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FILE NO.

PROPOSED RESTORATION  
of the  
SPANGLER'S SPRING -- CULP'S HILL AREA  
and the  
RE-LOCATION OF AVENUES  
in the  
AREA OF THE SPRING

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Contents of Report

1. Historical Statement -- An Account of the Battle in the Area of Spangler's Spring and Culp's Hill. . . . Page 2
  
2. Proposed Restoration of the Spangler's Spring -- Culp's Hill Area, and the Re-location of Avenues in the Area of the Spring. . . . . Page 14
  
3. Photographs of the Spangler's Spring -- Culp's Hill -- East Cemetery Hill Area. . . . . Page 18
  
4. Section of the Warren Survey Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg, covering the Area of Spangler's Spring -- Culp's Hill -- and Part of East Cemetery Hill.

THE BATTLE IN THE AREA OF SPANGLER'S  
SPRING AND CULP'S HILL

Formation of Battle Lines, July 1

Not until the Federal Eleventh Corps had entirely given way on the afternoon of July 1, was the First Corps obliged to seek safety in retreat from its position west of Gettysburg. It was about 4 p. m., July 1, when that entire line was abandoned, the corps sullenly retiring toward Gettysburg, and turning at every favorable opportunity to check the advance of the enemy. As the corps reached the town it became involved with the confused masses of the routed Eleventh Corps, and in consequence of this, many prisoners were taken by the Confederates.

In this state of affairs, at about 4 p. m., when the whole of the position previously occupied by the Federals had been abandoned and when the troops from the First and Eleventh Corps were surging through the streets of Gettysburg, Hancock arrived upon the Cemetery Hill with instructions from Meade. (George G. Meade, with Meade at Gettysburg, cited hereafter as Meade, 84, 85)

Meade had just explained all his plans to Hancock, whom he had selected to succeed Reynolds in the command of the left wing, requesting him to decide, after an inspection of the ground, whether it was expedient to deliver a battle either at Gettysburg or at some point back of the town, or to fall back upon Pipe Creek. Hancock, as soon as he arrived, assumed command and applied himself to the task of restoring order. He placed Wadsworth's division of the First Corps on the dominating position of Culp's Hill. This wooded hill commanded the valley of Rock Creek, faced the heights of Wolf's Hill and Benner's Hill, and completely flanked the plateau of Cemetery Hill, with which it was connected by a ridge with steep acclivities. About five o'clock Wadsworth was taking possession of this important position. (L. P. D'Orleans, Compte de Paris, Battle of Gettysburg, New Revised Edition, cited hereafter as Compte de Paris, 122-123)

Hancock quickly perceived that the position on Cemetery Hill from a tactical point of view, possessed strategic advantages. It commanded the town and all the roads leading to it. Instead of falling back, therefore, at the risk of greatly discouraging the soldiers, he chose this position on Cemetery Hill. (Ibid, 129)

General Hancock promptly addressed himself to the task of forming a strong line of battle on the crest of Cemetery Hill. In this he was materially assisted by Generals Howard, Buford and Warren, who, lately arrived upon the ground, rendered invaluable aid in stopping stragglers and directing them in the formation of a battle line. Around Smith's brigade as a nucleus the rest of the Eleventh Corps was finally concentrated in line on the north and west faces of Cemetery Hill. Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions were posted on the left of the Eleventh Corps, extending southward on Cemetery Ridge. Batteries of the two corps were skilfully planted in positions along the line now occupied from Culp's Hill around by way of the point of Cemetery Hill, along the west side thereof, and thence along its continuation as Cemetery Ridge. These dispositions, taken together with the fire of the batteries, which opened whenever the Confederates made any show of advancing, presented a sufficiently formidable front to deter them from attempting any serious demonstration. (Meade, 85-86)

Slocum had arrived with the Twelfth Corps, at 11 a.m., July 1, at a small place on the Baltimore Pike called Two Taverns, about five miles from Gettysburg. Here he had halted his command to await further instructions. Finally, about 2 p.m., upon receipt of Howard's urgent call for assistance, he started his column in the direction of Gettysburg. William's division which was in advance was directed, just before reaching Rock Creek, to the right by a cross-road to the Hanover Road, and to prepare to attack the Confederate left. He had marched for some distance in the direction indicated when he was recalled, intelligence having been received that the Federal troops had relinquished the town. Williams therefore counter-marched to a point near the crossing of Rock Creek on the Baltimore Pike, and there re-bivouacked.

Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, which had followed Williams on the Baltimore Pike, continued its way along the pike beyond the crossing at Rock Creek. Arriving there about 5 p.m., Geary reported to Hancock with two brigades, his third brigade having been left by order of Slocum as a reserve on the right. Hancock thereupon directed him to take his command over to the left of the First Corps to occupy and prolong the line southward along Cemetery Ridge. Geary, in obedience to these directions, posted his division along Cemetery Ridge, from the left of the First Corps to Little Round Top, on the slope of which he had placed two regiments. (Ibid, 86-87)

General Lee reached Seminary Ridge about 4:30 p.m. on the afternoon of July 1, just as the Federal troops were retreating through the town of Gettysburg and taking position on the hills beyond. He then learned from prisoners and other sources that they had been engaged

with two corps of the Army of the Potomac, and that other corps, under General Meade, were approaching. Ignorant of the exact position of the rest of the Army of the Potomac, he concluded that, with a force of only four divisions, weary from a long and bloody struggle, he ought not to hazard attacking the Federals in the strong position which they occupied on Cemetery Hill. He instructed Ewell, however, whose troops were in the best condition of any, and who occupied the best position, to carry Cemetery Hill, if possible, but not to run the risk of bringing on a general engagement before the arrival of the rest of the army. (Ibid, 88)

Ewell came to the conclusion that Cemetery Hill could not be carried, and as his troops were very much fatigued by their long march and the day's fighting, he decided to await the arrival of his Third Division, commanded by Johnson. This division was reported to be near at hand, and could be employed to capture Culp's Hill, which commanded Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson could get into position, however, it was reported to Ewell that the Federals (probably Slocum's command) were moving on his left flank, and by that time that the report could be verified the night had so far advanced that he gave up his purpose of attempting to occupy Culp's Hill. Johnson, however, sent to the hill a reconnoitering party, which was driven back by Wadsworth's troops with a loss of many prisoners. (Ibid, 88-89)

#### BATTLE OF JULY 2

At eight o'clock on the morning of July 2, after Geary had been relieved from occupying the Federal left, Slocum, who was in command of the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, brought back all of his forces to the west bank of Rock Creek. Geary placed his division upon the wooded flank of Culp's Hill which commanded this side of Rock Creek as far as the streamlet flowing from Spangler's Spring. Ruger prolonged his line in the same direction by resting his right flank on the conical hillock called McAllister's Hill, taking advantage of the natural roughness of the ground. These two divisions speedily made intrenchments along their front. (Compte de Paris, 142)

With reference to troop locations it should be noted that Geary's division, and more to the south the brigade of McDougall, occupied the east front of Culp's Hill as far as Spangler's Spring. They had erected intrenchments which followed this front in the direction of Rock Creek and were continued south-eastward by skirting, for a distance of about fifty yards, a stone-wall, and terminating finally between Rock Creek and the

Spring. (Ibid, 185)

On the other side of the swamp, which was almost impassable at that point, the Colgrove and Lockwood brigades had intrenched themselves along the stream, extending their right as far as the vicinity of the Baltimore turnpike. (Ibid, 185) Near this position was a dam in Rock Creek which widened the creek from 60 to 80 feet at that point, and from 6 to 8 feet deep, thus rendering the 3rd Wisconsin and 27th Indiana regiments posted there unassailable from the east and south. (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, hereafter cited as O.R., Series I, Vol. 27, Part I, 812) This position was a strong one, though greatly extended, and was near the turnpike. The turnpike was important to defend at any cost, it being the line of retreat of the army. At the south it was covered by Power's and McAllister's Hills, which were occupied by Slocum's artillery; but more to the north a triangular wood, intervening between the marshy swale and a cross-road, would enable the enemy to reach the Spangler house by surprise, and thence the road itself. (Compte de Paris, 185)

During the morning of July 2 General Meade instructed General Slocum to examine minutely the ground on the right, and to report as to the expediency of making a vigorous attack with a force composed of his own corps (the Twelfth) and the Fifth Corps. The attack was to begin upon the arrival of the Sixth Corps, which was to cooperate with the other two corps. General Warren, the chief engineer of the army, was detailed to aid General Slocum in his examinations of the ground. General Slocum reported unfavorably as to the attack, stating that he did not think that the ground occupied by the enemy on his front presented any inducement to dislodge him, and General Warren also reported that he did not think an attack advisable from that point. Upon receiving these reports General Meade decided to abandon the projected attack, and to postpone all offensive operations until the arrival of the Sixth Corps, or until the intentions of the Confederates were more evident. (Meade, 103)

On the early morning of July 2, Ewell's and Hill's Confederate troops, having all reached the field during the night, were placed in position. Ewell's was posted on the left, extending from Benner's Hill to the Seminary, through the town of Gettysburg. His line thus covered the right wing of the Army of the Potomac. The order in which the corps held the ground was as follows: Johnson's division on the left, Early's in the center, and Rodes' on the right.

General Lee, who had carefully studied the Federal lines on July 1, and the morning of July 2, sent word to General Ewell to examine the ground to his front and to prepare to assault the enemy from that point. This was what General Meade had contemplated doing, up to the moment when he received the unfavorable reports of General Slocum and Warren.

