

Note: This is an alternative text that may be considered in place of the chapters TRIUMPH AND DISCORD and A COLONY IN CRISIS.

When the Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years War in the autumn of 1763, men in Massachusetts Bay and the other North American colonies partook of the pride that Englishmen throughout the Empire felt in the defeat of France, the champion of absolutism and ancient foe. Thousands of them had left shop and farm to shoulder a musket in the "French War" and had shared with the men from the Mother Country the days of boredom, defeat, and victory. Now they were home secure from the French threat that had loomed over the thin line of English colonies for longer than the oldest man remembered. Crown Point, Ticonderoga, Oswego, and Fort Pitt were household words, and long winter evenings and muster days were enlivened by old soldiers' tales. On April 19, 1775, veteran Capt. John Parker, "commander of the Militia" in Lexington, Massachusetts, ordered Sgt. William Munroe to form his men, a number of whom had fought with their captain in the colonial wars, to face a British force on its way to seize colonial supplies at Concord. Later that same day, other men who had served in Britain's wars killed fellow-Britons in Concord, Lincoln, and every town between Lexington and Charlestown.

What had happened during the eleven and a half years that separated the moment of imperial triumph and the day of Lexington and Concord? The answer is complex because the American Revolution was not an ordinary revolution; and the men who made it were not stock revolutionaries. "In other revolutions, the sword has been drawn by the arm of offended freedom, under an oppression that threatened the vital powers of society," wrote William Van Murray in 1787. But this was not the case in 1775. There was none of the tyranny that has so often driven men into rebellion. The Americans were not oppressed with shackles to cast off. They were freer than any people in the eighteenth century. What is more, they knew that they were free.

Yet a revolution had been in the making for several years. But how can it be justified and explained? If its origins did not lay the usual passions and conflicts that have characterized other revolutions, what were they? One member of the revolutionary generation, Edmund Randolph, wrote that it was a revolution "without an immediate oppression, without a cause depending so much on hasty feeling as upon theoretic reasoning." Emotions there were a plenty,

but behind them, molding and channeling them, were reasoned, rational theories that addressed themselves, to a degree rarely paralleled, to the fundamental questions of men's relations with government. What produced the climate in which such "theoretic reasoning" thrived so that, as one contemporary put it, even "peasants and their housewives in every part of the land" had begun "to dispute on politics and positively to determine upon our liberties"? The answers lie in the events that produced a decade of controversy.

Great Britain emerged from her imperial contest with France as the world's most powerful state with a far-flung empire, an exhausted treasury, and a national debt of unprecedented proportions. With no immediate foreign challengers, her leaders turned their attention to consolidating and reforming the empire's administration and making it more nearly self-sufficient. However, every ministerial plan for integrating the older American colonies into the imperial fabric ran afoul some colonial interest or principle.

Relations between Britain and the Americans were profoundly affected by the conditions under which the colonies had developed. Official oversight by the government in

Westminster had been so limited and spasmodic that the colonists were accustomed to a large degree of self-government. The assemblies vigorously asserted that they were competent to legislate for internal affairs, including the right to levy provincial taxes and control the colony's purse. Most politically conscious Americans were "jealous" of their rights, even when they were not unanimous in agreeing just what those rights were. British failure to understand this product of "salutary neglect" caused the bonds of imperial affinity to begin to unravel at the moment of triumph. Tension between England and her colonies had existed with varying intensity throughout the colonial period. Relations between royal, civil, and military officials and the colonial legislatures were frequently strained by mutual suspicion and impatience. Commercial regulations annoyed Americans who believed that they were being discriminated against; however, colonial evasion of the full force of such regulations through bribery, smuggling, and the frequent refusal of juries to convict violations frustrated efforts to make mercantilism work effectively. But if there were irritants, there were also strong ties of sentiment and interest. Shared cultural, legal, and political traditions were powerful forces for unity. While economic regulations limited some forms of colonial development, other segments of the American economy, such as shipbuilders, merchant seamen, distillers, and planters of flax and

tobacco, benefited from British protection and encouragement. British military and naval power played a decisive role in protecting the colonists from the Spanish, French, and Indians. Emotional bonds also existed, often reinforced by continued contacts with relatives and friends "at home." The years following 1764 witnessed a derangement of this balance between tensions and loyalties and led from local, limited resistance to revolution.

