The background of the document is a photograph of the Oriskany Battlefield Monument, a tall, white, tapered stone obelisk. To the right of the monument, a log cabin with a small cupola is visible. The scene is set on a grassy hill under a clear blue sky.

**BATTLEFIELD DELINEATION:
SIEGE OF FORT STANWIX AND BATTLE OF ORISKANY
BATTLEFIELD KOCOA ASSESSMENT AND MAPPING PROJECT
GA-2255-11-017
ROME, NEW YORK**

ARPA COMPLIANT COPY

**Research Based on a Grant from
The American Battlefield Protection Program
To
Rome Area Chamber of Commerce**

**Report Prepared By
Michael Jacobson, PhD, RPA**

September 12, 2013

**For More Copies:
Kristen L. McMasters
Archaeologist and Grants Manager
National Park Service
American Battlefield Protection Program
1201 Eye Street NW (2287)
Washington, DC 20005**

This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Interior.

**BATTLEFIELD DELINEATION:
SIEGE OF FORT STANWIX AND BATTLE OF ORISKANY
BATTLEFIELD KOCOA ASSESSMENT AND MAPPING PROJECT
GA-2255-11-017
ROME, NEW YORK**

**Research Based on a Grant from
The American Battlefield Protection Program
To
Rome Area Chamber of Commerce**

**Report Prepared By
Michael Jacobson, PhD, RPA**

September 12, 2013

**For More Copies:
Kristen L. McMasters
Archaeologist and Grants Manager
National Park Service
American Battlefield Protection Program
1201 Eye Street NW (2287)
Washington, DC 20005**

This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Interior.



Acknowledgements

The Public Archaeology Facility and authors of this report would like to acknowledge those who aided in the research and analysis for this project. We would like to thank the Rome Area Chamber of Commerce for allowing us to take part in this study and for helping to arrange for the presentation of our results at the public presentation in June 2013. We would also like to thank the staffs of the Fort Stanwix National Monument and Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site. They were a continuous help by providing access to their records and archives. They also gave us numerous insights and details of their experiences and interpretations of both Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. We would also like to acknowledge Joseph Robertaccio. He has conducted personal research on the Battle of Oriskany for years and was kind enough to provide us with documents and some of his interpretations of the battle. We would also like to acknowledge Brock University for allowing us access to their Loyalist collection. The documents reviewed in their collection detailed the personalities and perspectives of the British and Loyalists during St. Leger's expedition. We also appreciated the landowners that allowed us access to their property and details on the history of landscape use on their property. Finally, we would like to thank the staff of New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation's Bureau of Technical Preservation Services who provided insights into the Oriskany Battlefield's landscape and a listing of previous archaeological testing within the park.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

 1.1 Overview of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany 3

 1.2 Project Overview 4

II. RESEARCH GOALS 12

 2.1 Identification of Archives and Collections 13

 2.2 Defining Features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany 13

 2.3 Identifying the Boundaries of the Siege site and Battlefield 14

 2.4 Developing an Integrated View of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany 14

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 15

 3.1 Documentary Research 15

 3.2 Initial GIS Mapping 16

 3.3 Field Methods 16

 3.4 GIS Analysis 17

IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 20

 4.1 The Oneida Carry and the Mohawk Valley 20

 4.2 Preparations for the Invasion of the Mohawk Valley 28

 4.3 St. Leger’s Advance 31

 4.4 The Siege Begins 37

 4.5 The Battle of Oriskany 39

 4.6 Finalizing the Siege 50

 4.7 Aftermath 56

V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS 61

 5.1 KOCOA Determination 61

 5.2 Historic Perspectives of Defining Features 72

 Preparations and British Advance 72

 Battle of Oriskany and Willett’s Sortie 75

 The Siege 78

 The British Retreat 81

 5.3 Geographic Analysis of Defining Features 85

VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY 96

 6.1 Environmental Setting 96

 6.2 Post Battle Land Use and Alterations 101

 Development of Fort Stanwix and the Oneida Carry 101

 Oriskany Battlefield 110

 6.3 General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity 157

 6.4 Condition of Battlefield Defining Features 157

VII. PRESERVATION PLAN/FUTURE RESEARCH 206

 7.1 Confirmation of Integrity Assessment 206

 7.2 Integration of Common Interpretive Elements 209

 Collaborative Interpretation 209

 7.3 Future Preservation Strategies 210

VIII. SUMMARY 211

APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY 216

APPENDIX II: FORT STANWIX/ORISKANY REPOSITORY COLLECTION DATA 225

APPENDIX III: FORT STANWIX-ORISKANY BATTLEFIELD DEFINING FEATURES DATABASE 231



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Location of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield in New York State. 6

Figure 2. Location of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield in Oneida County. 6

Figure 3. [REDACTED] 8

Figure 4. [REDACTED] 9

Figure 5. [REDACTED] 10

Figure 6. [REDACTED] 11

Figure 7. Illustration of Oneida Carry c. 1756 from *the Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(1):6). 22

Figure 8. Illustration of Oneida Carry forts c. 1756 from the *Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(2):48). 23

Figure 9. Illustration of Fort Rickey c. 1758 from *the Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(3):26). 24

Figure 10. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s 1777 campaign strategy. 29

Figure 11. Path of British advance towards the Oneida Carry. 36

Figure 12. Troop movements during August 5 to 6, 1777. 38

Figure 13. Troop positions at the initiation of the Battle of Oriskany. 48

Figure 14. Troop positions during final combat at the Battle of Oriskany. 49

Figure 15. Troop movements related to Willett’s Sortie. 49

Figure 16. Troop movements during the final days of the siege and Maj. Gen. Arnold’s advance. 56

Figure 17. [REDACTED] 67

Figure 18. [REDACTED] 68

Figure 19. [REDACTED] 69

Figure 20. Inset A of Figure 19. 70

Figure 21. Inset B of Figure 19. 71

Figure 22. 1777 L. De Fleury *Sketch of Siege of Fort Schuyler*. 82

Figure 23. De Fleury’s 1777b sketch map of Siege of Fort Stanwix. 83

Figure 24. Colonel Gansevoort 1777 map of Fort Stanwix. 84

Figure 25. Fort Stanwix viewshed of Oneida Carry. 87

Figure 26. [REDACTED] 88

Figure 27. [REDACTED] 89

Figure 28. [REDACTED] 90

Figure 29. [REDACTED] 91

Figure 30. [REDACTED] 93

Figure 31. [REDACTED] 94

Figure 32. [REDACTED] 95

Figure 33. USDA Soil Series associated with Oneida Carry defining features. 99

Figure 34. USDA Soil Series associated with the Oriskany Battlefield defining features. 100

Figure 35. 1810 map of Rome, New York (Zenzen 2004:8). 104

Figure 36. 1850 illustration of area of Fort Stanwix (Lossing 1850). 104

Figure 37. Fort Bull monument (Cookinham 1912). 105

Figure 38. Image of the Rome Club marking the location of Fort Stanwix (Cookinham 1912). 106

Figure 39. Image of park marking the location of Fort Stanwix. 106

Figure 40. 1886 Bird’s Eye map of Rome, New York (Burleigh et al. 1886). 107

Figure 41. 1850 illustration of Oriskany Battlefield (Lossing 1850). 115

Figure 42. Illustration of 1877 events marking the Battle of Oriskany’s centennial (Curry 2000:119). . 116

Figure 43. Commemorative map of the Battle of Oriskany. (Utica Daily Observer August 7, 1877). 116

Figure 44. c. 1879 Illustration of Ravine defining feature (reproduced from Curry 2000:113). 117



Figure 45. c. 1879 illustration of Small Ravine defining feature (Curry 2000:14).....	118
Figure 46. 1884 photograph of dedication of the Herkimer monument at the Oriskany Battlefield (Cookinham 1912).	118
Figure 47. c. 1900 photograph of Small Ravine defining feature (Cookinham 1912).....	119
Figure 48. c. 1912 photograph of the Ravine defining feature (Cookinham 1912).	119
Figure 49. 1939 aerial photograph of Oriskany Battlefield.	120
Figure 50. 1949 aerial photograph of Oriskany Battlefield monument.	122
Figure 51. 1952 aerial photo of Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site marking movement of Beech Tree Marker and area of possible fill.	123
Figure 52. [REDACTED]	125
Figure 53. [REDACTED]	126
Figure 54. [REDACTED]	127
Figure 55. [REDACTED]	128
Figure 56. [REDACTED]	129
Figure 57. [REDACTED]	130
Figure 58. [REDACTED]	131
Figure 59. [REDACTED]	132
Figure 60. [REDACTED]	133
Figure 61. [REDACTED]	134
Figure 62. [REDACTED]	135
Figure 63. [REDACTED]	136
Figure 64. [REDACTED]	137
Figure 65. [REDACTED]	138
Figure 66. [REDACTED]	139
Figure 67. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1740.	140
Figure 68. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1758.	141
Figure 69. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1777.	142
Figure 70. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1800.	143
Figure 71. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1830.	144
Figure 72. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1860.	145
Figure 73. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1890.	146
Figure 74. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1920.	147
Figure 75. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1950.	148
Figure 76. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1740-1758.....	149
Figure 77. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1777.	150
Figure 78. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1800.	151
Figure 79. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1830.	152
Figure 80. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1860.	153
Figure 81. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1890.	154
Figure 82. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1920.	155
Figure 83. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1950.	156
Figure 84. [REDACTED]	166
Figure 85. [REDACTED]	191
Figure 86. Illustration of Fort Wood Creek c. 1756 <i>the Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps</i> (CC 1(2):48).....	192



Figure 87.	193
Figure 88. Fort Stanwix defining features on 2m DEM.....		194
Figure 89.		214
Figure 90.		215

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Chronology of Mohawk Valley Military Events during the Summer of 1777.	59
Table 2. Defining Features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix/Battle of Oriskany.	62
Table 3. USDA Soil Series for Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield (USDA 2008; 2013).	98
Table 4. List of Previous OPRHP Excavations at Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site.	208



LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Photo 1. Facing north at wetland area near Oriskany Battlefield park entrance..... 124

Photo 2. Facing northeast towards battle monument with noticeable fill areas..... 124

Photo 3. [REDACTED]..... 161

Photo 4. [REDACTED]..... 162

Photo 5. [REDACTED]..... 162

Photo 6. [REDACTED]..... 163

Photo 7. [REDACTED]..... 164

Photo 8. [REDACTED]..... 164

Photo 9. [REDACTED]..... 165

Photo 10. [REDACTED]..... 166

Photo 11. [REDACTED]..... 168

Photo 12. [REDACTED]..... 168

Photo 13. [REDACTED]..... 169

Photo 14. [REDACTED]..... 172

Photo 15. [REDACTED]..... 172

Photo 16. [REDACTED]..... 173

Photo 17. [REDACTED]..... 174

Photo 18. [REDACTED]..... 175

Photo 19. [REDACTED]..... 175

Photo 20. [REDACTED]..... 176

Photo 21. [REDACTED]..... 177

Photo 22. [REDACTED]..... 178

Photo 23. [REDACTED]..... 179

Photo 24. Facing northwest at Oriskany Battlefield Unknown Soldier monument..... 180

Photo 25. Facing southeast across Eastern Heights defining feature and road disturbance..... 180

Photo 26. [REDACTED]..... 181

Photo 27. [REDACTED]..... 181

Photo 28. Facing east at monument marking Beech Tree..... 182

Photo 29. Facing northwest across Western Heights defining feature..... 183

Photo 30. [REDACTED]..... 184

Photo 31. [REDACTED]..... 184

Photo 32. [REDACTED]..... 186

Photo 33. [REDACTED]..... 186

Photo 34. [REDACTED]..... 187

Photo 35. [REDACTED]..... 187

Photo 36. [REDACTED]..... 188

Photo 37. [REDACTED]..... 189

Photo 38. [REDACTED]..... 189

Photo 39. [REDACTED]..... 190

Photo 40. [REDACTED]..... 191

Photo 41. [REDACTED]..... 193

Photo 42. [REDACTED]..... 195

Photo 43. [REDACTED]..... 195

Photo 44. Facing south towards Fort Stanwix. 196

Photo 45. [REDACTED]..... 198

Photo 46. [REDACTED]..... 198

Photo 47. [REDACTED]..... 199

Photo 48. [REDACTED]..... 200

Photo 49. [REDACTED]..... 200



Photo 50.	[REDACTED]	201
Photo 51.	Facing north at Mohawk River Lower Landing monument.	202
Photo 52.	[REDACTED]	202
Photo 53.	[REDACTED]	203
Photo 54.	[REDACTED]	205



I. INTRODUCTION

In the hopes of ending the American Revolution, British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne put into motion a plan to divide the northern colonies rebelling against British rule during the 1777 campaign season. His plan consisted of a multipronged attack (Alden 1969:287-295; Graymont 1972:114; Scott 1927:62; Venables 1965:2; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). From Canada, he would lead an expedition towards Albany along the Hudson Valley. Also from Canada, British Brigadier General Barry St. Leger would lead an expedition from the west marching along the Mohawk Valley towards Albany. From New York City, British General William Howe was to play a supportive role by sending troops north along the Hudson Valley towards Albany. In its advance along these routes, the campaign was to encourage a rise in support from Loyalists and Native Americans and divide the Continental forces, which together would push for an end to the war.

This report presents research and spatial analyses related to British Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's role in this campaign. The Siege of Fort Stanwix¹ and the Battle of Oriskany were significant events in St. Leger's expedition and in the larger Campaign of 1777. Brig. Gen. St. Leger's defeated attempt to take Fort Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley led to Burgoyne's defeat at the Battles of Saratoga, which in turn changed the direction of the war (Alden 1969:321-327; Watt 2002:287-310). St. Leger's expedition also had a lasting effect on the American Revolution in the area of present day Upstate New York. The siege and the battle changed the nature of community in the region. The conflict between Patriots and Loyalists divided communities and families creating a civil war. It also led to divisions among the Haudenosaunee² (Iroquois). These conflicts pushed the Haudenosaunee to cement their affiliations with either the British or the Continentals³. The decimation of the Tryon County Militia left the Mohawk Valley and the surrounding region open to raids and attacks by British rangers and their Native American allies. These raids ultimately led to the Sullivan-Clinton campaign, which was a scorched earth retaliatory campaign against the British allied Haudenosaunee (PAF 2010; 2011; 2012). The violence would present a shadow on the settlement of New York State following the American Revolution and relations between New York State and the United States relationships with Native Americans.

¹ Fort Stanwix was the original name of the fort built in 1758. The Continentals referred to the fort they rebuilt as Fort Schuyler. However, Fort Stanwix remained a common name for the fort. For this report, the fort is referred to as Fort Stanwix, especially to avoid confusion with Fort Schuyler at present day Utica, New York.

² Haudenosaunee is the name preferred by Native Americans who are part of the six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Haudenosaunee originally consisted of five nations: Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. In the early 18th century, the Tuscarora were adopted into the Haudenosaunee, which became known as the Six Nations (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:23; Graymont 1972:6).

³ The role of the Haudenosaunee in the American Revolution was complex. The Six Nations and their members debated amongst themselves which side they would join: British, Continental, or remain neutral (Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Graymont 1972; Williams 2005). Due to this complexity, it is difficult to define allegiances clearly. Many of these allegiances began with the events related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. In a general sense, the Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, and Cayuga allied themselves with the British, while the Oneida and Tuscarora allied themselves with the Continentals (Raphael 2002:246). For the purposes of this report, this general view of allegiances will be used when discussing British allied Haudenosaunee (Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, and Cayuga) and Continental allied Haudenosaunee (Oneida and Tuscarora), while always being cognizant of the complexity present within such allegiances.



To better understand the history of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany and their influence on the American Revolution, the Rome Area Chamber of Commerce, in association with the staffs of the Fort Stanwix National Monument and the Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site (SHS), initiated a project to delineate and revise the boundaries of the siege and the battle. The project, as presented here, consisted of historical research to identify landscape features related to the battle, field verification of the features, and an initial assessment of their integrity. The National Park Service's American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) funded the project. Researchers at the Public Archaeology Facility of Binghamton University conducted the historical research and battlefield delineation in collaboration with staff from Fort Stanwix National Monument and Oriskany Battlefield SHS. The information gained from the project will add to the interpretation of the siege and the battle, as well as aid in the development of preservation plans for identified features associated with the siege and battle.

The Siege of Fort Stanwix (ABPP Number NY217) and the Battle of Oriskany (ABPP Number NY218) were both documented by the National Park Service's American Battlefield Protection Program in 2001 and reported in the program's 2007 Revolutionary War and War of 1812 study (NPS 2007). The 2007 study reports both events as being Priority I battlefields, with Fort Stanwix classified as a Class A battlefield and the Oriskany Battlefield classified as a Class B battlefield. Under the ABPP's criteria, Class A battlefields are a "Site of a military or naval action with a vital objective or result that shaped the strategy, direction, outcome, or perception of the war," Class B battlefields are a "Site of a military or naval action with a significant objective or result that shaped the strategy, direction, or outcome of a campaign or other operation" (NPS 2007:24). The listing of these two battlefields as Priority I defined them as battlefields listed as either Class A or B with a medium to high short to long-term threat to their preservation.

As a first step to delineate the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany, this project included detailed documentary research to identify the defining features related to both events. Project researchers conducted military terrain analysis of the shared landscape of both events. Researchers applied KOCOIA (Key Terrain, Observation, Cover/Concealment, Obstruction, and Avenue of Approach/Retreat) criteria for conducting the military terrain analysis. The results of the historical research and field survey presented in this report suggest that there is a wide range of integrity among the individual defining features related to post battle occupation and use. Urban development in the City of Rome and agricultural and commemoration activities related to the Oriskany Battlefield's landscape had definite and differing impacts on the defining features. However, taken as a whole, the defining features provide a high research and interpretive potential for the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield. It is important to note that this study focused on historic and archival research as well as field mapping. No archeological survey or excavation occurred as part of this research. Chapter 7 (p. 206) discusses research questions for future archeological testing.



1.1 Overview of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany

As one of the three prongs in Lieutenant General John Burgoyne's campaign of 1777, it was Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's responsibility to lead a force west from Lake Ontario along the Mohawk Valley and meet with Burgoyne's forces in Albany separating New England and portions of New York from the rest of the rebelling colonies (Alden 1969: 287-295; Venables 1965:2; Watt 2002:50). St. Leger's objective was to advance through the Mohawk Valley destroying Patriot infrastructure and encourage Loyalists in the Mohawk Valley to rise up in support of the British. The major obstacle for St. Leger was the Continental outpost of Fort Stanwix, located along the main transportation route connecting Lake Ontario to the Mohawk Valley. By taking the fort, St. Leger would have achieved easy passage for the movement of British troops and supplies from Lake Ontario to the Hudson Valley.

St. Leger began his expedition from Montreal, Canada on June 23, 1777. His forces followed the waterways of the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontario and continued along the Oswego River to Lake Oneida to arrive near the Oneida Carry (Claus 1777; Watt 2002:77). The Continental Army at Fort Stanwix, informed of St. Leger's approach by the Oneida, prepared for the siege by rebuilding and resupplying the fort (Willett 1831:49). They also attempted to hinder the British approach by blocking the British proposed path along Wood Creek (Gansevoort to Schuyler July 26, 1777; Lowenthal 1983:18). Despite the obstacle, the British forces arrived at the Oneida Carry on August 2, 1777 initiating the Siege of Fort Stanwix (Lowenthal 1983:26; Watt 2002:127-128).

When St. Leger's expedition marched towards the Mohawk Valley, it entered an ethnically and politically charged situation. The Haudenosaunee, specifically the Oneida and Mohawk Nations, had well-established settlements in the Mohawk Valley since before the arrival of Europeans (Berleth 2010; Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Graymont 1972). The Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora held territories to the west of the Mohawk Valley, but had an active interest in the outcome of the American Revolution. British, Palatine Germans, and the Dutch had settled in the valley beginning in the early 18th century (Berleth 2010). Each of these groups had their own economic and social interests that Patriot and British forces used to influence people to join their side. Encroaching settlements, trade and economic issues, and prior slights all swayed the choice of allegiance during the American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley. These allegiances led to divisions within communities. The events related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany cemented these loyalties.

The Patriot Tryon County Militia attempted to relieve the fort and end St. Leger's expedition. Informed of their advance, St. Leger sent his Loyalist and Native American forces to stop the militia's advance. On August 6th, the Loyalists and Native Americans troops ambushed the militia along a military road leading to Fort Stanwix in what would be called the Battle of Oriskany (Watt 2002:155-194). It was one of the bloodiest engagements of the American Revolution (Canfield and Clark 1909:57). The majority of the militia were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner during the daylong mostly hand-to-hand engagement. Continental troops performing a sally from Fort Stanwix ended the battle by raiding the camps of Loyalists and their Native American allies (Watt 2002:189-194). The attack on the camps saved the remaining militia at Oriskany, but overall the battle decimated the militia's presence in the Mohawk Valley for much of the war.



The siege lasted for nearly two more weeks. Continental Major General Benedict Arnold finally ended the siege by propagating a ruse that pressured Brig. Gen. St. Leger and his forces into retreat (Watt 2002: 240-250). Arnold was able to convince St. Leger that he would not be able to defeat the approaching Continental Army. St. Leger retreated from the Oneida Carry and back to Canada using the same path he used on his approach to the fort (St. Leger 1777).

Brig. Gen. St. Leger failed to advance across the Mohawk Valley and aid Burgoyne. His advance ended at Fort Stanwix and although his forces decimated the Tryon County Militia, he was unable to inspire an uprising of Loyalists in the valley. With St. Leger's expedition in retreat, Burgoyne's forces had to advance down the Hudson Valley and maintain the campaign alone. The Continental Army strengthened their defenses against Burgoyne as Major Generals Philip Schuyler and later Major General Horatio Gates unified their forces against Burgoyne (Alden 1969:321-327; Watt 2002:287-310). Burgoyne's advance ended with his surrender in October of 1777. His defeat was a turning point in the American Revolution by providing the impetus for the French to join the American cause.

The decimation of the Tryon County Militia at the Battle of Oriskany led to a period of violence across the New York frontier (Graymont 1972; Williams 2005). With the loss of the Tryon County militia, there was little protection for the western American settlements. They became victim to raids and massacres. General George Washington attempted to quell the raids with the Sullivan-Clinton campaign. However, raids especially within the Mohawk Valley continued to the end of the American Revolution.

1.2 Project Overview

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany took place along the western edge of New York's Mohawk Valley (Figure 1, p. 6). The events centered on an area between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek called the Oneida Carry, Great Carry, or Carrying Place (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:51). This name derived from a strip of land that served as a connector for travelers along the waterways where they could carry their boats and supplies between waterways. The area of the Oneida Carry is now associated with the City of Rome. Fort Stanwix is located in the City of Rome on the eastern side of the former Oneida Carry. The Oriskany Battlefield is located in both the City of Rome and the Town of Whitestown (Figure 2, p. 6).

An initial survey of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield conducted for the ABPP (NPS 2007) described the siege area as having a study area consisting of 10,090 acres and a core area of 960 acres (██████████). The Oriskany Battlefield had a study area of 1,628 acres and a core area of 280 acres (██████████). The study area includes the entire extent of the battlefield. The core area is that portion of the battlefield that included direct combat or fighting. Historic accounts and the presence of related material culture define the battlefield's extent. The study area includes not only the core, but also secondary areas, such as paths of advance/retreat, supply lines, and observation posts. These areas were essential for the greater conflict, but were not directly involved with the actual combat actions. Since the Fort Stanwix area is within the City of Rome, the area consists of an urban setting. The Oriskany Battlefield is in a more rural area, with small farms and fields surrounding it. The core of the Oriskany Battlefield is mostly associated with the Oriskany Battlefield SHS.



The research presented here is a revised mapping and delineation of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany. In reviewing the accounts of British, Continental, Loyalists, Tryon County Militia, and Native American warriors in terms of how they viewed the battlefields' landscapes, a new and integrated interpretation of the battle can be made that recognizes the shared history of both the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. As mentioned previously, the analysis presented here relies on military terrain analysis (KOCOA). Military historians and the ABPP have used such a system to help in the interpretation of how battles unfolded. It is an analysis that reflects the concept of landscape as a resource used by officers and soldiers in their attempt to gain an advantage in battle, and influence the outcome of an encounter. Maximizing observable areas for oneself and limiting or obstructing the views and advance of the other side is the foundation of such a battle strategy. The application of this approach to the reanalysis of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield SHS produced a more inclusive interpretation of the two events.

Researchers based their identification and interpretation of the siege/battlefield's defining features on a review of a sample of journals, letters, maps, and other historic documents created by or originating from participants in either the siege or battle. A defining feature in this study was defined as either a natural (i.e. creek or hill) or cultural (i.e. structure or road) feature that was integral to the progress of the battle. Contextual information related to the defining features aided the determination of their role in the battle. Contextual information included aspects of the feature, such as their size, composition, function, and distance from other features. Field verification of these features not only allowed an interpretation of how the features related to the battlefield's landscape as a whole, but also an initial determination of their integrity by viewing if any surface evidence of disturbance was identifiable. The comparison of the soldiers' views of space to the current use of space provides an initial assessment for the defining features. Using this baseline information, further analysis of the landscape using visual assessment and spatial analyses helps to determine the integrity of the features. Integrity is defined here as the level in which a defining feature represents its location, setting, feeling, contains material deposits related to its use during the battle, and the ability of the information related to the feature to answer possible research questions concerning the overall battle (See Section 6.4, p. 157, for a full definition used in assessing defining feature integrity). The spatial inventory of features and their integrity helps to determine priorities for preservation.




Figure 1. Location of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield in New York State.




Figure 2. Location of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield in Oneida County.



The project's primary goal is to provide a more geographically integrated and thematically related history of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. Reintegrating the landscapes of both events is central to understanding that the events had a shared history with common combatants, a shared landscape, and were influential over each other. The foundation of this requires the use of multiple sources related to the battle. Researchers made use of accounts from British, Continental, Loyalists, militia, and Native Americans. Battles are not monolithic; they are a conflictive process between multiple sides, each with their own ideologies and views of warfare. Interpreting the battle accurately requires that the research address these multiple perspectives. The inclusion of multiple historical views combined with innovative mapping using a geographic information system (GIS) approach, provides a more integrative and novel approach to understanding the battlefield and its features.

The following sections will elaborate on the historical background from these several perspectives, summarize the battlefield's defining features using KOCOA analysis, and present a research design that will assist with assessing integrity and development of a preservation plan for the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield.




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 3. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 4. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 5. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 6. 



II. RESEARCH GOALS

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany were essential to the outcome of the American Revolution. The siege and the battle helped to shape the war by directly affecting the Saratoga Campaign and indirectly leading to violent raids and wilderness warfare in Upstate New York and Pennsylvania during the rest of the revolution. Both the siege and the battle were part of Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's expedition and had immediate influences on each other. The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany also had a lasting effect on Haudenosaunee society. These events cemented the allegiances of members of the Six Nations to either the British or the Continental forces. These allegiances led to a division within the Six Nations, with the majority of Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga siding with the British and the majority of Oneida and Tuscarora siding with the Continentals. At the Battle of Oriskany, members of the Six Nations stood against each other in battle, breaking the Covenant Chain. These events are important to the history of the Haudenosaunee, as this internal conflict would shape relations among the Haudenosaunee far beyond the war. While both events have a shared history, the spatial interpretation of and preservation strategies for them has become separated.

The primary goal of this project is to develop an integrated mapping schematic and boundary delineation encompassing both sites and their connective corridors and approach alignments for the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany in 1777. Fort Stanwix has a broad history on its own. The fort was involved with the French and Indian War and was the site of numerous treaty signings during the 18th century. The Oriskany Battlefield has had a duality in its role in military history and its use as a commemorative site. These identities had overlapping, but divergent manifestations within the battlefield's landscape. The aesthetic and recreational requirements of 19th century tourists had more of an effect on the shaping of the battlefield's landscape than interpretation of the battle's history. The two sites have also been managed separately. The National Park Service (NPS) as the Fort Stanwix National Monument has developed, reconstructed, and operated Fort Stanwix, while New York State's Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation's (NYSOPRHP) Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site (SHS) has developed and operated the site of the Oriskany Battlefield. With different government agencies operating the sites, there is a natural differentiation and separation in the interpretation of both sites. Recently, the agencies responsible for the Fort Stanwix National Monument and Oriskany Battlefield SHS developed a cooperative partnership to strengthen the preservation and presentation of both sites, individually and collectively.

A broad based battlefield delineation approach was an application of this cooperative partnership to develop an integrated spatial representation of the two main activity areas associated with the 1777 Siege of Fort Stanwix. To accomplish the battlefield delineation, researchers formulated a set of research goals for this project. Those research goals included the identification of historical archives and documents related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany; the identification of defining features; and an initial assessment of the integrity and context of the greater battlefield's defining features and general landscape.



2.1 Identification of Archives and Collections

Due to the importance of St. Leger's expedition in the American Revolution, numerous historians have written about it (Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Graymont 1972; Jones 1851; Scott 1927; Stone 1970; Venables 1965; Watt 2002). These secondary histories have highlighted some accounts while muting others. These histories have also centered on events and figures important to the siege and battle with little consideration of the landscape or spatial features. To complete this study, researchers reviewed primary accounts to get beyond historical biases and identify important landscape features.

Therefore, the project's first research task was the identification of archives and collections holding historic materials related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. The documents, images, and letters related to the siege and battle are divided among different institutions and archives. The identification of archives with relevant materials established a foundation for research, allowing researchers to prioritize and quickly access relevant records. This aided our research by allowing a means to access efficiently the materials most helpful to our study; it also establishes a central reference for researchers to use in future studies of this battle and campaign (See Appendix II, p. 225 for list of archives with relevant materials). Section 3.1 (p. 15) details the methods used to conduct the historic documentation of the battlefield's defining features. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 (p. 61) present the results of the documentary research and the military terrain analysis.

2.2 Defining Features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany

The results of the historic research led into the second goal of identifying the siege/battle's defining features according to KOCOAs standards. As mentioned previously, KOCOAs is an application of military terrain analysis and an acronym categorized as Key Terrain, Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Retreat. The categorization of the battle's defining features provides standardization in the interpretation of a battle's flow and its landscape. Researchers determined the general locations of defining features by reviewing historical texts, oral histories, and maps. Analysts mapped the defining features into a geographic information system (GIS) to allow for additional analysis. Project researchers followed the initial mapping with a field survey, during which teams walked portions of the battlefield mapping those landmarks and defining features visible in the current landscape. Field survey and GIS analysis helped to refine the perception of how the troops used these features, most specifically by interpreting firing ranges of weaponry probably used during the siege/battle. Analysis of historic maps and imagery that postdate the battle help to support interpretations of changes in the landscape noted by disturbance of the ground surface. This comparison and analysis allowed an initial assessment of the features' integrity. The characterization of these features using a KOCOAs analysis helped researchers determine what function each feature had in the battle and how each feature influenced the course of the battle. Section 3.2 (p. 16) details the methods used to analyze the battlefield's defining features. Chapter 5 (p. 61) presents the results of these landscape analyses. Appendix III (p. 231) provides a list of identified defining features and associated information.



2.3 Identifying the Boundaries of the Siege site and Battlefield

Another goal of this project was to revise the boundaries of the siege and the battle and present them as a unified landscape of related events using the defining features as a guide. Interpretation of the historic accounts along with GIS analysis provides the means to achieve this goal of identifying the overall boundaries of the battle and its defining features. Contextual information on the defining features allows an evaluation of defining feature boundaries, as well as the boundaries for the study area, core area, and potential National Register area. All of this information may require field confirmation or archeological field survey to more accurately determine the integrity of the major defining features and answer questions related to the history of the battle.

2.4 Developing an Integrated View of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany

The information gained from the goals just described aids in achieving the final project goal of developing an integrated view of the siege and battle. The revised battlefield boundary will show that the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany had a shared history that can be clearly shown in the extant material landscape. A new view of the siege and the battle's landscape should enhance interpretations of both events. Both parks' systems will have more information to revise presentations to the public addressing the shared history of the two sites. Assessment of the defining features' integrity will show how much of this landscape remains. By providing information on the integrity of identified features, the parks' resource management staff will be able to further inventory and manage the identified features. Park staff will also be able to use this information to develop preservation and interpretative strategies that best reflect the shared history of the sites.

An outgrowth of this research is also the integration of a more inclusive history of the siege and the battle. Researchers actively sought to identify and review accounts beyond just the British and Continental officers. The accounts of civilians, Loyalists, junior officers and enlisted men, and especially Native Americans have often been relegated to secondary roles. By accessing the records of Loyalists and Native Americans, project researchers were able to better identify who participated in the battle and their views of the siege/battle. These records also helped identify the different defining features used by each side of the conflict. It also helped identify how combatants used various features or the same features for different purposes.



III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section on research methodology outlines the strategies used to accomplish the goals of this project.

3.1 Documentary Research

Research on the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield began with the identification of primary historic records and secondary sources related to the battles and St. Leger's expedition. Appendix II (p. 225) contains a list of archival sources reviewed for this study. Researchers examined these documents and maps to identify landmarks, positions, and topographic features related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield. The review also keyed on information that would help researchers understand the combatants' motives and tactics, both of which are closely related to how the battle unfolded and its aftermath. Research teams recorded any references or remarks relating to landscape features on a common form. This form recorded the name of the feature, the location of the feature, the relevance to the battle, the bibliographic source of the statement, the perspective of the source, any additional comments, and if the reference had a map or illustration of the feature. Researchers entered the records into an Access database for use in comparison and GIS mapping (See Appendix III, p. 231).

Project researchers often established the names of features from the source's reference to the feature, such as "hill," "ridge," or "ambuscade." Researchers did standardize these names for use in the defining features database and the GIS. If descriptions of features had different names, such as hill versus mountain, but the locations and overall descriptions were similar, we concluded that the sources were referring to the same feature and they were given the most widely used name.

Researchers also recorded the contextual information of the source or witness, including bibliographic referencing. This contextual information included the source perspective, rank, and military unit. *Perspective* was defined as the source's "side" - British, Continental, or Native American. *Rank* and *military unit* represents a further breakdown of the perspective information. The contextual information allowed for comparisons of various sources. Analysts could compare different views of the same feature, or visualize how the same participant saw different features on the battlefield. The contextual information also helped to track individuals across the battlefield for the duration of the battle, providing there was enough information from the witness. The identification of military unit helped to place the individual in the battlefield based on general troop movements. The placement of individuals allowed researchers to determine the reliability of the source's perspective of certain features and movements. For example, a Continental troop positioned in Fort Stanwix was given some credence in describing events occurring in the fort, but subject to increased examination of his statements related to the Battle of Oriskany. Those troops who were describing a feature or movement for which they were not directly associated were probably relaying secondary information, and although it may be correct, a direct participant's observations of an action had precedence. Although researchers prioritized some sources given the context, researchers did include other more indirect sources. *Relevance to the battle* was an



measurements provided in historic sources, relation to larger features (hills), and presence above the surface or as part of the terrain.

The survey team logged each battlefield feature using a Trimble GeoXM 2005 series global positioning system (GPS) running Windows Mobile and ArcPad 10. The data dictionary used was based on the one developed by the National Park Service for the Revolutionary War/War of 1812 documentation project (NPS 2001). Not all items in the data dictionary were relevant to this study. The team used this dictionary in order to be consistent with the previously collected NPS data. The GPS system parameters were set to those used in previous studies: PDOP Mask: 6.0; SNR Mask: 6.0; Elevation Mask: 15; Minimum satellites: 4.

Project researchers took photographs of the battlefields' overall landscapes and the areas of defining features. Whenever possible, the survey team took multiple shots in a 360-degree pan from a central point. Together, these photographs presented an overall perspective of the landscape surrounding a defining feature.

3.4 GIS Analysis

The results of the field mapping helped to refine the locations of the defining features and identify their contexts. The data recorded by the GPS and the project photographs were integrated into the GIS base map. The data aided in the comparison of the different accounts and data sets reviewed in this study. The comparative analysis of historic sources, present location and condition of landscape features, and known changes to the battlefields' landscapes allowed for a refinement of the locations and boundaries for the battle's defining features. Specialized GIS analysis was conducted to refine further these boundaries and locations.

Analysts used Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) to identify elevation changes across the battlefield aiding in the analysis of terrain. Terrain features, such as rises and depressions, can inform analysis of avenues of approach and retreat, areas of concealment, and firing or observer positions. However, the Oneida Carry has very subtle elevation changes that may not be identifiable with DEMs. Analysts used both 2 m and 10 m resolution DEMs. The 2 m resolution DEMs provided a high-level detail in terms of elevation changes, but often the presence of modern intrusions (i.e. roads, canals) could overshadow historic landscapes. The 10 m resolution offered a more generalized view of elevation in an area, but did not provide detail on small changes in elevation. To compensate, analysts performed slope analysis on the DEM. The results provided a clearer view of changes in topography that provided evidence for the identification of firing positions and areas of movement.

The general mapping of the defining features was further refined using the military terrain analysis extension for ArcGIS 10. When analysts linked distance or range of fire to the viewshed analysis, the spatial analysis established a predicative model for ascertaining areas of gunfire for the battle. The extension allows for the interpolation of viewsheds using DEM data based on various conditions, such as observer height, target height, azimuth, distance between observer and target, and elevation angle of observation. By integrating the range of fire with a viewshed analysis, factors related to terrain and attributes of the shooter can be changed and accounted for in the analysis. Within the



attributes of the viewshed, observer height can be changed for those troops standing or hidden at a lower height behind an obstacle, such as brush or fallen timber. Distance can be changed to account for the different firing ranges of various weapons, such as musket and rifle. Changing these attributes for the interpolation of viewsheds allowed for experimentation in the positioning of observers and seeing the effects of the landscape, such as accounting for trees or obstacles.

For this study, muskets had an assumed range of 100 yards, and rifles had an assumed range of 300 yards. Muskets were accurate to within 50 to 80 yards of a target and rifles within 200 to 500 yards (Babits 1998:12-15). Analysts used an average range of 300 yards for the rifle and an average range of 100 yards for the musket to determine the area firing ranges from specific positions within the battlefield. Due to increased accuracy and firing range of rifles, troops and warriors were more likely to aim and fire rifles for accuracy, whereas soldiers fired muskets with little regard to aim or accuracy (Babits 1998:12-15). Those musket balls at the maximum extent of the range of fire would most likely not be accurate on their target. Artillery used in the Siege of Fort Stanwix included cannon and cohorns or mortars, with an effective range of 1,000 to 2,000 yards and 750 to 1,400 yards, respectively (NPS 2013). Analysts used the Military Analyst extension for ArcGIS 10 to determine the range of fire for musket, rifle, and artillery fire related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. In this analysis, positions of the observer were akin to the positions of shooters and artillery positions. The range of fire analysis helped to clarify where firing positions were located and reinforced if defining features were associated with fields of fire.

