


MANASSAS

NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK • VIRGINIA



- Historic House
- Historic House Site
- P Picnic Area
- ... Trails

ABOUT YOUR VISIT Manassas National Battlefield Park is about 26 miles southwest of Washington, D.C., near the intersection of U.S. 29 and Va. 234. The visitor center is open daily from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., except Christmas Day. The park operates on E.D.T. from the last Sunday in April to the last Sunday in October. The nominal entrance fee is waived for persons under 16 years of age and organized school groups. The tour map is your guide to various outlying points of interest.

ADMINISTRATION Manassas National Battlefield Park is administered by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.

The National Park System, of which this park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the great historical, natural, and recreational places of the United States for the benefit and inspiration of all the people.

A superintendent, whose address is Box 350, Manassas, Va. 22110, is in immediate charge of the park.


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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service



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The pleasant rolling countryside along Bull Run was twice the scene of major battle as Federal armies under Irvin McDowell and John Pope attempted to seize the strategic railroad junction at Manassas, Virginia. The one shall be ever memorable as the first large-scale battle of the tragic Civil War, while the other—fought 13 months later—paved the way for Robert E. Lee's first invasion of the North. By dangerously threatening the National Capital, both engagements brought deep humiliation and disillusionment to the North. Yet by so arousing national determination, each proved an empty victory for the South.

FIRST MANASSAS

Cheers rang through the streets of Washington on July 16, 1861, as McDowell's army, 34,000 strong, marched out to begin the long-awaited campaign to capture Richmond and end the war. It was an army of green recruits, few of whom had the faintest idea of the magnitude of the task facing them. But their swaggering gait showed that none doubted the outcome. As excitement spread through both official Washington and the citizenry, throngs with wine and picnic baskets followed the army into the field to watch what all expected would be a colorful show.

These were 90-day volunteers summoned by President Abraham Lincoln after the startling news of Fort Sumter burst over the Nation in April 1861. Called from shops and farms, they had little knowledge of what war would mean. The first day's march covered only 5 miles, as many straggled to pick blackberries or fill canteens.

McDowell's lumbering columns were headed for Manassas, an important rail center 25 miles southwest of Washington guarded by some 22,000 Confederate troops under Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard. If McDowell could seize this junction, he would stand astride the best overland approach to Richmond. His movements were covered by another Union army 45 miles away. This was Gen. Robert Patterson's force of 18,000 at Winchester with orders to pin down Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's army of 12,000.

At Beauregard's urgent plea, Johnston set out early on the 18th to unite the two armies. Marching to the nearest point on the Manassas Gap Railroad, Johnston's men entrained for the battlelines after briefly putting up such a show of resistance that Patterson thought a heavy attack was underway.

On July 18th McDowell's army reached Centreville. Five miles ahead a small meandering stream, Bull Run, crossed the route of the Union advance, and there guarding the fords from Union Mills to the Stone Bridge, waited Beauregard's Confederates. McDowell hoped to turn their right flank, but the division he sent toward Blackburn's Ford was so sharply repulsed that he abandoned the plan and spent 2 days searching for crossing points north of the Stone Bridge. It was during these 2 days that most of Johnston's men arrived undetected to reinforce Beauregard's ranks.

Leaving brightly burning campfires, the Federal army moved out early on the 21st in long columns that choked the dusty country lanes leading to Bull Run. As Israel B. Richardson faked an attack at Blackburn's Ford and Daniel Tyler demonstrated at the Stone Bridge, the columns of David Hunter and Samuel P. Heintzelman swung wide to the right in a flanking maneuver. The success of McDowell's new plan depended on speed and surprise, both difficult with inexperienced troops. Stumbling through the darkness along narrow roads, the men encountered numerous delays. They were 2 hours late when they reached Sudley Springs Ford about 9:30 a.m.