The same year that marked the end of the French and Indian war witnessed the inauguration of a fateful British venture into the explosive area of frontier regulation. In an effort to provide for the orderly settlement of western lands, the King issued the Proclamation of 1763 that imposed a temporary limit on white occupation west of a line that ran along the crest of the Appalachians. The Proclamation violated the common-sense American belief, amounting to an article of faith, that white men were destined to occupy and exploit vacant lands and that the Indians must be driven away or destroyed. Settlers, land speculators, and fur traders competed for the new lands, but they agreed in opposing any form of regulation, especially if it emanated from London, that limited their freedom of action.

Closely associated with the decision to take a more active part in regulating the frontier was the Ministry's decision to station 10,000 soldiers in North America. The Americans argued that, with the French threat removed, such a force was unneeded and that it would be used as an imperial police force and a threat to civil liberties. There was another, ultimately more fateful ramification: funds had to be found to pay for the American garrisons. Although the British public debt amounted to approximately \$140,000,000, including more than \$1,150,000 appropriated to reimburse the colonies for wartime expenditures, no responsible British official proposed that any part of the debt should be paid by the Americans. However, all parties in England agreed that the colonies should share the costs of their defense; and the search for ways to make them contribute produced policies and legislation that led to the American Revolution.

When the Cabinet and Parliament attempted to tighten enforcement of the Acts of Trade and to raise more revenue through the Sugar, Currency, and Stamp Acts, they did not anticipate the vehement colonial opposition that quickly shattered their optimism. American opposition took four forms that became characteristic of colonial resistance

during the next decade: legalistic-political arguments, economic counteraction; propaganda; and mob violence. Their colonial opponents appealed to the principles of the British Constitution and convened the Stamp Act Congress to counter the legal basis of the parliamentary acts. Not content with these forms of opposition, they resorted to non-importation agreements that boycotted goods taxed by the Sugar Act and refused to permit the issue of the stamps required by the Stamp Act. American writers flooded the reading public with pamphlets and broadsides that attacked the new policy with appeals to reason and emotion. Opposition did not stop there. Organized mob action led by 'Sons of Liberty' used violence and intimidation to frustrate execution of the laws and overawe loyalist supporters of Parliament's authority.

The Greenville ministry that had authored the hated acts fell, but its successor fared no better. Americans greeted the Townshend Revenue Act and the creation of the vice-admiralty courts with an even more fundamental attack upon the foundations of the Empire.

The establishment of the vice-admiralty courts rounded out the creation of an administrative system for the American colonies. This system was based upon the constitutional concept that imperial sovereignty did not reside in the Crown, nor in the House of Lords, nor in Commons, but in all three functioning jointly in Parliament. This meant that the "King's High Court of Parliament," which for almost a century had possessed ultimate authority in the British Isles, was also supreme in the dominions beyond the realm, replacing the older doctrine that the Crown could govern within the colonies without interference from Parliament. The constitutional change that had evolved since the period of British Commonwealth and Revolution of 1688 to the point where effective sovereignty resided in Parliament, first at home and now throughout the Empire.

This constitutional evolution had included legislation and judicial acts that advanced and secured the civil rights of subjects and established a political system that, with all its iniquities and abuses, formed the basis for representation and responsible government. But the extension of parliamentary authority to the colonies did not have the same happy effect on their liberties. They could not be effectively represented in the House of Commons; and without active participation, conflicting American and imperial interests were bound to collide.

Parliament's attempts to legislate for the Empire were accompanied by centralizing moves that militated against traditional local rights, of which the broad extension of the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts at the expense of the common law courts in America was an example. Moreover, to insure the execution of imperial policy, not only were the more important colonial officials — most governors and councilors and all fiscal and customs officers, as well as all vice-admiralty judges - appointed by the Crown and Ministry, but also most laws passed by colonial assemblies had to be submitted to the Privy Council, which possessed the power of disallowance or veto. The Privy Council also exercised the right to review cases appealed from colonial courts.

Contemporaneous with the evolution of Parliament's power, the American colonies experienced a growth in population, wealth, and political experience. As they matured, their people became less English and more American. This growing sense of identity clashed with the centralization of the Empire. The provincial ~~new~~ assemblies were the most important agencies for the expression of resistance to imperial policy; and at the same time Parliament was becoming supreme in the Empire, important conceptions of parliamentary privilege developed within the assemblies paralleling those that had attended the

rise of legislative supremacy in England. By 1774 the colonial assemblies claimed complete local legislative autonomy. Thus two institutions that were products of English concepts of responsible self-government became vehicles of a conflict of fundamental values and interests.

