

# **“THE GENERAL PLAN OF ATTACK WAS UNCHANGED.”**

**Robert E. Lee and Confederate Operations on July 3**

William D. Hewitt

---

Confederate General Robert E. Lee had been encouraged by the results of July 2, 1863. Lieutenant General James P. Longstreet had captured the Peach Orchard, which could serve as an artillery platform. Lieutenant General Robert S. Ewell had seized a large portion of Culp’s Hill, and “the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy.”<sup>1</sup>

The events of July 3 were extensions of the operations of July 2; their planning and execution were not significantly different. This paper addresses Lee’s decisions regarding operations on July 3, and how those decisions were successful or unsuccessful. The discussion focuses on the operational (i.e., army) level of war, and the corresponding tactical-level results. The tactical impacts of subordinates’ actions on Lee’s plan are key to understanding the failures of July 3.

## **EDUCATION**

Lee’s planning was driven by his education in the military thinking of his time, namely that of Napoleon Bonaparte and his interpreters – particularly regarding the tenet of concentration against a decisive point. A significant portion of combat power, Lee had learned, must attack a decisive point. This tenet formed the central basis of his planning on July 2 and 3. Beyond this central maxim, Lee’s education was replete with guidance on the circumstances he now faced, but unfortunately, this guidance at times seemed in conflict with itself.

On one hand, Napoleon would caution, “Do not attack in front positions, which you can obtain by turning them.”<sup>2</sup> But on July 1, Lee did not have enough intelligence on the enemy to maneuver, and on July 2, he was too close to the enemy to maneuver – that is, he had enough intelligence to know that he could not maneuver. But on July 3, with the seizure of the Peach Orchard and the arrival of his cavalry, Lee recognized that he now had both the assets and space to maneuver to the south with a force capable of success.

Further, Napoleon thought it best, “To attack a wing when the enemy has decided superiority, and attack the center when the enemy is too spread out.”<sup>3</sup> He further counseled, “Frontal attacks should only be undertaken, when weakness is present.” He would further state, “When once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity ...”<sup>4</sup>

At the United States Military Academy at West Point, tactics instructor Denis Mahan characterized Napoleon’s art of battle as “a crashing fire of cannon in mass opened upon [the enemy], the rush of the impetuous column into the gap made by the artillery ...”<sup>5</sup> Napoleon would refer to the goal of Lee’s attack as a “breach” in the enemy’s line. He would state, “Once the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken.”<sup>6</sup>

19<sup>th</sup> Century military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini would add that, “A portion of the artillery should concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be struck.”<sup>7</sup> According to Jomini, other forces, such as the cavalry, “may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear when the enemy is being attacked by infantry in the front.”<sup>8</sup>

In summary, these Napoleonic maxims clearly stated that Lee could not maneuver in the face of the enemy; Lee should not transition to the defense, unless absolutely necessary; and Lee had to attack weakness – not the point where the enemy had prepared his position. But the conditions that faced Lee, and the military principles that applied, seemed to conflict, showing that at times there is no perfect answer. Judgment and discernment, and at times true genius, would be required. Lee could look to history and his own experiences for examples, as it is the study of many specific examples that enables one to discern their differences and capture their true lessons. Against these fundamentals, Lee would attempt to organize force around these concepts and strive for success.

## **EXPERIENCE**

To this point of the war, Lee had experienced the exasperating and uncontested escape of the Federals after the Seven Days campaign and again at Second Manassas. During these efforts, Lee’s adversary had demonstrated the ability to withdraw faster than Lee could pursue. Lee’s flank attacks during these battles could not be sustained. He had achieved initial confusion in the enemy, but he could not build on that success and create panic. Thus the final fruits of Confederate victory were not realized.

Lee’s experience had thus showed him that the transition to pursuit is a difficult task. A commander must have a holding force sufficient to maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy while he deploys a pursuit force to keep the enemy from reestablishing a coherent defense. This holding force is designed to slow a withdrawal, allowing time for the pursuit force to deploy to advantage. Pursuit forces can deploy along parallel routes or follow the assault forces. Their goal is to intensify panic and bring about the total submission of an enemy. In the past, Lee’s adversary had been able to detach its main body from a “stay behind” force, allowing the main body to arrive at a defensible position before Lee’s pursuit force could deploy. Lee should have learned that his pursuit force must be more mobile than the enemy’s main body, so that he could arrive at an advantageous position before the enemy did. Lee had only belatedly learned another lesson espoused by Napoleon, that the cavalry was the ideal pursuit force.<sup>9</sup>

## **TRUISMS**

One military truism is key throughout operations: Maintain “stance” and balance. A force must be capable of executing any desired plan. Regardless of the brilliance of any plan and the morale of the army, some plans are just not possible, or are so highly improbable that commanders should not attempt them. Lee’s force had suffered significant damage to this point, and while his adversary had also suffered, during planning a commander must look at the entire requirement of forces. Lee’s initial numeric inferiority and subsequent damage diminished his capabilities. When a commander assesses the requirements of the coming battle against his capabilities, he allocates units to conduct specific tasks.

Imbalances or shortfalls must be addressed, particularly in the initial assault. If the initial assault is unsuccessful, there will be no exploitation or pursuit. Therefore the initial assault must be successful.

When the requirements of battle exceed the capabilities, increased risk occurs. And at a point, the risk becomes so great, that the plan becomes a gamble. As former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan often told his staff, “Hope is not a method.” [should have a reference for this] Uncorrected shortfalls in every element (i.e., assault, exploitation, and pursuit forces) comprise a recipe for failure.

Proper timing of events and phases is a command challenge. Committing the pursuit force too early can result in mixing forces and may allow the adversary to meet the pursuit force separately, or maneuver away from the threat. Committing the force too late allows the adversary to arrive at a subsequent defensive line and establish a coherent defense before the pursuit force can arrive.

Further, when multiple units are assigned multiple tasks, timing becomes even more complex – and critical. A pursuit force, particularly in a numerically inferior attacker, may serve “double duty” as a counterattacking force or reserve, in case the attack suffers a reverse. “Trigger” actions, which are preliminary conditions or events, must be established to give additional time for decisions and preliminary movement of forces to transition from one task to the next task.

Any pursuit force must be more mobile than the its enemy’s withdrawing force. If possible, it is placed in an advantageous position, so that preliminary fighting does not damage it before it is needed for its assigned task. It should be well supplied and equipped to drive deep into the enemy’s rear, to maintain pressure on the withdrawing enemy. By attacking and isolating portions of the enemy, the pursuer defeats the enemy’s command and control and turns an orderly withdrawal into confusion and then panic.

An attacking commander must not only be able to discern when to begin a pursuit, he also must be able to discern when to abandon a failed effort. The difference between success and failure can rest on the thinnest of lines. This discernment is the most difficult task amidst the swirling events of battle, with its many unknowns and uncertainties. Many battles are decided by the smallest of forces.<sup>10</sup> Many attacks are abandoned on the brink of success when the commander’s determination falters.<sup>11</sup> A general must maintain a cool head and see the battlefield clearly.<sup>12</sup> A commander who continues an attack a minute longer than he should, with bad results, is judged a “bloody fool,” while a commander who continues a minute longer with good results is judged a “great captain.” This is the commander’s great dilemma ...