Historic documentation, field observation, and map analysis suggested the locations of possible firing positions. Militia and rangers were more likely to supply their own guns. It is difficult to determine exactly which firearms rangers used. However, Colonel John Butler of Butler's Rangers preferred rifles and this may reflect a pattern present in 1777 as well (Cruikshank 1893:59). The Hesse-Hanau Jagers in service to the British were a rifle company (Watt 2002:254, 258), but the British Regulars were most likely using the Short Land Pattern musket (Babits 1998:12-15). Captain Joseph Brant along with Lt. Col. Daniel Claus supplied the Mohawk and some of the other British Allied Native Americans with arms, which could have been a mixture of musket and rifle (Claus 1777; Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Graymont 1972; Williams 2005). The Seneca that joined the expedition with Colonel John Butler had limited arms (Graymont 1972:125-126). Their original purpose was to observe the British movement into the Mohawk Valley, not to participate. However, they did take part in the fighting, especially at the Battle of Oriskany, using the limited arms they brought with them (tomahawks, knives, and personal guns) (Graymont 1972:134).

Analysts applied a reverse range of fire to identify firing positions. This analysis specifically aided the identification of the area where British artillery batteries were located. Since the British artillery's main target was Fort Stanwix, range of fire analysis was conducted from multiple possible positions to identify what areas could reach the fort. Those areas with multiple overlap in range of fires suggested positions for artillery.



GIS allowed a common venue to compare the different data sets used in this study. Historical viewpoints gained from the documentary evidence varied among individuals. With GIS, researchers could place these views within the same database and compare them to provide an integrated historical perception of the siege and the battle. The addition of other data sets and analysis to the historical perspective provided a deeper understanding of the battle. Primary documents and the documentary record often do not directly address spatial analyses, such as viewsheds and firing ranges. However, with the aid of spatial data (DEMs), analysts could use the results of such analyses in comparison with documentary accounts to develop an improved image of combat not available strictly from the historical records. The data sets served to inform each other, providing new interpretation and insights into the siege and the battle.



IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's 1777 expedition into the Mohawk Valley was an attempt to wrest control of a region that had become essential to the Continental cause. The Mohawk Valley had traditionally provided food and resources for the Hudson Valley. It also served as a transportation route connecting the Hudson Valley with the Great Lakes region. The Continentals had realized the importance of the valley and quickly established control in the region founded on developing relations with Euro-American farmers and Native Americans in the Mohawk Valley. St. Leger's goal was to disrupt these alliances and promote Loyalist and British control over the valley resulting in a severed and limited Continental government.

Although St. Leger's expedition was a failure, the events of 1777 dramatically changed the direction of the American Revolution and the impacts of the war within present day Upstate New York. The British Campaign from Canada had two major effects on the American Revolution. First, St. Leger's defeat in the Mohawk Valley led to the failure of General Burgoyne's army at the Battle of Saratoga, which in turn marked a turning point for the Continental Army's efforts. The British loss provided the French with a justification to enter the war on the side of the Continentals. Second, the violence related to St. Leger's expedition in the Mohawk Valley cemented the divisions between Loyalist and Patriotic (or Continental) neighbors and within the Haudenosaunee. These divisions would lead to violent raids throughout the Mohawk Valley and present day Upstate New York into 1778, and would push General George Washington to order the Sullivan-Clinton expedition in 1779.

4.1 The Oneida Carry and the Mohawk Valley

The Oneida Carry was a vital transportation route long before the American Revolution. The area between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek (present day Rome) had been a regular transportation route since precontact periods. Prior to the entrance of Europeans in the region, the Mohawk Valley had been under the control of Haudenosaunee nations, specifically the Mohawk and Oneida. The mostly contiguous waterways between Lake Ontario and the Hudson Valley facilitated travel and allowed speedier travel than on foot. The one major gap, about a mile to 6 miles in distance, was located between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek. This gap became known as the Carry Place, or the Oneida Carry since it marked the point in the transportation route where travelers had to carry their goods and boats between water courses (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:51). The gap created a slight restriction to transportation and an opportunity for control. Whoever controlled the territory of the gap could control access and transportation in the Mohawk Valley. With the settlement of Euro-Americans in the region, the importance of the Oneida Carry greatly increased.

Eighteenth century economic developments between the Haudenosaunee and Dutch, French, and British powers led to military interest in the Oneida Carry. French and British economic interests in the region developed from the beaver trade and general trading with Native Americans. European traders brought in muskets, alcohol, metal blades and kettles, and European textiles that found an interested audience in the Haudenosaunee (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:31-32). To afford these items, the



Haudenosaunee began earnestly hunting the item most sought-after by the Europeans, beaver. The hunting of beaver grew from a seasonal or an occasional hunt to a full time endeavor requiring the Haudenosaunee to expand their territory (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:33-34). The beaver hunt altered the Haudenosaunee social structure giving more power to hunters and warriors and less authority to sachems or chiefs (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:35). More time devoted to beaver hunting also meant less time for other pursuits, such as agriculture and hunting for food, requiring increased trade for supplies from Europeans and ultimately more entanglement and reliance on the Europeans.

In attempts to exert some influence on the trade, the Haudenosaunee limited the access of European traders to their communities by restricting the construction of forts and trading posts. The Haudenosaunee attempted to maintain a balance between French and British influence by allowing limited trading from both groups (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:41-46). The French and British both offered goods wanted by the Haudenosaunee, and the Haudenosaunee would sell to whichever group provided the best deal. The French pushed for a centralized trading center at Niagara (Fort Niagara) and in response, the British demanded the establishment of a trading post at Oswego (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:46-47). The centralization of trading posts provided the Haudenosaunee with access to goods, but it also led to conflicted loyalties within and outside the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee.

Economic conflicts primarily between the French and the British would occasionally lead to military conflict. The War of Austrian Succession or King George's War, 1744-1748 and the Seven Year's War or French and Indian War, 1754-1763, both brought European conflicts into the Haudenosaunee's sphere and pushed their involvement (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:47). The most definitive of these was the French and Indian War (1754-1763). During these conflicts from the late 17th century to the French and Indian War, the French and British put pressure on the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee to take sides. The conflicts would occasionally lead to divisions among the Six Nations. Although individuals were able to make their own choice of allegiance even in opposition to the nation, geography often became the basis for many of these alliances. Those nations closest to the British, specifically the Mohawk, traded with and had more social connections with the British and felt a need to side with the British; the Seneca were spatially and economically more connected to the French and as such sided with the French (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:47). The Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Tuscarora attempted to remain neutral. Only with Britain's victory almost assured, did these nations decide to support Britain (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:48). British allied Haudenosaunee (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Tuscarora) supported Britain's invasion of French Canada in 1760, but they were hesitant to engage in combat against French Allied Seneca at Fort Niagara (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:48). The end of the war and France's ceding of Canada to the British alleviated much of the tension as the Haudenosaunee could focus their social and economic relations on one European power, the British.

The Oneida Carry became a central route during the French and Indian War. The Mohawk Valley served as a reliable transportation route for soldiers and their Native American allies. The British Major General William Shirley developed a fort system within the Mohawk Valley to ensure the transport of supplies from the Hudson Valley to Oswego to keep control of Lake Ontario (Hagerty 1971:21). The Oneida initially resisted the construction of fortifications along the Oneida Carry, but with the threat of French attacks on their villages, they submitted to the British and in October of 1755, construction started



on two forts in the Oneida Carry: Fort Williams along the Mohawk River and Fort Bull along Wood Creek (Hagerty 1971:22-26).

In 1756, France's Lieutenant Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry attacked the Oneida Carry. He destroyed Fort Bull with an explosion of the fort's magazine and ammunition (Hagerty 1971; Scott 1927:16). To ensure protection of the carry after de Léry's attack, the British constructed a system of forts throughout the Oneida Carry in late 1756. These forts included Fort Wood Creek (near the ruins of Fort Bull), Fort Craven (south of Fort Williams), Fort Newport (along Wood Creek), and Fort Rickey (at the confluence of Wood Creek and Canada Creek) (Figures 7-9, pp. 22-24) (Scott 1927:16). Fort Newport's construction included a gated dam along Wood Creek that when released allowed easier access down Wood Creek (Hagerty 1971:69). These forts did not remain in use for long. In August of 1756, British Brigadier General Daniel Webb panicked at the fall of Oswego to the French and assumed the French would continue their advance towards the Mohawk Valley. In response, Webb ordered the destruction of all the Oneida Carry forts (Hagerty 1971:72-73; Scott 1927:16-17). In 1758, The British Army constructed Fort Stanwix as an outpost guarding the Oneida Carry for the duration of the war.




Figure 7. Illustration of Oneida Carry c. 1756 from the *Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(1):6).




Figure 8. Illustration of Oneida Carry forts c. 1756 from the *Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(2):48).




Figure 9. Illustration of Fort Rickey c. 1758 from the *Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps* (CC 1(3):26).

With the end of the French and Indian War, Britain solidified their control of an increasingly multiethnic community along the Mohawk Valley. The Haudenosaunee had controlled the Mohawk Valley for generations, but during the 18th century, Europeans had increasingly entered the valley due to its trade and farming possibilities. A major ethnic group, the Palatine Germans, had entered the valley after a long path of emigration from Europe. Displaced by the War of Spanish Succession, Palatine Germans sailed to the New York Colony around 1712. Britain's Queen Anne promised the Palatine refugees settlement in the British colonies of North America, which allowed Britain to populate the colonies and provided workers to harness resources for Britain (Berleth 2010:66). However, residents did not welcome the Palatines in the ports of New York City or in the settlements of Albany and Schenectady. Mohawk chiefs finally welcomed the Palatines to settle within the Mohawk Valley (Berleth 2010:66). These immigrants added to the complex community of the Mohawk Valley, which also included Native Americans, Dutch, and British settlers. The result of the settlement pattern was a multicultural community along the Mohawk Valley from the Oneida Carry to Albany.



The most prominent individual in the Mohawk Valley's social and economic structure was William Johnson. In 1738, Johnson immigrated to the valley and built an outpost along the Mohawk River, trading primarily with Mohawks and Palatine Germans (Berleth 2010:24). During the 18th century, he built up this outpost along with his residence and landholdings in a settlement called Johnstown located approximately 121 km (75 mi) east of Fort Stanwix (Figure 11, p. 36). Prior to the French and Indian War, Johnson had built up a relationship with native groups within the region, learning the Mohawk language, dressing in native styles, and living in their camps and villages (Berleth 2010:15-26). He used these connections to build alliances with members of the Five Nations. These alliances provided him with a foundation for developing an economic empire based on trade and land ownership. During the war, he led Native American and British troops into battle against the French. Following the war, he added to his social and economic influence by increasing trade and developing political power. In 1756, the British government appointed him the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern colonies. This office gave him political control over the settlement and trade across the region, specifically the Mohawk Valley. He used the position to guarantee access for family, friends, and those who would provide him patronage.

His office and relations with the Haudenosaunee, especially the Mohawk, resulted in his acquiring large tracts of land. By his death in 1774, he owned approximately 170,000 acres of land (O'Toole 2005:281-282). One of these land acquisitions led to initial divisions among the Haudenosaunee that would play a crucial role in the American Revolution. In what would become known as the Klock dispute, Johnson and a German farmer, George Klock, struggled over land claims. In the 1760s, the Mohawk gave Johnson a tract of land of about 80,000 acres (Hamilton 1976:299). However, Klock claimed this land despite his questionable title over it (Wonderly 2008). Johnson and Klock fought over the land for 14 years with no resolution (Wonderly 2008). His Mohawk allies, including his brother-in-law, Joseph Brant, supported Johnson. The Mohawk saw Klock as a land speculator attempting to steal their lands. Klock's allies included members of the Oneida, such as Tehawenkaragwen (Hanyery) (Wonderly 2008). Both groups harassed each other leading to tension between them (Wonderly 2008). The dispute would be an initial step in the personal conflict between Joseph Brant and Hanyery.

The reason behind the Oneida's support of Klock over Mohawk interests is not exactly clear, but may hint at underlying tensions within the Mohawk Valley. Wonderly (2008) suggests that Oneida support for Klock came from land disputes originating from the early 18th century. It may also be the result of a reaction to Johnson's power and influence. Johnson organized much of the Mohawk Valley under the auspices of his official position governing Tryon County. He owned many of the civil services within the community, such as the county jail, courthouse, and Anglican Church (Wonderly 2008). He also determined the outcome of elections by choosing candidates and determining suffrage (Venables 1965:63-64; Wonderly 2008). Johnson held a firm control over the Mohawk Valley that he could use to favor his supporters and attack his opponents.

Sir William Johnson's negotiation of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) added further tensions among the Haudenosaunee. The treaty established the boundary between Native American territory and Euro-American settlement in British controlled North America. The boundary line began at Fort Stanwix moving south and west to the confluence of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, and continued along the Ohio River to the confluence of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers. Those lands west of the line remained as



Native American territory and those lands east became open to Euro-American settlement. Locally, the Oneida resisted this as they lost territory because of the treaty (Glatthaar and Martin 2007: 71). Much of the land lost by the Oneida became the property of Sir William Johnson (Wonderly 2008). The loss of land to Johnson and being subject to his control led the Oneida to question his authority.

Many of the cities and settlements along the east coast (i.e. Boston and Philadelphia) became centers for ideologies defiant of British rule as well as taxation and political policies during the mid to late 18th century (Alden 1969; Raphael 2002). As urban centers, it is understandable that they may have been more directly subject to results of British taxation and trade and manufacturing policies than rural settlements along the western frontier. However, the patriotic fervor and political questioning in the eastern cities spread into the Mohawk Valley. Due to Johnson's authoritative control of the valley, these ideologies found a ready audience in members of the Dutch and Palatine German communities.

These ideas also found a reception among the Oneida who were already resistant to Johnson's form of British rule (Wonderly 2008). A missionary, Samuel Kirkland, was an effective messenger for patriotic ideology and managed to influence the Oneida towards the Continental's cause. Kirkland was a Presbyterian missionary who had done missionary work among the Seneca, but developed a strong presence among the Oneida. Kirkland's theological training was at the College of New Jersey (Princeton University) where he was exposed to the rising patriotic political ideology (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:57). The Oneida developed a respect for Kirkland as an opposition to Johnson. While Johnson lived on an estate with large landholdings acquired from Native Americans, Kirkland lived in a simple residence and refused to take land (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:72). Johnson only occasionally provided gifts, but Kirkland provided daily food and supplies (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:72). Kirkland and Johnson also differed on access. Kirkland proposed the building of a church for the Oneida and the supplying of a blacksmith. Oneida had acquired numerous metal tools, but had no ability to repair them and were subject to outsiders, such as Johnson for repairs. Johnson opposed the construction of the church and offered the building of an Anglican church that he would control. He stated that there was no need for the Oneida to have a blacksmith, since they could rely on his services (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:70-72). While Kirkland was trying to establish an independent infrastructure for the Oneida, Johnson was trying to keep the Oneida dependent on him socially and economically.

By the 1770s, Sir William Johnson had established a fiefdom with social and economic control over the Mohawk Valley. Members of his family, such as Molly Brant (wife), Joseph Brant (brother-in-law), John Johnson (son), Guy Johnson (nephew and son-in-law), and Daniel Claus (son-in-law), and friends, such as John Butler and his sons, received the gifts of Johnson's authority. The Johnsons and the Butlers were officers in the Tryon County militia providing military protection to Johnson's authority (Watt 2002:27). Underneath this control was a growing tension. With the introduction of patriotic ideology, the tension found a manifestation- revolution and support of the Continental's cause.

With Sir William Johnson's death in 1774, British control over the Mohawk Valley broke. Johnson led the valley as a powerful individual; his death left a power vacuum that his family and friends were not able to fill in the face of local uprisings and patriotic or Continental government influences. Palatine Germans and Dutch settlers who were against British rule made the first move against Johnson's family by pushing the Johnsons and their friends out of the Tryon County Militia. In 1775, Colonel Guy



Johnson and Daniel Claus fled with their families and associates to Canada to escape the threat of Continentals (Watt 2002:22). In 1776, Continental Army Major General Philip Schuyler was ordered to disarm and arrest Sir John Johnson and those loyal to him in the militia. Before Schuyler could reach him, Johnson and his troops retreated across the Adirondacks to Canada (Watt 2002:29-32). The Johnson's abandonment of the Mohawk Valley left the control of the valley to the Continental Army and the Tryon County Militia.

While the Euro-Americans decided to side with the crown or the Continentals, the Haudenosaunee were in their own discussions concerning their allegiances. While his Loyalist Mohawk Valley neighbors fled to Canada, John Butler went to Fort Niagara and took the office of Acting Indian Supervisor (Watt 2002:37-38). From Fort Niagara John Butler worked to sway Native Americans to support the British's war against the Americans. Joseph Brant, a Mohawk chief, also actively campaigned for the Haudenosaunee to join the King (Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Graymont 1972; Watt 2002). Due to the threats of encroaching American settlement and a history of land claim disputes, the Mohawk had placed their allegiance with the British. On the Continental side, Samuel Kirkland and Continental Army Major General Philip Schuyler pushed the Oneida and Tuscarora to side with the Americans (Glatthaar and Martin 2007). Continental officials such as Major General Philip Schuyler and Major General Horatio Gates encouraged the other Haudenosaunee nations, the Seneca, Onondaga, and Cayuga, to side with the Continentals, or at the very least remain neutral (Berleth 2010:166,201; Gansevoort to Schuyler July 4, 1777; Gates to the Six Nations May 29, 1777 in Penrose 1981:76-77). Most of the Haudenosaunee, specifically the Seneca, Onondaga, and Cayuga, were content to remain neutral, seeing the American Revolution as a conflict within the European community that did not concern them. However, by 1777 "a significant number" of Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca were interested in establishing an alliance with the British (Raphael 2002:246).

From 1776 and into 1777, the pressures of both sides on the Haudenosaunee increased. Haudenosaunee war chiefs pushed for entering into the war, while the sachems tried to keep the Six Nations out of combat. Under the influence of Joseph Brant and in rejection of White settlement in their territory, the Mohawks put their allegiance with the King. The Oneida, under the influence of Samuel Kirkland, and remembering their treatment under William Johnson did not openly support the Americans, but did serve as advisors and scouts. In January of 1777, the Onondaga Nation suffered a massive outbreak of disease killing major chiefs and villagers. Members of the Six Nations took the outbreak as sign of the weakness of the community to handle the tensions brought on by the war. It was decided that the council fire would be temporarily extinguished (Graymont 1972:113; Kirkland to Schuyler January 19, 1777 in Penrose 1981:70-71; Raphael 2002:247). The council fire had served as a symbol of the unity of the Six Nations since the beginning of the Confederacy. With the extinguishing of the council fire, each member of the Six Nations received the freedom to choose a side in the war. This decision would lead to a civil war amongst the Haudenosaunee. Native American historian, Rick Hill (Public Archaeology Facility 2011:100-101), states that the council fire was not extinguished, but split with different communities holding their own council fires rather than one united showing the fracturing within the Haudenosaunee.



The tension among the various groups within the Mohawk Valley led to a complex and violent situation leading up to Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's invasion of the Mohawk Valley. Loyalist forces, having earlier evacuated to Canada, were eager to retake their homes and lands, while Continental forces attempted to retain control of the region. The community within the Mohawk Valley consisted of a population mixed with Continentals exerting control, Loyalists in hiding for fear of accusations of treason, and people attempting to remain neutral or outside of the conflict. St. Leger's expedition to the region would lead to the rising of these tensions to the surface and lead to a civil war among the Euro-American groups as well as the Haudenosaunee.

4.2 Preparations for the Invasion of the Mohawk Valley

In the winter of 1777, British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne developed an expansive plan to divide the northern rebels. He used his time in England during the winter of 1776 to 1777 to promote himself over then Governor-in-Chief Guy Carleton to government and royal officials. He also pushed his plan for the 1777 campaign (Watt 2002:45, 49). He laid out his plan in the "Thoughts for conducting the War from the Side of Canada". His treatise proposed various options of directing the war against the Continentals from Canada (Figure 10, p. 29). Lieutenant General John Burgoyne borrowed from and expanded upon the ideas of other British generals, most notably General Carleton and his halted campaign along Lake Champlain the previous year (Watt 2002). Lord Germain put his support behind Burgoyne and ordered Burgoyne's option of a main body moving south from Canada through the Hudson Valley, while a smaller contingent moved from the west along the Mohawk Valley towards Albany (Alden 1969:310-311). Both groups planned to meet in Albany. General Burgoyne's forces included over 8,000 British regulars and Hessians, 150 French Canadians, 100 Loyalists, and 400 Native American warriors, while Brigadier General Barry St. Leger led a group of approximately 1,900 British regulars, Hesse-Hanau Jagers, French Canadians, Loyalists, and Canadian and Haudenosaunee (Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga) Native American warriors (Alden 1969:311). Sir William Howe would provide additional support by moving north from New York City into the Hudson Highlands.

Burgoyne's meetings with members of the exiled Johnson family in Canada shaped his design for action in the Mohawk Valley. They told him that a strong contingent of Loyalists remained in the Mohawk Valley and the Johnson family's ties with the Haudenosaunee, specifically the Mohawk, would ensure their loyalty with Britain (Watt 2002:21, 33). Sir John Johnson's formation of a Loyalist force in the Mohawk Valley and their trek across the Adirondacks to Canada supported the idea of loyalist determination in the area (Watt 2002:30-32). Loyalists and Native Americans would rise up to support a small British contingent marching along the Mohawk Valley leaving the main body of British troops to move south along Lake Champlain and the Hudson Valley.



Figure 10. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne's 1777 campaign strategy.

Members of the Johnson family saw the Burgoyne expedition as a way to reclaim their lands and their positions within the colonial government. They had abandoned their properties for exile in Canada. They also lost much of their political influence, and became subject to the dictates of Governor-in-Chief Guy Carleton. Carleton did not favor the Johnson family and saw their exile as a way to exert his power over them (Watt 2002:32). William Johnson's political structure hinged on four main individuals related to the Johnson family: William Johnson's son, John, William's sons-in-law, Guy Johnson, Daniel Claus, and William's friend John Butler. All four had previously held leadership roles in the Tryon County militia (Watt 2002:27). William Johnson had chosen Claus to replace him as Superintendent of the Indian Department (Watt 2002:25). However, prior to his death, Johnson had second thoughts and chose Guy Johnson as his replacement as Superintendent of the Indian Department over Daniel Claus to keep the Johnson name associated with the office (Watt 2002:25). Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus attempted to influence Native Americans to join the British in war (Watt 2002:22). Carleton saw these moves as undermining his authority in Canada. In response, Carleton established his own Indian Department (Watt 2002:23). By reorganizing the Johnson familial structure, Carleton was establishing his authority over the Loyalists and their relations with Native Americans. In response, Guy Johnson appointed John Butler a Deputy-Superintendent of the Indian Department based at Fort Niagara (Watt 2002:37). Although Butler was at odds with Guy Johnson, Johnson saw this appointment as a way to maintain influence. He also



rejected Carleton's demand that he remain at Fort Niagara, instead travelling to Britain to directly appeal to British officials to secure his office (Watt 2002: 37).

The Johnson family, especially Claus, politicked in Britain to reclaim their positions. With some success, the Johnson family was able to establish themselves in positions of power within the St. Leger expedition. Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Sir John Johnson led the loyalist troops as the King's Royal Regiment of New York (KRR) (Watt 2002:33). Claus as a colonel led the Native American warriors, specifically those associated with Captain Joseph Brant. Lieutenant Colonel John Butler led a contingent of Indian Department Rangers. The exiled Loyalists had positioned themselves to retake the Mohawk Valley.

In 1776, the Oneida, along with Samuel Kirkland, asserted to the Continental authorities the importance of defending the Oneida Carry from invasion. They stressed that the carry had long been a vital transportation route linking the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers with the Great Lakes and would provide easy access for an invading army from Canada (Watt 2002:33-34). In response, under the leadership of Major General Philip Schuyler, the Continentals began rebuilding forts along the Mohawk Valley, specifically Fort Dayton (present-day Herkimer) and Fort Stanwix (to be renamed Fort Schuyler). The 3rd NJ and 4th NY regiments along with militia worked to build Fort Dayton before moving to Fort Stanwix (Watt 2002:34-36). The construction provided a material presence of the Continental Army claiming authority over of the Mohawk Valley.

After the French and Indian War, the British abandoned Fort Stanwix due to its loss of strategic value. In the years following its abandonment, Fort Stanwix had fallen into decay. Due to its important position in the Oneida Carry, Gen. Schuyler ordered Colonel Elias Dayton of the 3rd NJ to finish building Fort Dayton and move the majority of the troops to Fort Stanwix for its repair (Watt 2002:36). On July 12, 1776, they arrived to begin the reconstruction. Lieutenant Ebenezer Elmer (3rd NJ) provided a description of Fort Stanwix as he saw it on August 2, 1776:

The fort is exceedingly well situated, the ditch deep being the same which was made in the first erecting of it; the glacis being likewise old, the pickets even and low, the gates are strong without any ravelin to the front; the sallyport, leading out into low meadow ground, made it very commodious (Lt. Ebenezer Elmer as quoted in Scott 1936).

Lt. Elmer's description suggests that much of the fort consisted of the earlier architecture. Remarks from Col. Dayton to Maj. Gen. Schuyler suggest he was confident in the fort's reconstruction by engineer Nathaniel Hubble and its ability to withstand a siege (Dayton to Schuyler August 1, 1777 quoted in Luzader et al. 1976). Col. Dayton also used the occasion to rename the fort as Fort Schuyler.

Despite the work in 1776, reconstruction of the fort continued into the summer of 1777. In October of 1776, Colonel Samuel Elmore's Connecticut Regiment relieved the 3rd NJ. In December of 1776, the Continental Congress approved a resolution calling for increased construction at Fort Stanwix and the other forts in the valley (Luzader et al. 1976). Maj. General Philip Schuyler ordered that a French engineer, Captain B. de LaMarquise work to rebuild the fort (Luzader et al. 1976; Watt 2002:60). In



April of 1777, the 3rd NY regiment reinforced Col. Elmore and the Connecticut Regiment; Colonel Peter Gansevoort arrived on May 3, 1777. A week later, the Connecticut troops left the fort and on May 28, Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett and the rest of the 3rd NY arrived at Fort Stanwix (Luzader et al. 1976; Watt 2002:60).

Captain de LaMarquise's work on Fort Stanwix severely hindered the reconstruction of the fort. Although ordered to repair the fort, Cpt. De LaMarquise pushed to completely rebuild and redesign Fort Stanwix (Luzader et al. 1976). Lt. Col. Willett arrived at Fort Stanwix in the midst of the reconstruction and noted numerous errors and incompetency on the part of Cpt. de LaMarquise (Willett 1831:44). Willett noted numerous critiques: repairing rather than rebuilding the fort would be a simpler task; logs used for pickets were cut seven feet longer than needed; these were misplaced and badly designed pickets; and most detrimental, the new barracks being built outside the fort would be useless in the event of a siege (Willett 1831:44-45). The level of incompetence eventually led Col. Gansevoort to arrest the engineer and send him back to headquarters in July of 1777 (Willett 1831:45). There was little time to make up for the delays and mistakes in construction as the Brig. Gen. St. Leger's expedition had already begun his advance by the time of the engineer's arrest. Although they continued repairing the fort, they were not able to complete the renovations by the time of St. Leger's arrival.

Brig. Gen. St. Leger was unaware of the repairs conducted at Fort Stanwix and thought the fort was a minor stronghold requiring little artillery. Reports from Col. John Butler informed him that the fort contained a picket of 60 men (Claus 1777). Prior to the expedition's departure from Lachine, Col. Claus ordered Indian officer John Hare and Mohawk chief John Odiserundy to conduct reconnaissance of Fort Stanwix (Claus 1777). They returned with five prisoners and word of the repairs to Fort Stanwix (Claus 1777; Graymont 1972:118). Col. Claus claimed Brig. Gen. St. Leger ignored his suggestion that they improve their artillery supply in light of the apparent repairs to the fort (Claus 1777). Brig. Gen. St. Leger was going to rely on artillery he had, which included 2 six-pound and 2 three-pound cannons, and 4 cohornes (Claus 1777:719). The expedition was on its way with no halting of its advance.

4.3 St. Leger's Advance

On June 23, Brig. Gen. St. Leger's expedition began with Lt. Col. Johnson's KRR and Lt. Col. Claus leaving the ports of Lachine south of Montreal (Claus 1777). The next day, Brig. Gen. St. Leger left Lachine. Riding on a fleet of bateaus down the St. Lawrence River towards Lake Ontario were British regulars, French-Canadians, Hesse-Hanau Jagers, Mississauga and Haudenosaunee⁴ warriors (Figure 11, p. 36).

On July 8, the expedition arrived at Buck Island. The expedition remained at Buck Island for about ten days to allow the forces to regroup and resupply. While on the island, Col. Claus received his appointment to the position of Commander of the Indian forces. He also received the supplies Col. John Butler procured for the Native American warriors. Col. Claus claimed these were insufficient for his

⁴ Claus (1777:719) stated that while at Buck Island, he "collected a body of 150 Misisagey [sic] and 6 [sic] Nation Indians." He did not list which nations these warriors represented, but he did mention the presence of Mohawk warriors on the expedition from Canada. This suggests that British allied Haudenosaunee warriors were with the British advance starting from Lachine.



department's needs requiring him to resupply from his own sources (Claus 1777). On July 19, the expedition started its crossing of Lake Ontario.

While on Lake Ontario, Brig. Gen. St. Leger divided his forces. St. Leger had originally planned to send Col. Claus with Col. Johnson's KRR to Oswego and meet with the other forces, including Col. Butler, Capt. Brant and the Mohawk, while St. Leger would travel with the Mississauga and Haudenosaunee already with the expedition along the Salmon River and through the woods to surprise Fort Stanwix (Claus 1777). St. Leger's continued assumption was that Fort Stanwix was a picket and not a fully invested fort. He planned to quickly take the picket and open the Mohawk Valley to his force's invasion. On July 24, St. Leger sent orders for Claus to join him on his advance along the Salmon River. St. Leger's orders were met by Claus's demand that St. Leger supply aid to his forces in Oswego.

On July 23, Claus arrived at Oswego and met with Capt. Brant and 300 warriors (Claus 1777). Claus encountered a diplomatic disaster. To encourage Haudenosaunee, specifically Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga, to join the British, St. Leger had rationed a quart of rum per person and while waiting for the expedition's organization in Oswego many of the warriors had overindulged on the rum and created a level of disinterest in the expedition (Claus 1777). Brant asked Claus to stay to keep the Native Americans engaged in the expedition. Claus informed St. Leger of the situation and in response, St. Leger abandoned his march along the Salmon River to join the rest of the forces at Oswego (Claus 1777; Graymont 1972:124).

While the British forces prepared for the expedition, Cpt. Joseph Brant had continued his travels through Haudenosaunee territories attempting to sway the Haudenosaunee to side with the British. On June 27, Brigadier General Herkimer and members of the Tryon County Militia met with Cpt. Brant at the Village of Unadilla (Herkimer to Schuyler July 2, 1777 as quoted in Penrose 1981:81-82). His goal was to push for neutrality but also gain information on Brant's motives (Graymont 1972:116). Gen. Herkimer may have been pushing for neutrality, but tensions between Capt. Brant and Colonel Ebenezer Cox of the Tryon County Militia put an end to the first day's meeting. On the second day, Gen. Herkimer set up riflemen in the woods to kill Brant and his followers if the situation became violent (Watt 2002:83-84). Under pressure from Brant, Herkimer made multiple concessions before leaving Unadilla (Graymont 1972:117). Herkimer's concessions included allowing for protection of Loyalists in the Mohawk Valley. The meeting offered more for Brant than for Herkimer. Brant was able to freely travel throughout the region and promote his agenda, while Herkimer received little in information from or influence over Brant.

Brant was not the only British official attempting to sway the views of the Haudenosaunee. In mid-July 1777, Col. Butler held a weeklong council at Irondequoit with Seneca warriors, sachems, women, and children (Graymont 1972:120). Butler offered them rum and supplies. After a few days of revelry, he asked the Seneca to side with the British in war against the Americans. At first, the Seneca hesitated trying to honor promises to Americans to remain neutral (Graymont 1972:120). Butler added to the debate with glowing descriptions of the power of the British. As Mary Jemison, a Seneca, would later recount,



...the king was rich and powerful, both in money and subjects; that his rum was as plenty as the water in lake Ontario; that his men were as numerous as the sands upon the lake shore; and the Indians, if they would assist in the war, and persevere in their friendship to the king till it was closed, should never want for money or goods (as quoted in Raphael 2002:247).

Again, the Seneca discussed their involvement in the war. Some such as Cornplanter (Gayentwahga), remained against taking sides, but over the week, the Seneca decided to side with the British. They appointed two war chiefs, Sayenqueraghta and Cornplanter (Graymont 1972:122-123). Their entrance into the war was quick as Butler arrived with Seneca warriors at Oswego to aid in St. Leger's expedition on July 25 (Graymont 1972:124).

Following the arrival of Butler and St. Leger at Oswego, the expedition continued on to Three Rivers to meet with other Native American warriors. At Oswego, Butler and Claus fought over their ranks, as Claus outranked Butler, much to Butler's surprise. Claus also took most of Butler's stores for Brant's warriors leaving the Seneca and other warriors under supplied (Graymont 1972:125). At Three Rivers, Butler held another council with Native Americans in an attempt to push them to join the expedition. While Butler led the council at Three Rivers, the rest of the expedition continued towards Fort Stanwix. Butler arrived at Fort Stanwix three days after the rest of the expedition due to his delay at Three Rivers (Graymont 1972:127-128). Mary Jemison again offers some insight into the council at Three Rivers stating,

Previous to the Battle at Fort Stanwix, the British sent for the Indians to see them come and whip the rebels; and at the same time stated that they did not wish to have them fight, but wanted to have them just sit down, smoke their pipes, and look on. Our Indians went, to a man; but contrary to their expectation, instead of smoking and looking on, they were obliged to fight for their lives (quoted in Raphael 2002:251).

As with Irondequoit, Butler created a false sense of expectations for the warriors. He made it seem as if the warriors would be observers when Burgoyne and St. Leger intended the Native Americans to be active participants.

The main expedition body continued on to the Oneida Carry. Lieutenant Henry Bird of the British 8th Regiment led with a small party covering the distance from Three Rivers to Oneida Lake. They went by boat to Nine Mile Point on the north shore of the lake and camped (Lt. Bird Journal- July 29, 1777 from Stone 1970:221). They then marched ██████████ to Wood Creek (Lt. Bird Journal- July 30, 1777 from Stone 1970:221). At Wood Creek, the Continental Army's defenses halted the expedition's advance.

In an attempt to slow the British advance, Colonel Gansevoort ordered the obstruction of Wood Creek by cutting trees into the creek (Gansevoort to Gen. Philip Schuyler July 26, 1777- Papers of Continental Congress). This strategy had been in place since 1776 when Maj. Gen. Schuyler ordered



Colonel Elias Dayton that “upon the receipt of ... intelligence of the approach of an enemy thro Lake Ontario that you should cause the Timber on the banks of Wood Creek to be felled into it” (Schuyler to Dayton July 18, 1776). Schuyler also ordered Dayton to make any roads able to carry artillery impassable. The Continental Army cut timber into the creek for approximately 25 miles. The obstruction worked, blocking the advance along Wood Creek and they had to construct a road approximately 25 miles long from Fish Creek to the Carrying Place to allow for the transportation of troops, artillery, and supplies (Claus 1777; Lt. Bird Journal from Stone 1970:221; St. Leger 1777:44).

The Oneida had kept a watch on the progress of the St. Leger expedition’s march towards Fort Stanwix. They shared information on councils between British agents and Native groups, as well as movements of British agents with the Continentals (Glatthaar and Martin 2007; Penrose 1981). The Oneida realized they had a stake in the Continental Army’s success. They demanded that the Continentals make more of a stand at Fort Stanwix than Fort Ticonderoga. Fort Ticonderoga had fallen to Burgoyne’s advance on July 6 with little resistance from the Continentals (Watt 2002:98). The fall of Ticonderoga put fear into the Continentals as well as the Oneida. The Oneida had become increasingly associated with the Continental cause and as such linked to the success and failure of the cause. As an Oneida, Thomas Spencer strongly called upon the Continentals and militia in the Mohawk Valley to remain strong against St. Leger’s advance.

Brothers: Now is your time to awake, and not to sleep longer; or, on the contrary, it shall go with Fort Schuyler as it went already with Ticonderoga.

Brothers: I therefore desire you to be spirited, and to encourage one another to march on the assistance of Fort Schuyler. Come up, and show yourselves as men, to defend and save your country before it is too late. Dispatch yourselves to clear the brush of the fort, and send a party to cut trees in the Wood Creek to stop up the same.

Brothers: If you don’t come soon, without delay, to assist this place, we cannot stay much longer on your side; for if you leave this fort without succor, and the enemy shall get possession thereof, we shall suffer like you in your settlements, and shall be destroyed with you. We are suspicious that your enemies have engaged the Indians, and endeavor daily yet to strike and fight against you; and General Schuyler refuses always that we shall take up arms in the country’s behalf.

Brothers: I can assure you, that as soon as Butler’s speech at Oswego shall be over, they intend to march down the country immediately to Albany. You may judge yourselves that if you don’t try to resist, we shall be obliged to join them or fly from our Castles, as we cannot hinder them alone. We, the good friends of the country, are of opinion, that if more force appears at Fort Schuyler, the enemy will not move from Oswego to invade these frontiers. You may depend on it we are willing to help you if you will do some efforts too (Thomas Spencer as transcribed by Stone 1970:210-211).



The Continental soldiers at Fort Stanwix were aware of the approaching enemy not only from the Oneida's information, but also from the numerous attacks on the Oneida Carry. British allied Native Americans were already in the area of Fort Stanwix during June and July 1777. They made their presence known in the form of numerous ambushes and attacks. The first was on June 25 with the attack on Captain Gregg and Corporal Madison. Both men were in the woods surrounding Fort Stanwix hunting pigeons when they were ambushed (Lowenthal 1983:16; Willett 1831:46). The British allied scouts killed Corporal Madison and scalped Cpt. Gregg, but he survived the attack.⁵ A second attack occurred on July 3 against Ensign Spoor and seven men who were collecting sod for the reconstruction of the fort. British scouts killed one soldier, injured another, and took the other five prisoner (Lowenthal 1983:16). Based on the number of prisoners, this attack was probably the same one conducted by the reconnaissance ordered by Col. Claus. A third attack was made on July 27 [REDACTED]. Three girls were picking berries outside of the fort when British scouts attacked them. Two of the girls died in the attack, while the third escaped with a gunshot wound to the shoulder (Lowenthal 1983:18; Gansevoort to Van Schaick July 28, 1777). It is questionable if the victims were girls given their ages (Watt 2002:114). They were more likely teenagers, but identifying them as girls helped to raise public feelings against the British. These attacks put the fort on alert for an impending attack by British forces.

