JAPANESE RELOCATION AND REDRESS IN NORTH AMERICA: *A Comparative View*

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Forty years ago the governments of both great North American democracies executed their separate but similar plans for incarcerating their tiny minorities of Japanese origin: just over 125,000 persons in the continental United States and fewer than 25,000 in Canada. There is a large and growing literature devoted to what happened in each country, but very little has been published of a comparative nature.[1] I am going to make the comparison in a very schematic and abbreviated way and then sketch, equally roughly, the comparative rehabilitation and steps taken toward a kind of redress in each country since the Great Pacific War.

On either side of the 49th parallel Japanese immigrants, or Issei, began to arrive in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In each country they followed Chinese as migrants from Asia and they settled almost exclusively in the farms, villages and cities of the Pacific coastal plain: by the census years of 1940-41 more than 88 percent of Japanese Americans lived in California, Washington and Oregon, while more than 95 percent of Japanese Canadians lived in British Columbia. In neither nation was the incidence of persons of Japanese ethnicity high: they represented fewer than one tenth of one percent (.001) of the total population in each country and even on the West Coast their incidence was low: 1.2 percent of the three American states' population and 2.7 percent of the Canadian province's. In each country Japanese had inherited already developed prejudices against Chinese, and these prejudices were exacerbated by the growing strength

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and aggressiveness of the Japanese Empire. Nativist anti-Japanese sentiments and movements flourished on both sides of the border and the rhetoric of leaders such as V.S. McClatchy of Sacramento and Miller Freeman of Seattle, American publishers and publicists, or A.W. Neill, Canadian politican from Comox-Alberni, British Columbia, is almost interchangeable.

But the legal and constitutional positions of the immigrants and their descendants were significantly different. In Canada, where naturalization was controlled by the government in Ottawa, Japanese immigrants were eligible for naturalization on the same terms as other immigrants. But in Canada suffrage requirements were determined by the provinces and British Columbia denied the ballot and a long list of other civil rights to Canadian citizens of Asian ancestry, whether naturalized or native born. When war came to Canada, in 1939, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's government would not accept Japanese Canadian volunteers because "war with Japan was possible."[2]

In the U.S.A. Asians, except under special circumstances, could not become naturalized citizens because the naturalization statute of 1870 restricted that process to "white persons and persons of African descent."[3] Immigrants from Japan, and other Asians, were thus in a special category: they were "aliens ineligible to citizenship," and, as such, were severely discriminated against by all levels of American government. Their native-born children, the Nisei, fell under the protective umbrella of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution: "All persons born in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." Since in the U.S suffrage and other civil rights inhere in citizenship, the legal position of the American Nisei was distinctly superior to that of their Canadian cousins. And, in 1940, when the United States instituted its first peacetime draft, persons of Japanese origin incurred equal liability.

The outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941, saw strikingly similar responses by the two governments. In the U.S. the drafting or enlistment of Japanese was stopped and many, but not all, of those already in the military services were discharged. In both countries special restraints were placed on Japanese populations, citizen and alien: fishing boats were seized, bank accounts of aliens or accounts in alien banks were frozen, some enemy aliens were interned, and firearms, explosives, short wave radios and certain photographic equipment were confiscated. The overwhelming majority of the ethnic Japanese population, however, was left in nervous liberty. The never-dormant anti-Japanese movements got new leases on life and from December 7 on, more and more voices clamored for incarceration, or worse, of all Japanese.

Neither government had anything resembling a plan for dealing with domestic Japanese although in the fall of 1940 the Permanent Joint Board on Defense recommended that "in the event of hostilities with Japan, the two governments should follow policies of a similar character" in regard to Japanese residents. That recommendation seems largely to have been ignored.[4] By Feb. 19, 1942, following the advice of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and much pressure from assorted west coast groups, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 which gave the Army the authority to remove Japanese from the West Coast. Five days later, on Feb. 24, Mackenzie King, yielding to British Columbia pressures and his own inclinations and consciously following the American example, issued Order in Council, P.C. 1486, giving similar authority to Minister of Justice Louis S. St. Laurent. In each country special civilian bodies were created to effect the evacuation: the War Relocation Authority in the U.S. and the federal British Columbia Security Commission in Canada. Those few Japanese in either country who lived east of the coastal mountain ranges remained largely undisturbed, and in the Territory of Hawaii, where Japanese comprised about a third of the population —

Courtesy, The Bancroft Library

The American evacuation program for mainland Japanese Americans attempted to keep families together and to provide elements of outside life for internees. In the picture above, an evening English language class is conducted for those wishing to attend at the Heart Mountain, Wyoming, camp. Below, the high school class of 1943 graduates from the Granada Center in Amache, Colorado.



