


“To Consider Every Contingency”

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, and the factors that affected the reconnaissance and countermarch, July 2, 1863

Karlton D. Smith



Two of the most controversial issues surrounding Confederate forces on July 2, 1863, concern the reconnaissance conducted by Captain Samuel R. Johnston and the counter-march of Lieutenant General James Longstreet. While the majority of studies have focused on the actions of these two officers, most do not take into consideration the actions of other individuals or the deployment of other troops on the field and their possible impact on the events of the day. This paper will attempt to address some of these issues.

On July 1, 1863, instead of merely concentrating the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee was confronted with a battle at a time and place not of his choosing. He arrived on Herr's Ridge along the Chambersburg pike at about 2 P.M., where the "battle was raging with considerable violence." After witnessing his army driving the 1st and 11th corps of the Army of the Potomac through Gettysburg, Lee moved his headquarters to Seminary Ridge, approximately one mile east of Herr's Ridge. There he met with Lieutenant General James Longstreet, his senior corps commander, at about 5 P.M.¹

From their position near the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Lee and Longstreet could have seen Federal batteries and infantry on the open slopes of Cemetery Hill, one and one-quarter miles to their right front. This position was clearly marked by a massive tree standing on the crest of Cemetery Hill. The position "was evidently a strong one" and the Federal right "appeared to rest on a cemetery..." The wooded slopes of Culp's Hill stood to the left of this position. Further to the south along Cemetery Ridge, Lee and Longstreet would have viewed Ziegler's Grove, the area south toward the Peach Orchard, and could have seen cavalry guarding the Federal left flank. Lee wrote, "Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his [Meade's] troops and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile."²

After making “a studied view of the position upon which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land surrounding” Longstreet probably recommended a “wide tactical development” against the Army of the Potomac’s left flank. Lee rejected this idea. At this time, Lee knew he had confronted two of the seven infantry corps in the Army of the Potomac. However, he reported:

Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General [Richard S.] Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward.³

For Lee, a battle had “become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.”⁴

For Longstreet’s troops, July 1 would prove to be a hard day’s march. The divisions of major generals Lafayette McLaws and John B. Hood had been ready to march from the bivouac areas between Fayetteville and Greenwood, about sixteen miles from Gettysburg, by 8 A.M. on the morning of July 1. The division of Major General Richard H. Anderson of Lieutenant General A. P. Hill’s corps had preceded them “soon after daylight.” McLaws wrote that he “had not been long in place” before Major General Edward Johnson’s division of Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell’s corps “appeared.” Johnson’s column, which included Ewell’s supply train and reserve artillery, had come into the Chambersburg pike from the direction of Green Village. Lee ordered Longstreet’s column to halt and “directed that Johnson’s division and train should pass to its corps...”⁵

Longstreet’s third division, under Major General George E. Pickett, was ordered to remain in Chambersburg, twenty-three miles from Gettysburg, until relieved by Brigadier General John D. Imboden. Pickett was advised that “the commanding general desires you to come on this evening as far as this point [Greenwood], and to follow on after the remainder of the command across the mountains to-morrow morning.” In the event that Pickett was not relieved until the early morning of July 2, he was authorized to “move across the mountain without stopping here.”⁶

At 10 A.M., Longstreet issued new orders to McLaws and Hood to wait one hour after Johnson’s division and trains had passed before marching and to “camp on the other side of the mountain as near to the division leading you as you conveniently can.” McLaws and Hood began their march at about 4 P.M., in the rain and with the promise of humid marching conditions. Once the march commenced, Longstreet’s men moved “with elastic step, every one feeling the time had come for active work.” McLaws reached the summit of South Mountain by sunset (about 7:41 P.M.). Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw recalled that from the summit “could be seen and heard the smoke and din of battle then raging in the distance.”⁷

Private William T. Fluker, 15th Georgia Infantry, remembered:

We kept steadily going all the evening. Night came on and still the steady tramp, tramp of the infantry and the rumble of trains and artillery of a vast army in motion. We began to suspect by this time that we were going somewhere for something, as we failed to get our usual ten minutes rest out of every hour... The tired men would cry out “rest, rest,” but no order came to rest. Men fell asleep marching only to wake as they stumbled or bumped against their file leaders and get cussed for tramping on his heel.⁸

Despite Johnson's head start, Longstreet's column overtook the tail end of Johnson's trains before midnight. One soldier remembered the march became "slow and tedious." "To walk two or three steps," he said, "and then halt for that length of time, was anything but restful and assuring to troops who had marched all night without sleep or rest."⁹

Orders were also issued to Colonel John B. Walton, commanding Longstreet's reserve artillery, to follow McLaws and Hood. It was understood that it would "be some hours" before Walton could move out. Longstreet reissued orders to Walton at 5:30 P.M., which were not received until 10 P.M., "to come on to-night as far as you can without distressing your men and animals." It was noted that Walton would be "wanted for to-morrow's battle."¹⁰

Longstreet left Lee on Seminary Ridge at about 7 P.M. He remembered that at that time, Lee "had formed no plans beyond that of seizing Culp's Hill as his point from which to engage, nor given any orders for the next day." It was unclear where the right flank of the Confederate line would be on the morning of July 2. By the next morning, Longstreet succeeded in marching his men to Herr's Ridge, opposite Seminary Ridge and the Confederate right as it existed at the end of July 1. Longstreet also noted that Lee's "desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehensions."¹¹

Longstreet was returning to his temporary headquarters in Cashtown, seven miles from Gettysburg, when he met McLaws, informed him of the engagement, and directed him "to go into camp at the water course, then some miles distant..." McLaws reached his camp site "a little after twelve at night." However, one soldier reported that "at 10 o'clock we encamped..." This camp was along Marsh Creek, about thirteen miles from Greenwood and two miles west of Herr's Ridge, and occupied the farms of Ephraim Whisler and Samuel Lohr.¹²

Lee visited with Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell after Longstreet left Seminary Ridge. Lee wanted to discuss the possibility of moving Ewell's corps away from the Culp's Hill area on the Confederate left to an area along the southern portion of Seminary Ridge on the Confederate right and launching an attack from that position. By midnight, Ewell was able to convince Lee that he could attack and capture Culp's Hill. Lee decided to leave Ewell in place and to open an attack from his right with Longstreet's corps. Lee, however, issued no specific attack or movement orders on the night of July 1.¹³

While Lee was exploring his options, Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, was concentrating his army along the crest of Cemetery Ridge, between Culp's Hill and the Round Tops. Two brigades from the 1st Cavalry Division, under Brigadier General John Buford, were screening the army's left flank near the Peach Orchard and the Little Round Top area. The U. S. Signal Corps opened communications from a station on Little Round Top by 11 P.M. on July 1. The 3rd Corps established a skirmish line on the west side of the Emmitsburg road, extending from the Peach Orchard and connecting with the skirmishers of the 1st Corps on their right. The other corps of the Army of the Potomac were marching toward Gettysburg and would arrive throughout the night of July 1 and the early morning hours of July 2.¹⁴

Before dawn began to break on July 2, the various elements of the Confederate army were stirring. Hood's division began arriving in the area of Marsh Creek by midnight. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Shepherd, 2nd Georgia Infantry, wrote that after "a most tiresome march through the mountains, this regiment, belonging to Benning's brigade, arrived at 12 p.m...where it was permitted to bivouac for a few hours." Hood later wrote that the orders to hasten forward had been so imperative that his troops "were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours, during the night..." At 2 A.M., Pickett's division was leaving Chambersburg, and by 2:30 A.M. Walton, with the reserve artillery, finally had a clear road to start his march.¹⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. L. Fremantle, a British observer with Longstreet, wrote that they had "breakfasted a little before daylight." Colonel Shepherd reported that Hood's division resumed its march at 3 A.M. but were again halted "after proceeding some three miles." Brigadier General Evander M. Law's brigade, which had been detached from Hood's division to patrol the

area of New Guilford (now Duffield), Pennsylvania, “moved as rapidly as possible toward Gettysburg,” twenty-three miles away, at 3 A.M. The three remaining brigades of Hood’s division began arriving near Herr’s Ridge by 5 A.M. but apparently remained strung out along the Chambersburg road. Captain Benton H. Miller, 59th Georgia Infantry, remembered his regiment was resting “in front of the railroad cut, where the first day’s fight was.” McLaws’ division, which had received orders “to march at 4 o’clock...did not leave until about sunrise,” began to deploy along Herr’s Ridge by about 7 A.M.¹⁶

At 4:30 A.M., the troops of Major General Richard H. Anderson’s division were on Whistler’s Ridge about two miles from Seminary Ridge. Major General Henry Heth’s division was stationed in Herr’s Woods on the east slope of Herr’s Ridge. Brigadier General Edward L. Thomas’ brigade had its right flank just south of McMillan’s Woods. Colonel W. L. J. Lowrance, commanding Brigadier General Alfred M. Scales’ brigade, stated that “at early dawn...I was ordered to a position on the right of and on line with the artillery, which left me still on the extreme right of the line...I threw out a strong skirmish line.” Lowrance’s position was in the area of Spangler’s Woods. There were no significant Confederate forces south of Spangler’s Woods at this time of the morning. By 9 A.M., Lowrance’s brigade occupied a line that ended just north of Spangler’s Woods. McLaws’ division was stationed on a ridge line just west of Herr’s Ridge Road.¹⁷

