




The Atlanta Campaign
and Kennesaw Mountain
National Battlefield Park, Georgia



A Federal battery engaged in drill, using a 20-pounder Parrott gun, the most effective type of ordnance employed during the Atlanta Campaign. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

THE COVER

The cover is a reproduction of a wartime sketch illustrating the Confederates preparing for the defense of Kennesaw Mountain. In order to mount batteries on the crest of the mountain it was necessary, due to the steepness of the slope, to pull the guns by hand. This type of work was not unusual for both armies during the Atlanta Campaign, which in many places was fought over rugged terrain. Reproduction of this sketch is by courtesy and permission of the U. S. Army Signal Corps.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

HAROLD L. ICKES, *Secretary*

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · NEWTON B. DRURY, *Director*

The Atlanta Campaign and Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park

“BROTHERS OF A COMMON STOCK, of equal courage and tenacity, animated by convictions which they passionately held, they did on both sides all that it was possible for soldiers to do, fighting their way to a mutual respect which is the solid foundation for a renewal of more than the old regard and affection.” Thus wrote General Cox, a participant in the War between the States, of the men who engaged in the Atlanta Campaign.

The Eve of the Atlanta Campaign

DURING THE SUMMER OF 1863 heavy blows had fallen on Confederate hopes. Grant captured Vicksburg on July 4, and the whole length of the Mississippi River passed under Federal control. Food supplies and reinforcements furnished the Confederates in the main theatre of war east of the river were thereafter cut off. On this same July 4, Lee was in full retreat after the crucial Battle of Gettysburg, which ended the last Confederate invasion of the North.


The war in the West now centered around the Federal effort to control Chattanooga, which, after severe setbacks, was successful. In the Battle of Chickamauga, fought a short distance south of Chattanooga, on September 19–20, the Federal Army was defeated. It was forced to retreat hurriedly to Chattanooga where it was almost surrounded on the east and south by Confederates who occupied Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, and the Chattanooga Valley. All but the most circuitous Federal lines of supply, based on Nashville, were interrupted, and the besieged army was soon in dire straits. Starvation threatened until reinforcements arrived and an effective supply line was established. New leaders were sent to assume command of the Federal Army—Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Hooker—and in hard fighting, November 23–25, the Confederates were driven from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and forced back from Chattanooga.

The Federal forces were now in possession of a strategically strong base, from which they effectively could disrupt industry and communications in the very heart of the Confederacy. A successful invasion of Georgia would not only deprive the South of a rich source of food and ordnance, but would lower both the military and the civilian morale, and remove the last possibility of European states recognizing the Confederacy.

By May 1, 1864, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman had assembled at Chattanooga approximately 100,000 men, well equipped, with 254 guns. Opposing him at Dalton, Ga., 34 miles distant, was Gen. Joseph E. Johnston with about 50,000 men, only fairly well equipped, with 187 guns. Soon after the campaign started, Johnston's forces were increased to about 60,000 men. The Confederates were less abundantly supplied with ammunition than were the Federals. Owing to the comparative size of the armies, Johnston was on the defensive, but fighting over terrain well adapted for defensive tactics in territory friendly to the Confederacy.

Terrain and Factors Affecting the Atlanta Campaign

THE FEDERAL ARMY was based on Chattanooga, and the Confederate Army on Dalton, Ga., during the winter of 1863–64. Atlanta, 120 miles from Chattanooga, and 85 miles from Dalton, was Johnston's base for supplies. This city, full of machine shops, foundries, and arsenals, after Johnston's army, was Sherman's main objective. Its defense was the crucial task of the opposing Confederate force. Grant's instructions to Sherman in the spring of 1864 directed him “to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their resources . . .” Atlanta, a large town for the time, was situated at the juncture of several



William Tecumseh Sherman, commander of the Federal forces in the Atlanta Campaign, was one of the ablest northern generals developed by the war. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

strategic railroads. The Western and Atlantic Railroad, running from Atlanta through Dalton to Chattanooga, was the line of communication of both armies; one reaching Richmond, Va., from Atlanta by way of Danville, was a supply line between the Confederate States and the line of communication between Johnston and Lee; another ran from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia to the coast at Savannah; and still another connected Atlanta with Montgomery, Ala.