With the British approaching, Gansevoort attempted to make final preparations for a siege. Gansevoort demanded an increase in supplies noting spoiled meat, loss of food as gifts to the Native Americans, inferior artillery, lack of gun powder, and "... a great number of the gun bullets do not suit the firelocks, some bullet molds, for casting others of different sizes would be of great advantage to us" (Gansevoort to Schuyler July 26, 1777 as quoted in Penrose 1981:83). Supplies arrived intermittently or in insufficient amounts (Gansevoort to Schuyler July 4, 1777 as quoted in Penrose 1981:90-91). Gansevoort presented a bleak picture for the fort's preparations for a siege.

In response to his requests, at the end of July, bateaux were sent from Fort Dayton to resupply Fort Stanwix with ammunition and other supplies. The bateaux arrived at the lower landing of the Mohawk River near Fort Stanwix on August 2, 1777 (Willett 1831:49-50). Gansevoort ordered two hundred men from Fort Stanwix to aid in moving the supplies. During the transport of the last load to the fort, Lt. Bird's party of British soldiers and Native warriors entered the Oneida Carry (Lt. Bird Journal from Stone 1970; Willett 1831:50). The British attacked the lower landing. Most of the bateau men were able to escape uninjured. However, two men were injured, one was missing, and British forces took the boat captain prisoner (Lowenthal 1983:24). The following day, a party from Fort Stanwix found the

⁵ There is a story of Capt. Gregg's dog running to get help from the fort. Although Col. Gansevoort's account of the ambush does not mention the dog (Gansevoort to Schuyler June 27, 1777), other accounts maintain the importance of the dog to Capt. Gregg's survival. Lt. Col. Willett mentioned the dog in his account of the attack (Willett 1831:46) as did Continental Army Surgeon, Dr. James Thacher (Thacher 1862). Capt. Gregg's widow did state that Capt. Gregg was hunting with his dog. She also claimed that after the attack, the dog woke Gregg up, who quickly passed out. After awaking three hours later, Gregg sent his dog to find help. The dog attracted the attention of some Continental soldiers fishing about three miles away. They followed the dog back to Capt. Gregg and carried his body back to Fort Stanwix (Draper Papers Brant Papers V. 3). A descendent of Capt. Gregg informed Fort Stanwix National Monument staff that the family bible included listing of the dog (named Tray).



missing boatman shot in the head, scalped, and stabbed in the chest. They brought him back to the fort, where he quickly died (Lowenthal 1983:26).

On the night of August 2nd, the British advance party of Brig. Gen. St. Leger, Col. Claus, and Native American warriors arrived at the Oneida Carry (Watt 2002:127). They set up their camps throughout the Oneida Carry. Ens. William Colbrath's journal records that those in the fort could see the enemy's fires near Fort Newport suggesting the presence of camps (Lowenthal 1983:24). In preparations for an attack, those in the fort fired upon two barns outside of the fort and burned them (Lowenthal 1983:24). Colbrath (Lowenthal 1983:24) described the barns as being "a [l]ittle distant from the fort." Colbrath does not state who owned the barns, but five families were in residence around the fort in 1777 and the barns probably belonged to one of these families (Lowenthal 1983:24). The barns might have allowed coverage for any attacking forces. With both sides making final preparations, the Siege of Fort Stanwix had begun.




Figure 11. Path of British advance towards the Oneida Carry.



4.4 The Siege Begins

Oneida tradition marks the start of the siege with an anxious exchange between Brant and a young Oneida scout. British allied warriors, including Captain Joseph Brant discovered a seventeen-year-old Oneida scout, Paul Powless (Paulus), in the woods away from Fort Stanwix (Wonderly 2008 quoting Draper 11:202-4). As Powless started to retreat, Joseph Brant called him to stop, assuring Powless that Brant's warriors would not attack him. As both sides aimed guns at the other, Capt. Brant attempted to convince Powless to join him and the British with promises of rewards (Wonderly 2008 quoting Draper 11:202-4). Rejection of the British, Brant promised, would result in the destruction of the Oneida. Powless, continuing to aim his rifle at Brant, responded that the Oneida were allied with the Continentals and as a result would share in any "good or ill [that] might come" (Wonderly 2008 quoting Draper 11:202-4). Unable to change Powless's alliances, Brant and Powless went their separate ways, both racing each other to Fort Stanwix (Wonderly 2008 quoting Draper 11:202-4). This was the first direct engagement with the British forces (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:152). Powless's stand was a definitive statement of the Oneida's increased alliance with the Continentals during the siege and the rest of the war.

The beginning of the siege was less grandiose than Brig. Gen. Barry St. Leger may have expected. The majority of the British force was still attempting to bypass the obstructed Wood Creek. The construction of an alternative route resulted in the delay of St. Leger's supplies and artillery for days. The Loyalists and Canadians, under the command of Captains Hon Jost Herkimer and Jean-Baptiste-Melchoir, respectively, attempted to clear Wood Creek of its obstructions, while Sir John Johnson's KRR worked on constructing the new road bypassing Wood Creek (Watt 2002:131-132). Most of the Native American warriors were still making their way to the Oneida Carry following the discussions at Three Rivers and would not arrive until August 5 (Watt 2002:127). The main force with supplies and artillery would not arrive until after August 6 (Figure 12, p. 38).

On the afternoon of August 3, St. Leger stood what troops he had around the fort to provide a sense of force while making his demands (Lowenthal 1983:26; Watt 2002:127-128). Capt. Gilbert Tice entered Fort Stanwix under a flag of truce issuing St. Leger's demands of surrender (see Watt 2002:128-130 for the transcription of St. Leger's proclamation). Although St. Leger promised the protection of the Continentals if they surrendered, they refused to capitulate (Lowenthal 1983:26). The Continental troops dedicated themselves to withstanding the siege.

Brig. Gen. St. Leger made use of his limited forces by keeping up an attack on Fort Stanwix during August 4-5. Capt. Tice had informed St. Leger of the improvements he had seen in the fort (Watt 2002:130). St. Leger knew he could not fully engage the fort considering the much-improved condition of the fort and his delayed forces, especially the artillery. Rather than simply wait, St. Leger engaged the fort with the forces he had. Allied Native warriors and Hesse-Hanau Jagers fired small arms and rifles at the fort from the fort's garden, using the crops of potatoes, bushes, and weeds as cover (Lowenthal 1983:28; Willett 1831:50-51). Marksmen fired into the fort killing one guard in the northeast bastion of the fort (Lowenthal 1983:29). St. Leger's forces were also successful in firing shells into the fort from the British royals (cohorn) (Willett 1831:51).



The Continental soldiers reacted to St. Leger's attacks on Fort Stanwix by continuing to clear the area around the fort and set up preparation within the fort. On August 4, a party of Continentals left the fort to burn down a house and barn of a local resident, Mr. Roof, outside of the fort (Lowenthal 1983:28). They also brought in two haystacks to the fort's trench. This denied the British opportunities for concealment outside of the fort. Sharpshooters were also positioned across the fort to return fire at the British and their allies (Willett 1831:51). St. Leger's forces also took part in the razing of structures around the fort, specifically the Continental barracks constructed under the misguided direction of Cpt. de LaMarquise (Lowenthal 1983:29). It is uncertain how the Continental soldiers were using the barracks prior to the siege. Willett seemed to disapprove of their use and instead relied on the rebuilt barracks within the fort (Willett 1831:41). With the start of the siege, the soldiers probably abandoned the barracks seeking protection within the fort.

The Continental troops had seen the enemy and the enemy had already killed or wounded some of their fellow soldiers in those first few days. The shells fired into the fort made the siege a reality. Those in the fort were isolated. The troops could not leave the fort and all communication had been cut off to the outside (Lowenthal 1983:28). Willett (1831:51) described how on the night of August 5, "the Indians... spread themselves through the woods, completely encircling the fort, and commenced a terrible yelling, which has continued at intervals the greater part of the night." The yelling unsettled those within the fort, but the next day's events would prove worse for the soldiers.




Figure 12. Troop movements during August 5 to 6, 1777.



4.5 The Battle of Oriskany

With the start of the siege, Colonel Gansevoort had no traditional avenues to inform Major General Philip Schuyler of the fort's situation or to request reinforcements. However, the Oneida were able to spread the word of the start of the siege. Two Kettles, the wife of the Oneida chief Hanyery, left Fort Stanwix with the start of the siege and passed the British siege lines undetected. She travelled east across the Mohawk Valley stopping in Oriska (Oriskany), continuing to Fort Dayton, and then further down the valley spreading the word of the Siege of Fort Stanwix (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:153). The seventeen-year-old who stood against Brant at the start of the siege, Paul Powless (Paulus), also escaped the fort and made it to Schenectady to request help from Continental leadership (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:153-154). With Gen. Burgoyne approaching Albany, Maj. Gen. Schuyler had few resources to provide to Fort Stanwix. It became the responsibility of the Tryon Militia to relieve the siege at Fort Stanwix.

During July of 1777, the Tryon County Militia's Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer had established the foundation of the Tryon County Militia's response to a British invasion of the Mohawk Valley. On July 17, he issued a proclamation warning of a possible British invasion and the need for the militia to make a defense of their lands, properties, and families. This was followed on July 30, with word from the Oneida that the invasion was real and approaching. He called the militia to organize at Fort Dayton (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:155). Brig. Gen. Herkimer expressed to Maj. Gen. Schuyler his troubles raising militia troops to relieve Fort Stanwix (Herkimer to Schuyler July 1777). Herkimer stated that the British's alliances with Native Americans and the fall of Fort Ticonderoga created a fear within the militia that "...their poor wives and children would be then left helpless and fall prey to the merciless savages" (Herkimer to Schuyler July 1777). Many militia members chose to stay at home to protect their families and property. Such was their fear that the Committee of Safety countered Herkimer's orders that an advance party repair the road towards Fort Stanwix and ordered them to halt their march. To Herkimer, the situation was dire, as he could not see raising the required number of militia for the march.

Herkimer was able to raise approximately eight hundred members of the Tryon County Militia (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:155). Herkimer used pride, vengeance, and fear to push militia members into joining the march. He spread the details from Col. Gansevoort's letter describing the British attack on the three girls picking berries outside of Fort Stanwix (See Watt 2002:136-137). He also reiterated the story of Jane McCrae, a Loyalist who was attacked by Native Americans allied with Lieutenant General John Burgoyne's forces marching down the Hudson Valley (Watt 2002:138). These stories fueled the fear that if the British and their allies were attacking women and children, even the Loyalists, then no one was safe. For the militia members who were not inspired by these events, social pressure pushed them to serve. Local patriots would accuse those who did not answer the call of cowardice or treason. At Fort Dayton, the Tryon County Militia formed to start their march to save the Continental Army at Fort Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley from the threat of Native American violence.

The militia started their march towards Fort Stanwix on August 4, marching west along the north side of the Mohawk River to Fort Schuyler (Utica). Scott (1927:203-204) claims that the militia had few supplies in that they were set to relieve Fort Stanwix and not planning on a long expedition. Herkimer stated that he would probably only be able to rely on the militia's involvement for 16 days (Herkimer to



Schuyler July 1777). John Butler stated that the militia traveled with 15 wagons (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777). On August 5, the militia reached the Village of Oriska (Oriskany), where they encamped (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:155-56). It was at Oriskany where 60 Oneida warriors, including the chiefs Hanyery and Cornelius, joined the militia's march (Scott 1927:204). It was also on this day that Herkimer sent Adam Helmer and two others to Fort Stanwix to inform the Continentals of their arrival (Scott 1927:204). Herkimer had asked for a signal from the fort to confirm the arrival of Helmer and to encourage those in the fort to aid in his advance by pinning the British forces between the fort and the militia.

Supporters of the British had noticed the militia's march. On the night of August 5th, Molly Brant sent word to her brother, Joseph Brant, that General Herkimer and 800 soldiers of the Tryon County Militia were on the march to relieve the Siege of Fort Stanwix (Claus 1777:721; St. Leger 1777:44; Watt 2002:134). The approaching militia was to be within 10-12 miles of the British encampment by that night. St. Leger attempted to avoid being caught between Fort Stanwix and the approaching militia by directly engaging the militia (St. Leger 1777:44). With most of his troops still occupied by the clearing of Wood Creek and construction of the supply road, St. Leger could not devote a large number of regular troops to engage the enemy. By his account, he could only afford to send 80 "white men, rangers and troops included, with the whole corps of Indians" (St. Leger 1777:45). John Butler had recently arrived from Three Rivers with the Seneca and other Native Americans. St. Leger quickly put them into service to face the approaching militia. Sir John Johnson volunteered to lead the assault on the militia (Watt 2002:134).

The final formation of British forces to meet the militia was not particularly British. The majority of the force was composed of Native American warriors from the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Delaware Nations as well as Mohawks allied with Captain Joseph Brant. Sir Johnson with the KRR and Indian Department rangers with Major John Butler made up the next largest contingent. Butler had just arrived at the Oneida Carry when St. Leger ordered him to join the march (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777). Hesse-Hanau Jagers were probably the closest to actual British troops sent to meet the militia. The composition of these troops meeting members of the Tryon County militia based in the Mohawk Valley meant that the upcoming battle would be a local civil war rather than a representation of the larger revolution.

In preparations for the ambush, Brant sent a warrior to observe Herkimer's approach. The warrior hid himself within a hole and under hemlock brush about a mile from the Village of Oriskany (Oriska) (Jones 1851:344). The warrior secretly watched the Tryon County Militia pass by counting the number of troops. He was able to quickly return and inform Brant of the approaching militia. With this information, Butler, Brant, and Seneca Chief Cornplanter established a plan to ambush the approaching troops. Scott (1927:200-201) states that many historians give credit to Brant and Cornplanter with devising the plan for the ambush. He, however, notes that the British would not fully entrust the Native Americans with devising such plans and they probably served as advisors to Sir John Johnson, who chose the final plan. Butler gave credit for the original idea to the Seneca chiefs with Loyalist officers approving of the plan (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777). St. Leger (St. Leger 1777) and Claus



(Claus 1777) both attribute the plan to Johnson. They chose a location along the military road about halfway between the Village of Oriska and Fort Stanwix.⁶

The road was located on a rise south of the Mohawk River sided by woods. The rise was about 30 m (100 ft) higher than the Mohawk River. From descriptions, the road was more of a path than a formalized road in the area of the ambush. Historical descriptions during 1777 note that the road was cut through thick forest (Jones 1851:344) and was irregularly maintained path. Lt. Ebenezer Elmer of the 3rd NJ stated that in the spring of 1777, the road was in such bad condition that it was almost impassable (Stone 1970). In the summer of 1777, Maj. Gen. Schuyler had ordered Gen. Herkimer to clear the roads (Schuyler to Gansevoort July 8, 1777). In his July 17 correspondence to Maj. Gen. Schuyler, Brig. Gen. Herkimer claimed that the Tryon County Committee of Safety undermined his order for the militia to repair the road prior to his relieving of Fort Stanwix (Herkimer to Schuyler July 1777). The result was that the military road was unmaintained with heavy brush on both sides obscuring views of the surrounding landscape from the road.

The ambush site was located on a plateau between two main ravines. The ravine to the east reached a depth of approximately 9 m (30 ft) below the rise. The bottom of the ravine consisted of wetlands with a corduroy road constructed to cross the bottom of the ravine. The second ravine, to the west, reached a depth of approximately 4.6 m (15 ft) below the rise. These ravines provided a natural boundary for the heights associated with the ambush. Thick woods of hemlock, beech, birch, and maple bound the road on either side as it crossed the rise (Scott 1927:200). Within the woods was thick undergrowth. The position was perfect for a trap, sided by ravines and thick woods that provided cover for the Loyalist soldiers and Native American warriors. Blacksnake stated that the force's leaders chose the position of the ambush for pragmatic if not grim reasons,

[O]ur chiefs commander and other officers concluded the [sic] we should march [redacted] from our camps to on the choice ground where and we must [s]hed our whites [b]rothers and ourselves [b]lood over the Earth and the Bodies of the Deade [sic] one will forever laid [d]own, for the cause of obtaining the British government, the most object is going off three miles from the tents, for to keep the Stinking the Deade [sic] Bodies off from the tents (Blacksnake from Abler 1989:128).

There are two interpretations of the British allied forces' formation at the Oriskany ambush. Major John Norton, a student of Brant, claimed "The Line extended obliquely to the right, along the path by which the enemy were to advance" (Norton 1970:273). Other accounts state that the line was horseshoe shaped with warriors and Loyalists mainly positioned along the western side of the road (Scott 1927:235). It is probably likely that some warriors were positioned on the northeastern side of the road. Brant's Mohawk warriors lined the southern end of the ambush closest to the first ravine (Watt

⁶ Due to the lack of primary accounts, especially from members of the Tryon County Militia, the exact locations of troop positions and movements cannot be determined from documentary evidence. Curry (2000:263-265) identifies a lack of consistency between primary and secondary accounts that leads to an ambiguity in the analysis of the Oriskany Battlefield's landscape. Due to this uncertainty, the identification of troop positions is approximate based on the available primary documents.



2002:159) Johnson's KRR's and the Hesse-Hanau Jagers held position at the other end crossing the road near the second ravine. Along the side road Butler's Indian department Rangers and the Native American warriors (mostly Seneca) waited to spring the main attack. The original plan was to have the militia advance onto the rise with Johnson's KRR waiting to intercept their advance. Brant would encircle the militia's rear preventing any retreat. When the militia was blocked, the rangers and warriors waiting on the side would begin their attack. Such a plan required patience and adherence to timing. Graymont (1972:134) states that some of the Native warriors, such as Red Jacket, chose not to fight and left the battlefield. Many of the Seneca and other warriors were unprepared to fight in respect to a lack of firearms; instead, they armed themselves with hatches, knives, spears, or spontoons (Graymont 1972:134).

While the British forces prepared a tightly organized ambush, the Tryon County Militia approached with less order, split between Gen. Herkimer's hesitation and his officers' forcefulness. On the morning of August 6th, the Tryon County militia started their day waiting for the signal from Fort Stanwix. They had spent the night camped at the Village of Oriska near the confluence of Oriskany Creek and the Mohawk River. Herkimer tried to maintain patience and wait for confirmation of support. His officers, specifically Colonel Ebenezer Cox pushed him to advance. They accused him of cowardice and treason referencing his Loyalist family members, specifically Han Jost Herkimer (Scott 1927:204). Herkimer questioned their steadfastness in battle claiming they would retreat in combat and stated that he wanted to protect the militia. Yet, Herkimer fell to the pressure of his officers and gave the order to "March on" (Scott 1927:205).

The militia marched along the road towards Fort Stanwix in a column formation. At the front of the column was the 1st Regiment, followed by the 2nd Regiment, and the 4th Regiment. The 3rd Regiment was in the rear with the supply wagons (Watt 2002:148). Col. Ebenezer Cox led the 1st Regiment from the Canajoharie District, Col. Jacob Klock led the 2nd Regiment from the Palatine District, the 3rd Regiment from the Mohawk Valley District was led by Col. Frederick Visscher, and the 4th Regiment from the Kingsland-German Flats District was led by Col. Peter Bellinger. Oneida warriors under the leadership of Thawengarakwen or Hanyery Doxtater were part of the march. There were an estimated 100 Oneida aiding the Tryon County Militia during the Battle of Oriskany. Two Kettles and Paul Powless's warning not only pushed militia to join the fight, but Oneidas as well. Hanyery led Oneidas from Oriska as well as Oneidas from other villages (Wonderly 2008). Herkimer did not use the Oneida as scouts or flankers, which may have provided him with a warning of the awaiting ambush. Instead, it seems the Oneida mixed into the main body of the militia column. Thomas Spencer and his brother Edward were at the front of the militia's column followed by General Herkimer (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:158). It is unclear if Herkimer sent out scouts or flankers. The common belief is that he did not use flankers. However, Scott (1927:205) claimed that accounts of the battle suggest that Herkimer did use scouts, but they were either killed or unable to serve as scouts due to the constrictions of the ravine. Watt (2002:154, 159, and 160) claims that Gen. Herkimer used Oneida scouts and flankers, but the militia's biased view of Native Americans led them not to trust the scouts. In either case, Herkimer was ignorant of the force that awaited him.



At about 10 o'clock on the morning of August 6, Herkimer and the Tryon County Militia entered the ambush site (Graymont 1972:134)⁷ (Figure 13, p. 48). The main body moved steadily through the first ravine and onto the rise. The wagons and the 3rd regiment were crossing the wetlands at the bottom of the ravine when some of the British allied Mohawk warriors sprung the trap early yelling and charging at the militia with guns, tomahawks, and knives (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777; Cruikshank 1893:36; Graymont 1972:134; Watt 2002:160). Due to the early charge, most of the rear guard and supply wagons were not encircled in the trap. Members of the 3rd Regiment retreated while Col. Visscher attempted to rally them. Brant and the Mohawk warriors moved against the retreating rear guard killing any that could not flee fast enough (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161). The militia's surgeon Moses Younglove, states that the start of the battle caught the troops off guard and some, including Gen. Herkimer, believed it was a false alarm (Younglove NA). This belief was quickly rejected as the attack on the militia increased.

On the rise between the ravines, the fighting consisted of disordered hand-to-hand fighting. Col. Cox's regiment was the first fired upon after the attack on the rear (Younglove NA). They tried to make a stand in the road. The men formed a line firing into the trees. Once the militia troops fired their volley, the British allied warriors streamed out of the woods and attacked the firing line while the militia troops attempted to reload. Other warriors ran around the mass of troops attacking them with gunfire (Watt 2002:163). It appears that Col. Cox died during one of these charges against the 1st Regiment's line. Both of the Spencer brothers were killed during the battle (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161). It is uncertain when or where they died. It may have been during the attack on the front of the militia column that killed most of Col. Cox's first battalion, or if they went along with Herkimer to respond to the attack on the militia's rear.

The fighting at the front and rear of the militia's column added to the confusion of the battle. Gen. Herkimer had begun the march at the head of the column leading his troop, but with the ambush underway, he worked to rally them. Herkimer moved to the rear after hearing Visscher's attempts at rallying the militia's rear troops (Garrison 1778). The surprise of the ambush had put the militia into shock and disorder. Military organization failed as officers attempted to reform the troops and many soldiers attempted to flee. Herkimer rode his horse down the column calling for order and a reformation of the columns (Watt 2002:162). As Herkimer approached Col. Klock's 2nd Regiment, a fired ball hit his horse. The ball went through the horse and into his leg, shattering it (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161; Watt 2002:162). The horse fell and pinned Herkimer to the ground (Watt 2002:162). Militia troops helped to carry Herkimer to a rise and propped him against a beech tree.

Militia troops attempted to react as the attack moved from the militia's rear to the front of its column. Depositions from members of the militia, John Garrison and Ensign Garred Van Brocklin, claim that there was a movement along the column first to the rear and then back towards the front of the column, [REDACTED] (Garrison 1778; Van Brocklin 1778).

⁷ There are various alternatives for the timing of the battle. Moses Younglove puts the timing of the first fire on the militia at 11 am (Younglove NA). Adam Helmer states he arrived at Fort Stanwix at 1 pm (Continental Congress Item 67:69). Ensg. Colbrath places Helmer arriving at Fort Stanwix between 9 and 10 am (Lowenthal 1983:29). Reviewing these variations in timing, Scott (1927:207) places the start of the battle between 8 and 9 am with the battle concluding around 3 pm.



Ensign Garred Van Brocklin also described the British allied warriors as moving down the militia's column keeping a running fire at the militia (Van Brocklin 1778). The warriors' initial attack decimated the militia resulting in an estimated loss of 50 to 60 percent of the militia within the first thirty minutes of the battle (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161).

The chaos of the fighting continued with the road as the center of the fighting. For the militia, organization continued to break down as the Loyalists and their warrior allies killed their officers. Watt (2002:163-164) claims that the loyalist rangers targeted officers. British allied warriors entered the melee of the battle initially with knives, clubs, and tomahawks engaging in hand-to-hand combat. They eventually picked up the rifles and guns of fallen militia (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161; Watt 2002:163). With the collapse of leadership and the loss of soldiers, the remaining troops began to take cover behind trees. Such cover was limited as warriors and rangers would identify the smoke from a fired gun and quickly attack the position. The militia began to work together in teams with one firing and one readying a defense, while the other reloaded. This helped the survival of individual units, but the formation on the road had collapsed.

The Oneida were also involved in the melee fighting. Blatcop Tonyentagoyon fought armed only with a tomahawk in the center of the fighting (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:161-62). Louis Atayataronghta used his rifle to shoot British allied Mohawk, Seneca, and Cayuga warrior snipers hiding in the woods (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:162). Hanyery remained on his horse, while his wife, Two Kettles, and his son Cornelius Doxtader, remained on foot beside he and his horse firing muskets and pistols at the British forces (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:162). A musket ball hit Hanyery's right wrist. Two Kettles responded by reloading Hanyery's musket. During the battle, he and many other Oneida joined the fight with swords and tomahawks (Wonderley 2008 quoting Draper 11:196-197). The Oneida probably were fighting not just in the center of the battlefield, but on a rise that would become essential to the militia's survival.

The militia began to reform on an area of elevated ground north and east of the road. Herkimer formalized this reformation of the militia by ordering the formation around his position at the beech tree. With the chaos of the ambush, many of the militia's troops either did not hear or ignored the order. Younglove states that Cox was still alive during the regrouping on the rise. He states that Col. Cox threatened to shoot any troop that did not follow the order to regroup and fulfilled this promise by killing a member of the militia who would not follow the order to regroup (Younglove NA).

Order returned to the militia and the troops were able to establish a defensive position on the rise. The early start of the attack meant that the militia did not get near Sir Johnson's KRR and the Hesse-Hanau Jagers. The Loyalists and Hesse-Hanau Jagers were forced to come to the melee in the center of the ambush site. When they came close to the scene of the fighting, they began firing. However, the disorder and the hand-to-hand fighting meant there was little way for the KRRs and Hesse-Hanau Jagers to accurately fire at their enemy. Rather, they fired into the mass of combatants (Watt 2002:166). Seneca warriors would later accuse the Loyalists of friendly fire and the killing of one of their chiefs (Watt 2002:166). The KRR attempted to break the position with a bayonet charge, but the tight defensive circle held (Watt 2002:170-171). The battle reached an impasse with the militia's reformation. The militia was



not strong enough to push forward, but the Loyalist and their warrior allies were not strong enough to break the defenses.

The stalemate of the battle continued with the arrival of a rainstorm across the field. The rain fell for about an hour (Scott 1927:211; Watt 2002:175) as both sides took whatever shelter they could. During the rain, the remaining militia improved their defenses tightening their circles and sheltering themselves with the downed trees and stumps in the elevated area. The Loyalists and warriors positioned themselves outside the militia's circle waiting for a break in the storm to attack (Figure 14, p. 49).

Following the storm, Sir John Johnson attempted to break the stalemate. He had learned from Butler's interrogation of prisoners that Herkimer was expecting help from Fort Stanwix (Watt 2002:179-180). With this information, he developed a scheme to enter the defensive circle. He ordered his KRR troops to turn their coats inside out and approach the militia's defense circle as allies (Campbell 1831:80; Scott 1927:215; Stone 1970:238; Watt 2002:178). Some of the militia welcomed the approach of the disguised Loyalists. However, Captain Gardinier sensed the ruse and warned the militia of the enemy's approach. Gardinier ran forward to intercept the Loyalists. While fighting with some of the KRR, he fell to the ground (Scott 1927:215-216; Stone 1970:238-240; Watt 2002:180-182). KRR troops bayoneted both of his thighs pinning him to the ground. A KRR soldier moved to bayonet him in the chest. Gardinier grabbed the musket from the soldier and pulled him to the ground to use him as a shield. Militia private Adam Miller aided Gardinier by killing one of the Loyalists pinning Gardinier to the ground. The soldier being used as a shield by Gardinier rose up and attempted to kill Pvt. Miller. Freed by Pvt. Miller's aid, Gardinier killed the soldier with a spontoon, saving Pvt. Miller. Slowly the militia believed Gardinier's claim of the enemy's ruse and attacked the disguised rangers. The KRR though were close enough to charge into the militia's circle.

With the Loyalists entering the militia's defenses, outright civil war ensued. Loyalist and Patriot Mohawk Valley residents met each other within the circle fighting with bayonets and using muskets as clubs (Stone 1970:240; Watt 2002:182-184). As the Loyalists fought within the circle, the warriors pushed from outside the circle. This pressure led to a collapse of the militia's defense. The militia again had lost control. Loyalists and warriors were about to make a final push against the militia when they became aware of fighting near their camps around Fort Stanwix.

While the Battle of Oriskany raged, those in Fort Stanwix waited to determine a response. The morning of August 6 had been calm around the fort. Those in the fort noticed that the warriors positioned around the fort left towards the lower landing along the Mohawk River (Lowenthal 1983:29). Ensign Colbrath stated that between 9 and 10 in the morning, three militiamen enter the fort informing the commanders of the militia's approach (Lowenthal 1983:29; Willett 1831:51). The leader of these three men, Adam Helmer, brought news of the Tryon Militia's approach to the fort and a request that those in the fort come out and support the militia (Continental Congress Item 67:69). The fort fired the three shots requested by Gen. Herkimer informing them of the receipt of his message (Lowenthal 1983:29). The noise and chaos of the battle probably kept the militia from hearing the signal.

Col. Gansevoort ordered Lt. Col. Willett to take 200 men and a three-pounder artillery piece with 50 other men down the road to aid in the militia's approach (Figure 15, p. 49). Willett postponed his sally



from Fort Stanwix for about an hour due to a rainstorm (Willett 1831:51). This storm is most likely the same that temporarily halted the Battle of Oriskany. Between 1 and 2 o'clock, Willett with 200 to 250 men and artillery (3lb cannon) left the fort (Continental Congress Item 67:69; Lowenthal 1983:31; Willett 1831:53). Willett's advance stopped between a half-mile and a mile down the road when they encountered Sir John Johnson's KRR encampment (Continental Congress Item 67:69; Lowenthal 1983:31). Willett ordered his troops to carry as much material from the camp as they could and burn the remaining supplies (Continental Congress Item 67:69).

The British realized their encampment was under attack and quickly initiated a response. St. Leger claimed that Willett's forces approached Lt. Bird's position on the Lower Landing of the Mohawk River (St. Leger 1777:44). He saw Willett's advance and ordered Capt. Hoyes to flank Willett encircling Willett between Lt. Bird and Capt. Hoyes. Lt. Bird left his position after he was falsely informed that Sir John Johnson required aid (St. Leger 1777:44). To help Hoyes, St. Leger led the British soldiers to intercept Willett and push him into retreat into the fort (St. Leger 1777:45). As Willett's forces approached the Upper Landing and the location of the former Fort Williams, 200 British troops appeared to engage the Continentals (Continental Congress Item 67:69). The Continental's artillery officer, Captain Savage, immediately set up artillery to respond to the British threat (Continental Congress Item 67:69). Along with the artillery, Willett was able to establish a firing line (Willett 1831:53-54). The British were unable to set up their own firing line under the Continental's fire and retreated to the main British camp. With the British gone, he was able to scour Johnson's camp and the nearby Native American camp taking supplies and goods from the camps back to the fort over numerous trips. One of the main prizes collected from the camp was a collection of Sir Johnson's papers.

Willett (1831:53-54) claimed that the officer that he surprised was Sir John Johnson. Historians (Scott 1927; Watt 2002:191) suggest that Johnson returned to camp during the battle's lull before Butler's final push into the circle. Brig. Gen. St. Leger makes no statement on Johnson being within the camp during Willett's sortie. Rather his description of the sortie has him leading the troops against Willett (St. Leger 1777). Willett captured a prisoner in the camps during his sortie, a Lieutenant George Singleton of Johnson's regiment (Willett 1831:55). Singleton claimed to have been injured at the Oriskany Ambuscade and Sir John Johnson brought him back to the camp (Willett 1831:132-133). Singleton also stated that Johnson was in the camp when Willett attacked it (Willett 1831:53-54). Singleton's account along with the capture of Johnson's personal papers and belongings from the camp, probably convinced Willett that he had been engaging Johnson rather than St. Leger.

In the end, Willett's sortie was a success. He collected a large amount of enemy supplies, killed 15-20, and captured 4 prisoners, all without one casualty (Continental Congress Item 67:69; Lowenthal 1983:31). The most important result of Willett's sortie was its effect on the Battle of Oriskany. Those fighting heard the noise of small arms and artillery fire just prior to the ranger and warriors' final push against the militia. Many of the warriors became concerned for the condition of their families and supplies left in the camps outside of the fort. The warriors left the field. With no support from their native allies, the Loyalists and Hesse-Hanau Jagers also left the field to take care of their camps.



Although the militia kept their position in the field, they had experienced a major loss of troops during the battle. Of the estimated 800 soldiers that entered the ambush site, 130 to 150 remained fit for duty (Watt 2002:185). Butler claimed they had killed 500 militia, including most of the officers (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777). Most of the militia's officers and the members of the Committee of Safety were killed in the battle. The survivors collected what wounded they could and left the field returning towards the Village of Oriska. Those who could continue marched to the remains of Fort Schuyler 12 miles from the battlefield to spend the night (Watt 2002:188). The remnants of the militia returned to their homes. Militia soldiers took Gen. Herkimer to his home to address the mortal wound to his leg. The militia and their families made no major effort to recover the dead from the battlefield in fear of another ambush. Many of the community's able-bodied men died at the Battle of Oriskany and the community was limited in their attempts to retrieve the remains. Oneida oral tradition states that Oneida women from the Village of Oriska under the cover of darkness attempted to help injured militia and Oneida warriors (Nancy Demyttenaere Personal Communication 3/27/2013). There are no documented accounts of Oneida losses (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:164). As noted, the two Spencer brothers were killed and Hanyery was injured. Due to the large number of killed and injured on both sides, it is probable that the Oneida also had a high number of casualties during the battle.

The British allied warriors also suffered major losses. Claus (1777:721) stated that the losses for the British included 3 officers, 2 to 3 privates, and 32 Native American warriors. St. Leger stated that 30 Native American warriors were killed and another 30 were wounded. Butler stated the losses included 2 officers killed, one wounded, and the Native American allies suffering 33 killed and 29 wounded mostly from the Seneca (Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777). Graymont (1972:138) places the number at 33 killed and 29 wounded with the Seneca having 17 killed and 16 wounded based on Butler's accounts. Five Seneca Chiefs were killed (Graymont 1972:138). Their losses continued when they returned to camp and found it pillaged. As Col. Claus (1777:721) stated, "the disappointment was rather greater to the Indians than their loss, for they had nothing to cover themselves at night, or against the weather, & nothing in our Camp to supply them till I got to Oswego." Blacksnake described the violence of the battle when he stated, "there I have Seen the most Dead Bodies all it over that I never Did see, and never will again I thought at that time the Blood shed a Stream Running Down on the Decending ground" (Blacksnake from Abler 1989:128-130).




Figure 13. Troop positions at the initiation of the Battle of Oriskany.




Figure 14. Troop positions during final combat at the Battle of Oriskany.




Figure 15. Troop movements related to Willett's Sortie.



4.6 Finalizing the Siege

The violence of the Battle of Oriskany did not end the conflict within the Mohawk Valley. The Loyalists and their Native American allies decimated the Tryon County Militia. Brig. Gen. St. Leger's forces were finally able to make use of the artillery by opening the supply road from Fish Creek to the Oneida Carry. The British were in a favorable position to conquer Fort Stanwix. The Continental troops did have some hope despite the loss of aid from the Tryon County Militia. Lt. Col. Willett's sortie had struck a blow to British morale, especially their Native American allies, and gathered key intelligence from Sir John Johnson's papers. However, they were still limited on supplies and had no information on when or if another relief force might arrive. The siege was still far from decided.

The day after the Battle of Oriskany was fairly quiet in terms of arms fire in the area surrounding Fort Stanwix (Lowenthal 1983:32). St. Leger's artillery was able to pass by the log and timber obstructions in Wood Creek. Following Willett's sortie, St. Leger ordered the construction of fortifications throughout the Oneida Carry. He had a two-gun battery with mortar beds, and three redoubts built near his camp to defend against another attack similar to the sortie (St. Leger 1777:45). He also sent Captain Lernoult with 110 men to build another artillery battery at the Lower Landing on the Mohawk River. The battery consisted of three-pound guns aimed at both the fort and the approach to the Oneida Carry, and along the military road. The true nature of the siege began to set in as St. Leger entrenched his troops.

On August 8th, the British put their new confidence in their military prowess and fortifications to use. Col. John Butler along with a captain and a doctor brought a message from St. Leger demanding the fort's surrender (Lowenthal 1983:33; Willett 1831:55). Col. Gansevoort, Lt. Col. Willett, and Colonel Mellon met with Col. Butler and his officers. Willett (1831:56) described the meeting as genteel, with the room filled with officers and the discussion of demands over wine, cheese, and crackers. The British claimed that with the loss of Herkimer's forces, there was no hope of aid for those in Fort Stanwix and that General Burgoyne had already reached Albany. However, if they surrendered the fort, the British would protect them from harm. St. Leger claimed that only with effort was he able to keep the Native American warriors from exacting revenge for their losses on August 6th. If the Continentals refused to surrender, St. Leger could not promise to hold back the warriors and they would most likely attack not only the fort, but the Mohawk Valley as well (Willett 1831:56). Willett replied to Butler and St. Leger's demands by stating,

You have made a long speech on the occasion of your visit, which, stripped of all its superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from a British colonel, to the commandant of this garrison, to tell him, that if he does not deliver up the garrison into the hands of your Colonel, he will send his Indians to murder our women and children. You will please to reflect, sir that their blood will be on your head, not on ours (Willett 1831:57).



The consequences of the siege became clear to both sides. Col. Gansevoort refused St. Leger's demands, but allowed their surgeon to visit with the British prisoners taken during Willett's sortie and agreed to a temporary cease-fire (Willett 1831:58).

St. Leger may have been somewhat sincere in his claims of attempting to hold back his Native American allies. Some Native Americans, such as Mary Jemison, stated that they were "deceived into the campaign" (Stone 1970:243). The British asked the Native Americans to observe rather than participate in the fight, but once on the field the warriors felt obligated to join the fight. With the loss of warriors, chiefs, and materials, they began to wonder how worthwhile this expedition was (Graymont 1972:139-141; Stone 1970:243-244). However, they also wanted revenge for their losses. The British allied Native Americans were reeling from their losses at the Battle of Oriskany. They tortured and killed the prisoners taken at Oriskany despite attempted intervention by the British (Graymont 1972:139; Walrath 1833; Younglove NA). Brant and some of the other warriors pushed to follow the remaining Tryon County Militia and kill them (Graymont 1972:139-141). The British allied Native Americans' morale was hurt by the events of Oriskany and Willett's sortie, pushing them to seek retribution either on those in the fort or along the Mohawk Valley.

