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**THE BATTLE OF GLORIETA PASS:
ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE CIVIL WAR**

DAVID WESTPHALL

THE CIVIL WAR in the Territory of New Mexico culminated in the battle of Glorieta Pass, which took place near Santa Fe on March 28, 1862. The battle, although almost forgotten today, is important because it deprived the Confederacy of four potential advantages which could have altered the course of the War between the States.

A Confederate victory at Glorieta Pass would have meant not only the addition of New Mexico to the Confederacy, but would also have opened the way for the Confederate conquest of the American West, including Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California. Arizona was already under Confederate control. The addition of this territory would have more than doubled the size of the Confederacy, and assured it sufficient area for national settlement, economic development, and the expansion and strengthening of slavery. Moreover, the resulting prestige could have brought the European diplomatic recognition which the South coveted. During this early part of the war France and England were even more sympathetic toward the South than they were when Lee made his bid at Gettysburg for, among other things, diplomatic recognition.

A victory at Glorieta Pass would have opened the way to the gold fields of Colorado and California. Because of the Northern blockade, the South was not able to use its chief resource, cotton, to finance the war as planned. Nevertheless the Confederacy put forth stiff resistance. If the South had had funds to match its sterling military talent, who knows what the result would have been? If a Confederate victory at Glorieta Pass had opened the road to

the western gold fields, the Union would have been deprived of one of its most important sources of war-making ability. With the Confederacy controlling twelve hundred miles of Pacific shoreline, the Union blockade which strangled the South would have become much more difficult to maintain and much less effective.¹ The South could have exported its cotton again, and imported arms and other necessary supplies. The South would have had a chance to develop an effective navy, instead of a smattering of raiders launched from British and French ports.

Of the four potential advantages to the South, the last two are the most important. Had the Confederacy been able to seize the gold fields and the coast, the flow of gold, which Lincoln called "the life-blood of our financial credit,"² would have been diverted from Washington to Richmond, and "the oceans would have swarmed with *Alabamas*."³

New Mexico was the geographic key to the surrounding areas, and to the eventual conquest of California. The invasion was assigned to Texas, and by October 31, 1861, about three thousand frontiersmen and Indian fighters had assembled at San Antonio for the march to Fort Bliss, near El Paso, and the advance up the Rio Grande into New Mexico.⁴

The South had several reasons for believing the Texans would be successful in New Mexico. The commander of the invasion force, Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, was a graduate of West Point with a distinguished record including service in the Seminole and Mexican Wars.⁵ Equally important, he had recently served with the Union Army in New Mexico and was familiar with the territory. The troops sent into New Mexico were frontiersmen schooled in Indian warfare and inured to hardship. Some of them were veterans of the Mexican War. Many of them brought their own horses and weapons for the campaign, and all knew how to ride and shoot.

Southerners believed that the Apache and Navajo would keep Federal troops busy and divert them from the campaign. There were never enough troops in New Mexico to control the Indians, and as the Civil War approached the Indians seemed to sense that the

whites were quarreling among themselves, and their raids became even more numerous than before.

The Confederacy believed that there were many Southern sympathizers in New Mexico. The Territory's delegate to Congress, Miguel A. Otero, expressed a pro-Southern viewpoint which became even more pronounced after his marriage to a lady from South Carolina. New Mexico's governor and territorial secretary were from North Carolina, and the Territory's military commander was from Mississippi. Several prominent New Mexico newspapers disseminated a pro-Southern point of view. New Mexico had commercial ties with pro-slavery Missouri, and most of the traders who came into New Mexico over the Santa Fe Trail were from the South. In 1859, after Southern friends had made the suggestion to Governor Otero,⁶ New Mexico had enacted a stringent slave code.