Between Chattanooga and Atlanta the country was generally wooded, and, except the area between the Oostanaula and the Etowah Rivers, was rugged and hilly. In front of Dalton a ridge about 30 miles long ran in a north-south direction and could be crossed by an army in only two places, at Mill Creek Gap where the railway passed through it, and at Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles farther south. In front of Marietta were Brush Mountain, Kennesaw Mountain, Lost Mountain, and Pine Mountain, and other rugged hills. Interposing their courses across the theatre of action from Dalton to Atlanta were the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee Rivers. All the roads were of the poorest kind.

Sherman described the Atlanta Campaign in these words: "We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish lines, taking advantage of the shape of the ground, and of every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the 'defensive' had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought individually in every possible style, more frequently with the musket clubbed than with the bayonet."

Military critics considered the Atlanta Campaign a model of military strategy, and they have found little in it to criticize. One critic sums up the campaign in these words: "Except in attacking the Kennesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the character of Sherman's operations was, throughout, the same. To protect his main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched across it. He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy, and directed it by a circuit off the main line, upon the Confederate rear. In every case the operation was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest positions, and to retreat." Another critic comments: "It is rather curious to note that Johnston made no effort to defend the rivers across his line of retreat by taking positions behind them; and that he appeared rather to prefer having a river at his back, as at Resaca and at the Chattahoochee. He was careful to provide plenty of bridges for his retreat, and by destroying them at the right time, he hindered the pursuit.

"Both hostile armies in this campaign made constant use of fieldworks. It was only by means of intrenching that Sherman was able to hold Johnston with a small force in front, while he dispatched the bulk of his command upon the wide turning-movements."

Writing many years after the war, General Sherman said of his adversary in the Atlanta Campaign up to the Battle of Peach Tree Creek:

“No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.”

The Atlanta Campaign was only one phase of a gigantic plan of battle which it was hoped would end the war. The line of battle may be said to have extended from Fort Monroe in Virginia on the Chesapeake Bay across northern Virginia to the Rapidan River, hence curving southwestward through West Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and western North Carolina, northwest Georgia, and the middle of Alabama to the Gulf of Mexico. Grant's army facing Lee in northern Virginia constituted the center, and Sherman's army at Chattanooga, the right, of this long offensive line. The might of the Federal Army was concentrated under Grant and Sherman, just as that of the Confederate Army was concentrated under Lee and Johnston. The great offensive was planned to open on May 4, in both Virginia and Georgia. Sherman was to drive straight into the heart of the South.

The Atlanta Campaign


RINGGOLD GAP

THE FEDERAL ARMY wintering in Chattanooga had maintained an advance position at Ringgold Gap which served to prevent surprise attacks. On May 7, Sherman moved through this gap in the initial phase of the Atlanta Campaign.

RINGGOLD GAP NATIONAL MARKER SITE, south of Ringgold, Ga., on United States Highway 41, has for its primary purpose the orientation of the traveler who is following Sherman's route. A bronze relief map is mounted here illustrating the terrain over which fighting occurred in 1864. The locations of the major engagements of the Atlanta Campaign are shown and a brief narrative of the campaign is given.

ROCKY FACE RIDGE

AS SHERMAN ADVANCED from Ringgold Gap, he found Confederates strongly intrenched on Rocky Face Ridge north of Dalton. Realizing the strength of this position, Sherman determined to march around it and threaten the Confederate line of communication, the Western and Atlantic



Joseph Eggleston Johnston was commander of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee and the Army of Mississippi which opposed Sherman during the Atlanta Campaign. He was the fourth ranking general in the Confederate Army; a masterful tactician and a worthy opponent for any enemy. Johnston was replaced by Hood before the battles around Atlanta were fought. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

Railroad. He believed that such a move would force his opponents to retire in order to protect vital communications to their rear, and that they would have to offer battle under circumstances more favorable to him. While a Federal column was flanking the Rocky Face Ridge position, by way of Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles to the right, Sherman made several attempts to force a passage over the ridge and through Mill Creek Gap in order to divert Confederate attention from his important flank movement.

The Federal maneuvers were efficiently executed, and, as a result, the Confederates on May 12 abandoned Rocky Face Ridge, retiring to Resaca.

