Advance and Pursuit: Evening 3 July to 14 July

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“His position so commanding that our troops were compelled to relinquish their advantage and retire.”
- Gen R. E. Lee, July 4, 1863

General Robert E. Lee had brought his combat power against Cemetery Hill, the decisive point, twice and failed to seize it. Lee had damaged his adversary, but a cohesive defense remained to Lee’s front. His options were limited. Over the three days of combat his forces had expended their offensive capabilities and now were no longer capable of offensive operations. Lee had also expended so much combat power that he could not successfully defend and retake the initiative by exploiting any future success. Once he had committed to his expenditure of men and ammunition in his major attack on July 3, a retrograde was his only option. He could still defend, as part of a delay, but whether defend or delay, he was headed back to Virginia. The Federal army had finally shown itself to be a worthy adversary.

“I think myself he errs on the side of prudence and caution and that a little more rashness of his part would improve his generalship.” – General George G. Meade

Nine months earlier General George G. Meade wrote the above sentence about Major General George McClellan, one of his numerous predecessors in command of the Army of the Potomac. After Gettysburg, Meade found himself in similar conditions to McClellan after Antietam. How did he respond to this challenge?

Retrograde and Pursuit

The Confederate retrograde and Federal army’s pursuit engenders much discussion and criticism. A brief study on the educational and experiential backgrounds of the two commanders, a review of the doctrinal truisms of the period, and a close examination of the situation, including a short discussion on the armies’ condition and the terrain, can shed light on this discussion. Finally, a look at General Lee’s plan and its execution, in comparison to General Meade’s plan and execution, will provide the basis for some critical analysis.

Retrogrades can take one of a combination of three forms, in which a unit conducts a directed, organized movement to the rear, or away from the enemy. Forms of retrograde include delay, retirement, and withdrawal. A delay is usually conducted when the commander needs time to concentrate, preserve, or withdraw forces. In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing his advance to gain time. Retirement is a directed, rearward movement by a force that is not in contact with the enemy and does not anticipate significant contact with the enemy. In a withdrawal, a force in contact plans to disengage from the enemy and move in a direction away from the enemy.

Military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini stressed that retreats are the most difficult operations in war. He wrote that it is best to retreat slowly with a well-arranged rear guard. In an editorial adjustment to Jomini’s above guidance, slow infers lethargic or plodding movement. A more precise term is deliberate. Retreating soldiers must believe that their chain of command remains in control of the situation and has a plan for the future. Through deliberate movement, commanders infuse a belief in their competence,
reducing the chance of panic. Deliberate movement to the rear reasserts positive command and control over a force. After a defeat, an army’s tendency is to increase speed—safety is to rear, and the faster one gets there, the sooner one will be safe. But speed can result in panic. Moving deliberately encourages the soldier to regain confidence and know the leaders are still in command. Deliberate movement rebuilds unity in that the soldier does not feel isolated from the unit. Times for halts must be carefully controlled by leaders, because a single unit can erroneously stop and delay the entire column.\(^5\) Napoleon would caution that after a battle, “Commanders in Chief must never let the victors or the vanquished rest.”\(^5\)

The retrograde (particularly the withdrawal) mirrors the pursuit but in an opposite manner. The retrograde is deliberate, while the pursuit is aggressive. The retrograde seeks to prevent panic and sustain cohesion, while the pursuit seeks to instill panic and destroy cohesion. A withdrawing force tries not to be delayed, while the pursuing force seeks to delay the adversary. In the retrograde, flank security is important, but in the pursuit, flank security can be minimized, because the withdrawing force is trying to avoid battle by not deliberately engaging the pursuing force. In a retrograde the commander must exercise precise control over his force, so initiative by subordinates is limited, while in the pursuit, the commander should allow maximum initiative by his subordinates, since there is no time to wait for centrally made decisions, which increase the chance for the enemy to escape.

In the retrograde, a successful commander must get ahead of the enemy both mentally and physically, i.e., he must get inside his enemy’s decision cycle. He must seek to break contact of his main body away from the enemy, while maintaining intelligence on the enemy. A successful commander must see the battlefield as a whole. He must convey not just the specifics of the operation, but also the framework in which the operation must be executed. The plan must be appropriately detailed. Whether units move sequentially or simultaneously, the plan must be thorough and understood by all subordinates, and rely on excellent communications. With common understanding, subordinates can address emergencies while staying within the framework of the plan.

The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired end state. This statement provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations. It is an excellent tool for the retrograde and pursuit. To conclude, a successful commander must balance centralized planning with decentralized execution.

General Meade’s educational experience had taught him numerous references to the pursuit. His West Point professor Alfred T. Mahan cautioned his students that a pursuit should not be too vigorous as the enemy could turn around and counterattack. He also instructed that in the pursuit it is important to assume the initiative with a maximum effort against an enemy’s weakest point, and finally, a pursuer should give a defeated army no rest.\(^6\) “Be bold in pursuit,” Jomini wrote, adding, “If beaten, the enemy must be pursued relentlessly.” Frederick II of Prussia, famous as Frederick the Great, wrote that the “winner should attempt a destructive pursuit of the enemy.”\(^8\)

The dominant thinkers of the time specified the requirements for the pursuit. These included that a commander must organize his depots and marches by establishing a relationship between the two;\(^9\) a commander must ensure that his logistics, the means that brings troops to the battlefield, is sufficient;\(^10\) the pursuit is better done from the flank than the direct line;\(^11\) a commander must act on the knowledge that, in Napoleon’s words, the “greatest secret of war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy;”\(^12\) and finally, during a pursuit a commander must look for opportunities to seize the initiative using an “active defense” over a “passive defense.”\(^13\)

One noteworthy historical example cadets studied at West Point during Meade’s time there was Napoleon’s pursuit of more than one hundred miles of the Prussian army after the Battle of Jena from October 15 to November 1, 1806. Napoleon seamlessly transitioned from attack to pursuit, moving his army quickly along the enemy’s line of withdrawal, conducting a series of attacks against portions of the enemy, wearing down his adversary until they ultimately capitulated.