Courtesy, The Bancroft Library

there were more than 150,000, roughly equal to the number in all of continental North America — they were almost all left at liberty. The American evacuation was uncompromisingly racist, insisting, in one instance, on the evacuation of a half-Japanese infant from a Maryknoll orphanage in Los Angeles, while Canada made exceptions for a few Eurasians and Japanese married to persons of other ethnic groups.

The methods of incarceration were quite different. The U.S. placed its Japanese in ten sand and cactus concentration camps — euphemistically called relocation centers — hastily erected in desolate parts of the interior from eastern California to western Arkansas. These were girt with barbed wire and guarded by soldiers although administered by civilians. Canada had a more varied — and less expensive — system. A little over half were sent to what the government called "Interior Housing Centres" in eastern British Columbia which were largely depopulated mining towns, although some "new towns" were constructed for them. They were neither guarded nor wired in, the government assuming, as the Czarist goverment in Russia used to, that climate and geography would keep them in place. Some 2,000 adult males were sent to work camps in British Columbia and Ontario which were loosely guarded, while nearly 1,000 were incarcerated, under close confinement, in northern Ontario. Some 6,000 were allowed to "relocate" to sugar beet work in Alberta and Manitoba and to self-supporting projects elsewhere in the interior. Canadian relocatees were allowed only limited liberty: in Alberta, for example, special permission was needed for a Japanese to enter a city. The Canadian plan originally called for sexual segregation — men to work camps and women and children to interior centers. This provoked a mass protest by Canadian Nisei in April, 1942. Although the leaders were incarcerated and sent to the northern Ontario camps for their pains, the work camps proved ineffective and most Canadian Japanese families were reunited within a year.

The American evacuation was, from the first, largely a family affair and, except for some 2,000 male aliens interned, family units were kept together. The American process, although more total and harsher in its immediate format, had some ameliorating features from the outset. Run largely by sympathetic if paternalistic civilians, the U.S. War Relocation Authority always had the goal of moving "loyal" Japanese Americans into the mainstream of society as soon as possible. Hundreds of Nisei college students were allowed to resume their educations in interior and eastern campuses as early as fall, 1942. Thousands of other Japanese Americans, largely Nisei, were released for short-term agricultural work and for "permanent" relocation in urban centers from Salt Lake City to Boston. Once released from WRA custody relocatees had relative freedom of movement so long as they did not return to the West Coast.

Starting in 1943 Nisei were allowed to enlist, in many cases right from concentration camps, into what became the celebrated 442nd Regimental Combat Team and into Military Intelligence. In 1944 selective service was reinstituted for Japanese Americans, in and out of camp. But to effect all this rehabilitation — the government was primarily concerned with aiding the war effort — it was first felt necessary to determine loyalty. Initially this was done rather casually: anyone who wasn't in the F.B.I.'s bad books and could get testimonials of reliability from Caucasian citizens could be a candidate for what the W.R.A. called "leave clearance." But eventually a mass loyalty test was administered — by questionnaire! The crucial questions — which had originally been framed by the U.S. Army for prospective Japanese American recruits and draftees but which the W.R.A. mindlessly administered to all adults — were those numbered 27 and 28 on the questionnaire. They read:

Courtesy, The Bancroft Library

The U.S. War Relocation Authority, responsible for implementing and supervising the American evacuation, had the final goal of moving "loyal" Japanese back into the mainstream of American society as quickly as possible. The couple pictured here held professional jobs before the evacuation and were among the first internees considered eligible for indefinite leave from the Heart Mountain center.

> 27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?
> 28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other foreign government, power or organization?