Lee needed more precise information on the position of the Federal army before he could issue definite attack and movement orders. He sent patrols out to explore the possibility of an attack from the Confederate right. Colonel Armistead L. Long, Lee’s military secretary, was especially interested in the proper placement of artillery along Hill’s and Ewell’s lines. Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, the army’s chief of artillery, reported that “from the farthest occupied point on the right and front...soon after sunrise [about 4:44 A.M.] I surveyed the enemy’s position toward some estimate of the ground and the best mode of attack.”¹⁸

Confederate staff officers could have clearly seen the Federal 3rd Corps skirmish line on the west side of the Emmitsburg road and the Peach Orchard area before the road crossed the high ground at the Peach Orchard. The 4th Maine skirmish line ran from the Millerstown road to just past the Peter Rogers’ house about one hundred yards west of the Emmitsburg road. They could also have seen the summit of Little Round Top and the signal flags flying from there. Throughout the morning, they would have seen the 2nd Corps moving into position along Cemetery Ridge and 3rd Corps troops moving up the Emmitsburg road. Apparently, no one mentioned the possibility of the Federal left flank being partially concealed or being on low ground.¹⁹

The reconnaissance with the most impact on Lee’s thinking appears to have been conducted by Captain Samuel Richards Johnston. From Fairfax County, Virginia, Johnston was thirty years old in 1863. He had been trained as a civil engineer and was appointed a lieutenant in Company F, 6th Virginia Cavalry, on April 20, 1861. By July 21, Company F was employed “in picket duty and scouting near the enemy’s line in advance of regular pickets.” In this assignment, the company obtained “valuable information” because of its knowledge of the area “as well as previous surveys of Lieutenant Johnston, who was much employed in command of scouting parties.”²⁰

Johnston was appointed a volunteer aide-de-camp to Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart while stationed at Dranesville, Virginia, and was “acting Inspector of Outposts of Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s staff” in February 1862. Stuart described Johnston as “sober, indefatigable, and capable.” He served as a contract engineer near Richmond until assigned as a lieutenant of engineers to Longstreet on June 4, 1862. He was promoted to captain of engineers and assigned to Lee’s staff on August 12, 1862.²¹

Johnston conducted reconnaissance work for the army in campaigns previous to Gettysburg. During these operations, he came under the eyes of both Lee and Longstreet. Longstreet noted that Johnston had been “very energetic and untiring” in his efforts “to discover the various positions of the enemy.” In his reports of the Second Manassas and Antietam campaigns, Longstreet thanked Johnston, among others, “for great courtesy and kindness in assisting me on

the different battle-fields.” Johnston helped to lay out the earthworks at Fredericksburg and assigned positions for the Confederate batteries. On May 3, 1863, during the battle of Chancellorsville, Johnston “discovered large parks of the enemy’s wagons and the camps of some of his troops on the opposite side of the river” and posted artillery the next day “to open a hot fire upon the parks and camps.” Johnston had proven himself to be an experienced and capable engineer officer and had become an experienced reconnaissance officer.²²

All of the major military books of the time stated that there was no more important duty for an officer than that of “collecting and arranging the information upon which either the general, or daily operations of a campaign must be based.” A reconnaissance was necessary because even a detailed map could “never convey all the information that will enable an officer to plan, even an ordinary march, with safety.” Since military operations would be based on this information, “any serious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the campaign, and even the fate of the war.”²³

A reconnoitering officer “should be known to be cool-headed and *truth-ful*; one who sees things as they are, and tells clearly and precisely what he has seen.” Such an officer was “to ascertain *precisely* the duty required of him; and what further should be done in case of certain contingencies that may, from the nature of the duty, be naturally looked for.” A reconnoitering officer should also obtain maps, a good telescope, aids for judging distances, writing materials, some good guides and “gain all the knowledge he can, from the local inhabitants at hand...”²⁴

Lee had conducted reconnaissance operations during the Mexican War. At Cerro Cordo and Churubusco, Lee had not only scouted enemy formations but routes for military units to follow, and he had conducted those units along the routes he discovered.²⁵

Johnston was called to headquarters before the sun was up on July 2. He was ordered by Lee “to make a reconnaissance of the enemy’s left and report as soon as possible.” Johnston claimed that Lee had said nothing about finding a...

... route over which troops would be moved unobserved by the enemy, but it was not necessary as that was part of my duty as a reconnoitering Officer, and would be attended to without special instructions, indeed he said nothing about the movement of troops at all, and left me with only that knowledge of what he wanted which I had obtained after long service with him, and that was that he wanted me to consider every contingency which might arise.

These orders, at least as reported by Johnston, are somewhat vague. Johnston does not indicate that he was informed of Lee’s intention to launch a major assault from his right flank, the troops that might be involved, or the route those troops might have to take. It appears from Johnston’s statement that he did not attempt a clarification as to his *precise* responsibility or what to do “in case of certain contingencies.”²⁶


Johnston admitted that he did not have a watch at the time, but he estimated that he left on his mission at “daybreak,” probably about 4:12 A.M. We cannot be certain what, if any, equipment or maps Johnston had with him. He never wrote of talking with any of the inhabitants he may have met along the way. Johnston claimed that he was accompanied by Longstreet’s engineer officer and three or four others as an escort.²⁷

Longstreet’s engineer officer, John J. Graham Clarke, was born about 1832 in Virginia. Like Johnston, Clarke was an engineer by training. He was on duty at Yorktown in April of 1861 and was appointed a captain of engineers on February 15, 1862. He was in charge of the defenses of Mulberry Island, Virginia, and supervised work at Drewry’s Bluff in May of 1862. He was promoted to major of engineers on May 4, 1863, and reported to Longstreet’s staff on May 15. Clarke, apparently, left no account of his activities at Gettysburg. Johnston’s accounts are the only ones that specifically mention Clarke as being on this early-morning reconnaissance.²⁸

Johnston later wrote to Lafayette McLaws:

...my general route was about the same that General Longstreet took when he made his march. I crossed the creek on the same bridge that he did and turned to the left at once and got on the ridge where you subsequently formed your line, following along that ridge in the direction of the round tops across the Emmitsburg road and got up on the slopes of round top, where I had a commanding view, then rode along the base of round top to beyond the ground that was occupied by General Hood, and where there was later a cavalry fight.²⁹

On his return trip, Johnston wrote that "...when I again got in sight of Emmitsburg road I saw three or four troopers moving slowly and very cautiously in the direction of Gettysburg." Johnston said he reported to Lee, after "the usual delay in finding headquarters," at about 7 A.M., although it could have been a little later, having been gone approximately three hours. Longstreet and Lieutenant General A. P. Hill were present with Lee. In making his report, Johnston sketched his route on a map Lee was holding on his lap. He assured Lee that he had reached Little Round Top. Johnston wrote that later in the day, as McLaws' division "was formed ready to advance," Federal troops were seen forming in the Peach Orchard. "That," said Johnston, "was the first evidence of any force being ready to oppose us on the enemy's left that I had seen during the day."³⁰



The probable route of Captain Johnston's reconnaissance.

Several questions have arisen over the years concerning Johnston's reconnaissance, not the least of which are where exactly he went and what he saw or did not see. It is this writer's belief that Johnston did not get to Little Round Top as he claimed but instead was on the slopes of Big Round Top. There were also plenty of Federal troops in the area between the Round Tops and the Emmitsburg road for Johnston to see.³¹

For example, the U. S. Signal Corps made several attempts on July 1 to establish communications between the Round Tops and Emmitsburg, Maryland. Due to atmospheric conditions, this was not accomplished until 11 P.M., and this line "was maintained during the subsequent battle." There was thus a signal station on Little Round Top at the time of Johnston's reconnaissance on July 2.³²

Brigadier General John Buford's 1st Cavalry Division

bivouacked on the Federal left on the evening of July 1. His main line was at or near the Peach Orchard. The 6th New York Cavalry bivouacked in the Peach Orchard, and the 3rd Indiana Cavalry bivouacked in “the woods [possibly Rose’s Woods] near Round Top.” Battery A, 2nd U. S. Artillery under Lt. John H. Calef and attached to Buford’s division, was also stationed near the Peach Orchard. Buford received orders at about 10:30 A.M. on July 2 to withdraw to Taneytown, Maryland, and began to leave this general area about an hour later.³³

Most of the 3rd Corps (about 7,000) had bivouacked in the area of the George Weikert farm, along the southern extension of Cemetery Ridge. Brigadier General J. H. Hobart Ward’s brigade was southwest of the farm while Brigadier General Joseph B. Carr’s and Colonel William R. Brewster’s brigades were located north and west of the farmhouse. This area was (and is) clearly visible from both Round Tops.³⁴

The 4th Maine Infantry was on picket duty during the night of July 1 in the fields west of the Emmitsburg road and was supported by the 63rd Pennsylvania lying in the Emmitsburg road. The 2nd Corps (about 11,000) had halted for the night about three miles from Gettysburg along the Taneytown road, or about one mile south of the Round Tops. They were ready to march by daylight of July 2 and first took position near the intersection of Granite Schoolhouse Lane and the Taneytown road, about three-quarters of a mile south of Little Round Top. The head of the column should have been in this area by about 5:30 A.M., with the rest of the column on or near the road to the south.³⁵