The Confederates believed that they had support in other areas of the Southwest. A convention at Tucson had already declared for the South. Northern sympathizers in Arizona had fled into Mexico, and Arizona had become a Confederate territory. In California Federal troops were used more than once to break up secessionist rallies, and it was estimated that as many as thirty thousand men would have taken up arms for the South at the approach of a strong Confederate force.⁷ In the newly formed territory of Colorado the situation was similar. On October 26, 1861, while the Texans were marching from San Antonio, Governor William Gilpin wrote a friend: "The malignant secession element of this Territory has numbered 7,500. It has been ably and secretly organized from November last, and requires extreme and extraordinary measures to meet and control its onslaught. . . . To prepare for what may be accomplished by them is my duty."⁸ In Utah the United States government was persecuting the Mormons for their practice of polygamy, and the South believed that the Mormons would welcome a chance to aid the enemies of their tormentors.

For these reasons, when the Texans advanced into New Mexico from Fort Bliss their prospects for success seemed good. The Territory's southern governor and military commander had been replaced, but this did little to dim Confederate hopes. On February

21, 1862, the Confederate Army of New Mexico met a Federal force of about 1,200 regulars and 2,600 native militia and volunteers at Valverde in southern New Mexico. The Federal troops were led by the Territory's new military commander, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, brother-in-law of the Confederate commander, General Sibley.

The engagement began when the Confederate advance guard tried to cross the Valverde ford from the east to the west bank of the Rio Grande, but was driven back by a Federal detachment. Soon both armies were concentrated at the ford and a full-scale battle was in progress. Under cover of their superior artillery, which drove the Confederate guns from the field, the Federal infantry crossed the river to the east bank; then the guns came across and took up a position in the Federal lines. Confederate dragoons and lancers⁹ charged several times, but under the deadly Federal fire the screams of wounded horses mingled with the groans of their riders. Colonel Canby ordered a charge to complete what appeared to be a Federal victory when about a thousand Texans on foot climbed from an old channel of the Rio Grande where they had taken refuge from the Yankee artillery. Armed with rifles, pistols, shotguns, and bowie knives, their determination reinforced by desperate thirst, they hurled themselves at the key Union battery. Cannister and grape ripped gaps in their onrushing ranks, but the Texans pressed forward to the battery and overwhelmed it in a savage hand-to-hand struggle. "Never," reported a Confederate officer, "were double-barrelled shotguns . . . used with better effect."¹⁰ The gunners fought back bravely with pistols and ramming staffs, but most of them were killed. The Confederates now turned the captured guns on the supporting infantry who, terror-stricken by the rebel yells and the slaughter of the gunners, fled into the Rio Grande "more like a herd of frightened mustangs than like men."¹¹ Many of them were killed as they tried to wade across, and a correspondent for the Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph* described the Rio Grande as "literally dyed with blood."¹² Although he may have exaggerated, in relation to the numbers involved, the

hard-fought Confederate victory at Valverde was possibly the most lethal battle of the Civil War.¹³

The Confederate invasion of New Mexico had started off successfully, but for several reasons it was destined to fail. The Confederate dependence on the Indians as inadvertent allies worked in reverse. According to the Confederate plan, the invading army would be self-sustaining, without a supply line reaching back into Texas, and despite a large supply train the Texans expected to rely heavily on New Mexico sheep and cattle for food. But with an invasion imminent, Canby had decided to let the civilians fend for themselves, and as a consequence the Indians had ravaged the countryside. After the campaign Sibley wrote: "The indispensable element, food, cannot be relied on. During the last year, and pending recent operations, hundreds of thousands of sheep have been driven off by the Navajo Indians."¹⁴