## SITUATION

A review of the factors facing Lee can provide the baseline for events and analysis. These factors include the friendly situation, the enemy situation, and the terrain. A discussion of feasible options, a comparison of options, and Lee’s decision provide the basis for understanding Lee’s intent.

### Friendly Situation

Lee’s army had been reinforced from the previous day. Major General George Pickett’s division, the smallest in the army, and Major General J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry division had arrived on the afternoon of July 2. But the army had also been damaged. The divisions of major generals Henry Heth, William D. Pender, and Robert E. Rodes had been damaged on July 1. Both Heth and Pender were wounded. Major generals John B. Hood’s and Lafayette McLaws’s divisions had also suffered serious losses on July 2. Hood was wounded along with several brigade commanders. In addition, the cumulative casualties in Major General Jubal Early’s division from both days had rendered it less than combat effective.


Figure 1 shows the Confederate and Federal forward line of troops early on July 3. Hood remains at the base of Big Round Top and has extended his position slightly south and east from July 2. McLaws retains a skirmish line opposite the Federal center positions, but pulls his main line of defense to the rear about a mile, just west of the Emmitsburg road.<sup>13</sup> Major General Richard H. Anderson reoccupies his general line after July 2. Lieutenant General A. P. Hill minimally adjusts the rest of his corps. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s corps remains to the immediate southwest of town (Rodes’s division) and east of town with Early’s division. Major General Edward Johnson’s division is entrenched and committed to the

eastern lower slope of Culp's Hill. Neither Longstreet on the right nor Ewell on the left could easily be extracted from their present positions in daylight.

With the arrival of Stuart's cavalry division late on July 2, Lee now had the ideal pursuit force. On July 2, he had only infantry available. Now, he could employ his cavalry to prevent the failed pursuits of past battles. He could also emplace the pursuit force with direct access to its potential task and the pursuit phase could now be separated from the initial assault.

### Enemy Situation

On this the third day of battle, Lee would have expected the Army of the Potomac to have its full force concentrated.<sup>14</sup> He certainly knew that his army had engaged six of the seven Federal corps. The remaining 6<sup>th</sup> Corps had skirmished on the south side of the battlefield, but Lee may not have identified it. Analysis would have yielded that Lee had damaged two Federal corps on July 1, and at least two more, if not three, corps on July 2, but also that the Federals were sufficiently strong enough to conduct counterattacks on the evening of July 2 to seize Big Round Top.



In addition to the Federal forward line of troops, Figure 1 shows the hidden 6<sup>th</sup> Corps units, which Lee suspected were serving as the reserve. *The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War*

The official records provide insight into Lee's knowledge of the enemy. Figure 1 is Lee's map to accompany his report, and shows what he believed to be the friendly and suspected enemy locations on July 2 and 3. Lee was correct with most of his intelligence, but there were some notable errors. It is of utmost importance to understand that this map represents either what Lee knew or expected – not necessarily what we now know was true.

Of significant note is that, on his map, Lee placed all of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps as a reserve directly behind Cemetery Hill and Ridge – reflecting his education, which had taught him to expect that reserves would be placed directly behind the decisive point. So, while history records that the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps – with an expected strength of at least 10,000 fully capable men – was dispersed, Lee believed the entire corps was located beyond view and located to defend Cemetery Hill and Ridge. It was a logical assumption, but one that would contribute to Lee's error in judgment regarding what would become the folly of Pickett's Charge.

### **Terrain**

Terrain analysis yields the following key points: First, both Federal flanks were anchored on high hills. From the Round Tops the Federals could view most of the low ground from there to Jack's Mountain, some eight miles to the west. By attacking from that direction on July 2, Lee had drawn Federal attention to the south of the battlefield. While the seizure of the Peach Orchard and the arrival of cavalry allowed Lee to maneuver, he could not do so undetected.

Second, the best terrain available for any Confederate defensive effort was to the rear, especially between Cashtown and Herr's Ridge. The best terrain available for any offensive effort was directly in front of Anderson's division's general position. That terrain provided the flattest slope across a wide plain.

Third, the Confederate force was divided by the town of Gettysburg, with the Confederates remaining on exterior lines with each flank committed.

Fourth, on the tactical level, terrain would continue to greatly constrain Ewell and Longstreet. Ewell's axis of attack on July 2 yielded gains on the east side of Culp's Hill. Wolf Hill on his left and the severe slope on his right would prevent Ewell from bringing his force to bear. He had sufficient space on his axis for only three or four brigades at a time. Longstreet could not improve his position unless reinforced, as his two divisions were overextended with gaps between brigades.

In summary, if the defense were implemented, movement would have to be undertaken at night. If the offense was continued, the favorable terrain was limited to the center sector.

### **OPTIONS**

Lee's options were to maneuver, to withdraw, to transition to the defense, or to continue the offense. Thanks to Stuart's arrival, Lee could now maneuver, though his options were limited. Movement to the east and north remained problematic, as it risked exposing Lee's line of communications, which extended from Virginia through Chambersburg and Cashtown to Gettysburg.

Maneuver to the east and south was another option. With the enemy now concentrated, the Peach Orchard in friendly hands, and the Federal observation post on the heights above Emmitsburg, Maryland seized, that avenue was open. Lee had gained significant depth of space for maneuvering south after the successful July 2 attack through the Peach Orchard and the corresponding adjustment by the Federals to occupy and reinforce the Round Tops. There were roads available to move trains, though Lee would need two parallel roads to move all the trains within twenty-four hours. He could move some of his trains on a single road at the eastern base of South Mountain and move the remaining trains back through the pass along the west side of South Mountain, but Lee would need an additional road for his infantry, which would protect the trains as they moved. Stuart's cavalry would have to screen from Longstreet's immediate right to the front of the march.

If Lee decided to maneuver south, Ewell would have to move first. But Ewell was now committed to Culp's Hill – committed too far to be pulled, as if snared. On the other end of the line, Longstreet was now occupying terrain from the Peach Orchard to Houck's Ridge, and would be needed to anchor any movement. Hill was protecting the center and the Cashtown Pass line of communication. Lee had no force left, save Pickett, with which to begin any maneuver south and west. But Pickett's force simply was not large enough to maneuver any significant distance and still be capable of defending itself while awaiting other forces to join it. So, Pickett could not move any extended distance, but he could move to extend Longstreet's line beyond Warfield Ridge. Ewell would have to disengage in order to lead the more significant maneuver. This operation would require two days – one night for Ewell to pull back, and the next day for him to move far enough to the south with the trains – and must be performed without detection by the enemy. Napoleon would caution that maneuver with the enemy nearby is problematic. Maneuver would have been easier on July 2, with the Federals distracted to Lee's left and Seminary Ridge masking his movements – but at that point Stuart had not been available.