While there was probably little or no dust because of the damp conditions of the previous days, fog was reported by at least one officer in the 3rd Corps. There was, however, no reason for the Federal troops to have remained quiet. A staff officer in the 3rd Corps wrote that at daylight the “clear notes of a single bugle broke upon the ear, and before its echoes had lost itself among the hills a dozen had taken up the call, and the drums added their sullen roll...” It is usually assumed that Johnston somehow missed seeing all these Federal troops. But did he? Johnston never wrote that he had not seen *any* Federal troops. He merely wrote that when he arrived on Warfield Ridge with McLaws, there was a “force ready to oppose us.” Johnston may have seen Federal troops in the Peach Orchard area but not in any force, in his opinion, to stop a strong Confederate advance.³⁶

Johnston commenced his reconnaissance from Lee’s headquarters position along the Chambersburg pike. Johnston probably accompanied General Pendleton to the area of at least Spangler’s Woods before splitting from Pendleton’s company. At the beginning of his reconnaissance, Johnston would have been behind Confederate positions on Seminary Ridge until he was past Spangler’s Woods. While trying to stay out of sight of any possible Federal patrols, Johnston may have been on the *reverse* or western slope of Warfield Ridge and not been in a position to directly observe the Peach Orchard area. He probably crossed the Emmitsburg road further south than he thought, perhaps somewhere in the area of the Michael Bushman and John Slyder farms. He then went up the west slope of Big Round Top. A Federal officer, who was on Big Round Top on July 3, reported that, like Johnston, he had “a commanding view” of the area. Johnston could then have traveled through part of the John Slyder farm and skirted Bushman Hill before re-crossing the Emmitsburg road in the area of Biesecker Woods. To Johnston, Lee was headquarters. He may have expected to find Lee at the headquarters tents and had to be redirected to Lee’s actual physical position closer to the Seminary buildings. This could explain Johnston’s statement concerning “the usual delay in finding headquarters.”³⁷

Longstreet has been harshly criticized over the years for the slow arrival of his troops on Herr’s Ridge on the morning of July 2. Some of these critics felt that Longstreet should have pushed his troops to the right of the Confederate line, along Warfield Ridge, during the very early hours of July 2. As has been shown, as dawn was breaking on July 2, the Confederate right rested in the area of Spangler’s Woods, at little more than a half mile north of Pitzer’s Woods and the northern

edge of Warfield Ridge. To have marched there would have necessitated a night march over uncertain terrain through an area that had not been scouted. That would have left a half-mile gap in Lee's line and would have added three to five miles to the day's march. As one twentieth-century army officer wrote: "To have demanded more of them [Longstreet's men] at that time would have detracted from their battle efficiency when they did arrive on the ground."³⁸

The Chambersburg road, over which Hood and McLaws would have to march, was one-way; crossed at least one ridge (Whisler's Ridge); and probably contained a number of stragglers, wounded soldiers, and other debris of the previous day's battle. The rate of march was probably two miles per hour, if not somewhat slower (about one and three-quarters miles per hour). This means that if Hood left his bivouac area at 3 A.M., it would have taken at least two hours for the head of his column to appear on Herr's Ridge after a march of about three miles. If McLaws began his march at sunrise (about 4:45 A.M.), his troops should have been approaching Herr's Ridge at around 7 A.M. Fremantle reported that at 7 A.M. "I rode over part of the ground with General Longstreet, and saw him disposing McLaws' division for today's fight." Major Benjamin F. Eshleman's Washington Artillery Battalion, of the artillery reserve under Colonel Walton, arrived in the area of Whisler's Ridge by 8 A.M. This placed the artillery reserve a little more than one mile from Herr's Ridge. The artillery battalion of Colonel E. P. Alexander began arriving in the area about one hour later. All of this "assumes that the march discipline was perfect, that there was no straggling, and that the men marched in fours well closed up and with no gaps in the column."³⁹

Longstreet's column would have contained just a little less than 14,000 infantry. The artillery battalions of Col. H. C. Cabell and Maj. M. W. Henry, attached to the divisions of McLaws and Hood, respectively, contained 780 men (most of whom were probably marching), 280 artillery horses, 35 guns, and at least as many caissons. This figure does not include Col. Walton's artillery reserve, which arrived separately from Hood and McLaws. The column may also have included an estimated 1,100 supply wagons and 300 baggage wagons.⁴⁰

"On the morning of the 2d," wrote Longstreet, "I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight, and renewed my views against making an attack." Longstreet also "again proposed the move to Meade's left and rear." Lee again rejected these proposals. It was clear that Longstreet did not like the position the Confederate army was in. He did not think Gettysburg was a good place for the Confederates to fight, nor did he agree with Lee's battle plan as it developed. Lieutenant Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's assistant adjutant-general, later wrote:

As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield.⁴¹

Longstreet, as a corps commander, not only had to give orders to McLaws and Hood; his division commanders; and Walton, his chief of artillery, he also had to oversee and supervise the operations of his staff. Lieutenant Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, the assistant adjutant-general; Major John W. Fairfax, acting assistant adjutant and inspector general; Major Osman Latrobe and captains John W. Riely and Stephen Winthrop, assistant adjutants-general; and Captain T. J. Goree, Longstreet's aide-de-camp, had to know what Longstreet's orders were to McLaws, Hood, and Walton -- where the troops were moving, when they would be moving, and what Longstreet's thoughts were on the coming engagement -- so they could properly carry out Longstreet's orders and act in his name if necessary. Major S. P. Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major R. J. Moses, chief of commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant Colonel Peyton T. Manning, chief of ordnance; and Doctor J. S. D. Cullen, medical director, had to know where the troops were moving, so they could bring up the necessary supplies and support for the front line troops. Longstreet may also

have had the services of Company H, 7th South Carolina Cavalry, the Kirkwood Rangers, for “courier and escort service.”⁴²

Hood joined Longstreet, who was with Lee and Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, on Seminary Ridge “shortly after daybreak.” Hood remembered that Lee was “anxious” for Longstreet to attack. Lee said to Hood: “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.” Longstreet, who wanted to await the arrival of Pickett’s division before moving, noted to Hood that Lee “was a little nervous.” Longstreet and Hood were “assisting their deliberations by the truly American custom of *whittling* sticks.”⁴³

After McLaws arrived in the area of Herr’s Ridge at about 7 A.M., he was ordered to report to Lee on Seminary Ridge at about 8 A.M. He found Lee “sitting on a fallen tree with a map beside him.” Longstreet was “walking back and forth some little distance” from Lee. Lee, after pointing to his map and directing McLaws’ attention “to about the place across the country from where we were,” wanted McLaws to place his division *perpendicular* to the Emmitsburg road in the area south of the Peach Orchard. McLaws, not knowing that Johnston may have already made his report, requested permission to accompany Johnston on a reconnaissance. Longstreet did not want McLaws to leave his division and directed him to place his division *parallel* to the Emmitsburg road. Lee repeated his desire to place McLaws *perpendicular* to the road. Longstreet, for a second time, refused to allow McLaws to accompany Johnston. McLaws ordered Lieutenant Thomas Jefferson Montcure, his engineer officer, to conduct a reconnaissance and instructed him as to “what to observe particularly, as he was an officer in whom I had confidence...” But, Montcure “was ordered back.” McLaws conducted his own, limited, reconnaissance and was “soon convinced that by crossing the ridge where I then was, [Seminary Ridge] my command could reach the point indicated by General Lee, in a half hour, without being seen.”⁴⁴

Colonel John B. Walton, with the 1st Corps Artillery Reserve, arrived along the Chambersburg pike, probably near Whisler’s ridge, by about 8 A.M. Lieutenant William Miller Owen, Walton’s adjutant, reported the unit’s arrival to Longstreet. Longstreet ordered Colonel E. P. Alexander, commanding one of Walton’s battalions, to report to him directly. Alexander was ordered “to accompany... the divisions of Major-Generals McLaws and Hood in the attack upon the left.” Alexander was also ordered to “take command of the three battalions of artillery accompanying them,” his own plus Cabell’s and Henry’s.⁴⁵

Alexander wrote that he was ordered to reconnoiter the enemy’s left flank and “in about three hours had a good idea of all the ground...” Alexander was to examine “all the roads leading to the right & front, & get an understanding of the enemy’s position & how & where we could best get at it...” General Pendleton reported that he conducted Alexander “to the advanced point of observation,” probably near Pitzer’s Woods, but that “a sharp contest occurred in the woods to the right and rear of this forward point.”⁴⁶

Prior to this, Pendleton had “surveyed the enemy’s position toward some estimate of the ground and the best mode of attack.” On his return from this reconnaissance, Pendleton also surveyed the “ravine road,” either the Black Horse Tavern road or the dry stream bed of Willoughby Run. He was also “made aware of having entered the enemy’s lines by meeting two dismounted cavalymen. These cavalymen, Pendleton reported, “immediately surrendered.” After surveying the “course and character” of the ravine road, Pendleton returned to “an elevated point on the Fairfield road, which furnished a very extensive view.” This was probably Bream’s Hill just above the Black Horse Tavern. Federal cavalry could be seen “in considerable force” and “bodies of infantry and artillery, accompanied by their trains” could be seen moving along the Emmitsburg road toward Gettysburg. Longstreet joined Pendleton at this position about midday.⁴⁷