Because of lack of discipline the Texans alienated the native population. Sibley's official policy was to treat the natives with restraint and to pay them for any provisions confiscated. Sibley's troops were hard fighters, but even after rigorous training at San Antonio, they lacked the discipline of the professionals under Sibley's command. They let their horses graze in the "Mexican" wheat fields, saying that they just happened to "get loose." No amount of extra duty could cure them of this. On nights of bitter cold many of the soldiers forced their way into the New Mexicans' adobe homes and crowded the families into one room or evicted them altogether. The Texans simply took whatever they wanted. In answer to Federal charges, a Confederate soldier insisted in later years that no woman was "appropriated" without her consent.¹⁵ In any case, an indifferent native population¹⁶ soon became intensely hostile toward the invaders. The arrogance of the Texans, who had nothing but contempt for "Mexicans," renewed an enmity which had its roots in the Texas War for Independence in 1836 and in an abortive Texas invasion of New Mexico in 1841 to enforce boundary claims. The Texans soon learned that with only twenty-two Negro slaves in the territory¹⁷ the New Mexicans had little in-



terest in slavery, and that any strong pro-Southern feeling in the territory was the result of an Anglo-Saxon minority vocal out of all proportion to its strength. The slave code of 1859 had resulted from the efforts of this minority and a few politically ambitious New Mexicans like Otero. When the crisis came, Otero, who believed that the war would end in several independent republics in the West, urged his fellow New Mexicans to remain neutral, then join the strongest after the war.¹⁸ Most New Mexicans, who wanted nothing better than to be left in peace, concurred, but the behavior of the Texans stirred them from their apathy. After the Texans had been in New Mexico a short time, any herds and flocks that had not been run off by Indians were driven elsewhere by their owners when the invaders approached.

The vigorous action of Colorado's Governor Gilpin not only effectively suppressed Southern sympathizers in that Territory, but a force of 916 volunteers, mostly Denver miners, was raised and sent into New Mexico. In California too, secessionists were controlled, and troops were raised and shipped around Cape Horn to join the Federal armies in the east. In addition, although they arrived too late to do any fighting, a force of some 1,400 California Volunteers made an extraordinary march across the Colorado and Gila deserts with the intention of saving New Mexico for the Union.¹⁹ However it was the First Colorado Regiment of Volun-

teers commanded by Colonel John P. Slough,²⁰ a Denver lawyer, which proved decisive in stopping the Confederate invasion of New Mexico. In order to arm and equip the regiment, and also to keep weapons out of the hands of potential rebels, Governor Gilpin purchased all the available firearms in the Territory and paid for them with drafts on the Federal treasury. He also jailed all known Southern sympathizers. Perhaps more than any other single person, Gilpin was responsible for the Confederate defeat in New Mexico. An officer of the First Colorado said Gilpin's actions "proved to be the salvation of this country [Colorado] from the hands of the rebels."²¹ Ironically, Gilpin was recalled to Washington and dismissed for issuing unauthorized drafts.

A final reason for the Confederate failure was the battle of Glorieta Pass itself. After the Confederate victory at Valverde the Federal army took refuge at Fort Craig near the battlefield. The Confederates wanted the supplies at Fort Craig, but did not have heavy enough artillery to attack the fort's earthworks. By going north they at least cut the fort's supply line, so they continued up the Rio Grande, hoping to find supplies at Albuquerque. There the small garrison had burned what they could not carry away and retreated to Santa Fe. The Confederates followed them to Santa Fe, still hoping to find supplies. The Santa Fe garrison also destroyed everything they were unable to take with them, and retreated to Fort Union, the last Federal stronghold in New Mexico. The Confederates entered the capital unopposed and prepared to march on Fort Union, about fifty miles northeast of Santa Fe, which they believed was only weakly defended.

Meanwhile, the First Colorado had hurried into New Mexico by forced marches, making sixty-seven miles in one twenty-four hour period. After resting at Fort Union, Colonel Slough added 336 regulars from the fort to his 916 Colorado Volunteers, and advanced on Santa Fe. At Bernal Springs he dispatched Major John M. Chivington²² with 210 cavalry and 180 infantry to proceed ahead of the main body and raid Santa Fe. Chivington was to march as far as he could that day, remain encamped the next day, then the next night continue to Santa Fe and surprise what Slough