Another option was to transition to the defense and allow initiative to temporarily shift to the Federals. In case of defeat, Lee would have to maintain control of two passes over South Mountain to extricate his army.<sup>15</sup> He would need to maintain a position far enough east of South Mountain that the Confederates had enough space to regain the initiative. Both Seminary Ridge-Oak Ridge and Loehr Ridge to the rear near Marsh Creek offered a good line, though Seminary Ridge-Oak Ridge line had an exposed southern flank.

The last option was to maintain the offense, in which case Lee would continue to view Cemetery Hill as the decisive point. He could undertake a traditional Napoleonic attack, as described previously. But if Lee's attack was to succeed, proper coordination of all elements would be essential – too many of his units were damaged to devise a plan that did not maximize potential combat power. All assets, including the artillery and cavalry, would be needed.

## **DECISION**

Lee could not heed the lessons of his education. His enemy was entrenched to his front with both flanks anchored, and his troops were too far entrapped on the current battlefield. While the numerically inferior Confederates occupied an extended line, his numerically superior adversary remained on shorter interior lines. The enemy was not spread too thin, as Lee was. Lee believed his enemy had a strong, undamaged reserve. His education would suggest that a flank attack, or a maneuver, would be a better option than a frontal attack – but a flank attack would not achieve the seizure of the decisive point: Cemetery Hill. And a maneuver would be too time-consuming.

If Lee were to continue the attack, he would need sufficient forces for the assault, exploitation, and pursuit in order to complete the defeat of the Army of the Potomac – and he must resource the assault for success. On the other hand, surrendering the initiative and transitioning to the defense, would require fewer forces. Nevertheless, despite the lessons of his education and the state of his forces, Lee decided to remain on the offense.

## **THE PLAN**

The mission statement of a unit provides answers to questions regarding who, what, when, where, and why. Answers to these questions are the minimum requirements for a unit to execute a mission. Subordinate units require the same information to complete any assigned task. Lee's declaration that the "general plan of attack was unchanged" has led to confusion by those uninformed of Lee's stated goal: to "dislodge" the Federals. A mistaken focus on Federal comments regarding a "flank attack" as opposed to an "attack on the flank," without consideration given to Lee's stated goal, has contributed to this confusion. In a terrain-oriented attack, such as Lee's, the direction of the attack is irrelevant; seizure of the specified terrain is the only concern. At Gettysburg on July 2, Lee was clearly terrain-oriented in his focus on Cemetery Hill<sup>16</sup> In stating on July 3 that "the plan was unchanged," Lee affirmed that he was

again making a terrain-oriented decision, and that the terrain he had in mind was again Cemetery Hill. Thus Lee's mission statement could have read, "The Army of Northern Virginia attacks early on 3 July to dislodge the Federals from Cemetery Hill."

Lee had decided to make the main attack against the enemy's left center.<sup>17</sup> He envisioned using Hood and McLaws, reinforced by Pickett, as the assault force. The assault would launch from near the Peach Orchard and, thus would require Hood and McLaws to disengage from their current positions and pull back slightly behind the Peach Orchard.<sup>18</sup> Lee sent orders to implement this plan.<sup>19</sup> Longstreet, contrary to normal habit, did not visit Lee's headquarters on the night of July 2 to make his report or receive or clarify instructions.<sup>20</sup> However, when Alexander arrived at Longstreet's bivouac after dark, Alexander was ordered to emplace his artillery in support of an attack from the southern end of the battlefield. Alexander does not identify who gave him the instructions, but it is evident that Longstreet's headquarters were in receipt of instructions of a plan to begin offensive operations from that quarter toward Cemetery Hill on July 3. Pickett was ordered, probably by Lee's headquarters, to move earlier than anticipated and join Longstreet.<sup>21</sup> Pickett moved to an area that would support the assault from the vicinity of the Peach Orchard.<sup>22</sup> Ewell's corps would attack Culp's Hill at the same time. Artillery would be emplaced along Seminary Ridge overnight to support the infantry assault, which was to begin early in the morning of July 3. Hill would support from the center as an exploitation force and perhaps contribute to the pursuit force as well. The cavalry would be placed on the flank and toward the enemy's rear as the pursuit force.<sup>23</sup>

Technically, Lee had planned a penetration, rather than a frontal attack. In a penetration, the attacking force seeks to rupture (Napoleon's "breach") enemy defenses on a narrow front to penetrate the defense. Penetrations are executed when enemy flanks are not assailable and maneuver cannot be undertaken. Commanders mass effects from all available fires at the point of penetration, then widen the penetration and pass other forces through to the enemy rear.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, in a frontal attack, an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker portion of the enemy force, or fix a larger force over a broad front.<sup>25</sup>

Confederate artillery was placed during the night with only minor adjustments in the morning. The number of guns in support was approximately 160.<sup>26</sup> Colonel E. P. Alexander, in charge of Longstreet's artillery, thought the planned cannonade would take about thirty minutes to have the desired effect,<sup>27</sup> which, as Longstreet would later say, was to "drive the enemy or greatly demoralize him ..." With 190 to 250 rounds available per gun, Alexander dared not fire longer than an hour, since, according to Lee's plan, he would need to move some pieces forward to accompany and support the assault.<sup>28</sup> Longstreet's comment regarding the goals of the cannonade shows that its target was not just the Federal artillery, but its infantry as well.<sup>29</sup> Longstreet hoped Alexander would drive the Federals from Cemetery Ridge, or so greatly demoralize them that he would be able to seize the ridge virtually unopposed.

The role of fear – demoralization - as a weapon cannot be casually overlooked. The cannonade's purpose was to "drive" or "demoralize." The first goal was physical, while the second goal was psychological – which, because it manifests less visibly, is harder to evaluate. But psychological targets are nonetheless valid military targets. With a cannonade of such magnitude, Lee could hope to instill a sense of helplessness in the enemy. When a soldier feels there is little he can do to alleviate his current stresses, the chain of command begins to deteriorate. Soldiers feel isolated. They do not fight as a unit. The weaker links begin to act, and the others begin to follow suit. They do not withstand additional stresses very well.

Figure 2 shows the operation with the penetration force, the follow force for exploitation, and the pursuit force, with a strong simultaneous supporting attack by Ewell. Lee attempts to build combat power by focusing his efforts on narrow fronts and adding combat power with his artillery.

For a supporting, or shaping attack, Ewell focused his force as well. Brigades from Rodes and Early reinforced Johnson, and in doing so these two divisions could not further contribute to the attack.<sup>30</sup> Johnson now had seven brigades available for July 3. Rather than continue the attack up the steepest part of Culp's Hill, Johnson shifted further to his left. Ewell had no force left to attack on his center or right and could not threaten the face of Cemetery Hill or the north side of Culp's Hill. Ewell was to attack at the same time as Longstreet.

