaving but 4,000 or 5,000, and such portions of the cavalry not employed in patrolling, and portion of the field artillery as a general reserve north of the Potomac, the works of which would only be held by their artillery garrisons.

It will be seen, therefore, that a force of this magnitude would not furnish a satisfactory defense against a powerful and prolonged attack. It would be necessary to sustain it by arming all the able-bodied men in the District, and putting them upon the lines and in garrisons in the northern forts, and even then the defense would be weak.

If the river was low, and the enemy held both shores, the necessity of more troops would be still more apparent, and it would be unsafe to mention a less number than 50,000 or 60,000 men as sufficient to make a good defense, and this last number coincides nearly with what the commission thought necessary to hold and cover the city in case an enemy is within "striking distance," and even then they would rely only upon the concentration of our entire armies "for ultimate security against more serious attacks from the main body."

The tabular statement of armament, garrison, &c., gives the number, caliber, and character of guns in the works.(*) In those few cases where the guns are not on hand, the figures are entered in red; so also are the names of two or three forts not actually commenced, or as yet not materially advanced. Most of the guns wanting can be supplied at short notice from the Arsenal, as soon as the works are ready to receive them.

It should be remembered that the commission recommended a strong work on Rozier's Bluff, opposite Fort Lyon, to defend water batteries on the left bank of the Potomac; a water battery on Jones' Point, below Alexandria, and two works in advance of the Arlington lines, none of which are included in the statement. They would probably require in all 2,000 more men.

The figures representing actual garrisons at this date are the numbers of "enlisted men" present at the work. While in some few cases (as at Fort Corcoran) there are more than required as artillery garrisons, in others there is a deficiency.

The rifle.pits south of the Potomac require but a very short period of good working days to be completed, with the force now detailed for that purpose. At the Chain Bridge they are completed; at Fort Lyon, nearly so. From the Potomac to Eastern Branch the line has been run through, but it is proposed ultimately to enlarge the part from Rock Creek to the Eastern Branch. This, with good weather, would require a regiment a couple of weeks to do.

I understand from General Barry that there are on hand in the <ar40_180> forts 100 rounds of ammunition per gun, and sometimes more, except for the 100-pounders, for which ammunition is now being supplied.

The statements as to number of guns required for new or old works are not regarded as final and exact. There is indetermination on these points and others in some few eases.

J. G. BARNARD,
Brigadier-General, &c.

ORA, I, 25, Part 2 (serial 40), 177-80.

Abstract from return of the Department of Washington, Maj. Gen,. S. P. Heintzelman commanding, for the month of March, 1863; headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Troops in the Department of Washington, Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman commanding, March 31, 1863.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

5th New York Cavalry, Company I, Capt. George C. Morton.

DISTRICT OF ALEXANDRIA.
Brig. Gen. JOHN P. SLOUGH.

1st District of Columbia, Lieut. Col. Lemuel Towers.
26th Michigan, Col. J. S. Farrar.
153d New York, Maj. E. P. Davis.
11th Rhode Island, Col. George E. Church.

ARTILLERY DEFENSES OF ALEXANDRIA(*)
Brig. Gen. ROBERT O. TYLER.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Col. H. L. Abbot.
19th Connecticut, Col. L. W. Wessells.
1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery,(+) Col. Thomas R. Tannatt.
34th Massachusetts, Col. George D. Wells.
2d New York Heavy Artillery, (+) Lieut. Col. Jeremiah Palmer.
3d New York Artillery Battalion, Lieut. Col. A. Senges.
Wisconsin Heavy Artillery (one company), Capt. C. C. Meservey.

ABERCROMBIE'S DIVISION.(++)
Brig. Gen. J. J. ABERCROMBIE.

Second Brigade.
Col. BURR PORTER.

22d Connecticut, Col. George S. Burnham.
40th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Jos. A. Dalton.
141st New York, Maj. J. W. Dininny.
16th Virginia, Col. J. T. Close.

Third Brigade.
Col. WILLIAM GURNEY.

127th New York, Lieut. Col. S. L. Woodford.
142d New York, Col. N.M. Curtis.
143d New York, Col. D. P. De Witt.
144th New York, Col. R. S. Hughston.

Unassigned.

9th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. J. Bigelow.
4th New York Heavy Artillery, Lieut. Col. H. H. Hall.
17th New York Battery, Capt. G. T. Anthony.

CASEY'S DIVISION.(*)
Maj. Gen. SILAS CASEY.

First Brigade.
Col. FRANK FESSENDEN.

25th Maine, Lieut. Col. C. E. Shaw.
27th Maine, Col. Mark F. Wentworth,

Second Brigade.
Col. ASA P. BLUNT.

12th Vermont, Lieut. Col. Roswell Farnham.
13th Vermont, Col. F. V. Randall.
14th Vermont, Col. W. T. Nichols.
15th Vermont, Col. Redfield Proctor.
16th Vermont, Col. W. G. Veazey.

Third Brigade.
Brig. Gen. ALEXANDER SAYS.

39th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles Schwarz.
111th New York, Col. Clinton D. MacDougall.
125th New York, Col. George L. Willard.
126th New York, Col. Eliakim Sherrill.

Artillery.(+)

2d Connecticut Battery, Capt. J. W. Sterling.
11th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. E. J. Jones.
Keystone (Pennsylvania) Battery, Capt. M. Hastings.
1st Rhode Island Artillery, Battery H, Capt. Jeffrey Hazard.

PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES.(++)
Col. HORATIO G. SICKEL.

First Brigade.
Col. WILLIAM SINCLAIR.

1st Rifles, Col. C. F. Taylor.
1st Infantry, Capt. William C. Talley.
2d Infantry, Capt. Richard Ellis.
6th Infantry, Capt. James Carle.

Second Brigade.
Col. HENRY C. BOLINGER.

3d Infantry, Maj. William Briner.
4th Infantry, Col. R. H. Woolworth.
7th Infantry, Capt. L. B. Speece.
8th Infantry, Maj. S. M. Baily.

Third Brigade.
Col. J. W FISHER.

5th Infantry, Lieut. Col. George Dare.
9th Infantry, Lieut. Col. James McK. Snodgrass.
10th Infantry, Maj. J. B. Knox.
11th Infantry, Lieut. Col. Samuel M. Jackson.
12th Infantry, Col. Martin D. Hardin.

CAVALRY DIVISION.(*)
Maj. Gen. JULIUS STAHEL.

First Brigade.
Brig. Gen. Jos. T. COPELAND.

5th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Ebenezer Gould.
6th Michigan, Col. George Gray.
7th Michigan, Col. W. D. Mann.