Those in Fort Stanwix recognized the dire situation. They were isolated from the outside. The British had blocked communication coming to and from Fort Stanwix and any potential relief was lost at the Battle of Oriskany. The fort's leadership saw the need to get word to Albany that they required aid. They were uncertain if the Continentals in Albany knew of their situation. It was decided that Lt. Col. Willett and Major Stockwell would leave the fort and secretly travel to Albany to send word of Fort Stanwix's need for aid. Willett left the fort in the early morning of August 9th (Lowenthal 1983:34).

Lt. Col. Willett and Maj. Stockwell took great care to remain undetected on their expedition. To remain light and able to move quickly in the woods, they took only a minimum of supplies including spears, cheese and crackers, and "a quart canteen of spirits (Willett 1831:60). They did not take guns, blankets, or baggage. Willett's path began at the fort's sally port, across the wetlands surrounding the fort towards the Mohawk River. While crossing the swamp, they skirted the camps of the British allied Native Americans. They continued in the general direction of the Mohawk River. After traveling 50 miles in about two days, they arrived at Fort Dayton near German Flatts.

At Fort Stanwix the siege continued. St. Leger formally demanded the Continental Army's surrender of Fort Stanwix on August 9. Col. Gansevoort refused leading to resumption of small arms and artillery fire (Lowenthal 1983:37). Artillery fire became the standard as St. Leger attempted to break the fort with his barrages. By August 15, Ens. Colbrath counted 137 shells fired by the British at the fort. On August 11th, the British altered the course of the creek used by the Continentals for drinking water. The fort's inhabitants began digging wells to replace the water (Lowenthal 1983:39). The pressure of the siege led some of the fort's troops to desert, fleeing to the enemy (Lowenthal 1983).

St. Leger's artillery was incapable of breaking through the fort's construction (St. Leger 1777:45). The 137 shells accounted by Colbrath had made little effect on the fort. St. Leger noted that deserters had informed the British that a six-inch plank protected the fort's powder magazine (St. Leger 1777:45). If his artillery could break through the planking, the explosion of the magazine would destroy



much of the fort. Artilleryman Lt. Glenie proposed converting one of the cohorns into a howitzer and firing horizontally into the fort to destroy the magazine (St. Leger 1777:45). The British attempted the conversion on August 16th, but had little success beyond killing a Continental soldier on the fort's parade grounds (Lowenthal 1983:43). The cohorns were unable to hold enough powder to account for the required distance needed to break into the fort, resulting in the shell falling short (St. Leger 1777:45). St. Leger quit his reliance on artillery and ordered the construction of trenches to approach Fort Stanwix to allow for the placement of a mine under the fort (St. Leger 1777:45). The trenches also would have allowed the placement of cohorns closer to the fort (Watt 2002:230-231).

The British trenching had more success than the artillery in threatening the fort. The French Canadians serving under St. Leger acted as the engineers excavating the trenches towards the fort (Watt 2002:211-212). The French Canadian's commander, Capitaine Hertel De Rouville, stated that the trench excavations were mismanaged. He claimed that the excavations resulted in a trench that was 100 feet long, but only 3 feet deep (Hertel 1945). He also asserted that the chief engineer made a mistake in laying out the trench resulting in the deaths of some of the French Canadians (Hertel 1945). Despite the error, the trenches were effective at threatening the fort. By August 19, the trenches had reached to within a 150 yards of the fort (Lowenthal 1983:46). The Continentals attempted to stall the engineers by firing small arms and artillery into the trenches (Lowenthal 1983:47, 48). The British attempted to use their Native American allies to distract the fire at the trenches by having the warriors advance towards the fort (Lowenthal 1983:48). Fort Stanwix's situation was becoming increasingly precarious as the constant bombardment was hurting morale and leading to desertions from the fort. The trenches were getting closer and ammunition was running low.

Meanwhile, as General Burgoyne continued his advance down the Champlain and Hudson Valleys, and St. Leger was closing in on Fort Stanwix's fortifications, the Continental Congress was attempting to change leadership in the Northern Army. New England members of the Continental Congress pushed for the removal of General Philip Schuyler. The Continental Army's quick evacuation and surrendering of Fort Ticonderoga in the face of General Burgoyne's approach frustrated many of the New England representatives (Berleth 2010:215; Graymont 1972:151). They accused him of being a traitor. John Adams went as far as to state, "We shall never be able to defend a post until we shoot a general" (as quoted in Berleth 2010:215). The Continental Congress ordered Major General Horatio Gates to replace Schuyler as head of the Continental Army's Northern Army.

Even as Schuyler was being replaced, he established a plan to relieve the Siege of Fort Stanwix. Gen. Schuyler had ordered Brigadier General Ebenezer Learned's Massachusetts brigade to help in the relief of the fort (Willett 1831:61). This took 900 Continental soldiers from halting General Burgoyne's advance in an attempt to stop St. Leger. Major General Benedict Arnold volunteered to lead the relief of Fort Stanwix with Brig. Gen. Learned's brigade and the 1st NY Regiment (Berleth 2010:245; Glatthaar and Martin 2007:167). Maj. Gen. Schuyler pushed Maj. Gen. Arnold to involve the Oneida on his relief march. Schuyler hoped that the violence of the Battle of Oriskany convinced the Oneida to fully give up neutrality and with the added incentive of \$1000 and the promise of a council in the fall would join Arnold's march (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:168). Leaving Albany to organize his troops at Fort Dayton, Arnold called on the remaining Tryon County militia to join the fight. Oneida warriors willing to serve in the fight and as scouts also aided Arnold.



On August 16, an outcome of the Battle of Oriskany played out at Gen. Herkimer's home near Little Falls (east of Herkimer). Major General Arnold's surgeon, Robert Johnston, amputated General Herkimer's leg seeing it as the only way to heal the general. However, General Herkimer died later that day (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:164; Watt 2002:231-233). The following day, Maj. Gen. Arnold and Lt. Col. Willett left Herkimer's home and with the relief column left for Fort Dayton. Events at Fort Dayton would lead to a changing momentum in the siege.

Frustrated by the slow progress of the siege, Sir John Johnson proposed a plan to send about 200 soldiers to the Mohawk Valley to attack Patriots and encourage the rising up of Loyalists within the Valley (Claus 1777:721). St. Leger refused citing his need for troops for the siege. Instead, a flag, or group of 14 troops, including Ensign Walter Butler (son of John Butler), 10 soldiers, and 3 warriors went to the Mohawk Valley to encourage Mohawk Valley Loyalists to rise up (Claus 1777:721). Willett (1831:61) states that the number included 6-8 soldiers and 8-10 warriors. On August 15, while at Rudolph Shoemaker's tavern in German Flats the flag was arrested by a contingent from the nearby Fort Dayton (Watt 2002:227; Willett 1831:61-62).

On the night of August 17, Major General Benedict Arnold arrived at Fort Dayton. He was briefed on the arrest of Walter Butler and the others at German Flats (Watt 2002:233). Arnold arranged for a court martial on August 20 with Lt. Col. Willett serving as judge advocate and Butler defending himself (Watt 2002:233-234; 236; Willett 1831:62). The court martial found three of the accused guilty of spying or desertion and they were sentenced to death. The rest, including the warriors were treated as prisoners of war (Watt 2002:238).

Shortly after the completion of the court martial, Oneida scouts informed Arnold of the situation of Fort Stanwix. The scouts provided information on the number of troops St. Leger had around Fort Stanwix, about 1,700 troops and warriors (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:167). Arnold's forces amounted to between 900 and 1,000 troops and warriors (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:167; Watt 2002:242). The situation provided pause to the normally brash Arnold. He was unable to organize the number of troops needed to stand against Brig. Gen. St. Leger's forces and relieve the siege. An inequitable engagement was especially questionable after the Battle of Oriskany. For Arnold to succeed, he needed an alternative.

Hon Jost Schuyler provided the basis of a plan that would effectively end the Siege of Fort Stanwix. As a member of Walter Butler's Flag, Hon Jost Schuyler was sentenced to death. His mother pleaded with Arnold to spare his life (Graymont 1972:144). Arnold promised to do so if Hon Jost would aid Arnold's plan. Hon Jost served Arnold's plan at two levels. Since Hon Jost served with the British, he could convince the British of Arnold's forces. Hon Jost's personal and family history with Native Americans, specifically the Oneida, allowed him the ability to speak with the British allied warriors and convince them of Arnold's strength and the futility of remaining in the siege (Watt 2002:224, 246). The plan required Hon Jost to enter St. Leger's camp and tell St. Leger of Arnold's approach (Watt 2002:245). The plan hinged on Hon Jost convincing St. Leger that Arnold's forces greatly outnumbered the British forces besieging Fort Stanwix, a massive exaggeration. Hon Jost claimed that Arnold's troops "were as numerous as the leaves in the forest" (Graymont 1972:144). To add to the story, Arnold provided a bullet riddled coat to Schuyler making it seem that he had escaped. Oneida scouts, posing as British allied Haudenosaunee, staggered in the camp supporting Schuyler's account.



When Hon Jost's account of Arnold's approach reached the British allied warriors, they began their retreat. They had become tired of the siege and its lack of direct combat and the approach of a larger army made them question the value of fighting at Fort Stanwix (Graymont 1972:144). St. Leger attempted to keep his Native American allies in the fight, but they had already started to leave. At a council with his officers and allied Native American chiefs, he was told that 200 warriors had already left (St. Leger 1777:45). The chiefs suggested that he leave as well. With the prospect of no support from his Native American allies and a large force under Gen. Arnold approaching, Gen. St. Leger agreed to begin the retreat (St. Leger 1777:46). St. Leger had planned to begin his retreat the night of August 22, taking the sick and wounded to Wood Creek. However, another false account came in that the enemy was within two miles of the Lower Landing at the Mohawk River. This information caused a panic among the British and their Native allies and pushed the retreat to occur before noon of August 22nd (Watt 2002:250,253,255). Both groups rushed towards Wood Creek to catch the bateaus leaving to cross Oneida Lake (Figure 16, p. 56). The flight was so quick that those digging in the trenches did not hear of the retreat and only discovered as they saw their comrades fleeing (Hertel 1945; Watt 2002:252). While some ran, others plundered the supplies left in the abandoned camps.

On the morning of August 22, the Continentals in Fort Stanwix had no information of Arnold's approach or St. Leger's retreat. The morning began with artillery fire (Lowenthal 1983:49). Around noon, a deserter informed the Continentals that St. Leger was retreating due to an approaching force. To confirm this story, Col. Gansevoort ordered fire onto the British batteries. There was no return fire. Later in the day, more men came to the fort claiming St. Leger's retreat. Col. Gansevoort ordered 30 men with two wagons to enter the enemy's camps. The soldiers captured 4 prisoners and killed two warriors. They also filled both wagons with baggage from the camps (Lowenthal 1983:49). That night, Hon Jost Schuyler entered the fort and informed them of his part in Arnold's ruse. Besides the sudden leave of the camps and associated goods, St. Leger's forces left bateaus at Wood Creek and a cohorn near a bridge crossing Wood Creek (Lowenthal 1983:49-50). Col. Gansevoort sent three troops to intercept Arnold and inform him of the retreat.

As the British retreated, Arnold rushed from Fort Dayton to Fort Stanwix. "The excessive bad roads and necessary precautions in marching thro' a thick wood retarded us so much that we have but this moment reached whit place" (Arnold to Gates August 23, 1777). Arnold pushed his troops to reach Fort Stanwix quickly, but was wary of the possibility of ambush following the Battle of Oriskany. His march brought his forces across the Oriskany battlefield where the remains of the fallen remained unburied. Arnold reached Fort Stanwix on August 24. He immediately dispatched troops to follow the retreating British. The Continentals followed the British to Oneida Lake, but were only able to see the last of the British boats leaving the shores of Oneida Lake and the Continentals ended their pursuit (Arnold to Gates August 24, 1777). When St. Leger reached Onondaga Falls, he realized Arnold's ruse. St. Leger sent a letter to Carleton "which shewed, in the clearest light, the scenes of treachery that had been practices upon me" (St. Leger to Carleton August 27, 1777). The messenger carrying the letter to St. Leger stated that Arnold's forces were limited and "that there was not an enemy within forty miles of Fort Stanwix."

With St. Leger's retreat, the fight centered on Burgoyne's advance down the Hudson Valley. Major General Arnold brought his troops back to the Hudson Valley to attempt to halt Burgoyne's advance. Oneida joined with the Continentals in their fight at Saratoga (Wonderly 2008). One hundred



and twelve Oneida and Tuscarora traveled east to support General Gates push against Burgoyne (Watt 2002:279). The Continentals and native allies were able to leave the Mohawk and provide support at the battles of Freeman's Farm, which allowed a heavy loss to Burgoyne's numbers (Watt 2002:289).

The British allied warriors under Joseph Brant also pushed east. Brant arrived with Canajoharie Mohawks at Burgoyne's location on August 28 (Watt 2002:269). British forces with St. Leger also pushed east to join Burgoyne's forces. St. Leger's forces expected to leave Oswego and reach Burgoyne's army via the St. Lawrence River. However, on September 8, Governor Carleton ordered the British 8th Regiment to travel to Buck Island and disperse their supplies to the upper posts (Watt 2002:276). The result was the loss of much of St. Leger's force. The remaining expedition traveled on and reached Montreal on September 22 (Watt 2002:279). After resupplying, St. Leger's forces were sent to reinforce British forces at Fort Ticonderoga. They reached the fort on September 27 (Watt 2002:287). While St. Leger was occupied at Fort Ticonderoga, Burgoyne was facing a more concentrated Continental force supplemented by those forces that were previously in the Mohawk Valley. Burgoyne's loss at Bemis Heights left him outnumbered and surrounded. He surrendered on October 17, 1777.

St. Leger's expedition was supposed to be a supportive role for Burgoyne's main advance down the Hudson Valley. In distracting the Continental Army and rallying loyalist and Native American sentiment against the Continental Army, St. Leger's expedition was to provide strength to Burgoyne. However, St. Leger's inability to take Fort Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley led to Burgoyne's weakness and ultimate surrender. Even with the defeat of the Tryon County Militia at the Battle of Oriskany, local militia and Continentals took inspiration from Fort Stanwix's refusal to surrender. By holding Fort Stanwix, the Continental Army forced St. Leger into retreat and the Mohawk Valley's Continental and militia forces and their Oneida and Tuscarora allies were free to support Gates's army in the Hudson Valley.




Figure 16. Troop movements during the final days of the siege and Maj. Gen. Arnold's advance.

4.7 Aftermath

In the aftermath of defeat, Loyalist officers were compelled to place the blame on others, and requested reimbursement for expenses. Colonel Claus was the most blatant of accusers as he attempted to place much of the blame on Butler by stating that Butler's bad information led St. Leger to believe Fort Stanwix was not well fortified (Claus 1777). He also claimed that although St. Leger assured him that Butler had sufficient supplies waiting for Claus and allied Native Americans, when he arrived at Oswego, Joseph Brant told him of the lack of resources and Butler's encouragement of unruly behavior and alcohol consumption among the Native Americans (Claus 1777). Claus claimed that he had tried to save the situation by informing St. Leger of Fort Stanwix's fortifications and by bringing his own supplies, for which he requested compensation. Claus's attempts at justifying his role failed. Guy Carleton's response to Claus's request for orders was a simple statement of no further orders. Claus's command had ended (Graymont 1972:157). Carleton's response to Claus was scathing. In a letter, Carleton questions the fact that he has paid Claus, Butler, Sir John Johnson, Captain Tyce, and Captain Fraser for what Carleton saw as the same expense. Carleton stated,



It appears to me therefore extremely improper to be paying large sums of money to so many different hands for the same purpose, and it is become highly necessary to put the direction of these matters under one Person, who cannot with propriety be any other than the Commanding officer at Niagara to whom therefore I must refer this Business, and consequently your demand, as he is the best judge what expenses are necessary to be incurred, ... (Carleton to Claus October 20, 1777).

With this statement, Carleton finalized the fighting between Claus and Butler.

The formation of Butler's Rangers formalized Butler's authority. In a letter dated September 15, 1777, Carleton ordered the raising of a Ranger unit to be under Col. John Butler's leadership.

By the virtue of the power and authority in me vested by the King, I do hereby authorize and empower you, or such officers as you shall direct, by beat of drum, or otherwise, forthwith to raise, on the Frontiers of this Province, as many able bodied men, of this Majesty's loyal subjects, as will form one Company of rangers, to serve with the Indians, as occatin [sic] shall require... (Carleton to Butler September 15, 1777).

Butler's Rangers quickly became a formidable force along the frontiers of what would become Pennsylvania and New York. They conducted raids and ambushes on outposts and settlements, most notably the Cherry Valley Massacre and Wyoming Valley Massacre (Berleth 2010; Graymont 1972; Williams 2005). Occasionally, Butler's Rangers would join Brant's Native American warriors in raids and campaigns.

The ability to conduct such widespread raids was the result of the losses suffered by the Tryon County Militia at the Battle of Oriskany. The militia lost most of their officers and a large number of troops at the battle. Either out of fear of another ambush or that British forces would attack their homes and farms if left defenseless, surviving militia became hesitant to continue to serve with the militia (Tryon County Safety Committee to Governor George Clinton September 7, 1777). As a result of a declined militia presence, settlements throughout the Mohawk Valley and west of the Hudson Valley became open to raids throughout 1778 (Berleth 2010; Graymont 1972; Williams 2005). The destruction of farms led George Washington to order the Sullivan-Clinton campaign in the summer of 1779 (Public Archaeology Facility 2010; 2011; 2012). Continental troops followed a scorched earth campaign against the British allied Haudenosaunee burning their villages and crops. Those who served at Fort Stanwix during the siege as part of the NY First and Third regiments were part of the Sullivan-Clinton campaign. The result of the Sullivan-Clinton campaign was a decimation of much of British allied Haudenosaunee territory, specifically Seneca and Cayuga, and the retreat of British allied Haudenosaunee villagers to Fort Niagara to request help from the British.

One major result of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany was the division among the Haudenosaunee. The Battle of Oriskany saw open warfare between members of the Haudenosaunee Nations. Those members of the Six Nations that preferred neutrality or were hesitant to take sides



changed following the battle. The Seneca's losses of supplies during Willett's sortie and the loss of chiefs at the Battle of Oriskany turned the Seneca from neutrality to supporters of the crown. The effect of the Battle of Oriskany and the subsequent raids on the Oneida was to cement their alliance with the Continentals. Following St. Leger's retreat, Oneida warriors hurried to Saratoga to help the Continental Army defeat Burgoyne (Wonderly 2008). The Oneida also aided the Continental Army beyond the Western frontier at Valley Forge and the Marquis de Lafayette at Barren Hill (Wonderly 2008).

The Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga saw the Oneida's involvement in the Battle of Oriskany as disloyal to the rest of the Six Nations. In retribution, British allied Haudenosaunee attacked the Village of Oriska (Oriskany) (Home of Oneida Chief Hanyery) shortly after the Battle of Oriskany (Wonderly 2008). In 1780, the British at Fort Niagara imprisoned Oneida elders Skenandoa and Good Peter and led the attack on Kanonwalohale (Oneida Castle) (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:252). Brant regularly made direct attacks on the Oneida and attempted to attack the Oneida refugees in Schenectady and Canajoharie (Wonderly 2008). Following the destruction of the Oneida Villages of Oriska and Kanonwalohale, Oneida confiscated Loyalist and British Allied Mohawk properties including those of Joseph Brant's sister, Molly Brant (Wonderly 2008). Hanyery moved into Molly Brant's home (Graymont 1972:147). Chair of the Tryon County Committee of Safety, Peter Deygart, encouraged the Oriska refugees to replace their losses by attacking the Mohawks (Graymont 1972:147). The division between Loyalists and Continentals, and among Haudenosaunee became manifest in acts of vengeance and raids throughout the war.

It is easy to see the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany as separate events, but this ignores how the two events influenced each other and together influenced the American Revolution. The siege and the battle have seemingly separate landscapes with unique aspects that may make them seem as isolated events. However, they were both part of a larger event, Brig. Gen. St. Leger's expedition in the Mohawk Valley. The siege was the main event of St. Leger's expedition and the Battle of Oriskany was a direct result of the siege. The Tryon Militia met with members of St. Leger's force at the Oriskany Battlefield because of the militia's goal to relieve the siege. Lt. Col. Willett's ability to leave the fort and successfully attack the Loyalist and British allied Native American camps was because those forces were engaged at the Battle of Oriskany. The decimation of the militia at Oriskany prolonged the siege, but Willett's sortie helped to assure that St. Leger would not have an easy victory if he were to have a victory at all.

Understanding that these two events had a shared landscape rather than separate ones is central to seeing the integration of these two events. The next section details the defining features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. By understanding these features and their role in the conflict, the landscape serves to tell a detailed story of the siege and the battle and how both were part St. Leger's expedition into the Mohawk Valley.



Table 1. Chronology of Mohawk Valley Military Events during the Summer of 1777.

British Forces

Continental Forces

June and July- Preparations

Montreal: **Brigadier General Barry St. Leger** prepares for the expedition. **Colonel Daniel Claus** sends a group of Native American warriors to reconnoiter Fort Stanwix.

Fort Stanwix: Continental Army prepares for expected attack on the Oneida Carry by rebuilding and reinforcing Fort Stanwix (Schuyler).

June 23: The British leave Lachine, Canada beginning their advance to the Mohawk Valley along the St. Lawrence River.

June 25: **Capt. Gregg** and **Corporal Madison** are ambushed while hunting pigeons. British scouts kill **Cpl. Madison** and scalp **Capt. Gregg**, who survives his wounds.

July 3: British scouts ambush **Ensign Spoor** and seven men while Spoor and the other Continental troops were cutting sod to repair Fort Stanwix. One soldier was killed, another was injured, and the other five were taken prisoner. This ambush was probably related to the reconnaissance sent by **Daniel Claus**.

July 8: **St. Leger's** forces arrive at Buck Island (Carleton Island) to reorganize and supply the expedition.

July 19: British forces leave Buck Island and begin the crossing of Lake Ontario.

July 23: British forces arrive at Oswego. At Oswego, Captain Joseph Brant and his Mohawk warriors join the British advance. Colonel John Butler holds councils with Seneca and other Haudenosaunee in attempts to convince them to join the British side.

July 27: British allied Native American scouts ambush **three girls** picking berries outside of Fort Stanwix. Two of the girls died, while the third survived her gunshot wound to the shoulder.

July 28: **Colonel Gansevoort** sends women with children, the sick and injured away from Fort Stanwix.

August 1: **Oneida** warriors inform Fort Stanwix of the approaching British forces.

August 2: Bateaux arrive from Fort Dayton (Utica) to resupply Fort Stanwix. British forces under **Lt. Henry Bird** arrive in the carrying place and begin attack on bateaux. The Siege of Fort Stanwix begins.

August 3: Main body of British forces arrives and surrounds Fort Stanwix.

August 4: Small arms fire throughout day at Fort Stanwix.

August 5: There is continued fire against Fort Stanwix; British forces burn down the new barracks built outside the fort.

August 6: Battle of Oriskany occurs southeast of Fort Stanwix; **Lt. Col. Marinus Willett's** attack on the Loyalist and British allied Native American camps serves to distract the British forces.

August 7: Continued firing around Fort Stanwix. The British set up artillery batteries and redoubts.



- August 8:** With the British artillery batteries established, they continue to bombard the fort. **Colonel John Butler** enters Fort Stanwix with ultimatum for Fort Stanwix's surrender. **Lt. Col. Willett** begins expedition to Albany.
- August 9:** Continentals refuse to surrender and firing begins again. **St. Leger** starts trenching towards Fort Stanwix.
- August 11:** British cut off Fort Stanwix's water supply by diverting creek. The Continental soldiers replace the water supply by digging wells within the fort.
- August 13:** **Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold** moves to take control of relief force based at Fort Dayton. He joins up with **Lt. Col. Willett** in Albany. **Walter Butler** travels through Mohawk Valley to recruit Loyalists.
- August 14:** The British continue their artillery attacks on Fort Stanwix. **Maj. Gen. Arnold** arrives at Caughnawaga to take control of Tryon County Militia 3rd Regiment.
- August 15:** Continental authorities arrest Walter **Butler** in German Flatts.
- August 16:** British try to fire howitzers horizontally at the fort, but they have little effect. **Gen. Herkimer** dies of wounds received at the Battle of Oriskany.
- August 17:** British quiet around Fort Stanwix. **Maj. Gen. Arnold** arrives at Fort Dayton to organize relief force.
- August 19:** While continuing the artillery attacks on Fort Stanwix, the British have also begun excavating trenches towards Fort Stanwix. The British trenches are within 150 yards of Fort Stanwix.
- August 20:** Continentals use small arms to slow trenchers. **Walter Butler** sentenced to death.
- August 21:** As part of a deal to avoid the death for treason, Loyalist **Hon Jost Schuyler** is sent to deceive **St. Leger** into thinking a large body of militia is on its way to relieve Fort Stanwix.
- August 22:** **St. Leger** believes **Hon Jost Schuyler's** ruse and begins to retreat. Siege of Fort Stanwix is over.
- August 24:** **Gen. Arnold's** relief force arrives at Fort Stanwix. **St. Leger's** forces were already on move to Oswego.



V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS

5.1 KOCOA Determination

The main unit of study for this project is the defining feature. A defining feature, as either a natural or a cultural feature, is the basic unit in the KOCOA system of military terrain analysis. Developed by military experts and historians, the KOCOA system is a specialized technique for landscape analysis in which natural and cultural terrain features or landmarks are studied for their relation to a battle. KOCOA is an acronym that stands for:

- Key terrain
- Obstacles
- Cover and concealment
- Observation points
- Avenues of approach and retreat.

How a defining feature was used during a battle defines its categorization in the KOCOA system. Although a feature may have had multiple functions during the battle by the different sides in the conflict, to be termed a defining feature, the feature must meet at least one of these uses. The importance of a defining feature is based upon its role in determining the success or failure of a military unit in the battle.

Table 2 (p. 62) lists the defining features related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. These defining features are limited to those features or landmarks discussed in the historical records reviewed for this study. The list includes the major and influential features related to the battles. The table is divided into five sections: terrain or topographic features, road and transportation networks, structures or villages, fortifications, and miscellaneous. Records for each feature also include descriptions of its location; relevance to the battle; comment; its KOCOA description; and an integrity assessment. Appendix III (p. 231) lists a full record of all accounts recorded for the KOCOA analysis. Figures 18-21 (pp. 68-71) shows the location of the major defining features.



Table 2. Defining Features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix/Battle of Oriskany.

This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 17. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 18. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 19. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 20. Inset A of Figure 19.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 21. Inset B of Figure 19.



5.2 Historic Perspectives of Defining Features

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany were both part of a complex set of movements and strategies across the Mohawk Valley over the summer of 1777. To detail the importance of the siege and battle's defining features this section details the historical relevance of the defining features associated with the siege and the battle. This section presents Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's expedition into the Mohawk Valley into four sections to simplify the complexity: 1) Preparations and the British Advance 2) The Battle of Oriskany and Willett's Sortie 3) The Siege and 4) The British Retreat. This division of the discussion of the defining features presents an integrated history for the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany that also shows how they had a shared landscape.

Preparations and British Advance

The **British Advance** () is an extensive defining feature reaching from Lachine (near Montreal) across the St. Lawrence River, Lake Ontario, and inland along rivers, creeks, and lakes until it reaches the Oneida Carry. There are other defining features encompassed within the overall British Advance including **Lachine, the St. Lawrence River, Buck Island, Salmon Creek, Lake Ontario, Oswego, Three Rivers, Oneida Lake, Nine Mile Point, the Royal Block House, Wood Creek, Fish Creek, and the British Supply Road**. St. Leger's expedition stopped to resupply and regroup his forces and rally and organize volunteers. The majority of these defining features are avenues of approach due to the relation these defining features had to advancing the British forces towards Fort Stanwix. Wood Creek and other features more directly associated with Fort Stanwix and the Continental forces had other KOCOA categorizations.

The ports of **Lachine**, Canada () mark the start of the British Advance. St. Leger left Lachine with the goal of taking Fort Stanwix; therefore, for the purposes of this project the advance begins at Lachine. St. Leger's fleet started to leave Lachine on June 23, 1777, with St. Leger and his artillery leaving on the 24th (Claus 1777:719). The boats followed the St. Lawrence River west although members of the British advance did not detail the exact course.

In early July, St. Leger's forces began to congregate on **Buck Island** (now called Carleton Island) (). St. Leger reached the island on July 8. The island served as a staging position that allowed St. Leger to regroup and organize his forces after travelling the St. Lawrence River and before entering Lake Ontario. On July 19, the expedition left the island and entered Lake Ontario. Again, the exact course of St. Leger's fleet could not be determined, but most likely they stayed relatively close to the shore.

While on Lake Ontario, St. Leger began to put his strategy for taking Fort Stanwix into action. He and a group of 250 allied warriors and the 8th and 34th Regiments split from the main expedition force (Claus 1777:720) (). The rest of the expedition was to continue on to Oswego. St. Leger's strategy was to use the small force to cross inland starting from Salmon Creek south to the Oneida Carry and surprise Fort Stanwix. The small force was at Salmon Creek on July 24 when Claus informed St. Leger that his strategy would not occur as planned due to difficulties at Oswego.



Oswego offered another chance for the expedition to regroup after crossing Lake Ontario. Sir John Johnson and the King's Royal Regiment of New York (KRR) stayed on an island away from Oswego, while Col. Claus and the rest of the expedition organized in the fortifications at Oswego. The expedition arrived around July 23. They met with Captain Joseph Brant and his Mohawks as well as Colonel John Butler and the Indian Department's Rangers (Claus 1777:719). Butler was to use Oswego to rally members of the Six Nations to the British cause and help to supply them and the expedition. Brant claimed that Butler failed in his task causing St. Leger to abandon his march from Salmon Creek and join the rest of the expedition at Oswego (Claus 1777:719-720). On July 26, the expedition left Oswego towards Fort Stanwix. In a letter dated July 28, 1777, Thomas Spencer informed Colonel Gansevoort that the British had passed Oswego and were on their way to Oneida Lake and Wood Creek (Spencer to Gansevoort July 28, 1777). The expedition continued to make use of boats on their march towards the fort.

Three Rivers's location [REDACTED] made it an expected destination for the expedition ([REDACTED]). It was here that Butler was to have another attempt to rally members of the Six Nations. Thomas Spencer gave warnings to the Continentals of this meeting saying that he and the Oneida would propose peace, but expected to be ignored (Journal of the Council of Safety 1:1026). Three Rivers was also a point along the British Advance to Fort Stanwix. Lt. Bird led a small group towards Fort Stanwix ahead of St. Leger's main force. His march was postponed at Three Rivers while allied warriors prepared for the march (Bird 1777). The expedition continued along the Oneida River from Three Rivers to Oneida Lake.

Oneida Lake served as a major landscape feature for the expedition (Figure 18, p. 68). Lt. Bird's forces were the first to cross the lake. They did so by rowing from the confluence of the Oneida River to Nine Mile Point. His method of crossing the lake was described as "order'd [sic] the Boats to keep 70 yards behind each other-half the men kept there [sic] arms in their hands whilst the other half row'd Orded, on any of the boats being fired on the men arm'd to jump on shore- the rest to support them with all expedition" (Bird 1777). This order suggests that the boats ran along the Oneida Lake's shoreline in case the men had to jump to shore.

Nine mile point [REDACTED] shore of Oneida Lake that served as a stopping point for the expedition (Figure 18, p. 68). Lt. Bird and St. Leger both stopped there separately to camp before proceeding to Wood Creek. The exact location of Nine Mile Point could not be determined, [REDACTED]. Following encampment at Nine Mile Point, the British forces marched along Oneida Lake towards Wood Creek. [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] On August 1, Oneida scouts informed the Continentals at Fort Stanwix of the appearance of 100 men at the blockhouse and ready to march to Fort Stanwix (Lowenthal 1983:24). The British most likely used the blockhouse as a staging area for their march.



When the British arrived at **Wood Creek**, they found that the Continental soldiers from Fort Stanwix had blocked it by felling timber into the creek for about 20 miles (Claus 1777:720; St. Leger 1777:44) ([REDACTED]). The timber present across the creek served as a major obstacle to the British advance. As Wood Creek was a major transportation route, the Continentals had long planned the use of this tactic to slow the progress of the British towards the Oneida Carry. In letters from Major General Philip Schuyler to Colonel Elias Dayton during August and September 1776, Schuyler directed Dayton to maintain scouts between Fort Stanwix and Oswego to identify any approach by the British. In the event of any approach, “Do not forget to fill Wood Creek with Timber, as that will considerably retard their progress, if they mean an attack upon your post” (Schuyler to Dayton September 7, 1776). With the information provided him by the Oneida and Thomas Spencer, Col. Gansevoort ordered fatigue crews to fill Wood Creek with timber (Gansevoort to Schuyler July 26, 1777; Lowenthal 1983:18).

With Wood Creek obstructed, the British had to revise their mode of approach to Fort Stanwix. Thomas Spencer suggested that the British would send their artillery and supplies up **Fish Creek** (Spencer to Gansevoort July 29, 1777) ([REDACTED]). The British did follow Fish Creek [REDACTED] and from there constructed a **British Supply Road** to the Oneida Carry (Claus 1777:720; St. Leger 1777:44) ([REDACTED]). [REDACTED] The Loyalists began the work on the road, but the British finished construction on the road. The Loyalists went to intercept the Tryon County Militia on August 6 (St. Leger 1777). The road followed an older road built during the French and Indian War (Hagerty 1971).

While the British were advancing on **Fort Stanwix**, the Continental army at the fort, under the leadership of Colonel Gansevoort, was preparing for the siege and dealing with the encroaching threat (Figure 20, p. 70). In June, Col. Gansevoort informed Gen. Schuyler that repairs on the fort were progressing, although slowly (Gansevoort to Schuyler June 15, 1777).

One of the main features described by Gansevoort in his correspondence was the new **Continental Barracks**. [REDACTED] The new barracks were also in the location of a Mr. Thomas Mair’s barn. Both the Oneida and Col. Gansevoort distrusted Mr. Mair. They suspected him of spreading counterfeit money and providing erroneous information on Butler’s approach to the Oneida Carry (Gansevoort to Schuyler June 27, 1777). Gansevoort also proposed to tear Mr. Mair’s house down due to its proximity to the fort. The demolition of Mr. Mair’s property was probably a useful means to push him out of the Oneida Carry while rebuilding the fort. The Continental troops did not use the barracks during the siege since the structure was outside of the fort (Willett 1831:44-45). The British burned the barracks on August 5 (Lowenthal 1983:29).

Another feature that Continental forces thought could be used by the British for cover and concealment were two **barns** a “little distant from the fort” (Lowenthal 1983:24). Thirty men with cannon destroyed the barns on the night of August 2. The burning of the barns was part of the overall preparations for the siege not only at the fort, but in the surrounding area as well. It is unclear from the documents if the barns were related to the fort’s use, such as a stable or if they belonged to Mr. Mair.



Besides preparing for the siege, the Continentals had to address the threats imposed by the approaching British. In addition to the general expedition force, the British also had allied warrior scouts spread across the countryside between Oswego and the Oneida Carry. Thomas Spencer stated that British allied warriors blocked the roads preventing movement of Oneida scouts and himself (Spencer to Gansevoort July 29, 1777). The threats of the British forces also manifest themselves in small attacks in the area of the fort. There were three ambushes in the Oneida Carry prior to the start of the Siege of Fort Stanwix. The ambushed victims were part of the Continental forces tied to Fort Stanwix or living in association with the fort. The ambushes provided evidence of British allied Native Americans being present around the fort and the impending attack on the Oneida Carry.

The first **ambush was on Captain Gregg and Corporal Madison** on June 25 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On July 3, **Ensign Spoor** and between seven and 16 privates were ambushed while cutting sod at the ruins of Fort Newport. The result was that one soldier was killed, one wounded, and five taken prisoner. These prisoners were most likely the same taken to **Buck Island** (Claus 1777:719).

The last ambush occurred on July 27, when three girls were attacked while picking berries [REDACTED] outside of Fort Stanwix. The **Berry Girls Ambush** resulted in two of the girls being killed and scalped with the third shot in the shoulder.

On August 2, the first of the British expedition arrived in the Oneida Carry (Abler 1989:127). The main British force arrived on August 3 (Lowenthal 1983:26). The British and their allies set up fires near the ruins of Fort Newport on the night of August 2, giving evidence to the Continentals of their arrival (Willett 1831:130). The siege had begun.

Battle of Oriskany and Willett's Sortie

The siege had just begun when St. Leger received word that the Tryon County Militia was coming to support the forces in Fort Stanwix. The British were still constructing their camps and the supply road to bring the artillery to the Oneida Carry. With the British busy with the road, the Loyalist forces under Sir John Johnson and John Butler along with their Native American allies, including Captain Joseph Brant and his Mohawks and Cornplanter and the Seneca went to engage the Tryon County Militia before they could support those in Fort Stanwix.

There is little written detail on the spatial movements of the battle of Oriskany. Much of this is due to the loss of officers on the side of the militia who would have written official accounts of the battle. The history of the Battle of Oriskany often includes local traditions and insights that may or may not be reflective of actual events. Researchers based the identification and description of defining features related to the battle on primary accounts when available.



With word that the Tryon Militia was coming to the Oneida Carry to help relieve the siege, the Loyalists and the British allied Native Americans left the siege area on the **Oriskany Advance** towards the Village of Oriskany to intercept the oncoming militia (Figure 21, p. 71). The Seneca Blacksnake stated that an ambushade was established [REDACTED] from their camps “to keep the stinking the dead bodies off from the tents” (Abler 1989:128). The **Oriskany Ambuscade** was centered on the **Military Road** on the high ground between two ravines (Campbell 1831:78). A **Ravine** bounded the east end of the ambushade. A swamp defined the **Ravine Bottom** with a small stream flowing through it and a corduroy bridge crossing the stream and swamp. East of the Ravine was the **Eastern Heights**, while west of the ravine was the **Western Heights** and further west was a small ravine that served as the northwestern border of the ambushade. Surrounding the military road was the thick **Oriskany Woods** that offered ready cover for the Loyalists and their allies (Figure 21, p. 71).

Major John Norton, a protégé of Captain Joseph Brant, stated that the ambushade consisted of Native American warriors concealed in the woods along the Military Road. Johnson’s position was at the north end of the line crossing the road (Norton 1970:273). Capt. Brant and the Mohawks positioned them to the south of the line. The plan was to have the militia cross the ravine and come atop the Western Heights. When the militia was mostly on the heights, Brant’s Mohawks would run to the militia’s rear cutting off their escape. The Loyalists would block any militia advance down the road and the main line of the ambushade would charge into the militia. The British forces established an effective trap for the militia.

The Loyalists and their allies added to the information on the approaching militia by establishing an observation point along the military road. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The British allied warriors placed a warrior in the hole to observe the approaching militia while remaining concealed. When the militia passed, the warrior left the hole and informed the British forces of the militia’s approach.

The exact location of the **Military Road** is difficult to determine. It does not coincide with the present road (NY 69). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A previous study (Graf 2000) attempted to use historic descriptions and remote sensing to identify the location of the road. Remote sensing has had limited success in identifying the location of the road. The difficulty in identifying the location of the road results from the lack of an actual formal road.