It seems to have been General Lee's first intention to move the bulk of his army to this flank and to assault there. He, like General Meade, was deterred from doing this by the unfavorable reports of subordinates. He then resolved to make the main attack well over on the Federal left, and ordered Longstreet to move his command to the Emmitsburg Road, to envelop the left flank of the enemy. (Ibid, 104, 105)

It was General Lee's intention now to make a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the Federal Army. Instructions had been sent to Ewell to have his command in readiness to advance when he heard Longstreet's guns open for his assault on the Federal left flank which could be converted, if opportunity should offer, into a real attack. (Ibid 128-129)

Ewell maintained later that he had not heard the sound of Longstreet's cannonade -- which had been in progress against the Peach Orchard since half-past three o'clock. He had only heard Hill's artillery, which opened fire about five o'clock, and immediately prepared for battle. Six batteries posted on Benner's Hill supported the attack of Johnson's division against the slopes of Culp's Hill. But at the end of one hour these guns, entirely unprotected, were silenced by those of the Federals, sheltered inside of the works constructed the day before. The youthful Major Latimer, who commanded the Confederate artillery, was killed; a single battery still sustained the fire. Johnson, finding the north and north-east fronts of Culp's Hill too strongly defended, determined to attack the Federals in the very gorges of Rock Creek in order to turn their positions by way of the south-east. It required some time to bear to the left and reach these gorges. Neither of the contending parties could bring artillery to this point. (Compte de Paris, 174-183)

The Compte de Paris gives a good description of the area in which the action took place. He says that "the culminating point of Culp's Hill does not exceed in height by more than two yards that of Cemetery Hill; it commands by thirteen yards the lowest point of the ridge that connects it with Cemetery Hill, and by more than fifty yards the water of Rock Creek. At the foot of Culp's Hill Rock Creek winds eastwardly, then resumes its course southerly. Below the summit of this hill, Wadsworth had erected strong breastworks, composed of trunks of trees, stones and earthworks. The wooded and rocky slopes are gentler toward the east than toward the north; the slope southward is more gradual, forming a small plateau, over which a stone-wall extends to a marshy swale in the direction of Rock Creek. A "fresh and shady spring, called Spangler's Spring, spouts out at the base of the hillock, presently losing itself in this marsh." (Ibid, 184, 185)

It was not until nearly sunset that Johnson advanced to the attack of the Federal right. The ground over which he had to pass was very rugged, heavily wooded, and covered with rocks and boulders. (Meade, 129) Leaving the open slopes which he occupied, Johnson descended in the direction of Rock Creek, and soon found himself masked by the woods that lined the west banks. His division was drawn up in two lines, the left flank resting at the Taney house (Compte de Paris, 185). The division formed with Jones' brigade on the right, Nicholl's next on his left, Steuart's next on his left, and Walker's concluding the left of the line of attack, moved forward to the assault. They had not proceeded very far, however, when active demonstrations on the part of Gregg's cavalry, covering the right flank of the Federal Army, compelled Walker's brigade to look to the safety of the assaulting columns, through which necessity that brigade was withdrawn from the attack.

It should be noted that during the height of the battle on the Federal left at Round Top and the Wheatfield, Slocum had sent Ruger's division and Lockwood's brigade, under A. S. Williams, to support the Sickles Third Corps line and that Lockwood's brigade had rendered efficient service in aiding in the repulse of the Confederates. Ruger's division had only crossed the Taneytown Road when it was learned that their services were not needed, and they were halted. (Meade, 129, 130)

Shortly after these troops moved out Slocum had ordered Geary, with two brigades, to follow Williams, leaving his Third Brigade, Greene's, to hold the right flank. Geary, for some unaccountable reason, instead of following Williams on the direct road to the Federal left wing in the direction of the firing, had crossed Rock Creek and marched down the Baltimore Pike, in the opposite direction from the scene of the fighting. Fortunately, he was halted before going very far, remaining where he was for the night.

On Greene principally, who held the line of works centering at Culp's Hill, had devolved the arduous task of guarding the right flank of the army. When the position was first occupied by the Twelfth Corps, quite a substantial line of breastworks had been erected. These works were now to prove of great value. Greene was ordered to occupy, with his one remaining brigade, the whole of the works previously occupied by the entire Twelfth Corps. He had scarcely extended his line so as to cover the vacated position of Kane's brigade, which had been on his right, when the Confederates attacked. As soon as the attack began, Greene sent to Howard and Wadsworth for reinforcements. (Ibid, 130)

Between seven o'clock and nine o'clock determined assaults continued to be made, every one of which was gallantly met and repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants, inflicted by the troops of Greene and those of the First Corps, occupying the northeastern line of Culp's Hill. Jones

on the right, Williams in the center, were each time driven back, leaving many dead and wounded to mark their line of advance. General J. M. Jones was severely wounded in one of these repulses. (Ibid 130, 131). The Federals were greatly inferior to the Confederates in number, but the entrenchments they occupied crowned a real wall of rocks, adding greatly to the Federal defensive position. (Compte de Paris, 186)

Steuart on the left of the assaulting columns, met with more success than the other brigades. Concealed and sheltered by woods and rocks, and under cover of darkness, he worked his way around to his left until he chanced upon the unoccupied works of Ruger's division, which at the point where Steuart struck them were perpendicular to the general line. This success seriously menaced for a time the integrity of the right flank of the Federal line. It was, however, reversed by General Greene, who, handling his small command with great skill, swung his right regiment to the rear and, presenting a firm front to Steuart, prevented him from making any farther advance. (Meade, 131)