Second Brigade.
Col. R. BUTLER PRICE.

1st Michigan, Col. Charles H. Town.
1st Ohio (two companies), Capt. N. Jones.
2d Pennsylvania, Lt. Col. J. P. Brinton.
1st Vermont, Col. Edward B. Sawyer.

Third Brigade.
Lieut. Col. ROBERT JOHNSTONE.

5th New York.
18th Pennsylvania.
1st West Virginia.

Artillery.

9th Michigan Battery, Capt. J. J. Daniels.

DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.
Brig. Gen. J. H. MARTINDALE.

2d District of Columbia, Col. C. M. Alexander.
10th New Jersey, Col. W. R. Murphy.
118th New York, Lieut. Col. O. Keese, jr.
152d New York, Lieut. Col. Alonzo Ferguson.
169th New York, Col, Clarence Buell.
27th Pennsylvania, Company F, Capt. Chauncey Spering.
150th Pennsylvania, Company K, Capt. David V. Derickson.
157th Pennsylvania (four companies), Maj. Thomas H. Addicks.
– Pennsylvania Infantry (six companies.)(+)
11th New York Cavalry (six companies), Col. J. B. Swain.
U.S. Ordnance Detachment, Lieut. Col. George D. Ramsay.
1st U.S. Cavalry, Company L, Capt. C. R. Fisher.
2d U.S. Cavalry, Company M, Capt. C. W. Canfield.
5th U.S. Cavalry, Company M, Capt. William McLean.

ARTILLERY CAMP OF INSTRUCTION.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM R. BARRY.

1st Delaware Battery, Capt. B. Nields.
10th Michigan Battery, Capt. J.C. Shuetz.
1st New York Artillery (Battery A), Capt. Thomas H. Bates.
12 New York Battery, Capt. George F. McKnight.
16th New York Battery, Capt. F.L. Hiller.
19th New York Battery, Capt. William H. Stahl.
27th New York Battery, Capt. J.B. Eaton.
Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Lieut. E. H. Nevin, jr.
1st West Virginia Artillery (Battery A), Lieut. Max. Sivers.

DEFENSES NORTH OF THE POTOMAC. (++)
Lieut. Col. JOSEPH A. HASKIN.

First Brigade.
Col. AUGUSTUS A. GIBSON.

3d Maine Battery, Capt. James G. Swett.
2d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Col. A. A. Gibson.
1st Vermont Heavy Artillery, Col. J. M. Warner.

Second Brigade.
Col. LEWIS O. MORRIS.

1st Maine Heavy Artillery, Col. D. Chaplin.
7th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. Lewis O. Morris.
9th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. J. Welling.
9th New York Battery, Capt. Emil Schubert.
117th New York (Battalion), Lieut. Col. A. White.

Third Brigade.
Col. WILLIAM R. PEASE.

5th New York Heavy Artillery (Battalion), Maj. G. F. Merriam.
10th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. Alex. Piper.
117th New York (Battalion), Col. William R. Pease.

CORPS OF OBSERVATION. (*)
Col. A. B. JEWETT.

23d Maine, Col. William Wirt Virgin.
39th Massachusetts, Col. P.S. Davis.
14th New Hampshire, Col. Robert Wilson.
10th Vermont, Lieut. Col. William W. Henry.
6th Michigan Cavalry, Companies I and M, Capt. Charles W. Deane.
11th New York Cavalry, Companies E, F, and I, Lieut. Col. S. H. Wilkeson.
10th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. J. Henry Sleeper.

RAILWAY BRIGADE. (+)

109th New York, Col. B. F. Tracy.

FORT WASHINGTON.
Col. CHARLES S. MERCHANT.

16th Indiana Battery, Lieut. Charles R. Deming.
4th U.S. Artillery (headquarters).

ORA, I, 25, Part 2 (serial 40), 177-83.

HEADQUARTERS OF ARTILLERY, U.S. ARMY,
Washington, May 18, 1864.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the inspection of the defenses of Washington, made by order of the Secretary of War.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HOWE,
Brigadier-General, Inspector of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS INSPECTOR OF ARTILLERY,
Washington, May 17, 1864.

Major-General HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:

SIR: In compliance with the directions of the Secretary of War, received on the 29th ultimo, I have made an inspection of the works in the defenses of this city, and beg leave to submit the following report of the inspection: My time being broken by court duties, I was unable to make but little progress in the inspection until the 10th instant, and since that time the movement of troops within the line of defenses has somewhat embarrassed the completion of the inspection. The character and strength of the troops garrisoning the different forts, their discipline, drill, and efficiency, the kind and extent of the armament, the condition and supply of the magazines, ammunition, and implements are found in this report under the names of the respective forts. After a careful examination of the line of works I am of the opinion that they are ample in their engineering and artillery strength for the purpose for which they were intended–the defense of Washington. The works on the south side of the Potomac may be divided into three classes: First, those which immediately cover approaches to the city, and are within artillery command of the city; second, those which cover approaches, and are beyond the range of artillery command; third, those which do not cover approaches to the city, and are beyond the range of artillery from the city. Of the first class, which I regard as the most important, are the works extending from Fort C. F. Smith on the right to Forts Richardson and Scott on the left, inclusive. The consecutive works in this line are within close artillery support of each other and with good field of fire. Forts Corcoran, Whipple, and Albany, Bennett, Haggerty, and Runyon are interior works of this class, Forts Whipple and Corcoran being of the first importance, having a strong command over five of the works in the front line. Fort Runyon is out of repair, and is at present unoccupied. It holds, however, an important position, being at the head of Long Bridge, and if occupied would hold the bridge and guard it from a surprise. I recommend that it be put in order and occupied. The exterior works of this class are connected with a strong earthen epaulement, and extending along the line of works to the Potomac on the left, with embrasures for light artillery at favorable points. If this class of works is held, it is not, in my judgment, in the power of an enemy seriously to annoy Washington with a fire from the south side of the river. With an artillery strength of men sufficient to develop the fire of the forts, and a proper support of infantry, I am of opinion that the works cannot be carried by an assault. <ar68_884>

The weakest feature in this line of works, and it obtains more or less throughout the whole line of the defenses, is their liability to be surprised. The garrisons of the works, with the exception of small guards, are quartered outside the works. No infantry force has been kept between and near the line of the works. The outpost guards have been very weak. The character of the topography of the country for miles outside of the works, with the numerous roads, all favor and invite a sudden and covered dash upon the works.