ROCKY FACE RIDGE NATIONAL MARKER SITE, 10.9 miles south of Ringgold, on United States Highway 41, at Mill Creek Gap, is one of the points where Sherman attempted to pass through the ridge. The relief map displayed at this site portrays the physical difficulties which confronted the Federal Army and outlines the military action. The visitor readily can appreciate the advantages



Atlanta-Chattanooga Highway looking south toward Mill Creek Gap in Rocky Face Ridge. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

enjoyed by troops intrenched on such a commanding ridge and in the narrow gap over and through which Sherman was attempting to pass. Confederate fortifications are visible at many points along Rocky Face Ridge.

RESACA

AS SHERMAN APPROACHED RESACA he found the Confederates intrenched on a semicircle of hills about the town with the Oostanaula River to their rear. The Federal troops assaulted at several points along the Confederate line.

While the Federal attacks were attended with heavy losses, they enabled Sherman to secure excellent artillery positions which commanded the railroad crossing of the Oostanaula River and exposed the Confederates to serious danger. At the same time a Federal column was crossing the Oostanaula River below Resaca at Lay's Ferry to threaten the Confederate line of communications.

The Federal bombardment of the bridges and the flanking movement across the river forced the Confederates to retire, leaving Sherman in possession of Georgia north of the Oostanaula River.

RESACA NATIONAL MARKER SITE, 12.6 miles south of Dalton, and north of Resaca, on United States Highway 41, was a short distance inside the Confederate fortifications which encircled the town. The bronze relief map mounted at this

site illustrates the important troop movements which resulted in the Confederate withdrawal. A road north of the marker site runs east to the cemetery where the Confederate dead were interred.

CASSVILLE

RETIRING SOUTH FROM RESACA, the Confederates on May 17 halted 3.5 miles north of Adairsville and sought a strong defensive position from which they could offer battle. Finding no terrain strong enough for a stand against the numerically superior Federal Army, the Confederates withdrew to Cassville. As Sherman followed, a portion of his troops marched directly toward Cassville, while other columns were sent through Kingston. Johnston thought this presented an opportunity to destroy an isolated Federal column. His attack, executed on May 19, failed, however, chiefly because the Federal columns were within supporting distance of each other.

The Confederates then withdrew to a curving ridge east and south of Cassville. But certain of Johnston's corps commanders felt that the Confederates here were too exposed to artillery fire. Johnston therefore withdrew on the night of May 19, taking up a position on a range just south of Cartersville and the Etowah River.

CASSVILLE NATIONAL MARKER SITE is situated




This reproduction of a wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in HARPER'S WEEKLY for June 11, 1864, illustrates the position of Osterhaus' division of the Federal Army on Bald Hill at Resaca and the shelling of the railroad bridge across the Oostanaula River.

1 mile south of Cassville, on United States Highway 41, and east of the ridge on which the Confederates intrenched on May 19. The fortifications on the ridge are well preserved. The relief map on the site indicates troop positions and movements which culminated in the Confederate withdrawal.

NEW HOPE CHURCH

AS A YOUNG OFFICER, Sherman had traveled over the Allatoona Pass and remembered it as a formidable defensive position, so again he decided to use flanking tactics. His intention was to move on Atlanta, and on May 23, his entire army left the line of the railroad and moved to the southwest. The country was almost in a state of nature, with few or no roads. Johnston soon comprehended the meaning of this move and sent his troops toward New Hope Church, 4 miles north of Dallas, from which several roads radiated toward Atlanta. Arriving here on May 25, he assumed a position

A line of Federal skirmishers advancing toward Resaca. This unusual sketch illustrates clearly the manner in which skirmishers ordinarily advanced ahead of the main body and is typical of many actions in Georgia during the Atlanta Campaign. Wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in HARPER'S WEEKLY, June 11, 1864.



protecting the vital roads. Late that afternoon a portion of the Federal Army appeared and made a series of desperate but unsuccessful assaults.

Now that the railroad had been abandoned, the problem of feeding the Federal troops was a major one, for supplies had to be hauled by wagon from the Western and Atlantic Railroad over narrow dirt roads which heavy rainfalls had converted into quagmires. Having flanked the Confederates from their position at Allatoona, Sherman now determined to move back to the railroad in order to reestablish a dependable line of supplies. Despite Confederate vigilance, superior man power enabled Sherman to reach the railroad. By June 6 he had concentrated his troops in the vicinity of Acworth, 12 miles north of Marietta.