The assault force (Longstreet and Ewell) would constitute approximately 45 percent of Lee's combat power. The exploitation force (part of Anderson) would be about 10 percent of the force, and the pursuit force (Stuart and other forces) would be at least 10 percent of the force. The exploitation force was undersized, but combined with the anticipated (and necessary) lack of damage to the assault force, its effects would be greater than apparent.

Not only did Lee's mission statement remain the same from July 2 to July 3, the mission statements of Lee's immediate subordinates did not change either. These would read: "1<sup>st</sup> Corps attacks Cemetery Ridge early on July 3 to dislodge the Federals from the ridge," "2<sup>nd</sup> Corps attacks Culp's Hill simultaneously with 1<sup>st</sup> Corps attack to make Cemetery Hill untenable," and "3<sup>rd</sup> Corps supports by reinforcing 1<sup>st</sup> Corps and preventing the enemy from shifting forces."

Purists may try to argue that because McLaws and Hood were replaced by Pettigrew's and Major General Isaac R. Trimble's units from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps that Lee's mission had changed. But as long as Longstreet still commanded the assault, Lee's direct subordinates retained responsibility for their continued task. Only the uninformed would attempt to argue that because it was a different day, or that some sub-units had shifted, that the overall plan had changed.

Sketch and statement








Figure 3 shows Johnson's position on Culp's Hill before reinforcements arrived in support of the July 3 attack. Vegetation is also indicated, as are hills and other obstacles.



Lee would deploy Stuart with all available cavalry to a single flank. (See Figure 4.) In doing so, Lee indicated his general plan of operation for the cavalry. Many authors have speculated on Stuart's mission, indicating in some cases that Stuart had no mission at all, or in other cases that he was performing a guard (defensive) mission on that flank. Tactical deductive reasoning helps to eliminate much of this speculation.

It is clear that Lee did not intend to deploy his cavalry defensively in a guard mission. A guard mission requires that the force extend from the flanks of the main body along good terrain toward the overall rear. Since the guard force is not looking for a fight, it is positioned far enough toward the rear to avoid contact unless the enemy attacks in that direction. Further, a guard force would be located on both flanks of the main body, though perhaps not in equal numbers, to provide a balanced security posture against any potential enemy activity. To leave one flank unprotected would defy principles of war. Thus, were Stuart defensively deployed for a guard mission, he would have assisted Ewell by providing flank security, thus freeing up Ewell's infantry forces for battle. But he was not.



Similarly, the same line of logic applies to the notion that Stuart had no role to play in the day's operation. First, it would be a cardinal sin for Lee to leave his intelligence-gathering and most mobile force without a mission during such a critical assault. Further, if the cavalry were not assigned a mission it would deploy to the rear where the men could feed and attend to their horses and themselves – especially true for Stuart's force, which had ridden hard for several days and was in need of rest. Therefore Stuart's deployment forward, toward the enemy, and in tight formation, indicates not a defensive maneuver or a day of rest – but an offensive mission.

With Stuart taking all available forces to a single flank, Lee accepted risk by leaving his other flank unprotected. By deploying the cavalry at a distance from Ewell's main body and forward of it, Lee also indicated an offensive mission for Stuart. Lee had learned after the Seven Days campaign and Second Manassas that the pursuit force has to be more mobile than the enemy's withdrawing force. By definition, any pursuit force has to move a greater distance than the withdrawing force, so therefore it should be located in anticipation of future and early movement. Under optimum conditions, it has to be better rested and supplied than the withdrawing force, and it has to be faster.

Further evidence of Lee's intent to use Stuart as an attack force lay in the cavalry's formation. Stuart was deployed in a tight mass formation with all four brigades of about 6,000 men and horses along a 5,000-foot frontage and approximately a 750-foot depth.<sup>31</sup> While screen and guard forces would be widely deployed to gather intelligence across the widest possible zone, a tight formation is designed for a quick response. Figure 4 shows the tightness of Stuart's entire force in relation to the total battlefield. Clearly, Stuart was in an offensive formation.

Stuart's report on the battle states that he acted "... pursuant to instructions from the commanding general..."<sup>32</sup>, indicating that Stuart was under orders from Lee. He moved "to the left of Ewell's left ... to a position, where wide plain ... stretching toward Hanover,"<sup>33</sup> which was the Federal army's withdrawal route. Stuart went on: "Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it and improve the opportunity."<sup>34</sup> This sentence suggests that Stuart had to wait for the enemy to be dislodged before he acted, and that he fully expected and hoped for this outcome. The only person who could give Stuart such expectations was Lee, which provides some insight into Lee's intent to "dislodge" the enemy. Further, inasmuch as Stuart's mission was to "discover it and improve the opportunity," clearly Stuart had an offensive mission that was directed after a successful dislodgment. By definition, Stuart's mission was to act as the pursuit force.<sup>35</sup> Stuart's comment reinforces that Lee also expected additional battles or engagements conducted by Stuart, at a minimum, in the rear of the present Federal position, following the assaults of July 3.

## EXECUTION

Over the course of the morning of July 3, however, Lee's plan changed. Previously, Longstreet had sent elements in search of continuing the attack on the flank, but when Lee heard of this effort, he ordered it stopped.<sup>36</sup> Under normal circumstances any Confederate demonstration against a flank might draw enemy strength from defending against the main attack in the center, and normally this is viewed as a positive action. However, given Lee's intent to "dislodge" the enemy, any effort on the Federal flank might block the army's withdrawal routes and would be counterproductive.

It was also obvious that Longstreet, by shifting Law's division further to the south and east, had shifted forces in a direction exactly opposite of Lee's intent and had effectively eliminated that division from Lee's use. Law could not be moved again after sunrise, since much of his force was under Federal observation and within range. Longstreet had developed an entirely different plan that would now require Pickett to execute, in addition to requiring Hill to shift forces.

When Lee reiterated his desire to strike the main position using Longstreet's corps, Longstreet then expressed his reservations about using Hood and McLaws. When launched from the Peach Orchard, the flank of these divisions would be exposed, enabling the Federals to move on their flank.<sup>37</sup> Lee, recognizing the validity of Longstreet's logic, adjusted the assault force by adding Heth's division, now commanded by Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew, and half of Pender's division, commanded by Major General Isaac Trimble.

Interestingly, while most authors focus on Longstreet's delay during the countermarch of July 2, Lee himself was only critical of Longstreet's delays on July 3.<sup>38</sup> He had expected a coordinated assault by Longstreet and Ewell.<sup>39</sup> Ewell reported that he was ordered to renew his attack at daylight. He did as ordered but early in the action he received orders from Lee that Longstreet would not be ready to attack until 10 A.M.<sup>40</sup>

Since dawn, Ewell, with Johnson's reinforced division, was forced to defend against Slocum's preemptive attack. As the hours of delay mounted, Ewell shifted his forces constantly in an effort to mass fresh units to correspond to Longstreet's anticipated efforts. Ewell would add units as they reinforced, and rotated other units to other locations. But advances up the hill were limited. Longstreet's delays on July 3 prevented a coordinated attack and ironically made Longstreet's task much more difficult. Ewell did all that could be done, given the constraints on the ground. The error was not in Ewell's fight, but in staying on poor terrain after July 1.