With a view to strengthen the works in this particular, I recommend that regiments of the [Veteran] Reserve Corps be stationed at the following points: One regiment between Forts Richardson and Craig; one regiment between Forts Craig and Tillinghast; one regiment between Forts Tillinghast and Woodbury and in advance of Fort Whipple; one regiment between Forts Woodbury and Strong and in advance of Fort Corcoran; one regiment between Forts Worth and Ward; one regiment between Forts Garesché and Berry, and one regiment between Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy.

From the troops of the Reserve Corps thus posted I recommend that the officers commanding the defenses south of the Potomac be instructed to establish outposts as follows: A picket reserve of three companies at Ball's Cross-Roads; a picket reserve of three companies at Bailey's Cross-Roads; a picket reserve of two companies on the Little River pike, between Clover Hill and Hunting Creek; a picket reserve of two companies on the Leesburg and Georgetown pike at the cross-roads, between Langley and Fort Marcy. I recommend that the best instructed and most efficient artillery troops in the line of defenses be kept in the works of the first class. Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy, in the second class, cover the approaches to the city by the Chain Bridge; they are in close artillery support of each other, but beyond the range of artillery support from the nearest work (Fort Smith) on their left. If the cover of these works and their connections are properly manned it is believed they cannot be carried by assault. From the position of these works they do not offer advantages sufficient to an enemy, if possessed, to make them worth the operations of a siege; they do not immediately command the bridge, and the right bank of the river at the head of the bridge is commanded by Batteries Vermont, Cameron, Kemble, and Parrott on the left bank, and the bridge is swept by Battery Martin Scott on the left bank. The strength of artillerymen at Battery Martin Scott I do not consider sufficient. I found but 1 non-commissioned officer and 3 men in charge of four guns. I recommend that 1 officer, 4 noncommissioned officers, and 24 men be allowed this battery.

The works of the third class, extending to the left from Fort Berry to the Potomac, do not immediately command approaches to the city, and are beyond artillery range from it. They, however, command important ground, and cover the depot at Alexandria, and are in good supporting distance; and they are sufficiently strong, if properly manned, to resist an assault. The possession of them would offer no objective point to an enemy that would render them liable to a siege.

Battery Rodgers, below Alexandria, and Fort Foote, on the left bank of the river, are important works for river defense. Battery Rodgers received ammunition for its two guns on the 9th instant, and Fort Foote ammunition for its 15-inch guns on the 13th instant. From the length of time that is necessarily occupied in serving guns of the caliber in these two works, and the unfavorable heighth of <ar68_885> these batteries above the water-line for accuracy of firing, the guns of the two works do not afford sufficient reliable fire as would insure the checking of an attempt to pass the batteries. I would, therefore, recommend that these two works be furnished with the full armament for which they are constructed, and that they be manned by efficient artillerists. The works on the north side of the Potomac are a continuous line of forts from Fort Sumner, on the river above the city, to Fort Greble, on the river below the city. The forts in this line are in artillery support of each other, and connected throughout by earthern epaulements. Fort Gaines is an interior work. The most important position of this line is that part included between Forts Sumner and Slocum, as it covers the approaches to the city on the river line of roads. The most important works in this portion of the line are Forts Stevens, Reno, Sumner, and Slocum. The portion of the line between Fort Slocum and the Eastern Branch is less liable to be assailed, and that portion of the line east of the Eastern Branch the least liable to attack of any part of the whole defenses. The most important works between Fort Slocum and the Eastern Branch are Forts Lincoln, Bunker Hill, and Totten.

The most important works east of the Eastern Branch are Forts Stanton, Carroll, and Greble, which, from their position, are in range of the Arsenal and Navy-Yard, and Fort Stanton in easy command of both. With a view to guard these works from a surprise, I recommend that regiments of the Reserve Corps be stationed at the following points: One regiment between Forts Sumner and Mansfield, one regiment near Fort Reno, one regiment near Fort Stevens, one regiment between Forts Slocum and Totten, one regiment between Forts Lincoln and Bunker Hill; the officer commanding the division north of the Potomac to establish a picket-line from this force. The cavalry force at the fords of the Potomac, beginning at Great Falls and extending to the Monocacy, is sufficient, as is the force on the south side to guard the railroad. The forts throughout the line are advanced to completion, sufficient for defensive purposes, except Forts Ward and Stanton, in which I found but few guns mounted, and the work on them progressing but slowly.

The guards at the different bridges I think have been insufficient, and the guard duty generally loosely and carelessly performed. This has arisen in some degree from the guards being composed of detachments of companies and commanded by non-commissioned officers. I recommend that the following changes be made in the guards at the bridges: One full company at Fort Jackson, at the head of Long Bridge; one full company at the new stockade at the head of Aqueduct Bridge; one full company at the Georgetown head of the Chain Bridge, with a guard of 10 men and 2 non-commissioned officers from this company at the iron gates of the bridge; one platoon of a company at the Navy-Yard bridge, and the other platoon of the same company at the upper bridge of the Eastern Branch. The performance of the guard duty as required by the regulations of the service should be rigidly enforced. There is no communication between the forts by signal, nor between the outside and the forts. Signals are made from the outside of the works directly to department headquarters, and from thence to headquarters of the division south of the Potomac by telegraph. I recommend that signal communication be had between the outside and the forts, and between the forts. The roadways within the line of defenses are ample and sufficiently good for practical purposes. <ar68_886>

Subsistence is readily obtained from the depots in the line, and twenty days' kept on hand in the works south of Hunting Creek and at Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. The other works keep ten days' supply on hand. I am of opinion that it would promote the health, discipline, drill, and efficiency of the Reserve Corps to encamp them without the limits of the city, but within the line of defense, leaving in the city only guards for hospitals, public property, and provost duty. I recommend that they De encamped at the following points: One camp near Fort Gaines, one camp between Batteries Cameron and Vermont, one camp between Fort Scott and Fort Craig, one camp near Alexandria Seminary. These points are favorable for reserves and are accessible from all points of the line, and would afford advantages to the troops for improvement that they cannot have within the limits of the city. I observed in the inspection, too, generally, a want of observance of the regulations of the service which requires the marking of clothing, knapsacks, canteens, and haversacks. This omission was very marked in the Second and Seventh New York Regiments. The Ninth New York Heavy Artillery was changed during the inspection from the north to the south side of the river, and I inspected it in the works previously occupied by the First Connecticut. I regret to state that I found this regiment, in point of discipline and drill (both in artillery and infantry), much less efficient than any regiment in the line of defenses. The men of this regiment are generally young, active, and intelligent men, and the fault lies mainly with the commanding officer of the regiment, Colonel Welling. The condition of the regiment bears unmistakable evidence that the colonel of the regiment is not fit for the command.

