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FRONTIER DEFENSE IN THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, 1853-1861¹

By A. B. BENDER

JEFFERSON DAVIS became secretary of war on March 7, 1853.² Taking up the problem of frontier defense, he declared that he was not in sympathy with the plan of his predecessor.³ In his annual report of December 1, 1853, Davis characterized Conrad's defense program—that of locating a long line of military posts among the Indians—as expensive and ineffective. He contended that such a plan would injure discipline and deaden the efficiency of the troops. Furthermore, the division of forces would be interpreted by the Indians as an exhibition of weakness. To attempt to guard the entire frontier was utterly impractical. He leaned, therefore, to the frontier policy of Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup. Like the latter, Davis believed that a more effective mode of defense was to mass a few large bodies of troops at strategic positions.⁴ Within the fertile regions, a few points accessible by steamboats or railroads should be selected. Large garrisons maintained at such points could serve as bases for operation into the In-

1. This is the third in a series of articles dealing with the New Mexican Frontier, 1846-1861. For an account of official explorations, see A. B. Bender, "Government explorations in the Territory of New Mexico, 1846-1859," in *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, IX, 1-32; "Frontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico, 1846-1853," is in *ibid.*, IX, 249-272.

2. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of United States Army, 1789-1903* (Washington, 1903), I, 16.

3. This was Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad. *Ibid.*

4. *Sen. Ex Docs.*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 6.

dian country.⁵ Davis's concentration policy was carried out but partially.

Meanwhile the civil and military authorities in the territory of New Mexico or the Ninth Military Department⁶ attempted to solve the problem of frontier defense. In July, 1853, General John Garland was assigned to the command of the department and soon arrived with some 300 recruits to strengthen the military posts.⁷ Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs David Meriwether, who had arrived in August,⁸ also had a theory about handling the Indian problem. He believed that the title to all Indian lands near the settlements should be purchased, to be paid for in annuities, and deductions made for depredations. Above all, Meriwether advocated vigor and decision. "Feed or clothe the Indians or chastise them. But do it decisively," he urged.⁹

The apostle of firmness found conditions far from satisfactory. The Mescalero and White Mountain Apache, in particular, were giving trouble.¹⁰ To Commissioner of Indian Affairs John W. Manypenny, Meriwether wrote that nothing on the border was safe. Robbery and murder were the order of the day.¹¹ Despite this alarming picture, Secretary of War Davis reported to the president that the territory was comparatively free from Indian disturbances during that year. The few depredations that did occur, he

5. *Ibid.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 5, pt. 2, p. 6.

6. See this volume, page 249.

7. General Garland was assigned to the command of the Ninth Military Department on July 20, 1853. With the exception of a brief period October 11, 1856-May 12, 1857, when Colonel Bonneville was in temporary command, Garland was the chief military officer until September 16, 1858. R. P. Thian, *Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the United States, 1813-1880* (Washington 1881), 50-71; *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, August 13, 1853.

8. Meriwether assumed the duties of his office on August 8, 1853. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 374.

9. *Ibid.*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 430-431.

10. Michael Steck to Meriwether, August 23, 1853; John Garland to Meriwether September 14, 1853. Ms., Letters Received, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Indian Office, Department of Interior, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.).

11. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 430.

stated, were generally traced to murderers and outlaws for whose actions none of the tribes could be held justly responsible. The tribes to which these lawless members belonged promised to deliver the murderers and to restore plundered property.¹² To assure greater security in the territory, Davis believed that an additional regiment of cavalry and one of infantry were needed.¹³

While Davis and Meriwether aired their views about the proper mode of frontier defense, military officers took more direct action. In the fall of 1853 General Garland inspected all the military posts of the department except forts Massachusetts, Defiance, and Cantonment Burgwin.¹⁴ In December of the same year Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel D. T. Chandler was directed to reconnoiter the White Mountains country, to interview the principal chiefs of the Mescalero Apache, and to demand restitution of stolen property and the surrender of murderers. If he did not obtain satisfaction Chandler was to attack the Indians.¹⁵ At the same time Brevet Major James H. Carleton, First Dragoons, conducted an exploring-punitive expedition into the reputed haunts of the Apache in the vicinity of the Gran Quivira country.¹⁶

These expeditions into the Indian country, coupled with insistent demands of the Mexican government and the frontier settlers for more adequate protection, resulted in the erection of three additional military posts. Fort Thorn was built in December, 1853 and was garrisoned with two companies from Fort Webster, which was then abandoned. The

12. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, pp. 4, 5.

13. By the end of 1853 an aggregate of 1,678 men, composed of twenty-one companies, were distributed among the ten military posts of the department. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, p. 51.

14. For a description of these posts see *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 60; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 9, pp. 425-426; Lydia S. Lane, *I Married a Soldier* (Philadelphia, 1893), 46-47; Garland to L. Thomas, October 29, 1853. Ms., Letters Received, Adjutant General, Old Files Section, Executive Division; Adjutant General's Office, Washington (hereafter the last reference will be cited as Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.)

15. W. A. Nichols to D. T. Chandler, December 11, 1853. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

16. For Carleton's expedition see Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 17-20.

new post was located on the west bank of the Rio Grande at Santa Barbara, near the upper end of the Mesilla valley; it guarded the El Paso-Santa Fé route against Apache and outlaws.¹⁷ In the following year Fort Bliss¹⁸ was constructed near El Paso. In April Fort Craig was established and Fort Conrad abandoned. The new post was nine miles south of Fort Conrad and ten miles above Fray Cristobal. Located at the entrance of the Jornada del Muerto, it afforded better protection and was better situated for grazing purposes than the abandoned post had been.¹⁹

The state of comparative peace reported by Secretary of War Davis lasted for a little more than a year and then almost all of the Indian bands in the territory took to the war-path. Active campaigns against the Mescalero, Jicarilla, and Utah under the direction of General Garland followed. Treaties were negotiated by Governor Meriwether but were not approved by the federal government. The Indian situation remained unsolved. On March 30, 1854 the Santa Fé-Texas mail was attacked by a combined force of some 250 Jicarilla Apache and Utah warriors about twenty-five miles from Taos. The mail train's escort, composed of some sixty dragoons under Lieutenant (later Captain) J. W. Davidson suffered heavy losses; Davidson with but seventeen men,

17. Fort Thorn occupied a very unhealthy site, being located upon the edge of an extensive marsh. It was abandoned in 1859. Assistant Surgeon T. Charlton Henry characterized it as the "sickliest post in the territory." *H. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 60; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, pp. 222-225; Garland to S. Cooper, January 27, 1854. *Ms.*, L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

18. The "Post of El Paso" was established in February, 1848 and was garrisoned by three companies of First Dragoons and one of the Santa Fé Battalion, Third Missouri Mounted Volunteers. The official designation as Fort Bliss was not made until March 8, 1854. With the shifting of boundaries of the departments of Texas and New Mexico, during 1853-1861, Fort Bliss was shunted back and forth between these departments. By General Orders, Number 12, December 8, 1860, the post was restored to the Department of Texas. Fort Bliss, Post Returns, February 1848, March, 1854, March, 1867, December, 1870. Records Section, Officers Division, Adjutant General's Office, Washington.

19. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 96, p. 414; John S. Billings, *Report on Barracks and Hospitals with Descriptions of Military Posts* (Washington, 1870), 244.

mostly wounded, escaped.²⁰ Three days later the New Mexico legislature memorialized the United States senate for more adequate protection.²¹

To prevent further disaster and to check the Apache, Lieutenant-Colonel Philip St. George Cooke carried the war into the heart of the Indian country. He assembled about 200 dragoons, a company of artillery, and some thirty Mexicans and Indians at Taos, and on April 4 took the field. Kit Carson served as guide. For four days this frontier army laboriously plodded through a very broken and precipitous country in search of the Indians' trail. On April 8 Cooke discovered the Indians near Agua or Ojo Caliente and gave them battle. The Apache under their principal chief, Chacón, were routed.²²

In the latter part of May federal troops encountered another band of Apache at Cieneguilla. Lieutenant Davidson and a force of sixty men from Cantonment Burgwin, who had been on a scouting expedition, discovered the Apache on a mountain ridge. Although the Indians had the advantage of position and were superior in number—about 200 strong—the troops charged their camp. After a loss of some twenty men, Davidson withdrew to Taos. Shortly afterward the Indians retreated to the west side of the Rio Grande, being hotly pursued by Colonel Cooke with a force of about 200 dragoons and riflemen and a spy company of citizens and Pueblo Indians.²³ By the end of June the Apache were so thoroughly humbled that they sued for peace.²⁴ A force of 180 men under Colonel Chandler was still in the field in the country of the Mescalero.²⁵

20. R. P. Bieber, "Papers of James J. Webb, Santa Fé Merchant, 1844-1866," in *Washington Universities Studies*, XI, Humanistic Series, No. 2, p. 295; *Austin State Gazette*, April 29, 1854; *H. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 33-34.

21. *Senate Journal*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 297.

22. P. St. George Cooke to W. A. Nichols, May 24, 1854. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

23. *Austin State Gazette*, June 3, 1854.

24. John Garland to L. Thomas, September 30, 1854. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

25. This band had been infesting the road leading from El Paso to San Antonio, committing robbery and murder. *Ibid.*

Congress next took up the Indian problem. By Act of July 31, 1854, it appropriated \$30,000 for the negotiation of treaties with the Apache, Navaho, and Utah. Governor Meriwether was entrusted with the negotiations.²⁶ In the fall of the year the latter reported to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Manypenny that the losses sustained by the white population of the territory during the current year (1854) were about \$112,000.²⁷

While Meriwether was preparing to act, the Indians again took to the war path. On February 7, 1885 Senator Albert G. Brown of Mississippi presented a memorial from the citizens of New Mexico requesting a loan of arms and ammunition and "praying for . . . protection . . . against Indian depredations."²⁸ General Garland, too, pointed out the need of a larger military force in the department. He called upon the governor for five companies of mounted volunteers for a six months' period and urged congress to make the necessary appropriations and to send at least 550 recruits. President Pierce submitted this report to the secretary of war, asking for an immediate increase in the military strength on the western frontier.²⁹

Meanwhile Garland sent out punitive expeditions. By March of the same year almost 1,000 troops were in the field. Captain R. S. Ewell, First Dragoons, conducted a campaign against the Mescalero in February. The Indians were defeated and sued for peace. Lieutenant Samuel D. Sturgis and his command gave chase to another band of Mescalero and routed them. These Indians came to Fort Thorn to sue for peace. A band of Utah having committed murders and depredations along the upper Red River, Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy led a force of about 500 regulars and volunteers in pursuit. A combined force of Utah and Apache warriors

26. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 526.

27. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 222.

28. *Senate Journal*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 208.

29. In November, 1855, the adjutant general's office reported an aggregate of 2,112 men in the department of New Mexico. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 56-57, 138-139.

was overtaken at Cochetopa Pass and the Indians were routed. In a second engagement on the Upper Arkansas, near the Poncho Pass, the Indians were again defeated and forced to sue for peace.

To break the power of the Apache, Colonel Dixon S. Miles, with a force of some 300 men, set out on a three months' campaign through the White, Sacramento, and Guadalupe mountains. He did not measure strength with the Indians. Upon arriving at the Bonita river, Dr. Michael Steck, Indian agent for the Apache, pleaded their cause. The Indians sued for peace, promising to surrender stolen property and to deliver hostages.³⁰ Miles's expedition not only quieted the Indians but also opened two new wagon roads.³¹

The Apache depredations showed the need of additional military posts in the department. Fort Stanton was established in May, 1855. The post was located on the site near which Captain H. W. Stanton had lost his life in an encounter with the Mescalero Apache. It was very favorably situated on the Bonita River, some twenty miles east of the White Mountains. Being easily accessible, in a region abundantly supplied with grass, wood, and water and on a good connecting road,³² Fort Stanton was no small factor in lessening the power of the Mescalero. Settlements in the vicinity of the neighboring mountains were thus made com-

30. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, pp. 507-510, pt. 2, pp. 57, 59-69.

31. Miles opened one wagon road from Fort Fillmore to the junction of the Ruidoso with the Bonita river and a second one from Albuquerque to the same point—a distance of about 150 miles. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, pp. 69-70.

32. Fort Stanton was the center of a military reservation embracing an area of more than 140 square miles. In July, 1857, Captain J. N. Macomb of the Topographical Engineers was *en route* to the post to survey and mark the boundaries of the military reservation. The post was abandoned in August, 1861 but was reoccupied in the following year by a garrison of volunteers. After the Civil War it was occupied by four companies of the Eighth Cavalry and one company of New Mexico volunteers. It was again abandoned in August, 1896. *Ibid.*, p. 70; Billings, *opus cit.*, 248; Carl C. Rister, *The Southwestern Frontier, 1865-1881* (Cleveland, 1928), p. 63, footnote 393; J. N. Macomb to J. J. Abert, July 28, 1857. Ms., Letters Received, Chief of Topographical Engineers, Old Records Section, Office of Chief of Engineers, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., L. R., C. T. E., O. R. S., O. C. E.).

paratively safe.³³ By September of 1855 Meriwether wrote that the tribes which had been on the warpath earlier in the year had been humbled and had sued for peace. Treaties³⁴ had been negotiated with the Mimbres and Mescalero Apache,³⁵ Navaho and Utah with the understanding that they cultivate the land assigned them. But the sale of "ardent spirits" to the Indian and his practice of gambling—for which the white man was responsible—left the tribes destitute and goaded them on to new outbreaks. To check these evils Meriwether recommended that the trade and intercourse laws with the Indians be extended over the entire territory and that gambling be made a penal offense.³⁶

With the acquisition of the Gadsden Purchase, some 5,000 Indians were added to the existing troublesome native population. To meet this new problem, additional military posts were needed. Fort Buchanan was established in 1856 as a protection for the Santa Cruz valley and as a check on the Indians north of the Gila. The post was located in the Sonoita, about twenty-five miles east of Tubac³⁷ and was garrisoned by four companies of First Dragoons.³⁸

33. Sylvester Mowry, *Arizona and Sonora* (New York, 1864), 22.

34. Meriwether's treaties were not ratified by the senate. Even if they had been, it is doubtful whether the Indians would have observed them. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 542.