It is worthwhile to investigate more closely Steuart's attack near Spangler's Spring. Although his right wing crossed Rock Creek sooner than his left, due to a misunderstanding of orders and to natural obstacles, the Federals rapidly retreated, suffering and inflicting only slight injury. About fifty feet from the bank of the stream, the right wing charged up a thickly wooded slope under great disadvantage. By this time the 3rd N. C. and the 1st Md. were isolated from the rest of the brigade. Nevertheless they steadily advanced up the height toward the Federal breastworks, while the enemy slowly yielded ground. For a while the assailants were caught in a cross-fire and their loss was heavy.

Johnson ordered Steuart to hasten the advance of the left wing. This was done as rapidly as possible and a steady advance began. The Confederate left rested almost upon the line of Federal breastworks that paralleled the summit of the hill and was perpendicular to the creek. Lieutenant-Colonel S. T. Walton, with the 23rd Virginia, charged these works and quickly dispersed the few guards defending it. The 37th Virginia, 10th Virginia, and 1st Maryland, having come to the aid of the 23rd Virginia, quickly and completely carried the works.

Between the captured breastworks and a stone-wall to the left of and parallel to it, the entire brigade except the North Carolinian regiments formed a battle-line and trapped the Federals in a cross-fire. Firing soon ceased, however, because the impression prevailed that they might be firing at their own compatriots; thus only sporadic firing occurred. (O. R., Series 1, Vol. 27, Part II, 509-510)

Steuart had reached the stone-wall, and had taken possession of the entire southern position of the plateau extending as far as the front of the small woods on which Greene's right had been resting. The latter could not offer much resistance, but the approaching night-fall having rendered the Confederates cautious, and being ignorant of the proximity of the Baltimore Pike, Steuart remained in the works that had been captured, exchanging from thence useless volleys of musketry with the enemy. (Compte de Paris, 186)

When it was found that the services of Ruger's division were not needed on the Federal left, Williams had ordered it to return as quickly as possible to the right and to reoccupy the line they had vacated. Kane's brigade also returned and took position on the right, further strengthening the flank. (Meade, 131) It was about dusk when Ruger received his order. On crossing the Baltimore Pike and entering the woods to gain his former line, the skirmish line that Ruger had sent out well in advance to reconnoiter, fearing that the enemy may have crept in during his absence, were fired upon and driven back. It was then discovered by Ruger that all that part of the breastworks on the left of his original position were in possession of the enemy, as also were those farther to his left that had been occupied by Geary. That part of the breastworks on the right extending to Rock Creek was still unoccupied. These he at once took possession of. Owing to the darkness and the difficult character of the ground, it was deemed too late to attempt to drive the enemy out that night. Ruger then placed his division along a slight crest to the east of the Baltimore Pike, so as to prevent the enemy making any farther advance toward the turnpike. It was after midnight before these arrangements were completed. About one o'clock on the following morning, July 3, Candy's brigade of Geary's division returned and took position on the right of Kane's brigade which, it will be recalled, had already returned and had been posted in support of Greene's right. (Meade 133, 134)

More interesting light is thrown on these movements by reading directly from the reports of two of Ruger's brigade commanders, McDougall and Colgrove. McDougall states that it was soon ascertained by the skirmishers that the enemy had not only obtained possession of our works, and were occupying them in force, but had advanced into the woods south of them. On our men retiring, they were fired upon by the enemy from the woods south of the works and immediately in front of our line. (O.R., Series I, Vol. 27, Part I, 783) Colonel Silas Colgrove reported that he received orders to march the brigade back, and to occupy the position he had left. The brigade was immediately put in motion. It

arrived on the open ground within a few hundred yards of its old position about 10 p.m. The night being quite dark and the line of breastworks being covered with the timber, it was impossible to tell whether they were occupied or not.

"In obedience to instructions" Colgrove adds, "I threw forward one company of skirmishers from the Second Massachusetts . . . we found the works on the right of our line unoccupied. We immediately took possession of them. The skirmishers were ordered to cross the open space between the right and left of our line, and reconnoiter the woods and line of works on that side. They shortly returned with 23 prisoners, and reported that the enemy held our works on the left in large force. It was also ascertained from the prisoners that Jones' and Steuart's brigades occupied our works. It was deemed unsafe to undertake to recover them at that time, owing to the darkness of the night, consequently the brigade was held in position in the works on the right during the night." (Ibid, 813)

#### BATTLE OF JULY 33

When Slocum and Williams, after the meeting of corps commanders at Meade's Headquarters on the evening of July 2, had returned after midnight to their respective commands on the right, they learned for the first time of the Confederate occupation of the Twelfth Corps' vacated lines. Slocum at once notified General Meade of the facts, and was ordered by Meade to dislodge the Confederates in the morning. Orders for an attack at daybreak, to regain the lost portions of the lines, were then issued by Slocum.