What aged Issei or women of any age were to make of the first is hard to say, but the second was worse, at least for Issei who could not become citizens. It was asking them voluntarily to assume a stateless status, and, incidently, a clear violation of the Geneva convention. This loyalty program eventually led to some 18,000 non-jurors being labeled "disloyal" and segregated at Tule Lake, California, for repatriation or expatriation to Japan. All told 4,724 Japanese Americans actually left for Japan after the war: of these 1,659 were aliens, 1,949 citizens accompanying repatriating parents, and 1,116 were adult Nisei.

For Japanese Canadians there was no real wartime rehabilitation program: hardly any were enrolled in colleges and perhaps 100 were accepted for military service at the very end of the war. The government pursued an aggressive and successful program of encouraging Japanese Canadians to apply for postwar passage to Japan. Almost half the prewar population — 10,813 persons — applied for "repatriation." Counting adults only, about 42 percent were Japanese nationals, 21 percent naturalized citizens, and 36 percent

native-born Canadians. Eventually almost 4,000 did go. That departures for Japan from the U.S. and Canada were almost equal even though Japanese Americans outnumbered Japanese Canadians by more than five to one speaks volumes about their respective visions of the future.

During the war both governments unambiguously expressed the wish to prevent any postwar reestablishment of Japanese enclaves on the Pacific Coast. In the United States the general ban on returning to the Pacific Coast was, in effect, lifted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous *Endo* case of December, 1944, which restored domestic freedom of movement to Japanese American citizens. While not all of the exiled Japanese Americans returned to the West Coast, large numbers of them did. As we have seen, 88.5 percent of Japanese Americans lived there in 1940. This fell to 58.2 percent by 1950, but by 1960 was back up to about two-thirds where it has remained. In Canada, where no court could exercise meaningful jurisdiction, the bar on returning to coastal British Columbia stayed in effect until April 1, 1949, more than three and a half years after the end of the Pacific war. British Columbia, which had more than 95 percent of Japanese Canadians in 1941, had just a third in 1951, and the figure has not changed significantly since. Today, there are more Japanese Canadians in Ontario than in B.C., more in Toronto than in Vancouver.

TABLE I

COMPARATIVE POPULATION FIGURES 1941 and 1971 FOR CANADA, THE CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES AND HAWAII

Japanese in Canada, 1941 and 1971

Province	1941	%	1971	%
Ontario	234	1.0	15,600	41.9
British Columbia	22,096	95.5	13,585	36.5
Alberta	578	2.5	4,460	12.0
Others	241	1.1	3,615	9.6
Total	23,149	100.0	37,260	100.0
Population of Canada	11,506,655		21,568,315	
Japanese as a %	0.2		0.17	

Japanese in the Contiguous United States, 1940 and 1970

Region	1940	%	1970	%
Pacific Coast (CA, OR, WA)	112,353	88.5	239,678	64.6
All other	14,595	11.5	131,471	35.4
Total	126,948	100.0	371,149	100.0
Population of Lower 48	131,699,275		202,163,212	
Japanese as a %	0.1		0.18	

Japanese in Hawaii, 1940 and 1970

	1940	% of HA pop	1970	% of HA pop
Hawaii	157,905	37.3	217,175	28.2

N.B. The preliminary estimated number of persons of Japanese ethnicity in the United States for 1980 (including AL and HA) was 700,747. The comparable 1970 figure was 591,290.

Courtesy, The Bancroft Library

Another method used by the WRA to return Japanese Americans to American society was that of outside employment. This couple preparing to leave the Heart Mountain center were "permanently" relocated in a non-coastal urban center.

In addition to their liberty, Japanese in both countries lost large amounts of real and personal property. Farms, fishing boats, businesses, automobiles, refrigerators and other possessions which had to be abandoned at the time of evacuation were involved in forced sales at a mere fraction of value. Quite often the victims of the relocations were, in current parlance, "ripped off," and usually ripped off to the advantage of some opportunistic Caucasian. In addition, of course, in each country Japanese were largely denied the opportunity to participate fully in the wartime prosperity which finally ended the decade-long depression that Canadians call the "dirty thirties."