apparently believed was a small Confederate force occupying the town. About twelve o'clock that night Chivington's force reached Kozlowski's ranch near the old Pecos ruins, where they learned from the owner that Confederate scouts were about five miles ahead at Pigeon's ranch²³ near the eastern entrance of Glorieta Pass. While the rest of the men encamped for the night Lieutenant Nelson and twenty cavalrymen were sent ahead with orders to bring back a prisoner. They returned about dawn with four well-armed and mounted Texans who, in the darkness, had mistaken the patrol for their own comrades and were easily captured. Chivington learned, or deduced, from the prisoners that a sizeable body of Texans was in the area. He discarded his original plan and decided to march ahead for a daylight battle. After breakfast the Federal force set out along the Santa Fe Trail with the infantry in front, the cavalry in the rear, and a wave of scouts screening the advance.

While the Federals were marching from Bernal Springs to Kozlowski's ranch a Confederate advance guard of about three hundred men and two artillery pieces set out from Santa Fe. They encamped that night at Johnson's ranch near the mouth of Apache Canyon. The canyon forms the western end of Glorieta Pass, which is about seven miles long, narrow at both ends, and a quarter of a mile wide in the middle. The next afternoon the Confederates also took the Santa Fe Trail, completely unaware as they made their way through Apache Canyon that a Federal force was moving toward them. They were commanded by Major Charles L. Pyron, who had been one of the leaders of the final charge at Valverde and who was about to meet in Major Chivington an officer of equal dash and presence of mind.

Chivington's force continued past Pigeon's ranch and entered Glorieta Pass. About two o'clock the Federal scouts turned a short bend in the canyon and found the Confederate scouts resting in a thicket of trees and bushes. The Confederates were taken completely by surprise, and a lieutenant and thirty men surrendered without firing a shot. When the main body received word of what had happened they knew the enemy was just ahead. Chivington ordered his men to close ranks and advance at the double. The

Coloradoans ran forward eagerly, as if they were hurrying to a Denver saloon instead of to mortal combat. As they advanced they stripped for action by throwing aside blankets, canteens, and knapsacks. After about three-quarters of a mile they turned a bend and saw the Confederates some four hundred yards ahead. At the same time the rebels spied their adversaries. Major Pyron immediately deployed his men as skirmishers across the canyon floor. The howitzers were unlimbered, the Lone Star banner was unfurled, and the howitzers opened fire. When the shells screamed over them, the Federal ranks were thrown into confusion; horses bucked and shied and the men milled about uncertainly. Chivington quickly divided the infantry into two groups and sent them clambering up either side of the canyon with instructions to get on the Confederate flanks. The cavalry, consisting of 132 regulars from Fort Union and a company of 88 Colorado Volunteers, was ordered to a protected position in the rear. Captain Howland of the regulars was instructed to wait until the Confederates showed signs of retreating, then to charge with the cavalry.

As the Colorado infantry climbed, they were protected by the rocky, wooded terrain which tended to nullify the howitzer fire. Eventually, as Chivington had foreseen, the Confederates were forced to withdraw. They limbered up their guns and retreated about a mile and a half to a ditch about fifteen feet wide and as many deep which ran across the canyon. Howland failed to seize this opportune moment to attack. Pyron ordered the guns set up behind the ditch and the bridge which spanned it destroyed. This time the Texans were positioned across the canyon from summit to summit. Chivington surveyed the situation and decided to repeat his previous tactics. Because the Confederate front was now wider, the regular cavalry was sent forward on foot to fight with the infantry. The volunteer cavalry under Captain Cook was held in reserve with orders to charge when the Confederates should again appear to give way. After about an hour the Confederates were enfiladed on their left flank, and once more they limbered up their guns to retreat. Chivington shouted at the cavalry. Even before the words had left his mouth Cook had drawn his saber, spurred