Figure 5 shows the locations of units as Johnson organized his final attempt. He had rotated new units to the attack, and those that had been fighting for hours were withdrawn. He had shifted to the left, but did not attack Baltimore Pike, although he had three brigades available with generally flat and open terrain between Culp's Hill and Powers' Hill. Ewell did not want to attack up the steepest slope, nor could he move against the Federal route of withdrawal. Ewell understood that attacking the Federal withdrawal route was counter-productive. But he did not have sufficient space to bring all his forces to bear at one time. After multiple attempts and eight hours of fighting, Ewell could no longer wait for Longstreet to begin his attack. By noon, his current position "offered no advantage." When it was reported that Federal troops were approaching his left flank,<sup>41</sup> Johnson was forced to retire to better ground in the rear, near his initial positions of July 2 at about 1:00 P.M.<sup>42</sup> At this point, Ewell's lead brigades were forced back upon the trail brigades. With the continued rotation of units and the hours of battle, Ewell had been neutralized. And Longstreet's attack had not yet begun.

Stuart began his movement to the extreme left flank during the morning, but was detected about noon, and Federal cavalry responded.<sup>43</sup> Stuart, recognizing his mission required a significant part of his force to implement a pursuit, could only commit portions of his division at a time,<sup>44</sup> hoping that a minimal commitment would be sufficient. Stuart sent one brigade forward, then two brigades, then two regiments from different brigades, with two additional regiments following in support. In the end though, Stuart was forced to commit at least three of his four brigades to the attack. Not only was his force depleting its combat power, but the enemy was not retreating. To execute his assigned mission, Stuart would now have to penetrate the strong Federal cavalry force currently deployed in front of him before he could conduct his primary pursuit mission. But he had not yet beaten the Federal cavalry, so there was little

chance that further commitment would be successful. Thus Stuart, too, was neutralized before Longstreet's main attack even began.

Finally, after all the delays and the failures of Ewell and Stuart, Longstreet's artillery cannonade began at about 1:00 P.M. The cannonade continued until ammunition began to run low<sup>45</sup> and it appeared that some Federal guns were displaced to the rear. However, the artillery ammunition shortage was discovered too late to recall the infantry, which had begun its advance. During the cannonade many Confederate rounds overshot the front line. But Lee believed that the Federal reserve (6<sup>th</sup> Corps) was located there, and that their complete demoralization or movement was critical to the success of Longstreet's assault, so the "overhead" shots served an important purpose. Lee had no way to verify this critical assumption, however, yet the success of his plan now hinged on it.

Once the smoke cleared, the view to Longstreet's front showed the enemy had not been "driven." Instead, the Federals remained in position. The only way to determine if the Federal infantry was "demoralized" would be to test its resolve. So the attack continued. Longstreet later claimed that it quickly became clear that the attack was culminating.<sup>46</sup> It is unclear whether Longstreet saw the Federals move against the Confederate right flank or left flank, but clearly the Federals were not retreating.

The infantry lined up with Pickett on the right and Pettigrew and Trimble on the left, and began their assault. The supporting artillery to accompany the infantry assault had been identified earlier in the day and placed behind the artillery line, but when it was needed could not be found.<sup>47</sup> During the artillery cannonade, the pieces designated for the infantry assault had been moved to the rear, but no one had notified Alexander or Longstreet. Alexander would advance some guns, but not enough to change the outcome of the assault.<sup>48</sup>

The devastation in the attacking columns was striking. Later that night Lee would comment to Brigadier General John D. Imboden, "And if they had been supported, as they were to have been, but some reason, not yet fully explained to me, they were not – we would have held the position they so gloriously won ... and the day would have been ours."<sup>49</sup> The missing support to which Lee referred could have been Longstreet's men<sup>50</sup>, or Richard Anderson's brigades (using the different "follow" role of Pickett). Or Lee could have believed it was the artillery that fell short of expectations, either in its execution of the pre-assault cannonade or regarding the missing guns that were to follow the infantry assault. However, a critical analysis indicates that Lee's assessment was not accurate. As planned or executed, this attack could not have succeeded.


## CRITIQUE

Lee's evaluation of the first two days of fighting deserves some scrutiny as it relates to historical changes in Federal performance. On July 1, with four Confederate divisions committed early against two Federal corps, the outcome was predictable. On July 2, Lee's attacks yielded nothing more than that he should have gained, given the force ratios (See Figure 6.). With Longstreet's 14,000 men (and three of Anderson's brigades) attacking the 10,000 soldiers of the Federal 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps, the Federals would have been expected to surrender the Peach Orchard and the adjacent low ground. With three Confederates brigades attacking a single Federal brigade, the Southerners should have seized most of Culp's Hill. That is, all the terrain the Federals did give up should have been expected. While Lee stated that he was encouraged at these results, these engagements were a draw. Each commander continued to hold the ground that he sought to hold.

Secondly, performance indicators on the first two days of fighting also deserve some review. The Army of the Potomac had fought stubbornly on July 1, and the fighting on July 2 could have been described non-tactically as "magnificent." For Lee to miss these changes in Federal performance was an oversight.

No evidence exists that Lee had considered any options other than continuing the offense. If given his current capabilities and his enemy's change of performance, Lee had failed to consider other options, he had made a command error. On June 25, Lee's decision to expose a portion of his lines of communication, and again on June 29, when he chose to advance into the Susquehanna Valley Lee began

a process which would, under some circumstances, have limited his options unintentionally. On July 3, Lee, insofar as he did not consider his other options, had intentionally limited his options. On the first two occasions, he had other options and had selected the best available. A commander should build options, keep options open for as long as necessary, and seek new options – not intentionally restrict options, thus painting himself into a corner. Focusing on a single option without consideration of other options appears to be an irrational over-commitment, and is indicative of increased risk, if not a gamble. Lee had proceeded through this decision point too quickly.



Too much emphasis has been placed on Lee's decision to attack the center, as if it were a change of plan from July 2. Again, Lee would later state that the "general plan of attack was unchanged." Criticism generally concludes that Lee, having attacked the flanks, which the Federals then reinforced, would choose to attack the center, which he assumed would now be the weakest point. Of course, since much of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps had not yet entered the battle on July 2, Lee could not have accounted for all Federal corps to that point, and he could not see behind Cemetery Ridge to determine whether the Federals had redeployed behind the center or reconstituted its reserves, a necessary and predictable action. Nevertheless, Lee's maps for both July 2 and 3 shows the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps behind Cemetery Ridge – Lee's map did not show a weak center.

All considerations aside, it is important to note that on July 2, Lee attacked Cemetery Hill, not the Federal flank. Meade had been protecting Cemetery Hill, and could be expected to continue to do so. The Federal forces on and adjacent to Cemetery Hill were still observable there. It is far too simple to speculate and argue against Lee's own description of his plan to conclude any change other than a more direct approach. Lee still had to mass against a single "unchanged" decisive point.