Longstreet, in addition to his regular contingent of troops, had the temporary services of a scratched-together group of cavalry and artillery under Colonel John L. Black, 1st South Carolina Cavalry. Black, under orders from Lee, had served as Longstreet’s rear guard on July 1. Black reported to Lee sometime early on the morning of July 2. Lee introduced Black to Longstreet “to

explore your ground, watch your flanks and rear.” Black, after ordering up his cavalry and Captain James F. Hart’s South Carolina battery, accompanied Longstreet to his temporary field headquarters on Bream’s Hill above the Black Horse Tavern at about 11 A.M. Black was ordered to take possession of the bridge on the Fairfield road where it crosses Rock Creek. He also sent two lieutenants, at Longstreet’s request, in two different directions to report “whether they could see any enemy or not.” Hart’s battery was placed in position to cover the Fairfield road. Black spent “much of the fore part that day with Gen. Longstreet...”⁴⁸

Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw, McLaws’ division, wrote that his brigade “being at the head of the column” had halted “at the end of the lane leading to the Black Horse Tavern, situated some five hundred yards to our right.” This position was probably along the high ground, west of Herr’s Ridge road and on the lane connecting the Adam Butt farm with the Mark Forney farm on the Black Horse Tavern road. From this position, Kershaw had a commanding view of the Alexander Currens’ farm along the Emmitsburg road. He observed that a “large body of troops, with flankers out in our direction, passed over that point and joined the Federal army.” Considering that McLaws’ column was about two miles long, if Kershaw’s brigade was at or near the Adam Butt farm, then the rear of the column would be at Herr’s Tavern and, perhaps, partially on the Chambersburg road.⁴⁹

Longstreet’s veterans seemed more than ready to renew the engagement. These men had the impression that after all the other troops had made their marches and had attacked the enemy’s flanks and rear and after “all the display of strategy and generalship” had failed to dislodge the enemy, then Longstreet’s corps would be called on to strike “the hard, stubborn, decisive blow.” Another veteran wrote that while they were in position on Herr’s Ridge, they were given “enthusiastic accounts of the good behavior and triumph of our side” on July 1. This seemed to fire the men to a “white heat,” and the movement to the right showed that “a demonstration of satisfaction was plain in every face.”

I never at any time in the war heard such eager wishes for instant battle. Many said, “These Yanks say that we whip them in Virginia because we are at home and they are away from home; today we shall whip them at home.”⁵⁰

Lee at about 9 A.M., after meeting with Longstreet and McLaws, went to consult once more with Lt. Gen. Ewell. Lee was still considering moving Ewell’s corps away from the Federal right to a more advantageous position along Seminary Ridge, opposite Cemetery Ridge. While visiting with Ewell, Lee finalized the movements for the day. Lee, however, according to one of Ewell’s officers, was not “very sanguine of its success. He feared we would only take it at a great sacrifice of life.”⁵¹

As a result of all the reconnaissance work and his own observations, Lee knew the Federal army “held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery.” Lee reported:

The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other...His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity...Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile.⁵²

As Lee's battle plans matured, it became his intention to launch attacks all along the length of what he perceived to be the main Federal line. Longstreet was to attack the Federal left and drive the enemy from the Emmitsburg road and from a position "it was thought our artillery could use to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge." Ewell's corps "was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer." Hill's corps "was ordered to threaten the enemy's center, to prevent re-enforcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack." It stands to reason then that Hill's corps, particularly the right division of Major General Richard H. Anderson, would play a strong supporting role to Longstreet. Longstreet, therefore, could not move into position until Anderson was in position.⁵³

Anderson's division received its initial orders at about 7 A.M. Anderson left the area of Whisler's Ridge and moved along the Chambersburg pike for about one mile to Herr's Ridge. The division then bore off to the right and "passed through troops whose arms were stacked, was informed they were McLaws's and Hood's divisions..." Anderson continued "the march over undulating fields and wooded crests nearly in a straight line..." for about two to three miles. By 10 A.M., Anderson had four of his five brigades on the west slope of Seminary Ridge, to the right of Pender's division, extending the existing Confederate line. The brigade of Brigadier General Cadmus M. Wilcox, which had been on skirmish duty near the Black Horse Tavern on the night of July 1, had the farthest to march and went into position just before noon. As Anderson's division was moving in front of him, Longstreet's forces could not reasonably be moved into position until Anderson had cleared the road.⁵⁴


As Wilcox was moving along the reverse slope of Seminary/Warfield ridges, he detected the movement of Federal forces in Pitzer's Woods to his front. This was an advanced force sent out by the 3rd Corps "to feel the enemy's right." After a sharp encounter, this force was driven back to the 3rd Corps position. Wilcox then placed his brigade along the northern portion of Warfield Ridge with the exception of the 10th Alabama Infantry. This unit "occupied the woods to the right and at right angles to the remainder of my line, for the safety of my right flank." This was a defensive measure and not one designed to support an attack from Wilcox's right. This may be an example of poor communication or staff work as it appears that Wilcox at that point had no knowledge of Longstreet's forces coming up on his right.⁵⁵

The only unit missing from Longstreet's command, with the exception of Pickett's division, was the brigade of Brigadier General Evander M. Law. Law's brigade had been detached at New Guilford to help guard the army's flank. The brigade left New Guilford at about 3 A.M. on July 2. Longstreet received permission from Lee to await the arrival of Law's brigade before beginning his march to the south. Law's brigade arrived in the area of Herr's Ridge shortly before noon after a twenty-three-mile march. Longstreet began his march less than an hour later. When Law's brigade arrived, it "found the other brigades of Hood's division resting about a mile from the town, on the Chambersburg road."⁵⁶

Longstreet had previously received orders "to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement, so as to avoid being seen by the enemy." Longstreet believed that Lee had ordered Captain Johnston "to lead and conduct the head of the column." Longstreet wrote that his troops "moved forward under guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions." Because McLaws was moving under Johnston's guidance, Longstreet felt this released him from immediate supervision of McLaws' division. He, therefore, chose to ride at the head of Hood's column.⁵⁷

Longstreet began his march to the Federal left flank at about 12:45 P.M. on July 2. Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw's brigade led the advance. From his position near the Adam Butt farm, Kershaw moved "by flank from the head of column perpendicularly to the rear." The brigade turned to its right and followed the farm lane from the Adam Butt farm to the Mark Forney farm on the Black Horse Tavern road. It passed to the right of the tavern between the

tavern and the bridge. The column came to a halt about three hundred yards from the tavern “when the head of column was about to reach the top of a hill where it would be seen.”⁵⁸



The route of Longstreet's counter-march.

General McLaws, riding in front with Captain Johnston, ordered Kershaw's brigade to halt. Longstreet, who had been riding with Lee, left Hood's division to ride forward and determine the cause of the delay. Longstreet and McLaws conducted a quick reconnaissance on their own. By the time they returned to the head of Kershaw's column, they were both “manifesting considerable irritation...” McLaws indicated that he had found a more suitable route on his earlier

reconnaissance but that the way to get to it was by counter-marching. After suggesting that Hood's division take over the lead, to which McLaws objected, Longstreet authorized the movement.⁵⁹

Kershaw was ordered to conduct a countermarch back to the Adam Butt farm. From there he followed a farm lane that intersected with the Fairfield road at the Butt's Schoolhouse and the Isaac Johns farm. He followed the Fairfield road toward Gettysburg for a distance of about one-half mile before turning south onto the Willoughby Run road.⁶⁰

Although Hood's division was led on a "long and circuitous march," there are no accounts from Hood's division concerning a countermarch. That may be because Hood's division did not conduct a countermarch. Hood's division, following McLaws' division, turned from the Herr's Ridge road onto a farm lane at Dr. Samuel E. Hall's house. After passing through some woods, Hood turned his column south on a farm road, one that paralleled modern-day Park Avenue, and past the farm of Peter Stallsmith. The Civil War-era road directly connected with the Willoughby Run road.⁶¹

Despite the precautions taken, the march was seen by the Federal signal station on Little Round Top. At 1:30 P.M., the signal station reported that a "heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10,000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right." About forty minutes later, the station reported that the enemy troops "were passing on a by-road from Dr. [Samuel E.] Hall's house to Herr's tavern... A train of ambulances is following them." The signal corps officers may have had help from Daniel H. Klinge, a local farmer who lived along the Emmitsburg road. At about mid-day, Mr. Klinge and his family had been told by several officers to leave. At one point, while going past the base of Little Round Top, Klinge was stopped and taken to the summit where he "told the places the rebels were putting their wounded of the first day in, names of roads, distances, and where they led to."⁶²

The division of Major General George E. Pickett began to arrive near the Marsh Creek camp site on the Chambersburg road at about 2:00 P.M., after a twenty-three-mile march from Chambersburg. Major Walter Harrison, Pickett's acting assistant and inspector general, remembered that the men "were parched by the excessive heat and the dust of the road..." Despite the dust and the heat, the "officers and men of the division were at once anxious to get on to where the battle was engaged." Pickett rode in advance to find Longstreet and report his division's position. Harrison reported to Lee on the position and condition of the division with the advice that "with two hours' rest, they could be at any part of the field he might desire to use them."