While British and colonial leaders engaged in a great long-distance constitutional debate, the effectiveness of British imperial administration suffered irreparable damage. Americans violated and evaded the terms of those acts that seemed inimical to their interests with little fear that they would be successfully prosecuted. Mobs thwarted the execution of the law, attacked the persons and property of unpopular officials and their supporters with the knowledge that local juries would neither indict nor convict. These conditions were widespread; but Massachusetts, and especially Boston, were seen as the "head of rebellion."

Although the radical leaders in Boston denied that there was a real breakdown in public order, others believed by the summer of 1768 that a state of virtual anarchy existed. The government in Westminster, alarmed by the breakdown of civil authority, ordered four regiments of infantry to Boston.

But this only compounded the problems of governing British subjects who refused to admit to the legitimacy of Parliament's rule. In the first place, troops could be employed as police only at the request of the civil authorities, and no local official dared invoke their aid. The colonial radicals knew this, and exploited the situation with demagogic skill. Disputes over quartering the troops led to scattering the soldiers in several buildings, causing a breakdown in discipline and frequent confrontations between soldiers and civilians. Local justice was not impartial in dealing with ^{cases} arising from these confrontations. Townsmen were rarely charged, magistrates often refused to accept the unsupported testimony of soldiers, fined them heavily, and upon failure to pay, bound them out to civilians. Low morale and impaired discipline were reflected in desertions, drunkenness, and prostitution. Colonial non-consumption and non-importation caused an economical depression that compounded all social problems.

While Bostonians and soldiers faced one another across barriers of hostility and distrust, the members of the British Ministry faced a harsh dilemma. The Townshend duties that had been levied to lighten the heavy burden of the British taxpayer, had by the spring of 1769 brought in no more than \$3,500, while colonial non-importation and non-consumption agreements had

produced a loss in trade of ^{£700,000}~~£7,000,000~~ in one year. Most men in public life were convinced that attempting to collect the duties in the face of colonial opposition was economically and politically unwise. At the same time, they were equally certain that the government could not retreat without jeopardizing the Empire.

William Pitt, the political hero of the war with France, had again succeeded as Prime Minister, but he was temperamentally unfitted for the role of a peacetime premier, and his physical and mental health soon made him incapable of exercising leadership. He gradually faded from the political scene and resigned the Privy Seal in October 1768.

The new titular head of the Cabinet, the Duke of Grafton, was a well-intended mediocrity who could not command the support of his colleagues, and he resigned in frustration in January 1770. The only available man who enjoyed public and parliamentary respect was Townshend's successor as Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Frederick North, who as First Lord of the Treasury, became the head of the Ministry, a post he occupied against his own wishes throughout the American Revolution.

The critical parliamentary debates of 1769 thus took place during a period when the Government was practically leaderless and when any real hope of realizing revenue from America had disappeared. Faced by the recognition of the unwelcome, but inexorable fact of the failure of the revenue system, Parliament repealed the duties, except for the one on tea that was retained to vindicate the principle expressed in the Declaratory Act of 1766: that Parliament possessed the right to legislate for the Empire.

American political thought had undergone a fundamental change from the day when London's right to regulate trade and levy external duties had been acknowledged. Constitutional distinctions over internal and external duties had disappeared; and Benjamin Franklin was only slightly in advance of his fellows when he concluded that the colonies were separate states with sovereign rights - even in their relations with England with whom they shared a common King, but whose Parliament had no authority over them.

A deceptive quiet prevailed in Massachusetts Bay in mid-1765; and the commanding general in North America, Thomas Gage, decided to transfer two of the four regiments at Boston to

Halifax, Nova Scotia. He even considered withdrawing the remaining units. The Bostonians were elated. Prudence had paid off, and Franklin's prediction that if Boston would avoid provoking a crisis "this military cloud that now blusters over you, will pass away, and do you no more harm than a Summer Thunder Shower," seemed sound. Even the radical "Journal of the Times" ceased publication, as though the quarrel with England were ended.