Lee was attacking strength. He tried to overcome the inherent disadvantages of this fact by focusing his infantry on a narrow front, using all available assets. Historically, frontal attacks and penetrations did not have a high rate of success in the Civil War. Lee clearly recognized this, as he always chose maneuver over frontal attacks, when possible. At times, he would be forced to seek to blunt enemy advances with frontal attacks, such as at Antietam. And Malvern Hill taught him the challenges of a frontal attack, where his attack was repulsed. Lee would attempt to compensate for the record of history and the difficulties of his current situation with the addition of artillery.

On July 2, Lee attacked with six of his nine divisions, or 67 percent of his forces: Hood, McLaws, Johnson, Rodes, Pender, and portions of Early and Anderson. On July 3, Lee achieved a similar percentage, attacking with five of his eight division equivalents, or 63 percent of his force: Pickett, Johnson reinforced, Stuart, Anderson, and Heth and Pender, the latter both damaged. But while the percentages were similar, by July 3 Lee's army was a smaller army, though with the addition of the artillery, the percentage increased to some degree.

### **Force Analysis**

Lee's infantry force was not sized to both penetrate the enemy defense and defeat suspected reserves. Meade would surely have reserves, as Lee depicted on his map. Lee would adjust his force ratios by adding massive artillery to compensate for his shortfall in men. His artillery would therefore have to play a larger role in the attack than was customarily entrusted to this arm of service.

Combat power equivalents are one method of analyzing force ratios. With this method, an analyst can add up how much combat power is needed for a task. This is a somewhat subjective method, given the varying size and condition of each unit, but it is nevertheless a valuable and necessary one. A commander must apply a sufficient force against a defined enemy. Once he determines his own force, he then estimates the enemy's equivalents as well. Thus arriving at a ratio, he can make the final judgment of whether he has sufficient force for the task. For example, if Lee believed he faced a 5,000-man enemy force, and he had 15,000 men attacking, then Lee had achieved a 3:1 advantage. But given the inherent advantages of the defensive force, Lee must then ask himself whether his attacking force was too large or too small, and adjust accordingly, as he allocated assets. He sought to add friendly forces until he judged himself to have sufficient strength for the task at hand. Artillery assets can add to the overall ratio, to some extent. It is unclear what Lee's force-ratio goal was.


In the process of comparing combat power, "apples to apples" comparisons must be made. For example, if Federal divisions, which were typically smaller than their Confederate counterparts, were half the size of their counterparts, then one Confederate division would be equivalent to two Federal divisions. This could be a subjective process, but a commander must somehow determine whether his force will be successful, whatever system he uses. After all, no commander willingly and intentionally conducts his main attack without some belief his force can achieve success. Five thousand men do not successfully attack 15,000 in a penetration, where man-for-man combat power is the same. No rational man would do this.

Lee must have used some form of force analysis. His genius of battle required some judgments and evaluations to be made. Longstreet's 13,000 men were attacking not just the 6,000 Federals at the point of contact, but the other thousands who could shift along the line to reinforce the point of contact, not to mention the thousands of infantry that would be nearby in the reserve. The addition of a single Federal division in the immediate area would nearly equalize the force ratios. Two Federal divisions would tilt the equation to the defenders. The Confederate artillery would have to succeed in driving and demoralizing the Federals for Longstreet to gain the ridge. By itself, Longstreet's force was perilously close to being insufficient to the task. Longstreet would have to rely not only on the artillery, but also on Ewell to tie up at least a portion of the Federal reserve. If Lee expected the Federal 6<sup>th</sup> Corps to be the reserve, located as he depicted it on his map, then Longstreet's 13,000 men would be attacking at least 16,000 men (6,000 in the front line and 10,000+ men in reserve, not to mention the troops along the immediate flanks). Lee must have expected his artillery to compensate.

## How the Plan Unraveled

Figures 7 through 9 show the progression of the relationship between the plan and the expectation. They will be used as a graphic measure of Lee's success. Lee must have judged that he had sufficient forces to accomplish the attack (axis B). If he had any doubt, he would have added other forces. He could have reinforced the assault to augment the initial force, at the expense of the exploitation force (Anderson's division). Or he could have employed McLaws, who had pulled back to just west of the Peach Orchard and did not have any instructions.<sup>51</sup> Lee could have assigned additional combat multipliers, such as artillery, or planned a diversion (not a full scale attack, which he had ruled out as counter-productive) around the Round Tops by a small force to distract and divide the defending forces, perhaps drawing off some of the reserves. These actions would have ensured a higher chance of initial force success (Axis A on the figures), but would do so at someone's expense.

Lee also took uncertainty into account. He wanted a portion of Rodes' and Hill's (Anderson's division and half of Pender's division) forces retained to protect the center (see axis C).<sup>52</sup> Clearly, Lee judged that the force in his plan was between axis A and axis C. Once the plan was completed, it fell along axis B below. At a minimum, Lee judged his attacking force to be sufficient for the task.




But by noon Ewell had been forced off Culp's Hill and was incapable of conducting a simultaneous attack to make Cemetery Hill "untenable." Stuart's role was neutralized as well. With Johnson's withdrawal from Culp's Hill and Stuart's neutralization occurring even before the artillery cannonade began, criticism for beginning the artillery phase, before launching the ground assault, is appropriate. With Johnson's withdrawal, all of Meade's reserves, and his local Culp's Hill reserves as well, could now focus completely on Longstreet. The imbalance of forces was thus exacerbated. The local reserves and 6<sup>th</sup> Corps reserves could be focused, and other Federal forces could be shifted laterally. Lee should have now calculated that his 13,000 men were attacking as many as 22,000 men.

At this point, Lee could have called off the artillery and saved its combat power for a later defensive phase. But by continuing the cannonade and the assault, no coherent defense after this attack would be possible. Even before the cannonade was over, Lee had painted himself into the corner. He now faced the point of continuing the attack, or returning to Virginia, if unsuccessful.



As Longstreet's infantry began lining up and the artillery ceased firing, another judgment was made to continue with the ground attack. Figure 8 shows the evolution of these two Confederate setbacks against the element of time, and the corresponding decrease in probability of success for the Confederates.




Lee, by the end of the cannonade, still thought the assault could achieve some success,<sup>53</sup> as depicted in Figure 8 by the solid arrow under "Infantry Assault." That belief was incorrect. Lee must have assumed that the Federal reserve (the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps by Lee's map), had either fled or was so devastated that it could not significantly contribute to the defense. But Meade had never been forced to commit his main reserve. (Local reserves under Hancock did.) Had Longstreet penetrated, and had sufficient forces from Anderson, and even Law and McLaws, been sent to exploit the breach, Meade could have committed his reserves – more than sufficient to push the attackers back. Longstreet was vastly undersized.

While Stuart's neutralization was not viewed as critical to the day's operation, his cavalry was vital to any campaign success. Without a pursuit force, Meade could have withdrawn to defensible terrain with difficulty, and continued the fight. Without a Confederate pursuit force, any initial success achieved would be limited to the immediate battlefield – resulting in another stalemate at best, like the previous two years' efforts.