Within a half an hour I reported this to Gen. Lee in person. His reply was: "Tell Gen. Pickett I shall not want him this evening, to let his men rest, and I will send word when I want them."⁶³

Meanwhile, McLaws was encountering "considerable difficulty" on the Willoughby Run road:

Owing to the rough character of the country in places and the fences and ditches we had to cross, the countermarch was effected, and my troops were moving easily forward along a road with fences on the side not giving room enough for a company front, making it necessary to break files to the rear.⁶⁴

After marching on the Willoughby Run road for about one mile, the column returned to the Black Horse Tavern road. The column followed this road, or the dry bed of Willoughby Run, to Pitzer's Schoolhouse. Here the column halted again. Longstreet asked McLaws how he was going in. When McLaws answered, "That will be determined when I can see what is in my front," Longstreet replied that there was nothing in his front that "you will be entirely on the flank of the

enemy.” McLaws stated that he would continue his march “in columns of companies, and after arriving on the flank as far as necessary will face to the left and march on the enemy.” That suited Longstreet.⁶⁵

At this point, to break up any further delays, Longstreet ordered Hood’s division to quicken its march and to “pass to the front of McLaws.” Hood’s movement was accomplished by “throwing out an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way.”⁶⁶

McLaws’ division, with Kershaw’s brigade in the lead, was reaching the base of Warfield Ridge just before 3:00 P.M. Unlike the Chambersburg pike, the roads for this march were, at best, country lanes. They were very narrow and unpaved. This should have lowered the march rate to about one and one-half miles an hour. The march covered about five miles. This would require a march of between three and six hours for Longstreet’s men to get into position. The earliest time Longstreet’s forces could be in position was 4 P.M. It was noted that Lee was anxious about Longstreet’s “slow” march. But as one modern officer has stated, “The marching of the First Corps was normal; and when one is anxious to get down to business, anything that is normal appears to be slow.”⁶⁷

The sharpshooters of Brigadier General W. T. Wofford’s brigade had been “kept well to the front,” probably as an advanced skirmish line. There was some concern that the sharpshooters would somehow get on the wrong route and uncover the movement. Major James M. Goggin, McLaws’ assistant adjutant-general, was ordered by McLaws “to look after them.” Goggin rode at least a mile in front of the column when he saw the sharpshooters “approaching at a brisk pace.” One of the men informed Goggin that:

General Sickles was approaching very rapidly and could be “cut off” if we moved promptly. I galloped back at full speed and when I reached the Command I found it again at a halt, and both officers and men of our division in, apparently no very amiable mood. On inquiry I was informed that the halt had been ordered that Hoods Command might be moved to the front & you (Longstreet) & Genl McLaws were pointed out to me engaged, it appeared, in very earnest conversation.⁶⁸

McLaws had good reason to be in a “very earnest conversation” with Longstreet. The situation at the Peach Orchard was anything but what McLaws was expecting. McLaws, writing to his wife within days of the battle, wrote that the report was “that the enemy had but two regiments of infantry and one battery at the Peach orchard.” Instead, “the enemy were discovered in greater force than was supposed.” As Kershaw was approaching the woods on the summit of Warfield Ridge, he was fired on by Federal artillery. Kershaw, “a very cool, judicious and gallant gentleman,” turned the head of his column to the right and placed it behind the protection of a stone wall. McLaws, meanwhile, “hurried back to quicken the march of those in the rear, and sent orders for my artillery to move to my right and open fire...”⁶⁹

Just prior to the Confederate occupation of Warfield Ridge, at about 3:00 P.M., Gen. Meade discovered that:

Major-General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps, not fully apprehending the instructions in regard to the position to be occupied, had advanced, or rather was in the act of advancing, his corps some half a mile or three-quarters of a mile in front of the line of the Second Corps, on the prolongation of which it was designed his corps should rest.⁷⁰

The 3rd Corps, instead of occupying a position along Cemetery Ridge, now occupied a position that was nearly twice as long and was not anchored on any other troops or a naturally strong

position. From the Confederate perspective, instead of fewer than five hundred infantry and one battery to oppose their advance, there were now nearly five thousand five hundred infantry plus at least four batteries of artillery. This “new” line ran for nearly 1,100 yards from the south edge of the Peach Orchard, along the Emmitsburg road nearly to the Peter Rogers’ house.⁷¹

McLaws wrote, “Thus was presented a state of affairs which was certainly not contemplated when the original plan or order of battle was given, and certainly was not known to General Longstreet a half hour previous.” Major Osman Latrobe, of Longstreet’s staff, delivered an order to McLaws from Longstreet asking why he did not charge. McLaws informed Latrobe he would charge as soon as his division was formed for it. Soon after this, the order was repeated. McLaws “informed the officer again that the enemy was so strong in my front that it required careful preparation for the assault...” McLaws now received a preemptory order to charge, which had been issued by both Longstreet and Lee. As McLaws was instructing his staff “to send orders for a simultaneous move of the whole line,” he was ordered “to wait until Hood got into position.”⁷²

There is good documentation that Lee was with Longstreet most of the afternoon of July 2 or was at least in the area of Warfield Ridge. Longstreet wrote that while he was placing his troops in position, “General Lee at the same time gave orders for the attack to be made by my right...” General Pendleton reported that after Wilcox’s brigade had cleared Pitzer’s Woods of Federal troops, which allowed the Confederates to view the ground beyond the woods, he was “about to enter the woods, met the commanding general, *en route* himself for a survey of the ground.” General Wilcox also remembered that at about 4 P.M., Lee “stopped near me for a few minutes...” Fitzgerald Ross wrote that an hour earlier, “we rejoined General Longstreet, who, after a long consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, was at this moment riding down with his Staff towards the front.” Major John W. Fairfax of Longstreet’s staff also remembered that Lee was with Longstreet for most of the day, up to about 3 P.M.⁷³

Lieutenant D. Augustus Dickert, 3rd South Carolina Infantry wrote, “Longstreet passed us once or twice, but he had his eyes cast to the ground, as if in a deep study, his mind disturbed, and had more the look of gloom than I had ever noticed before.”⁷⁴

While Longstreet was in apparent consultation with Lee, he began receiving messages from Hood about the conditions on his front. Hood, like McLaws, noted the changed conditions in the Peach Orchard area and also what appeared to be Sickles’ left flank in the area of Devil’s Den. Hood reported that his Texas scouts had discovered that the country around the Round Tops “was open, and that I could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top, and assault the enemy in flank and rear.” Hood considered “it was unwise to attack up the Emmetsburg road, as ordered.” He suggested going around the Round Tops and attacking the Federal position in flank and rear.⁷⁵

Hood sent two staff officers to Longstreet “bearing to you my request to be allowed to make the proposed movement.” Longstreet’s answers both times were: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.” Hood next sent Major William Harvey “Harry” Sellers, his adjutant-general, to Longstreet and received the same response. At almost the same time, Major John W. Fairfax of Longstreet’s staff rode up and repeated the order. As Hood’s line started to advance, Longstreet arrived in person. Hood again protested, “the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career,” the method of attack and his “regret at not being allowed to attack in flank.” Longstreet’s answer was, in effect, “We must obey the orders of General Lee.” Longstreet is sometimes criticized for not following Hood’s advice and for trying to attack the Round Tops from the flank and rear. However, this would have necessitated another march into position of at least a mile and a half. This would have required at least another hour to two hours to get the troops into position, not to mention having to move the artillery support. This would have moved the attack time back to about 6 P.M. and would have given Longstreet’s men less than two hours of daylight to launch an attack and to try to exploit any gains. This would have meant no attack at all on July 2.⁷⁶

After Longstreet returned to McLaws' position, he wanted to know why a battery had not been placed in position "where the road by which we marched reached the edge of the open space in front." McLaws was afraid a battery at that position would draw enemy fire, be in the way of his attack, and "tend to demoralize my men." Longstreet ordered a battery into position, and it immediately drew enemy fire.⁷⁷

Colonel E. P. Alexander, commanding a battalion of Longstreet's reserve artillery, had been given command of all the batteries that would be engaged in the afternoon. In his early reports, he wrote that he was to "accompany" the divisions of McLaws and Hood "in the attack upon the left." He confirmed that the "march into position was performed with these divisions." Brigadier General Pendleton reported that after Longstreet had halted his infantry, he "sent back to hasten his artillery....Cabell's, Alexander's and Henry's battalions at length arrived."⁷⁸

Colonel Henry C. Cabell, commanding McLaws' artillery battalion, reported that he "moved up with the division." As the command began to ascend Warfield Ridge, Cabell moved his battalion to the head of the column. He then "turned to the right, and placed the battalion in position on the edge of the wood, the right resting near the road leading from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg." Cabell's lead battery was probably the one Kershaw witnessed moving "along the road parallel with my line of march."⁷⁹

