A History of the Daniel Boone National Forest 1770 - 1970

With the situation outlined in the previous chapter with regard to people, land ownership and living conditions as a background, it is easily understood why the area of the Cumberland National Forest was chosen as the site of one of the New Deal Social Projects. This was the Sublimity Forest Community situated in Laurel County directly adjacent to the city of London, Kentucky.

The information upon which this chapter is based may be found in a report entitled, "History of the Sublimity Forest Community Situated in Laurel County, Kentucky", written by W. E. Hedges in 1947. This report may be found in the library of the Daniel Boone National Forest at Winchester, Kentucky.

The introduction to the history of this project states, "Subsistence homesteads represented the first public rural rehabilitation attempt in the United States. This program was begun in 1933, under the Department of the Interior, Division of Subsistence Homesteads, and was later consolidated with the programs of the Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Administration. These administrations were established in 1935 and 1937, respectively, to continue and enlarge resettlement efforts. Official interest of the Forest Service began on July 31, 1933."

The Sublimity Forest Community was developed under authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 115). The Forest Service was charged with the development and management of the Sublimity Forest Community under Administration Order #171, dated May 27, 1936. The Resettlement Administration was changed to the Farm Security Administration in the Department of Agriculture on September 1, 1937. The cooperating agencies for this project then became the Farm Security Administration and the Forest Service.

A preliminary report was prepared by S.H. Marsh of the Regional Office in the spring of 1935, and was submitted to the Chief on June 3, 1935, together with the other reports required. This report provided for the purchase of 80 submarginal farms aggregating 6,320 acres at a cost of $50,560, and for the resettlement of the 80 farm families on three-acre subsistence farms at a development cost of $416,240. The plan provided for the purchase of the resettlement area about two miles south of London, and the correlation of subsistence farming with timber sale and other work on the nearby Cumberland National Forest.

The tentative plans provided for government ownership of homesites and subsistence farms and the forest land which would afford employment for the settlers. Since timberland sufficient to provide the estimated employment had already been acquired as a part of the Cumberland National Forest, the next step was to determine the availability of suitable farmland.

Investigation of the large number of the less fortunate who made up the majority of families considered for this project presented a pitiful picture, and showed a desperate need of something to improve their social and economic condition and to wean them from their traditional habits of living, which were contributing factors. Resettlement appeared to at least offer a clue to a solution to the problem.

Social justification appeared to be obvious, but since economic justification was considered only from the standpoint of direct money return, a good showing on this score appeared doubtful from the beginning.

Upon determination that efforts at economic justification had lead only to confusion, it was decided by the framers of the report on January 17, 1936, that the only honest economic justification was as an experiment.

From that point the project was looked upon purely as an experimental undertaking. In consideration of this the report stated, "Developed and administered simply as an isolated farm and housing project, with the nearby forest looked on merely as a fortunate opportunity for employment, it has little virtue as a U.S. Forest Service venture. Used, however, as a testing ground of fitting a minor agricultural resource into a major forest resource for the purpose of securing the maximum obtainable social and economic benefits for a large forest population, it can and should be undertaken by the U.S. Forest Service."

It is apparent in reviewing the proceedings in the report that the usual complications resulting from having two agencies equally responsible for the success of the project, but neither having final command, pertained to the operation of this project. Throughout the report, by reading between the lines, it can be determined that the Forest Service was continually hampered in its decisions and in its activities by decisions from the "allegedly co-operating agency."

The procedures to be followed in the selection of settlers for this community was one of the first occasions where disagreement was encountered. The report continues, "The matter of choosing settlers on a sound and equitable basis was one of the most controversial questions that confronted the management at any time. The framework of the final report and all forest and regional officers were of the opinion that some sort of measuring scale would be highly desirable, but how to reduce to a common denominator such virtues as honesty, industry, compatibility, and so forth, remained a problem. The Chiefs office agreed with the regional point of view, and in January of 1936, set up a broad and general base for reducing intangible family characteristics to specific terms. However, another section of the Chief's office disagreed with this and took the position that there be no local responsibility for major decisions affecting individual families and that families be accepted or rejected by one who would not be available at a later date to give reasons for his decisions." Upon insistence by the region that no such responsibility be hidden or conveniently placed out of reach, they were advised, "It may prove damn convenient to have final selection of settlers made from afar so that responsibility for decisions cannot be located."

The region prepared a detailed settler-selection plan which included a numerical scale for showing the relative suitability of applicants. This plan was not well received by the Resettlement Administration who took the position that no scoring system would be acceptable to real sociologists, since it would be a reflection on their ability to use their professional talents. The problem that the Sublimity project was confronted with was the practical problem of non-professional people choosing settlers, and maintaining records to justify their recommendations was of no avail, and the Resettlement Administration agreed with the viewpoint that the local public should not be able to locate the source of decisions, on the grounds that it would strengthen the local management organization to be able to truthfully say that rejections were caused by a social worker who would be gone by the time questions were asked. This position was in conflict with the standards for Resettlement Administration's own projects which required that settlers be chosen by a local committee.

It was finally agreed between the Forest Service and the Resettlement Administration that a plan based upon a scale used for evaluating the relative suitability of families for the various elements of selection be followed, which was implemented at once.

There were 691 applications received. These were disposed of as follows: Accepted as settlers — 227; rejected as settlers — 293; withdrew before action — 92; disqualified because of age, residence and so forth — 61, and pending as of January 15, 1943, when settler selection activities were discontinued — 18.

Of the 691 applicant families, 325 were examined and rated according to the scale of the plan. The results of the examinations were tabulated and are included in the report.