The morning of the 3rd of July dawned upon an entirely different disposition of the troops on this part of the field. Geary's line, which had been along the main hill was now extended and sharply turned on the ridge west of the indentation on the hill, while Ruger's troops had formed a line slightly concave to the enemy's position, entirely south of the swale, with their left resting almost on the Baltimore Pike and their right on Rock Creek. Lieutenant Muhlenberg, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, stationed his own and Lieutenant Kinzie's batteries, supported by Lockwood's brigade, southwest of the Baltimore Pike, commanding the enemy's position, the low ground in the descent of the swale to Rock Creek. To the southeast of these two batteries were posted, on Power's Hill, Knapp's battery, under Lieutenant Atwell, and on McAllister's Hill, Lieutenant Winegar's battery, both facing north. Thus was produced a cross-fire at right angles with the line of fire of the other batteries, and commanding, across the swale, those portions of the Twelfth Corps' lines held by the enemy. These two hills, Powers' and McAllister's, are landmarks about a quarter of a mile distant from each other and about two-thirds of a mile from the enemy's position. To

guard against any movement of flanking by Confederates, Neill's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, which had been sent by General Meade to Powers' Hill on the previous evening was thrown across Rock Creek, on the prolongation of Ruger's line. (Meade, 138, 139) Here on the morning of July 3, Neill's brigade encountered and checked the advancing Confederate sharpshooters and skirmishers of the Second Virginia regiment sent out from Walker's brigade.

The Confederates during this time were not idle. Ewell had reported his success to Lee, and the latter, encouraged by his view of the result of the day's operations, had determined to continue his efforts to carry the position of the Federal Army. Ewell was therefore ordered to resume at daylight the attack from Johnson's front, and was informed that a simultaneous attack would be made by Longstreet on the right wing. Now that General J.E.B. Stuart had come up with his cavalry, Walker's brigade, which had been protecting Johnson's left flank, became available for his operations and was returned to him. Daniel's and O'Neal's brigades, of Rodes' division, were brought over from their position in the town of Gettysburg to strengthen Johnson's division as was also Smith's brigade of Early's division. (Ibid, 139, 140)

Thus the Confederate General Johnson was able to resume the offensive with seven brigades; the remainder of Ewell's Corps, thus reduced to six brigades, would support him only in case of his success in dislodging the Federal right and turning the Federal position on Cemetery Hill. These movements had been promptly executed, but at the other extremity of the line preparations had not been made for an early morning attack. (Compte de Paris, 197)

Ewell was not apprised of this delay on the Confederate right. He urged Johnson to attack as soon as he had received the three brigades that had been assigned to him. On the Federal side only the darkness of the night prevented the troops from assuming the offensive. It was dangerous to allow the Confederates to remain in the works they had just taken; they must be dislodged before they discovered how near they were to the Baltimore turnpike. (Ibid, 198)

As soon as it was light enough to see, or about four o'clock in the morning, Muhlenberg opened with his artillery and subjected the enemy to a damaging fire, which continued about an hour. Geary was then about to advance, when Johnson, who was also ready to advance, made a vigorous attack all along his line. (Meade 141, 142) (O.R?, Series I, Vol. 27, Part I, 870)

The Confederates came up in three lines, scarcely separated from each other, and attacked their adversaries with vigor. They had at last obtained a view of the Baltimore road covered with wagons, troopers, and straggling infantry, who were pushing toward the south in crowds, seized with terror in spite of the efforts of several squadrons of Federal Cavalry to preserve order along this important highway. This sight stimulated the attacking Confederates. A desperate struggle took place among the rocks with which the ground was thickly covered. (Compte de Paris, 189)

The force of the Confederate attack fell chiefly on Greene's and Kane's brigades, whom Steuart furiously attacked but was repulsed with great loss. (Meade, 142) At 5 a.m. the One Hundred and Forty-Seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ario Pardee, Jr., of Candy's brigade, was ordered to charge and carry the stonewall above Spangler's Spring occupied by the Confederates. They succeeded in doing this and the Confederates then abandoned the entire line of the stonewall. (O.R., Series I, Volume 27, Part I, 836) Lockwood's brigade was then brought up to reinforce Greene's lines. Johnson's right, to which point Daniel's brigade was directed as a support to Jones, found the position on its front so strong that no serious attempt was made to assault it. In front of Geary, however, where the enemy thought that opportunity existed to make a lodgment, the fight continued for hours. Steuart and Walker assaulted again and again, but were pushed back with heavy loss. The breastworks on the Federal side so well protected the men that their loss was comparatively slight.