General Lee and his army had not experienced the need for operational withdrawals before Gettysburg. In June and July 1862 they had to delay McClellan’s advance against Richmond, and Lee had to withdraw his army from Maryland to Virginia after the Antietam (Sharpsburg) battle. In the first case, Lee went over to the offensive in late June and managed to drive McClellan to the James River. In the second
instance, the Antietam withdrawal was less than ten miles, and was much easier to execute against the methodical McClellan. But after Gettysburg, their retrograde to the Potomac would take several days over a forty-mile route.

Lee should have learned after his experience on July 1 and 2 that Meade knew how to move the Army of the Potomac. Although damaged by the three days at Gettysburg, Meade’s army still had the potential to cut Lee off from his retrograde route.

While the Federal army had experiences with withdrawals, it had never conducted a true pursuit. Their success in conducting retrograde movements did not teach it how to conduct a pursuit. Moving to the rear motivated by fear is different from moving to your enemy’s rear motivated by success.

With both theory and practical examples, both commanders knew the requirements and had an expectation for themselves and their adversary’s future actions, as well.

### Doctrinal Truisms

Doctrinal truisms are the generally held views of the theoreticians of the period. They can evolve over time with changes to military thought, equipment, and experience.

For the Federals, the first truism, regarding the importance of seizing the initiative, requires some explanation. Simplistically, initiative implies the offense, but a defender can retain the initiative in certain circumstances. For example, if a defender occupies key terrain in a position that forces the enemy to attack while greatly disadvantaged, the defender, by forcing the enemy to action, retains the initiative. History provides examples: Napoleon mastered the ability to maneuver toward the rear of his defending enemy, threatening his lines of communication while occupying good ground. This action would force the enemy to move to the rear, where he would either be forced to attack Napoleon as he occupied good ground, or try to move around Napoleon. This action would result in Napoleon either awaiting an attack on ground he chose, or attacking any exposed part of the enemy while in movement. Either way, the adversary was disadvantaged, and Napoleon retained the initiative by forcing the enemy to action. Napoleon controlled events.

A second truism is that the desire for perfect intelligence or perfect preparation leads to inaction. Assumptions must be made, and flexible plans must be developed that can accommodate most, if not all, of the enemy’s likely options. Change is inevitable in military operations, and time and timing are critical to overcoming inertia.

The third truism is that the maneuver force must be more mobile than the enemy. In an era when neither army has a theoretical advantage in maneuver, the commander’s will and previous performance become crucial. To outmaneuver an enemy who enjoys terrain advantages requires attempts to delay, disrupt, and confuse that enemy in order to successfully catch him. Whether in attacks, pursuits, or retrogrades, moving faster than your opponent requires preparation, flexibility, and responsiveness on the part of both leaders and armies.

Next, a commander must allocate forces to specific tasks. Usually, it is important to weight the earlier phase of battle for an attack, but for the pursuit it is more beneficial to weight the later phased force. This process will increase the payoff. These two demands are not contradictory.

If after the force allocation process, a commander has additional forces available, he should weight the later phase. For example, if a commander has ten divisions for a deliberate attack, he may envision that four are needed for the initial assault, and three for the exploitation and pursuit. Assuming that no other requirements exist, three divisions remain available and uncommitted for use. The commander might add one remaining division to the initial assault to ensure initial success. He should add at least two of the remaining three to the exploitation and pursuit forces, to maximize benefits. More weight to the later phase increases potential payoff. The same holds true in the defense. Once the line is well protected and resourced, it is more beneficial to weight the counterattack force. The enemy is most vulnerable after a failed attack, and the larger the counterattack force, the far greater the potential impact.
Lastly, in the pursuit, the goal is to capture or kill significant portions, if not all, of the enemy. The goals must shift from being satisfied with normal achievements to doing all the damage possible. Risk implications and security needs should be adjusted accordingly. Flank security is not as important. Caution and deliberate movement with centralized decision-making is counter-productive. Pursuing commanders should take risks and give subordinate commanders wide latitude for action with general guidance while placing the emphasis on speed and audacity. Food and forage may be necessary at times, but temporary deprivation may be necessary to achieve results.

LEE’S SITUATION

Lee first needed to organize his force for future movements. Richard Ewell’s 2nd Corps was too far extended on the left of Gettysburg. On the evening of July 3, Ewell would pull back and occupy the line from the Fairfield Road north along Seminary Ridge to Oak Hill. J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry division would pull back to Ewell’s left. James Longstreet’s 1st Corps was too exposed on the right with forces in close proximity to the enemy, being along the base of Big Round Top, so he, too, would pull back to Warfield Ridge on July 3. Once the army was generally along the same line, Longstreet could anchor the move. Figure 2 shows the general location of forces.

Lee was forced to contend with several restrictions, notably his massive trains. He had to drive part of the 45,000 to 50,000 cows, 35,000 sheep, and thousands of hogs his army had seized in Pennsylvania to safety. Located near Fairfield, they would be joined by Ewell’s trains, which alone were almost forty miles in length. Other corps also had trains. Longstreet’s and A.P. Hill’s 3rd Corps trains were near Cashtown. John Imboden’s cavalry brigade, reinforced with artillery, would control the seventeen-mile-long ambulance train. Lee’s reserve trains were fifteen to twenty miles long.

Comb at forces included more than thirteen miles of infantry (four abreast) and more than 3 (estimated) miles of artillery, and the cavalry division, if concentrated, extended about fourteen miles (two abreast). The total length of troops and trains was well over 100 miles, even without gaps and intervals between units.

Lee was also faced with high turnover in his leadership. Figure 1 below shows the Confederate leadership turbulence caused by the battle. Lee had to contend with 44 percent turnover in his commanders at the regimental level on up. Fortunately, the majority of replacements were at the regimental level rather than the higher levels. The impact on the replacement of regimental commanders was minimal, given the demands of the current challenges for the retrograde. Conducting marches and defensive operations are not as difficult as other military operations, but the presence of experienced corps and division commanders was essential. Lee essentially kept his command team intact after the battle. He also had to contend with approximately 33 percent casualties, but he did have access to some infantry forces posted near Winchester, Virginia, who could be called on for support.