An interesting insight into the matter of settler selection, which reflects the psychology of the times, was the feeling on the part of almost everybody connected with the project, except District Ranger B.E. Mansberger, that the management would be swamped with applications. One of the early problems was how to prevent an excessive number of applications and what to do to keep the demand for occupancy from getting out of hand. In the Forest Service, applications were thought of in terms of hundreds. In fact, the final report provided for the Ranger to visit the first one hundred highest rated applicants. Mention of as many as a thousand applicants to be considered at one time was not uncommon in discussions with members of the Chiefs office. Ranger Mansberger argued that there may have to be some canvassing in order to get the desired number of suitable applicants and when he failed to get a hearing he commented, "This all proves that we don't know the people we are dealing with."

The Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1943, and subsequent years indicated an intention on the part of Congress to liquidate resettlement projects. It was the decision of the Department of Agriculture that the Farm Security Administration and not the Forest Service would be the liquidating agency. This was implemented by a Memorandum of Understanding dated June 30, 1945, which provided that the Sublimity Community Project with the exception of certain land described therein, was thereby transferred from the Forest Service to the Farm Security Administration. The memorandum was effective as of July 1, 1945.

Some of the conclusions listed in the report are as follows, "Progress was indicated in every activity and relationship. This was particularly true in the following respects:

While occupancy was never entirely satisfactory it became more stable each year.

Rental payments increased each year and 97.9 percent of all rentals were collected.

A cooperative spirit, almost non-existent at first, took root and there was an increasing tendency to take cooperative undertaking as a matter of course.

The economic security and social outlook of the people was greatly increased.

Community meetings which were first monopolized by a few to carry on petty bickering, later developed into enjoyable, profitable and wholesome occasions.

Heads of families developed a keen sense of responsibility for maintaining themselves and their dependents in a self-respecting manner, while children accepted school as an opportunity and not something being imposed upon them.

It is a debatable question, and depends on the value placed on turning a family from a condition of dependence and despair to self-reliant members of society, as to the extent to which Sublimity was a success from a Governmental investment standpoint. Many thoughtful people believed that the United States was made much richer, in human values, than the $73,780 loss indicated in the balance statement.

However, the seasoned consensus appears to be that except for experimental and demonstration purposes such projects have little or no place in our economic, political and social setup. The chief reasons for this conclusion are:

The minimum successful management would require considerable control over the people; thus extending public employment and so-called bureaucracy.

The control necessary to success implies tenancy or only limited ownership. This is countered to the more wholesome unrestricted ownership.

Success would often require concession which could be taken as favoring the few at the expenses of many.

A resettlement program ambitious enough to provide for all eligibles would upset the economy of the country.

Life on such a community basis, even though it may be wholesome, suggests a form of regimentation which is often objectionable to those it is designed to help.

It may be concluded that to the extent Sublimity was managed in accordance with the original objectives, it was most successful as an experimental undertaking. The anticipated results, pointing out what not to do, as well as what to do, were not fully accomplished due to the letdown in management, the war and liquidation.

At least two results from Sublimity can be applied on the National Forest to the benefit of all concerned. These are: the reaction of both land and people to an opportunity to produce should put to rest any doubt as to the soundness of the program of rehabilitation, on an individual basis, on the National Forest, and the effect of the Advisory Committee on the attitude of the general public; this committee had no official authority, yet the fact that it existed and local people were included in its membership created a public attitude all but unknown to projects handled solely by public employees — to the general public Sublimity was 'ours' while the Cumberland National Forest managed by the same staff was 'theirs'.

The following recommendations represent the opinion of the report writer as to the proper course for the Forest Service, particularly Region 7, to pursue with respect to subsequent rehabilitation activities: that the establishment of rehabilitation communities on or in connection with the National Forest be discouraged; that in case such projects are to be established on or in the connection with the National Forest, the Forest Service insists that full authority for all phases of management and finance be centered in one agency, that there be reasonable assurance of continuity of the given level of management, that there be a closed season on offiical reports and news items for the purpose of putting the reporter in a favorable position and that official inspections be made against prescribed policies, procedures and techniques and not the current whim of the inspector; that the methods used to increase land production and to assure compliance on the part of the tenant be extended on an individual basis to all areas of National Forest lands that are more suitable for farming than for other purposes, and that the Advisory Committee philosophy he studied with a view of incorporating it as an essential part of National Forest development and management.

Thus ended one of the noble social experiments of the New Deal, which involved the Cumberland National Forest in Kentucky.

It was the plan of this project to select a number of the best qualified mountain families and bring them together in a community where each would have a small acreage of productive farmland, with a suitable house and outbuilding; to provide the services of specialists such as the social workers, agronomists, etc., to assist each family in their planning and use of their land and resources. Also should provide each family with supplementary employment on the National Forest, or on a Forest Service project such as the sign shop, exhibit shop or a similar activity to provide sufficient income, supplementary to their income and food production on their own tract of land, to provide a better standard of living than they have known previously.

This plan was implemented to the best ability of a dual-headed, cooperatively administered relationship hampered by all of the types of interagency red-tape inherent in such a governmental undertaking. Considered against the impact of these obstacles, the project made surprising progress during its brief active life from 1937 to 1945.

However, the end product of such an experiment is the final measure of the extent of its success. The houses and outbuildings constructed on this project still stand in this community on the edge of London, but not a single one is owned or occupied by one of the project-selected-families which made up the original experiment. All have long ago gone elsewhere, many returning to the environment from which they came. It has been experienced many times that mountain people live where they do because that is where and how they prefer to live.

It is significant that few, if any, of these artificial, social and economic relationships, established by government regulation and financed by tax payers' funds, have continued to function on their own efforts once the regular contribution of public funds has ceased.

Any individual interested in studying in more detail the sociological and economic relationship involved in this project will enjoy reviewing in detail the records and detailed discussions of the happenings at Sublimity between 1933 and 1947 as contained in the report.