Descriptions of the military road during 1777 suggest that the road was not a formal road, but rather an irregularly maintained path. In spring of 1777, Lt. Ebenezer Elmer (3rd NJ) described the road as virtually impassible (Scott 1936). Arnold complained to Gansevoort that the delay in his march was due to the bad condition of the roads (Arnold to Gansevoort August 22, 1777). Gen. Schuyler had ordered Gen. Herkimer to clear the roads in the summer of 1777 (Schuyler to Gansevoort July 8, 1777), but apparently there was little result. The lack of road clearing would have resulted in undergrowth on the sides of the road and little in soil disturbance that would be identifiable by remote sensing.



The **Militia Advance** towards Fort Stanwix begins at the Oneida Village of **Oriskany**. General Herkimer rallied members of the Tryon Militia at **Fort Dayton** and marched towards **Fort Stanwix** along the **Military Road**. The militia encamped at Oriskany on the night of August 5 where Oneida warriors joined the march on the morning of August 6. The Village of Oriskany was an Oneida Village located where the military road crossed Oriskany Creek. It was composed of two Dutch houses and numerous Native American residences (Lt. Ebenezer Elmer in Stone 1970:235). After leaving the village, the militia continued northwest along the military road.

The attack from the Oriskany Ambuscade halted the militia's advance about two miles from the Village of Oriskany. The militia had not completely crossed the ravine before the attack began. Mohawk warriors began their attack as the militia's baggage wagons began to cross the ravine bottom. The Mohawk did not fully surround the militia's rear and many militia troops retreated as Brant's Mohawk warriors cut others down. The rest of the militia was on the Western Heights moving forward when the main line of the ambuscade attacked. The main attack hit Colonel Ebenezer Cox's 1st Regiment, inflicting massive losses on the regiment. Cox's Flank was positioned on the Military Road (Younglove NA:1). The men attempted to stand their ground, until the majority were killed or wounded.

Gen. Herkimer was injured during the initial phase of the battle while he rode his horse down the column. His men sat him against a **Beech Tree** within the center of the **Western Heights** where he gave orders to the floundering militia. To increase their defenses, Gen. Herkimer ordered the militia to retreat towards and encircle the **Western Heights**.

The disorder of the battle was evidenced by Dr. Moses Younglove's account of Capt. Fox's Advance. Younglove (NA:2) states that Capt. Fox was near the front of the militia's column at the northwest edge of the battlefield near the Hessian's position. Looking for the safety of other militia, Capt. Fox confused the Hessians for militia and moved towards their position. Upon the discovery of the Hessians' identity he retreated, but into the position of enemy warriors.

The militia was able to hold onto their defensive position on the **Western Heights** using fallen trees and stumps for cover and concealment. The effects of Lt. Col. Willett's sortie caused many of the British allied warriors to retreat to their camps. Following the British allies retreat from the battlefield, the remaining **militia retreated** from the field following the military road back to Oriskany.

While the Tryon County Militia fought back against the British force's ambush, those in Fort Stanwix pushed their own attack in the form of **Lt. Col. Willett's Sortie**. Gen. Herkimer had sent Adam Helmer and three other militia members to Fort Stanwix to inform the fort that the militia was coming and to help support them. At about 2 o'clock, Willett and 250 men and an artillery piece left the fort (Willett 1831:131). They marched down the military road to the Loyalist camp and ransacked the camp; they then went to the adjacent Indian Camp. The Continentals pillaged both camps, filling wagon's with goods taken from the empty camps. In all they made three trips gathering supplies. In response, St. Leger led an **advance** against Willett leading from the east side of the Mohawk River. Both sides prepared a firing line; however, Willett was quicker and with musket and artillery fire, pushed the British into **retreat**. News of the sortie made it to those fighting at the Oriskany Ambuscade. They left Oriskany to try to defend their camps ending both the Battle of Oriskany and Willett's sortie.



The Siege

At the center of the siege and the objective of St. Leger's expedition is **Fort Stanwix**. The fort's position in the Oneida Carry was one of protection. The Oneida Carry had long been a main transportation route in the region connecting the Mohawk River and the Hudson Valley with Oneida Lake and Lake Ontario. Controlling this passage allowed control over the Mohawk Valley as well as the ability to communicate and move supplies in the region. The importance of this area was expressed during the French and Indian War as the British built a system of forts throughout the Oneida Carry, including Fort Bull, Fort Newport, Fort Williams, Fort Craven, and Fort Stanwix. The French destroyed Fort Bull during the war and the other forts including Fort Stanwix fell out of use after the French and Indian war and deteriorated. The Continentals rebuilding of Fort Stanwix showed their determination to keep control of the Mohawk Valley. The same **Military Road** at the center of the Battle of Oriskany connected these forts and different locations within the Oneida Carry. It served as a path for the avenues of approach and retreat for both the British and Continentals throughout the siege.

Warriors and troops relied more on the Military Road than the Mohawk River for travel. Two locations on the Mohawk River were important during the siege, the **Upper Landing** and **Lower Landing** of the Mohawk River (Figure 20, p. 70). Both were long used landmarks in the Oneida Carry. The Upper Landing was used as the entrance and exit point for the Mohawk River when the river was high and the lower Carry served the same purpose when the river was low. At the start of the siege, bateaus from Fort Dayton arrived with supplies and troops for Fort Stanwix at the Upper Landing (Lowenthal 1983:24). The British saw the importance of this location and placed the Loyalist camp near the Upper landing and Fort Williams to block access to the Military road and the Upper Landing. St. Leger also positioned Lt. Bird with a small artillery battery of two 3-lb cannons at the Lower Landing after August 6 (St. Leger 1777:44-45). This battery allowed protection from any advance along the Military road coming towards the Oneida Carry.

Fort Stanwix's **Fort Glacis** were the sloped areas surrounding the fort's structure. Supplies must have been placed along the glacis, as Ensign Colbrath's journal states that on August 11, a fatigue party was sent to collect "Barrels of Lime, a number of boards and some timber lying at the foot of the glacis" (Lowenthal 1983:39). The glacis is also a referenced location for other events, such as the Berry Girl ambush and the Continental Barracks.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The swamp is part of the large area of wetlands associated with the Oneida Carry. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It served as both an obstacle against the British advancing on the fort and as an area of concealment for those entering or



leaving the fort. This was the case for Adam Helmer and three other Tryon Militia members who entered the fort on August 5 (St. Leger 1777:44). Lt. Col. Willett also used the swamp to conceal his leaving of the fort on his mission on August 10 (Willett 1831:43).

The area surrounding Fort Stanwix was actively used for farming prior to the siege. This led to numerous **Field Obstructions** noted by participants of the siege (Figure 20, p. 70). These obstructions included piles of hay and structures or houses near the fort that offered obstructions and means for covering or concealing enemy positions. Both sides removed these obstacles by burning them or moving them to other areas (Lowenthal 1983:28, 38).

With the start of the siege, the British, the Loyalists, and their Native American allies established camps throughout the Oneida Carry. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Other Native American camps were probably positioned throughout the woods surrounding Fort Stanwix. De Fleury's 1777 map ([REDACTED]) of the siege places these camps throughout the woods surrounding the fort and Willett mentioned Native Americans howling and making noise in the woods the night of August 5 (Willett 1831:51, 131). These calls may have originated from the various camps. Willett's sortie on August 6, ransacked the Main Native American Camp. The Native Americans moved the position of the camp east across the Mohawk River on August 10 (Willett 1831:59). Willett noted the location of this camp near the Mohawk River in his description of his mission leaving the fort (Willett 1831:59).

Willett's Mission began on the night of August 10 as a way to acquire relief from the siege. Following the Battle of Oriskany, the British demanded Fort Stanwix's surrender. Col. Gansevoort refused St. Leger's demands. However, the Continentals knew they were in a difficult position with the loss of the Tryon County Militia's support. Willett took on the task of getting word of Fort Stanwix's situation to the main Continental Army. He left with Major Stockwell during the night crossing the swamps surrounding the fort concealing them from nearby enemy camps. The exact route of the mission could not be determined. Willett does state that he and Maj. Stockwell took a northerly route after roaming the swamps for a bit. They followed their route north until reaching a river that they repeatedly crossed. They then continued north for a few hours, then turned east until the night of August 11. The next morning they moved south and arrived at Fort Dayton in the afternoon of August 12, traveling an estimated 50 miles (Willett 1831:59-61). Analysts made the defining feature's boundaries using the vague descriptions provided by Willett. They could not determine an exact path.

[REDACTED] The position made use of a rise above the Fort Stanwix swamp that provided protection and higher ground. It was from this camp that St. Leger led his advance against Willett's Sortie on August 6. The British Artillery included two 6-lb guns, two 3-lb guns, and four cohorns (Claus 1777:719). The British positioned all of the artillery pieces, except the two 3-lb guns near the British camp. The British fired their artillery on a daily basis at Fort Stanwix during the siege



(Lowenthal 1983). Ens. Colbrath counted 137 British shells fired at the fort by August 15 (Lowenthal 1983:43).

The **British Headquarters** was most likely associated with the British Camp, but the camp as associated with the artillery battery was not established until after August 6 due to the difficulty in moving the artillery and supplies past Wood Creek (St. Leger 1777). [REDACTED]

The siege confined the Continental forces within Fort Stanwix. Willett was able to leave the fort only by secret. The others in the fort could occasionally leave the fort to gather supplies quickly, but for the most part, were subject to the actions of the surrounding British and their allies. This was the case when the British diverted **Technohat Creek** on August 11 (Lowenthal 1983:39). The creek was the fort's main water supply. By moving the creek, the British attempted to push the Continentals to surrender. The Continentals were able to excavate two wells within the fort to replace the water (Lowenthal 1983:39).

Woods that provided cover and concealment for the British and their allies surrounded the Oneida Carry. The British forces used the woods, fallen logs, and tree stumps to cover themselves while firing at the fort (Claus 1777:720; Willett 1831:51, 131). An event detailed by Jones (1851:340) as originally told by Jabez Spicer relates to a Sniper Oak Tree associated with the **Woods**. A Native American warrior took position in an oak tree at the edge of the woods surrounding the fort and repeatedly killed Continental soldiers standing guard at the northwest bastion of the fort. To counter the sniper, a Continental troop placed a dummy soldier as guard. When the sniper shot the dummy, they identified the sniper's position with the rifle's smoke and fired artillery at the sniper's position. No further attacks came from that area suggesting that the sniper moved or the Continental troops killed the sniper.

The failure of St. Leger's artillery to damage Fort Stanwix pushed him to excavate the **British Trenches** to overcome the fort's defenses. His plan was to trench to the fort and place an explosive beneath the fort's magazine resulting in massive destruction of the fort. He ordered the French Canadians to excavate the trenches. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The commander of the French Canadians, Capitaine Jean-Baptiste-Melchoir Hertel de Rouville, claimed the trenches were excavated to a depth of approximately 3 feet deep (Hertel 1945). [REDACTED] Those in the fort used grape shot and firearms against the approaching trenchers (Lowenthal 1983:46, 48). A **British warrior allied advance** served as a diversion to aid the trenchers drawing fire from the fort (Lowenthal 1983:48). The British used the trenches as a last attempt to take the fort. They may have succeeded if other events did not transpire that would push St. Leger into retreat.



The British Retreat

The impetus for St. Leger's retreat began in **Fort Dayton** (German Flatts). The Continental Army was strained to respond to the siege following the Battle of Oriskany. While the majority of the Continental's Northern Army was attempting to stop General Burgoyne's Advance, Generals Schuyler and Horatio Gates were reliant on the Tryon Militia to relieve the siege. However, the militia had lost most of its officers and soldiers at Oriskany and survivors were hesitant to leave their homes unprotected or to join in another fight. It fell to Major General Benedict Arnold to rally the militia and relieve the siege.

Gen. Arnold's arrival in Fort Dayton worked with other circumstances to allow a means to defeat St. Leger. Arnold came to Fort Dayton on August 16 to rally and organize the remnants of the Tryon County Militia. Col. Willett had arrived with Major Stockwell at Fort Dayton around August 12. They left Fort Dayton to meet up with Arnold in Albany and return to Fort Dayton to rally the troops (Willett 1831:61). During Willett's travels to Albany, Loyalist Walter Butler was arrested near Fort Dayton. Upon Willett and Arnold's arrival at Fort Dayton, Arnold ordered a court martial to try Walter Butler, with Willett serving as judge advocate (Willett 1831:62). The court martial sentenced Butler to death, but under pressure, Arnold relented and sent Butler to Albany for imprisonment.

Arnold's ruse to intimidate St. Leger came out of the court martial. Han Jost Schuyler, one of the Loyalists arrested with Butler agreed to help with the ruse by informing St. Leger of Arnold's approach with a large force to relieve the fort. Han Jost Schuyler led off to meet St. Leger, while Arnold's forces followed. Arnold's advance stayed off the main roads to avoid a potential ambush. However, they were forced to follow the road in the area of the Oriskany Battlefield (Watt 2002:259).

St. Leger was responsive to Han Jost Schuyler's message pushing St. Leger into a panic. The British quickly gathered supplies and artillery, but left much of their camps abandoned. The forces moved to **Fort Newport** to stage the retreat. The British had cleared Wood Creek of timber. St. Leger used Wood Creek to float down the wounded, the supplies, and artillery to **Oneida Lake**, while the main force would march along the creek protecting those on the creek (St. Leger 1777:46). St. Leger ordered Captain Lernoult to leave his post at the Mohawk's lower landing and reposition his men at the ruins of **Fort Williams**, near the Mohawk's upper landing to protect against a possible sally from Fort Stanwix (St. Leger 1777:46). Captain Hoyes was left at the ruins of **Fort Bull** to wait for Capt. Lernoult's men for the final retreat.

The retreat continued along Wood Creek past the confluence of the creek with **Canada Creek** to Oneida Lake. The confluence of Wood Creek and Canada Creek was the location where St. Leger felt his troops would be free from an attack. After regrouping at the entrance to Oneida Lake, St. Leger's forces crossed the lake and continued their retreat to Oswego. Meanwhile, Arnold was in pursuit. On August 24, he and his men reached Fort Stanwix. After being held up by rain, they continued their pursuit, but upon reaching Oneida Lake, they saw the last of the British boats rowing across the lake (Arnold to Gates August 24, 1777). Arnold returned to the fort, and the siege and St. Leger expedition had ended.




Figure 22. 1777 L. De Fleury Sketch of Siege of Fort Schuyler.




Figure 23. De Fleury's 1777b sketch map of Siege of Fort Stanwix.




Figure 24. Colonel Gansevoort 1777 map of Fort Stanwix.



5.3 Geographic Analysis of Defining Features

Analysts applied various analytical techniques to the spatial data related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield as an attempt to better define the functionality of the different defining features. The analyses presented here include georeferencing of historic maps, viewshed analysis, interpolation of slope, and firing ranges for the core areas. Each of these analyses help to refine the locations of the defining features and provides a foundation for future research and preservation initiatives.

The **georeferencing** of historic maps was an initial analysis conducted within GIS. Georeferencing involves the matching of shared points on historic and modern maps. The process fits historic maps into a similar scale as the modern map overlaying the historic map on the modern map. The result is a historic image that is comparable to other data sets. By comparing historic maps with a shared scale and spatial reference, changes to the landscape and post battle disturbances to defining features become evident. Historic maps from the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries were georeferenced. Analysts used common points that they assumed were static over the 200 plus years between the original drafting of a map and the present for georeferencing. Analysts avoided points that are subject to change, such as riverbanks and road widths whenever possible. The accuracy of early maps is questionable given the lack of standardized cartography methods used today. Although georeferencing can provide a reasonable match between projections of past and current landscapes, error based on inaccurate cartography practices in the past and uncertain changes to assumed common points can lead to inaccuracy in the overlay. Section 6.2 (p. 101) details the results of this georeferencing.

Viewshed analysis aided the identification of defining feature function and the troop positions. Historic documents of the siege and the battle were often limited in their descriptions of views. Accounts centered on specific events rather than descriptions of the general layout of the surrounding landscape. Viewshed analysis presented information that analysts could use to determine what observers could or could not see on the landscape. The results of the analysis allowed interpretation of functionality for defining features, such as observation and cover/conceal.

Viewshed analysis for the Oneida Carry shows that the Continentals and the British carefully chose their positions in the landscape to allow a wide observation of the area. Figure 25 (p. 87) shows the viewshed the Continental Army had from Fort Stanwix. Observer positions were placed at the bastions of Fort Stanwix at a height of 10 m above the ground surface to account for the fort's height. The results show that the fort was well chosen within the Oneida Carry to provide an encompassing view of the carry. Most of the Oneida Carry could be seen from all four of the fort's bastions. Only the area southeast of the fort could not be seen by all four bastions, but could still be seen by three of the four bastions. The woods at the perimeter of the carry most likely led to decreased visibility. Accounts state how the warriors used the woods as an area of concealment.

The viewshed from British positions show that their positions in the Oneida Carry offered less of a view than at Fort Stanwix (Figure 26, p. 88). Observer positions for this viewshed were placed at main posts used by the British around the Oneida Carry, such as the British artillery battery, Loyalist camp, and Fort Newport. The British placed themselves around the carry to surround Fort Stanwix as part of the



siege. They also seem to have placed themselves widely to strategically ensure visual coverage of the carry. There are just a few areas that could be seen from all four observer points. Most areas of the carry were only visible from one or two points. The visual restrictions of the carry would have required placement of scouts and observation points that needed to be constantly filled for the duration of the siege. This also explains why St. Leger sent Lt. Bird to establish a post at the Mohawk Lower Landing. It would have added another layer of defense to an area with very limited observation.

The viewshed analysis of the areas associated with the Battle of Oriskany show that visible areas were limited and probably added to the battle's confusion. Figure 27 (p. 89) shows the viewshed analysis for the causeway hole defining feature. The exact location of the feature is unknown, but the description provided by Jones (1851:344) provides a location that would have had an open view to the approach of the Tryon County Militia. In Figure 27 (p. 89), the viewable area covers the road as well as the rise south and west of the road and the areas to the northeast towards the Mohawk River. The areas northwest and southeast were blocked from view, but a wide enough view was attained from this position to ascertain the militia's movements quickly.

The uneven terrain of the Oriskany Battlefield made observation difficult. Figure 28 (p. 90) shows the viewshed from Sir John Johnson's position along the military road. Figure 29 (p. 91) shows the viewshed for the Tryon County Militia from its entry point into the ravine. Both positions had very limited viewsheds. These viewshed analyses were constructed assuming favorable conditions. Analysts did not account for trees with thick underbrush and the road was assumed to be in a straight alignment. The landscape during the battle included trees with a thick underbrush and an informal road that had some meandering. Both of these factors would have decreased visibility. The rangers and their allied warriors could have easily hidden close to the roadside and not be noticed. Johnson's limited view is more concerning. The militia would have to have been deep into the ambush to meet Johnson's forces. The early springing of the trap meant that those at the front of the militia's column, the 1st Regiment, probably did not see Johnson's position. Johnson's troops likely could not see the approaching militia and even if they moved closer, their view may have been limited. This probably led to instances of friendly fire. The Seneca did accuse the Loyalists of killing one of their chiefs (Norton 1970:273; Watt 2002:166). This lack of sight most likely added to the battle's confusion.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 25. Fort Stanwix viewshed of Oneida Carry.




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 26. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 27. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 28. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 29. 



Analysts conducted a **slope analysis** to make changes in elevation more evident. The Oneida Carry is relatively flat. An urban topography defines the present landscape. Cut and fill activities have generally leveled the terrain, although some slight changes in elevation are evident. Even at the time of the siege, the Oneida Carry was level. The wide spread wetlands and dry areas were linked to such a level terrain. The Digital Elevation Model used in identifying terrain had limitations depicting rises and ridges, like Ridge A and Ridge B of the artillery Battery. The use of slope analysis made elevation changes more blatant. Instead of being a strict measurement of elevation that had little change from the surrounding area, slope produced a measure in the percent of elevation change. This allowed a clearer display of elevation changes. Figure 30 (p. 93) shows the resulting analysis and the presence of Ridge A and Ridge B.

With the ridges evident in historic imagery and the present day landscape, fire range analysis confirmed the ability to use artillery from these ridges effectively. Analysts performed a fire range analysis with an assumed range of 1,000 yards for cohorts and observer points made along the ridge in the location of cohort emplacement (Figures 31 and 32, p. 94 and 95). In a similar way as the viewshed, the range of fire analysis determined what areas could be fired upon by different firing (observer) positions. The area that could be reached by all four positions was a thin band that led directly from the ridges. Movement of the firing positions away from these positions lessened the effect of the artillery on the fort. Therefore, the artillery battery must have been located on these ridges.

The combination of analyses helped to clarify the locations of defining features, such as the British artillery batteries. A combination of georeferenced historic maps, range of fire analysis, and slope analysis, provided a more precise determination of defining feature locations, such as the British artillery battery. The 1777 De Fleury map showed the British artillery battery as located northeast of Fort Stanwix (Figure 30, p. 93). Historic accounts also state that the artillery was located northeast of the fort (Jones 1851:336; Journal of the Council of Safety 1777:1038). The map also depicted the artillery batteries being placed on a rise. The documents also state the presence of artillery on the ridge (Jones 1851:336; Journal of the Council of Safety 1777:1038). Two rises were identified in the De Fleury map (Ridge A and Ridge B). GIS analysis helped to confirm the location and layout of defining features. It also aided with the determination of impacts to defining features and their integrity. The inclusion of these analyses merged the information garnered from the historic documents. It also provided insights not directly addressed within the documents.




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 30. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 31. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 32. 



VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY

The environment of Oneida County, specifically the vicinity of the Oneida Carry and the Oriskany Battlefield, had a direct influence on the tactics and troop movements implemented during the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany. The importance of Fort Stanwix was due to its position in the Oneida Carry. From the Precontact period to the 18th century, the major water routes in the area, Oneida Lake, Mohawk River, and Wood Creek, served as a major transportation route for Native Americans and later European traders between Lake Ontario and the Hudson Valley (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:51). The connections of rivers and lakes made for an almost complete water route, except for the Oneida Carry, a gap between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek. Travelers were forced to carry their boats and supplies between the river and creek. During the French and Indian War, the British built forts to control movements along this route. After the war, William Johnson saw the economic and political possibilities by establishing trading settlements in the Oneida Carry (Berleth 2010). With the start of the American Revolution, the Continentals held the Oneida Carry under the urging of the Oneida to protect the Mohawk Valley and Oneida villages. Brigadier General Barry St. Leger saw the strategic value of taking Fort Stanwix to control the Mohawk Valley. Settlement activities and industrial development in the region following the American Revolution dramatically reshaped the Oneida Carry. The economic promise established by a water route between Lake Ontario and the Hudson Valley that helped Native American trade continued and expanded with the new nation throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. These developments have protected some portions of the battlefield and disturbed others. This section discusses the environmental setting of the battlefield during and after the battle.

6.1 Environmental Setting

The landscape associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany is expansive, reaching from Montreal, Canada along the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontario and down to the Mohawk River Valley. The siege and the Oriskany Battlefield were concentrated in the Oneida Carry and the Mohawk Valley and therefore, this discussion centers on the environment of the Mohawk Valley. The discussion of soils in this section provides a baseline of expected soils associated with the siege and battle's defining features. Due to the ephemeral nature of battles and even sieges, there is not a definitive battlefield soil. Neither the siege nor the battle had enough time depth to allow for extensive deposition or widespread alteration of the natural soils. Instead, limited material deposits and trenching made a slight impact on the natural soils. Therefore, the discussion of soils informs more about the potential impacts to soils. There is an expectation that urban development will affect soils with construction and cut-fill activities. Agricultural practices may also affect soil deposits. However, pasture and plowing activities have a different impact than urban development. By reviewing soils, primary soil impacts become evident and can inform future testing and feature evaluation.

The defining features of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield are mostly located within the Mohawk Valley physiographic province (USDA 2008:7). The province consists mostly of alluvial and outwash deposits that were shaped along with the Mohawk River Valley by glaciation until about 10,000 to 12,000 years ago (USDA 2008:5). An ice sheet completely covered this area of New York during the Pleistocene. The result was the formation of valleys and deposition of glacial till throughout the county. Rushing waters from melting glaciers helped to establish the major rivers and



creeks, such as the Mohawk River and Wood Creek. Stagnate waters led to the development of lakes and wetlands (USDA 2008:5-6). Oneida Lake is a remnant of the larger glacial Iroquois Lake (USDA 2008:6). In areas with glacial lakes, lacustrine deposits dominate the soils. In the area of the City of Rome and Wood Creek and Fish Creek the lacustrine deposits are coarse (USDA 2008:6). Drainage from Iroquois Lake with the recession of the glaciers led to extensive scouring of the Mohawk Valley due to the large volume of water and glacial material flowing through the drainage (USDA 2008:6). Historically, the Oneida Carry included numerous swamps or wetlands as indicated in a 1758 map of the area (Figure 52, p. 125). The wetlands, ravines, rises, terraces, and rivers created by glacial action established boundaries and directed movements for troops and allied warriors. The St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario, parts of the British force's avenue of approach, were also the result of glaciation. The area's elevation ranges from approximately 116 m (380 ft) at Oneida Lake to 160 m (520 ft) ASL at the Oriskany Battlefield.

The glaciation also led to the development of the soils associated with the siege and battlefield's defining features (Table 3, p. 98; Figures 33 and 34, pp. 99 and 100). For the purposes of this project, the soils reviewed focused on the main Fort Stanwix siege area and Oriskany battlefield since much of the defining features outside of these areas were avenues of advance/retreat associated with waterways. There were four main soil types associated with the defining features reviewed: alluvial (Udorhents, smoothed; Hamlin Silt Loam; Wayland Silt Loam; and Wakeville Silt Loam), glacial uplands (Kendaia Silt Loam; Alton Gravelly Loam; Chadakoin Silt Loam; and Conesus Silt Loam), depressions and wetlands (Lyons Silt Loam; Covert Loamy Sand; Adrain Muck; Canandaigua Silt Loam; Fredon Gravelly Silt Loam; and Carlisle Muck), and disturbed urban soils (Urban Land and Alton-Urban land complex). The urban soils, as defined by the USDA (2008) were primarily associated with the Oneida Carry/Fort Stanwix defining features. Urban soils under the USDA's definition for this region consist of "areas where at least 50 percent of the land surface is covered with impervious material or buildings. The impervious areas include parking lots, shopping centers, industrial parks, highways, and institutional sites" (USDA 2008:34). Generally, this would suggest a high amount of post battle disturbance to the defining features. However, some impervious areas (i.e. parking lots) can work to protect buried soils by limiting impacts from the surface. Such impacts may also be limited to specific locations, such as cellars or buried utility lines. Those deposits not directly impacted can still have high integrity.

The Oriskany Battlefield has more intact soils than Oneida Carry/Fort Stanwix area. The topography is associated with soil types at the Oriskany Battlefield. Low lying areas, such as the Ravine, Ravine Bottom, and stream are associated with depression soils and wetland soils, while those soils on the rises are associated with glacial upland soils.

Undisturbed battle related soils for both Fort Stanwix and Oriskany should be representative of the natural soil deposits for the area. Due to the relative short duration of siege and battle, battle related activities probably had little impact to the intact soils in 1777. Impacts associated with trenching, midden or trash deposits, and dropping of cultural and battle related materials were probably the primary impact to the landscape. As such, determination of battle related impacts to the landscape will be identified by the presence of battle related cultural material rather than a widespread and definitive soil change.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 33. USDA Soil Series associated with Oneida Carry defining features.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 34. USDA Soil Series associated with the Oriskany Battlefield defining features.



6.2 Post Battle Land Use and Alterations

The events of 1777 integrated the landscapes surrounding Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. They shared a historical connection to Brigadier General Barry St. Leger's expedition. However, soon after the siege and the battle, the two sites diverged in terms of use and landscape. Fort Stanwix's landscape was buried under the urban growth of the City of Rome, while the area of the Oriskany Battlefield became associated with the local rural and agricultural economy. These different uses not only established diverse threats to the preservation of the specific landscapes of the fort and the battlefield, it also resulted in alternative ways of memorializing the two areas.

Development of Fort Stanwix and the Oneida Carry

The events of 1777 placed Fort Stanwix on a level of high esteem. It was the "fort that didn't surrender." Following the siege, the fort continued to serve as a military installation. It served to protect the Oneida Carry and the surrounding Oneida Villages. The Continental Army would base missions out the fort. Colonel Gosen (Goose) Van Schaick's 1779 expedition against the Onondaga was a major offensive based out of Fort Stanwix (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:230-232; Williams 2005:206-209). Even with such importance, changes in the war quickly led to a devaluation of the fort.

The violence and destruction of the war led to the lack of need for Fort Stanwix. The raids of 1780 along the Mohawk Valley against American and Oneida villages decimated the landscape. Loyalist forces under Sir John Johnson destroyed villages (Berleth 2010:296). The Oneida fled to refugee camps established near Schenectady (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:261). Mohawk Valley residents retreated to Albany and the Hudson Valley. British forces avoided the Oneida Carry on their raids removing any threat of detection by the fort's occupants. By 1781, Fort Stanwix had little to protect since the colonial frontier had moved east towards Albany and the Hudson Valley.

The Continental Army's actions acknowledged the diminished importance of the fort. The army directed supplies to high priority areas in the war, leaving Fort Stanwix regularly undersupplied. Captain Joseph Brant's Mohawk warriors would occasionally attack the fort. On March 21, 1781, Brant's forces ambushed a party of woodcutters collecting firewood for the fort (Berleth 2010:296). The diminished supplies and attacks led to low morale amongst the fort's troops. Other events quickly added to their misery. Flooding resulting from heavy spring rains in 1781 eroded away portions of the fort (Graymont 1972:245; Watt 2002:314). The commandant of Fort Stanwix, Colonel Robert Cochran described the flooding's destruction as "the works are all tumbling into the ditch and cannot be repaired without more men" (as quoted in Graymont 1972:245). Following the flood, a fire burned the fort's barracks and parapets (Berleth 2010:296). These events adversely affected the fort's integrity. With the fort requiring massive repairs, the Continentals faced a choice between maintaining the fort and abandoning it. Since the fort had lost its importance, their choice was simple. In May of 1781, the Continental Army left Fort Stanwix to the elements as it transferred troops and supplies to Fort Herkimer (Berleth 2010:296). For the rest of the war, the fort sat unmaintained and left to decay.



Post War Settlement

The Continental government and Great Britain concluded the American Revolution with the Treaty of Paris of 1783. The treaty considered issues between the new American Nation and Britain, but contained no resolution for those Native Americans that had sided with Britain (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:277). The King's representatives ignored the needs of Britain's native allies. Many Native Americans felt forgotten by their former allies. They had sacrificed life and property for the king, but had received little protection with the end of the war. These native groups, specifically those members of the Six Nations that sided with the king were left in uncertainty on their association with the United States. They were unsure if they could return to their lands or if they could maintain sovereignty.

The Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1784 was an attempt to clarify these issues. It was also the start of land negotiations between the Haudenosaunee and the newly established New York State and United States Federal government. Representatives from the Continental Congress met with members of the Six Nations in October of 1784 at the remains of Fort Stanwix to negotiate a peace. In the final treaty, the British allied Haudenosaunee ceded their claims to lands in Ohio and around Niagara, and in return, they could return to their homelands (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:284-285). Starting in 1785, New York State, under the leadership of Governor George Clinton, began securing Oneida lands (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:292). The selling of these lands opened formerly Oneida areas, including the Oneida Carry, to American settlement.

Americans quickly established communities within the former native lands. The settlers established the Village of Rome in 1796; it was incorporated in 1819 (Child 1862). As before the American Revolution, transportation was central to the area's success. However, whereas boats had to be pulled out of the Mohawk River and Wood Creek and carried across the Oneida Carry, developers invested in the construction of canals. In 1796, the Western Inland Lock and Navigation Company constructed a canal to replace the portage road across Oneida Carry (Hanson and Hsu 1975). Philip Schuyler, Peter Gansevoort, and Marinus Willett were directors of the company (Erie and Champlain 1825:607). The Western Inland Lock and Navigation Company's canal became a predecessor for the Erie Canal. Figures 35 and 55 (pp. 104 and 128) show the canal's route in reference to the remains of Fort Stanwix.

Dominick Lynch was another of the company's directors. As a land speculator, he was one of the first major landholders in the Village of Rome. By 1800, he had acquired 2,000 acres of land (Zenzen 2004:7). He began leasing lots in the Village of Rome in the early 1800s (Hanson and Hsu 1975). Many of these lots coincided with the remains of Fort Stanwix. He also established the first streets in Rome, Dominick (running east-west) and James (running north-south) (Zenzen 2004:7). These streets founded the grid layout for the Village of Rome. Construction of residences and buildings on Lynch's lots associated with the fort resulted in the leveling and razing of portions of the fort and related structures.

Development was only one threat to the remains of Fort Stanwix. The village's settlers quickly realized Fort Stanwix's remains could provide a source of revenue by their selling of mementos and materials taken from the fort. People began looting the site of Fort Stanwix for possible finds.



Rome, formerly known as Fort Stanwix, is delightfully situated in an elevated and level country commanding an extensive view for miles around. This Village . . . seems quite destitute of every kind of trade, and rather upon the decline. The only spirit which I perceived stirring among them was that of money digging, and the old Fort betrayed evident signs of the prevalence of this mania, as it had literally been turned inside out for the purpose of discovering concealed treasures -1807 Christian Schultz (Green, 1915:183 as quoted in Hanson and Hsu 1975).

Green's (1915:183) description of the Village of Rome as a "destitute" community would quickly change. The Erie Canal's close proximity would lead to increased trade and transportation as well as development in the Village of Rome.

The impetus of the industrial development was the construction of the Erie Canal. Construction on the canal began in Rome, New York on July 4, 1817. The canal served to link the Great Lakes region with the Hudson Valley and New York City. The result was an increase in trade and industrial and commercial development along the canal's route. The canal ran east-west parallel to both Wood Creek and the Mohawk River. As both waterways were used to fill the canal, the Erie Canal intersects portions of Wood Creek and the Mohawk River. In these areas, the construction of the canal led to clear impacts on the course of the waterways and the immediate landscape.

With the trade and industrial opportunities provided by the canal, the Village of Rome increased in size. The area of Fort Stanwix provided a reasonable location for development. By 1850, the Village of Rome had replaced the remains of Fort Stanwix. Benson Lossing described it as "The village, in its rapid growth, has overspread the site of the fortification, and now not a vestige of antiquity remains" (Lossing 1850) (Figure 36, p. 104).




Figure 35. 1810 map of Rome, New York (Zenzen 2004:8).





Figure 36. 1850 illustration of area of Fort Stanwix (Lossing 1850).



Figures 35, 40, 52-61, and 66-75 (pp. 104, 107, 125-134, and 139-148) illustrate the Oneida Carry's changing landscape resulting from settlement and urban development. Eighteenth century maps () show little to no development of the Oneida Carry. Wetlands and woods dominated the landscape. Forts built during the French and Indian War and reoccupied during the American Revolution (Fort Stanwix) were the centers of occupation. Even with the early 1800s, there was little development. Figures 35, 55, and 70 (pp. 104, 128, and 143) show that some of the streets for the Village of Rome had been established by 1810, but development was minor and limited to these few streets. With the Erie Canal, and later railroads, the village quickly expanded. Figures 56-57 and 71-72 (pp. 129-130 and 144-145) show that by the mid-19th century, urban development had spread across much of the Oneida Carry and the site of Fort Stanwix. Although still depicted in 1845 (Figure 56, p. 129), Fort Stanwix was completely absent in the 1852 map of Rome (Figure 57, p. 130). Alleys and streets, including Dominick, Liberty, Spring and James Streets, cut across the area of the fort. Between these streets structures were constructed. These structures had associated cellars and utilities, such as cisterns, wells, gas and water lines, that all impacted the fort's remaining buried deposits (Hanson and Hsu 1975). Hanson and Hsu's (1975) report on the archeology of Fort Stanwix details the effect the 19th century construction had on the fort's cultural deposits and features.

There has been limited archeology dedicated to identifying deposits related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix in the Oneida Carry outside of the area immediately surrounding Fort Stanwix. Urban growth expanded across the entire Oneida Carry during the 19th century (Figures 40, 58-60, and 73-74, pp. 107, 131-133, and 146-147) and most likely had a similar effect on disturbing battle related deposits as those identified at Fort Stanwix. Even with such disturbances, there were early attempts at preserving or interpreting Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:10) (Figures 37-39, below- p. 106). They centered on major historical landmarks, such as Fort Bull and Fort Stanwix giving no recognition to the ephemeral features spread across the Oneida Carry. These movements were small as the priority was industry over preservation. It was during the 20th century that interest in preservation grew.



SITE OF FORT BULL AT THE WESTERLY END OF THE CARRY ON FISH CREEK

Figure 37. Fort Bull monument (Cookinham 1912).




Figure 38. Image of the Rome Club marking the location of Fort Stanwix (Cookinham 1912).




Figure 39. Image of park marking the location of Fort Stanwix.




Figure 40. 1886 Bird's Eye map of Rome, New York (Burleigh et al. 1886).



The 20th Century and Development of Preservation Initiatives

The Oneida Carry's 20th century landscape had no resemblance to its 18th century landscape. Dense residential areas, commercial districts, and industrial factories had replaced the wetlands and woods. Despite this intensive reshaping of the landscape, there were still hints of the 18th century's military footprint. In 1912, workers claimed to have found 18th century munitions possibly related to Fort Williams (Hagerty 1971:69). Such events maintained the memory of Fort Stanwix within the local population. Commemorative events, such as in 1876, 1877, and 1927 helped to develop a sense of importance in developing a heritage landscape associated with Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004).

Widespread and formalized memorialization of Fort Stanwix began in 1923. The New York State legislature approved funds for a project to identify and document the battlefield sites in preparation of the 150th anniversary of the siege (Zenzen 2004:12). Local groups, such as the Rome Kiwanis Club, used the preparations for the sesquicentennial to develop plans for a long-range memorial for Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:12-13). The president of the Mohawk Valley Historical Association and local newspaper editors collaborated on promoting the idea of establishing a preservation initiative for Revolutionary War sites. They also initiated the idea of acquiring the properties associated with Fort Stanwix for developing a memorial (Zenzen 2004:13). This group would be the foundation of the current preservation structure of Fort Stanwix.

The rising interest in memorializing Fort Stanwix coincided with the realization that Rome's economy had stalled (Zenzen 2004:13). Following World War I, Rome's economy began to decline resulting from decreases in manufacturing production and trade. The downward economic trend would continue for the rest of the 20th century as industries left the area for other parts of the country. City officials and economic leaders would have seen the signs of this trend even in the 1920s. The push for historic preservation and heritage tourism became their new priority as a way to fill the gap in the economy created by decreased industry.