The relocations were four decades ago; the war has been over for almost that long. What has happened to the North American Japanese in that time? Their status has changed dramatically. From a pariah group which many wanted to expel they have become, in the words of one American sociologist, a "model minority." Each nation has made a formal apology: in 1964 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson admitted that the relocation had been a "black mark" against what he claimed was "Canada's traditional fairness and devotion to the principles of human rights." Twelve years later President Gerald R. Ford in a bicentennial year executive order both apologized — "We know now what we should have known then — not only was the evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans" — and revoked Executive Order 9066. These pronouncements, however symbolic, underline the changed status and situations of the North American Japanese.

In the 1950s legal discrimination was removed from the statute books of each nation.

Courtesy of the Japanese American Citizens League

On February 19, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford formally rescinded Executive Order 9066 in the presence of members of the Japanese American Citizens League and Japanese American members of Congress. On President Ford's immediate left stand Congresswoman Patsy Mink and Senator Daniel Inouye.

Japanese Canadian citizens could vote anywhere and in the U.S. Japanese as well as other Asians became eligible for naturalization. While a few in the majority communities kept wartime memories ever fresh, the postwar Japanese economic miracle and the rise of a threatening People's Republic of China made the public image of Japan an increasingly favorable one. On the American side, the belated admission of Hawaii to statehood in 1959 meant that one state had an Asian American majority and thus there were senators and representatives of Japanese ethnicity in Washington. This new political clout is epitomized by the career of Democratic Senator Daniel Inouye. A much-decorated infantry Captain who had lost an arm fighting in Italy, Inouye was called upon to be the keynote speaker at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. That a Japanese American could fulfill such a sensitive symbolic role less than 27 years after Pearl Harbor says something about the fluidity of American institutions. Six years later, as a member of the Senate Select Committee investigating what became known as Watergate, Inouye helped bring down a President. Polls taken at the time showed him with the highest positive rating of any committee member. Later that year California sent the first Japanese American to Congress from the mainland: Norman Minetta represented not an ethnic community — Japanese are a tiny minority in his San Jose district — but a moderately liberal one. Less than 30 years before his election some of the Japanese returning to San Jose had shots fired into their homes. A second mainland Japanese American, Robert Matsui, now represents Sacramento.

No Japanese Canadian has received national political recognition, although one

Canadian-born Japanese, S.I. Hayakawa, a kind of conservative culture hero, was elected to the U.S. Senate from California in 1976. While some Japanese Canadians have achieved significant positions within the civil service, the Japanese Canadian best known outside of his own ethnic community is Professor David Suzuki, a geneticist at the University of British Columbia, who has done science shows on television.

Despite the not surprising lack of Japanese Canadian political personalities, the contemporary situation of both communities of North American Japanese is strikingly similar. Each group has benefited from ethnic and racial tensions which have served to lessen the once apparently polar differences between persons of Asian and European ancestry. In Canada two kinds of tensions have served to promote the social position of Japanese Canadians. First is the centuries-long conflict between French and English Canada in which language loyalty and acculturation to either an English or a French norm is seen as crucial by both sides. In this conflict, Japanese, by their all but universal adoption of the English language, are seen as allies of anglophone Canadians. Second, immigration from less developed parts of the Commonwealth — Asians from Uganda, blacks from the Caribbean — is seen as a much greater threat by many Canadians than the steady trickle from Japan which has run, in recent years, between 500 and 1,000 annually.

Japanese Americans have benefited similarly from apparent contrasts with other racial and ethnic groups seen as more threatening to the norms of society. Their increasingly middle-class status and outlook makes them truly seem a "model minority" in comparison, say, to blacks or chicanos. The most recent comparative income data (1970) show that more than 90% of Japanese American families were above the poverty line.[5] Although there are no equivalent Canadian data, there is every reason to believe they would be comparable. The numbers demonstrate that Japanese Americans earn considerably more than other minority groups (including other Asian Americans) but considerably less than white Americans, even though Japanese Americans have, on average, more education than the latter. This disparity is most noticeable at each end of the economic spectrum. Despite their greater amount of schooling, a larger proportion of Japanese Americans exist in poverty than their educational attainments would predict, a fact ignored by those who speak of an unalloyed Japanese American success story. Similarly, given their education and the extremely high cost of living where most of them live (California and Hawaii), the percentage of those in the $25,000 and above bracket should have been about twice what it is. This is further evidence of subtle but continuing economic discrimination. Quite often this discrimination takes the form not of exclusion from employment, but rather of a failure to promote Japanese Americans (and other Asian Americans) into higher managerial positions. Many of them are thus conspicuously "over-qualified" for the jobs they hold. There is often a distinct reluctance of employers to put Japanese Americans and other non-whites into positions in which they can hire and fire whites. I suspect, but cannot demonstrate, that similar conditions prevail in Canada.