But the members of the colony's House of Representatives did not even try to avoid a crisis. Instead, on July 1 they unanimously resolved that "no man can be taxed or bound in Conscience to obey any Law, to which he has not given his Consent, in Person, or by his Representative." Although the resolution's final text was watered down, the original received wider publication, and the issue of the constitutional relationship between colony and Empire was revived. The two regiments remained in Boston, Royal Governor Bernard was recalled to London, and learned, native-born Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson took over the colony's administration. Hutchinson knew his fellow-countrymen and correctly divined the changes that had occurred in their political thinking when he wrote in his classic The History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay from the Year 1749, until June 1774:

At first, indeed the supreme authority (of Parliament) seemed to be admitted, the cases of taxes only excepted; but the exceptions gradually extended from one case to another, until it included all cases whatsoever. A profession of "subordination," however, still remained; it was a word without any precise meaning to it.

If what the political active colonist meant by subordination was not clear, one thing was - that by early 1770 effective government had virtually ceased to exist in Massachusetts.

Hutchinson realized more clearly than the King and Ministry that the soldiers in Boston could not bolster the civil authority. Yet he dared not take the responsibility for their removal. So they remained, the all too visible symbols of an unpopular authority, and the vulnerable targets of the town's resentments and frustrations. Like Englishmen everywhere, the Bostonians had an ancient distrust of professional soldiers. Then too, the position of the soldiers differed from that of their European counterparts. Their conduct was circumscribed by law and custom, and they could not function as a police agency unless martial law were declared, and British officials were most reluctant to resort to that extreme. Dragging subjects was rarely tolerated.

Boston's inhabitants recognized and exploited the soldier's vulnerability. When they thought that all the regiments were about to withdraw, they harassed the men, perhaps to speed their

departure or to vent their dislike for the government. When it was obvious that the 14th and 29th Regiments were remaining, the pressure intensified. The commanding officer, Colonel Dalrymple lived in constant fear of an outbreak of violence, while local radicals urged that the time of prudent restraint was past and that only direct action would get the soldiers out of town.

As incidents multiplied, the conviction grew on both sides that justice could not be obtained without violence, and a condition perilously close to gang warfare existed in Boston's streets. Then on March 5, 1772, the event that entered history and legend as the "Boston Massacre" brought the situation to a bloody climax. A lawless street mob goaded a squad of confused, frightened, and angry soldiers into firing upon them, killing three civilians outright and mortally wounded two more.

During the week that followed, while the soldiers and the officer in charge awaited trial, the Sons of Liberty controlled the town, and both parties attempted to capitalize upon the riot's propaganda potential. The

local radicals were the more successful. Samuel Adams orchestrated a demonstration on the 8th, the day of the victims' funeral, that left an indelible imprint upon American mythology. Crispus attacks, alias Michael Johnson, whom contemporaries knew as a waterfront ruffian; Samuel Maverick; sailor James Caldwell; and rope-maker Samuel Gray : were transformed into martyrs to American liberties. Agonized negotiations led to the withdrawal of the troops to Castle William in the harbor. Capt. Thomas Preston and the soldiers were tried for murder. Their counsels were John Adams and Josiah Quincy. Preston and four soldiers were acquitted. Two were found guilty of manslaughter, but were released after pleading "benefit of clergy" and being branded on their right thumbs. Samuel Adams and his fellow-radicals made the Massacre" a milestone on the road to revolution.

The troops' removal to Castle William was a major victory for Boston's whigs', and they exploited the victory in the May 15 town meeting with a new set of instructions to their representatives in the General Assembly. To the earlier denial

~~To the earlier denial~~ of Parliament's power to legislate for the colony they added the more revolutionary rejection of the right of the King and Ministry to issue binding instructions to the governor. The claims for colonial autonomy produced a new glossary of terms. "State House" replaced "Town House" or "Court House." "The house of representatives of Massachusetts Bay" became "his majesty's commons." The statutes became "the laws of the land" instead of "the province's laws," and, significantly, the colony's "charter" was now its "compact."

Victory was made sweeter by the news that on the very day of the "Massacre" Parliament had repealed all the Townshend duties, except the one on tea.

The three years that followed the summer of 1770 were relatively quiet ones. The spirit of resistance was still alive, but the major grievances that had united the colonists in opposition to parliament's imperial policies had been removed. Colonial radicals found it hard to find new popular issues. Samuel Adams and his confederates did what they could to keep the agitation alive with an annual service memorializing the

"Massacre's" victims, but in the absence of overt acts of parliamentary authority, most of the people did not rally to the old issues. Non-importation had failed, and revival of trade stimulated the colonial economy. A general prosperity prevailed. Poor harvests in Europe created or greatly increased demand for American grain. Shipbuilding prospered; and specie arrived from England to buy colonial products. The Gaspee affair, ministerial resolutions to pay governors from royal exchequer funds, and other irritants failed to reverse a general relaxing of tensions. But the fundamental questions raised in the 1760s were still unanswered.