Fort C. F. Smith, Maj. W. A. McKay commanding.–Garrison, four companies Second New York Heavy Artillery–1 major, 15 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 548 men. Armament, three 12-pounder field howitzers, two 6-pounder field guns-four 24-pounder siege guns, one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer, six 4_- inch ordnance, and four 8-inch siege mortars. Magazines, two; dry and in serviceable condition. Ammunition, full supply and well packed. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, very ordinary; wants improving much. Drill in infantry, insufficient; wants more energy and attention given to it. Discipline, great want of improvement. Garrison is sufficient.

Fort Strong, Major Maguire commanding.–Garrison, three companies Second New York Heavy Artillery– 1 major, 10 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 410 men. Armament, one 24-pounder field howitzer, five 24-pounder siege guns, one 6-pounder field gun, two 24-pounder howitzers, four 30-pounder Parrotts, and two 10-inch siege mortars. Magazines, two; not entirely dry, one recently repaired. Ammunition, full supply; serviceable condition. Implements, full sets; serviceable. Drill in artillery, indifferent; requires improving. Drill in infantry, very deficient; much labor is required to bring it to an efficient condition. Discipline, deficient; fault of the officer in command; he needs more energy and efficiency. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Bennett, Major Maguire commanding.–Garrison, one company Second New York Heavy Artillery–2 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 117 men. Armament, three 24-pounder siege guns and two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers. Magazine., one; leaks in places. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, <ar68_887> complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient for the work.

Fort Corcoran, Lieut. Col. J. Palmer commanding.–Garrison, three companies Second New York Heavy Artillery–1 lieutenant-colonel, 8 commissioned officers, 396 men, 1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, two 12-pounder heavy guns, four 12-pounder light Napoleons, and three 10-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, three; two serviceable, one unserviceable and being repaired. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, full sets and serviceable. Drill in artillery, very ordinary; wants improving much. Drill in infantry, very deficient; fault is in the officer in command; but little attention seems to have been given to improvement. Discipline, low state; shows inefficiency in the command. Garrison is amply sufficient.

Fort Haggerty, Capt. Charles L. Smith commanding.–Garrison, one company Second New York Heavy Artillery–1 captain, 3 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 164 men. Armament, four 24-pounder siege guns. Magazines, one; dry, well-packed, and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply; in a good condition. Implements, complete. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, wants improving much. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is more than necessary.

Fort Woodbury, Maj. N. Shatswell commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery–1 major, 10 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 256 men. Armament, four 6-pounder James (rifled), four 24-pounder siege (smooth), one 24-pounder F. D. howitzer (smooth), three 30-pounder Parrotts (rifled), one 24-pounder Coehorn mortar. Magazines, two; dry, and a new one being built. Ammunition, full supply and well packed and in good condition. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair; approaching good. Drill in infantry, commendable degree of efficiency. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient.

Fort Cass, Maj. N. Shatswell commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery- -8 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 220 men. Armament, three 6-pounder field guns (smooth), five 20-pounder Parrotts (rifled), three 24-pounder siege guns (smooth). one 24-pounder F. D. howitzer (smooth), one 24-pounder Coehorn mortar. Magazines, two; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply, well packed and in serviceable condition. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient for the work.

Fort Whipple, Major Rotfe commanding.–Garrison, three companies First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery– l major, 13 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 414 men. Armament, six 12-pounder field guns (smooth), four 12-pounder field howitzers (smooth), eight 12-pounder James guns (rifled), eleven 4.5-inch ordnance. Magazines, four; two not in a serviceable condition. Ammunition, full supply; good condition. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient; interior work.

Fort Tillinghast, Major Rolfe commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery– 7 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 220 men. Armament, one 24-pounder field howitzer (smooth), two 20-pounder Parrotts (rifled), three 24-pounder siege guns (smooth), one 24-pounder F. D. howitzer, four <ar68_888> 30-pounder Parrotts (rifled), two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. Magazines being rebuilt; at present unserviceable; work progressing slowly; ammunition kept in bomb-proof. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient for the work.

Fort Craig, Major Holt commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery–15 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 280 men. Armament, one 24-pounder field howitzer, four 24-pounder siege, five 30-pounder Parrotts, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar. Magazines, two; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and in good condition. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Albany, Captain Rhodes commanding.–Garrison, one company First Massachusetts Volunteers–5 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 145 men. Armament, two 24-pounder field howitzers, four 24-pounder siege, two 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and in good condition. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Scott, Major Trumbull commanding.–Garrison, one company First Connecticut Heavy Artillery–4 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 137 men. Armament, two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, two 6- pounder James (rifled). Magazines, two; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient for the work.

Fort Richardson, Major Trumbull commanding.–Garrison, three companies First Connecticut Heavy Artillery–1 major, 12 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 412 men. Armament, two 24-pounder field howitzers, six 24-pounder siege (smooth),one 100-pounder rifled Parrott, three 30-pounder rifled Parrotts, two 24- pounder Coehorn mortars, one 10-inch mortar. Magazines, two: dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison sufficient for the work.

Fort Rodgers, Major Meservey commanding.–Garrison, one company First Wisconsin Volunteers–1 major, 5 commissioned officers, 203 men. Armament, one 15-inch Rodman gun, one 200-pounder Parrott (rifled). Magazines, two; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, supplies received May 9, 1864. Implements, complete, good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison larger than necessary.