Meanwhile, back at the Stone Bridge a nearby 30-pounder Parrott boomed out at 5:15 a.m., startling a peaceful countryside and announcing Tyler's attack. This sector of the Confederate line was held by Nathan Evans' small force of 1,400 men, who anxiously awaited an attack that never came. At 8:45 a.m. a Confederate signal officer wig-wagged the warning "Lookout for your left; you are turned" after seeing the glint of the morning sun on a brass fieldpiece in one of McDowell's flanking columns.

Evans left 400 men at the bridge and moved swiftly to Buck Hill behind the Stone House to counter the attack. Soon the Federals splashed across Sudley Springs Ford and

advanced cautiously up the Manassas-Sudley road. At 10:15 a.m., Evans opened fire on Ambrose Burnside's lead brigade. As the Federals pressed the attack, Evans called for reinforcements. Now brigades under Barnard Bee and Francis Bartow moved into the line. When fresh troops under William T. Sherman drove on the Confederate flank about noon, the thin gray line collapsed and the men fled in disorder and confusion across the Warrenton Turnpike. For a moment the Federals were close to victory. But instead of following up his advantage, McDowell slowed the pursuit to regroup his men.

Barnard Bee now valiantly attempted to rally the broken Confederate units on Robinson House Hill. Seeing Jackson's brigade drawn up firm and resolute on Henry Hill, Bee pointed dramatically toward Jackson and shouted: "Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" Just as Stonewall Jackson was winning his name, Johnston and Beauregard galloped onto the field. The colors advanced, and the line stiffened and held.

For the next hour an uneasy lull settled over the field. Then at 2 p.m., as though cued from the wings of a vast outdoor stage, the splendid Union batteries of Ricketts and Griffin pounded up Henry Hill and opened a duel with 13 cannon in Jackson's line 330 yards away. The din lasted about 20 minutes before Griffin advanced two guns to Ricketts' right, opposite Jackson's left flank. The movement proved his undoing, for a few moments later the 33d Virginia regiment, mistaken by the Federals for supporting forces, closed to within 70 yards of the Federal guns. A deadly volley cut down the men and horses of Griffin's battery, and soon both batteries were lost to the Federal command.

Under a burning sun, charges and countercharges swept over the field as both armies fought for possession of the Henry-Robinson Hill plateau, the key to victory. Smoke drifted over a field confused by similarly colored uniforms


and flags. When advance Federal units (Hunter, Heintzelman, and Tyler) failed to break through, McDowell sent Howard's brigade on Chinn Ridge to turn the Confederate left.

The battle now entered a critical stage. Kirby Smith's brigade moved up to block the advance, and Early and other Confederate reserves quickly followed. Outflanked, Howard fell back in disorder. Now Beauregard ordered an attack all along the line. Wildly cheering, the men rushed the crumbling Union defenses. Retreat turned into rout then into panic, as soldier and sightseer alike fled back to Washington. All efforts by McDowell to rally his army proved in vain.


The Confederate victory profoundly influenced the grand strategy of the war. "First, it imbued the Southern politicians with an exaggerated idea of the prowess of their soldiers and so led them to under-estimate the fighting capacity of their enemy," the British military historian J. F. C. Fuller points out; "secondly, it so terrified Lincoln and his Government that from now onwards until 1864, east of the Alleghenies, the defence of Washington became the pivot of Northern strategy."

Once more the Confederates settled down at Centreville. They built quarters and an elaborate network of fortifications, and to observe Federal movements along the Potomac they established outposts such as Munson's Hill. Lincoln and his advisors had the greater task of rebuilding an army. The job was entrusted to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, popular with the ranks, soldierly in bearing, and engaging in manner. By the spring of 1862 he had assembled an army of 100,000 and laid plans to advance on Richmond by another route. Transferring the Army of the Potomac by water from Washington to Fort Monroe on Hampton Roads, he would march up the peninsula toward Richmond and join McDowell's corps coming overland from Fredericksburg. Together they would seize the Confederate Capital. It was work for a giant and McClellan energetically put his hand to it.