Captain Fitzgerald Ross, an Austrian military observer, wrote that he rejoined Longstreet at about 3 P.M., just after Longstreet had had "a long consultation with the Commander-in-Chief." Ross observed that "Longstreet rode up the line and down again, occasionally dismounting, and going forward to get a better view of the enemy's position."⁸⁰

The best evidence suggests that Longstreet's artillery first opened fire between 3 and 3:30 P.M. Hood's infantry assault began one-half hour later, at about 4 P.M. McLaws' infantry moved to the assault at about 5:30 P.M. At 3:30 P.M., the Federal signal station on Little Round Top reported to Major General Daniel E. Sickles, 3rd Corps, the massing of Longstreet's forces on Sickles' left.⁸¹

Longstreet's post-Gettysburg career is well known and need not detain us. But what of Captain Samuel R. Johnston's "failed" reconnaissance on July 2? Did it have any bearing on Johnston's post-Gettysburg career? Apparently not. An officer in the Washington Artillery remembered seeing Johnston on July 5 "looking for favorable ground in our rear to lay out a line of battle." After the pontoon bridge had broken at Falling Waters during the retreat, Longstreet praised the work of Johnston, Major John J. Clarke, and Captain Henry T. Douglas, who had "applied themselves diligently to the work of repairing the bridge." Johnston was promoted to major on March 17, 1864, and to lieutenant colonel on September 15, 1864. During the Richmond campaign in 1864 and 1865, Johnston was in charge of some of the defensive works along Longstreet's front. Colonel Walter Stevens, chief engineer, Army of Northern Virginia, wrote that Johnston "has no superior as constructing & locating engineer." Johnston continued his career as an engineer after the war and died in East Orange, New Jersey, on December 24, 1899.⁸²

The "Lost Cause" myth holds Longstreet personally responsible for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg. He has been charged over the years with disobeying Lee's orders and for his slow movement into position on July 2. In this writer's opinion, both of these charges are substantially without foundation. It must be conceded that Longstreet did not believe Gettysburg was a good place for the Confederates to fight a battle, and he clearly did not agree with Lee's battle plan. As the ranking lieutenant general in the Confederate army, second-in-command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and considering his close association with Lee, Longstreet may have felt he had freedom to make suggestions to Lee. "The question," as stated by Colonel B. D. Sanger, "of when a principal lieutenant must cease to give advice is always a moot one." However, once Lee had issued final orders, any further suggestions would have seemed out of place.⁸³

Longstreet brought his forces forward in the most expeditious manner available to him. His troops had to fight the elements, road conditions, and other troops blocking their way in order to

reach the Marsh Creek encampments. By at least 7 A.M. on the morning of July 2, Longstreet's forces were in position on Herr's Ridge, opposite the right center of the Confederate line as it then existed. After waiting for Law's brigade, with Lee's permission, Longstreet began what would become a circuitous march of almost five miles to reach his attack position. This march was accomplished in the minimum time possible, and by 4 P.M., Longstreet's men were in position to attack.⁸⁴

Perhaps the last word on Longstreet's performance properly belongs to a twentieth-century general who, like Lee, at times had to deal with opinionated subordinates. When commenting on Longstreet's performance at Gettysburg, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that Longstreet could not have attacked on the morning of July 2 "with any strength." Eisenhower continued, "It has been charged, though nobody today knows the truth, that he was holding back to get Lee to see the futility of the attack... But it is pretty hard to go back into the motives of the man. Lee always respected Longstreet." As to the charge that Longstreet was dragging his feet, Eisenhower felt that Longstreet was too good of a soldier to deliberately botch an attack. Despite their differences at Gettysburg, the always-combative Longstreet never failed to support Lee. At Appomattox, for example, Lee was "apprehensive" of receiving "humiliating demands" from Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. Longstreet suggested "that in that event he [Lee] should break off the interview and tell General Grant to do his worst."⁸⁵

Notes

¹ U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1880 – 1901), Series I, 27(2): 348. [Hereafter cited as *OR*]; James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," *The Annals of the War* (Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia *Weekly Times*, 1879), 420.

² *OR*, Series I, 27(2):318; Arthur J. L. Fremantle, *The Fremantle Diary*, ed. Walter S. Lord (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1954), 254; Harry W. Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 105; For photographic evidence of this see William A. Frassanito, *Gettysburg: A Journey in Time* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), 70, 71, 74, 75. Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson reported that "the intervening ground being slightly undulating, inclosed by rail and plank fences, and under cultivation." Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis reported that "...the intervening space, excepting the crests of the hills, being fields, intersected by strong post and rail fences." *OR*, Series I, 27(2):614, 650.

³ James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox: A Memoir of the Civil War*, ed. James I. Robertson, Jr. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1960), 358; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas R. Hay, *James Longstreet* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 170; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):317, 318.

⁴ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):317, 318. Part of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division was one mile west of Cashtown by 10 A.M. (See *OR*, Series I, 27(2):622.)

⁵ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):358, 613; *OR*, Series I, 51(2):732; Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Millwood, NY: Kraus Publishing Co., 1977), 7:64-90; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 351; Fremantle, 201. I believe Lee did this so he could be assured of concentrating two of his three corps in the area of Cashtown with Longstreet's men bringing up the rear. These orders were issued before Lee was aware of any fighting at Gettysburg.

⁶ *OR*, Series I, 51(2):732. The orders for Pickett were issued at 10:30 P.M., July 1.

⁷ *OR*, Series I, 51(2):732; Joseph B. Kershaw, "Kershaw's Brigade at Gettysburg," in Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. 4 Vols. (1888, Reprint, Secaucus, NJ: Castle, n.d.), 3:331; D. Augustus Dickert, *History of Kershaw's Brigade* (1899. Reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing, Co., 1990):231. Times given in this paper for sunrise, sunset, and twilight were obtained from the U. S. Naval Observatory, Astronomical Applications Department, <http://aa.usno.navy.mil>, March 14, 2005. "Sunrise and sunset conventionally refer to the times when the upper edge of the disk of the Sun is on the horizon, considered unobstructed relative to the location of interest. Atmospheric conditions are assumed to be average, and the location is in a level region of the Earth's surface... Before sunrise and after sunset there are intervals of time, twilight, during which there is

natural light provided by the upper atmosphere, which does receive direct sunlight and reflects part of it toward the Earth's surface." <http://aa.usno.navy.mil>, March 14, 2005.

⁸ Robert M. Willingham, *No Jubilee: The Story of Confederate Wilkes* (Washington, GA: Wilkes Publishing Com., 1976), 33.

⁹ Dickert, 231.

¹⁰ *OR*, Series I, 51(2):732. Why it took four and a half hours for these orders to reach Walton is unclear.

¹¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*: 361; Sanger and Hay, 172.

¹² Fremantle, 255; McLaws, "Gettysburg," 67, 68; Diary of Marcus L. Green, Philips' Georgia Legion, diary entry for July 2. Copy from GNMP Files 7-GA-Battalions. Copy was obtained from Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania NMP. Original from Kennesaw Mountain NB. The distance from Greenwood to Marsh Creek is about thirteen miles. At the average marching rate of two miles per hour it would have taken the head of McLaws' division about six hours to reach its encampment. As McLaws' column was almost two miles long, the tail of the column would have reached the encampment between 11 and 12 P.M. It was from the front yard of the Whisler house that Lt. Marcellus Jones, 8th Illinois Cavalry, fired the opening shot in the battle.

¹³ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):445, 446; Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 365-367. In the post-war years, Longstreet was accused of disobeying an order from Lee to attack at sunrise. Several of Lee's staff officers, including Walter H. Taylor, Charles Marshall, and A. L. Long, denied that Lee issued any orders for the morning of July 1. Long wrote that he could not "recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg..." See Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 437, 438.

¹⁴ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):509, 513, 927, 928, 939; *OR*, Series I, 27(3):487, 488; J. Willard Brown, *The Signal Corps, U. S. A. in the War of the Rebellion* (Boston: U. S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896), 360, 361.

¹⁵ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):358, 420, 424; William Miller Owen, *In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery of New Orleans* (Boston: Ticknor & Com., 1885), 243; John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat* (1880, Reprint, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 56. Hood is quoting from a letter he sent to Longstreet on June 28, 1875. Brig. Gen. Henry I. Benning's brigade was leading Hood's division on July 1.

¹⁶ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):366, 420; Fremantle, 205 (Fremantle also reported that they were up by about 3:30 A.M.); Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 362; E. M. Law, "The Struggle for 'Round Top,'" in Buel and Johnson, 3:319; Buel and Johnson, 331; Andrew B. Cross, *The War and the Christian Commission* (Baltimore, MD: U. S. Christian Commission, Committee of Maryland, 1865), 26; Extract in GNMP Files 7-GA59. Capt. Miller was permanently disabled by a compound fracture of the left thigh and was captured on July 4, 1863. (See Lillian Henderson, *Roster of the Confederate Soldiers of Georgia*, 6:35, 36.) Brigadier General George T. Anderson, Hood's division, wrote that the division "arrived near the battlefield via Chambersburg road... and took position with other troops of Longstreet's corps on right of the road..." See David L. & Audrey J. Ladd, eds., *The Bachelor Papers: Gettysburg In Their Own Words*. (Dayton, OH: Morningside Press, 1994-1995), 1:449.