**Figure 1. Confederate Leadership Personnel Turbulence* from 1-3 July**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Corps Commanders</th>
<th>New Division Commanders</th>
<th>New Brigade Commanders</th>
<th>New Regiment Commanders</th>
<th>Commanders - Up 2 echelons</th>
<th>Total % New Commanders</th>
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<td>0/3</td>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>14/37</td>
<td>79/169</td>
<td>34/218</td>
<td>96/218</td>
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<td>33%**</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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*Infantry Only
** Heth would return to command by 7 July
**Lee’s Perspective on the Federal Forces**

While little is documented regarding what the Confederates knew of their adversary, Lee commented that he thought the Federals had been “much shattered.” His enemy was obviously well posted along the ridge to his front, with most of the Federals currently committed to the defense. Federal cavalry were deployed on the flanks, as attested to by the cavalry engagements late on July 3.

**MEADE’S SITUATION**

**Federal Forces**

The battle damaged Meade’s army as badly as Lee’s army, and he faced serious deficiencies in men, leaders, and conditions. Aside from more than 20,000 casualties (one in four of his men), Federal leadership was also severely impacted, as shown in Figure 2. The greatest numeric damage was among the brigade and regimental command. Additionally, one in six commanders were now serving at least two grades higher than his normal level, e.g., captains were commanding regiments and majors were sometimes commanding brigades. Some units, such as the 6th Corps, were virtually untouched, while other units were so decimated they would either be integrated into other units or become inactivated as soon as the situation stabilized.

Meade’s loss in key leadership was most debilitating. He had lost John Reynolds and Winfield S. Hancock, his trusted subordinates who could serve as wing commanders. Other corps commanders had not performed with distinction. Meade would need to rely on those whom he did not fully trust.

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<td>43%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<td>35%</td>
</tr>
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*Infantry Only

While Meade and his chief of staff, Daniel Butterfield, had been at odds, Butterfield had experience in supervising the staff work of army headquarters. He was gone now, wounded on July 3. Meade needed a replacement as he relied on staff work much more heavily than did Lee. He opted to alternate Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren, chief engineer, and Major General Alfred Pleasonton, the cavalry corps commander, as his acting chief of staff in the days immediately after the battle. On July 8 he named Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphries, from the 3rd Corps as his new, permanent chief of staff on July 8.

From a personnel perspective, Meade suffered far more than Lee. Meade lost key immediate subordinates and leaders at the very levels (brigade and regimental) needed for offensive operations. 6th Corps commander, Major General John Sedgwick, was someone Meade could trust with independent operations as a wing commander but the damage in the other corps limited Meade’s ability to exercise...
initiative. Opportunities open and close so fast that inexperienced leaders would hesitate before taking risks. Meade’s decision-making process and his offensive limitations would also require change to be successful.

Both armies needed to resupply after the battle. As Lee moved closer to his supply base, Meade’s supplies were displaced some twenty-five miles away in Westminster, where a majority of his 4,000 wagons, approximately 1,100 ambulances, and 30,000 horses and mules waited. There were shortages in cannon, rifle ammunition, and shoes. To assist in the resupply effort, the Federal army was repairing the rail network to Gettysburg, but for now, roads and wagons were the means of resupply. The Federal trains would require a day’s road march to rejoin the army.

Meade’s Perspective on the Confederate Forces

Meade was aware that the Confederates had pulled back to the Oak Ridge-Seminary Ridge line on July 4. Estimating his own strength after the battle at between 60,000 and 70,000 men, Meade knew that he had “punished him [Lee] severely,” estimating Lee’s strength at about 8,000 to 10,000 less than his own strength.

Figure 3 shows the actual disposition of forces:
TERRAIN

Confederate Perspective

Terrain was on Lee’s side: the same terrain that forced him into the Susquehanna Valley on June 29, the same terrain that hindered his movement on July 1 and 2, was now the terrain that would protect him. Figure 4 shows the extreme terrain that dominated the route back to Virginia. The initial phase of movement offered easily defendable terrain. Once the gently rolling terrain was traversed, Fairfield and Cashtown served as gateways to severely restricted terrain. Very narrow passes cross over South Mountain, with the mouth of the passes measuring about 1,000 feet across and narrowing to less than 100 feet wide at points. Elevation differences of 1,000 feet between the valley floors and the peaks of the mountains occur at both passes. (In comparison, Culp’s Hill has approximately 140 feet of elevation change, and Big Round Top has about 280 feet.) These passes were essentially choke points that were miles long. Small forces could delay very large forces for extended periods of time.

Once the Confederates reached the Cumberland Valley, the terrain opened considerably all the way to the Potomac River crossing sites. Parallel road networks eased movement over multiple routes. Water was abundant.

Crossing sites of the Potomac were available at Williamsport, Shepherdstown, and Falling Waters. If Lee could get across the river without hindrance, he could resupply, get treatment for his wounded, and regain a favorable intelligence network.

Time was also on Lee’s side. Note the distances for Lee to travel through the mountains and the distance Meade would need to march around the mountains. Lee had the shortest distance, and with a good plan and good jump on the enemy, he could reasonably expect to be successful.
Federal Perspective

The terrain provided both opportunity and hindrance for Meade. Just as South Mountain had screened the Confederate move north in June, it would screen its retrograde. The Cumberland Valley and the Susquehanna Valley offered numerous routes north and south for ease of movement, but movement to the east and west was extremely limited. In particular, steep elevations and narrow widths dominated the passes. The passes were choke points from one end to the other. Exiting a choke point, as Lee found on July 1, could be disadvantageous.

While the passes could be defended easily with minimal forces, they would also restrict defending forces from turning around and attacking any pursuit force. South Mountain then could be used to advantage, for it forced the Confederates to move either to the east of them or the west. Lee had three avenues of retrograde (see Figure 5). With the length of his army on a single route, Lee could have used two of the three avenues: either a combination of the avenue through Cashtown and Fairfield, or a combination of Fairfield and the southerly avenue through Frederick. Use of the northern and southern avenue, while leaving the central avenue unused, would split Lee’s force in the face of the enemy, and be inefficient as well. If Lee chose the two more northerly routes, Meade could use the southern route, unhindered. He would have exterior lines, adding about ten miles of march for the Federals. If Lee chose the southern two routes, Meade would have to either fight a series of battles or swing that much further around Lee’s flank.