During the 1920s, development of the heritage projects memorializing Fort Stanwix was conducted on a local level with state funding. The State of New York provided funding for the 1927 sesquicentennial and purchased properties associated with the Mohawk Lower Landing and the southeast bastion of Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:13-14). The state also funded the development of a museum for Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:17). Some of the state's funds were used to build a replica of Fort Stanwix to stage the sesquicentennial events (Zenzen 2004:14). The replica was built away from the actual fort's location so as to not affect local business that stood on the fort's location.

During the 1930s, the push for preservation relied less on state support and worked to involve the Federal government. During the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes pushed for the preservation of historic sites across the nation as part of the National Park Service. Rome's civic leaders saw this as an avenue to better develop their preservation of Fort Stanwix. They pushed congress to establish Fort Stanwix as a national monument. On August 21, 1935, the same day he signed the Historic Sites Act, Pres. Roosevelt signed the bill establishing Fort Stanwix as a national monument (Zenzen 2004:21). However, the monument could only be enacted when the title to the associated properties was given to the Federal government. Since congress did not appropriate funds



for land acquisition, the primary means of gaining title was by donation from landowners (Zenzen 2004:20-21). With no lands to establish a monument, the National Park Service relied on the placement of markers and monuments to interpret the history of Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:22).

The potential of tourist dollars had given historic preservation a push within Rome during the 1920s and 1930s. However, with World War II and the establishment of Griffiss air base, the economy developed a new priority. With the United States military bringing jobs and funds to Rome, businesses were less willing to donate land for the creation of the national monument. The economic boom ended in 1964 with the closure of Griffiss airbase. The loss of military related jobs dramatically hurt Rome's economy, which had already been hit by the loss of agricultural and manufacturing jobs. Heritage tourism again became the answer to improving a decimated economy.

By the mid-20th century, the early 19th century transportation technology of canals had become obsolete. Trains and automobiles had replaced the need of canals to transfer goods. The 1924 Sanborn map of the City of Rome (██████████) shows that some of the canal system was still present within the Oneida Carry. The Black River Canal running along the east side of Fort Stanwix and a spur of the Erie Canal running south of Fort Stanwix were still present (██████████). By 1947 (██████████), these canals had been filled in and replaced by roads. Black River Boulevard replaced the Black River Canal and Erie Boulevard replaced the Erie Canal's spur.

The 1960s saw a resurgence in the promotion of developing Fort Stanwix into a heritage tourism destination. In 1962, local officials pushed the National Park Service to put Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield on the National Register of Historic Places. The National Park Service initially refused, citing a lack of historic significance for the Oriskany battlefield and the lack of integrity for the site of Fort Stanwix (Zenzen 2004:29-30). The National Park Service assumed that urban development had destroyed all evidence of the fort. Pressure from Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and Senator Robert Kennedy pushed the National Park Service to grant landmark status on Fort Stanwix.

In 1965, an urban renewal project was initiated in the area of Fort Stanwix for the purpose of building a museum interpreting the fort's history. The Rome Urban Renewal Agency was formed to organize the urban renewal initiative and purchased properties for the purpose of development. As part of this project an archeological excavation was conducted to determine the size and shape of Fort Stanwix. The 12 week excavation was led by Colonel J. Duncan Campbell (Zenzen 2004:34). Excavations identified intact features associated with the fort, including the fort's ditch, glacis, the barrack's floor, bake house, store house, and bake oven along with associated artifacts. Testing showed that there was integrity to Fort Stanwix's cultural deposits with 19th century cellars presenting the biggest impact. The uncovering of intact deposits undermined the National Park Service's argument for denying National Register eligibility to Fort Stanwix.

In response to the new evidence, the National Park Service became an active force in developing the Fort Stanwix National Monument. Park officials also began to push the idea of reconstructing the fort as part of urban renewal after previously rejecting reconstruction (Zenzen 2004:36). From 1967 to 1970, the 19th century buildings located atop the remains of Fort Stanwix were razed while archaeologists



excavated the remains of Fort Stanwix (Hanson and Hsu 1975; Luzader et al. 1976; Zenzen 2004). The reconstructed Fort Stanwix was dedicated in 1976 (Zenzen 2004:80).

In 1973, the Rome Urban Renewal Agency transferred ownership of 16 acres to the Federal government (Zenzen 2004:69). This met the requirement established in 1935 of the monument being made on land donated to the government. The transfer of title also established the monument's boundaries. Congress has never established official boundaries for the Fort Stanwix monument. The 1935 law did not list the boundaries; instead, the size of the monument was based on donated lands. The 1973 land transfer presented a working basis for boundaries, but the monument does not have any officially legislated boundaries (Zenzen 2004:69).

The reconstruction of Fort Stanwix was one of the last major developments of the fort's modern landscape. On July 2, 2005, the Marinus Willett Center opened on the grounds of the Fort Stanwix National Monument (NPS 2005). Hartgen Archaeological Associates conducted archeological testing prior to the construction of the new visitor center. Archaeologists identified disturbances from the 19th century and the 1970s reconstruction of the fort (Hartgen 2005). The rest of the Oneida Carry has seen little alteration from the urban landscape established during the 19th and 20th centuries. The demolition of older structures and construction of new buildings and commercial buildings presents the biggest threat to cultural deposits associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix both within and outside of the Fort Stanwix National Monument.

Oriskany Battlefield

The Oriskany Battlefield's landscape developed independently from that of Fort Stanwix and as such has had different threats and impacts than those found in the Oneida Carry. The Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site has allowed for continued preservation of most of the battlefield's current landscape since its inception as a commemorative landscape in 1879. The landscape has been reshaped primarily by 19th century farming practices and later memorialization of the site. Farmers filled and drained portions of the battlefield to aid in crop production, while preservation groups and park staff reshaped the battlefield's landscape to meet the needs of park visitors.

The area of the Oriskany Battlefield had little direct use or occupation until the 19th century. Eighteenth century maps ([REDACTED]) of the area of the Oriskany Battlefield have no villages or depiction of its use beyond that as a portion of a transportation route. The area was part of the Oneida Nation's territory, but there is no indication that they used the area associated with the Oriskany Battlefield for anything besides a path (Curry 2000:20). Major Oneida Villages, such as Oriska (Oriskany) and Oneida Castle were located away from the area of the Oriskany Battlefield. The path was not formalized or maintained seasonally leading to a possible meandering of its location across the terrace it crossed. Thick woods and wetlands dominated the battlefield's 18th century landscape. The military road was initially constructed in 1759 as part of the British defense of the Oneida Carry during the French and Indian War (Curry 2000:28). After the war, the British government did not see a need to maintain the now abandoned military features and natural forces worked to reclaim the forts and roads with erosion and overgrowth.



There was little mention of the Oriskany Battlefield for the rest of the American Revolution. There were accounts from Major General Benedict Arnold's march across the battlefield on his approach to relieve Fort Stanwix in late August of 1777 that the bodies of those who died during the Battle of Oriskany remained unburied (Bilharz 2009:59; Watt 2002:259). Continental Soldier Frederick Sammons described the condition of the battlefield as he saw it shortly after the fighting as, "I beheld the most shocking site I had ever witnessed. The Indians and white men were mingled with one another, just as they had been left when death first completed his work. Many bodies had also been torn by wild beasts" (Stone 1877:191). Historic accounts state that remains were found [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a distance of approximately 5 km (3 mi) (Bilharz 2009:59; Jones 1851:361-362). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. It seems that the majority of bodies were never buried and left to decompose on the surface with natural processes working to bury the remains (Bilharz 2009:59-60; Curry 2000:48). Oral tradition and some newspaper reports state a few burial details were sent into the area after the war and in the succeeding generation, but no official accounts recording these actions have been found to date. With the abandonment of the Mohawk Valley beginning around 1780, the use of the military road associated with the battlefield probably had little use until after the end of the war.

Post War Settlement

The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix and New York State's purchase of Oneida territory opened the western Mohawk Valley to settlement as part of the Oneida Patent. The Oriskany Patent was established in 1705⁸. It reached from the Oneida Carry to Oriskany Creek (Curry 2000:37). Oneida rejection of the patent led to limited development of the patent. The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix helped to reinforce British control of the Oriskany patent. Still settlement in the area was not widespread until after the American Revolution. The Oriskany Battlefield is located within both the boundaries of the City of Rome and the Town of Whitestown, New York. The Town of Whitestown was established in 1788 (Jones 1851). The main road connecting the burgeoning towns of Utica and Rome ran along the north side of the Mohawk River rather than following the military road (Curry 2000:68). This led to limited development in the area of the battlefield.

During the early 19th century, the area surrounding the battlefield remained dominated by old growth forests and had little development. The military road was updated with improved alignments and conversion to a plank road during the 1840s. These improvements were temporary as the Rome & Utica Plank Road Company that maintained the road abandoned this section of the road in 1856 (Curry 2000:70). The Oriskany Patent was divided into lots in 1784 (Figure 62, p. 135). The Oriskany Battlefield is located in Lot nos. 4 and 5 of the Oriskany Patent. The 1789 patent map listed George Clarke as owning Lot 5 and Roger Mompeson owning Lot 4. Both were original investors in the Oneida patent from the early 18th century and had died prior to 1785 (Curry 2000:75-76). By 1785, George Clarke's son, George Clarke had title to Lot 5 and Augustus Van Cortlandt's heirs had ownership of Lot 4 (Curry 2000:76). The Clarke and Van Cortlandt families kept title to the lands until the mid-19th century

⁸ The original grant, known as the Oriskany Patent, was given to Thomas Wenham, George Clark, Peter Schuyler, Peter Foulkanier and Roger Roger Mompeson on 18 April, 1705 (Curry 2000:37).



although they leased the properties to farmers. The Parkhurst and Kent families were the main tenant families associated with the Oriskany battlefield, which had been included in subplot 2 of the Great Lot 4 of the Oriskany Patent (Curry 2000). The Parkhurst family leased the property until 1830, when the Kent family began leasing the property (Curry 2000:81).

The most dramatic change was the removal of the trees and vegetation that defined the battlefield's cultural landscape. The Loyalists and their Native American allies chose the location for the Oriskany ambush based on its topography, but also because of the cover the trees and vegetation provided. The vegetation allowed the Loyalists and their allies to lie in wait, concealed from the Tryon County militia, who had no warning of the impending ambush.

The precise date of the clearing of the battlefield's vegetation is not certain, and probably occurred over time (Figures 76-79, pp. 149-152). The deforestation of the battlefield probably started fairly early after the American Revolution. Jones (Daily Herald [Utica NY] July 30, 1883, Page 2, "Informal Ceremonies Saturday: at the Deposit of the Records Where Herkimer Fell") states that an early settler, Burrows, built a log cabin on the battlefield and cleared about an acre of land around the cabin. Lossing's 1850 illustration (Figure 41, p. 115) of the battlefield clearly shows that the landscape was used for agriculture, and was reshaped and cleared for such use. A photograph (Figure 46, p. 118) taken at the park during the 1884 commemorative ceremony and photographs (Figures 47-51, pp. 119-123) taken during the early 20th century also show a landscape cleared of vegetation. Twentieth century aerial photographs (Figures 49-51, pp. 120-123) of the park area depict a cleared landscape not only within the park's boundaries, but in the surrounding farms. The result of the clearing of vegetation on the battlefield allowed for a manufactured recreational and commemorative landscape that contained farm fields and a park during the 19th and 20th centuries (Figures 80-83, pp. 153-156). However, this also limited interpretation of the battle. Without the vegetation, much of the understanding of the battlefield was missing. There is also the possible distortion of perceived scale as some battlefield features and distances may be perceived differently in an area with a viewshed limited by trees and brush versus an open field.

The Parkhurst family initiated agricultural development of the area of the battlefield. They clear cut the landscape to develop agricultural fields. In the process of the clear cutting, numerous human remains related to the battle were uncovered (Curry 2000:76). Jones (1851:361-362) noted that early settlers gathered the bones and interred them in a common grave. Given the nature of the remains (lack of burial) it is probable that the remains were disturbed by early settlement in the battlefield. Farming practices also led to changes in the topography of the battlefield that resulted in disturbances to the features and material remains associated with the battle.

Besides the removal of the forest, farmers also removed the other main characteristic of the battlefield's landscape, wetlands. Such wetlands are common throughout the Mohawk Valley. An 18th century map (Figure 52, p. 125) of the Oneida Carry depicted widespread wetlands across the region. Correspondence during the American Revolution notes the unfavorable conditions of the military road, specifically noting the wet nature of the terrain, which led to erosion and bad condition of the road (Arnold to Gansevoort August 22, 1777; Scott 1936). The road's location on a terrace above the Mohawk River suggests that these wetlands were not just along the river, but were located throughout the valley. Both John Butler and Joseph Brant chose locations, such as at the Battle of Wyoming and at the Battle of



Newtown, with wetlands to serve as areas of concealment and obstacles to direct enemy movements towards ambushes (PAF 2012; Williams 2005). The wetlands along the Oriskany battlefield would have served much of the same purpose. Such wetlands would have been a detriment not only to transportation, as with the military road, but for farming practices, such as crop production and raising pasture animals.

Within the existing state park boundaries, there is evidence of reshaping of the terrain, specifically draining wetlands during the 19th century. Farmers cut drainage ditches into the area of the Western Heights to allow for easier drainage from the top of the heights to the bottom of the Ravine. Historic Preservation Supervisor Nancy Demyttenaere has noted a buried drainage system that directs water from the heights to the ravine (Nancy Demyttenaere Personal Communication 12/20/12). There was most likely some level of cutting and filling of the battlefield's landscape as part of the drainage of the fields. Based on the surface survey, the exact location of fill and the depth could not be determined, but such activity has reshaped the battlefield's landscape. There are some wet areas within the park boundaries that are probably remnants of wetlands (Photo 1, p. 124). These low lying areas may indicate the best evidence for the battle related ground surface.

The cleared and drained farm fields were plowed or used as pasture during the 19th century. Both practices can affect buried cultural materials. Plowing can lead to the movement of some artifacts, but the results of such disturbance are probably minimal. Plowing could distort or destroy buried or topographic features. Repeated plowing may have led to a settling or flattening of the field's topography. Pasture animals can also lead to the flattening of topography and movement of artifacts based on their movements across the field (Osborn and Hartley 1993). Despite the possibility of disturbance related to these activities, they are relatively passive and probably led to minimal alteration of the battlefield's greater landscape and cultural deposits.

The construction of residences and farm outbuildings may have led to more intensive although localized disturbances. If the 18th century cabin had a cellar hole, then it would have created a definitive and bounded disturbance to the battlefield. The remains of the cellar hole may have been mistaken as the location of the Beech Tree where Herkimer sat during the battle (Icon Architecture and Saratoga Associates 1998:40). The Lossing illustration (Figure 41, p. 115) depicts a barn located on the Western Heights near the road. The foundation of the barn may have had little subsurface impact on the battlefield's deposits depending on how deep the barn's foundation extended. A modern dairy barn complex, which developed around this single historic barn, was demolished in the early 1950's and the area regraded. The extent of this cutting and filling remains unknown.

One major disturbance related to the southwestern line of the battlefield is the construction of the Rome-Oriskany Road (NY 69). The road most likely does not follow the path of the military road used during the battle, although portions of the two routes may overlap. The military road was probably not formalized. Instead, it was based on a previous Native American Trail that was occasionally maintained to allow for the transport and movement of military supplies and troops. The occasional maintenance and environmental conditions of the area probably led to some movement of the road's alignment. The construction of a plank road in the early 19th century formalized the road's location. The current position of the road is probably the same as the plank road as suggested by the Lossing illustration (Icon



Architecture and Saratoga Associates 1998:40). A GPR survey along NY 69 along with soil borings identified possible evidence of the plank road in close proximity to the road's current path in the area of the culvert crossing the ravine (Graf 2000). The culvert's position may be following a path of least resistance across the ravine, a route that had been historically recognized and may have been part of the military road. If this is the case, the continued use of the Rome-Oriskany Road and its related maintenance and construction most likely disturbed any remains of the military road that would overlap with the current road.

Another transportation route that may have caused some disturbance to the battlefield was the Utica-Rome suburban rail line. The line was a trolley service that connected the cities of Rome and Utica. It ran north of the main battlefield and south of the Erie Canal (Icon Architecture and Saratoga Associates 1998:39). It may have crossed portions of the Tryon County Militia's avenue of retreat from the ravine to the Mohawk River.

Commemoration

Commemoration of the Battle of Oriskany has also reshaped the battlefield's landscape. The result was a landscape based on 19th century park aesthetics. The landscape was reshaped to fit the needs of visitors and recreational activities rather than preservation or interpretation of original battle related features. The battlefield became a shadow hidden below the commemorative landscape.

Attempts at memorialization of the Battle of Oriskany began in 1777. The Continental Congress allocated funds for the construction of a monument to the fallen Brigadier General Herkimer, but left it to the state of New York to decide on its placement. Representative K. Van Rensselaer pushed Congress to follow up on this resolution in 1803, but no action was taken (Curry 2000:83-84). Governor George Clinton pushed the New York State legislature to approve the location of the monument in 1827 and 1828. The House designated his burial and home as the site of the monument, but the Senate failed to pass the bill (Curry 2000:84). The initiative to establish the monument continued at the state and federal levels into the 1840s.

The first official commemorative event occurred in 1844. Lossing (1850:245-246[*note 8*]) states that the event was a political rally led by Democrats John A. Dix and Senator Daniel Stevens Dickinson. The event attracted 15,000 spectators. As part of the commemoration, scaffolding was built as a speaker's stage on the supposed spot where General Herkimer was shot at the bottom of the Ravine.⁹ The remnants of the scaffolding are depicted in the 1850 Lossing illustration (Figure 41, p. 115). The illustration also shows a flattened area associated with the scaffolding that was probably made during the construction of the scaffolding. The current landscape includes a flattened area that relates to the probable location of the scaffolding.

⁹ Lossing also notes that there was a dark spot identified in his illustration between the tree and barn that was the location of the Beech Tree. He states it was cut down eight years before his visit and the stump removed (1850:245-246[*note 8*]).




Figure 41. 1850 illustration of Oriskany Battlefield (Lossing 1850).

The centennial events related to the American Revolution during 1876 influenced an expansion of commemoration of the Battle of Oriskany. In 1877, the newly established Oneida Historical Society hosted a centennial event for the Battle of Oriskany (Curry 2000:118-119) (Figure 42, p. 116). An estimated crowd of 60,000 attended (Curry 2000:120). Historian Robert Ellis was one of the main speakers. He presented one of the first researched accounts of the history of the Battle of Oriskany (Roberts 1877). The events occurred on the Ringrose and Lanfear farms. Stands, tents, and booths were set up to accommodate the visitors. The Utica Daily Observer presented a map with both battle related and contemporary landscape features (Figure 43, p. 116). The 1877 event showed a strong interest in memorializing the Oriskany Battlefield.




Figure 42. Illustration of 1877 events marking the Battle of Oriskany's centennial (Curry 2000:119).




Figure 43. Commemorative map of the Battle of Oriskany. (Utica Daily Observer August 7, 1877).



The transition of the Oriskany Battlefield into a commemorative landscape was aided by the selling of five acres by William and Kate Ringrose to the Oneida Historical Society in 1880 (Curry 2000:112). The property allowed the historical society to establish a park to memorialize the Oriskany Battlefield. Figures 44 and 45 (p. 117) depict the Oriskany landscape at the time of the sale. They show that the landscape had numerous trees and brush, more so than present in 1850. It was also more than would be found in the subsequent creation of the memorial landscape. In 1884, the Oneida Historical Society dedicated the stone obelisk battle monument. Approximately 6,000 people attended the dedication (Curry 2000:122). Photographs of the ceremony (Figure 46, p. 118) show that the landscape was again devoid of trees and brush. Based on comparisons of these photographs with earlier illustrations, it seems that there was a deposition of fill associated with the construction of the monument (Photo 2, p. 124). The fill was used to build up the landscape around the monument making it more prominent in the park. It also created an uneven topography, most notably a bowl or depression southeast of the monument. The “Hole”, is not depicted in the Lossing illustration (Figure 41, p. 115), but is present in an 1884 photograph (Figure 46, p. 118). Based on a surface assessment, the depression appears constructed rather than a part of the natural landscape and may have been created during the 19th century to accommodate visitors to one of the commemoration ceremonies. The bowl shape of the depression may have been planned as a rudimentary amphitheater. The park has used the depression for this purpose with effective results (Nancy Demyttenaere personal communication 12/20/12). It is uncertain if this construction cut into or placed fill on top of previously buried battle related deposits.




Figure 44. c. 1879 Illustration of Ravine defining feature (reproduced from Curry 2000:113).




Figure 45. c. 1879 illustration of Small Ravine defining feature (Curry 2000:14).



Figure 46. 1884 photograph of dedication of the Herkimer monument at the Oriskany Battlefield (Cookinham 1912).



Figure 47. c. 1900 photograph of Small Ravine defining feature (Cookinham 1912).



Figure 48. c. 1912 photograph of the Ravine defining feature (Cookinham 1912).



Figure 49. 1939 aerial photograph of Oriskany Battlefield.

The next phase of commemoration occurred in the 1920s. The Oneida County Historical Society's park worked to memorialize the lands associated with the Ravine and Western Height defining features. In 1925, the Mohawk Valley Historic Association began to purchase a 48 acre portion of the Parkhurst farm [REDACTED] (Curry 2000:126, 164). The purchase was finalized in 1939. The association developed this area into a recreational and memorial park. In 1915, a park reservation was designed to include 125 acres of the original battlefield. The land acquisitions of the 20th century were attempts to build on the land acquired during the late 19th century to develop this park reservation. However, New York State has only been able to acquire three quarters of the proposed 125 acres. Two flanking parcels that would encompass the western edge of the ambush site and area of the eastern retreat were scheduled for protection, but never acquired (Nancy Demyttenaere personal communication 3/28/13). In the late 1920s, the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Mohawk Valley Historic Association erected three monuments to the unknown soldiers who died at the Battle of Oriskany and Colonel John Vrooman. New York State purchased the original Oriskany park from the Oneida County Historical Society in 1927 and in the 1950s, the state finalized their acquisition of lands that would consist of the Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site with the purchase of additional lands from the Ringrose family and the 48 acre parcel from the Mohawk Valley Historic Association (Curry 2000:163-164).



The park's landscape after New York's purchase for the most part remained the same. Numerous trails have been constructed and abandoned throughout the park connecting the Eastern and Western Heights across the Ravine. For the most part, the park's landscape represented maintenance of the 19th and early 20th century memorialized landscape composed of manicured lawns and a park made for traditional recreation and commemorative park aesthetics rather than interpretation of the battle.

Recently, park officials have promoted an interpretation of the battle by using the landscape. Wetlands and vegetation are being allowed to reform and regrow so that over time a landscape similar to that present during the battle can be observed by visitors. Trails are also being put in place to mark likely paths of combatants across the heights and the ravines. Over time, the development of this landscape should provide an insight into the experience of those who fought in the battle.



Figure 50. 1949 aerial photograph of Oriskany Battlefield monument.




Figure 51. 1952 aerial photo of Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site marking movement of Beech Tree Marker and area of possible fill.



Photo 1. Facing north at wetland area near Oriskany Battlefield park entrance.



Photo 2. Facing northeast towards battle monument with noticeable fill areas.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).


Figure 52. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 54. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 55. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 56. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 57. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 58. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 59. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 61. 




This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 62. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 63. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 64. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 65. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 66. 




Figure 67. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1740.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 68. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1758.




Figure 69. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1777.




Figure 70. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1800.




Figure 71. General landscape of Oneida County c. 1830.




Figure 72. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1860.




Figure 73. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1890.




Figure 74. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1920.




Figure 75. General landscape of Oneida Carry c. 1950.




Figure 76. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1740-1758.




Figure 77. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1777.




Figure 78. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1800.




Figure 79. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1830.




Figure 80. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1860.




Figure 81. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1890.




Figure 82. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1920.




Figure 83. General landscape of Oriskany Battlefield c. 1950.



6.3 General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity

The central features for the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany are protected due to their status as a National Park Service National Monument and a New York State Historic Site, respectively. They are also both listed on the National Register of Historic Places. This has led to the preservation of the immediate area surrounding Fort Stanwix and the majority of the Oriskany Battlefield's core. Other defining features, specifically those associated with British forces positions throughout the Oneida Carry, are not protected. Urban development in the City of Rome has probably had a high level of impact on them, but ongoing demolition and new construction within the Oneida Carry presents a constant threat to these features as well as opportunities to advance further studies of them.

Commercial development is the main threat to feature integrity. Some portions of the Oneida Carry have seen recent development, such as along Dominick Street. Nineteenth and 20th century residences and commercial and industrial structures have been replaced by apartment buildings, strip malls, and parking lots. Each of these renovations presents different levels of impact. Some parking lots, for example, present a low threat of impact to buried deposits. Development has occurred at a lower level outside of the city due to the presence of agricultural fields and local zoning regulations. However, this may change as economic factors push some farmers in the area to sell or lease their land. There is always a possibility of commercial or industrial development in these areas as part of economic revitalization efforts.

6.4 Condition of Battlefield Defining Features

The National Register of Historic Place's evaluation of integrity (National Park Service 1997) inspires the definition of integrity used in this project's assessment of defining feature integrity. The evaluation presented here is not a determination of the eligibility of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield for the National Register of Historic Places. Both sites are already on the National Register of Historic Places. Instead, this project uses the criteria established by the National Register of Historic Places as a guideline rather than an actual determination of National Register eligibility. The National Register of Historic Places lists seven criteria for evaluation of integrity. These seven include location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association (Hardesty and Little 2009:63).

Given that the defining features were associated with a battlefield and had little to no structural remains, the common way to approach the defining features is to view them as archeological sites following under criteria D of the National Register Criteria for evaluation, "That have yielded or may be likely to yield, information important in history or prehistory" (NPS 1997). Since researchers assessed the features primarily as archeological features, to have a high level of integrity, not all seven need to be present. The defining features are associated with a battlefield and some of the criteria will not be applicable, such as design and workmanship. The criterion of setting is an evaluation of how similar the current landscape is to the time of its significance. The period of significance for this study is 1777 during St. Leger's expedition. Urban developments in the City of Rome and agricultural and commemorative activities at the Oriskany Battlefield have drastically altered the setting for most of the defining features under assessment in this project. Feeling is defined as that the feature along with its setting provides "a historic sense of the property during its period of significance" (Hardesty and Little 2009:64). The location criterion relates to if the feature's location is identifiable. For this project,



material relates to the presence of archeological or cultural deposits associated with the defining feature. Association is defined as the ability of the feature and/ or cultural deposits to answer potential research questions (Hardesty and Little 2009:64).

Understanding that none of the features will meet all seven of these criteria and that some, such as design and workmanship will not be applicable; researchers established a scale to guide the integrity assessment. If a defining feature meets none or one of these criteria, it will be assessed as having low integrity. If it has two to three, it will be assessed as having moderate integrity, and if it has four or more, it will be assessed as having high integrity.

The following is a list of the defining features associated with the 1777 Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany with a description of their current conditions. Researchers concentrated their physical evaluations on those defining features primarily associated with the Oneida Carry and the Mohawk Valley. Evaluation of the defining features, strictly on above surface indications is limited and can be wrong in the determination of buried cultural deposits. As such, these assessments should be considered preliminary. Further archeological field-testing for buried cultural deposits should be conducted to better define the integrity assessment. Limited resources in terms of time and access prevented an extensive review of all of the defining features.

British Advance/Retreat

British Advance/Retreat

The British advance/retreat stretched from Lachine, Canada to the Oneida Carry for approximately 483 km (300 mi). Due to the size of the feature and limited time, project researchers were unable to evaluate the entire feature. Most of the route follows waterways, such as the St. Lawrence River, Lake Ontario, Oswego River, Oneida River, Oneida Lake, and Wood Creek. Most of these rivers follow a similar course as present in the 18th century. Increased settlement and resulting activities, such as agricultural, industrial, and commercial development, have altered portions of the landscape along these waterways. These changes probably did not drastically disturb the integrity of the battlefield related aspects of the waterways along the British advance/retreat. The defining feature probably still meets the location, setting, feeling, association, and possibly material for materials lost by troops during the advance. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.

Lachine

Lachine was the starting point of the St. Leger expedition. From the ports of Lachine, the British army launched its fleet of bateaus along the St. Lawrence River. Due to its distance from the battlefield's core and its location within Canada, researchers were unable to evaluate the feature's integrity.



Buck Island

Buck Island was a staging area for the British forces as they exited the St. Lawrence River and entered Lake Ontario. It offered the British a chance to regroup and resupply. The name of the island is now Carleton Island. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The island is a resort community, with the development of vacation homes being the biggest threat to integrity. Due to its distance from the battlefield's core, researchers were unable to evaluate the feature's integrity.

Salmon Creek

[REDACTED] Brig. Gen. St. Leger had planned to use the creek as an avenue of approach to the Oneida Carry. However, the situation in Oswego required him to abandon his plan. It is uncertain how much impact St. Leger's forces had at the Salmon Creek feature. They most likely established an encampment as they prepared for Col. Claus's arrival. Since the feature was probably a temporary encampment, the British and their allies most likely did not invest much in the development of the landscape. There has been little development outside of residential housing suggesting little impact on the feature. Due to its distance from the battlefield's core, researchers were unable to evaluate the feature's integrity.

Oswego

The Oswego defining feature was a staging area for St. Leger's forces. During their advance towards the Oneida Carry, the British forces used Fort Ontario and Oswego to resupply and regroup. They also met with allied Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, and Cayuga warriors who joined the British advance. The Fort Ontario State Historic Site marks the location of Fort Ontario. The 19th century fort continues to stand at the state historic site overlaying the remains of the 18th century fort. The majority of interpretation of the fort is of the fort during the mid-19th century rather than 1777. However, there is some interpretation related to the events occurring at the fort during the American Revolution. Use of the fort after the American Revolution as a military installation until the mid-20th century probably affected the integrity of deposits and features associated with the fort's occupation during the American Revolution. However, the defining feature's association with a state historic site helps to ensure the protection of the defining feature in the future. The defining feature still meets the location, setting, feeling, association, and possibly material for materials lost by troops during their encampment. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.



Three Rivers

The Three Rivers defining feature was a locus for the British forces transitioning from the Oswego River to the Oneida River. The feature was also the site of a council between John Butler and Haudenosaunee representatives. The exact site of the council could not be determined, [REDACTED]. The area has been subject to residential development, which may have had some impact on the integrity of battle related deposits. Since the precise location is not known and no surface indications of the council are present, replaced instead by rural and residential development, the only criteria met is the possible presence of material left during the British and their native allies' use of the feature as an encampment. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

Wood Creek/Fish Creek

The two major creeks associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix/Battle of Oriskany (Wood Creek and Fish Creek) are characterized as meandering creeks (Photos 3 and 4, p. 161 and 162). Meandering creeks form in areas with low gradients (Waters 1996:128-129). The low gradient leads to multiple curves along the course of the creek. The area between the Oneida Carry and Oneida Lake has a low gradient with widespread wetlands. The meandering curves lead to erosion and deposition along the creek. Alluvial forces erode the concave portion of the curve, while depositing sediment along the convex portion of the curve, the point bar (Waters 1996:130-131). Erosion and deposition activities can have an adverse effect on archeological deposits.

In terms of Wood Creek and Fish Creek, site occupation was not central to the landscape use of the features during the Siege of Fort Stanwix. Rather, the British used both as avenues of transport. The transport of troops and warriors along the creeks would have left little material evidence. The Continental Army's obstruction of Wood Creek had a material effect on the creek. This, however, was probably of short duration given the British clearing of the creek and decomposition of any timber associated with the obstruction of the creek. Instead, the question of integrity for the two creeks is if the current course of the creeks is the same as during the time of the siege. It is difficult to confirm the course during the siege as there was little documentation. Contemporary maps show more general course outlines for the creeks rather than detail patterns of the meanderings. Given the nature of a meandering creek, it is most likely that there was some amount of reshaping. The present day overall pattern of the creeks is probably reflective of that found during the siege.

Besides erosion, the biggest impact on Wood Creek was the Western Inland Navigation 1796 canal and the subsequent Erie Canal (Photo 5, p. 162). The canal generally runs parallel to Wood Creek and intersects the creek at points. The Erie Canal took some of its water from Wood Creek to allow for the transport of vessels. The removal of the water from the creek probably lessened the velocity of the flow and therefore the amount of erosion along the creek. The lack of erosion may have helped to limit the amount of reshaping of the creek. The construction of the canal worked to distort those portions of the creek that intersected the canal. This is most evident near the confluence of Wood Creek and Oneida Lake and the area of Wood Creek near the Oneida Carry. In these areas, the proximity to the canal meant that the canal became the defining waterway and the course of the creek became less defined.



Urban development in the City of Rome has also reshaped portions of Wood Creek ([REDACTED]). The 18th century damways along the creek, including the one near Fort Newport, used to facilitate transport along the creek have been removed. The course of the creek has also been straightened to ease the spatial organization of roads and neighborhoods [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This reshaping appears to have occurred in the 20th century as 19th century maps depict a reservoir associated with the earlier damming of the creek and a less strict alignment for the creek as currently exists.

For those areas associated with the 19th century canals and the urban development of the City of Rome, the feature has low integrity in that location is the only criteria met. The others (setting, association, feeling, and material) have all been impacted. For portions of Wood Creek and Fish Creek in more rural settings, the criteria met increases to include: location, association, and possibly material. Much of the landscape has changed from the old growth woods found in the area in 1777 to the farm fields of today, affecting setting and feeling. This means that for the portions of Wood Creek and Fish Creek the integrity level is moderate to possibly high if materials are determined to be present.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 3. [REDACTED]



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 4. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 5. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 6. 

Oneida Lake

The British used Oneida Lake to advance to and retreat from the Oneida Carry ( ). During the advance, the British floated along the lake and marched along the northern shoreline, whereas during the retreat, the British forces went across the entire lake. The British appear to have used the confluences of Oneida Lake and Wood Creek and the Oneida River as their entry points into the lake. There does not seem to be any impacts to the integrity of the lake. As such, the defining feature meets the criteria of location, setting, feeling, association, and material for artifacts lost by British troops during their approach and retreat. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.

Nine Mile Point

Nine Mile Point was the location along the British advance where the British forces exited Oneida Lake and continued along the shoreline towards Wood Creek. The exact location of Nine Mile point is indeterminate (Photo 9, p. 165). 

There has not been much development in the area besides light residential construction. Since the precise location of the feature is not known, location, setting, and feeling are not met. If the location proposed by the GIS analysis for this project for Nine Mile Point were correct, than location and setting criteria would be met given the lack of development in association with the feature. It may be difficult for a visitor to determine the landscape association with the feature and so feeling would still not be met. Buried material deposits associated with the British encampment may still be present due to the lack of disturbance. Taken together, the criteria met establish the feature as having moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 7. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 8. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 9. 

Royal Blockhouse

The blockhouse  was built during the French and Indian War. It had fallen into disuse in the time between the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. During St. Leger's expedition, the location of the blockhouse served as a staging area for regrouping of forces during the advance to and retreat from the Oneida Carry. The area of the blockhouse has been impacted by the construction of the Erie Canal and residential and commercial development (). There is no surface evidence of the blockhouse (). Construction related to the canal and development may have avoided some buried deposits. However, there is no surface integrity to the feature meaning the feature does not meet the setting and feeling criteria. With no definitive material remains, the association criterion is not met. The defining feature meets the location and possibly material for materials lost by troops during their staging activities. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 84. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 10. 



British Supply Road

The obstruction of Wood Creek forced the British to build a supply road to move artillery and supplies from Fish Creek to the Oneida Carry. There are no visible remains of the road. [REDACTED]. The area has had little development outside of agricultural fields (Photo 11, p. 168). There is little to no evidence of disturbance to the integrity of the feature. Since the exact location of the feature is unidentified, there is little ability for the feature to meet the location, feeling, or association criteria. Setting is also difficult to meet with the development of rural farm fields. There may be possible materials dropped by advancing troops. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

Continental Barracks/Barns/Outbuildings/Field Obstructions

There were numerous structures listed as being located outside of Fort Stanwix during the siege. These features posed threats to the fort's inhabitants by serving as areas of cover and concealment for the British forces. As such, the Continentals burned down some of the structures. The British also burned some structures, such as the fort's barracks. These features were located fairly close to Fort Stanwix. [REDACTED] This would place it within the Fort Stanwix National Monument. The barns burned during the start of the siege were located a "little distance from fort" (Lowenthal 1983:24). [REDACTED] As such, there is little threat to their future integrity. However, urban development during the 19th and 20th centuries might have affected any buried deposits associated with these features. Excavations at Fort Stanwix show that the urban impacts were not wide spread and intact buried deposits from the late 18th century were still present (Hanson and Hsu 1975; Luzader et al. 1976; Zenzen 2004). The defining features meet the location, feeling, association, and possibly material. The reconstructed Fort Stanwix adds to the feeling criteria, but the setting in the surrounding area has changed due to urban development. If no buried deposits are present the integrity is moderate, but if deposits are present than the feature has high integrity. Further testing may be required to determine if deposits are present.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 11. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 12. 



Battle of Oriskany and Willett's Sortie

Oriskany Ambuscade

The Oriskany Ambuscade defining feature consisted of the main line of British allied warriors and rangers dispersed along the military road. Thick woods and undergrowth concealed the ambuscade. During the initial attack, warriors and rangers fired from the ambuscade onto the Tryon County Militia marching on the military road. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The vegetation has been removed from the SHS portion of the ambuscade and across much of the private lands (Photo 13, below). Farmers removed the original forests during the early 19th century for agricultural purposes. The feature meets the location criterion, but the removal of the original woods has altered the feature's setting and may make it difficult for a visitor to comprehend the battlefield's landscape during 1777. This means the feature does not meet the feeling criterion. There is a high probability of buried cultural material in association with the feature. Agriculture practices may have had some impact on buried artifacts, but overall agricultural impacts, such as plowing present a minor impact. Given that the feature meets the location, association, and material criteria, the feature has moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 13. [REDACTED]



Oriskany (Village)

The Oneida Village of Oriska (Oriskany) was the location of the militia's encampment the night prior to the Battle of Oriskany. It was a staging area on their approach to Fort Stanwix and where many Oneida warriors, including Hanyery, joined the march. Captain Joseph Brant and his Mohawk warriors destroyed the village shortly after St. Leger's retreat (Wonderly 2008). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Urban development during the 19th and 20th centuries probably impacted feature integrity. As shown at Fort Stanwix, urban impacts can be spatially limited and allow for low impacts to buried cultural deposits. As such, portions of the historic village may be present within undisturbed contexts, such as yards. Urban development has impacted the setting and feeling of the feature. However, the location, material, and association criteria are still met allowing for moderate integrity.

Military Road

The military road defining feature was the main transportation route connecting settlements and forts in the area of the Oneida Carry, including Fort Stanwix, Fort Schuyler, Fort Dayton, and Oriska. The Oriskany Battlefield was located on the military road. The military road also served as the functional connection between the siege area of Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. The KRR and their Native American allies traveled along the road to establish the Oriskany Ambuscade. They followed the road back at the end of the battle. Major General Benedict Arnold followed the road on his approach to relieve the siege of Fort Stanwix.