Fort Lyon, Major Campbell Commanding.–Garrison, five companies Tenth New York Heavy Artillery–1 major, 18 commissioned officers. 1 ordnance-sergeant, 627 men. Armament, seven 6-pounder field guns (smooth), ten 32-pounder sea-coast (smooth). ten 24pounder siege guns (smooth), five 30-pounder Parrotts (rifled), four 24-pounder Coehorn mortars, and two 10-inch siege mortars. Magazines, one; dry in and good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; <ar68_889> requires more energy and attention from the officer in command to make them efficient. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Weed, Major Campbell commanding.–Garrison, one company Tenth New York Heavy Artillery–5 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 122 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers (smooth), three 24-pounder siege guns (smooth), six 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one:dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, ordinary; wants improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; wants improving much. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Farnsworth, Major Campbell commanding.–Garrison, one company Tenth New York Heavy Artillery– 3 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 128 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers (smooth), four 4_-inch ordnance (rifled), four 24-pounder siege guns (smooth). Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and good condition. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; wants labor and attention to become efficient. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort O'Rorke, Captain Armstrong commanding.–Garrison, two companies Tenth New York Heavy Artillery–6 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 242 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers (smooth), six 20-pounder Parrotts (rifled), one 24-pounder siege gun (smooth), two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; wants improving much. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Willard, Major Abell commanding.–Garrison, three companies Tenth New York Heavy Artillery–11 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 358 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers, four 6-pounder James, four 4_-inch ordnance, two 24-pounder siege guns (smooth), two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars, two 10- inch siege mortars. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary: needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Ellsworth, Major Rice commanding.–Garrison, four companies Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery– 1 major, 18 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 522 men. Armament, four 6-pounder field guns (smooth), three 24-pounder siege guns (smooth), nine 8-inch sea-coast howitzers (smooth), one 100-pounder Parrott (rifled), three 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, fair. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Williams, Major Ells commanding.–Garrison, two companies Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery–1 major. 18 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 562 men. Armament, two 24-pounder field howitzers (smooth), four 10-pounder Parrotts, six 4_-inch ordnance, one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer, two 24-pounder <ar68_890> Coehorn mortars. Magazines, two; dry and in excellent order. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Worth, Major Hubbard commanding.–Garrison, two companies Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery– 1 major, 1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, two 20-pounder Parrotts, two 12-pounder Whitworth guns (rifled), five 12-pounder Napoleons, five 4_-inch ordnance, eight 24-pounder siege guns (smooth), two 100-pounder Parrotts, two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars, four 10-inch siege mortars. Magazines, dry and in serviceable condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Ward, Major Hemingway commanding.–Garrison, three companies First Connecticut Heavy Artillery– 1 major, 12 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 401 men. Armament, two 10-pounder Parrotts, five 4_- inch ordnance, five 32-pounder sea-coast, six 24-pounder siege guns, one 100-pounder Parrott, one 24-pounder Coehorn mortar, seven 8-inch siege mortars. Magazines, three; two serviceable, one unserviceable; new ones being built. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable (but seven guns of this work were mounted and ready for action; work not completed). Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, fair. Garrison is sufficient for the work.

Fort Garesché, Lieutenant Logan commanding.–Garrison, one company First Connecticut Heavy Artillery– 4 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 144 men. Armament, two 32-pounder field howitzers (smooth), five 24-pounder Parrotts, two 8-inch seacoast howitzers, two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary: Discipline, fair. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Reynolds, Major Hemingway commanding.–Garrison, one company First Connecticut Heavy Artillery– 3 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 147 men. Armament, four 12-pounder field howitzers, four 32- pounder sea-coast guns, three 30-pounder Parrotts, two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, fair. Garrison weak for this armament.

Fort Barnard, Major Cook commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Connecticut Heavy Artillery–1 major, 1 ordnance-sergeant, –– men. Armament, three 24-pounder field howitzers, six 32-pounder seacoast guns, three 24-pounder siege guns, two 8-inch seacoast howitzers, three 30-pounder Parrotts, one 24- pounder Coehorn mortar, and one 10-inch siege mortar. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and in good condition. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Fort Berry, Major Cook commanding.–Garrison, one company First Connecticut Heavy Artillery–1 ordnance-sergeant [sic]. Armament, four 24-pounder field howitzers, two 4_-inch ordnance, two <ar68_891> 8-inch howitzers. Magazines, one; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Fort Ethan Allen, Col. A. A. Gibson commanding.–Garrison, nine companies Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery–1 colonel, 29 commissioned officers, 1,346 men, and 1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, nine 6-pounder field guns, three 10-pounder Parrotts, three 32pounder bronze howitzers, four 24-pounder siege guns, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, eleven 30-pounder Parrotts, six 24-pounder Coehorn mortars, four 10-inch siege mortars. Magazines, four; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison larger than necessary. Cavalry garrison, one company (E) Thirteenth New York Cavalry–2 commissioned officers, 78 enlisted men, 53 equipped, 52 horses.

Fort Marcy, Maj. Z. L. Anderson commanding.–Garrison, three companies Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery–1 major, 8 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 430 men. Armament, two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, three 20-pounder Parrotts, three 10-pounder Parrotts, three 24-pounder siege guns, six 30-pounder Parrotts, two 24-pounder Coehorn mortars, one 10-inch siege mortar. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison stronger than necessary.

Fort Sumner, Col. Daniel Chaplin commanding.–Garrison, six companies First Maine Heavy Artillery–1 colonel, 30 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 868 men. Armament, six 6-pounder field guns, four 12- pounder field guns, eight 30-pounder barbette, three 8-inch siege howitzers, two Coehorn mortars, one 10-inch mortar, six 4_-inch rifled, two 100-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, two; only one of which is dry and in good condition. Ammunition, not a full supply; serviceable. Implements, full set and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Battery Vermont, Lieut. George Rollins.–Garrison, one company First Maine Heavy Artillery–1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 27 men. Armament, three 32-pounders -. Magazines, one; not dry; wants repairs. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Fort Mansfield, Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Talbot commanding.–Garrison, two companies(Third Battalion) First Maine Heavy Artillery–9 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 281 men. Armament, two 12-pounder howitzers, four 6-pounder James (rifled), one 8-inch siege howitzer, four 4_-inch (rifled). Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, full sets and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Simmons, Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Talbot commanding.–Garrison, two companies (Third Battalion) First Maine Heavy Artillery-1 lieutenant-colonel, 9 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, <ar68_892> 289 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers, one 8-inch siege howitzer, five 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is not full strength.

Battery Cameron, Maj. George W. Sabine commanding.–Garrison, one company First Maine Heavy Artillery–1 major, 5 commissioned officers 1 ordnance-sergeant, 146 men. Armament, two 42-pounder James (rifled), two 100-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, fair. Garrison is stronger than necessary.

Battery Parrott, Capt. Frederic E. Shaw commanding.–Garrison, one company First Maine Heavy Artillery–1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 46 men. Armament, two 100-pounder Parrots. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Battery Kemble, Capt. F. E. Shaw commanding.–Garrison, one company First Maine Heavy Artillery–3 officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 54 men. Armament, two 100-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Garrison is sufficient.

Fort Kearny, Maj. E. A. Springsteed commanding.–Garrison, two companies Seventh New York Heavy Artillery–1 major, 7 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 289 men. Armament, three 24-pounder siege, three 32-pounder barbette, one S-inch siege howitzer, three 4_-inch (rifled). Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, indifferent; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; wants improving much. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is of full strength.