Figure 5. Federal Planning of Confederate Options

Should Lee decide to move due south staying east of the mountains (Avenue East in Figure 5), he could maintain an illusion of threat toward Washington, but he would also move with the mountains to his flank or rear. Lee would have to conduct movement to the south judiciously with Confederate stops on good terrain in the passes, in case the Federals attacked and forced movement west. Near Frederick City, Lee could either turn toward Washington or westward to the crossing sites. On the other hand, if Lee moved west (Avenue West in Figure 5) into the Cumberland Valley, he could conduct either a delay through the passes using a smaller force, or a withdrawal. Using the southern routes favored the Confederates.
The most favorable terrain for the Federals was to the south, on an avenue between Frederick and Hagerstown. This wide avenue allowed great flexibility in shifting forces from one side of the avenue to the other, and had an excellent road network, with less restrictive passes. Frederick also had a railhead and could be used as a depot.

The weather was also a negative factor for the Federals. With the longer distances to travel, the rains of July 4 and 7 had that much more of an impact on the Army of the Potomac, regardless of which passes the combatants used. The rains that slowed Lee’s march also hindered Meade’s resupply effort and subsequent march. Figure 6 highlights the southern portion of the field. This area was the same terrain of which Lee spoke favorably after Antietam, and the same area in which Lee expected battle in late June. It was the best terrain for the offense.

**Figure 6. Federal Planning Options**

Lee had few options. He could not move his force east of the mountains, using those mountains to anchor his left flank. That option would delay the overall withdrawal by about twenty-four hours to allow the large trains near Cashtown to clear Fairfield before Ewell’s corps and Stuart’s cavalry could move. Lee could split his force, allowing the forces near Cashtown to use that pass, while the remaining forces used the Emmitsburg-Cavetown Pass. Splitting his force would allow Federals the use of Monterey Pass, and would threaten Imboden’s line of withdrawal. Lee chose his one good option; he would move west of the passes in order to protect his trains.28

Lee’s plan was driven by terrain which allowed him to capitalize on the benefits of a delay with the benefits of conducting a withdrawal, while simultaneously minimizing the potential resources costs of the delay. In a delay, a commander incurs a potential cost to his force by exposing a portion of that force to decisive battle. This allows his remaining forces to withdraw. The passes protected the Confederate flanks, again facilitating ease of movement. The Confederates would not have to divert forces or anticipate time needed to provide flank security, a major concern for a withdrawing force.

Movement would begin from current locations and continue until the units reached defendable terrain, regardless of the time it took to arrive. Movement would begin at about 3:00 A.M. on July 4. Ewell’s and the army trains would use the Monterey pass, while those of Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps, along with the cavalry trains, would use the Cashtown pass. Many of the casualties would accompany this second train.
as well. The second train would be under the protection of Imboden’s mounted infantry, who would begin movement from Cashtown at 4:00 P.M. on July 4. While the two trains were not equal in length, they were as equal as was possible, considering the existing limitations on command and control, and the need to maintain unit cohesion.

Hill’s infantry would move first from the center of the line toward dusk on July 4. Longstreet’s corps would provide cover while Hill marched to the first defensible terrain, at the at the mouth of Monterey Pass near Fairfield. Ewell would start his move from the left at 1:00 A.M. on July 5, and also move behind Longstreet, who would begin his move at dawn on July 5. George Pickett’s division, with its leadership decimated and ranks depleted, was assigned the duty of guarding the approximately 4,000 prisoners of war. Given the damage Pickett suffered, it was the best unit to perform this task, despite Pickett’s resistance to the mission. Longstreet and Ewell would pass through Hill’s defenses near Fairfield and continue through the pass with Longstreet leading. Once Longstreet cleared the narrow pass, Ewell would leapfrog past him. In this manner, then, for the next day, Ewell would become the lead element, and the stalwart Longstreet would always be in the center of the column. Hill would then bring up the rear. Stuart’s command was split with two brigades using the Cashtown pass and two brigades deployed near Emmitsburg.

![Figure 7. River Crossing Confederate Defense](image)

Figure 7 above shows the southern sector for the withdrawal to the crossing sites. Lee was also looking forward. He would order an ammunition train from Virginia to come north to the crossing sites to facilitate resupply. He had already ordered the pontoon bridges to Falling Waters prior to the battle, and now ordered troops at Winchester to move to the crossing sites and protect those bridges.
MEADE’S PLAN

Meade believed the Confederates had two options: to defend the passes or to withdraw through the
takes. He never considered that Lee might use the southern routes. But Lee had tipped his intent earlier,
during the Confederate pullback on July 4. Lee constrained his offensive options with his pullback. By
using the western route, Lee conveyed the condition of his army and his desire to cross the Potomac as
quickly as possible. With Lee’s overall physical position in relation to the crossing sites, the favorable
terrain enjoyed by the Confederates, and the apparent preparation for movement already begun by the
enemy, the Confederates enjoyed considerable advantage.

By the evening of July 3, Meade, like Lee, was already considering the next phase. By 10:00 P.M., he
asked Major General Darius N. Couch in Harrisburg to move forces south down the Cumberland Valley
to attack Lee’s northern flank if Lee began a withdrawal.33 Couch ordered a division of New York and
Pennsylvania National Guard and militia units under Brigadier General George Smith to move. It did not
move in the Cumberland Valley, as directed, but into the Susquehanna Valley. Smith’s men were so
poorly trained that when the joined the Army of the Potomac, Meade left them in the rear rather than
incorporate them into a corps.34 This division served no useful purpose, and became another force to feed,
equip, and supply.

On July 4, Meade ordered Major General William French, with approximately 8,000 men at Frederick,
to seize and hold the South Mountain passes to his west.35 He ordered the 12th Corps under General Henry
Slocum to advance on the right toward Benner Hill, and Oliver Howard’s 11th Corps to clear Gettysburg.
These operations confirmed that Lee was consolidated to Meade’s center and right.36

Meade called upon his cavalry for action. John Buford, having marched to Westminster, Maryland for
resupply, was ordered to Frederick, arriving by 7:00 P.M. on July 5. Meade ordered the other two cavalry
divisions of the cavalry corps to pursue the enemy’s left and rear near Cashtown Pass.37 One of these,
Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s, was ordered to the immediate left flank of the army near
Emmitsburg where it could more effectively determine in what direction the Confederates were moving.