35. The country reserved for the occupancy of this band was south of Fort Stanton, about twenty-seven miles wide, extending from the Sacramento mountains to the Pecos river. From this time on, an agency was maintained at this post and the Mescalero who kept the peace were rewarded by a payment in goods. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 506-510; R. E. Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexican History* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912), II, 302.

36. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 509.

37. Picturesque Tubac, the business center of the silver mine district of the territory, was first settled by Americans in 1856 when Charles D. Poston established his mining headquarters there. Between 1856 and 1860 it contained a mixed population of some 400 inhabitants, composed of Americans, Germans, Mexicans, and Indians. Upon the opening of the Civil War, the Apache swooped down on Tubac and after a brave attempt on the part of the American residents, the town was abandoned. By 1864 it was a city of ruins. J. W. Barber and H. Howe, *History of all the Western States and Territories* (Cincinnati, 1867), 565; J. Ross Browne, *Adventures in the Apache Country* (New York, 1869), 147-159; Mowry, *opus cit.*, 25.

38. Of all the army posts in the Southwest, Fort Buchanan was probably the worst situated and most poorly constructed. As late as July, 1859, it consisted of a series of temporary jacal buildings. The quarters lacked neatness and comfort. The

Reports on the Indian situation in the department for 1856 were somewhat conflicting. Colonel James L. Collins, who succeeded Meriwether as principal Indian official,³⁹ wrote to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. Mix that more murders and robberies were perpetrated in 1856 than in any one previous year.⁴⁰ Governor Meriwether, on the other hand, represented conditions as comparatively quiet. The Mimbres Apache he reported busily engaged in cultivating their farms. The Mescalero showed less improvement as they depended on the chase and thieving for their subsistence. The Gila Apache, too, made little progress. These bands were still actively engaged in robbing the peaceful Pueblos and travellers on the road from El Paso to California.⁴¹ The Jicarilla, who had been visited by Indian agents, seemed loyal to the government and asked for assignment to permanent homes.⁴² The Utah, too, asked for homes and expressed a willingness to commence farming the next spring.⁴³ The tribes, including those in the Gadsden Purchase, Meriwether also reported as prosperous and peaceful. The Navaho, however, continued in their favorite

39. Upon the organization of the New Mexico territory, the governor became *ex-officio* superintendent of Indian affairs. This position was held successively by Calhoun (1851-1852), Lane (1852-1853), and Meriwether (1853-1857). In 1857 the two offices were separated; James L. Collins became superintendent and W. W. H. Davis acted as governor until the arrival of Abraham R. Rencher. Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 314, footnote 241; H. H. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico* (San Francisco, 1889), 662.

40. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 542.

41. *Ibid.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 5, pt. 1, pp. 731-732.

42. It was not until 1873 that the federal government set aside a reservation for these Indians. Bureau of American Ethnology, *Eighteenth Annual Report* (Washington, 1899), pt. 2, p. 668.

43. Although the treaty concluded with this tribe in 1849 provided for a speedy designation of boundaries, it was not until 1868 that these Indians were located on a reservation in Colorado. *Ibid.*, pp. 780, 848-849.

houses were constructed of upright posts of decaying timber and covered with mud; dirt and grass covered the flat roofs as well as the floors; the rooms were low, narrow, and without ventilation. Stables, corrals, pig-pens, and dwellings were scattered indiscriminately over a distance of half a mile. Because of the unhealthy site, the troops suffered continually. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 5, pt. 2, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, pp. 210-211, 219-220; *H. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 1, p. 3; William J. Sloan to John D. Wilkins, July 17, 1859, B. L. E. Bonneville to L. Thomas, July 15, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

practice of stealing cattle and sheep.⁴⁴ In his annual report to the president, Secretary of War Davis expressed the same views as Meriwether. Except for occasional depredations, the Indians in this department showed no settled hostility to the whites.⁴⁵

While Meriwether and Davis represented the New Mexican Indian situation in a favorable light, the territorial legislature made an adverse report. It pointed out that no less than 30,000 uncivilized Indians roamed about with but little restraint and committed numerous depredations. In one foray Indian rustlers drove off no less than 10,000 head of sheep. The legislature requested that the Indians be located on reservations.⁴⁶

In the various official reports of 1857, the adoption of a reservation policy was favored. Collins, the new superintendent of Indian affairs of the department, strongly urged that the treaty-making policy be discarded and a colonizing plan substituted. The agent for the Utah, Diego Archuleta, expressed the same opinion, while Agent Steck recommended that the Apache be placed on a reservation below the Gila with four strong military companies as a guard. Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville⁴⁷ approved the reservation site selected

44. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 5, pt. 1, pp. 733-734.

45. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, p. 4.

46. The New Mexico legislature was continually memorializing congress. It maintained that the Indians were more treacherous and the white settlements less protected than when the Americans first came. To what extent these assertions were true is not certain. Conditions were bad. The constant cry for volunteer regiments may have been prompted by a desire on the part of New Mexicans to secure easy and profitable employment with the government as paymasters and in other capacities. Ms., Territorial Papers, listed in D. W. Parker, *Calendar of Papers in Washington Archives Relating to Territories of the United States to 1873* (Washington, 1911), Number 5466, Senate Files, 34 Congress, Archives Division, Department of State, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., T. P., Parker, Number, S. F., Cong., A. D., D. S.). The Territorial Papers used were typewritten, collated copies; Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 300, footnote. 224.

47. Benjamin L. E. de Bonneville was one of the most picturesque figures in the United States army. Born in France in (1795?). 1796, he immigrated to the United States at an early age, entered West Point in 1813, and two years later graduated from there as second lieutenant in the light artillery. In 1820 he was assigned to construct a military road in Mississippi. In 1831 he obtained leave of absence from the army and in the next year departed on an exploring tour to the Rocky Mountains. After being cut off from civilization for several years he returned with

by Steck, but the Apache were not located on reservations at this time. It was not until 1859 that permanent homes for the peaceful Pima and Maricopa tribes⁴⁸ were established.⁴⁹

For a number of years, the Mimbres, Gila, and Coyotero bands of Apache terrorized the frontier settlements west of the Rio Grande. Their bold forays extended to the north. Cattle-stealing and attacks upon exposed settlements occurred periodically. When the surprised the United States Indian agent H. L. Dodge, a few miles from Zuñi and brutally murdered him, the Gila expedition followed.⁵⁰

Colonel Bonneville was chief in command. Organizing his force in two main columns, he established his depot on the west bank of the Gila some twelve miles northwest of Lucien Springs. The northern column, commanded by Colonel William W. Loring and composed of three companies of infantry and several detachments of rifles and a company of spies under Captain Manuel Chaves,⁵¹ was detached on June 22. Loring's trail led across a rough, mountainous, and deserted country. In the Cañon of San Vincente, he

48. These tribes had rendered valuable service to the white man in the past. In 1847 they assisted Cooke's Battalion; they protected immigrant and mail trains against Apache; they sold food to immigrants. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 550, 555-557; Bureau of American Ethnology, *opus cit.*, pt. 2, pp. 820-821.