July 21, 1861, 12 noon: Fresh Union troops force the collapse of the Confederate morning position on Matthews Hill.



July 21, 1861, 4 p.m.: The last Confederate counterattack drives the Union army into a disorganized retreat.



SECOND MANASSAS

On March 9, 1862, the Confederates abandoned their positions at Centreville and fell back to a new line just south of the Rappahannock to counter McClellan's threat to Richmond. Three and a half months later Robert E. Lee crossed the Chickahominy at the head of the Army of Northern Virginia and, in a series of savage battles, rolled McClellan's blue tide back from the gates of Richmond. Meanwhile, concerned about the defense of Washington, Lincoln merged three armies that had operated without notable success in the Shenandoah Valley and gave command to Maj. Gen. John Pope. His task was to operate against Confederate rail communications at Gordonsville and Charlottesville, thus drawing heavy detachments away from Richmond and relieving pressure on McClellan. When Pope did threaten Gordonsville, Lee divided his army and sent Jackson there on July 13. Before the month was out Pope assumed field command of his 52,000-man army and started down the Orange and Alexandria Railroad toward Gordonsville.

Reinforced by A. P. Hill, Jackson sharply attacked his old foe from the Shenandoah Valley Nathaniel P. Banks at Cedar Mountain near Culpepper on August 9, hoping to destroy Pope's army in detail. Though Banks' corps was crushed for the rest of the campaign, the arrival of Federal reinforcements forced Jackson to pull back.

When Lee learned that McClellan was preparing to evacuate the peninsula and reinforce Pope, he sent James Longstreet to buttress Jackson at Gordonsville. Now with 55,000 men, Lee determined to strike Pope's army—which had shortsightedly taken up positions within the angle formed by the junction of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers—before McClellan could unite with him. Massing his troops behind Clark's Mountain, Lee planned to fall upon Pope's left at Somerville Ford and cut off his retreat to Washington.

Captured orders informed Pope of the movement, and on August 20 he withdrew behind the Rappahannock, where he successfully parried feints and thrusts against his right for 5 days.

Faced with a desperate situation, Lee gambled boldly by sending Jackson on August 25 with 24,000 men on a wide flanking movement around Pope's right to destroy his base at Manassas and cut his communications with Washington. Jackson moved rapidly through Amissville, Orlean, Salem, and Gainesville, covering 51 miles in 2 days, and fell on Manassas Junction with surprise and ferocity. After a day of wild feasting, Jackson burned the Federal supplies and moved to a position along an unfinished railroad on the old field of Bull Run to await the arrival of Longstreet's corps.

From his concealment in the woods north of the Turnpike, Jackson observed King's division of McDowell's corps advancing eastward toward Centreville. To allow them to pass might well forestall the main objective of the campaign, which was to bring Pope to battle before McClellan's reinforcements could reach him. Yet to attack now would likely bring down the weight of Pope's entire army upon his corps before Lee and Longstreet could join him. Jackson hesitated only a moment. Then with the softly spoken order "Bring out your men, gentlemen," he hurled units of Taliaferro's division, later reinforced by Ewell, at the black-hatted brigade of Gen. John Gibbon.

Fighting with a valor that would soon win them the name of "The Iron Brigade," Gibbon's men pushed to the edge of the Brawner Farm. There, supported by two regiments of Doubleday's brigade, they held a line within 100 yards of five Confederate brigades. "For two hours and a half, without an instant's cessation of the most deadly discharges of musketry, round shot, and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and neither broken nor yielding. . . ." As darkness closed on the field, Gibbon slowly withdrew.

That night, Ricketts, who had fallen back after his encounter with Longstreet at Thoroughfare Gap, and King decided

to withdraw toward Manassas. This fateful decision opened the way for Longstreet to unite with Jackson the next day. Pope, meanwhile, misinterpreted Jackson's attack as an effort to cut his way through to Longstreet. Confident of success, he ordered his forces to concentrate to crush Jackson early the next morning. Significantly, though, he made no effort to obstruct Longstreet's advance.