Kilpatrick confirmed that Lee was using the passes and that the Cumberland Valley was his route of
withdrawal. The Confederates had selected Avenue West. Early confirmation that Lee was not using
Avenue East would alleviate Federal security concerns for Washington and the Federal flank.

Meade ordered Sedgwick’s 6th Corps to advance toward Fairfield, but not to bring on a general
engagement.38 Meade thought he needed to know if the Confederates were intending to defend or
withdraw, and did not have “reliable information.”39 He prepared a plan to advance toward the Boonsboro
passes, but then cancelled the orders until he was sure of Lee’s intent.40 Meade also considered whether to
move his lines of communication from Gettysburg to Frederick. Again, he hesitated to make a decision
until he was informed on Lee’s intention. Finally, on July 6, Meade ordered the trains to rejoin their
corps, and the trains at Westminster were to go to Frederick. Dedicated train guard also rejoined the army
rather than stay with the trains.41

Amidst the indecision, Meade seemed content to follow Lee to an undecided end.

LEE’S EXECUTION

Heavy rain began to fall about noon on July 4. With the trains already organized and beginning their
move, this inclement weather was fortuitous. Had the rains arrived earlier, they would have greatly
hindered Lee’s departure, limiting visibility and causing the wagons to bog down in the fields. While the
weather made the march difficult for both opponents, it would help the Confederates more. The heavy
rains obscured observation of the movement of Confederate infantry. The weather provided some
element of uncertainty to the Federal understanding of the Confederate situation. The Confederate move
would also damage the roads, making the Federal move all the more difficult. But rains would also swell
the river.

At Cashtown, Imboden’s ambulance train took fifteen hours to get his entire force on the road. He
turned off the main road at Greenwood at the far end of the Cashtown pass, shortening his route to
Greencastle. Within twelve hours, Imboden was at Greencastle, some twenty-five miles along the route. He arrived at 4:00 A.M. on July 5. With a fifteen-hour pass time, the trail elements of the train passed Greencastle at 7:00 P.M. that night. His lead elements arrived at Williamsport on the evening of July 5, with his trail elements still at Greencastle. The trail of the trains closed sixteen hours later, and having suffered the accordion effect of a road march, the train was now some twenty-five miles long. (The accordion effect occurs as gaps widen between elements in a march.) The Army trains, with Ewell’s trains, completed twenty-one miles, and arrived at Hagerstown at 11:00 P.M. on July 4. The last eleven miles to Falling Waters were completed at 4:00 A.M. on July 5.

Once the infantry got on the route of march, it too stretched some twenty miles. Hill initially moved to Fairfield and established a strong defense at the base of the passes. Meade did not know whether Lee was delaying or withdrawing, adding to the uncertainty. Lee said of this defense, “If ‘those people’ will only come out and give us an open field fight, we will smash them.”

Lee’s well-known style of hands-off leadership would change. He massaged his plan as the situation changed. His subordinates, fully appreciating the gravity of the challenge, responded as well. Flexibility and initiative allowed the plan to adjust as the situation changed.

Federal cavalry caused Lee to change his plan. They attacked the flanks, the crossing sites, and his unprotected trains. Cavalry forces, under French, hit the bridge site at Falling Waters, hindering the march by destroying the pontoon bridge over the Potomac. Captain Ulrich Dahlgren, using elements of Wesley Merritt’s cavalry brigade, struck Imboden’s trains, and Kilpatrick’s division raided the trains as they marched through Monterey Pass in South Mountain. Later on July 5, Buford’s division mounted an attempt to seize Williamsport.

In response to these Federal raids Lee changed his overall plan. After receiving reports of Federal cavalry in the area, Stuart, under orders, went toward Cavetown, Maryland which guarded the next most southern pass from Monterey. At 5:00 P.M. on July 5, Kilpatrick began a series of skirmishes that led to a large meeting with Stuart at Hagerstown in the afternoon of July 6. Four brigades of Confederate cavalry supported by Alfred Iverson’s infantry brigade fought and repulsed Kilpatrick’s division. With the threat from Kilpatrick contained, Iverson’s brigade moved on to Williamsport, arriving late on July 6.

Other units that had not directly participated in the battle greatly assisted in the withdrawal. Brigadier General Grumble Jones, a brigade commander whom Stuart personally disliked and had left out of the active operations in Pennsylvania, sped his brigade forward to the Potomac crossing sites. He arrived at a critical time to repel the Federal attacks there. Imboden, another commander whose brigade had been banished from the main battle area due its disciplinary issues, after commanding a separate rear guard, executed a demanding road march, arrived at the crossing sites, and assumed more authority than given him by organizing the defenses there. Imboden would begin river-crossing operations.

Lee, also, dispatched Longstreet, his trusted aide, to relieve the trains and hold the crossing sites. Longstreet’s infantry started to arrive at Hagerstown by the evening of July 6.
Figure 8 shows the limit of advance of the main body of Confederate infantry forces. While smaller brigade-size units were in the crossing site area earlier, the main body forces rested almost five days near Hagerstown, while Lee devised his defensive plan.

Lee’s plan for the crossing sites was not completed until July 9. The line of defense was not occupied by infantry until late July 10 and early July 11. Lee said of this defensive position: “In the rest of the war, I want only to be attacked in such a prepared position.” Lee, the engineer, picked the best available ground for defense. Aridgeline had a marshy area in front of it. The infantry improved the defense with logs, packed earth, stones, and a ditch. Roads to the rear allowed for quick withdrawal across the river and efficient shifting of forces along the defensive line in response to potential Federal attacks. Lee paid great attention to the center and right of his line to ensure the line was well anchored. The center and right had to hold at all costs, while Lee’s left could delay back toward the crossing sites, if needed.

On July 11, with the defensive line occupied, Lee began repairs to the pontoon bridge site at Falling Waters. By 11:00 P.M. on July 12, the bridge was ready. Lee directed his cavalry to start patrolling the south side of the crossing sites on July 12, in expectation of Federal activity in that area.

With two sites (a float bridge at Williamsport and a pontoon bridge at Falling Waters), Lee began crossing his force. He monitored the crossing of units and adjusted the forces, as needed, to achieve balance. He ordered elements awaiting floats at Williamsport to move to Falling Waters and cross the bridge to minimize the time needed to escape. With the trains evacuated and the river water level falling, Ewell’s corps waded across the river at Williamsport followed by Stuart, the more mobile rear guard. Longstreet crossed the bridge at Falling Waters, and Hill’s corps followed. Henry Heth’s division, the army’s rear guard, was the last to cross.