Fort Bayard, Maj. J. M. Murphy commanding.–Garrison, one company Seventh New York Heavy Artillery– 6 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 129 men. Armament, two 12-pounder field howitzers and four 20- pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is not full strength.

Battery Smead, Capt. N.H. Moore commanding.–Garrison, one company Seventh New York Heavy Artillery– 1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 147 men. Armament, four 20-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, indifferent; needs much improving. Discipline, very indifferent. Garrison is stronger than necessary.

Fort Gaines, Capt. Charles Maguire commanding.–Garrison, one company Seventh New York Heavy Artillery–5 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 146 men. Armament, five 32-pounder barbette, one 4_- inch (rifled). Magazines, one; dry and in good order. <ar68_893> Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, indifferent; needs improving. Discipline, indifferent. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort De Russy, Lieut. Col. John Hastings commanding.–Garrison, two companies Seventh New York Heavy Artillery–1 lieutenant-colonel, 10 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 289 men. Armament, three 32- pounder barbette, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar, five 30-pounder Parrotts, one 100-pounder Parrott. Magazines, one; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary; needs improving. Drill in infantry, indifferent; needs improving much. Discipline, too loose for efficiency. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Reno, Col. Lewis O. Morris commanding.–Garrison, four companies Seventh New York Heavy Artillery–21 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 602 men. Armament, nine 24-pounder barbette, one 24-pounder F. D. howitzer, two 8-inch siege howitzers, two Coehorn mortars, two 10-inch mortars, four 30-pounder Parrotts, one 100-pounder Parrott. Magazines, two; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, indifferent; wants improving much. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; wants more energy and attention in the commanding officers. Discipline, too loose for efficiency. Garrison is ample strength.

Fort Reno, Capt. S. E. Jones commanding.–Garrison, one company Seventh New York Heavy Artillery– 5 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 149 men. Armament, seven 20-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, indifferent; wants improving. Drill in infantry, very indifferent; but little attention seems to have been given to it. Discipline, deficient. Garrison is of sufficient strength.

Fort Carroll, Capt. Loring S. Richardson commanding.–Garrison, one company Eighth Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–4 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance sergeant, 124 men. Armament, six 12-pounder field guns, four 32-pounder barbette, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 30- pounder Parrott. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, not a full supply, but serviceable: requisition made for full supply. Implements, complete and serviceable. Garrison drilled only as infantry.

Fort Slemmer, Maj. Charles Hunsdon commanding.–Garrison, one company First Vermont Artillery–3 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance sergeant, 73 men. Armament, three 32-pounder barbette, one 8-inch siege howitzer. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, full sets and serviceable. Drill in artillery, ordinary. Drill in infantry, ordinary. Discipline, ordinary. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Totten, Maj. Charles Hunsdon commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Vermont Artillery–1 major, 7 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 206 men. Armament-four 6-pounder field guns, eight 32-pounder Parrotts, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar, three 30-pounder Parrotts, one 100- pounder Parrott. Magazines, two; one in serviceable condition and one being repaired. Ammunition full supply and serviceable. <ar68_894> Implements, complete and serviceable. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison not of sufficient strength.

Fort Slocum, Lieut. Col. R. C. Benton commanding.–Garrison, two companies First Vermont Artillery–l lieutenant-colonel, 10 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 280 men. Armament, six 10-pounder Parrotts, three 24-pounder barbette, three 24-pounder siege, four 24-pounder F. D. howitzers, two Coehorn mortars, one 10-inch mortar, seven 4_-inch (rifled). Magazines, three; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison not of sufficient strength.

Fort Stevens, Lieut. Col. R. C. Benton commanding.–Garrison, two companies Eleventh Vermont Volunteers (First Vermont Heavy Artillery), one company New Hampshire Heavy Artillery (unattached)–1 lieutenant-colonel, 14 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 423 men. Armament, four 24-pounder barbette, six 24-pounder siege, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar, five 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and in good order. Drill in artillery, fair. Drill in infantry, fair. Discipline, fair. Garrison of sufficient strength.

Fort Meigs and Extension, Capt. E. Schubert commanding.–Garrison, one company Ninth New York Independent Battery–3 officers and 50 men; a detachment Ninth Company Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers, I officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 49 men. Armament, five 12-pounder guns, two 12- pounder field howitzers, five 32-pounder barbette, four 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar, two 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, three; two not dry, one dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and in good condition. Drill in artillery, New York Battery, fair; Massachusetts detachment drilled only as infantry. Garrison only sufficient for a guard.

Fort Saratoga, Capt. Andrew Fagan commanding.–Garrison, withdrawn; works guarded by Battery H, First Pennsylvania Artillery, from Camp Barry–1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, six 32-pounder barbette, one 8-inch siege howitzer, one Coehorn mortar. Magazines, one; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable.

Fort Du Pont, Lieut. Marcus Conant commanding.–Garrison, one-half company Ninth Unattached Company Massachusetts Ar-tillery-1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, and 29 men. Armament, two 6-pounder field guns, three 24-pounder barbette, three 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable.

Fort Mahan.–Garrison, one company Unattached Heavy Massachusetts Artillery–1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, three 12-pounder field guns, four 15-inch Rodman, four 24-pounder F. D. howitzers, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch siege mortar, three 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. <ar68_895>

Fort Davis, Lieut. D. D. Dana commanding.–Garrison, one-half company Ninth Unattached Company Massachusetts Volunteer Artillery–1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, and 32 men. Armament, five 6-pounder field guns, three 24-pounder barbette, three 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar. Magazines, two; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply. Implements, complete and serviceable. Garrison not drilled at artillery.

Fort Lincoln and Battery Jameson, Capt. A. W. Bradbury commanding.–Garrison, withdrawn; works guarded by First Maine Battery from Camp Barry–1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, eight 6-pounder field guns (bronze), four 12-pounder field guns, five 24-pounder barbette, one 24-pounder siege, six 32-pounder sea-coast howitzers, two 24-pounder howitzers (F. D.), two 8-inch howitzers, two Coehorn mortars, one 10-inch mortar, four 30- pounder Parrotts, one 100-pounder Parrott. Magazines, two; dry and in good order, one magazine has never had a luck. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable.

Fort Bunker Hill, Capt. Charles Heine commanding.–Garrison, withdrawn; works guarded by Fourteenth Michigan Battery, from Camp Barry–1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, eight 32-pounder barbette, one 8-inch siege howitzer, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch siege mortar, one 4_-inch ordnance, two 30-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, one; dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable.