In both countries the existence of exogamus marriage — once a relative rarity — has become quite pronounced. Although there are no definitive statistics or even large scale studies, research about American Sansei (third generation Japanese Americans) by several scholars show that more than half of their marriages are to non-Japanese, and a study of Canadian Sansei by Gordon Hirabayashi indicates that the rate there may be well over 75 percent.[6] This later figure has caused at least a few Japanese Canadians to question publicly the continued survival of their group. Although this could conceivably happen in a generation or two in Canada, where the ethnic population is quite small and relative-



Courtesy of the Japanese American Citizens League

U.S. Representative Robert Matsui of Sacramento, California is one of several Japanese Americans to attain national political office in the last two decades.

ly dispersed, a Japanese American community of some size seems assured for the foreseeable future.

The role of ethnic Japanese organizations in years to come is also conjectural.[7] Since the 1960s it has been clear to most close observers of the Japanese communities in North America that the winds of change stirring other ethnic groups are not without their effect on the Nisei and particularly upon their children, the Sansei. The rise of ethnic consciousness in the United States, largely in response to the black liberation movement, and the development of multiculturalism as an official policy in Canada, have each affected young Japanese. A distinct but articulate minority of them, particularly those in college or of college age, have become "radical" and "militant" to a degree that shocks their elders even more perhaps than does similar behavior by their white or black peers. The most radical see themselves as allies of lower-class minorities, and on campuses on both American coasts, have coalesced with them in such organizations as the Third World Liberation Front. Much more characteristic is an increased awareness of their ethnic heritage on both sides of the Pacific, with the result that courses in Asian American history and culture and Asian American Study Centers have arisen in many U.S. colleges and universities. In Canada, not surprisingly, such movements have been slower to get under way. As the 1980s began no such courses existed in any Canadian university, but interest in Japanese Canadian history has been greatly increased by a growing number of books, films, conferences and a traveling exhibit celebrating the 1977 centennial of the putative first Japanese arrival in Canada. In addition, newly formed scholarly associations for the interdisciplinary study of Asian North Americans now exist in each country. In the United States the mimetic effect of the black, brown and red power movements has produced a half-serious, half-comic yellow power movement. Its rhetoric, too, is imitative: a popular third generation joke styles accommodationist Japanese as "bananas," that is,

"yellow on the outside but white on the inside."

National organizations have changed as well. The Japanese American Citizens League, the one national Japanese American organization, is a case in point. Founded as a defensive device for an oppressed minority, the organization and its membership are not at all sure of their present function since the most obvious oppressions have vanished. In the post-World War II era the JACL, whose actual membership has never amounted to as much as a tenth of the mainland Japanese American population, became one of the most effective minority lobbying groups under the direction of its Washington representative, Mike Masaoka. Exploiting the guilt felt about the evacuation by many Americans, it played an important role in the passage of much legislation affecting the Japanese American community, from the Japanese American Claims Act of 1948 to the symbolic repeal of the Emergency Detention Act in 1970. By the late 1970s, as its leadership was shifting from Nisei to Sansei, from a generation that experienced the wartime ordeals to one for whom they are, at best, a vague memory, the JACL asked, formally, for some kind of "redress" for the wrongs done to the Japanese American people during and after the war. In an argument that pointed out that the West German government was in the process of paying between $35 and $40 billion to Jews and Jewish institutions, but without suggesting an appropriate price tag for their own injuries, the JACL insisted that:

> Redress for the injustices of 1942-1946 is not just an isolated Japanese American issue: it is an issue of concern for all Americans. Restitution does not put a price tag on freedom or justice. The issue is not to recover what cannot be recovered. The issue is to acknowledge the mistake by providing proper redress for the victims of injustice, and thereby make such injustices less likely to occur.[8]

As a result of that campaign a bill was enacted into law in late 1980 creating the presidential Commision on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians to inquire whether "any wrong" was done pursuant to Executive Order 9066, and should it so find, to recommend appropriate remedies to the Congress within 18 months. That commission has held formal hearings and should make formal recommendations to Congress sometime in 1982.