By July 14, Lee had escaped.

MEADE’S EXECUTION

Once Sedgwick reported that Lee appeared to be defending the passes, Meade reissued the order for the army’s movement toward Middletown, Maryland, but incurring a thirty-hour delay.
The Federal cavalry achieved great results initially. Kilpatrick attacked the trains using the Monterey pass on the night of July 4, capturing and destroying about 250 wagons with minimal losses. Colonel J. Irwin Gregg’s brigade of cavalry attacked the tail end of the trains using the Cashtown pass, capturing about 2,800 men. Buford’s division linked up with Kilpatrick to coordinate attacks. On July 6, Buford attacked Williamsport with limited success. Confederate infantry from Winchester, Virginia, ordered to protect the crossing site, joined with Fitz Lee’s cavalry brigade to repel Buford’s attack. Kilpatrick attacked Hagerstown, defended by Confederate cavalry, with limited success, until Iverson’s brigade of infantry reinforced the Confederate horsemen and forced Kilpatrick’s withdrawal. Other skirmishes occurred, but when Confederate infantry arrived, the Federal cavalry pulled back, joining up with French’s forces guarding the South Mountain passes.

Figure 9 shows the Federal march tables for the period, indicating the Federal force’s lack of movement between July 4 and 6, even though Meade knew on July 5 that the Confederates were already using the Cashtown and Fairfield passes for movement to the rear. Ending the thirty-hour delay, Meade ordered his army to arrive at the South Mountain passes near Boonsboro, Maryland by the evening of July 8. Figure 9 shows the result, with marches of more than fifteen miles in the rain and over rain-soaked ground on July 7 and 8. Upon arrival Meade directed one day of delay for resupply near Middletown. Meade executed a deliberate movement, keeping “as concentrated as the roads … will admit …” Once resupplied, on July 10, Meade wired Major General Henry Halleck in Washington that he thought it best to postpone the attack, and Halleck provided guidance not to bring on an attack until his forces were concentrated. By July 12, both armies faced each other along a line from Hagerstown to Falling Waters. Meade was aware that the river levels were falling rapidly. He began considering crossing the Potomac with a substantial force to cut Lee’s lines of communication, but opted for a more direct attack. He wired Halleck of his intent to attack on July 13, but recanted “due to the need to develop a plan that would have some reasonable degree of success.” Halleck encouraged Meade to “give him another blow” before he crossed, in what would become a fruitless attempt to achieve something.

During this exchange, Lee escaped. Meade notified Halleck of the missed opportunity on the morning of July 14. The Gettysburg campaign was over.
CRITIQUE OF LEE

Lee devised his plan soon after Longstreet’s failed assault on July 3. He effectively reorganized his army to accomplish a successful withdrawal. He used the terrain and time available to his advantage and implemented the fundamentals of a retrograde operation. Lee’s plan has no discernable weakness. Units moved in accordance with the plan and Lee deviated from his plan when the situation demanded, demonstrating the necessary flexibility. He fought the enemy, and not the plan.

Lee’s delay positions at the pass near Fairfield and his defensive position south of Hagerstown were both sound and effective. Whether intentional or not, Lee also created doubt, thereby extending his withdrawal window. Lee achieved success, in part, by demonstrating strength and resolve without changing his intent. In doing so, he provided a good lesson. He got ahead of his adversary by showing resistance when it cost him no resources, in terms of men, time, or energy, to do so.

However, while Lee also correctly anticipated future needs and future enemy actions, he took much time to devise and implement the defensive plan. On July 6, or soon thereafter, he should have moved forward and began arranging his defensive plan for the Potomac crossing sites. Lee was thinking linearly, first addressing one problem for almost two days, before turning his attention to the crossing. Simultaneous focus was needed.

Subordinates with cloudy reputations, namely Stuart, Grumble Jones, Imboden, and Iverson, did well during the retrograde. With a common understanding of necessity, they operated within the framework of intent, while correcting weaknesses.

Federal cavalry showed that even a small number of forces had the potential to significantly impact the plan. The Federals’ limited raids had the potential to create opportunities. Any hostile force in the rear of a withdrawing enemy can desynchronize his entire plan. The more active the enemy force in the rear, the more reaction will occur. Limited cavalry raids made Lee change his entire plan. Weary units had to conduct forced marches to arrive at Hagerstown.

Lee’s increased role of personal leadership was evident and necessary throughout the withdrawal. He took a more hands-on approach to the entire operation, relying on unit and personal strengths of specific subordinates. He had the foresight to use the forces at Winchester to maximum advantage, and devised a plan that maximized use of terrain.

However, Lee had a mental lapse in balancing current and future needs. His slow occupation of the defense at the crossing sites could have been disastrous. While Meade was not in position to capitalize on this shortcoming, Lee took three days to position his units. It is unclear if Lee’s intelligence gathering during this period provided him a level of confidence that he was safe from attack and therefore had time to implement to defense. At any rate, given the uncertainty of the water level of the Potomac and the condition of bridges, it would have been best not to act imprudently.

Lee surrendered the initiative once in defensive positions at the crossing sites, but Meade never seized it, either during the march or at the crossing sites. A generally non-aggressive Federal commander provided the Confederates the opportunity to cross successfully.

CRITIQUE OF MEADE

As Meade discovered, just as had McClellan earlier, a pursuit is a difficult endeavor. To find fault with someone else is easier than to order the advance.

Pursuits have two sets of forces: the direct pressure or “fixing” force, and the enveloping force. The direct pressure force maintains contact with the enemy to slow him down, while the enveloping force moves quickly along parallel routes and attacks weaknesses. The farther the enveloping force moves without contact, the greater the potential payoff. However, increasing the distance between the direct pressure force and the enveloping force also increases the risk. If the enemy turns to attack, either force may be too isolated for mutual support. A pursuing commander must balance risk with payoff.

He must also consider that if the enemy turns to attack, that also presents opportunities for the pursuer. A delaying enemy commander who turns to attack risks a minor victory over the holding force against a
major defeat of his army. He is, therefore, understandably reluctant to turn. The enemy commander must also balance risk and reward. Withdrawing commanders will not be overly aggressive in this situation. Figure 10 shows the elements of the pursuit and the related concept of risk versus reward. The enveloping force must move with all speed possible, foregoing normalcies.