his horse, and ordered his men to charge. As the Coloradoans galloped forward, many of them, in their first experience under fire, thought the musket balls whizzing over their heads were cannon balls. Captain Cook was one of the first hit when one of the standard loads of the day, an ounce ball and three buckshot, lodged in his thigh. He managed to stay on his horse until it stumbled and fell on him, adding a sprained ankle to his shattered leg. His company thundered past him wielding their pistols and sabers. Only one horse failed to clear the fifteen-foot arroyo. Half the cavalry, under Lieutenant Nelson, pursued the coveted guns, but the artillery horses were too swift and soon outdistanced them. The two rear sections, under Lieutenant Marshall, attacked and scattered the Confederate reserve. The infantry closed in on the flanks and completed the rout.²⁴ Various sources report Confederate losses of from 16 to 32 killed, and 30 to 40 wounded. All sources agree, however, that at least 70 Texans were taken prisoner. Reports agree that Federal losses were 5 killed, 14 wounded, and 3 missing.

Night had fallen and the Federals now withdrew to Pigeon's ranch where they buried their dead and cared for their wounded. Although jubilant over their victory, now that the excitement of battle had worn off, they were also sobered by the sight of the dead and the agonies of the wounded. The Confederates retreated to Johnson's ranch. From there they sent a party under a flag of truce to remove their dead and wounded from the battlefield.

The next day, because there was not enough water for their horses at Pigeon's, Chivington's force went back to Kozlowski's ranch. Here they found Slough and the rest of the Federal force, who had hurried forward when they got word of the fighting. After being apprised of the situation, Slough formed his plan of action. Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chavez,²⁵ one of the few native New Mexicans who had not deserted or been sent home as useless, had offered to guide a force over the mountains to the Confederate rear at Johnson's ranch. Slough accepted the offer and decided on a pincers movement. The next morning about four hundred infantrymen, commanded by Major Chivington and guided by Chavez,

set out into the mountains south of Glorieta Pass. Slough and the rest of the command, about eight hundred fifty men, continued on down the Santa Fe Trail with the intention of engaging the Confederates at Johnson's ranch until their comrades could attack them from the rear.

They reached Pigeon's ranch about ten o'clock and stopped for a rest. Some of the men visited friends wounded in the fighting two days before who had been left at the ranch; others filled their canteens, and others just lounged around. Suddenly pickets hurried in with the news that the Confederates were in the trees half a mile ahead. Bugles blared and men scrambled to find their weapons and fall in. The ranks had barely been formed when the roar of rebel artillery echoed through the mountains.

After the skirmish in Apache Canyon, Pyron had sent for help, and the rest of the Confederate forces in the area, about seven hundred men under Colonel William R. Scurry²⁶ had hurried to his aid. Scurry had placed his men in a strong natural position in the canyon at Johnson's ranch. Then he waited throughout March 27 for the expected Federal appearance. The enemy failed to show up, and on the morning of the 28th he started through the canyon to find them. Scouts soon brought word that the Federal army was halted at Pigeon's ranch, about half a mile ahead. The horses were sent to the rear, the men were deployed, and the three artillery pieces were ordered to open fire on the Federal skirmishers who now began to appear about a quarter of a mile in front of the ranch. Shortly after that the Confederate infantry moved forward. The Federal forces, with the cavalry dismounted, advanced from the ranch to meet them, and the eight Yankee field pieces began a brisk return of the rebel fire. The crackle of small arms fire mingled with the guttural roar of the artillery, and the engagement became general.

One Colorado company made its way in a ditch to the Confederate left flank. From there they planned to assault the flank and capture the Confederate guns. Scurry, however, had seen the danger; a force armed with pistols and bowie knives ran to the

ditch under heavy fire and threw themselves in on top of the startled Federals, who were driven back to their own lines after a sharp struggle.

Now the Confederates launched an assault. The Coloradoans recoiled and fell back to the ranch, and there was a lull in the fighting. The Confederate cannons, as at Valverde, were smaller than the Federal and again outnumbered. Although several of the Confederate gunners had sacrificed themselves in an attempt to keep their weapons in action, after all their officers had been struck down and one of the guns had been demolished by a direct hit, they withdrew from the field. At this point Scurry called them back with instructions to probe the Federal lines by fire: there was an adobe wall in front of the ranch buildings, and a rocky outcropping behind them, and Scurry wanted to find out where the Yankees had established their new line. This phase of the battle was marked by sniping and maneuvering in the trees and rocks around the ranch, and was what Colonel Slough called fighting "of the bushwacking kind."