NEW HOPE CHURCH NATIONAL MARKER SITE is located on Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles southwest of Acworth, at the important road junction for which both armies were contending. The relief map mounted at this point delineates the troop movements which resulted in the Federal flank movement around the Confederate Army to the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Acworth.

Portions of the Confederate fortifications are visible west of the marker site. North of the marker site is New Hope Church Cemetery. The original church which stood here during the battle has been replaced. New Hope Church is 17 miles west of Marietta on State Highway 120.



Reproduction of a section of the Cyclorama painting of the Battle of Atlanta illustrating the desperate nature of the fighting in vicinity of that city. Courtesy: Department of Parks, Atlanta. (Reeves Studio Photo.)

BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN

WHEN SHERMAN MOVED from New Hope Church, Johnston was compelled to follow on a parallel line. This shift put the Confederates in front of Marietta, in a battle line extending from Lost Mountain across Kennesaw Mountain to Brush Mountain, a distance of about 12 miles. Pine Mountain, an isolated eminence in front of this line, also was occupied. This position covered Marietta, the Western and Atlantic Railroad, which at this point passed between Kennesaw and Brush Mountains, and the bridges across the Chattahoochee River which would be indispensable if the Confederates were compelled to withdraw. Proceeding east from New Hope Church, Lost Mountain is approximately $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles, Kennesaw Mountain 14 miles, and Brush Mountain 17 miles distant.

Several days of rainy weather checked military operations. By June 14, however, a portion of the Federal Army had worked close to the Confederates on Pine Mountain. Generals Johnston, Hardee, and Polk rode to the summit of Pine Mountain that day to observe the enemy's line, and while there a battery of Federal guns, three-quarters of a mile distant, fired, one of the shots killing Polk instantly. The Confederate line of 10 miles or more was too long for the number of available troops, and Johnston soon concentrated them on Kennesaw Mountain.

The main Federal force now advanced toward Kennesaw Mountain, and as the Confederate position was neared, Sherman's men spread out on a line paralleling it and extending south. There was continuous skirmishing, but the operations were hindered by heavy rains which converted streams into torrents and roads into ribbons of mud.

Discerning that the Federals were attempting to envelop his flank by the movement to the south, Johnston moved Hood from the right to the left of his line in an effort to strike the Federals as they maneuvered for position. On the morning of June 22, Federal troops advanced toward Marietta along the Powder Springs Road. By noon they had reached the intersection of the Macland and Powder Springs Roads, situated on a ridge which offered a strong defensive position.



This interesting wartime photograph was taken from Confederate trenches clearly seen in foreground and right background, looking toward the little town of Resaca, Ga. Here are seen the road leading south into the town, to the left the Western and Atlantic Railroad, and beyond the town the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula River. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

The Federal troops were massed in the woods around the road intersection, only a portion of them intrenching. During the morning, Hood had concentrated his troops on the Powder Springs Road, and in the afternoon they were ordered to attack. From Confederate prisoners it had been learned that such a movement was intended, and the Federals had a little time to prepare for the assault. It began at 5:30 p. m., the Federal skirmish line being quickly engulfed, but failed to reach the main line owing to heavy artillery fire.

Prior to the Confederate assault, Hooker, in command of the Federal column, established his headquarters in the home of Valentine Kolb, which stands on the Powder Springs Road, 4.5 miles southwest of Marietta. Many of the fortifications erected during this engagement are also still in existence.

Indecisive skirmishing continued for several days. Sherman had the choice of making a frontal assault, or attempting another turning movement. The heavy rains and the all but impassable roads would make the turning movement especially difficult. Furthermore, the troops were tired of marching and wanted to fight. Lincoln, running

for reelection, needed a Federal victory to bolster his policy of continuing the war. If the frontal assault succeeded, all military resistance in north Georgia might be ended; if it failed, the flanking movement still could be attempted. These considerations determined Sherman to risk a frontal attack.