The radical whigs could not view the period with the equanimity of the average American. Every day of calm strengthened the Ministry and weakened the colonists' cause. Prosperity dulled vigilance for colonial freedom. Adams and his supporters believed that if the imperial system were allowed to continue on its course colonial liberties would eventually erode away. But they needed a spectacular, emotional issue that would arouse Americans from their complacency.

In May 1773 Parliament provided this issue by passing the Tea Act. Radicals and merchants united in denouncing this new exercise of parliamentary authority that was all the more obnoxious because of its monopolistic favoring of the ailing East India Company. Americans reacted in various ways, but Boston's Sons of Liberty, thinly disguised as Mohawk Indians and followed by a large crowd, boarded three tea ships moored at Griffin's wharf and destroyed about \$18,000 worth of tea.

The "Boston Tea Party" accomplished Sam Adams' purpose. It goaded Lord North's ministry into a showdown on the naked issue of power, which was precisely what Boston's radical whigs wanted. British reaction was swift and fateful. It was also the product of the failure of British leadership to understand that the older continental colonies had, in reality if not in theory, become states within the Empire that would no longer tolerate being treated as immature dependencies. Where the British Government had tried to rule by consent, it now resorted to rule by coercion. But the new formula had first to be applied, not to all the colonies but rather against one, the leader of resistance.

In a sense, the British response was the inevitable product of history. The colonies had not retreated one iota on the constitutional issue of parliamentary supremacy. Now the issue was joined: a subordinate unit was defying the imperial system, setting itself up as the ultimate judge of what was constitutional and challenging the concept of imperial unity. Once the question of whether ultimate sovereignty resided in the Empire or its constituent parts was raised, it had to be answered.

Coercion took the form of three acts that Americans called the "Intolerable Acts." The Boston Port Bill closed that city to maritime commerce until the East India Company had been reimbursed for deprivations of the Tea Party and transferred the customs house temporarily to Salem. The Government of Massachusetts Act made the council appointive as in other royal colonies and gave the governor exclusive power to appoint and dismiss all inferior law officers, including local judges and sheriffs. It also limited the functions of the town meeting and altered the method of selecting jurors. The administration of Justice Act protected royal officials by providing that those accused of capital offenses in the performance of their duties might, at the governor's discretion, be tried in another colony or in England.

While the extension of the Quartering and Quebec Acts to colonies were not integral parts of the coercive system, the colonists viewed them as such. The former was intended to end the type of disputes that had arisen over whether troops stationed in a colony must be assigned to barracks if their presence away from them was required. It provided that soldiers might be quartered by the governor's orders in uninhabited houses, outbuildings, barns, or other buildings that were more suitably located for a particular purpose. The Quebec Act extended the boundaries of the Province of Canada, created in 1763, to include those French speaking settlements in the Ohio Valley and Illinois Country that under the terms of the Proclamation of 1763 had been left without provision for a civil government. It also provided that the French civil law, with some modifications, would be retained along with English criminal law. The Test Act, which excluded Roman Catholics from office, was waived in favor of an oath of allegiance. Finally, the legality of the Roman Catholic religion within the province was recognized, and the right of the Church to collect tithes was confirmed.

The colonists naturally viewed the coercive acts as obvious and irrefutable proof of Parliament's intention to destroy provincial autonomy and violate the most precious

rights of free Englishmen. They saw in the extension of the Quartering Act a move toward using the army as a police force. To most Americans, especially the overwhelmingly Protestant New Englanders, the Quebec Act threatened both religious freedom and legal rights. This coupled with persistent rumors that a Church of England episcopate would be established in America roused the time-honored Puritan hatred for prelacy and all its works.

By this time, most politically conscious Americans were convinced that a conspiracy against colonial liberty was behind the policies of the British Ministry, and they judged every act of Parliament in that light. The old bonds that united the Mother Country and her colonies were dissolving under the stress of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. The Empire's subjects were no longer one people - they were British and Americans. The Intolerable Acts had made the Revolution all but inevitable.