Fort Thayer, Capt. H. D. Scott commanding.–Garrison, withdrawn; works guarded by Sixteenth Massachusetts Battery, from Camp Barry–1 ordnance-sergeant. Armament, four 24-pounder barbette, one 24-pounder siege, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one 24-pounder Coehorn mortar. Magazines, one: dry and in good order. Ammunition, full supply, well packed and in good order. Implements, complete and serviceable.

Fort Stanton, Capt. C. C. Bumpus commanding.–Garrison, one company Heavy Massachusetts Volunteer Artillery–2 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance sergeant, 128 men. Armament, six 32-pounder barbette, three 24- pounder F. D. howitzers, four 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 4_-inch (rifled). Magazines, two serviceable and third being built. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Not drilled in artillery; some in infantry.

Fort Snyder, Capt. James M. Richardson commanding.–Garrison, one-half company of Twelfth Company Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–2 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 69 men. Armament, six l2-pounder field guns, two 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar. Magazines, one; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and in good order. Implements, complete and in good condition. Garrison drilled some at artillery and infantry, sufficient for guard.

Fort Baker, Lieut. William Cook commanding.–Garrison, one company Sixth Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–1 officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 136 men. Armament, eight 10-pounder Parrotts, seven 24-pounder barbette, two 24-pounder F. D. howitzers, three 8-inch siege howitzers, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar. Magazines, two: dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and in good condition. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drilled some at artillery and infantry; not efficient. Garrison sufficient for a guard. <ar68_896>

Fort Ricketts, Lieut. Joseph M. Parsons commanding.–Garrison, one company Twelfth Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–1 officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, and 32 men. Armament, three 12-pounder field guns, one 8-inch siege howitzer. Magazines, dry and in serviceable condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drilled but little at artillery and infantry; not efficient.

Fort Wagner, Lieut. Lewis R. Whittaker commanding.–Garrison, one company Twelfth Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–1 commissioned officer, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 32 men. Armament, three 12-pounder field guns, one 8-inch siege howitzer, one Coehorn mortar. Magazines, one; dry and serviceable. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Drilled but little at artillery and infantry; not much efficiency.

Fort Greble, Capt. George S. Worcester commanding.–Garrison, one company Seventh Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–4 commissioned officers, 1 ordnance-sergeant, 120 men. Armament, six 12-pounder field howitzers, six 32-pounder barbette, one 8-inch siege howitzer, one Coehorn mortar, one 10-inch mortar, one 30-pounder Parrott. Magazines, one; dry and in good condition. Ammunition, full supply and serviceable. Implements, complete and serviceable. Garrison drilled some at artillery and infantry.

Fort Foote, Capt. L. B. Whiton commanding.–Garrison, one company Unattached Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers–5 commissioned officers, I ordnance-sergeant, 110 men. Armament, one 15-inch Rodman gun and two 200-pounder Parrotts. Magazines, three, only one of which is completed; completed one 'in good condition. Ammunition, not a full supply and not in a state of readiness for service. Implements, complete and serviceable. Company drilled at artillery and infantry, but is not efficient with the guns.

Battery Martin Scott, Colonel Gibson commanding.–Garrison, 4 enlisted men. Armament, two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, two 6-pounder James (rifled). Magazines, one; serviceable. Ammunition, supply sufficient; serviceable. Garrison is insufficient.

The garrisons of the works throughout the line have been exercised at artillery practice, and the results of the firing show a commendable degree of skill and proficiency. The magazines are furnished with the necessary materials for replenishing the ammunition, except that which is more readily obtained from the arsenal. The facilities for supplying the magazines from the arsenal are all that is necessary.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HOWE,
Brigadier-General, Inspector of Artillery.

[First indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
May 20, 1864.

Respectfully referred to General Barnard for remarks.
By order of Major-General Halleck:

J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Second indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS CHIEF ENGINEER OF DEFENSES,
Washington, May 21, 1864.

Respectfully returned.

General Howe's suggestions and remarks are excellent and should be carried out both as regards the disposition of troops and outposts and the maintenance of the works. The liability to surprise has long been appreciated by the engineers, who have, as far as possible, been engaged in providing flanking arrangements to such as were most important and exposed. It has long been the intention to repair Fort Runyon, but pressure of work elsewhere has prevented. I do not concur in the importance of Fort Greble at present. It is particularly liable to surprise, can with difficulty be flanked, and while Fort Carroll is held its site cannot be occupied by the enemy. Fort Carroll is being strengthened and flanked, as also Forts Stanton and Meigs. It was to concentrate the garrisons and diminish the danger of surprises that I recommended the suppression of Forts Davis, Du Pont, Wagner, Ricketts, and Greble. The Ordnance Department will furnish the complete armament of Fort Foote and Battery Rodgers as soon as it is able. I do not concur in the opinion that these batteries are too high; indeed, I consider that the latter is too low.

J. G. BARNARD,
Brigadier-General, &c.

[Third indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
May 21, 1864.

Respectfully referred to Major-General Augur, commanding department, for his consideration.
By order of Major-General Halleck:

J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Fourth indorsement.]
HDQRS. DEPT. OF WASHINGTON, 22D ARMY CORPS,
May 31, 1864.

Respectfully returned to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff. Most of General Howe's suggestions are theoretically correct, but with the present force at command here are impracticable. It is believed that everything is being done that can be to insure an efficient state of this command.

C. C. AUGUR,
Major-General, Commanding.

ORA, I, 26, Part 2 (Serial 68), 883-97.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF WASHINGTON, 22D ARMY CORPS,
Washington, D.C., July 29, 1864.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, &c.:

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of the 27th instant, I called together yesterday General De Russy, General Hardin, Lieutenant-Colonel Haskin, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, for the purpose of consultation as to what additional armament of field pieces it may be desirable to place in the forts defending the city. We find that the armament of these works was settled by a board of officers convened for that purpose by orders from the Secretary of War, dated November 9, 1863.(*) The works have been arranged in accordance with the report of this board, and to make any <ar71_493> material changes in the armament would require changes in the platforms or embrasures, involving considerable work, and be likely to produce confusion in the ammunition, besides introducing to the garrisons pieces with whose ranges they would be unacquainted. For these reasons we do not think it will be judicious to disturb the armament of the works at the present time, nor do I suppose that such was your intention in calling my attention to the fact that it might be well to place in the forts some additional field pieces, it being understood, however, that these pieces are to be used in almost every case in the exterior batteries to the right and left of the forts.