General Steuart in his report of the action stated that "the brigade rallied quickly behind rocks, and reformed behind the stonewall which was parallel to the breastworks. Here it remained about an hour, exposed to a fire of artillery and infantry more terrific than any experienced during the day, although less disastrous. Ultimately, in accordance with orders from the major-general commanding, the brigade fell back to the creek, where it remained during the rest of the day, nearly half of it being deployed as skirmishers." (O.R., Series I, Volume 27, Part II, 511)

About 10 a.m. Ruger received orders to try the Confederate line with two of his regiments, on the line of breastworks to the left of the swale and, if practicable, to force them out. Through an unfortunate mistake it was attempted to carry the position with these two regiments without first feeling the strength of the Confederates. In consequence, the two regiments selected, the Second Massachusetts and the Twenty-Seventh Indiana, crossed the swale on their front under a heavy fire, their officers leading the charge up the slope to the breastworks. Their ranks, however, had been so thinned by the sweeping fire of the Confederates that it was impossible to dislodge them, and the two regiments, after having sustained enormous losses in officers and men, were ordered to retire. Colonel Mudge, of the Second Massachusetts, was killed in this charge. (Meade 142, 143)

Relative to the use made of the defensive positions in the woods south of Spangler's Spring, a part of the report of Colonel Silas Colgrove, commanding a Federal brigade in that area, is here presented: "I immediately deployed sharpshooters from the Third Wisconsin and Second Massachusetts in front of our breastworks, covered by a small belt of timber, and returned the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters for about two hours. About this time the firing on our left, which had been very heavy, was fast receding, and loud cheering was heard along our lines. It was evident to me that General Geary had dislodged the enemy, and had retaken the breastworks occupied by him the day before . . . . Between the enemy and our line lay the open meadow, about 100 yards in width. The enemy were entirely sheltered by the breastworks and ledges of rock. It was impossible to send forward skirmishers. The enemy's advantages were such that a line of skirmishers would be cut down before they could fairly gain the open ground that intervened. The only possible chance I had to advance was to carry his position by storming it." (O.R., Series I, Vol. 27, Part I, 813)

When Ruger ordered forward the left of McDougall's brigade, they found the enemy had withdrawn from the stone-wall on the summit; this the brigade at once occupied. Geary and Ruger then pushed forward their whole line and forced the enemy out of the breastworks east of the stonewall. The Twelfth Corps now reoccupied and reestablished their old line, the enemy retiring from under fire beyond Rock Creek. (Meade, 143)

It is often said that soldiers of the Federal and Confederate armies fraternized at Spangler's Spring during the night of July 2. There is not sufficient evidence to support this statement and it appears to be based largely on assumption. There is a statement in the address of Captain Joseph Matchett on the occasion of the dedication of the 46th Pennsylvania Regimental monument (Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, Volume 1, page 308, 1904) which appears to show that troops of the two armies did not associate at the Spring. The Statement follows: "It seems Captain Selfridge of Company H, had taken some of his men's canteens and gone on ahead to Spangler's Spring to fill them, when he discovered "Johnnies" also there filling their canteens. He backed out with the best grace he could command, and reported it to the colonel. But Colonel McDougall, the brigade commander, did not believe it and got very angry, but the colonel insisted on deploying his men, and sent in a skirmish line, who found the enemy as stated and saved many lives."

Restoration of the Spangler's Spring - Culp's Hill Area  
and Relocation of Avenues in the Area  
of the Spring

The area in the immediate vicinity of Spangler's Spring is wooded but comparatively free from underbrush. Large rocks and boulders are abundant. South and east of the Spring is an area of meadow land.

The Culp's Hill area is heavily timbered. The eastern base of the hill along the Confederate battle line and near Rock Creek is thickly wooded and covered with underbrush. On the eastern and southern slopes of Culp's Hill may be observed numerous boulders and rocks protruding from the steep hillside.

The present Slocum and Geary avenues cut through the area which it is proposed to restore. In the matter of road relocation, it is proposed to extend a two-way avenue along a line approximately 75 yards south of Spangler's Spring to connect with Geary Avenue near the new comfort station. From the point at which the proposed avenue intersects the earthworks it is planned that a one-way avenue be constructed to follow the line of earthworks and to connect with the present Slocum Avenue at the top of the ridge above Spangler's Spring. This would render possible the removal of the old pavements in the immediate area of Spangler's Spring, thus making it possible to restore the entire area around the Spring to its condition as of the period immediately following the battle. This would mean the re-establishment of the timber growth in the area as indicated on the Warren Survey Map of 1868-9, and also the re-planting of the entire Spangler's Spring area in grass.

About fifty yards south of Spangler's Spring begins the line of earthworks which extends northwestwardly to a point 200 yards west of Culp's Hill. These earthworks were erected along the Union line of battle which has since been marked by monuments erected in honor of the regiments which participated in the battle in this area. On a ridge just north of the Spring is a stone wall which was used as breastworks by the Confederates on the night of July 2, and during the Union counter attack on the morning of July 3. The earthworks in this area were hastily constructed by Union troops on the night of July 1 and during July 2.