¹⁷ John B. Bachelder troop position maps for July 2, 1863, 4:30 A.M. and 9 A.M.; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):671.

¹⁸ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):350; Pfanz, 105-107.

¹⁹ See for example Frederick Tilberg and J. Walter Coleman, "Reconnaissance on the Confederate Right, July 2, 1863," in Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), 3:755-756. These were the brigades of Col. P. Regis De Trobriand and Col. George C. Burling. (See *OR*, Series I, 27(1):482, 531.)

²⁰ Robert E. L. Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray: A Biographical Register of the Staff Offices in the Army of Northern Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2003), 174; Janet B. Hewett, ed., *Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing, 1998), Part II – Record of Events, 69:784; Service Record for Samuel R. Johnston (copy in GNMP Files V5 – Johnston, Samuel R.) Johnston's records indicate he had a dark complexion, dark hair, hazel eyes, and stood 6 feet 2 ½ inches tall.

²¹ Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray*, 174; Hewett, 785.

²² *OR*, Series I, 11(2):760; 12(2):568; 21:552, 563, 569; 25(1):805, 821, 825, 852, 879.

²³ D. H. Mahan, *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post...* (New York: John Wiley, 1861), 105; Henry W. Halleck, *The Elements of Military Art and Science* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1862), 342. See also William P. Craighill, *The Army Officer's Pocket Companion* (1862. Reprint,

(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 144-164 and H. L. Scott, *Military Dictionary* (1864. Reprint, Denver, CO: Fort Yuma Press, 1984), 488-496 for more information on reconnaissance work.

²⁴ Mahan, 106-107.

²⁵ For information on Lee's reconnaissance work in Mexico see D. S. Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 1:237-272. General Winfield Scott wrote that Lee while "greatly distinguished at the siege of Vera Cruz, was again indefatigable, during these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value. Nor was he less conspicuous in planting batteries, and in conducting columns to their stations under the heavy fire of the enemy." Freeman, 247, 248.

²⁶ S. R. Johnston letter to Fitz Lee, February 11, 1878; Johnston letter to Lafayette McLaws, June 27, 1892, S. R. Johnston MSS, Douglas S. Freeman Collection, Library of Congress. See also *Southern Historical Society Papers* 5:183-184.

²⁷ *Ibid.*; S. R. Johnston letter to Rt. Rev. George Peterkin, Dec...18__, Freeman Collection. During the war Peterkin had served as an aide-de-camp to Gen. William N. Pendleton. This letter from Johnston could not have been written before 1878. Peterkin was not elected the first Episcopal bishop of the Diocese of West Virginia until 1878. Johnston refers to Peterkin as "My Dear Bishop." (See George William Peterkin's entry in Dumas Malone, ed., *The Dictionary of American Biography*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 14:501. The letter was probably written in 1895. Johnston makes a reference to an article by "Perry." This is most likely Leslie J. Perry, an editor on the *Official Records*, who wrote an article in 1895 refuting the charges against Longstreet made by Pendleton.

²⁸ Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray*, 97. Longstreet only reported, "Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself..." He did not mention any names. *OR*, Series I, 27(2):358. There is a collection of Clarke's papers at the Virginia Military Institute, but they relate to Clarke's service with the Army of Tennessee in the later part of the war and not to Gettysburg.

²⁹ Johnston to McLaws, June 27, 1892.

³⁰ Johnston to McLaws, June 27, 1892; Johnston to Peterkin, Dec. 18, ____.

³¹ There is some speculation that Johnston was on the slopes of Bushman Hill. This hill is located southwest of Big Round Top. However, it is not as high as Big Round Top and no officer who may have been on Bushman Hill wrote about a "commanding view" from the hill.

³² Brown, 360, 361.

³³ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):927, 928, 939, 1032; Newel Cheney, *History of the Ninth Regiment, New York Cavalry, War of 1861 to 1865* (Ashville, NY: Berrybook Press, 1901), 114-115; Col. George H. Chapman, 3 IN CA to John Bachelder, Ladd and Ladd, 1:46; Pfanz, 97; Col. John Pulford, 5 MI IN, reported that he had been ordered to the support of Calef's (Tidball's) battery at about 1 P.M. See *OR*, I, 27(1):525.

³⁴ Kathy Georg Harrison, *Cultural Landscape Report: Emmitsburg Road Ridge* (GNMP, n.d., n.p.), 2.

³⁵ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):369, 386, 478, 509, 531; Harrison, 2, 4.

³⁶ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):552; Diary of Adolfo Fernandez-Cavada, Assistant Inspector General to Brig. Gen. Andrew H. Humphreys, GNMP Vertical Files, V5 – Cavada, Adolfo, 3.

³⁷ Francis Adams Donaldson, *Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson*, Gregory Aiken, ed. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998), 307. The official history of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers also mentions, "The position commanded a view of all the country between the two lines to the left of the Union centre, covering a scope of some two square miles." Survivors' Association, *History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers* (Philadelphia, PA: J. L. Smith, Publishers, 1888), 254.

³⁸ Sanger and Hay, 175.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 175, 176; Fremantle, 263; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):366, 420, 429; Buel and Johnson, 331; E. P. Alexander, "The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg" in Buel and Johnson, 3:358; "Letter from Colonel J. B. Walton", in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 5:50. See also Col. D. B. Sanger, "Was Longstreet a Scapegoat," *Infantry Journal, Journal of the United States Infantry Association*, February 1936:39-45. Infantry usually averaged about two miles an hour. H. L. Scott's *Military Dictionary* says infantry can "pass over five miles in two hours, halts included." This is probably under ideal conditions. Conditions, in reality, were rarely ideal. (See Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 403.)

⁴⁰ For the strength of Longstreet's forces see John W. Busey and David G. Martin, *Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg* (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 1986), 130, 131, 137. The figures for supply and baggage wagons were extracted from a Memo by Kathy Georg Harrison, June 9, 1993 and Lt. Col.

Charles R. Shrader, "Field Logistics in the Civil War," in Jay Luvass and Harold W. Nelson, *The U. S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam* (Carlisle, PA: South Mountain Press, Inc., 1987), 255-284.

⁴¹ Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 422; Buel and Johnson, 340; G. Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (1905. Reprint, Jackson, TN: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., 1958), 157. Lee was thinking of an attack on the Federal left but, perhaps, not as wide a movement as Longstreet had proposed.

⁴² *OR*, Series I, 27(2):363. In the modern sense, G. Moxley Sorrel, although titled the assistant adjutant-general, was serving as Longstreet's chief of staff. Sorrel wrote that in October 1862, Company H, 7th South Carolina Cavalry (the Kirkwood Rangers) had been assigned to Longstreet's headquarters for "courier and escort service." See Sorrel, 117, 118; Hewett, Part 2, 64:135.

⁴³ "Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg," Letter from Hood to Longstreet, June 28, 1875, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 4:147 (see also Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 55-59); Fremantle, 205, 206.

⁴⁴ McLaws, "Gettysburg," 68-69; Lafayette McLaws, "Longstreet at Gettysburg," *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, February 15, 1888. T. J. Moncure, born in 1832, in Virginia, had served on topographic duty from December 1862 to June 1863 when he was assigned as an engineer officer to McLaws. See Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray*, 223.

⁴⁵ Owen, 243; *OR*, Series I, 27(2): 429; Hewett, 357;

⁴⁶ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):350; Buel and Johnson, 3:358-359; Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 235-236.

⁴⁷ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):350.

⁴⁸ Eleanor D. McSwain, *Crumbling Defenses, or Memoirs and Reminiscences of John Logan Black, Colonel, CSA* (Macon, Georgia: Eleanor D. McSwain, 1960), 36-39; John L. Black to John B. Bachelder, March 22, 1886 in Ladd and Ladd, 2:1240-1241. Col. Black (1830-1902) was appointed to West Point in 1850 but did not graduate. He was appointed lieutenant colonel of the 1st South Carolina Cavalry on October 31, 1861 and promoted to colonel on June 25, 1862. See Robert K. Krick, *Lee's Colonels: A Biographical Register of the Field Officers of the Army of Northern Virginia* (Dayton, OH: Morningside Bookshop, 1979), 48; Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, *Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy* (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, 1990), 278; Pfanz, 105, 116. Black wrote that the two officers he sent out reported back "At 8 a.m..." but he was probably mistaken as to the time.

⁴⁹ Joseph B. Kershaw to John B. Bachelder, March 20, 1876 in Ladd and Ladd, 1:453; Buel and Johnson, 331. Mark Forney related that his crops had been trampled, foraged, and destroyed. He also reported that the Confederates took, among other things, 65 bushels of wheat, 1,723 rails, 75 posts, and 360 feet of board fence. See GNMP Files 14-26: Summary of State Claims and 14-CF-44: Claims of Mark Forney.

⁵⁰ Dickert, 234; Diary of Lt. John C. Reid, 8th Georgia Infantry, GNMP Files V7-8GA. Original in Alabama State Archives.

⁵¹ Pfanz, 111-112; Jediaiah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer*, Archie P. McDonald, ed. (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 157.