Descriptions of the military road, specifically in the area of the Oriskany battlefield, suggest that it was not a formalized or regularly maintained road (Arnold to Gansevoort August 22, 1777; Spencer to Gansevoort July 8, 1777; Scott 1936). The route of the road may have varied depending on the season and conditions. Given the ephemeral nature of the road, it is difficult to determine the exact route. The road probably did parallel the current NY 69 and was in close proximity or overlapped the current road.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Historic activities related to farming and commemoration probably had some impact on the road. It is uncertain the level of cutting and filling that occurred within the historic site's boundaries and what impact they had on the road. For the portions of the road not paved over or located within the historic site, there seems to have been little impact on integrity besides agricultural activities. The removal of the woods that had bordered the road in 1777 has changed the setting of the feature. However, [REDACTED] provides enough locational information for interpretation allowing for a sense of feeling, despite the impacts to setting. The spatial information generated by the presence of the road informs activities related to other defining features and would aid in answering research questions on the Battle of Oriskany meeting the criterion of association. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.



British Oriskany Advance/Retreat

The British advance/retreat to and from the Oriskany Ambuscade was along the military road. As discussed previously, the road was not formalized and the exact path could not be determined. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Portions of the trail have been disturbed by residential and agricultural development. The rest of the trail has little related development, instead sided by woods and agricultural fields. The removal of the woods that had bordered the road in 1777 altered the setting of the feature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The reintroduction of woods is adding to improve the aspect of setting. The spatial information generated by the presence of the road informs activities related to other defining features and would aid in answering research questions on the Battle of Oriskany meeting the criterion of association. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.

Ravine

The ravine was the lynch pin to the Oriskany ambuscade (Photo 15, p. 172). Crossing the ravine caused the militia to slow their march and divided its forces. It allowed the waiting warriors and rangers to spring their attack on the unsuspecting militia. The northern outlet of the ravine is currently within the Oriskany Battlefield SHS. Trees and vegetation were removed from the ravine during the 19th century as the surrounding landscape was used for agriculture and later commemoration of the battle. Since the late 1970s, Oriskany Battlefield SHS staff has allowed nature succession growth to occur. Various trails were constructed in the ravine. The trails and paths have been abandoned or moved. Overall, there have been few lasting impacts to the feature. The limited impacts have helped to maintain the location, setting, feeling, material, and association aspects of the feature leading to high integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 14. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 15. 

*Ravine Bottom/Stream*

The bottom of the ravine is marked by a stream with adjacent wetlands (Photos 16 and 17, below-174). At the time of the battle, a corduroy road traversed the stream. As the supply wagons were crossing the stream, British allied Native American warriors started the attack on the militia. The militia troops at the bottom of the ravine were trapped. The ravine bottom continues to consist of a stream with associated wetlands. Impacts from the site's association with a commemorative park are evident. Trails running down to and across the stream have been constructed and abandoned. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the 19th century, the ravine bottom appears to have been cleared of vegetation. Since the late 1970s, Oriskany Battlefield SHS staff has allowed nature succession growth to occur. The limited impacts have helped to maintain the location, setting, feeling, material, and association aspects of the feature leading to high integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 16. [REDACTED]




This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 17. 

Militia Advance/Retreat

The Tryon Militia's advance and retreat generally followed a path starting from Fort Dayton north of the Mohawk River and crossing to the south side of the Mohawk River in the area of Fort Schuyler (Utica) and continuing along the military road through Oriskany towards Fort Stanwix. The retreat was less ordered, with many of the injured stopping in Oriskany. 




 The development has altered the feature's setting and feeling. Road construction probably also impacted any material remains. The location and association to spatial research questions are still present providing a moderate level of integrity.

Fort Dayton

Fort Dayton was a Continental installation that also marked the start of the militia's advance to relieve the Siege of Fort Stanwix. 


 Urban developments made during the 19th and 20th centuries define the landscape's current area (Photo 19, p. 175). Since these impacts were urban based, they may have been spatially limited providing a possibility for the presence of buried materials. The setting and feeling of the landscape has been changed since 1777 and so the only criteria met are location, and possibly material and association leading to a low to moderate level of integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 18. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 19. 



Johnson Position

Sir John Johnson's KRR and the Hesse-Hanau Jagers stood at the west end of the Oriskany Ambuscade (Photo 20, below). The Loyalists placed themselves across the military road. With this placement, the ambuscade formed a hook, with rangers and warriors placed parallel to the road and the KRR and Hesse-Hanau Jagers troops blocking the progress of the militia. The ambuscade led to the entrapment of the militia, with little ability for the militia to escape. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The area is now defined by rural development, which probably had little impact on the defining feature. The setting has had some changes, but the feature's presence near a road could be interpreted to suggest a level of feeling. The location is clear and there may be buried artifacts associated with the feature that would help inform future research suggesting a high level of integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 20. [REDACTED]

Small Ravine

A small ravine was located west of the main ravine that helped to bound the western heights and serve as an obstacle for the militia's movements. Capt. Cox's regiment crossed by the ravine immediately before the attack began (Jones 1851:344). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the 19th century, the trees and vegetation were cleared away (Figure 47, p. 119). Vegetation has returned (Photo 21, p. 177). No other impacts are evident besides some erosion. With the return of trees, the setting and feeling aspects of the feature are



improving. There is a high probability of buried materials that would inform research into the battle. These criteria along with location suggest a high level of integrity.

Causeway Hole

The causeway hole was a small depression used by a warrior to observe the militia's advance towards Fort Stanwix. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The hole probably did not leave any lasting evidence within the landscape. Subsequent use of the land, such as agriculture, in the 19th and 20th centuries probably impacted the feature. The lack of definitive location, setting, feeling, or any materials associated with the feature suggests the feature has no integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 21. [REDACTED]

Oriskany Woods

The woods surrounding the Oriskany Ambuscade were thick with trees and undergrowth. The woods provided extensive coverage for the British forces. Historic photographs show that these forests were cleared by the 20th century (Figure 49, p. 120). Woods have returned in portions of the feature's area (Photo 22, p. 178). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For those areas without trees, the setting and feeling aspects of the feature are absent. The presence of woods does improve the setting and feeling of the historic battlefield's presence. There is a high probability of buried battle related materials throughout the woods that would inform research. Along with location, these criteria suggest a moderate to high level of integrity.

*Cox's Flank*

Capt. Cox's regiment was at the front of the militia's column. It marked the furthest west the militia reached. British rangers and allied warriors heavily attacked the regiment killing most of the members of the regiment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Together, these criteria suggest a moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 22. [REDACTED]

Western Heights

The Western Heights was the core of the Oriskany Battlefield and has become a central part of the Oriskany Battlefield SHS. The Western Heights was the location where the militia regrouped and established a defensive circle around the beech tree, Brig. Gen. Herkimer's position during the battle. The state historic site's main monument is located on the heights making the feature the focus of the park. This focus has led to impacts to the feature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, the lack of woods, which were removed in the 19th century, hinders setting and feeling aspects of the feature. The cutting and filling activities may have impacted buried



materials and associated research questions. Further testing is needed to evaluate these impacts. Until then the feature is listed as having moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 23. 

Eastern Heights

As the fighting began with the attack on the ravine, members of the militia's 3rd regiment were caught behind the supply wagons. Some of those positioned on the eastern heights may have engaged the attacking Mohawks, but most retreated. During the early 20th century, preservation societies reshaped the eastern heights as a commemorative park. Trees were removed and the land was flattened to make the area serve as a park. A series of monuments, including an unknown soldier's monument, were constructed on the feature in the 1920s (Photo 24, p. 180). A road was also built across the eastern heights connecting the monuments with NY 69 (Photo 25, p. 180). Some low lying spots associated with wetlands (Photo 26, p. 181) are still present, but the reshaping of the landscape to serve as a commemorative park impacted the feature's topography. The feature meets the location criterion. However, the lack of woods, which were removed in the 19th century, hinders setting and feeling aspects of the feature. The cutting and filling activities may have impacted buried materials and associated research questions. Further testing is needed to evaluate these impacts. Until then the feature is listed as having moderate integrity.




Photo 24. Facing northwest at Oriskany Battlefield Unknown Soldier monument.



Photo 25. Facing southeast across Eastern Heights defining feature and road disturbance.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 26. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 27. 



Beech Tree

The beech tree was the location where the Tryon Militia placed the wounded Gen. Herkimer during the battle. It also became a rallying point during the battle with the militia establishing a defensive perimeter around the tree. The exact location of the beech tree is unknown. The tree was long ago removed. Curry (2000:53) states that the earliest mention of the beech tree is in Lossing's 1850 *Pictorial Fieldbook of the Revolution*. Lossing (1850) claimed that a dark area within his illustration (Figure 41, p. 115) marked the location of the beech tree. It appears that this would put the beech tree between the current parking lot and the ravine's edge at the center of the Western Heights. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Due to the uncertainty of its location and that there is no tree, the feature does not meet the location, setting, or feeling criteria. It is also unlikely much material was left behind at the tree during the battle leading to low integrity.



Photo 28. Facing east at monument marking Beech Tree.



Photo 29. Facing northwest across Western Heights defining feature.

Willett Sortie

Lt. Col. Willett marched with about 200 troops to aid the Tryon County Militia's advance. He pillaged the Loyalist camp and the nearby Native American camp. St. Leger attempted to halt the sortie, but Willett was able to repel St. Leger's advance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location criterion, but any material remains were most likely disturbed as were the setting and feeling aspects of the feature. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

British Sortie Advance/Retreat

As Lt. Col. Willett pillaged loyalist and British allied Native American camps, Brig. Gen. St. Leger led a counter attack to stop Willett. Brig. Gen. St. Leger advanced from the British camp across the Mohawk River south and west towards the Upper Landing of the Mohawk River. St. Leger generally followed the same path as his advance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location criterion and may contain buried material for portions of the feature associated with the park, leading to fulfilling the association aspect of the feature. Industrial development most likely impacted and disturbed any material deposits located along the western edge of the feature. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 30. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 31. 



The Siege

Berry Girls Ambush/ Capt. Gregg Ambush/ Ensign Spoor Ambush

Prior to the Siege of Fort Stanwix, British allied Native American warriors ambushed fort occupants as they conducted activities outside of the fort. The victims included soldiers hunting or conducting fatigue duty or girls picking berries. The warriors' primary goal was observation of the fort, but their ambushes had a secondary effect of terrorizing the people taking refuge in the fort. The Capt. Gregg and Ensign Spoor ambush sites were located near the remains of Fort Newport. This area has seen urban development during the 19th and 20th centuries, dramatically affecting the feature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The feature was also subject to the expansive urban development in the City of Rome. Although primary accounts list distances from Fort Stanwix and general areas for the ambush sites, the exact locations of these ambushes were not identifiable. Since the exact locations of these features are unknown, the location criterion could not be met. Urban development impacted the features' setting and feeling. These ambushes most likely did not leave much material buried or on the surface. These features have no integrity.

British Artillery Battery

On August 5, the British established a main artillery battery on a rise northeast of Fort Stanwix (Photo 32, p. 186). The main artillery battery included two six-pound cannons and 4 cohorn. For the duration of siege, the artillery battery was a central feature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location, material, and association criteria, although future archeological testing is suggested to confirm the presence of material. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.

British Camp

The British had numerous camps throughout the Oneida Carry during the siege. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location, material, and association criteria, although future archeological testing is suggested to confirm the presence of material. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 32. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 33. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 34. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 35. 



British Headquarters/Fort Newport

Fort Newport was a British fortification built during the French and Indian War. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The impacts have adversely affected both setting and feeling. The defining feature still meets the location criterion, and may have some buried battle materials. If materials are present, they could answer research into the fort's history and the feature's role in the siege of 1777. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 36. [REDACTED]

British Trenches

After his inability to use artillery to overtake the fort, Brig. Gen. St. Leger resorted to using trenches to approach the fort and planned to place explosives under the fort. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Urban development may have affected portions of the trenches located outside of the park. The setting has changed and there is no interpretation allowing for no sense of feeling for the feature. The location criterion is met and possible material may suggest research potential. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 37. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).


Photo 38. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 39. 

Canada Creek/Fort Rickey





This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 40. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 85. 



Fort Bull/Fort Wood Creek





Figure 86. Illustration of Fort Wood Creek c. 1756 the Crown Collection of Photographs of American Maps (CC 1(2):48).



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 87. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 41. 

*Fort Craven*

Fort Craven was one of the French and Indian War forts constructed in the Oneida Carry and destroyed under orders from Gen. Webb in 1756. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If the materials are present, they would probably have research potential meeting the association criterion. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 88. Fort Stanwix defining features on 2m DEM.

Fort Williams

Fort Williams was one of the first French and Indian War forts constructed in the Oneida Carry and destroyed under orders from Gen. Webb in 1756. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The location criterion is met, but the material and association is doubtful based on evidence of subsurface disturbance related to canal and road construction. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 42. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 43. 



Fort Stanwix/ Glacis

Fort Stanwix was originally a British French and Indian War installation constructed in 1758 (Photo 44, below). The Continental Army reclaimed and reconstructed the abandoned fort in 1776. The taking of the fort became the main objective of St. Leger's expedition. During the siege, Continental soldiers used the fort's glacis to reach supplies. The Continental Army used the fort as a military installation until 1781, when it was abandoned and destroyed in a fire. During the 19th century, urban development impacted the remains of the fort. Archeological excavations did find evidence of the fort (Hanson and Hsu 1975; Luzader et al. 1976; Zenzen 2004). In 1976, the National Park Service reconstructed the fort. Although impacted by urban development, archeological testing has shown portions of the fort are still present. The defining feature still meets the location, setting, association, and material criteria. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.

Fort Stanwix Gardens

To help supply the fort, the soldiers established a garden southeast of the fort. During the siege, British allied warriors used the plants and bushes in the garden as cover during their firing at the fort. ■■■■■

■■■■■ The impacts to the feature present some disturbance to the feature's setting and feeling. The defining feature still meets the location and possibly material criteria. If material is present, research as to the type of foods produced by the fort's occupants could be answered. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity. Further testing may be required to determine the presence of buried siege associated materials.



Photo 44. Facing south towards Fort Stanwix.



British Allied Warrior Advance

On August 21, a group of British allied warriors advanced towards Fort Stanwix to distract the Continental forces from the encroaching British trenches. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The exact path of the advance could not be identified so the feature does not meet the location criterion nor does it meet setting, feeling, material, or association. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

Fort Stanwix Swamp

[REDACTED] Most notably Adam Helmer and the other two militia members' approach to the fort prior to the Battle of Oriskany and Willett's escape from the fort was concealed by the swamp. The area is still typified by wetlands and has little development. The defining feature still meets the location, setting, feeling, association, and possibly material criteria. Therefore, the feature has high integrity.

Indian Camp

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location and possibly material criteria. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity based on the presence of material.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 45. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 46. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 47. 

Loyalist Camp



 The setting and feeling aspects of the feature are no longer present. The defining feature still meets the location and possibly material criteria. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity based on the presence of material.

Mohawk Upper Landing

The Upper Landing of the Mohawk River was the place where boats disembarked when the Mohawk River's level was high. At the start of the siege, the Upper Landing was the site of the British attack on the bateaus bringing supplies to the fort 


 The defining feature still meets the location, and possibly material and association criteria. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 48. 

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 49. 



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 50. 

Mohawk Lower Landing

The Mohawk Lower Landing was a traditional location to exit the Mohawk River when the river's level was low. 


 Although impacts have adversely affected the setting and feeling, the defining feature still meets the location criterion. Disturbances to the feature make the possibility of buried material deposits low. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.




Photo 51. Facing north at Mohawk River Lower Landing monument.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 52.





New Indian Camp

Following Willett's attack on the Native American camp on August 6, the Native Americans moved their [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The high density of housing in the neighborhood suggests a high probability for impacts. The feature no longer retains setting or feeling. The defining feature still meets the location, and possibly material and association, criteria. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.

This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 53. [REDACTED]

Sniper Oak Tree

Jones (1851:340) presented the story of a sniper shooting guards stationed in the northwest bastion of Fort Stanwix. After killing numerous guards, Continental soldiers set up a dummy to trick the sniper into firing. After seeing the smoke from the sniper's rifle, the fort fired rifle and artillery fire into the woods where the sniper was posted. No further firing was noted from that location. The exact location of the snipers location could not be determined. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Urban development erased any evidence there may have been of the feature. Since the exact location of the feature is unknown, the location and association criteria could not be met. Urban development impacted the feature's setting and feeling. The actions associated with the feature most likely did not leave much material buried or on the surface. The feature has no integrity.



Technohat Creek

Technohat Creek flowed near Fort Stanwix. The soldiers in the fort used it as a water source during the siege until British forces blocked it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The defining feature still meets the location criterion, but the setting as changed to the point it is no longer recognizable and there is little possibility of material remains. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

Willett Mission

On August 8, Lt. Col. Willett and Major Stockwell left Fort Stanwix for Albany to inform Maj. Gen. Schuyler of Fort Stanwix's situation. Willett and Stockwell traveled for 50 miles by foot. The exact route could not be determined as there was no mapping or detailed description of the route. Based on the descriptions provided by Willett, a route was estimated using GIS. Most of this route has had little development outside of agricultural and rural impacts. The exact path used by Willett is undetermined. Based on Willett's description, he left little material impact. With the feature not meeting the location, setting, feeling, or material criteria, the feature has low integrity.

Woods

At the time of the Siege of Fort Stanwix, the Oneida Carry's landscape included woods, wetlands, and higher dry areas. The forts and occupied areas were associated with the higher dry areas, but the majority of the carry was covered with woods and wetlands. This was especially the case along the perimeter of the carry. The woods surrounding Fort Stanwix offered a prime area for British rangers and Native American warriors to conceal their firing positions or camps.

These woods were removed during the 19th century as urban development in the City of Rome expanded. The wetlands associated with the area of the City of Rome have also mostly been filled. The defining feature still meets the location criterion, but the setting and feeling have been drastically impacted by urban development. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.

Arnold advance

Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold led a march of Continental troops and remnants of the Tryon County Militia from Fort Dayton to Fort Stanwix. He generally followed the same route taken by Brig. Gen. Herkimer and the Tryon Militia. For some of the route, Arnold and his troops stayed off the military road to avoid ambush. They did cross the Oriskany battlefield. Arnold reached Fort Stanwix and continued on to following the British retreat to the confluence of Wood Creek and Oneida Lake. Portions of the path have been disturbed by residential and commercial development in the areas of German Flatts, Utica, and Oriskany. The rest of the trail has little related development, instead sided by woods and agricultural fields. The defining feature still meets the location, setting, feeling, and possibly material criteria. Although in areas with development, the setting and feeling criteria are not met. Therefore, the integrity varies from low to high.



This image was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Photo 54. 



VII. PRESERVATION PLAN/FUTURE RESEARCH

Much of the landscape primarily associated with Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield are preserved due to their location in the Fort Stanwix National Monument and the Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site (SHS), respectively. Both venues offer ways to preserve the major features of both sites, such as Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield's Western Heights. Both sites also provide interpretation of the landscape's history. Those features located outside of the Fort Stanwix National Monument and the Oriskany Battlefield SHS are predominantly associated with private lands. The features are widespread among numerous landholders and land types (industrial, commercial, and residential). Within the private lands there is no formalized preservation or public interpretation plan.

As presented in this report, this project has identified and expanded the view of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany's landscape to include many defining features that are not included within either the Fort Stanwix National Monument or Oriskany Battlefield SHS and have little preservation protection. Table 2 (p. 62) lists the defining features identified during this project's research and the assessment of their integrity. The level of integrity of these features varies and the majority of them have had little to no interpretation. Even with the two governmental institutions providing preservation and interpretation, there are still productive avenues for future research and preservation. This section lists some potential areas of research and preservation that prioritizes the presentation of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield having a shared landscape and history.

7.1 Confirmation of Integrity Assessment

The field component for this project relied on a walkover survey of the identified defining features. The walkover was able to identify surface evidence of disturbances to defining features. When project analysts compared maps and imagery of the defining features from c. 1777 with later maps and imagery, other possible disturbances, such as canals, became evident. This analysis allowed an initial integrity assessment. Urban development, construction of transportation routes, and agricultural and commemorative activities presented a high threat of disturbance to most of the defining features located within the Oneida Carry and Oriskany Battlefield. Due to the presence of disturbance affecting the settings and feelings of features, analysts assessed many features as having low or moderate integrity (Table 2, p. 62).

The surface assessment of low and moderate integrity can be misleading. Most of the defining features have lost the aspects of setting and feeling. There is little left of the 1777 landscape to aid visitors' interpretation of the siege or battle. This is due to urban construction or removal of vegetation. This does not mean interpretation is not possible. Alternative avenues of interpretation can be developed to overcome a lack of setting (see Section 7.2, below). It also does not mean that buried cultural deposits have lost their integrity or archeological potential. The 19th century urban development on the location of Fort Stanwix was thought to have destroyed any remnants of the fort (Zenzen 2004). However, archeological testing has led to the identification of intact archeological features associated with Fort Stanwix and the recovery of approximately 40,000 artifacts related to fort activities, including the siege (Hanson and Hsu 1975; Luzader et al. 1976; Zenzen 2004).



We recommend archeological testing to confirm the initial integrity assessment. Testing at locations associated with features associated with the Oneida Carry and the Oriskany Battlefield should aid in an improved determination of the effect later development and cut and fill activities had on the battles' defining features. Not every defining feature inventoried for this project needs further testing. Some features, such as the causeway hole, the oak tree sniper and the ambush sites, most likely have no material remaining to identify. However, features, such as the British trenches, camps, forts, and artillery batteries may have left enough of a mark on the landscape to still be discernible. Forts Wood Creek and Rickey appear to still have a visible presence within the landscape (Figures 85 and 87, pp. 191 and 193) suggesting a high probability of intact buried cultural deposits.

Testing in the Oneida Carry should be prioritized in areas with possible intact deposits. Archeological excavations related to Fort Stanwix noted that cellars and buried utilities were the biggest impact to archeological deposits. Some of these features are located within areas with limited disturbance, such as residential yards and parks. As such, intact siege related deposits may still be present. If testing is not feasible, City of Rome officials and New York State SHPO should be informed of the location of defining features. Using this information, state reviewers and government officials could stress the increased sensitivity of battle related sites in the area and require testing prior to development of a project using appropriate battlefield archeology testing strategies.

Archaeological investigations of the Oriskany Battlefield may address the ambiguous nature of the Battle of Oriskany's documentary history and provide evidence of possible post-battle disturbance to the battlefield's landscape. The documents reviewed for this report (Chapter IV, p. 20) and Curry (2000) provide limited data for spatial analysis of the Oriskany Battlefield. The documentation of the exact locations of troop positions and movements associated with the Battle of Oriskany were lost to the fog of war, confusion during the battle, and heavy casualties suffered on both sides, especially officers. The acts related to establishing a commemorative landscape for the Battle of Oriskany led to cutting and filling of the battlefield's landscape. This appears to be the case for the area surrounding the battle monument. This area was probably built up to make the monument appear more prominent within the Mohawk Valley and to aid visitors during large commemorative events, such as in 1884. The commemorative impacts distort visitors' understanding of the battle and could lead to erroneous interpretations of the battle since the landscape reflects commemoration rather than the battlefield's 1777 landscape. Identification of fill areas would help to determine the battlefield's topography during 1777. With an understanding of the topography, the movements of troops and fighting locations could be better identified and interpreted.

Based on comments from New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation's (OPRHP) Bureau of Technical Preservation Services (Personal Communication 6/13/2013), there has been limited archaeological testing within the Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site (Table 4, p. 208) accounting for approximately 0.003% of the site's overall acreage. Testing has been associated with small scale construction and maintenance projects (i.e. installation of sign posts, flag poles, septic tanks). Testing also relied on the use of shovel test pits and test units. Such testing has limited effect in identifying battlefield deposits (Reeves 2011). As such, there has been no wide scale systematic investigation of the battle related cultural deposits within the site. The identification of intact deposits associated with the Oriskany Battlefield would require a more widespread investigation of the battlefield site using survey techniques applicable to battlefield archaeology.



Table 4. List of Previous OPRHP Excavations at Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site.

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

*Bold emphasis is from original comments.

The Oriskany Battlefield does present an ethical dilemma in regards to archeological testing. Since the bodies of the fallen were never formerly buried and there has not been a complete inventory of burial locations, there is a high probability for encountering human remains during testing. Given that the landscape is not just a commemorative one, but a memorial landscape for the fallen, the avoidance of burial excavation should be a high priority. Bilharz (2009) notes that Native American groups are deeply concerned over the possibility of archeological testing leading to the disinterment of burials. “There was strong, though not unanimous, opposition to any attempts to locate bodies or any activities at the site that might result in disturbance of burials” (Bilharz 2009:ii). Given the importance of the site to the Haudenosaunee, consultation should be conducted with nation representatives on how best to conduct any future archeological testing. Less invasive methods, such as remote sensing, may be the preferred option to determine the extent of fill on the Oriskany Battlefield.

Archeological testing would help refine the development of a preservation plan for the defining features associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. Testing would better determine the extent and nature of disturbance to battle related defining features. Archeological testing would help to determine what level of battle related material deposits are present in association with defining features. Archeological testing is not without its issues. Preservation strategies should be considered that take into account the sensitive history associated with these features. Alternative methods for testing beyond traditional excavation and new ways of site interpretation may provide a more beneficial avenue for research.



7.2 Integration of Common Interpretive Elements

The results of this project show that the 1777 Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany had a shared history and were integral to each other. Events at the siege influenced the actions at the Battle of Oriskany and the Battle of Oriskany in return shaped the Siege of Fort Stanwix. As such, an understanding of the historical context of one relies on the understanding of the other. However, given the cultural development of individualized administration for each site in the past, preservation and interpretation of the two sites have evolved separately presenting a separated identity of the two sites.

We recommend that to improve the preservation of the features and presentation of the storylines associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany there should be increased promotion of the shared history of the two sites. As part of this, a well balanced preservation and interpretative plan for both sites independently and collectively should be reflecting mutually supportive standards of practice and program support. Recently, the agencies responsible for both the Fort Stanwix National Monument and the Oriskany Battlefield SHS developed a cooperative management agreement enabling National Park Service staff to take up the leadership role for daily operations, interpretation, maintenance, and facilitation of preservation goals of both sites.

Collaborative Interpretation

As part of the continuation of developing a shared interpretation of both sites, we recommend developing a system of outreach programs that explicitly inform visitors of the shared history of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield. This could include driving tours, digital tours, or guided tours that direct visitors across the landscape. These tours would use the landscape to tell the history of the siege and the battle and as a necessity bring together both sites. These expanded tours could also lead people to an expanded view of the historic landscape by directing them to defining features outside of the parks. St. Leger's expedition covered a large expanse and these tours could not feasibly cover the entire range of the expedition. However, key points to the history of the expedition could be included in a tour that stretched from Oneida Lake through the Mohawk Valley to German Flats. This would lead to the inclusion of major defining features and battle related areas, such as Fort Stanwix, Oriskany Battlefield, the Oneida Carry, Fort Dayton, Willett's Mission, the advance and retreat of the British, the Tryon County Militia, Maj. Gen. Arnold's advance, Johnstown, Stone Arabia, Cherry Valley, Fort Klock, and the Village of Oriska. The inclusion of these defining features would allow the majority of the expedition to be presented. Aspects of the expedition's history that are often not presented, such as Willett's mission, Walter Butler's capture and court martial, and Arnold's advance, could be integrated into the interpretation.

Such an initiative would require improvements to the signage placed across the landscape. There is some level of the interpretation already present across the Mohawk Valley's landscape. Stone monuments erected by local historical societies and New York State historic road markers were placed at battle related locations during the early 20th century. Since the signage was set up by separate groups, there is no unified message, nor has there been an update to the message they present. With no centralization in message or presentation, the monuments become lost to visitors.



The implementation of a centralized signage network and design scheme would inform visitors of the locations of tour stops, the directions to other tour stops, and how to access digital tour stops. These tours would be based at either Fort Stanwix National Monument or Oriskany Battlefield SHS. At the sites, visitors could pick up a CD or other media providing audio for a driving tour. They could also view brochures or displays explaining how to access the digital (QR code based) tour. Signage using a similar theme placed in the landscape and used in conjunction with the digital or audio tours would let visitors know they were at the correct location.

The digital tour interface would allow for a flexible presentation of a feature's history. The digital tours are accessed using smartphones and tablets to reach a website or app associated with the tour. Since the presentation of information is digital, various media, such as text, photos, audio, and video, can be included in the presentation. This allows interpretation of locations that may have low integrity. For example, the Mohawk Lower Landing has low integrity due to industrial development. However, using digital media, historic descriptions of the feature and modern interpretations of its use could be provided as a tour stop. Illustrations using maps and images of Lt. Bird's artillery battery can help visitors better understand how that location related to St. Leger's expedition. The result is an interpretive sign that allows a more active and flexible interface for visitors.

The message presented in the tour and the action associated with the tours would show an integrated landscape between Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield. The history presented would show that although the two sites are separated by institutions and preservation history, they do have a shared history and both are part of a larger historic landscape.

7.3 Future Preservation Strategies

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany's landscape and the engaged interest of a wide cross-section of the local community suggest the potential for diverse forms of future preservation strategies. One such strategy would be designation as a National Heritage Area (NHA). An NHA is defined as a unique place, designated by Congress, where "natural, cultural, historic, and scenic resources combine to form a cohesive, nationally important landscape." (NPS 2003). These unique places demonstrate the contributions of people and events that made substantial impacts on the narrative of our Nation's history (NPS 2003:3). The place and events that formed Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle of Oriskany, in combination with generations of local residents and historical experts, indicate that these sites would be a viable candidate for NHA designation. Since only Congress can make such a designation, we recommend that a feasibility study be considered to determine how effective a heritage area designation would be to ensuring preservation of these nationally significant places. The National Park Service provides assistance in the form of guidance for such NHA feasibility studies (NPS 2003).

Other appropriate preservation strategies include preservation easements, boundary expansions, and voluntary deed restrictions, among other approaches to preservation in order to provide the largest amount of protection possible to these significant resources.



VIII. SUMMARY

This report has detailed the results of a documentary study and field mapping survey of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. The primary goal of the project was to develop a battlefield delineation by identifying battle related landscape features, assessing their integrity, and determining the boundaries of the siege and the battle. Included in this study was the identification of archives and repositories holding historic documents associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany, reviewing historic accounts for references to landscape features, conducting database and GIS analyses of the identified landscape features, and determining the integrity of these features with a field survey or walkover. All of this information aided researchers in performing a KOCO military terrain analysis of the siege and the battle. The research provided a perspective of the siege and the battle centered on the insights of those who fought on both sides in the battle.

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany was a complex military struggle. It covered a landscape from near Montreal, Canada to German Flatts, New York. It involved rivers, lakes, valleys, and villages as transportation routes, fortifications, and areas of intense fighting. The conflict resulting from St. Leger's expedition brought together British, Loyalists, French Canadian, Hessian Germans, and allied Native Americans to face a Continental force composed of mixed ethnicities and allied Oneida warriors. The result went beyond colonists rebelling against their king to civil war. This civil war was not just between Continentals and Loyalists neighbors, but a civil war among the Haudenosaunee. The effect of this conflict would not just shape the fighting along the Hudson Valley that summer and fall. It also influenced the rest of the war in Upstate New York (e.g. the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign) and shaped relationships between settlers and Native Americans into the start of the new nation.

The Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany had a shared history as both were tied to the events of St. Leger's expedition in 1777. For Brigadier General Barry St. Leger, his primary goal was to march through the Mohawk Valley and aid General John Burgoyne in dividing the Continental forces. Key to achieving this was the taking of Fort Stanwix. Since the French and Indian war, Fort Stanwix had served to protect the important transportation route that was the Oneida Carry and the Mohawk Valley. To successfully cross into the Mohawk Valley, St. Leger needed to take Fort Stanwix. The siege was the means to take it, but the Tryon County Militia threatened St. Leger's siege by marching to aid the Continentals in Fort Stanwix. Loyalist forces and allied Native Americans established an ambush on the militia's route to Fort Stanwix to block the militia's relief of the siege. The militia was surprised and decimated at the Battle of Oriskany. Despite their losses, the battle allowed Continentals the opportunity to harass and weaken the British forces within the Oneida Carry with Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett's sortie. Willett would later help relieve the siege by leaving the fort and joining forces with Major General Benedict Arnold to lead a force of Continental, militia, and allied warriors against St. Leger.

Despite this shared history, following the war, Fort Stanwix and Oriskany's landscapes developed along different paths. Fort Stanwix and the Oneida Carry became associated with an urban environment covered with industrial, commercial, and dense residential neighborhoods. The Erie Canal brought trade and manufacturing that pushed for expansive development across the Oneida Carry. This development created a widespread disturbance to features associated with the siege. The natural landscape of woods



and wetlands was replaced by factories, city streets, and neighborhoods. The urban landscape buried battle related features, such as Fort Stanwix. The Oriskany Battlefield became associated with a rural environment with agricultural practices. Farmers cleared the old growth forests to make way for fields. Farmers plowed up and moved the bones and material remains of those who died at the Battle of Oriskany. There were differences between the two sites beyond land use.

Preservation initiatives at Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield led to different ways of preserving and interpreting the sites. America's centennial in 1876 spurred interest in preserving American Revolution sites across the country, including Fort Stanwix and Oriskany Battlefield. At Fort Stanwix preservation was not actively pursued in the 19th century as civic leaders saw it as secondary to ensuring a strong manufacturing economy in Rome, New York. Economic slowdowns of the 20th century inspired business and city leaders to develop Fort Stanwix for heritage tourism. They also sought Federal aid in the form of legislation and institutional support (NPS) to preserve Fort Stanwix. Legislative limits on the development of the Fort Stanwix National Monument and the NPS's initial hesitation of developing the site kept preservation of Fort Stanwix halted until the late 1960s and 1970s. This wait probably aided the preservation and interpretation of Fort Stanwix by keeping the buried deposits relatively undisturbed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It also allowed general preservation strategies to modernize without leading to irreversible impacts to interpretation and preservation of Fort Stanwix.

The Oriskany Battlefield had an earlier and more localized preservation history than Fort Stanwix. While Rome civic leaders pushed the preservation of Fort Stanwix, county preservation groups, such as the Oneida County Historical Society, Mohawk Valley Historic Association, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Sons of the American Revolution worked to preserve Oriskany. These groups, spurred by the initial call in 1777 to erect a monument to the men and boys of the Tryon county militia, conducted preservation themselves starting in the late 19th century by purchasing the land associated with the battle. As this was done in the late 19th and early 20th century, more modern theory and methodologies for preservation were not yet developed and standardized. The landscape was shaped as a commemorative one made to serve as a recreational park more than an interpretive landscape. These local groups also did not push for federal aid, instead transferring ownership of the land to the State of New York in the 1950s. The result was that Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield have divergent institutional structures and culture focusing mission priorities, preservation planning, management standards and range of public services.

In 2001, the National Park Service and the American Battlefield Protection Program initiated a reassessment of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 battlefields, including the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. The reassessment was guided by the goal of preservation. For these battlefields, three boundaries were established: core, study area, and area of Potential National Register Eligibility (PotNR). The core is the area of the battlefield related to the most intensive and direct fighting; the study area includes the overall battlefield including the core area and the secondary features, such as staging areas and avenues of movement including approach and retreat; the PotNR boundaries include those portions of the battlefield that meet the National Register's integrity criteria. For the 2001 study, the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany's preservation continued as separate sites. Their landscapes were treated as separate, and features assessed as individual sites.



This project has worked to evaluate the landscapes associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany in the manner established by the National Park Service and the American Battlefield Protection Program. To better reflect the shared history of the siege and the battle, we have included them in the same study area, core area, and PotNR area rather than separating them ([REDACTED]). These boundaries were established by a general review of the historical literature related to the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany.

Besides providing a more integrated mapping of the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany's defining features, this project has also produced projects to aid future research into the siege and battle. As an initial part of the historical research, project researchers developed an annotated bibliography identifying historic documents, accounts, and illustrations associated with the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany. A list of archives holding these materials were also developed (Appendix II, p. 225). This should help future researchers to quickly identify historic research materials.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

Due to changes to the landscape and disturbance to the battlefield, the area of Potential National Register eligibility does not completely match the study area or the core areas. As stated Fort Stanwix and the Oriskany Battlefield have a shared military history, but a divergent preservation history. Urban development impacted those features within the Oneida Carry more severely than the features associated with the Oriskany Battlefield. We recommend archeological testing in the areas of defining features that were vital to the outcome of the battle to better determine the nature of the integrity. Fort Stanwix was assumed to be lost to urban development. Yet, archeological excavation showed that portions of the fort were still intact. This could be the case for other features within the Oneida Carry. Yards and parking areas may be preserving buried battle related deposits. Cut and fill activities related to developing a commemorative landscape for the Battle of Oriskany also had an undetermined effect on buried battle deposits. Subsurface testing should aid in better assessing the integrity of these features. Results of testing intact deposits should also better inform the interpretation of the flow of the battle by using material deposits related to the battle to ascertain tactics, and troop movements.

All of this information will aid in the determination of an overall preservation plan for the landscape associated with St. Leger's expedition into the Mohawk River Valley. The landscape has multiple uses from urban development to agricultural fields and each have had different effects on the battle related landscape. The areas used as agricultural fields remain relatively more intact than those in areas of urban and residential development. Farming practices, community and city development, waterfront development, canal and other transportation corridor development, as well as commemorative functions have also threatened the preservation of battle features. This report allows an initial step in planning to preserve the landscape of both the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany battlefield by identifying and mapping the associated defining features. The next step will be to evaluate integrity of these features more exactly to determine what remains and what has been disturbed. Taken as a whole, the gathered information will provide the groundwork for placing the Siege of Fort Stanwix and the Battle of Oriskany on a joint path to preservation and purpose.



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

Figure 89. 