The assault was made at two separate points against the Confederate center on the morning of June 27. One column struck south of Kennesaw Mountain along the Burnt Hickory Road. Another was hurled against a salient south of the Dallas Road, defended by General Cheatham, and known now as Cheatham's Hill. Eight thousand troops were sent against the Confederates at Cheatham's Hill, and 5,500 at the point south of Kennesaw Mountain. At Cheatham's Hill the Federals lost 1,580 men in killed, wounded, and captured, against slightly over 200 in Confederate losses; in the attack south of Kennesaw Mountain, the Federals lost about 600 men, including 30 officers, against about half that number of Confederates. The attack thus failed with heavy losses. Military critics charge Sherman with having made one of his few mistakes in ordering the frontal attack.

Realizing that the Confederate position could be carried only by a tremendous sacrifice of men, Sherman resumed the flanking tactics which he had employed so often. A Federal column was ex-

tended far beyond the Confederate left, and Johnston's line of communications to Atlanta was threatened. Consequently, on the night of July 2, the Confederates withdrew, thus ending the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.


CLOSE OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

AT SMYRNA STATION, 7 miles south of Marietta, the Confederates took up a defensive position and intrenched. The Federal advance and development of this position on July 4 caused the Confederates again to retire and take up a fortified line just north of the Chattahoochee River, extending from the general vicinity of the present Bankhead Highway to the point where United States Highway 41 crosses the Chattahoochee River. Johnston crossed the Chattahoochee on July 10, covered and protected, in the words of Sherman, "by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance." Sherman crossed his army over the Chattahoochee and soon faced the Confederates behind their first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek. At this critical moment an important event took place. On the evening of July 17 a telegram from Richmond was received by Johnston relieving him of command of

the Confederate Army facing Sherman in front of Atlanta, and substituting Gen. John B. Hood, who assumed command the following day.

Hood planned to attack at once, and on July 20, about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, his troops left their intrenchments and attacked the Federal troops while they were in motion attempting a crossing of Peach Tree Creek. Federal artillery had been massed at a point near the present bridge over the stream along Peach Tree Road, preparatory to crossing it in the Federal advance. The Confederate attack struck here first. The Federal troops drawn up on the ridge along which Collier Road in Atlanta runs today, with no trenches, met and repulsed the attack. The fighting was desperate and lasted 4 hours, the troops becoming commingled and engaging in hand to hand fighting. In the end the Confederates were repulsed, and they withdrew to their main fortified lines close to Atlanta.

Sherman had determined not to assault the intrenched Confederates, but to surround the city and to cut all communications, which would force Hood into a general attack or compel him to evacuate the city. In accordance with this policy, Sherman on July 18 started General McPherson with a portion of the Federal Army on a route to



the east of Atlanta. McPherson struck the Georgia Railroad near Stone Mountain and then turned toward Atlanta, tearing up the tracks as he proceeded.

Hood now tried to destroy McPherson's army situated in the vicinity of what are now Moreland Avenue and Flat Shoals Road in southeastern Atlanta. By a secret night march of 15 miles, a portion of the Confederates under General Hardee gained a position in the rear of McPherson. With Wheeler's cavalry, Hardee launched an attack about noon of July 22 that caught McPherson's troops entirely by surprise. McPherson himself ran directly into a column of Confederate troops as he rode hurriedly to investigate the firing. Wheeling his horse to escape, he was fired upon as he entered a copse of woods. His horse emerged riderless. McPherson's death was the greatest single loss suffered by the Federal Army during the Atlanta Campaign. In the meantime, another Confederate force was launching an attack on the Federal front. The Confederate attacks were not well synchronized. That from the rear came first. The Federals leaped over to what had been the front side of their trenches, turned around, and repulsed the attack. Then, as the attack in their front developed, they leaped back to their original position in their works and repulsed this attack. The fighting of July 22, known as the Battle of Atlanta, was the hardest of the campaign. Frustrated and defeated, the Confederates returned to their intrenchments encircling Atlanta.


Sherman now began to shift his troops west of Atlanta to cut the Atlanta and West Point and the Macon and Western (now the Central of Georgia) Railroads. As the Federals were moving, the Confederates on July 28 again struck their exposed flank near Ezra Church, where Mozley Park in Atlanta is situated today. The attack was repulsed, the Confederates suffering heavily.

After these three battles, fought within a week, Sherman effectively had closed all the railroads leading into the city except the Macon and Western and the Atlanta and West Point Railroads. He had brought by rail from Chattanooga a battery of 4½-inch rifles which easily could reach any point in the invested city. This bombardment forced citizens to seek refuge in cellars and caves dug in railroad embankments. At Whitehall and Alabama Streets in Atlanta today can be seen a gas lamp post, now repaired, which was shattered by an exploding shell.