According to Brady and Tipton photographs, the earthworks along the battle line extending from Spangler's Spring to Culp's Hill were largely constructed of earth, loose stones and logs and were built up to an average height of 20 inches. Certain sections of the earthworks, where the soil is deeper and more easily turned, appear to have been constructed largely of earth and are higher than the general line of works, a section some 200

yards west of Culp's Hill, near Stevens' Knoll, measuring 30" in height. A section extending 100 yards westward from Culp's Hill averages 26" in height. A section of earthworks extending approximately 100 yards southward from Culp's Hill has been nearly obliterated, due partly to erosion and partly to the construction of the old Battlefield avenue leading to Culp's Hill from Spangler's Spring. This avenue was replaced by the present avenue in 1935, and it is now possible to restore the earthworks along that part of the battle line. It is planned to repair the earthworks, where erosion has decreased the original height and width of the mounds, along the entire battle line in this area.

The lunettes on East Cemetery Hill and Stevens' Knoll apparently were constructed entirely of earth and were erected as a protection for the artillery positions. There are no indications of lunettes on Culp's Hill where Federal batteries had been placed. The artillery on Stevens' Knoll and several batteries located on East Cemetery Hill as well as the two batteries on Culp's Hill were used against the Confederate artillery on Benner's Hill in the artillery duel which preceded the Confederate infantry attacks on Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill. In the positions on Stevens' Knoll and East Cemetery Hill, the lunettes measure 30" at the point of greatest height, the mound tapering gradually toward either end. These defensive works on Stevens' Knoll and East Cemetery Hill are in good condition.

#### Reconstruction of Spangler's Spring

Under date of November 2, 1897, it was agreed by the Battlefield Commission to construct a canopy cover over Spangler's Spring in accordance with a drawing of Colonel E. B. Cope, engineer. Bids were received and opened December 10 of the same year, the bids ranging as follows:

C. W. Ziegler & Company	\$565.50
W. P. Dally	292.00
Meals and Lightner	189.45

It was recommended that the contract be awarded to Meals and Lightner, Contractors, of Gettysburg. Inspection was made by Superintendent John P. Nicholson and Colonel Cope on March 9, 1898 on the progress of the construction work. The work was completed early in April, 1898.

Mr. B. F. Lightner, 82, of Gettysburg, one of the members of the firm which constructed the canopy, stated on June 14, 1940 that the white granite stone used in the construction of the present canopy had been

purchased for use in the construction of the 12th and 44th N. Y. Monument located on Little Round Top, but was not considered of desirable quality and had therefore been rejected. The dark granite, as he recalled it, was quarried by himself from a quarry near Culp's Hill. Referring to the spring, Mr. Lightner states that at the time of the construction of the present canopy there were two springs, one on the site of the present canopy and a second twenty-five feet to the northeast thereof. There was no underground connection between the two springs and each spring drained southward in the direction of a tributary of Rock Creek. The relation of the two springs is shown on the Tipton photographs, attached to this report, said photographs having been made about 1880. Mr. Lightner states further that the spring to the northeast was closed by covering it with a large flat stone and grading the area around it. Contrary to a general impression, Mr. Lightner states that no provision was made to carry the water underground from the closed spring to the present one at the canopy.

Mr. W. C. Storrick, 85, states that he recalls clearly an occasion of a school social gathering held at Spangler's Spring in 1872 by the students of Adams County Normal School of Gettysburg. Mr. Storrick was shown the Tipton photograph of the spring showing two outlets covered by small stone canopies and he states that as he recalls it the Tipton photograph shows the spring generally as it was in 1872. He does not believe, however, that there was a stone slab covering of the springs as shown in the photographs, but that stones were placed around an open spring.

Mr. Reuben Culp, 86, states that the two springs were in existence during his boyhood days, but does not recall whether the springs were open or covered, as shown in the Tipton photographs.

#### Recommendation:

The study connected with Spangler's Spring thus far undertaken does not show conclusively whether the Spring was open or whether a small stone wall had been constructed around the Spring and covered over with a stone slab, as shown in the Tipton photographs. Although our investigation has covered all available source material, it is felt that the study should be carried further. In view of the lack of conclusive evidence relative to the structure of the Spring, therefore, it is felt that an attempt at restoration of the Spring should not be undertaken at this time. If the Spring is restored at some future time, it is suggested that it be constructed primarily as an historical exhibit and, as far as evidence will permit, along the lines of the original spring. No attempt should be made to carry city water through the Spring for public consumption. Provision

has already been made to provide city water to this area and this water may be made available through fountains near the parking area some 75 yards south of the Spring at those periods when the Spring water is declared unfit for public use.

62 | It is suggested that the plan for road re-location in Spangler's Spring area be undertaken within the near future, and that the present road ways and other paved areas in the vicinity of the Spring be obliterated. Along with the road re-location a small parking area should be provided on the two-way avenue south of the Spring and a second parking area for a limited number of cars should be provided near the entrance of the one way avenue along the battle line. This would render possible a solution of traffic problems in the area, and would also make it possible to restore the entire area around the Spring to grass and tree growth as indicated in the Tipton photographs.

62 | The restoration of that section of earthworks extending southward 100 yards from Culp's Hill, and the repair of the entire line of existing earthworks in the area of Spangler's Spring should be undertaken along with the relocation of avenues in the area of Spangler's Spring.