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Manuscript Sources

- CO42-37 *British Colonial Office Records-Canada 1700-1922*. Library and Archives Canada.
- CP *The Claus Family Papers*. Eight microfilm reels in the Loyalist Collection, Special Collections and Archives, Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario, Canada.
- CRM *Crown Collection of American Maps*. Series I-III.
- DOC *Documents Relating to the Battle of Oriskany and the Siege of Fort Stanwix*. 2nd Edition. Compiled and transcribed by Joseph Robertaccio
- Draper MSS. *Lyman C. Draper Manuscripts*, State Historical Society of Wisconsin [microfilm].
- FHP *Papers and Correspondence of Sir Frederick Haldimand*, British Library, Additional Manuscripts vols. 21,661-21,892 [microfilm].
- GCP Ser. Q *Guy Carleton Papers*, Ser. Q, MG 11, National Archives of Canada [transcripts from series CO 42, National Archives (Public Record Office), London; microfilm]
- GCP
1899-1914 *Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777-1795–1801-1804*, ed Hugh Hastings, 10 vols. Albany and New York: [various pubs.].
- GJP Guy Johnson Papers, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
- GP *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*. New York Historical Society.
- GWP *George Washington Papers*, Library of Congress [microfilm; “American Memory” online digital reproductions].
- HGP *Gen. Horatio Gates Papers 1728-1806*. New York Historical Society.
- LOY *Loyalist Collection*, Special Collections and Archives, Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario, Canada.
- PCC *Papers of the Continental Congress* (National Archives, Washington, D.C.) [microfilm publication M247]. items 63 and 67.
- SFP *Schuyler Family Papers*. New York State Library.
- WJP
1921 *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*. Edited by James Sullivan, Alexander C. Flick, and Milton W. Hamilton, eds. Albany, New York.



B. Correspondence and Interviews

- Arnold to Gansevoort August 22, 1777. From *Papers of the Continental Congress, Item 63*.
- Arnold to Gates August 23, 1777. From *Horatio Gates Papers*.
- Arnold to Gates August 24, 1777. From *Horatio Gates Papers*.
- Butler to Carleton August 15, 1777. From *Colonial Office Records CO42-37*.
- Carleton to Butler, September 15, 1777. From *Colonial Office Records CO42-37*.
- Carleton to Claus, October 20, 1777. From *Claus Papers*.
- Gansevoort to Schuyler June 15, 1777. From *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- Gansevoort to Schuyler June 27, 1777. From *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- Gansevoort to Schuyler July 4, 1777. From *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- Gansevoort to Schuyler July 26, 1777. From *Papers of the Continental Congress, Item 63*.
- Gansevoort to Van Schaick July 28, 1777. *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- Herkimer to Schuyler July 1777. From *Papers of the Continental Congress, Item 63*.
- Schuyler to Dayton July 18, 1776. From *Schuyler Family Papers*.
- Schuyler to Dayton September 7, 1776. From *Schuyler Family Papers*.
- Spencer to Gansevoort July 8, 1777. From *Journal of the Council of Safety*.
- Spencer to Gansevoort July 28, 1777. From *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- Spencer to Gansevoort July 29, 1777. From *Peter Gansevoort Military Papers*
- St. Leger to Carleton August 27, 1777. From *Colonial Office Records CO42-37*.
- Tryon County Safety Committee to Governor George Clinton September 7, 1777. From the Public Papers of George Clinton, *First Governor of New York, 1777-1795-1801-1804*,
- Personal Communication Nancy Demyttenaere on December 20, 2012 and March 27, 2013.
- Personal Communication OPRHP June 13, 2013.
- Personal Communication Len Cross September 12, 2013.

C. Published Primary Sources

- Abler, Thomas S., ed.
1989 *Chainbreaker: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of Governor Blacksnake as Told to Benjamin Williams*.
University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska.
- Bird, Lt. Henry
1777 Diary of Lt. Henry Bird. In *Life of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea Including the Indian Wars of the American Revolution*. William Stone. 1970 Scholarly Press, St. Claire Shores, MI. Original printed in 1838.
- Hertel, Jean-Baptiste-Melchior de Rouville
1945 L'Expedition du Fort Stanwix. In *Le Canada* Vol XXXIII (November).
- Journal of the Council of Safety
1777 Journal of the Council of Safety May 14-September 10, 1777; October 8, 1777-January 1778. In *Journals of the Provincial congress. Provincial convention. Committee of safety and Council of safety of the state of New York, 1775-1777*. T. Weed printer to the state, Albany, NY.



Kirkland, Samuel

1980 *The Journals of Samuel Kirkland, 18th-Century Missionary to the Iroquois, Government Agent, Father of Hamilton College*, ed. Walter Pilkington. Hamilton College, Clinton, NY.

Lowenthal, Larry (editor)

1983 *Days of Siege: A Journal of the Siege of Fort Stanwix in 1777*. Eastern National, Fort Washington, PA.

Norton, John

1970 *The Journal of John Norton 1816*, ed. Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman. Champlain Society, Toronto.

Penrose Maryly (editor)

1981 *Indian Affairs Papers, American Revolution*. Liberty Bell Associates, Franklin Park, NJ.

St. Leger, Barry

1777 Colonel St. Leger's Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix. In *A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before the House of Commons*. By Lieutenant General John Burgoyne. J. Almon, London, UK.

Thacher, James

1862 *Military Journal of the American Revolution*. Hurlbut, Williams, and Company. Hartford, CT.

Van Brocklin, Garred

1778 Deposition of Ensign Garred Van Brocklin, Tryon County Militia. In *Documents Relating to the Battle of Oriskany and the Siege of Fort Stanwix*. Transcribed by Joseph Robertaccio. Rome, NY.

Walrath, Henry

1833 Pension Application of Henry J. Walrath Pension no. S28937 (NY). In *Documents Relating to the Battle of Oriskany and the Siege of Fort Stanwix*. Transcribed by Joseph Robertaccio. Rome, NY.

Willett, William

1831 *A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett*. G. & C. & H. Carvill, New York, NY.

Younglove, Samuel

NA *Battle of Oriskany: Record of the Narrative of Dr. Moses Younglove*. NYSL, Albany, NY. Folder #42, Item 11965.

D. General Bibliography

Alden, Joseph

1969 *A History of the American Revolution*. Da Capo Press, New York, NY.

Babits, Lawrence

1998 *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.

Beers, D.G.

1874 *Atlas of Oneida County, New York*. D.G. Beers & Co., Philadelphia, PA.



Berleth, Richard

2010 *Bloody Mohawk: The French and Indian War and American Revolution on New York's Frontier*. Black Dome Press, Delmar, New York.

Bilharz, Joy

2009 *Oriskany: A Place of Great Sadness. A Mohawk Valley Battlefield Ethnography*. National Park Service, Boston, MA.

Burleigh, L.R., Beck, and Pauli

1886 *Rome, New York*. L. R. Burleigh, Beck, and Pauli, Troy, NY.

Campbell, William

1831 *Annals of Tryon County or the Border Warfare of new York, During the Revolution*. J. & J. Harper, New York, NY.

Canfield, William Walker and J.E. Clark

1909 *Things Worth Knowing About Oneida County*. Thomas J. Griffiths, Utica, New York.

Child, Hamilton

1862 *History of Rome, New York*. Hamilton Child Syracuse, New York.

Claus, Daniel

1777 Report of Colonel Daniel Claus to Secretary Knox, of his expedition into New York. In *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*. Edited by John Romeyn Brodhead. Volume 8 1857, Weed, Parsons and Company, Albany, NY. Pp. 718-725.

Cookinham, Henry

1912 *History of Oneida County, New York from 1700 to the Present Time*. S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, Chicago, IL.

Cruikshank, Ernest

1893 *The Story of Butler's Rangers and the Settlement of Niagara*. Tribune Printing House, Welland, Ontario.

Curry, George

2000 *Cultural Landscape Report Oriskany Battlefield State Historic Site Whitestown, New York*. SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, NY.

Erie and Champlain Canals

1825 *Laws of the State of New York, In Relation to the Erie and Champlains Canals Together with the Annual Reports of the Canal Commissioners, and Other Documents*. E. and E. Hosford, Printers, Albany, NY.

De Fleury, Francois Lois Tesseidre

1777 *Sketch of the Siege of Fort Schuyler*. Fort Stanwix National Monument, Rome, NY.

1777b *Sketch Map of Fort Stanwix area*. Fort Stanwix National Monument, Rome, NY.

Gansevoort, Peter

1777 *Map of Fort Stanwix*. Fort Stanwix National Monument, Rome, NY.



Garrison, John

1778 Deposition of John Garrison, Tryon County Militia. In *Documents Relating to the Battle of Oriskany and the Siege of Fort Stanwix*. Transcribed by Joseph Robertaccio. Rome, NY.

Glatthaar, Joseph and James Kirby Martin

2007 *Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution*. Macmillan, New York, NY. Digital Edition

Graf, Jamieson

2000 *Geotechnical Engineering Report GPR survey of Route 69 Site #2 Area Oriskany Battlefield Military Road Town of Whitestown, Oneida County, New York*. Geo-Graf, Inc., Kennett Square, PA.

Graymont, Barbara

1972 *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.

Green, Nelson

1915 *The Story of Old Fort Plain & the Middle Mohawk Valley*. Fort Plain, NY.

Hagerty, Gilbert

1971 *Massacre at Fort Bull: the de lery expedition against Oneida Carry 1756*. Mowbray Company, Providence, RI.

Hanson, Lee and Dick Ping Hsu

1975 *Casemates and Cannonballs: Archaeological Investigations at Fort Stanwix, Rome, New York*. National Park Service, Washington D.C.

Hardety, Donald and Barbara Little

2009 *Assessing Site Significance: A Guide for Archaeologists and Historians*. Altamira Press, New York, NY.

Hartgen

2005 http://www.hartgen.com/FOST/Home_willArcheo.htm. Accessed March 1, 2013.

Hamilton, Milton

1976 *Sir William Johnson: Colonial American, 1715-1763*. Kennikat Press, Port Washington, NY.

Holland, Major

1763 *The Provinces of New York and New Jersey: with part of Pensilvania and the province of Quebec*. Harry Lodowick Broenner, Frankfurt upon the Mayn, UK

Icon Architecture and the Saratoga Associates

1998 *Land Use history for the Oriskany Battlefield*. Unpublished report. National Park Service.

Jones, Pomroy

1851 *Annals and Recollections of Oneida County*. Pomroy Jones, Rome, NY.



Junr, J. Randel

1789 *Map of Oriskany Patent: Subdivided into Lots in 1789.* Map #747, Manuscripts and Special Collections. New York State Library, Albany, NY.

Lossing, Benson

1850 *Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution.* Volume 1. Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, NY.

Luzader, John, Louis Torres, and Orville Carroll

1976 *Fort Stanwix: History, Historic Furnishings, and Historic Structure Reports.* National Park Service, Washington D.C.

National Park Service (NPS)

1997 *National Register Bulletin. How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation.* National Park Service, Washington DC.

2001 *Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study: GPS and GIS Concepts and Methodology.* National Park Service: Cultural Resources Geographic Information Services.

2003 *National Heritage Area Feasibility Study Guidelines*
(<http://www.nps.gov/heritageareas/FSGUIDE/nhafeasguidelines.pdf>) Accessed April 4, 2013.

2007 *Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States.* American Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, Washington D.C.

2005 <http://home.nps.gov/fost/parknews/marinus-Willett-center-opens-to-the-public.htm>. Accessed March 1, 2013.

2013 <http://www.nps.gov/york/historyculture/revolutionary-war-artillery.htm>. Accessed March, 6, 2013.

NYCD

1853-1887 *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, ed. Edmund B. O'Callaghan, 15 vols. Weed, Parsons and Company, Albany, NY.

NYJPC

1842 *Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New-York, 1775-1776-1777*, 2 vols. Thurlow Weed, Albany, NY.

Osborn and Hartley

1993 *Adverse Effects of Domestic Livestock Grazing on the Archaeological resources of Capitol Reef National Park, Utah.* In *Proceedings of the First Biennial Conference in Colorado Plateau National Parks.* Edited by Peter Rowlands, Charles van Riper III, and Mark Sogge. National Park Service, Washington D.C.

O'Toole, Fintan

2005 *White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of America.* Farrar, Strauss, and Groux, New York, NY.

Pease, Richard

1758 *Topographical map of the country between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek : from an actual survey taken in November, 1758.* Weeds, Parsons & Co. Albany, NY.

1802 *Rome in 1802.* Weeds, Parsons & Co. Albany, NY.



Public Archaeology Facility

- 2010 *Documentary Research Report and Research Design Revolutionary War Newtown Battlefield Project (August 29th, 1779) Chemung County, New York Grant # (GA225508017)*. Prepared for National Park Service- American Battlefield Protection Program. Public Archaeology Facility, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.
- 2011 *Documentary Research Report and Research Design Revolutionary War Chemung Battlefield Project (August 13, 1779) Chemung and Tioga Counties, New York and Bradford County, Pennsylvania Grant # (GA225509022)*. Prepared for National Park Service- American Battlefield Protection Program. Public Archaeology Facility, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.
- 2012 *Revolutionary War Newtown Battlefield Project (August 29th, 1779) Chemung County, New York Report on Archeological Survey and Excavations*. Grant #GA-2255-10-015. Prepared for National Park Service- American Battlefield Protection Program. Public Archaeology Facility, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.

Raphael, Ray

- 2002 *A People's History of the American Revolution*. Perennial Press, New York, NY.

Reeves, Matthew

- 2011 *Civil War Battlefield Archaeology: Examining and Interpreting the Debris of Battle*. In *Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic*. Edited by Clarence Geier, Lawrence Babits, Douglas Scott, and David Orr. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX.

Roberts, Ellis

- 1877 *Historical Address: Battle of Oriskany Its Place in History*. In *Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Oriskany August 6, 1877*. Oneida Historical Society, Utica, NY. Pp.

Rogers, A.E., J. Murphy, and Newel Brown

- 1852 *Map of Oneida County, New York*. LC G&M, Philadelphia, PA.

Sanborn Map Company

- 1888 *Fire Insurance Map of Rome, Oneida County, New York*.
1924 *Fire Insurance Map of Rome, Oneida County, New York*.

Schoolcraft, Henry

- 1845 *Sketches of an Indian Council*. In *Agent in Census of Iroquois for State of New York*. Bartlett and Welford, New York City, NY.

1851-57 *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, 6 vols. Lippincott, Grambo, Philadelphia, PA.

Scott, John Albert

- 1927 *Fort Stanwix and Oriskany*. Rome Sentinel Company, Rome, NY.

- 1936 *Papers Based on the Journal of Lieut. Ebenezer Elmer of the Third New Jersey Continentals, 1776*. From the *Daily Sentinel*, March-April 1936. Rome, NY



SHPO

2005 *New York State Historic Preservation Office Report Guidelines*. New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation, Waterford, NY.

Sivilich, Daniel, and Garry Wheeler Stone

2009 *The Battle of Monmouth: The Archaeology of Molly Pitcher, the Royal Highlanders, and Colonel Cilley's Light Infantry*. <http://www.saa.org/publicftp/PUBLIC/resources/MonmouthBravo.pdf> (October 2009).

South, Stanley

1976 *Method and Theory in Historical Archaeology*. Academic Press, New York, NY.

Stone, William

1970 *Life of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea Including the Indian Wars of the American Revolution*. Scholarly Press, St. Claire Shores, MI. Original printed in 1838.

Stone, William jr.

1877 *The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne and the expedition of Lieut. Col. Barry St. Leger*. Joel Munsell, Albany, NY (1970 reissue DaCapo Press, New York, NY). 1877.

USDA

1941 *Aerial Images of New York*. USDA Agricultural Adjustment Administration Northeast Division, Washington D.C.

2008 *Soil Survey of Oneida County, New York*. United States Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C.

United States Geological Survey

1895 *Rome-Oriskany, NY 15' USGS quadrangle*

1947 *Oriskany, NY 7.5' Quadrangle Map*.

1947 *Rome, NY 7.5' Quadrangle Map*

1955 *Oriskany, NY 7.5' Quadrangle Map*.

1955 *Rome, NY 7.5' Quadrangle Map*.

1955 *Verona, NY 7.5' Quadrangle Map*.

Utica Daily Observer

1877 Commemorative Map. *Utica Daily Observer* August 7, 1877. Draper Manuscripts.

Venables, Robert W.

1965 *The Valley of Nettles: The Revolutionary War in the Mohawk Valley, Summer, 1777*. MA Thesis, Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN.

Waters, Michael

1996 *Principles of Geoarchaeology*. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ.

Watt, Gavin K.

2002 *Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777*. Dundurn Group, Toronto.

William, Levi

1845 *Map of Railroads from Rome to Albany and Troy*. LC Railroad Maps, New York, NY.



Williams, Glenn F.

2005 *Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign Against the Iroquois*. Westholme Publishing, LLC, Yardley, Pennsylvania.

Wonderley, Anthony

2008 *Oneida Hanyery vs. Joseph Brant*. <http://www.oneidaindiannation.com/culture/shako/exhibits/26839509.html>. Accessed March 7, 2013.

Zenzen, Joan

2004 *Reconstructing the Past, Partnering for the Future: An Administrative History of Fort Stanwix National Monument*. National Park Service, Washington D.C.

**APPENDIX II: FORT STANWIX/ORISKANY REPOSITORY COLLECTION DATA**

Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
Willett Marinus		Hartford, August 21, 1777. : The following is a narrative of part of the transactions at and near Fort Stanwix, since the investiture of the place by the enemy, given in manuscript by Lieutenant-Colonel Willett, of that garrison		manuscript	Siege of Fort Stanwix	microform: 1 sheet ([1] p.) ; 40 x 25 cm		Microprint 22 no. 43410 - Olin Library	Cornell University	Yes
John Albert Scott		Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany : the romantic story of the repulse of St. Leger's British invasion of 1777 told for the first time in chronological order and in detail		manuscript	Historical Account of Battles of Fort Stanwix/Oriskany	11-366 p. : ill., maps (part folded) folded facsimile. ; 24 cm.		LNL Fort Stan Scot F927	American Antiquarian Society	Yes
Carroll, Orville W.		Fort Stanwix : history, historic furnishing, and historic structure reports.		manuscript	NPS report	report		LNL FtSt Fort F976	American Antiquarian Society	Yes
Haldimand, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick, 1718 1791		Haldimand papers [textual record (chiefly microform), cartographic material (chiefly microform)]	Sir Frederick Haldimand fonds	Manuscripts and cartographic material (chiefly microform)	Maps and documents covering events from Seven Year's War to the American Revolution. Includes correspondence with military and native figures.	78 microfilm reels: negative and positive. 11.7 m of textual records: transcripts. 13 maps.	microfilm reels: A 609 to A 618, A 661 to A 671, A 677 to A 692, A 735 to A 754, A 760 to A 780.	R11231 0 1 E	Library and Archives Canada 395 Wellington Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N4 www.collectionscanada.gc.ca	Yes
Lt. B. Slake, Royal Engineers		B Slack Lt, Royal Engineers to Colonel Barry St Ledger		correspondence	Detailed Description of Water Route from Lachine to Ft Stanwix	microfilm		Series 2, Lot 614	Library and Archives Canada	No
Sir John Johnson		The Orderly Book of the King's Royal Regiment of New York		manuscript	Orderly Book of King's Royal Regiment	microfilm	ebook	E233 .J67	Binghamton University	Yes
Willett, Marinus	Col. Peter Gansevoort	Orderly Book of Peter Gansevoort's Third New York Regiment		manuscript	Orderly Book of NY3	microfilm			Fort Stanwix Monument (transcript); New York Public Library	Yes
Lt. William Colbrath	Larry Lowenthal	Journal of the most Material Occurrences Preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly Stanwix) Preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly Stanwix) with an Account of that Siege 3rd N.Y. Regiment	Days of Siege: A Journal of the Siege of Fort Stanwix In 1777	manuscript	Journal covering Siege of Fort Stanwix	microfilm		938p	David Library of the American Revolution	Yes
		Diary of the Hesse-Hanau Jagers Corps (German Rifleman)		manuscript	Accounts of Hesse-Hanau Jagers during American Revolution	microfilm			Hessian Papers, Morristown NHP	No
Committee of Safety Tryon County, NY	Samuel L. Frey	The minute book of the Committee of Safety of Tryon County Safety		manuscripts	Minutes of Tryon Committee of Safety	microfilm		ebook	Binghamton University	Yes
Phillip Conine Jr		Letter from Phillip Conine Jr (Albany County Militia?) to Leonard Bronk	Letters from a Revolution	correspondence	Details of Fort Stanwix	letter		Bronk Family letters	Greene County Historical Society	No
William Campbell		Annals of Tryon County	Border Warfare of New York During the Revolution	book	New York during the Revolution	1831 book on the history of New York during the American Revolution	Contains transcripts of primary documents	E263.N6 c28 1831	Binghamton University	Yes
Gov. George Clinton		Public Papers of George Clinton First Governor of New York 1775-1795		book	Papers of Gov. Clinton 1775-1795	book		E263.N6 N56	Binghamton University	Yes
Luzader, John		The Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix		1969 US Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Division of History	Architectural analysis of Fort Stanwix	v, 169, 8 l. illus., fold. plans. 27 cm		IRM (Fort Stanwix) (Luzader, J. F. Construction and military history of Fort Stanwix)	New York Public Library	Yes
Schoolcraft, Henry Rowe		Historical Considerations on the Siege and Defense of Fort Stanwix, in 1776		1845 book	Siege of Fort Stanwix	29 p. ; 23 cm		IGE Schoolcraft, H. R. Historical considerations on the siege and defense of Fort Stanwix	New York Public Library	Yes
Preist, Josiah	Issac Hubbell	The Fort Stanwix Captive		1 p. l., [5]-64 col. illus. 23.5 cm.	Siege of Fort Stanwix	First person account of Siege of Fort Stanwix by Isaac Hubbell		*KF 1841 Priest, J. Fort Stanwix captive	New York Public Library	Yes



Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
John Stanwix		Fort Stanwix Orderly Book	Orderly book of a brigade of British regular and Provincial troops commanded by Brigadier General John Stanwix at Oneida Station, New York, during the construction of Fort Stanwix on the present site of Rome, New York, from August 12 to October 14, 1758.	book		.21 linear foot (1 volume)		MssCol 2861	New York Public Library	No
Scudder, William		The Journal of William Scudder, An Officer in the Late New-York Line		book- 250 pages	Journal of Continental soldier	Early American imprints - no. 27681	"Supplement" signed on p. 250: William Scudder. New-York, August 21st, 1794 Errata statement, at foot of p. 250	Electronic resource	New York Public Library; New York Historic Society	Yes
Hanson, Lee H.	Hsu, Dick Ping	Casemates and Cannonballs	Archeological Investigations at Fort Stanwix, Rome, New York	book 1975	Archaeology of Fort Stanwix	report		IRM Fort Stanwix 76-431	New York Public Library	Yes
Elmer, Ebenezer	Scott, John Albert, ed	Papers Based on the Journal of Lieut. Ebenezer Elmer Of the Third New Jersey Continentals, 1776		manuscripts	Journal of Continental soldier	Microfilm. New York : New York Public Library, [19--]. 1 microfilm reel ; 35 mm		*ZH-IAG p.v. 538, no. 3	New York Public Library	Yes
Great Britain		Account Book and Ledger of British Army in America		.21 linear foot (1 volume) parchment	Account book of British Army	Account book from 1759 to 1760 by British forces		MssCol 1212	New York Public Library	No
Roberts, Ellis H.		Memorial of the Centennial Celebration of the Battle of Oriskany, August 6, 1877		book 199 pages	Centennial Commemoration of Battle of Oriskany	199 p. ; 24 cm.	"Historical address. Battle of Oriskany: its place in history. By Hon. Ellis H. Roberts." --p. [58]-129 Includes bibliographica 1 references	NYGB N.Y. G 43.7 O74	New York Public Library	Yes
Emmett, Thomas Addis	Emmet Collection	Thomas Addis Emmet Collection		Originals: 33 linear feet (83 boxes, 19 v.)	Documents of general period of American Revolution as well as The Revolutionary War is well documented in the correspondence and letterbooks of generals and other officers, as well as in orderly books, muster rolls, and returns.	The portion of the Emmet Collection housed in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Division consists of approximately 10,800 historical manuscripts relating chiefly to the period prior to, during, and following the American Revolution.	Entire collection available on microfilm. (MN: *ZZ-32049)	MssCol 927, MssCol 927	New York Public Library	No
Willett, William		A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett, Taken Chiefly from his own Manuscript		1831 book 162 pages	Account of Col. Willett	3 p. l., [5]-162 p. front. (port.) plan 22 cm.		Stuart 8418	New York Public Library	Yes
Father McKenna	Lewis Decker	Correspondence Father McKenna Chaplin of Kings Royal Regiment of New York to Reverend Father(?)		1965 transcription	Correspondence of Loyalist			Document X00733	Fort Stanwix National Monument	Yes
Penrose, Maryly		Mohawk Valley in the Revolution : Committee of Safety papers & genealogical compendium		book	Committee of Safety Papers including those for Tryon County	iii, 369 p. ; 24 cm.		F127.M7 M67	Binghamton University	Yes
Penrose, Maryly		Compendium of early Mohawk Valley families		book	Early families of Mohawk Valley	2 v. (xxvii, 1146 p.) : maps ; 24 cm.		F127.M7 P465 1990 v.1-2	Binghamton University	Yes
Penrose, Maryly		Indian Affairs Papers, American Revolution		book	Documents related to Iroquois	xviii, 395 p., [1] leaf of plates : ill. ; 24 cm		NYGB N.Y. G 96 I752	New York Public Library	Yes
Burgoyne, John		A State of the Expedition from Canada, as Laid Before the House of Commons		book	Burgoyne report on expedition	1780 book 140 pages		Electronic resource	University of Pittsburg	Yes



Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
Thacher, Dr. James		Military Journal of the American Revolution	From the Commencement to the Disbanding of the American Army; Comprising a Detailed Account of the Principal Events and Battles of the Revolution, with Their Exact Dates, and a Biographical Sketch of the Most Prominent Generals	1862 book	Account of Continental Surgeon Dr. Thacher	microfilm	ebook		Cornell University	Yes
Pownall, Thomas		Remembrancer of 1777	impartial repository of public events, Volume 5	1778 book	History > United States > Revolutionary Period (1775-1800)	microfilm	ebook		University of California	Yes
Brodhead, John R.		Documents Relating to the Colonial History of New York		1857 book	Claus's report on the Battles of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany	Vol. 8	ebook		Allen County Public Library Genealogy Center	Yes
Alexander, Rufus		Rufus Alexander Grider Albums		Maps and illustrations	Invasion of Mohawk Valley	9 volumes (boxes) ; 3 cubic feet	Vol. 5 deals with Siege	VC22932	New York State Library	Yes
Claus, Daniel		The Claus Family Papers		papers	Claus family papers, Native Americans, Revolutionary War	8 microfilm reels ; 35 mm.		MG19, F1. Volume 25	The National Archives of Canada. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada	Yes
Willett, Marinus		Willett, Marinus. Papers and Orderly Book		manuscripts	Willett, Marinus, 1740-1830 -- Correspondence ; Trials (Military offenses) ; New York (State) -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 ; Tryon County (N.Y.)	Approx. 160 pp. of material including regimental orders and letters, notes on enlistments.		BV Willett Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	Yes
Tryon County		Tryon County Records		manuscripts	Johnson, John, Sir, 1742-1830 ; New York (State). Court of Common Pleas (Tryon County) ; New York (State). Militia ; Tryon County Committee of Safety (N.Y.) ; American Loyalists ; Indians of North America	0.8 linear feet (2 boxes).		Tryon County records Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	No
Gates, Gen. Horatio		Gen. Horatio Gates Papers 1728-1806		microfilm	Burgoyne, John, 1722-1792 ; Gates, Elizabeth Phillips ; Monckton, Robert, 1726-1782 ; Great Britain. Army -- Colonial forces -- America ; Great Britain. Army -- Supplies and stores ; Fort Stanwix	2 v. ; 1 box.		BV Gates Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	Yes
Swartwout, Bernard		Barnardus Swartwout papers, 1777-1783, 1824		manuscripts	plan of Fort Stanwix rendered in pen and ink; and 78 pages of transcripts of documents related to Swartwout Jr.'s military career, particularly at Yorktown and in the Mohawk River Valley where he commanded Fort Herkimer	.25 linear ft. (1 box).		Barnardus Swartwout papers Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	No
Johnson, Sir William	Johnson, Guy	Map of New York land grants and purchases		map	ca. 1775 map of land grants	1 map on 2 assembled sheets : ms., col. ; sheet 79 x 62 cm..		New-York Historical Society Maps (M28.2.10 Non-circulating)	New York Historical Society	No
Schuyler, Gen. Philip		Gen. Philip Schuyler Papers		papers	Revolutionary War			BV Schuyler, Philip J. Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	No
Unites States		Revolutionary War Pension Applications			Pension applications of Rev. War veterans				National Archives	Yes
Brant, Joseph		Joseph Brant papers	Draper manuscripts, Brant papers.	Textual records [microform]	1. Brant, Joseph, 1742 1807 Manuscripts. 2. Indians of North America History Sources. 3. Mohawk Indians History Sources.	Part of The Draper manuscript collection. (Series F ; v. 1 22).	MB/FM copy 1 (6 reels), copy 2 (7 reels); 35 mm.	970.00497 B821, 87 034136	New York State Library; Wisconsin Historical Society	Yes
Chief Blacksnake		Blacksnake Conversations	Draper manuscripts, Brant papers.	Textual records [microform]	1. Blacksnake Manuscripts.			MSS.4s45 HSW	Wisconsin Historical Society	Yes
Fisher, Colonel Frederick		Colonel Frederick Fisher's Letter Book							Rome Historical Society	No



Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
Gansevoort, Peter		The Peter Gansevoort Military Papers.		manuscripts	This proposed publication, prepared by the State historian, consists of transcripts of correspondence and a few related documents of Revolutionary War Colonel Peter Gansevoort, commander of the Third New York Line regiment.	Unpublished Typescript, Galleys, and Page Proofs of "Military Papers of General Peter Gansevoort," 1763-1818 (collated ca. 1906-1907). 1 cubic foot		Manuscript Collection #AO131:D20616.	New York State Archives and at New York Historical Society	Yes
Gansevoort, Peter		Gansevoort-Lansing papers		manuscripts	Papers related to Gansevoort, Lansing, and Melville families	212 linear feet (357 boxes)	Gansevoort, Catherine Van Schaick, 1751-1830, Gansevoort, Peter, 1749-1812,	MssCol 1109	New York Public Library	No
Schuyler, Gen. Philip		Philip Schuyler Papers		manuscripts	Correspondence, 1761-1804, is with military officers, members of the Continental Congress, committees of safety, and family, and concerns the conduct of the Revolutionary War in the Northern Dept.	Originals: 21 linear feet (56 boxes, 15 v.)	Entire collection available on microfilm; New York Public Library	*ZL-444; MssCol 2701	New York Public Library	No
MacWethy, Lou D.		Col. Jacob Klock's Regiment, Second Reg., Tryon County (N.Y.) Militia, 1775-84		book- 1929	History of 2nd Regiment Tryon County Militia	14 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.		NYGB N.Y. G 65.5 M33	New York Public Library	Yes
Frey, Samuel L.		Samuel Ludlow Frey Papers		manuscripts	documents of Frey family	Box 7 and 8 related to Rev. War in Mohawk Valley		SC9829	New York State Library	Yes
Wyman, John E.		John E. Wyman Collection		manuscripts	U.S. Revolutionary War muster rolls for regiments in Connecticut and other states; Revolutionary War records from the Mohawk Valley; letters of Brant, Benedict Arnold, Samuel Kirkland	1 cu. ft. + 1 oversize folder (OVS+)		Coll. No. 222	New York Historical Association	No
McDonell, John Scotus		Spanish John	Being a Narrative in the Early life of Colonel John M'Donell of Scottos	book	Account of Loyalist John McDonell	74 p. port. 20 cm.		AN (Macdonell) (Macdonell, J. Spanish John)	New York Public Library	Yes
Schuyler Family		Schuyler Family Papers		manuscript	Correspondence during Rev. War	Box 1 Folder 13		SC19811	New York State Library	Yes
Younglove, Samuel		Battle of Oriskany: Record of the Narrative of Dr. Moses Younglove, Giving an Account of the Battle of Oriskany and of His Experience After Being Taken Prisoner		book	Account of Dr. Samuel Younglove of Battle of Oriskany and his time as a prisoner	microform			SUNY at Buffalo	Yes
Bryant, William Clement		Captain Brant and the Old King		book	quotes Clause's Anecdotes of Captain Brant	microform	ebook		Cornell University	Yes
Stone, William		The Life of Joseph Brant		book	Biography of Joseph Brant with quotes of primary documents	microform			Binghamton University	Yes
Talman, James J.		Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada		manuscripts	Narrative accounts from Loyalists	online			Champlain Society	Yes
Hadden, James	Horatio Rogers (ed)	Hadden's Journal and orderly Books		book	Account of Royal Artillery officer in Burgoyne's army	c, 581 p., [6] p. of plates : ill., fold. maps ; 22 cm	ebook	IGE Hadden, J. M. Hadden's journal and orderly books	New York Public Library	Yes
Continental Congress		Papers of the Continental Congress	New York State Papers	manuscripts	Letters and testimonies of major figures in Fort Stanwix/ Oriskany Battles	microfilm	see Item 67		Library of Congress	Yes
Great Britain		Commission of Enquiry into the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists		manuscripts	Accounts of Loyalists to British Government on losses due to the Revolution	Microfilm. New York, N.Y.: New York Public Library, 1960. 25 microfilm reels ; 35 mm. (MN: *ZZ-2309)	see vols. 20, 21, and 42 for Joost Harkemer, Sarah Meginn [McGinnis], and John Johnson	*ZL-12 to *ZL-47	New York Public Library	No
Rocque, John, d. 1762.		A Set of Plans and Forts in America, 1765		maps	Surveyed maps of American forts from 18th cent.	30 p., [1] p. of plates : ill., fold. map ; 16 cm.	1758 map of Fort Stanwix	Special Colls. Jefferson	Massachusetts Historical Society	No



Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
Mante, Thomas		The History of the Late War in North America		book	Account of Seven Years War		Contains Thomas Kitchin 1772 map Communication between Albany and Oswego		New York State Library	No
		Outline of the Mohawk River & Wood Creek : shewing the relative positions of Fort Bull, Fort Williams, and the German Flatts. Weed and Parson Co. 1849		map	Map of Fortifications along Mohawk River	1 map ; 18 x 29 cm.	Scale [ca. 1:260,000]	Map Coll (Pusey) MAP-LC G3802.M6 1756 .O8 1849	Harvard University	Yes
		Topographical map of the country between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek : from an actual survey taken in November, 1758		map	Map of fortification in Mohawk Valley- 1758	1 map; 18 1/2" X 21"		Special Collections G3803 .O2 1758 .P4	Stonybrook	Yes
Pease, Richard H.		Rome in 1802	1849 Documentary History of the State of New York	map	Map of 1802- Rome, NY	1 map ; 12 x 18 cm.		Map Div. Scrapbook 01-10236	New York Public Library	Yes
L. R. Burleigh. Beck & Pauli		1886 Bird's eye view of Rome, NY		map	Bird's eye view of Rome, NY c. 1886					Yes
Crysler family		Crysler family fonds		manuscripts	Records relating to Loyalist settlement in the Niagara region including documents relating to claims for losses during Revolutionary War, as well as military records	9.1 metres of textual records 238 volumes of textual records 4149 photographs 53 postcards 9 broadsides 2 watercolours 49 drawings 3 artifacts 9 maps	Adam and John Chrysler papers probably most relevant	film 714	David Library of the American Revolution	No
Cruikshank, Ernest	Gavin Watt	The History and Master Roll of the King's Royal Regiment of New York		manuscript	History of loyalist King's Royal Regiment of New York	book		6934	David Library of the American Revolution	No
New York (State). Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, 1777-1778		Minutes of the Committee and of the first Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York	December 11, 1776-Sept. 23, 1778	manuscript	Investigation of Loyalist conspiracies	2 v. ; 24 cm.	ebook	7115	David Library of the American Revolution	No
New York Historical Society		Muster and pay rolls of the war of the revolution, 1775-1783		manuscript	Muster and payroll records	2 v. ; 25 cm		7112	David Library of the American Revolution	No
United States. Continental Army. New York Regiment, 3rd.		Orderly Book		manuscript	NY 3rd Regiment Orderly book	1 v. (124 p.)		BV War Orderly books 3rd New York Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	Yes
United States. Continental Army.		Orderly Book		manuscript	Orderly books of Continental Army	6 v..		BV War Orderly books, HQ Non-circulating	New York Historical Society	Yes
Great Britain. War Office		Muster Books and Pay Lists (WO 12/4866): 34th (Cumberland) Regiment of Foot: 1759-1761; 1768-1787		manuscript	Muster roll of 34th (Cumberland)	2 microfilm reels of textual records; 35 mm.		FC LMR .G7W3M8C8	Loyalist Collection- University of New Brunswick	Yes
New Brunswick. Provincial Secretary.		Records of Old Soldiers' and Widows' Pensions ; 1837 - 1871		manuscript	Pension applications of Loyalists in New Brunswick	2 microfilm reels of textual records ; 35 mm.		MIC-Loyalist FC LMR .N4P7S6P4	Loyalist Collection- University of New Brunswick	No
Pope, Richard, (fl.1770s)		[Military Journal and Commonplace Book] : 1775-1777		manuscript	Journal of British troop at Saratoga	1 microfilm reel of textual records ; 35 mm.		MIC-Loyalist FC LMR .P6R5M5	Loyalist Collection- University of New Brunswick	Yes
Herchmer Family		Herchmer Family Papers : 1723-1892		papers	Papers of Johan Jost Herchmer, brother of Nicolas Herkimer and officer in Butler's Rangers	2 microfilm reels of textual records ; 35 mm.		MIC-Loyalist FC LFR .H4F3P3	Loyalist Collection- University of New Brunswick	Yes



Author	Other Author	Title	Other Title	Primary Material	Subject	Description	Notes	Archive ID	Location	Visited
Great Britain. Army. Provincial Corps. King's Royal Regiment of New York		Great Britain. Army. Provincial Corps. King's Royal Regiment of New York. Records : 1779 - 1785.		papers	Records of loyalist regiment following 1779	1 microfilm reel of textual records (4 Files) ; 35 mm.		MIC-Loyalist FC LFR .P7J3J6	Loyalist Collection- University of New Brunswick	No
1st NY Regiment		Orderly Book of 1st NY		manuscript	Orderly book of 1st NY at Fort Stanwix 1779-1780				Fort Stanwix National Monument	Yes
George Washington		George Washington Papers		manuscript	Correspondence and papers related to American Revolution	microfilm		George Washington Papers Series 3, 4, and 6	Library of Congress	Yes
Davies, K. G.		Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783		book	Documents related to American Revolution	book		E203 .G68 1972	Binghamton University	Yes
Hagerty, Gilbert		Massacre at Fort Bull; the de Léry expedition against Oneida Carry, 1756		book	Fort Bull massacre	book			Cornell University	Yes
Great Britain		British Army Colonial Manuscripts circa 1752-1807		manuscript	Documents related to British Military	manuscript	see folders 18 and 23	SC20855	New York State Library	Yes
Great Britain		<i>British Colonial Office Records-Canada 1700-1922.</i>		manuscript	Colonial records of Canada 1700-1922	ca. 22.75 m of textual records. 0.05 m photostats	Volume 37 includes documents for American Revolution	R178-16-9-E	Library and Archives Canada	Yes



APPENDIX III: FORT STANWIX-ORISKANY BATTLEFIELD DEFINING FEATURES DATABASE

This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).



This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).