It is true that some of the forts, particularly Fort Reno, ought to have some additional field guns for use in the fort, when the enemy approaches within short range, but the theory upon which the defense line is arranged is that all, or nearly all, the additional guns that may be required in case of an investment, or even an assault, are to be placed in the batteries to the right and left of the forts, all the principal forts being supported and generally flanked on both sides by batteries placed in commanding positions. It has been supposed that these field guns would be brought into the defenses by an army retreating before superior numbers, but from our recent experience we have seen that the enemy may succeed in appearing before our works before this additional artillery, or even the troops, can get here. Such being the case, it may be well to inquire whether some of the more important batteries on the line of defense ought not to be armed at once, or field pieces, with ammunition, placed in the forts ready to arm them, and hold the enemy in check, for some days, at least, in order to give time to re-enforce the garrison of the city. Having the officers whom I have mentioned to advise me, I thought it well to look into the whole subject in order that we might have an understanding, :and put on record what additional field guns it will be well to have on hand, and where they should be placed on the approach of the enemy at any future time. The following is the result of the consultation on this subject:

LINE NORTH OF THE CITY.

Fort Sumner.–To have additional field pieces; two to be placed on the line of the conduit to hold the bank between Fort Sumner and the river; two in Battery Benson, on Powder Mill Branch, and two in Fort Sumner, or Battery Alexander, as may be required.

Fort Simmons.–Six field pieces to be added; two to be placed in Battery Bailey, on Powder Mill Branch; two in Battery Mansfield, and two held in reserve, or placed in the batteries between Fort Simmons and Fort Bayard.

Fort Reno.–Should have four additional field pieces to complete the armament. In case of attack two or three light batteries should at once be sent to this important post, taking position at first on the ridge between Tennallytown and Fort Gaines.

Battery Rossell.–Being an inclosed work with a magazine, and occupying an important position on the right of Fort Reno, should be armed with two field howitzers, 24 or 32 pounders, and four 12-pounder field guns.

Fort Kearny.–There should be four light field guns added to this fort to arm Battery Terrill. <ar71_494>

Battery Smead.–There should be four field pieces added to this work; two of them to be placed in the battery on the left near Broad Branch.

Fort De Russy.–There should be six light pieces added to this work, to be placed in Battery Kingsbury, and in a battery now under construction, overlooking the bridge on Rock Creek.

Fort Stevens.–In case of threatened attack there should be two field batteries here (twelve pieces), one of them to be a mounted battery. These pieces are to arm the batteries between Rock Creek and Piney Branch, including Battery Sill.

Fort Slocum.–There should be six field pieces sent to this fort, to arm the batteries on the right and left of the fort.

Fort Totten.–The fort itself is sufficiently armed. The four light pieces are to arm the battery on the left. There ought to be two additional pieces to arm the battery on the right.

Fort Slemmer.–Four field guns are required to arm the batteries on the right and left.

Fort Bunker Hill.–There should be eight light pieces added to the armament of this work for the battery in front, and the batteries on the right and left.

Fort Saratoga.–There should be six light pieces added to this fort, to arm the batteries on the right and left.

The new redoubt (not named) between Fort Saratoga and Fort Thayer should be armed with four field pieces.

Fort Thayer ought to have four field pieces to arm the batteries between it and the railroad.

Fort Lincoln ought to have six additional field guns to arm the exterior batteries, beginning on the left at the railroad and ending on the right at Battery Jameson, on the Eastern Branch, making for the line north of the city, eighty-eight additional field guns.

Over the Eastern Branch.–The board to which allusion has been made had substituted field pieces for many of the barbette guns with which these forts had first been armed, and they are generally well supplied with small guns. Since that time, however, Fort Foote has been completed, and extensive additions have been made to Forts Stanton and Carroll. These being the most important works on this line, it seems proper that they should be sufficiently armed.

Fort Foote requires two 24-pounder, flank defense howitzers, one 12-pounder mountain howitzer, four 12-pounder Napoleons.

Fort Stanton requires one 32-pounder howitzer, two 4 1/2-inch rifled guns, four 12-pounder howitzers, two 12- pounder Napoleons.

Fort Carroll requires one 32-pounder howitzer, two 30-pounder Parrotts, six 12-pounder howitzers, making for the line over the Eastern Branch twenty-five additional pieces.

SOUTH OF THE POTOMAC,

Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen.–There ought to be six field pieces added to the armament of each of these works, to be used in the adjacent batteries in case of threatened attack. Two additional (mounted) batteries should be sent to this position in case the enemy appears in force.

Fort C. F. Smith is sufficiently armed, but in case of a threatened attack the batteries on the north side of the river, flanking this work, should be armed, the north battery with two 10-pounder Parrotts, and the south battery with two Napoleon guns. <ar71_495>

Fort Craig ought to have four long guns, 30-pounders, or 4 1/2-inch guns for the batteries on the right and left, and six Napoleon guns for the battery at the Columbia turnpike and the adjacent batteries on the right and left.

Fort Barnard requires two 12-pounder Napoleons for the exterior battery.

Fort Ward.–There should be added to this work twelve light guns. Four to guard the Leesburg turnpike north of the fort, and the remainder for the batteries toward Fort Worth.

Fort Williams ought to have eight additional light pieces to arm the batteries, two on the right and two on the left.

Fort Willard requires four additional field guns for the adjacent batteries to the right and left of the work.

Fort Jackson, at end of Long Bridge, ought to have two light guns, making for the line south of the Potomac fiftyfour additional guns, and for all the works around the city 167 additional guns. It is not supposed that all of these guns can now be obtained. I propose, therefore, only to send requisitions for those which seem to be in-dispensable– say field guns.

For Fort Reno and Battery Rossell, 10 guns; Fort De Russy, 6 guns; Fort Stevens, 6 guns; Fort Saratoga and the new redoubt, 6 guns; Fort Lincoln, 6 guns; Fort Stanton, 9 guns; Fort Carroll, 9 guns; Fort Foote, 7 guns; Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen, 6 guns: Fort Craig, 6 guns; Fort Ward, 6 guns; Fort Williams, 4 guns; Fort Willard, 2 guns; Fort Jackson, 2 guns; making 75 guns.

As the enemy cannot approach the city in all directions at the same time, it is hoped with due watchfulness that we may with the additional field guns now asked for so arm any point of attack as to hold the enemy in check until the city can be re-enforced with the necessary additional troops and batteries. In this conviction I cannot withhold the remark that our works are strong in themselves and strong in their armaments, but forts and cannon, even if Gibraltars, cannot of themselves defend a city against an enemy. In case the enemy attack us we will also require soldiers.

[C. C. AUGUR,
Major-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.]

ORA, I, 37, Part 2 (serial 71), 492-95.