49. The site selected was a spot fifteen miles square in the vicinity of Santa Lucia Spring. The boundaries included a rich and fertile valley watered by the Gila and large enough to accommodate the Mimbres, Mogollon, and Chiricahua bands of Apache. Michael Steck to A. B. Greenwood, May 11, 1860; J. L. Collins to Greenwood, October 17, 1860. *Ms., L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.*

50. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 279-280.

51. For the career of this picturesque New Mexican who aided the federal forces in many a fight against the Indians, see Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 383, footnote 387.

a valuable account of his adventures. In the meantime, he had been dropped from the army but was restored in 1836. He was promoted to the rank of major, Sixth Infantry in 1845 and two years later was brevetted lieutenant-colonel for bravery in the Mexican War. In 1855 he became colonel, Third Infantry. From October, 1856 to May, 1857 he was in temporary command of the department of New Mexico, when he was succeeded by General John Garland. On September 16, 1858 he resumed command of the department and held this post until October 25, 1859, when he was succeeded by Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy. During the Civil War he served as superintendent of the recruiting service in Missouri and was made brigadier general in 1865. He died at Fort Smith, Arkansas on June 12, 1878. Thian, *opus cit.*, 71;

struck a trail of about 2,000 sheep and a party of Indians. Two days later, in the valley of the Safo River, a battle took place. The Indians were defeated and considerable plunder was recovered.⁵²

Bonneville accompanied the southern column, composed of about 400 men, including guides and spies of the Pueblo Indians and Captain Blas Lucero's Mexicans. Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon S. Miles commanded this division. After a twelve days' march from the depot on the Gila, the command encountered a band of Coyotero and Mogollon Apache, about thirty-five miles north of Mount Graham or Floridian. On June 27 a sharp fight took place in which the Indians were repulsed with some forty killed, including several women. The troops suffered only twelve wounded and succeeded in taking about forty prisoners and destroying considerable property.⁵³

The *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette* characterized the Gila expedition as the most arduous, trying, and dangerous military operation projected since New Mexico became a possession of the United States government.⁵⁴ At the close of the campaign the territorial legislature passed a joint resolution thanking Bonneville and his men for attaining their object. Despite the current belief that the expedition had been successful, it did not solve the Indian problem in the territory.⁵⁵ It did, however, bring to light valuable information about the character of the country on the headwaters of the

52. *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, October 31, 1857.

53. *Ibid.*, *H. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, pt. 2, pp. 55-56, 60, 137; Dixon S. Miles to Bonneville, July 13, 1857. Ms., L. R., Headquarters of the Army, O. R. S., A. G. O. (hereafter Headquarters of the Army will be cited as H. A.)

54. *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, October 31, 1857.

55. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 279-280.

George W. Cullum, *Register of Officers and Graduates of United States Military Academy at West Point, 1820-1850* (New York, 1850), 77; W. H. Ellison, "From Pierre's Hole to Monterey," in *Pacific Historical Review*, I, 92, footnote 35; Washington Irving, *The Adventures of Captain Bonneville, U. S. A., in the Rocky Mountains and the Far West* (New York, 1852).

Gila and its tributaries—a region heretofore practically unexplored.⁵⁶

Meanwhile several suggestions were made for strengthening the southwestern frontier. Lieutenant Sylvester Mowry advocated the erection of a series of posts that would command the paths followed by the Apache in their foraging and plundering expeditions into Mexico. His suggestion included a cavalry post in the neighborhood of Tucson, one on the San Pedro, one in the vicinity of Los Mimbres, and one on the Gila above the Pima villages.⁵⁷

Secretary of War John B. Floyd⁵⁸ considered the strengthening of the frontier an immediate necessity. He advised that a line of posts running parallel with the frontier, but near enough to the Indian's habitat, be established at suitable positions and occupied by infantry. Such a line of defense, Floyd believed, would exercise a salutary restraint upon the tribes. In addition, he urged that large bodies of cavalry be stationed along the frontier, the cantonments to be located at points where hay and corn were plentiful and cheap.⁵⁹

Abraham R. Rencher, the new governor of the territory, arrived in Santa Fé in November, 1857 and shortly afterwards assumed the duties of his office.⁶⁰ The change in civil administration, however, did not improve the frontier conditions. In the following February the territorial legislature memorialized and petitioned congress to remove the wild tribes north of the 34th parallel.⁶¹ Until the opening of

56. Bonneville described portions of the region as most beautiful, healthy, and fertile. In some localities irrigating canals, ten feet wide, cut the mountain sides. Some of the valleys were capable of sustaining a population of 20,000 people. *Ibid.*; Bonneville to L. Thomas, June 2, 1857. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

57. Annie E. Whittaker, "The Frontier Policy of the United States in the Mexican Cession, 1845-1860" (M.A. Thesis. University of Texas, 1927), 69.

58. Floyd was secretary of war from March 6, 1857 to December 9, 1860. Heitman, *opus cit.*, I, 16.

59. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, pt. 2, pp. 4-5.

60. See footnote 39; Abraham R. Rencher to Lewis Cass, December 11, 1857. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5475, Bureau of Rolls and Library, A. D., D. S. (hereafter Bureau of Rolls and Library will be cited as B. R. L.).

61. *Sen. Misc. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 208, pp. 1-2.

the Civil War the various Indian bands periodically took to the war path and military attempts to subdue them proved but partially successful. During this period serious trouble arose with the Navaho. Numerous campaigns under the direction of Garland, Bonneville, Fauntleroy, and Canby followed. The southern Apache, too, renewed their raids. The Mormons were believed to be tampering with the Utah.

Early in 1858 trouble developed near Albuquerque and in the southern part of the department when Mexican bandits attacked some peaceful tribes. In February several Mexican outlaws swooped down upon a small band of Navaho in the vicinity of Albuquerque. At Doña Ana a similar attack was made on the Mescalero Apache. At daybreak on April 17, a party of armed Mexicans from Mesilla charged into the Indian camp at the Fort Thorn agency and ruthlessly butchered men, women, and children. Some thirty Mexican bandits under Juan Ortega were captured about one half mile from the post by a detachment of troops under Lieutenant George W. Howland.⁶²

About the same time the Pinal Apache disturbed the peace. Between February 15 and March 8 Captain Davidson, First Dragoons, with a command of seventy men, marched into the Pinal Indian country and along the north bank of the Gila. The surprise attack failed but the command learned considerable about the character of the country and the strength of the Indians.⁶³

In the fall of the year three elaborate expeditions took the field against the Navaho before these tribes were seemingly humbled. Some 300 men, composed of three companies of Mounted Rifles, two companies of infantry, and Captain Blas Lucero's company of guides and spies, left Fort Defiance on September 9,⁶⁴ in search of hostile Navaho.

62. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 233-239.

63. John W. Davidson to R. S. C. Lord, March 20, 1853. Ms., L. R., A. G., O F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

64. The first engagement with the Navaho occurred on August 29 near Ojo del Oso in which a detachment of Company I, Mounted Rifles, defeated the Indians. Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 315, footnote 242.

Lieutenant-Colonel Miles commanded the expedition. After trailing the Indians for several days, Miles overtook them in the Cañon de Chelly. Several skirmishes followed in which a number of Indians were killed and several thousand sheep captured. In the latter part of the month Miles again marched against the Navaho, this time advancing eastward from Fort Defiance. Several skirmishes again took place. The Indians were scattered, much of their property was destroyed, and some 6,000 sheep were captured.⁶⁵

Major Electus Backus, Third Infantry, led a third campaign against this tribe. With two companies of Mounted Rifles, four companies of infantry, fifty-five spies and guides under Captain Valdez and some twenty friendly Utah Indians, Backus set out for Cañon de Chelly on October 19. This imposing army was thirty days on the march and penetrated more than 340 miles of the enemy's country. Despite this elaborate show of force, the Backus expedition succeeded in killing only a few Indians and capturing several hundred goats and sheep.⁶⁶

The Navaho, however, had been hard pressed and sued for peace. On December 25, 1858 Superintendent of Indian Affairs Collins and Colonel Bonneville met the Navaho chiefs in council at Fort Defiance and negotiated a treaty. The agreement provided for the indemnification in live stock for all depredations committed since the preceding August, the liberation of captives, and the fixing of boundaries,⁶⁷ beyond which the Indians were not to pass. In the future the entire tribe was to be held responsible for depredations committed by its members. The federal government was to have freedom of passage through the Navaho country and the privilege of establishing military posts.⁶⁸ As usual

65. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 25, 309-313, 324-326.

66. Electus Backus to Bonneville, November 19, 1858. MS., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

67. Article one of this treaty fixed the boundaries in great detail. Bonneville to L. Thomas (enclosing treaty) January 9, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

68. *Ibid.*

the Indians failed to comply with the conditions of the treaty; the federal government failed to ratify.⁶⁹

In the same year the Department of the West⁷⁰ was reduced by the transfer of troops to other points on the frontier. The Department of New Mexico also suffered. Because of the Mormon trouble, mounted forces were sent to Utah. Two mounted companies at Fort Buchanan had been ordered to Camp Loring near the Red river to avenge the breaking up of a white settlement by the Comanche.⁷¹ Requests for more adequate defense again appeared. In Doña Ana county some 600 citizens petitioned General Garland for additional mounted troops in the Mesilla valley. Garland, accordingly, recommended the establishment of a military post near Albuquerque with a garrison of four companies. The new post was to protect the mail route between Neosho, Missouri, and Albuquerque and to defend the frontier settlements east of the Pecos.⁷²

In order to prevent Indians from returning from Mexico with stolen booty, George Bailey, special Indian agent visiting the department, recommended the erection of posts in the vicinity of Tucson, on the San Pedro, in the neighborhood of the Los Mimbres, and on the Gila near the Pima Villages.⁷³ Despite insistent demands and recommendations, only one new military post appeared in 1858, and this was a substitute for the abandoned Fort Massachusetts. Situated on Utah Creek in the Utah country, about

69. Governor Rencher, the Indian agents, and the people of the territory, knowing the Navaho character, considered the treaty a mistake. Subsequent punitive expeditions were necessary before the Navaho were overawed. Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 315-316.

70. On January 1, 1858 the United States was divided into seven military departments: Departments of the East, Florida, West, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and Pacific. The Western Department comprised the country west of the Mississippi River and east of the Rocky Mountains except portions of the Departments of Texas and New Mexico north of 33° north latitude. Upon the outbreak of the Civil War (April 27, 1861) the country comprised the following military commands: Departments of Annapolis, East, Pennsylvania, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Pacific, Washington, and the West. Thian, *opus cit.*, 8-9, 105.

71. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 293, pt. 3, p. 778.

72. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, pp. 291-293, 297-298.

73. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 559.

six miles south of the abandoned post, Fort Garland commanded the mouth of the cañons of the Rio de los Yutos and the Rio del Sangre de Cristo. Like its predecessor, the new post was to serve as a protection against Apache and Utah.⁷⁴

The Indian situation in the department in 1859 was somewhat complicated. Commissioner of Indian Affairs A. B. Greenwood reported conditions gradually improving.⁷⁵ Reports of military officers, however, presented a different view. Almost immediately after Bonneville's treaty of 1858⁷⁶ the New Mexico Indians again became restless. The regular offenders, including Mohave, Papago, Apache, and Navaho renewed their attacks on the white man. Punitive expeditions followed.

In January, 1859, a band of Mohave attacked the camp of Lieutenant-Colonel William Hoffman at Beaver Lake in the vicinity of the Colorado river near the 35th parallel.⁷⁷ The Indians were repulsed. In the following March Hoffman led more than 700 men from Fort Yuma⁷⁸ to Beale's Crossing and established Fort Mojave.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, a command of dragoons was marching northeastward from San Bernardino to the new post. This show of military strength overawed the Mohave. A number of chiefs, accompanied by some 400 of the tribe, appeared before Hoffman on April 23 and sued for peace. They accepted all the conditions imposed upon them. They agreed to the establish-

74. *Ibid.*, pt. 3, p. 778.

75. *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, I, 383, 393.

76. Cf., pp. 13-14 and footnote 69.

77. Hoffman, with a command of some fifty dragoons, had come from Martin's Ranch near Cajón Pass to reconnoiter for a military post. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 387-395, 401; Eugene Bandel, *Frontier Life in the Army, 1854-1861* (R. P. Bieber, ed., Glendale, California, 1932), 251.