Figure 10. Pursuit: Risk versus Reward

The above conclusions also apply to security forces. Rather than protect a flank, which is unlikely to be attacked, commanders should move security forces to attack and delay the enemy.

Meade was thinking linearly with limited foresight. Meade deduced that Lee had two options: to delay at the mountain passes, or to withdraw. He should have devised a plan that addressed both of these options, but failing to grasp the Napoleonic opportunity of Jena, Meade did not seamlessly transition to the pursuit. Instead, he demanded “perfect knowledge” before acting. He took too much time to consider alternatives and plan operationally.

Meade explained later that he had to wait until Lee’s intent was known before he could begin movement. This thirty-hour delay was critical. Meade’s decision-making process allowed the Confederates to retain the initiative on July 4 through 6. By waiting, Meade allowed one option to mature to the point where he could not respond effectively. If Lee were withdrawing, Meade’s delay allowed Lee to execute that option. In effect, Meade allowed Lee to escape by failing to address one of Lee’s options.

Meade correctly sent his cavalry to suspected enemy routes of withdrawal. The forces did damage the enemy, but did not maximize their potential. Once he decided on a course of action, Meade also seemed lethargic at points. His good marches of July 7 and 8 were offset by another day of resupply, and little movement on July 9 and 10 at Middletown. On July 10, Meade wired Halleck that his army was not yet concentrated; however, Figure 10 shows that only a minor effort was needed on July 11 and 12 to concentrate. The concentration should have been accomplished on July 7 and 8. Meade failed to become the “master of this enemy’s line of communications.” Moreover, he had difficulty mastering his own line.

Unlike Lee, Meade was arranging his stops by “normal circumstances”—driven by nightfall. Lee marched from key position to key position, and if a night march was necessary to accomplish that goal, he marched at night. Meade executed a set piece pursuit, first executing one phase, then planning the next
phase, rather than developing a complete plan to move quickly through phases. When uncertain about what to do next, Meade should have ridden ahead to make the decisions, so that his men were not waiting in place while decisions were made. For example, on July 8, before his army closed on the Middletown passes, Meade should have ridden forward to French’s positions, made his decision, and had his men quickly resupplied and moved forward. Meade needed to consider the guidance from his education to “be bold in pursuit”—to be “relentless.”

Even as the campaign became stagnant on July 12 and 13, Meade failed to seize the surrendered initiative. He used a “passive defense” even in the pursuit.

Meade’s reluctance to join the pursuit quickly caused him to miss an opportunity. Meade initially believed that he had to know Lee’s intent before he started his effort, but he should have expected a strong defense of the mountain passes. Whether Lee defended the passes or continued movement, Meade’s expectation of Lee’s intent was irrelevant. Lee was at Fairfield in the passes, and Meade should have been looking further “down the road,” figuratively and literally. He allowed a retreating army to retain the initiative. Figure 10 shows the limited number of miles marched on July 4 through 6 and again on July 9 through 12, reminiscent of Joseph Hooker’s marches, rather than Meade’s bold marches of June 29 and 30. There was no relentless pursuit. Like Lee on June 28, Meade was beginning to paint himself into a corner. That is, he intentionally limited his options considered. But in this case, Meade had an option available to him on July 5.

Even with the thirty-hour delay and the slow resupply on July 9, Meade still hesitated to bring Lee to battle. Lee’s minor error of slow defense planning and slow occupation of defensive positions, while unknown to Meade, presented another opportunity for Meade on the morning of July 11. With the Confederates in movement to their defensive positions, Meade let a second opportunity slip away because his army was not in position to take advantage of Lee’s error.

Now, with the enemy in entrenched positions on July 12, it was too late to attack—Meade was correct in that assessment.

THE “SCHOOLHOUSE” SOLUTION: AN ALTERNATIVE

Studying the same map from the perspective of the pursuer, rather than the pursued, provides an example of how the same terrain must be analyzed differently by the two commanders. While the passes protected Lee’s rear guard, they hindered his desire to advance toward the Federal direct pressure force. While the narrow passes at Carstwood and Monterey allowed a small rear guard to successfully block the route, the terrain prevented Lee from turning back on the Federals. Masses of formations could not deploy easily from the passes. Meade’s opportunity opened on July 4, and opened wider on July 5. With the Confederates committed to the more northern passes, the Federals should have quickly focused on the southern passes: Cavetown and Turner’s Gap, largest one leading from Frederick to Hagerstown. Just as the mountains screened Lee’s flank, they would protect Meade’s flank, as well. The enveloping force should have departed with forced marches on July 5 along Avenue East.

Meade’s educational experience could not have been more descriptive. He should have quickly moved a direct pressure force to follow the Confederates near Fairfield. With his enveloping main body force, Meade should have begun movement on the flank of the enemy south using as many parallel routes as were available. This enveloping force would be within supporting distance of the direct pressure force for at least two days—long enough to provide support if Lee turned on the direct pressure force. Figure 11 shows the axes of advance and locations of Federal forces.

The direct pressure force should have been small. It should have been comprised of units with an experienced commander who had fewer casualties. The 12th Corps, reinforced with a small corps, would have been sufficient, rather than the 6th Corps. This force needed to be about 15,000 men or fewer—enough to defend against one Confederate corps. If Lee tried to advance two corps against this force, Meade could either turn around to support Slocum, or attack Lee in the rear.

To accomplish this maneuver, force selection played a role. Meade should not have used the 6th Corps as the direct pressure force; Sedgwick was too valuable. He could be wing commander, needed for the
main battle, and his corps was undamaged. Meade should have brought up Humphries to serve as chief of staff immediately, rather than temporarily diverting Pleasonton from his duties as chief of cavalry. Artillery reserve assets could reinforce Slocum, but the dominant artillery force would accompany the enveloping force. Rested artillery assets should have been sent to reinforce French on July 5.

Figure 11. Proposed Federal Solution

Meade should have maximized use of his other forces as well. He needed to get to the crossing sites first. Once Lee committed to Avenue West, the question was how Meade could beat him there. Meade must slow him down.