In Canada the National Association of Japanese Canadians (formerly the Japanese Canadian Citizens Association) has concentrated its energies on a different form of redress. It is concerned chiefly with the proposed Canadian constitution and what it sees as deficiencies in it which might permit a reoccurrence of the events of 1942-1949. As its president, Gordon R. Kadota, put it recently:[9]

> On the current proposal to entrench the Charter of Rights into the Constitution [we] can endorse only the intent to entrench but not the proposal in its entirety. Specifically, we point out that although a number of crucial clauses do cover the protection of rights [a number of] phrases permit Parliament to override these sections.
>
> . . .
>
> [They] provide Parliament with the power to override these very rights by such means as the War Measures Act. The proposal as it stands, *does not* prevent a repetition of the injustices suffered by the Japanese Canadians. We also wish to add that the aboriginal rights of Canada's native peoples should be reflected in the Constitution.

* * *

Although, as E.H. Carr delights in pointing out, history is usually written by the winners, quite often it is also true that history is remembered better by the losers. The relocations of the North American Japanese occupy, at best, a line or two in most textbooks and are completely ignored in many. For the Japanese communities of this continent, however, that experience remains the central event in their history.

FOOTNOTES:

1. The earliest specific scholarly comparison is Robert W. O'Brien, "Evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast: Canadian and American Contrasts," *Research Studies State College of Washington,* Vol. 14 (1946), pp. 113-120, while Norman Thomas, "Fate of the Japanese in North America and Hawaii," *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. 16 (1943), pp. 92-95 is an acute contemporary comment. For a comparison of the whole experience see Roger Daniels, "The Japanese Experience in North America: An Essay in Comparative Racism," *Canadian Ethnic Studies,* Vol. 9, No. 2 (1977), pp. 91-100. For literature on Asians in North America generally, see Roger Daniels, "American Historians and East Asian Immigrants," *Pacific Historical Review,* Vol. 43 (1974), pp. 449-472 and "North American Scholarship and Asian Immigrants, 1974-1979," *Immigration History Newsletter,* Vol. 9, No. 1 (1979), pp. 8-11. Two new works expand our knowledge: Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps, North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada During World War II* (Malabar: Krieger Press, Florida, 1981) makes specific comparisons while Ann G. Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism* (Toronto: 1981) is the best treatment of the entire Canadian process.

2. J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record, Vol.* 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 149.

3. For a forlorn attempt to get a color-blind naturalization statute made by Charles Sumner, see *Cong. Globe,* 41st Congress, 2nd Session, 1870, pp. 4275-79, 5121-77.

4. See Roger Daniels, "The Decisions to Relocate the North American Japanese: A Note" *Pacific Historical Review,* Vol. 51 (February 1982), pp. 71-77.

5. Japanese American income data for families:

Below $4,000	9.5%
$4,000-$7,999	15.0%
$8,000-$11,999	22.5%
$12,000-$14,999	17.4%
$15,000-$24,999	28.3%
$25,000 +	7.3%
	100.0%

Computed from U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population: Japanese, Chinese and Filipinos in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1973), Table 9, p. 72.

6. Harry H.L. Kitano and Akemi Kikumura, "Interracial Marriage: A Picture of the Japanese American," *Journal of Social Issues,* Vol. 29, No. 2 (1973), pp. 67-81 and Gordon Hirabayashi, "From 'Enemy Alien' to Intermarriage in One Third of a Century," *Rikka,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (1976), pp. 3-8. See also Kitano's essay on "Japanese" at p. 570 and David Herr's essay on "Intermarriage" at p. 519 in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

7. For further comments on leadership and organizations see Roger Daniels, "The Japanese," in John Higham, ed., *Ethnic Leadership in America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 36-63.

8. National Committee for Redress, Japanese Americans Citizens League, *The Japanese American Incarceration: A Case for Redress* (San Francisco: 1978), p. 24.

9. National Association of Japanese Canadians, press release, November 25, 1980.