78. See Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 15, footnote 42.

79. Fort Mojave was situated on the left bank of the Colorado river, near the present Mohave City, Arizona. Hoffman at first called the post "Camp Colorado." In the latter part of April when he withdrew his command from the Mohave country, Major Lewis A. Armistead was left with two companies of Sixth Infantry and a detachment of Third Artillery. By May 1, 1859, Armistead had renamed the post "Fort Mojave." It was abandoned on May 28, 1861 but was reoccupied on May 19, 1863. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 416-417; *Ibid.*, No. 52, pp. 235-236; Bandel, *opus cit.*, 277.

ment of posts and roads through their country, to give hostages for future security, and to surrender the ringleaders of previous attacks.⁸⁰

This show of submission, however, was short lived. The following July, a band of Mohave ran off the herd of mules belonging to the mail party stationed several miles below Fort Mohave and the men were driven into the post. Several days later a force of about 150 Indians fired on the post patrols. Early in August Brevet Major L. A. Armistead led two companies of infantry and surprised the Indians some twelve miles below the fort. The Indians were severely defeated, losing some twenty warriors. They again sued for peace.⁸¹

In February of the same year Lieutenant R. S. C. Lord, Second Infantry, with a detachment of twenty-five men, set out from Fort Buchanan in pursuit of a band of Papago. This band had stolen horses from an American ranchman near the post and had gone to Santa Cruz, Mexico. The Indians were found and hostages were taken to Fort Buchanan.⁸²

Various bands of Apache continued their depredations and federal troops attempted to break their spirit. On February 5 an engagement took place between a detachment from Fort Bliss and northern Apache. Lieutenant Henry M. Lazelle, Eighth Infantry, with thirty men encountered the Indians on the San Diego mail route, about seventy-five miles northwest of El Paso. Although outnumbered about three to one, the command managed to drive off the Indians by whom they had been surrounded in the gorge of Dog Cañon. Lazelle was wounded in this action.⁸³ When Indian Agent Steck reported that the Apache had left the Mogollon and Burro mountains, Bonneville ordered a company of Mounted Rifles, under Lieutenant G. W. How-

80. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 391-411; Bandel, *opus cit.*, 272.

81. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 419-420; San Francisco *Herald*, August 21, September 14, 1859.

82. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 292-293.

83. *Ibid.*, 287-291.

land together with 100 men under Major W. H. Gordon to locate the troops at a point southeast of the Burro mountains, and thus protect the vicinity of the overland mail station.⁸⁴ In August Bonneville reported that eighty head of stock belonging to the Sonora Mining and Exploring Company had been stolen by Chiricahua Apache. A detachment from Fort Buchanan immediately set out in pursuit and about sixty of the stolen herd were recovered.⁸⁵

Lieutenant-Colonel I. V. D. Reeve led an expedition against the Pinal Apache. With 171 men and five officers—dragoons and Mounted Rifles—Reeve left his camp on the San Pedro on November 12. After an eight days' scout in the direction of the Mescal mountains, covering a distance of about 140 miles, he finally abandoned the chase.⁸⁶ During the same period two ineffective encounters took place with the Pinal Apache and Kiowa bands that had attacked the mail train at Colorado Springs bound for Fort Union.⁸⁷

The Navaho, too, caused trouble. Not only did they break their former pledges but were guilty of new depredations. On September 25 Indian Agent Silaz F. Kendrick held a council with the Navaho at Laguna Negra near Fort Defiance and pointed to the violation of the previous treaty. They had failed to pay pledged indemnities; a number of the tribe were committing depredations along the Rio Grande. The Indians were given an extension of thirty days to bring in more horses, sheep, and other property. Although they disclaimed responsibility, they, nevertheless, promised to comply with these demands.⁸⁸ As these promises were not kept, Brevet Major Oliver L. Shepherd conducted an elaborate campaign against the Tunicha Navaho. With a command of more than 270 men—Third Infantry

84. Bonneville to Thomas, July 15, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

85. *Ibid.* to *Ibid.*, August 6, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

86. I. V. D. Reeve to J. D. Wilkins, November 27, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

87. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 69, pp. 13-26.

88. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 341-345.

and Mounted Riflemen—Shepherd left Fort Defiance on November 1. The imposing army was twelve days on the march and covered about 180 miles. This arduous campaign, however, accomplished nothing.⁸⁹ Upon Shepherd's return, a band of Tunicha Navaho defied the troops by stealing the flock of public sheep from Fort Defiance. A punitive expedition of some 140 men under Lieutenant W. D. Whipple was at once organized. The Indians were pursued to the Tunicha mountains, but only part of the stock was recovered and with slight damage to the Indians.⁹⁰

To obtain more accurate information about the strength of the Navaho and the character of their country, military units reconnoitered different portions of the territory. In July Major Shepherd led three companies of infantry and two of Mounted Rifles west and southwest of Fort Defiance. The 265 miles trip in the direction of the Moqui villages and beyond was across a "section of country never before known or attempted."⁹¹ The Indians appeared friendly.

At the same time Captain John G. Walker, Mounted Rifles, led a party of men from Camp La Joya near Fort Defiance to Cañon de Chelly, to explore the reputedly impregnable stronghold of the Navaho and to instill fear into the Indians. Walker spent two days in the mysterious chasm. His reconnaissance substantiated Simpson's findings⁹² and exploded the current notion that the cañon could afford a refuge for the Indians with their numerous flocks and herds in a protracted war with the United States. Walker next moved northward as far as the Rio San Juan and visited the various bands, whom he found friendly and desirous of peace. His return to Fort Defiance, across the

89. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, II, 199-200.

90. W. D. Whipple to T. T. Fauntleroy, November 19, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

91. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 325-327.

92. See Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 10.

Tunicha mountains, was by a virgin trail, untravelled by troops or exploring parties.⁹³

In August Captain H. B. Schroeder, Third Infantry, examined a portion of the Navaho country while scouting for Indian cattle thieves. With a command of forty-five Mounted Riflemen and fifteen friendly Indians, Schroeder advanced northeast of Fort Defiance as far as Arroyo Tunicha. The cattle thieves were not found but the country was explored.⁹⁴ The following month Major Shepherd and his command reconnoitered for some 300 miles to the southeast of Fort Defiance. His trail led to the northern base of the San Mateo mountains, a great thoroughfare for thefts and robberies.⁹⁵

While troops were scouting to the southeast of Fort Defiance, Captain Walker, with two companies of Third Infantry and two companies of Mounted Rifles, struck out in the opposite direction. La Puerta Limita, the western extremity of the Mesa de La Vaca in the vicinity of the Moqui villages, was the farthest point reached. The region traversed presented a series of broken *mesas*, hills, valleys, and cañons. Except for the extreme eastern border, the Mesa de la Vaca was uninhabited. Walker believed that in a war with the United States the Navaho would avail themselves of the few watering places and conceal themselves in the "labyrinth of hills, valleys and arroyos." Discovering these hiding places would be as difficult as it was to find the Seminoles in the hammocks (everglades) of Florida.⁹⁶

While these explorations⁹⁷ were in progress, Bonneville made an extended tour of military inspection. His itinerary, May 2 to July 3, included the camp of the artesian

93. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 316-323.

94. *Ibid.*, 332-333.

95. *Ibid.*, 351-354.

96. *Ibid.*, 345, 349-350.