The cavalry did limited damage then withdrew in the face of Confederate infantry. Its impact on Lee’s plan was substantial, showing the potential of any enemy force in the rear of the adversary. These cavalry forces, including the brigade at Cashtown, should have continued their raiding throughout the valley. In the pursuit, they allowed themselves to be satisfied with capturing small numbers of wagons and men, when their target should have been large amounts of Confederate assets. If the Federal cavalry hit an infantry unit or entrenched enemy, they should have moved on and struck another target. The goal should have been to force the enemy to deploy and redeploy, again and again, in order to protect exposed assets under attack rather than movement, thus causing confusion and delay.

Other forces had a role to play. Couch’s force, regardless of its capabilities, should have continued into the Cumberland Valley. It would have joined first with the Federal cavalry, and then with the direct pressure force as it exited Monterey Pass. French’s forces should have advanced further than merely holding the passes, and joined in the cavalry battles.

The appearance of one Confederate brigade in Hagerstown and two Confederate regiments in Williamsport repelled Federal attacks. Similar shows of strength near Cavetown and Hagerstown by French’s forces, and near Chambersburg with Couch’s forces, would have presented the opponent with more resistance and forced him to fight. The goal of all these advanced Federal forces should have been to buy time for the main body to get between Lee and the crossing sites. By July 9, Meade could have seized the initiative. Lee would have been forced to attack Meade, if Meade did not attack first.

While accomplishing this move, Meade should have shifted his line of communications to Frederick by the evening of July 3 or as soon as possible. The city had a working railhead and was located to support
operations against either of the Confederates options. Frederick City could support operations at Emmitsburg or points toward the west. Retaining Gettysburg as the terminus of the line of operation could only support operations against the Confederate defense near Emmitsburg. Frederick City would also support all Federal axes of advance.

As the enveloping force proceeded south and turned west, any threat to the direct pressure force would have ended, as Meade would have become the master of his enemy’s lines of communication—Lee would be forced west, if he had intended to fight in the passes. Shown in Figures 6 and 11, the Federal avenues of approach led directly to the retreating Confederate main body! It would have taken two days for the lines of communication to shift to Frederick, just in time for the enveloping force to arrive in the vicinity. Even with a one-day resupply period, the enveloping force would have entered the Cumberland Valley on July 8. This solution was the optimal opportunity for Meade to bring Lee to battle.

Meade had a second opportunity, but again, he allowed Lee to retain the initiative. Meade approached the mountain passes on the evening of July 8. He did not clear them before July 10, and did not occupy defensive positions until July 12. With Lee’s defensive plan not completed until evening July 9, and that defensive line not occupied until late July 10 and morning July 11, Meade could have attacked on or before July 10. He should not have waited until Lee had set up his defense, but should have moved aggressively toward the Confederate crossing sites on July 10. Again, Lee would have been forced to fight his way back to Virginia.

But once Lee established his defense, Meade was smart and courageous not to attack. Some military authors have suggested that Meade should have attacked Lee’s left flank at Falling Waters. That flank was the easiest to defend. Any successful Federal attack would have forced the Confederates to simply fall back on their intended crossing site in a controlled delay. By July 13, the line was simply too strong.

Halleck’s guidance to Meade not to bring a general engagement until his force was concentrated was counter-productive. It encouraged the deliberate Meade to remain within his comfort zone, providing Meade with a false sense of accomplishment, rather than a true sense of Halleck’s expectations. When Halleck joined in the criticism of Meade following Lee’s escape, Halleck appeared self-serving.

In the pursuit, Meade committed major errors. He failed to organize his force properly, failed to “see the entire battlefield,” and failed to aggressively bring the enemy to battle. The potential in the pursuit is enormous. At and following the Battle of Jena, Napoleon lost 5,000 men, while his adversary lost 25,000 men. But Napoleon captured six times as many men and most of the artillery in his pursuit. He then seized Berlin and terminated the campaign.

Nevertheless, despite the pursuit phase setbacks, Meade won the campaign of Gettysburg.

Endnotes

3 Ibid., 232.
4 Ibid., 236.
8 Ibid., 103.
9 Jomini, The Art of War, 69.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 242.
12 Britten, *Jena Campaign Studies*, 105. Napoleon tried to concentrate toward the rear of his adversary to force a battle (p. 89). The enemy either had to attack Napoleon on ground that Napoleon had selected or withdraw further to the rear, offering Napoleon an opportunity to attack an enemy in movement.
15 Ibid., 28.
16 Ibid., 118.
17 Ibid., 147.
18 Ibid., 49.
23 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 542.
24 OR, Series 1, 27(1); 761, 84-85, 601.
26 Report of the Joint Committee, 334.
27 Report of the Joint Committee, 343.
28 OR, Series 1, 27(2): 299.
29 Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg*, 176.
30 Regimental field grade officers in the division were virtually decimated. All three brigade commanders were casualties as well. The chain of command in Pickett’s division was greatly affected at those levels.
31 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 986.
32 Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg*, 73.
33 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 499
34 Report of the Joint Committee, 338.
36 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 334.
37 OR, Series 1, 27(1): 916.
38 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 334.
39 OR, Series 1, 27(1): 310.
40 Ibid., 80-81; OR, Series 1, 27(3): 532-533, 547.
41 OR, Series 1, 27(1): 222.
42 Ibid., 213.
45 OR, Series 1, 27(2): 361.
47 Jomini would call this setup “triply advantageous;” see Jomini, *The Art of War*, 160. The natural advantage of the primary occupied position, and the trench works on the far side of the river, could support the near side of the river-crossing site.
49 Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg*, 322.
50 OR, Series 1, 27(3): 705.
52 Report of the Joint Committee, 334.
53 *OR*, Series 1, 27(1): 994.
55 Ibid., 254.
56 *OR*, Series 1, 27(1): 928.
57 *Report of the Joint Committee*, 334.
58 *OR*, Series 1, 27(3): 523-533, 564-565.
59 *Report of the Joint Committee*, 335.
61 *OR*, Series 1, 27(1): 89.
62 Ibid., 311.
63 Ibid., 91; *OR*, Series 1, 27(3): 669.
64 Report, LXXII.
65 *OR*, Series 1, 27(1): 106.
66 Ibid., 82.
67 Ibid., 92.