Meade could have pulled back to the McAllister Hill-Powers Hill-Round Top line. With so much force committed to a successful assault, the Confederates would have had to consolidate and reorganize before pursuing with infantry. This time lag would have provided Meade a window to conduct an orderly withdrawal. The trains and artillery reserve were located out of danger. Lee was relying heavily on the psychological impact of Stuart's force and the artillery. As Lee had done in the past, he was testing the resolve of his opponent's determination.

Had Meade been defeated and unable to withdraw a sufficient force to reestablish a defense, would Lee still have the remaining force to capture Washington? The question remains for the political analysts: Would Lincoln have sued for peace? Too many writers assume the defeat of the Army of the Potomac would automatically lead to that conclusion without considering the condition of Lee's army had it successfully destroyed Meade.



With Longstreet's defeat, the attack is viewed in retrospect as foolish even in the attempt. Figure 9 shows this difference by evaluating the sub-components of the overall attack. It combines the actual starting point with the decrements. Lee's assessment is shown as a solid line. The historical judgment, shown as a dashed line, indicates the infantry assault as "foolish." Using Lee's own assessment, the cannonade would now have to be completely successful, driving the Federals from both Cemetery Ridge and from the reserves before the assault. During the cannonade, Meade would shift additional forces toward Hancock's defenders. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps consolidated and moved north to the left rear of Hancock, and the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps units moved to the right rear of Hancock. Some of these forces were in view of the Confederate line, but apparently were not seen. As the smoke cleared and the Federals could be viewed remaining on the ridge, it should have been clear that the assault had no chance of success.

At the point of launching Longstreet's infantry, the chance of success was nil (see the solid black line in Figure 9). By the end of the assault, it is viewed as catastrophic (see the dashed line). Yet only the assault itself could change the evaluation. All the other elements of Lee's attack had concluded. To criticize Lee for allowing the assault to occur is not completely accurate. Lee's permitting the attack to occur must be viewed within the context of the earlier setbacks.

The entire Confederate effort was a gamble. Without the seizure of Culp's Hill by Ewell, not only would Longstreet have to seize Cemetery Ridge, but his force would have to seize or neutralize the Federals on Cemetery Hill, as well. Seizing only the ridge would leave his forces exposed, dominated by the considerable infantry and artillery on Cemetery Hill. With Johnson pushed back, this additional demand was transferred to Longstreet's force. Longstreet would also have to deal with the forces on Culp's Hill. To compensate, Lee needed to reinforce Longstreet with additional forces during the cannonade to raise the potential to possible limited success. Either infantry from McLaws or Hill was available. (Law was too entrenched to be extricated.) Criticism of Lee for not reinforcing the penetration force is justified, once the other supporting attacks and pursuit forces had been neutralized. Given the expected level of Federal reserves, Lee's force ratios at the penetration were unacceptably low.

The accumulation of events – Stuart's neutralization, Ewell being forced off Culp's Hill and the damage done to the Confederates on the first two days – made Longstreet's assault almost irrelevant to the overall outcome. Without direct pressure from either Rodes's division or Early's division to the northwest and northeast of town, respectively, those considerable forces on Cemetery Hill could redeploy

and reinforce against Longstreet's assault. Without pressure those Federal forces on the north end of the assault would swing out toward the approaching enemy and fire into the flank, much like the Vermont brigade did on the southern flank.

Lee's self-described style of leadership was, to develop his plan through thorough and detailed thought, then, after issuing orders, to leave the plan's execution to his subordinates. In this case, this leadership style worked to Lee's detriment. He needed to intervene. Rodes and Early should have at least demonstrated to pressure Cemetery Hill. Lee needed at least another division equivalent (8,000 men), if not two division equivalents (15,000 men) in Longstreet's assault. While Lee's plan had some acceptable risk, Lee did not compensate in the execution phase for Ewell's failure and for the Federal reserves protecting the decisive point. The chance of success for the infantry assault became non-existent even before the artillery began its cannonade. With the Federals still on the ridge after the cannonade, Lee should have cancelled the assault. In Figure 9 the dotted line shows the actual point of failure.

Criticism can be justifiably leveled at the cumulative performance of Lee's operations on July 3. Lee had committed his army with that force "out of balance" with the requirements for victory. Even if Pickett's division had been successful in the assault, it would be badly damaged. Pender's and Heth's divisions would be far worse off after the assault than they currently were, as would be Johnson's reinforced division. Early's division, like Rodes's, was not sufficient to contribute to the offense. Anderson's division was assigned two competing missions: support, if the initial assault failed, and follow-up the assault, if it was successful.<sup>54</sup> Even if Stuart could initiate the pursuit unhindered, he would have had limited potential against withdrawing Federal infantry with only the remnants of some units able to assist him in the pursuit. The cavalry would have some initial success, but if the Federal infantry didn't panic, it would regain cohesiveness and beat back the pursuers. Even in the planning phase of this attack, Lee's force was at best only tenuously capable of executing the operation. It is appropriate to criticize Lee for devising a plan that had only a very limited chance of complete success.

The question then is: When does a commander abandon his plan? At what point should Lee have called off the attack? When his pursuit force, Stuart's cavalry, was discovered? When Ewell's force was pushed off Culp's Hill? When it became clear that the artillery cannonade had not succeeded in driving off and demoralizing the enemy?

Analysis also must address the role of Longstreet's impact on Lee's intent, both in planning and execution. A large body of evidence indicates that Longstreet and Lee were not of the same mind on July 3. Evidence is inconclusive as to whether Longstreet intentionally developed an alternative plan rather than actively trying to implement Lee's plan. It is obvious that Lee's chief subordinate did not actively do those things expected of an experienced subordinate. He did not "clarify" any instructions his headquarters received from Lee. He did not visit Lee to get instructions the night of July 2. He redeployed his men without consultation, and in such a way as to make them difficult to extract in support of any other plan than his own. Early the morning of July 3, once he and Lee had met in the Peach Orchard, Longstreet realized that Lee's intent differed from his own, yet he continued to advance his own plan, even while Federal cannons roared their destruction upon Ewell's men.<sup>55</sup> Soon after dawn Longstreet had received Lee's guidance, yet he did not send for Pickett, but waited on Pickett to find him.<sup>56</sup> Longstreet did not expedite Pickett's movement, which was filled with unnecessary delays. And all the while, Ewell's men died as they rotated fresh units in at 7:30 A.M. and again at 10:30 A.M. Pickett was in final position before 9 A.M., yet Longstreet's cannonade did not begin until after 1 P.M.<sup>57</sup> In the interim, some movement by Pettigrew and Trimble's men occurred, but these changes could have been executed by 9 A.M., had Longstreet aggressively implemented Lee's plan. Delay after delay occurred, and the guns finally fell silent against Ewell. Without significant reinforcement, the only chance of success was gone. And Longstreet was finally ready. And Lee let the attack advance anyway.

With the doomed assault concluded, only one option remained:

Return to Virginia if possible.