97. For explorations in the interest of better roads and military posts in the department in 1859, see Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 25-31.

well expedition⁹⁸ at Galisteo, the depot at Albuquerque, Los Lunas, forts Craig, Thorn, Fillmore, Bliss, Stanton, and Buchanan.⁹⁹ Bonneville's report was highly valuable. The road leading to Fort Buchanan he considered good. It was impracticable, however, for the movement of troops, commercial trains, or stock until after the rainy season of July and August. The Santa Cruz river valley Bonneville characterized as a veritable network of mineral veins, consisting mainly of silver mixed with copper and lead. Machinery was operated by mule-power. The tribes west of Tucson he found peacefully inclined and engaged in tilling the soil, while to the east, in the Chiricahua, in the Pinal or White mountains, lived the dreaded Apache. If the Santa Cruz and San Pedro valleys were to be developed, Bonneville suggested that garrisons be placed between the settlements and the Indian country. One post of two companies was to be stationed at the Tucson mountains and another of equal strength on the San Pedro, on the mail route, or a few miles to the north.¹⁰⁰

Between July and September Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph E. Johnston also made a tour of inspection. Johnston's itinerary embraced Albuquerque, Los Lunas, Cantonment Burgwin, and forts Union, Defiance, Craig, Fillmore, Garland, Buchanan, and Bliss.¹⁰¹

The punitive expeditions, explorations, and tours of inspection were followed by a military post reorganization in the department. Fort Thorn was abandoned and its

98. In 1855 congress appropriated \$100,000 for sinking artesian wells. Between 1855 and 1859 Captain John Pope of the Topographical Engineers and a large corps of assistants were engaged in this work. The operations extended over portions of northwest Texas and eastern New Mexico. While the artesian wells experiment was a failure, it, nevertheless, brought to light a great mass of information valuable to the immigrant, the prospector, the scientist and the government. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, pt. 2, p. 38; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 540-541; *San Antonio Ledger*, July 25, 1857; *Austin State Gazette*, May 22, 1858; *Austin Southern Intelligencer*, September 29, 1858.

99. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 299-308.

100. *Ibid.*

101. J. E. Johnston to L. Thomas, October 3, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

property moved to Fort Fillmore. A post was located at the Santa Rita Copper Mines, on the site of Fort Webster which had been abandoned in 1853. The new post was garrisoned by a detachment of Mounted Rifles. The presence of troops at this point, it was believed, would allay difficulties at the mines which had developed between Mexican miners and Indians. A company of the Third Infantry was stationed at Hatch's Ranch, on the Gallinas river, about ten miles northeast of Anton Chico. It was designed as a temporary station, as the troops were to remain there only until the spring of 1860.¹⁰² At the junction of the San Pedro and Arivaipa, Fort Breckenridge was erected and manned with part of the garrison from Fort Buchanan.¹⁰³

Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, First Dragoons, succeeded Bonneville to the command of the department.¹⁰⁴ In an attempt to inject a new spirit into the frontier defense policy in New Mexico, Fauntleroy worked out an elaborate military reorganization program. His plan included no less than twelve proposals. Some involved the abandonment of existing military positions and the creation of new ones; others provided for an intensification program,—the strengthening of military posts.

The first proposal related to Fort Union. This post Fauntleroy desired broken up or moved to a point northeast of its existing position. The new location near the Raton mountains, Fauntleroy believed would render more direct and adequate protection to the mail route from Independence. The new position would also be close to the great Comanche trail and defend a larger area of frontier settle-

102 *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 295, 606-607.

103. *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, II, 222-223; Bancroft, *opus cit.*, 497; T. E. Farish, *History of Arizona* (Phoenix, Arizona, 1915), I, 322.

104. Fauntleroy was in command from October 25, 1859 to March 22, 1861 when he was succeeded by Colonel E. R. S. Canby. Twitchell says that early in 1860 W. W. Loring was sent by Secretary of War Floyd to take command of the department with the object of tampering with the patriotism of the officers of the army and that Loring was succeeded by Canby. Thian, *opus cit.*, 71; Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 360, 428-429.

ments. It was to be garrisoned by one mounted company and one company of infantry.

The next matter of importance was the creation of a new post on the eastern frontier to serve as the great supply depot for the entire department. Fauntleroy recommended such a post on the Canadian near the mouth of Utah Creek. A fort at this point would protect the route from Neosho, Missouri and the line of frontier from the proposed Fort Union as far as Fort Stanton. Three companies of mounted troops and one of infantry were to be stationed here.

Los Lunas, like Fort Union, was to be removed to or near Jemez, at a point in the direction of the Tunicha valley. The new post was to be garrisoned by three companies of infantry. Fort Defiance was also to be abandoned and a post located at Ojo del Oso, about forty miles east on the route to Albuquerque. Three companies of mounted troops and two companies of infantry were to be stationed there. Two other posts were to replace Fort Buchanan, one in or near the valley of Los Mimbres and the other on the San Pedro at the crossing of the overland mail route. A post in the Los Mimbres, Fauntleroy maintained, would perform a three-fold function: it would protect that portion of the Rio Grande settlements which had been exposed by the abandonment of Fort Thorn, protect the southern overland mail route and defend the mining districts of the region. A post on the San Pedro would prove advantageous as a depot in the event of operations against the Indians. Each of the new positions was to be defended by one company of mounted men and four of infantry.

The plan also provided for the discontinuance of Fort Bliss, Cantonment Burgwin, and the withdrawal of troops from Santa Fé and Albuquerque. Fort Garland was to be garrisoned by two companies of mounted men from Cantonment Burgwin and its infantry was to be withdrawn. Fort Stanton was to have one mounted and two companies of infantry while one company of cavalry and one of infan-

try were to be stationed at Fort Fillmore. Thus, under the reorganization plan, the twelve existing posts were to be reduced to nine. The mounted troops were to be better and more economically supplied. Fauntleroy's plan was endorsed by General Scott and submitted to the secretary of war, but the coming of the Civil War postponed its adoption.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile army officers had learned that the Mormons were tampering with the Indians. Major J. S. Simonson and Captain J. G. Walker received information from friendly Pah-Utes that the Mormons had invited the Navaho, Utah, and Mohave to a council at Sierra Panoche.¹⁰⁶ At this meeting arms and ammunition were to be distributed among the warriors. The Mormons represented the United States government and its citizens as the natural enemies of all Indians. Unless the red men resisted, their whole country would soon be lost.¹⁰⁷ In December, 1859, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Collins wrote to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Greenwood that the Indians would have to be thoroughly chastised before there would be security on the plains. Collins maintained that they had no respect for the government and would not have until they had been made to feel its power.¹⁰⁸

During 1860 Indian outrages and depredations continued daring and numerous. The Navaho were the chief offenders. In January a band of Indians had driven off several herds of sheep. Mounted troops from Fort Craig gave chase, overtook the rustlers, and recovered some 6,000 of the stolen animals. In the following month the cattle herd of Fort Defiance was attacked by a band of some 500 Navaho. The Indians were repulsed. The Navaho

105. Fauntleroy to S. Cooper, December 6, 1859. Ms., L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

106. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 339-340.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 69, p. 49.

then assumed a bolder attitude. About four o'clock in the morning of April 30, a force of Navaho warriors estimated between 1,000 and 3,000 men, attacked Fort Defiance. The assault lasted about two hours. The garrison of 150 infantry succeeded in driving off the Indians.¹⁰⁹ The *Santa Fé Gazette* attributed the Navaho boldness to the inactivity and want of energy of Colonel Fauntleroy. Governor Rencher expressed the same view.¹¹⁰ Fauntleroy was ordered by Secretary of War Floyd to carry on a vigorous campaign against the Navaho. Floyd believed that a winter campaign, if carried on with secrecy and prosecuted with vigor, would prove the shortest and most effective plan of operation.¹¹¹

As the summer advanced the outrages continued. On July 30, a band of Navaho murdered a number of settlers and seized stock within ten miles of Santa Fé. In September a band of Navaho again attempted to capture the mule herd of Fort Defiance and was again repulsed.¹¹² To put an end to these depredations, it was necessary to move a large part of the troops stationed in Utah southward to New Mexico. In June Fauntleroy reported forty-eight companies—more than 3,000 men—in his department.¹¹³ By September he had fifteen companies of regulars in the Navaho country. Upon Fauntleroy's request, Superintendent Collins had also organized a command of friendly Utah

109. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, II, 3, 52-56, 190-204.