All day on the 29th Pope hammered Jackson's line unmercifully, striking first the Confederate left near Sudley Church with Franz Sigel's corps and then the center in a gallant thrust by Grover. Late in the afternoon Pope called for a simultaneous all-out assault by Kearny against the left, Hatch in the center, and Porter against the right. When Pope issued the order at 4:30 p.m., he was not aware that Longstreet had come up with the main body of his troops and taken position south of the turnpike. Kearny drove back Jackson's left, but reinforcements from Longstreet blocked advances by Hatch and Porter. Again darkness ended the heavy fighting.

Early on the 30th, Pope, still believing that Longstreet had not yet arrived, prepared to bag Jackson before he could retreat. Porter would deliver the main assault, assisted by Hatch on the right and Reynolds on the left. (Shortly after the attack started, Pope transferred Reynolds' division north of the turnpike to help, thus dangerously weakening the Federal left.) About 3 p.m. Porter struck savagely at Jackson's center along the "Deep Cut." In desperate fighting, three successive waves of infantry stormed the Confederate position. Hard pressed, Jackson called for reinforcements. Since dawn Longstreet had anticipated this turn of events. Now he rushed Chapman's and Reilly's batteries forward and caught the blue columns in flank with a devastating fire that broke up the attack.

Snatching a rare opportunity, Lee now counterattacked all along the line. As Jackson assailed the Federals north of the turnpike, Longstreet swept forward across the fields to the south, with Hood's wildly yelling Texans leading and the


divisions of Anderson, Kemper, and D. R. Jones in close support. The attack carried across the rolling hills, Chinn Ridge fell, in spite of a stubborn defense by the brigades of McLean, Tower, and Hartuff, while Jackson's veterans successfully assaulted Buck Hill.

On Henry Hill, poignant with memories of the previous year, stood divisions of Reynolds and Reno and regulars under Sykes. Fighting with a courage that matched the crisis of battle, they successfully repelled Confederate attacks until darkness fell. During the night, Pope, now reinforced by 20,000 fresh troops, retired to Centreville where he took up a strong position.


Two days later, on September 1, Lee was repulsed in attempting to turn Pope's right at Chantilly. Pope then withdrew his weary forces to the safety of Washington's defenses. Few campaigns of the war would provide bolder or more brilliant execution than Lee revealed at Second Manassas, the campaign that launched his first invasion of the North and a bid for foreign intervention. Unlike First Manassas, this had been a clash between seasoned veterans who acquitted themselves with valor and courage.

	FIRST MANASSAS		SECOND MANASSAS	
	FEDERALS	CONFEDERATES	FEDERALS	CONFEDERATES
STRENGTH	35,000	32,000	73,000	55,000
KILLED	460	387	1,747	1,553
WOUNDED	1,124	1,582	8,452	7,812
CAPTURED OR MISSING	1,312	13	4,263	109
TOTAL CASUALTIES	2,896	1,982	14,462	9,474

August 29, 1862, 5 to 8 p.m.: Pope's three-pronged attack on Jackson fails because he misinterpreted the true Confederate position.



August 30, 1862, 3 to 5 p.m.: After repulsing Porter at the Deep Cut, Lee launches a swift and decisive counterattack.



Cries of the wounded sounded here at the Stone House during both battles.



Pierre G. T. Beauregard



Thomas J. Jackson



Robert E. Lee



Robinson House, home of a free Negro, became a Confederate rallying point in the first battle.



Irvin McDowell



Joseph E. Johnston



John Pope



These young Confederates were bound for Manassas when photographed in Richmond in 1861.



The opening shots of First Manassas were fired at the Stone Bridge. It was destroyed 8 months later.



McDowell's flanking march during the first battle carried him across Sudley Springs Ford.