Most of the month of August was spent without decisive result. Sherman dispatched his cavalry in an attempt to destroy the last railroad into the city. These efforts failed. "I now became satisfied," Sherman writes, "that cavalry could not, or would not, make a sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army." This movement was begun August 25, with Jonesboro,

Federal trenches facing Little Kennesaw Mountain. Note period rail fence and farmhouse construction illustrated by this picture. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)






Public square of Marietta, Ga., at the time of the passage of Sherman's army through the town shortly after the withdrawal southward of the Confederates, following the battles around Kennesaw Mountain. Wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in HARPER'S WEEKLY, August 6, 1864.

20 miles south of Atlanta (United States Highway 41), the objective. Sherman knew that with the capture of this town on the Macon and Western Railroad, Hood would be cut off from his base of supplies and the city of Atlanta would have to be evacuated. In the engagements that ensued around Jonesboro on August 31 and September 1, the Federal Army made a secure lodgment on the railroad and the fate of Atlanta was decided.

Hood evacuated Atlanta on September 1, and a portion of Sherman's army occupied the city the following day. The Confederate Army moved from Atlanta to Lovejoy Station, where it halted, prevented from taking any further immediate action by the necessity of covering Andersonville, 90 miles south, where 34,000 Federal prisoners were held in the largest of the Confederate prison camps. The Atlanta Campaign was at an end. Before long, preparations were under way for the movement which was to take the Federal Army from Atlanta to Savannah, the March to the Sea.

The success of the Atlanta Campaign, and of the

Portion of Sherman's army destroying the Macon Railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro, Ga. This was the last railroad left entering Atlanta, and its destruction forced the Confederates under General Hood to evacuate the city. Wartime sketch from HARPER'S WEEKLY for October 1, 1864.



events in the lower South which subsequently derived from it, made the collapse of the Confederacy almost inevitable, the exact date depending upon the success of Grant's operations against Lee in Virginia.

ANDREWS' RAID

WHILE NOT PART OF the Atlanta Campaign, Andrews' Raid may be mentioned here briefly because of its relation to the section of the country identified with the Atlanta Campaign and because of its considerable historic interest.

The first contact of North Georgia with the realities of the War between the States occurred in April 1862. J. J. Andrews, a citizen of Kentucky, together with 21 Federal soldiers, all in civilian dress, penetrated Confederate territory and on the night of April 11 they reached Marietta, Ga., where they spent the night at the Kennesaw House, now the Marietta Hotel. This group planned to capture a train on the Western and Atlantic Railroad and to destroy the railroad bridges between Chattanooga and Atlanta, so that Federal forces approaching Huntsville, Ala., could rapidly march into and capture Chattanooga, thus paralyzing communications in a large portion of the Confederacy. In the spring of 1862, Chattanooga was not heavily garrisoned, and this plan, although daring, had a chance of success.

On the morning of April 12, 1862, the raiders boarded a passenger train at Marietta, Ga., and when the train stopped at Big Shanty, or Kenne-


saw, so that passengers and crew could obtain breakfast, they stealthily uncoupled the locomotive and three box cars from the remainder of the train and rapidly proceeded northward.

The conductor of the stolen engine and another railroad employee set out on foot after the fleeing engine. Soon they found a small flat car propelled by poles, which they appropriated for the chase. At the Etowah River the two found a locomotive, the Yonah, and took along a number of Confederate soldiers to aid in the pursuit. Arriving at Kingston, a railroad junction, several trains were found blocking the progress of the Yonah. The conductor, in order to expedite the pursuit, abandoned the Yonah, ran around the trains which were blocking the way, and commandeered the William R. Smith, a Rome Railroad locomotive, standing on a siding. With this locomotive, the pursuit was continued, but 4 miles north, a break in the rails brought it to a halt. Afoot again, a run of nearly 2 miles brought two of the pursuers in sight of the locomotive Texas, headed southward. This engine was halted and backed to Adairsville, where its string of freight cars was disconnected, and in reverse, the Texas took up the pursuit.