After Scurry determined to his satisfaction that most of the enemy were on the rocky ledge behind the house, he organized another attack. The men were exhorted to capture the Federal guns as they had at Valverde, then they moved forward. "Soon they appeared in front," recalled a Federal private who fought in the battle, "encouraged and shouted on by as brave officers as live; some in squads, other [sic] singly, taking advantage of the timber as much as possible in their approach."²⁷ They were within fifty yards of the Northern lines when the Federal artillery, which had remained silent since the beginning of the attack, opened up; the gunners continued to load and fire with lightning precision, and the attackers were hurled back. They reorganized and moved in again, only to find that the Federals, leaving a few dead and wounded behind, had moved back to a new position. The battle had lasted a good part of the day, and it was nearly four o'clock.

The Confederates now launched their supreme effort. They charged the new Federal position, as one of their officers wrote, "inspired with the unalterable determination to overcome every

obstacle to the attainment of their object,"²⁸ and this time succeeded in reaching the Federal guns. The supporting infantry rushed forward to save their artillery, and "Inch by inch was the ground disputed."²⁹ Finally, after the artillery had gotten safely away, the Denver miners retreated, and the Texas frontiersmen, who were too exhausted to pursue them, were left masters of the field.

But while the Texans had been winning the battle, they had been losing the campaign. They had left their supply train at Johnson's ranch. Chivington's command had descended from the mountains, easily overcome the small guard of cooks, wagoners, and the sick, and burned all sixty-four wagons. The only Northern casualty had been a man wounded when an ammunition wagon exploded. This foray, as one Coloradoan wrote, "pierced [the Confederates] to their vitals, and drew from thence the life blood."³⁰ Most of the Confederate food, clothing, medical supplies, and ammunition was destroyed, and they found themselves destitute, a thousand miles from their home base, in hostile territory which had been stripped bare by Indians.

Chivington learned about the battle at the other end of the pass from captured Coloradoans who had been sent to the rear. Instead of moving through the pass, the raiders again took to the mountains, apparently because Chivington believed that Confederate reinforcements were approaching from Galisteo and did not want to be trapped within the rocky walls. About midnight they reached Kozlowski's ranch where the rest of the Federal force had established themselves after the retreat.

A truce had been agreed upon, and the next morning a Federal party returned to the battlefield and buried their dead. When they were finished they loaned their shovels to the Confederates. Years later when the bodies were exhumed and moved to the national cemetery in Santa Fe, there was no way to tell who had fought for the North and who had fought for the South. Reports of casualty figures vary, but a good estimate is that the North suffered 46 killed, 64 wounded, and 21 prisoners; Confederate losses were probably about 36 killed, 60 wounded, and 25 captured.

After the battle the Confederates had less than ten rounds apiece. That night their meal consisted of what corn they could find scattered in Pigeon's corral, and they slept without blankets. The next day, after burying their dead, they withdrew to Santa Fe. Sibley arrived from Albuquerque; a council of war was held, and the officers decided that without supplies their position was untenable. Soon the Confederate Army of New Mexico was retreating down the Rio Grande toward Texas.