---

<sup>1</sup> United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 70 volumes in 128 parts (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881-1891), Series 1, 27(2):308. [Hereafter cited as *OR*.]

<sup>2</sup> Albert S. Britt, *Critical Analysis in the Study of Military History* (West Point, N.Y.: U. S. Military Academy, 1973), 103.

<sup>3</sup> Antoine de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), 191; Britt, 98.

<sup>4</sup> Napoleon Bonaparte, *Maxims of War*, trans. G. C. D'Aguilar (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1902). See Maxim number six.]

<sup>5</sup> Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 415.

<sup>6</sup> Britt, 83.

<sup>7</sup> Jomini, 316. Bonaparte, see Maxim number 50.

<sup>8</sup> Jomini, 305.

<sup>9</sup> Bonaparte, see Maxim number 27. Maxim 27 states that the retreating columns must be able to rally in the rear, "to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen is when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction." Maxim 51 states, "It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent the retreating enemy from rallying."

<sup>10</sup> Bonaparte, Maxim number 29.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Maxim number 67.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Maxim number 73.

<sup>13</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):370. Supplement to the *OR*, Serial No. 5, 5(1):367.

<sup>14</sup> Meade ordered all forces to concentrate in the late afternoon of July 1. By the morning of July 3 any force could have marched at least forty miles. Not only should Lee have expected his adversary to have completely concentrated, but he should have known that other available forces from Baltimore, Frederick City, and Harper's Ferry, as well as other local forces, would have closed by July 3, as well.

<sup>15</sup> Kent Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 69.

<sup>16</sup> Lee's report on Chancellorsville addresses the enemy nineteen times and the terrain five times. At Gettysburg, Lee addresses the enemy five times and the terrain seventeen times. At Chancellorsville Lee was focused on the enemy (i.e., he was enemy-oriented), whereas at Gettysburg he was terrain-oriented.

<sup>17</sup> James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (New York: Smithfield Publishers, Inc., 1994), 386.

<sup>18</sup> Longstreet himself acknowledges the need to pull back his two divisions to near the Peach Orchard in order to launch Lee's intended attack. See James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," in *The Annals of the Civil War*, ed. A. McClure (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994), 432.

<sup>19</sup> The precise instructions sent to Longstreet are unclear. "Attack Cemetery Hill early tomorrow," can mean something quite different from "Attack Cemetery Hill from the Peach Orchard at dawn."

<sup>20</sup> Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 429.

<sup>21</sup> In defending himself from the charge of tardiness leveled against him, Longstreet states that if Lee had wanted a morning attack, he should have released Pickett to his control sooner than he did. Pickett originally was scheduled to begin movement after sunrise, but during the night the start time was moved forward to sunrise. Longstreet concedes that Lee told him at sunrise that Pickett would soon report to him and that Pickett was "on the field" at 7 A.M.; see Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 442. Several writers specify Pickett's Division moved at dawn. Charles E. Lippett, surgeon of the 57th Virginia, notes that the change of start time from 5 A.M. was amended during night, and the men were to be ready to move at 3 A.M. See, Charles E. Lippett diary, File 7-VA57, GNMP Library. John H. Lewis of Company G, 9th Virginia wrote, "as early as 3 o'clock...the division was under arms... ready to move..." in, "Recollections from 1860 - 1865," Brake Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, copy, File 7-VA9, GNMP Library. Lt. John T. James, of the 11th Virginia, writes "before daylight" in, John T. James to Father, July 9, 1863, typescript, File 7-VA11, GNMP Library. Pickett's move was approximately four miles to his initial location, to a location directly behind Seminary Ridge. This march could easily be traversed in less than three hours, placing Pickett on the battlefield no later than 7 A.M.

<sup>22</sup> These facts support Longstreet's contention that Pickett was not yet under his control formally. However, Longstreet did not actively try to gain command of Pickett earlier.

<sup>23</sup> This conclusion is explained with in-depth analysis later.

<sup>24</sup> *U. S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 7-13.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-15.

<sup>26</sup> E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 418-419.

- 
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 423.
- <sup>28</sup> E. P. Alexander, letter dated September 3, 1877, *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Oakman, Ala.: H-Bar Enterprises, 1997), 4:103.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 104.
- <sup>30</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):471.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 697.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., 699.
- <sup>34</sup> *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0*, 6-5; Paret, 103.
- <sup>35</sup> Map of the Field of Operations of Gregg's (Union) & Stuart's (Confederate) Cavalry, at the Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863. Surveyed by Frank O. Maxson, C.E. under the direction of John B. Bachelder.
- <sup>36</sup> Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 429.
- <sup>37</sup> Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 386.
- <sup>38</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):320.
- <sup>39</sup> Terry L. Jones, ed., *Campbell Brown's Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 223; *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):320.
- <sup>40</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27 (2): 447.
- <sup>41</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):224.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid., 320.
- <sup>43</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(1): 956.
- <sup>44</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):698.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., 352.
- <sup>46</sup> Captain Robert A. Bright, "Pickett's Charge," *Richmond (Virginia) Times-Dispatch*, February 7, 1904; Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 432.
- <sup>47</sup> E.P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 418-419.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid., 425.
- <sup>49</sup> Samuel P. Bates, *The Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: T. H. Davis and Co., 1875):171.
- <sup>50</sup> Some of Lee's staff officers would state that Longstreet's remaining forces under Hood and McLaws were to join in the assault. Longstreet denies this (see Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 441), but he also refers to them as "supporting" forces. Longstreet also concedes that he would have thrown those forces forward if the attack appeared to be successful. These units were not pre-positioned to accomplish this task, and Longstreet seemed to judge that the assault was defeated so early on that even had the assault "breached" the line, it would have remained without Hood and McLaws for at least an hour. Longstreet's concession calls into question whether he fully supported the attack.
- <sup>51</sup> Address of General McLaws before the Georgia Historical Society, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 7:79.
- <sup>52</sup> *OR*, Series 1, 27(2):608.
- <sup>53</sup> Wymberley J. De Renne, *Lee's Dispatches* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), 110.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," 429. Longstreet writes about this encounter and Lee's obvious dissatisfaction.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup> Longstreet writes that "most of the morning was consumed in waiting for Pickett's men ..." Pickett's division was on the field before 7 A.M. and in final position about 8:30 A.M. After in initial position Pickett's Division moved east less than 400 meters into final position. Eppa Hutton wrote the division was in final position "before eight o'clock" in, Eppa Hunton, *Autobiography of Eppa Hutton, 1822-1908*, (Richmond: The John Byrd Press, 1933), 89; Sgt. Levin C. Gayle, of the 9th Virginia, who stated that the troops were on the field, "by 9 A.M." from, typescript diary, File 7-VA9,GNMP Library; Corporal David Johnston, 7th Virginia recorded "as early as 7A.M." from, David E. Johnston, *The Story of a Confederate Boy in the Civil War*, (Portland, OR: Glass and Prudhomme Co., 1914), 203. Pickett's timelines noted here conflict with the generally held time of about 10 A.M.

---