Illustrating the method used by Sherman in destroying railroad materials. After tearing up the rails and cross tie timbers, the latter were thrown together for bonfires, the rails being so placed over the piles of ties that they were heated red hot during the burning of the ties. Then the rails were twisted around trees and posts to render them useless. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)

So closely did the Confederates follow that Andrews and his men had no time to replenish fuel and water or to burn the bridges as they had planned. At times the locomotives reached a speed of 60 miles an hour. After a race of about 100 miles, at a point north of Ringgold, Ga., the captured locomotive, the General, began to lose speed as fuel and water were almost exhausted. Reversing the General in an effort to wreck the Texas, the Federal soldiers abandoned the train and dashed into the woods. Most of the party were captured, and subsequently Andrews and 7 of his raiders were executed. A monument has been erected at Big Shanty, or Kennesaw, where the raid began. The raiders who were executed are interred in the Chattanooga National Cemetery, where a marble shaft surmounted by a bronze replica of the General marks the group of graves.

Two of the locomotives which participated in the Andrews' Raid incident are still in existence. The General is the property of the State of Georgia and is on exhibition in the Union Depot, Chattanooga, Tenn. The Texas is owned by the city of Atlanta, and may be seen in the Cyclorama building in Grant Park in that city. Part of a third locomotive which participated in the raid, the William R. Smith, is on the grounds of the William R. Smith Machine Co. in Birmingham, Ala. The boiler and its attachments have been preserved; the trucks, cab, and tender are missing.



Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park

THE HISTORY OF THIS PARK is closely associated with the Atlanta Campaign, inasmuch as Chattanooga commanded the approach to the Lower South from the west, and its possession by the Federal Army made the campaign possible. In a literal sense it may be said the Atlanta Campaign began with the struggle for Chattanooga.

The Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, at Chattanooga, Tenn., was established in 1890. It is one of the oldest and largest of the battlefield parks, embracing approximately 8,500 acres.

The various units of Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, including the battlefields of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, are all situated on the outskirts of Chattanooga and are readily accessible from that city. The top of Lookout Mountain affords the best general view of the battlefields around Chattanooga. Here is situated the Adolph S. Ochs Memorial Museum and Observatory. An attendant is on duty there to assist the visitor. In addition to the historical interest, there are few views in the country more arresting than that from the top of Lookout Mountain. From this point may be seen the great Moccasin Bend of the Tennessee River and picturesque rugged scenery reaching away to the far-off blue haze of the Cumberland Mountains.

The park administration building is situated near the northern entrance to the Chickamauga battlefield, and here a library, museum, and special services are available to the visitor.

The Atlanta Campaign National Marker Sites

BY LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1937, Congress directed that the route of march of the Confederate and Federal forces engaged in the Atlanta Campaign should be ascertained and marked. Five sites, Ringgold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cassville, and New Hope Church, were designated for special marker treatment.

Small tracts of land have been acquired at ap-

propriate locations at each of the sites through the efforts of public spirited citizens of the State of Georgia, and here parking areas and overlook developments have been provided. At each place a bronze national historic site marker has been erected. Also, bronze marker tablets illustrating and interpreting the main movements of the armies in the vicinity of each of the sites have been incorporated in the overlook developments. The Work Projects Administration of the State of Georgia cooperated in completing the work at the several sites. The national marker sites at Ringgold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, and Cassville are immediately adjacent to United States Highway 41, the main traveled road between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The New Hope Church national marker site is situated on Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles southwest of Acworth. It can be reached also by proceeding 17 miles west from Marietta on Georgia State Highway 120.

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK has been administered by the National Park Service since 1933. As a result of congressional action in 1935 and 1939 the battlefield park has grown from a small reservation of 60 acres at Cheatham's Hill, acquired by a group of Union soldiers in 1899, to a battlefield area of about 3,000 acres, including the principal points of combat, on most of which the fortifications constructed during the battle are well preserved.

The park administration building is situated 2 miles north of Marietta at the point where United States Highway 41 passes the northern tip of Kennesaw Mountain. A collection of maps, photographs, and relics in the administration building are helpful to the visitor in interpreting the Atlanta Campaign. Here library facilities and guide services are available to the public. Organizations or groups will be given special services if arrangements are made in advance with the superintendent. Communications concerning the park should be directed to the Superintendent, Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, Marietta, Ga.

MAP OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