The First Colorado, in obedience to a dispatch from Colonel Canby at Fort Craig, had retraced their footsteps to Fort Union, where another dispatch arrived ordering them to march south immediately. Canby, in order to reinforce the Federal forces in the north and because supplies were running low at Fort Craig, had started up the Rio Grande with about a thousand men, leaving Colonel Kit Carson and several companies of New Mexico Volunteers in charge of the fort. En route he learned of the battle at Glorieta Pass and the destruction of the Confederate train, and sent an order countering his first one. When Canby arrived at Albuquerque there was an artillery skirmish with the Confederate garrison; then he withdrew to Tijeras Canyon to wait for the First Colorado. The next day the main Confederate army arrived at Albuquerque with the Coloradoans not far behind. Because most of the ammunition was gone, Sibley buried part of his artillery³¹ and continued down the river. The First Colorado joined Canby and the combined Federal forces continued the pursuit. There was a skirmish when the Confederates crossed to the west bank of the Rio Grande at Peralta; then for two days the armies marched within sight of each other on either bank of the river.

Near La Joya the Confederates abandoned their remaining baggage, and, leaving their fires burning, slipped away under the cover of darkness into the San Mateo mountains. Here the once proud Texas army, starving, thirsty, and sick with smallpox and pneumonia, toiled on bleeding feet to drag their cannon over the mountains while the Apache hovered about them like ghosts waiting to scalp the stragglers. Over half of the original Confederate force left their bones in New Mexico.³²

Robert E. Lee had ordered reinforcements and all available supplies sent to Sibley,³³ while, at Fort Riley, Kansas, five thousand Federal soldiers were being outfitted for service in New Mexico.³⁴ After reaching Texas, Sibley wrote his superiors that it was impossible to campaign in New Mexico, and that his troops had "manifested a dogged, irreconcilable detestation of the country and the people."³⁵ He implied that they would refuse to return. For all practical purposes the Civil War in New Mexico was over.

Had the Confederates been in a more prosperous and friendly country, they might have been able to recoup their fortunes after Glorieta Pass. Under the circumstances, Chivington's raid was the *coup de grace* for the Confederate version of manifest destiny with its gold fields and outlet on the Pacific. Had the Confederates won the battle it might not have guaranteed them success, but it would probably have meant the opening of a third great theater of Civil War operations, and the battle of Glorieta Pass would be more familiar to Americans than it is today.



NOTES

1. Latham Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New Mexico Campaign," Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 2 (New York, 1887), p. 698.
2. Paul Horgan, *Great River: The Rio Grande in North American History*, vol. 2 (New York, 1954), p. 823.
3. Anderson, vol. 2, p. 698. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of California*, vol. 7 (San Francisco, 1890), p. 284, says insurance rates on mail steamers carrying California gold rose until insurance was suspended. At one point in the war, Washington ordered gold shipments stopped for fear they would be intercepted by rebel cruisers.
4. Martin Hardwick Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign* (Austin, 1960), pp. 36-38 says there were about 2,700 Texans after the first muster, but implies that more recruits were accepted later. On p. 77 an estimate of 3,000 is given. Some estimates place the number of Texans at close to 3,700.
5. Sibley, a native of Louisiana, was a veteran of 23 years service. He was the inventor of the Sibley tent and stove, both of which were adopted by the U.S. Army. After the war he entered the service of the Khedive of Egypt.
6. Loomis Morton Ganaway, "New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy," NMHR, vol. 18 (1943), p. 238.
7. Charles S. Walker, "Causes of the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico," NMHR, vol. 8 (1933), p. 86.
8. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, vol. 2 (Albuquerque, 1963), p. 369.
9. All the Texans were originally mounted, and trained as both infantry and cavalry. There were two companies of lancers, who, after Valverde, discarded that weapon and added shoulder weapons taken from Northern dead to their pistols. By the time the Texans reached Albuquerque, hardship and Indians had taken such a toll of the horses that a third of the Confederate Army of New Mexico was formed into a regiment of infantry.
10. Col. Thomas Green, "Engagement at Valverde, N. Mex.," *Confederate Victories in the Southwest; Prelude to Defeat; From the Official Records*, ed. by Calvin P. Horn and William S. Wallace (Albuquerque, 1961), p. 165.
11. Theophilus Noel, *A History of Sibley's Texas Brigade* (Richmond, 1961), p. 19. Noel was a Confederate private who fought in the battle.
12. Hall, p. 102.
13. Calvin Horn, *New Mexico's Troubled Years: The Story of the Early Territorial Governors* (Albuquerque, 1963), p. 101.