For most Americans this was an unwelcomed situation. In spite of all the conflicts and distrusts, old loyalties died hard, and most men hoped that some solution could be worked out that would at once preserve colonial liberties and the Empire. As positions, crystallized and the logic of events

moved toward revolution, men of good will went through the agonizing experience of choosing between two precious systems of loyalties that had so much in common and yet were divided by a basic constitutional conflict.

Britain's coercive policy aimed at isolating Massachusetts. It failed completely. Proposals for an intercolonial congress came from various provinces; and on May 27 members of Virginia's General Assembly issued a call for such a meeting. On June 17 the Massachusetts House of Representatives proposed that a congress convene in Philadelphia during September; and by the end of August, every colony except Georgia named delegates.

The First Continental Congress that convened in Carpenter's Hall in Philadelphia on September 5 met, not to proclaim independence, but to secure colonial autonomy within the British Empire. Because it was an extra - legal body whose members were chosen by provincial assemblies or popular conventions, the most conservative parts of colonial society were not represented. With this exception, the delegates represented a fair cross-section of American opinion. There were moderates like George Washington and John Dickinson, radicals like the Adamses and Richard Henry Lee, and conservatives like John Jay and Joseph Galloway. The membership totaled 55 - large enough to encompass diversity,

small enough to encourage genuine debate and effective action.

The membership included many able men, and their political skills were from the beginning severely tested. They had to project an image of sufficient firmness to persuade or frighten the Ministry into granting concessions and at the same time avoid a 'spirit of independency' that would alarm conservatives. The character of the Congress was made manifest when conservative Joseph Galloway introduced his truly revolutionary Plan of Union that proposed the establishment of a American government with a legislative council, composed of representatives chosen by the colonial assemblies, and a President appointed by the Crown. While it would be inferior to Parliament in that the latter would have authority to regulate all criminal, civil, commercial, and police matters affecting more than one colony and had the right to veto any parliamentary act affecting the colonies.

While the Congress was debating the Plan of Union, Paul Revere arrived with Dr. Joseph Warren's Suffolk Resolves that declared the coercive act unconstitutional, urged Massachusetts to establish a new government, and called upon the Congress to adopt commercial sanctions against Great Britain. By a majority of one colony, the Congress voted to shelve Galloway's proposal and endorsed the Resolves.

The Congress then proceeded to adopt a series of retaliatory measures, including non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption enforced by a Continental Association. Having agreed to this economic counteroffensive, the members passed a Declaration of Rights and Grievances directed to their fellow-subjects at home and in the colonies and addressed a petition to the King. On October 22, after resolving to meet again the following May if their grievances had not been redressed, the Congress adjourned.

By early 1775, three of the leading American political thinkers, James Wilson, author of Considerations on the Authority of Parliament; Thomas Jefferson, who wrote Summary View; and John Adams in his Novanglus, had propounded a federal solution to the problem of liberty versus authority within the Empire, a solution that anticipated the theory of self-governing dominions. It is one of the ironies of history that this solution, which the British government dismissed as unthinkable in 1775, was the basis upon which Parliament proposed to make peace in 1778.

VIGNETTE

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

(To Accompany a Cartographic Rendering)

In 1775 Great Britain's possessions included its original seaboard colonies, the lands of the Hudson Bay Company, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, the regions ceded by France and Spain in 1763, and Bermuda and the West Indies.

Of the older provinces, eight were royal colonies; two, Connecticut and Rhode Island, were charter; Maryland and Pennsylvania, which shared its governor with the Delaware counties, were proprietary. They differed in important ways from other contemporary and more recent European colonies in important particulars. In the first place, a majority of the colonists were of English stock; and they brought their legal and political institutions with them. While the Indians and Blacks were excluded from provincial political life, non-British immigrants, even when they preserved their languages and customs, enjoyed the same rights and immunities as those of English stock. Although the colonies' economic interests were subordinated to Britain's in cases of conflict, there was an ideal of mutuality that was absent in most colonial empires. American dissatisfaction with the operation of the British Empire not

based upon racial grievances born of feeling among the colonists that they were an oppressed people suffering the tyranny of an alien conqueror. Their grievances and the resulting revolution grew out of a conviction that they no longer enjoyed in full measure the rights to which free Englishmen were entitled. The revolution they made was unique because the empire against which they revolted had been unique. Other men in other times were inspired by their example, but they could duplicate neither their revolution nor the nation to which it gave birth.