⁵² *OR*, Series I, 27(2):308, 318.

⁵³ *OR*, Series I, 27(2): 308, 318, 319; Pfanz, 113, 114.

⁵⁴ *OR*, Series I, 27(2): 613, 617, 622, 631, 633; Letter from Gen. C. M. Wilcox, March 26, 1877, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 4:114, 115; Eric A. Campbell, "'Sacrificed to the bad management...of others.': Richard H. Anderson's Division at the Battle of Gettysburg," in *High Water Mark: The Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign: Programs of the Seventh Annual Gettysburg Seminar* (n.d. n. p.), 108, 109.

⁵⁵ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):482, 515, 939; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):617.

⁵⁶ Buel and Johnson, 3:319.

⁵⁷ Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 422. See also James Longstreet. "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Buel and Johnson, 3:340.

⁵⁸ Joseph B. Kershaw to John B. Bachelder, March 20, 1876 in Ladd and Ladd, 1:543, 544. Kershaw's column executed a "Company by the right flank. By file right. March." This movement is described in William J. Hardee, *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics. Two Volumes in One* (1861. Reprint, Glendale, NY:

Benchmark Publishing Corp. 1970), School of the Company, Lesson Six, Article 3:80-81. See also James R. Gunn, *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics* (1861. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1991), 159-160. See also Silas Casey, *Infantry Tactics. Three Volumes in One* (1862. Reprint, Dayton, OH: Morningside Press, 1985), Lesson Six, Article 3:165-166. Also William Gilham, *Manual of Instruction for the Volunteers and Militia of the United States* (Philadelphia: Charles Desilver, 1861), 155, 157.

⁵⁹ McLaws, "Gettysburg," 69; Buel and Johnson, 3:331; Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 423. In an unfinished paper on Gettysburg, McLaws, in referring to Johnston, wrote, "I quote his remarks & criticize his opinions to show that he knows nothing about the movement of troops. But I suppose from the details he gives, that his account of his reconnaissance is correct..." Lafayette McLaws Papers, Duke University. Fragments of a Gettysburg paper; the first page is missing. In a letter, May 17, 1875, Capt. T. J. Goree, Longstreet's aide-de-camp, wrote that Lee was constantly with Longstreet on July 2 and 3 and "that any movement that you made, as well as all delays, was with his advice or concurrence." See T. J. Goree, *Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree*, Thomas W. Cutrer, ed. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 158.

⁶⁰ Buel and Johnson, 3:332. For an explanation of a countermarch see Hardee: Lesson 6, Article 4:82-83; Gunn, 135-137; Casey, Lesson 6, Article 4:170; and Gilham, 268-270.

⁶¹ George T. Anderson to John B. Bachelder, March 15, 1876 in Ladd and Ladd, 1:449; William C. Oates, *The War Between the Union and the Confederacy* (1905. Reprint, Dayton, OH: Morningside Bookshop, 1974), 206. The modern-day Park Avenue runs to the east of the former Stallsmith farm. The old road ran on the west side.

⁶² *OR*, Series I, 27(3):488; I. N. Durboraw, "The Big Battle: A Comrade Sends Reminiscences of a Citizen of Gettysburg (D. H. Klinge)" in the *National Tribune*, December 8, 1892:4. The local farmers used their tree lots as crops. They would clear out most of the underbrush and graze their livestock in the woods. The trees were usually allowed to grow to a height of about 10 to 12 feet and were then cut down to provide building material, fire wood, and to allow younger trees to mature. The sight line from Little Round Top would have been much more extensive because of this in 1863 than today.

⁶³ Harrison, 87, 88. If Pickett's division rested for two hours they would be ready to move at 4 P.M. This would place them behind Longstreet's main line between the hours of 6 and 8 P.M. Too late to take part in the day's action.

⁶⁴ McLaws, "Gettysburg," 69. In this movement, also known as "In two ranks, undouble files," "the odd numbers will continue to march straight forward, the even numbers will shorten the step, and obliquing to the left will place themselves promptly behind the odd numbers; the rear rank will gain a step to the left so as to retake the touch of elbows on the side of the front rank." See Hardee, 82; Gunn, 164; Casey, 168-169.

⁶⁵ McLaws, "Gettysburg," 69, 70. One of the best maps showing the route taken by McLaws can be found in Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide* (1904. Reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1989), 70-71. Presumably Mrs. Longstreet got the information for this map from her husband.

⁶⁶ "Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg," Letter from Hood to Longstreet, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 4:148; McLaws, "Gettysburg," 70; Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 423.

⁶⁷ Sanger and Hay, 176; Sanger, 42. Rev. George W. Peterkin, in a letter to Pendleton's daughter, stated that he helped to guide Kershaw's column. He rode with Capt. William M. Dwight, a member of Kershaw's staff and "an old college friend," whom Peterkin referred to as "Timothy." See George W. Peterkin to Mrs. Susan P. Lee, April 29, 1887, in Susan P. Lee, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, Co., 1893), 291, 292. E. P. Alexander estimated the column lost an hour's march because of the counter-march. Without counter-marching McLaws had about a three-mile march. With the counter-march it was about five miles or about an hour's difference.

⁶⁸ James M. Goggin to James Longstreet, August 15, 1887 in U. S. Army Military History Institute, Civil War Miscellaneous Collection.

⁶⁹ John C. Oeffinger, ed., *A Soldier's General: The Civil War Letters of Major-General Lafayette McLaws* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 196; McLaws, "Gettysburg," 70. Capt. B. C. Manly, Company A, 1st North Carolina Artillery, Cabell's Battalion reported "...it was supposed that their left did not extend to this point of intersection to which we were moving. My instructions were, if we gained this point, we would be on the enemy's left flank..." *OR*, Series I, 27(2):380.

⁷⁰ *OR*, Series I, 27(1):116.

⁷¹ For a general discussion of Sickles' move see Pfanz, 124-148. The infantry involved were the brigades of brigadier generals Charles K. Graham, Joseph B. Carr, and Col. William R. Brewster. The batteries included, initially, 1st New York (G), Capt. Nelson Ames; 1st Rhode Island (E), Lt. John K. Bucklyn; Pennsylvania Light (C & F), Capt. James Thompson; and 3rd U. S. (F & K), Lt. John G. Turnbull.

⁷² McLaws, "Gettysburg," 72. Lee's presence with Longstreet at this time is confirmed by Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox in "General Wilcox to the Rescue," *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, November 24, 1877.

⁷³ Longstreet, "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Buel and Johnson, 3:340 & 341; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):350; McLaws, "Gettysburg," 72; Wilcox, *Philadelphia Weekly Times*; Fitzgerald Ross, *Cities and Camps of the Confederate States*, Richard B. Harwell, ed. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1958), 51, 52; Helen D. Longstreet, 64. Mrs. Longstreet is quoting a letter from John W. Fairfax to Gen. Longstreet, dated November 12, 1877.

⁷⁴ Dickert, 235.

⁷⁵ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 57, 58.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 58, 59. Sellers, 35 years old, from Gibson County, Tennessee, had served as a lieutenant in the Mexican War. He was named Hood's assistant adjutant-general, with the rank of captain, on March 19, 1862. He was promoted to major on November 5, 1862, after Hood had recommended him for promotion to brigadier-general. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel on February 16, 1864. One Texas veteran called Sellers, "the bravest man I saw or ever expect to see." (Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray*, 262-263.)

⁷⁷ McLaws, "Gettysburg," 72, 73.

⁷⁸ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):429; Hewett, Part 1, 5:357; *OR*, Series I, 27(2):351. Alexander, in "Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg," in Buel and Johnson, 3:359 and in *Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), states that he had the three artillery battalions, his own, Henry's, and Caball's, "parked near where our infantry lines were to be formed..." He implies that this had been done *before* the commencement of the counter-march. In Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 236, Alexander wrote that he "had gotten my battalion down in the valley of Willoughby Run, in a few hundred yards of the school-house" but that he had to wait on the infantry and Cabell and Henry. Because of these contradictions I have relied on Alexander's official reports for this description of Alexander's actions.

⁷⁹ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):367, 375.

⁸⁰ Ross, 51, 52.

⁸¹ *OR*, Series I, 27(2):372, 384, 407, 408, 412, 614; *OR*, Series I, 27(1):202. From this station "the greater part of the enemy's forces could be seen and their movements reported."

⁸² Krick, *Staff Officers in Gray*, 174; *OR*, Series I, 43(3):431; 46(2):1237, 1259, 1281, 1290, 1304; 46(3):1360, 1365, 1369, 1375; Owen, 257. With the possible exception of some reconnaissance during the Bristol Campaign, October 14, 1863, Johnston apparently spent the rest of the war as a constructing engineer.

⁸³ Sanger and Hay, 178.

⁸⁴ For a commentary on the speed of Longstreet's movements during the war, see R. L. DeNardo, "James Longstreet, the Modern Soldier" in R. L. DiNardo & Albert A. Nofi, *James Longstreet: The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1998), 36.

⁸⁵ Richard L. Graves, "A Battlefield Tour," *Civil War Times*, 3(7):7, 8; Jack Anderson, "General Eisenhower takes you on a tour of the Gettysburg battlefield," *Parade Magazine*, May 12, 1963; Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 628.