14. William A. Keleher, *Turmoil in New Mexico: 1846-1868* (Santa Fe, 1952), p. 189.
15. Hall, p. 56.
16. Ganaway, p. 337, quotes part of an editorial from the *Santa Fe Gazette* which pretty well sums up the pre-invasion attitude of the native population: "What is the position of New Mexico? The answer is a short one. She desires to be let alone."
17. Horgan, vol. 2, p. 821.
18. Ganaway, p. 337.
19. Federal forces in New Mexico were aware of the approach of the Californians thanks to the feat of John Jones, a courier from the column, who (setting a precedent for John Wayne) made his way through the Apache-infested Arizona desert with his message that help was on the way.
20. Slough afterwards served in Virginia and was promoted to the rank of general. He was one of the pallbearers at President Lincoln's funeral. He later became chief justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court. In 1867 he got into a political quarrel in Santa Fe's La Fonda, and was killed in the ensuing gunfight.
21. John M. Chivington, "The First Colorado Regiment," NMHR, vol. 33 (1958), p. 145.
22. Chivington, the presiding elder of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Colorado, was a former missionary to the Wyandotte Indians. Gilpin offered him the post of regimental chaplain, but he preferred a position as a combatant. He was a great favorite with the men, and also developed a solid military reputation. Unfortunately, this was marred in 1864 when he commanded the troops at the notorious "Sandy Creek Massacre" in Colorado in which 450 Cheyenne men, women, and children were killed.
23. The ranch, a local hostelry and stage station, was owned by a Franco-American, Alexander Valle. He may have received his nickname either from his broken English, or from his peculiar style of dancing at fandangos. He described the action at his ranch on March 28th as follows: "Goovernment manns vas at my ranch, and fill 'is cahnteen viz viskey (and Goovernment nevaire pay me for zat viskey); and Texas mahns coom up, and soorprise zem, and zey foight six hours by my vatch, and *my vatch vas slow!*" Quoted from Twitchell, vol. 2, p. 383.
24. With the long-range firearms used in this first of modern wars, the Federal cavalry would probably have been slaughtered, as were the Confederate horsemen at Valverde, had the Texans not been pressed by infantry on their flanks.
25. Chavez, who traced his ancestry back to twelfth-century Castile, was one of New Mexico's most renowned Indian fighters. He participated in his first expedition against the Apache at the age of 16, and when he

died at the age of 78 it was from the accumulated effects of arrow wounds suffered in a lifetime of campaigns against the Indians. At the beginning of the war he declined a commission in the Confederate Army.

26. Hall, pp. 144-45 estimates the total number of Confederate effectives in the area at between 700 and 1,000 men. Sibley was still at Albuquerque with about 600 men and most of the artillery. There were Confederate detachments in the Mesilla Valley, at Tucson, and elsewhere, and great numbers of sick and wounded were convalescing at various villages along the Rio Grande. Some estimates place the number of Confederates at Glorieta Pass as high as 1,800.

27. Ovando J. Hollister, *Boldly They Rode; A History of the First Colorado Regiment of Volunteers* (Lakewood, Colo., 1949), p. 71. Hollister was a Federal soldier who fought in the battle.

28. Col. William R. Scurry, "Engagement at Glorieta, N. Mex., *Union Army Operations in the Southwest; Final Victory; From the Official Records*, ed. by Calvin P. Horn and William S. Wallace (Albuquerque, 1961), p. 34.

29. Scurry, p. 34.

30. Hollister, p. 72.

31. Two of these guns, brass twelve-pounders, can be seen today in Albuquerque's Old Town Plaza.

32. Twitchell, vol. 2, p. 387.

33. Robert E. Lee, "Confederate Correspondence," *Union Army Operations in the Southwest*, p. 128.

34. Hall, p. 226.

35. Keleher, p. 190.