110. *Santa Fé Gazette*, May 22, 1860.

111. John B. Floyd to W. A. Nichols July 14, 1860. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.; Floyd to Lewis Cass, July 28, 1860. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5522, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

112. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, II, 60, 204.

113. Of this number, twenty-four companies were *en route* from Utah and one company was exploring a route from Green river to Santa Fé. The troops were distributed among the following posts: forts Garland, Union, Defiance, Marcy, Craig, Stanton, Fillmore, Buchanan, Breckenridge, Cantonment Burgwin, Albuquerque, Los Lunas, and camp near Hatch's Ranch. By November, 1860, the force was reduced by the transfer of one company of the Tenth Infantry to the Department of the West and seven companies of Third Infantry to the Department of Texas. *Ibid.*, 222-228.

Indians for this campaign.¹¹⁴ This apparent display of energy did not intimidate the Navaho.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile a spirited quarrel had developed between Governor Rencher and Fauntleroy. The former accused the military commander of a lack of energy and too great leniency in dealing with the Indians; the latter maintained that the civil authority was interfering unduly with the military.¹¹⁶

The territorial legislature also added to the confusion. Influenced by popular demand, in the spring of the year, it passed a law authorizing the organization and conduct of an independent campaign against the Indians. Fauntleroy vigorously opposed this program. When Rencher authorized the formation of two companies of volunteers of 100 men each and armed them, Fauntleroy refused to furnish ammunition.¹¹⁷ Moreover, Fauntleroy declared that in case of a war with the Navaho, if the governor authorized a campaign, he (Fauntleroy) would withdraw the troops from Indian country.¹¹⁸

While Rencher and Fauntleroy were bickering, the citizens of Santa Fé took the law into their own hands. "Urged on by a few ambitious or interested leaders the people called a convention at Santa Fé on August 27 and took up the matter of frontier defense. They appointed officers and agreed to raise a regiment of mounted volunteers, to enter the Navaho country by September 20." This

114. Nine of the fifteen companies consisted of infantry and were, therefore, of no value. *Ibid.*, 3, 63, 190.

115. James L. Collins to A. B. Greenwood, November 26, 1860. Ms., L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

116. Abraham R. Rencher to Lewis Cass, May 15, 1860. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5520, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

117. A volunteer force, however, soon took the field. Under the leadership of Miguel E. Pino and Manuel Chaves a force of about 400 men invaded the Navaho country, drove off considerable stock, and slaughtered a great many cattle and sheep for subsistence. When their ammunition gave out, the volunteers returned to the settlements. Item in *Santa Fé Gazette*, August 22, 1860, in Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5523, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.; Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 320-321.

118. Fauntleroy to Cass, May 7, 1860, May 15, 1860. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5520, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

was done in defiance of civil and military authorities. Governor Rencher attempted to resist the movement and Secretary of State Cass sustained him.¹¹⁹

In defiance of constituted authority, an unauthorized volunteer company of about 300 mounted men, probably led by M. L. Cotton, penetrated the heart of the Navaho country, took possession of their fields, captured a large amount of stock, and led away about 100 captives,—chiefly women and children. Some Pueblo Indians also took part in this venture and brought back some 5,000 sheep and horses as their portion of the spoils. A Mr. Phifer, sub-agent for the Utah, also led an expedition into the Navaho country. He, too, captured a large amount of stock and took some Indian captives.¹²⁰ Rencher believed that a few interested speculators backed by some federal officers including Superintendent of Indian Affairs Collins, were responsible for the unauthorized military ventures.¹²¹ In the winter of 1860-1861 the unauthorized expeditions were followed by an active campaign under Colonel E. R. S. Canby, culminating in a three months' truce, later extended to twelve. In July the troops were withdrawn. The Navaho, however, continued hostile.¹²²

On the eve of the Civil War the problem of frontier defense in the Department of New Mexico had been solved but partially. A chain of military posts had been established in the Indian country, along the Rio Grande, the southern border, and the Rio Colorado, but this line of defense did not prove adequate for the protection of the infant settlements. Generally, the forts were poorly gar-

119. Rencher to Cass, September 4, 1860, Cass to Rencher, October 1, 1860. Ms., T. P., Parker, Numbers 5525, 5529, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

120. Rencher to Cass, November 10, 1860, Rencher to J. S. Black, February 16, 1861. Ms., T. P., Parker, Numbers 5527, 5543, A. D., D. S.

121. Copy of Santa Fé *Gazette*, November 24, 1860, in Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5529, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.; Rencher to Cass, January 10, 1861. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5537, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

122. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 24, pp. 8-10; Bancroft, *opus cit.*, 655-656; Rencher to Cass, January 10, 1861, Rencher to W. H. Seward, April 14, 1861. Ms., T. P., Parker, Numbers 5537, 5547, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.


risoned; most of the troops were infantry and proved useless in the pursuit of Indians. The small cavalry force, though ably commanded, was generally too small to conduct a decisive campaign against the Indians who betook themselves to the mountains.¹²³ The civil officers, too, appear to have been honest and capable men. Their actions, however, were hampered in many ways: a rapid succession of Indian agents,¹²⁴ lack of means, conflicting or insufficient instructions, disagreements with the military authorities, and above all, the absence of a clear-cut policy, made success well nigh impossible.¹²⁵

The defense program of the federal government, however, had not been altogether valueless. An important object had been attained; the white man had added materially to his knowledge about the Southwest Indian and his country. As the troops scoured the plains and penetrated the mountain fastnesses in search of plunderers, they learned about the contour of the land, the trails, the water courses, and the springs. In short, they acquired that knowledge of the habits and customs of the red man which finally led to his conquest.

123. Mowry, *opus cit.*, 55-56; Collins to Greenwood, September 16, 1860. Ms., L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

124. Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 300, footnote 223.

125. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, II, 313-314; R. P. Bieber, "Letters of William Carr Lane, 1852-1854," in *New Mexico Historical Review*, III, 188-189; Alban W. Hoopes, *Indian Affairs and their Administration With Special Reference to the Far West, 1849-1860* (Philadelphia, 1932), 172, 238.



A CAMPAIGN SKETCH
(from Field Notes, Nov. 1872-April 1873)