For the restoration of wooded sections, cleared areas, stone walls and fences in the entire region extending from the Baltimore Pike through Spangler's Spring, Culp's Hill and to East Cemetery Hill, the Warren Survey Map of 1868-9, the pertinent section of which is attached to this report, is accepted as the most reliable source of information, and therefore will be the basis of any such work performed.

*Frederick Tilberg*  
Frederick Tilberg,  
Assistant Historical Technician.

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Tipton photograph of Spangler's Spring, the probable date of which is 1880. This view, taken from the south, shows the two springs, both with stone walls and stone slab covering. It is believed that the stone walls and stone slab covering were constructed about 1880.



Recent view of the Spangler's Spring canopy from the same position as that of the preceding Tipton photograph. The view, taken from the south, shows the wall and railing to the south of the Spring, pavements in the area, and the guard house.



View of the Canopy constructed over the single Spring outlet. This view, taken from the south, shows the Canopy soon after its completion in 1898. Soon thereafter, the stone wall and railing just south of the Canopy were constructed. The Canopy was not erected as a monument, and the bronze plates were placed thereon by the Gettysburg National Park Commission.



Recent view of the Canopy, with the stone wall and iron-pipe railing in the foreground. The locked cover of the Spring may be observed at the base of the Canopy. The view, taken from the south, shows sections of old pavement in the foreground, and Geary Avenue in the central background.



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Recent view of the Spangler's Spring Area from the south. The arrow indicates the canopy. On the right is the beginning of Slocum Avenue, its branch to the left beyond the canopy being Geary Avenue. The two avenues intersect at a point beyond the hill which may be seen in the central background of the photograph.



Recent view of the Spangler's Spring Area from high ground to the North showing the canopy (arrow), the pavement to the north, east and south of the Spring, and the guard house.



Tipton photograph, taken between 1880 and 1890, of meadow and swamp land 100 yards south and southeast of Spangler's Spring. The stone wall in the foreground was used as a Confederate defense against the Federal attack across this meadow on the morning of July 3. The arrow in the upper right hand corner indicates the location of Spangler's Spring in relation to the meadow in the foreground and the swamp land in the central background.



Brady or Tyson (predecessor of Tipton in the photographic business in Gettysburg) photograph showing breastworks south of Culp's Hill soon after the battle. This type of breastworks was hastily constructed of earth, small stones and logs, and was probably more than three feet high in places. It is planned to restore a section of this type of breastworks at an appropriate point as a field exhibit.



Photograph, probably by Tyson, taken of earthworks on Culp's Hill soon after the battle. At the right may be observed a section of earthworks constructed of earth, stone and logs, the height of which appears to be more than two feet. The town of Gettysburg may be seen in the background.



865—Breast Works on Culp's Hill, Gettysburg

Present view of the beginning of the line of earthworks approximately fifty yards south of Spangler's Spring. The mound in the left foreground is 18 inches high and its extension northward some fifteen yards measures 8" in height. It is planned to rebuild sections of earthworks which have wasted away due to erosion.



Present view of the line of earthworks on the south slope of Culp's Hill. The mound here measures 18 inches. Repair of this section of earthworks would consist of opening the trench on the left, or the inside, of the mound, and in increasing the height of the mound where necessary to maintain an average height of 20 inches along the line between Spangler's Spring and Culp's Hill.




Present view of earthworks approximately 200 yards west of Culp's Hill. This section, in an area of loose soil, measures 30 inches in height. This line of earthworks is in good condition, with the exception of grass planting to hold the top soil in place. View from Slocum Avenue, a heavily traveled avenue leading from Spangler's Spring to Culp's Hill and to Cemetery Hill.



Tipton photograph, undated but probably made between 1880 and 1890, showing in the foreground the line of earthworks west of Culp's Hill and in the central background the lunettes on Steven's Knoll in an early state of preservation.



Present view of lunettes on Steven's Knoll, showing artillery in position, and the relative height of the lunette and the gun. The lunettes are in good condition, with the exception of grass planting to hold the top soil in place. Certain trees of recent growth should be removed from the foreground of the battery.




Tipton photograph, probably taken between 1880 and 1890, showing early state of preservation of lunettes on southeast slope of East Cemetery Hill. The photograph shows the earliest manner of mounting artillery guns and shells on this Battlefield. The view is from the Baltimore Pike.



Present view of lunettes on the southeastern slope of East Cemetery Hill, showing artillery guns and shells in position. The lunettes are in excellent condition. This view is from the Baltimore Pike eastward in the direction of the Confederate battle line.





*Explanation of Characters used*

- |  |                                |  |                |
|--|--------------------------------|--|----------------|
|  | Stone wall, Virginia Fence.    |  | Union Works.   |
|  | Straight fence (rail or board) |  | House Burned   |
|  | Pine, Oak, Round Leaf          |  | Signal Station |
|  | House, Church, Outbuilding.    |  |                |

Section of Warren Survey  
Map of 1868-9, showing the  
Spangler's Spring - Culp's Hill -  
East Cemetery Hill area.

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107