Rainbow Bridge A Bridge Between Cultures: An Administrative History of Rainbow Bridge National Monument

One of the most important developments of the 20th century involved the numerous debates and struggles over environmental issues. Indeed, the modern concept of "environmentalism" was forged in the middle part of the century. Environmental issues ranged from protecting the Hetch Hetchy Valley to the use of pesticides to the evolution of urban smog. In the American West, water was the core of a multitude of conflicts. Some of these disputes centered on development schemes involving the Colorado River and one in particular affected Rainbow Bridge NM. The Colorado River also framed the evolving conflict between utilitarian conservationists and strict preservationists. Developing the river begged the question of how public lands under the control of the National Park Service should be managed. Were they meant to be enshrined for permanent preservation or could their status be fluid in comparison to the larger demands of the Upper Colorado Basin states? Plans to develop the Colorado also problematized the role of the Secretary of the Interior. He directly managed two federal agencies—the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation—who were at odds in their plans for the Colorado. Controversy over developing the river, thought settled with the signing of the Colorado River Storage Project Act in 1956, emerged again in southern Utah during the 1960s at Rainbow Bridge NM. For over a decade, "Save Rainbow Bridge" was the battle cry of environmental groups and an unforseen glitch in the larger matrix of western water and land management.

During the late 19th and early 20th century, the idea of preservation became part of an evolving ethos in land resource management. The byproduct of this preservationist impulse was legislation that allowed for congressionally approved national parks and presidentially designated national monuments. These new edifices were designed to protect scenic and natural resources as much as possible. Many federal managers hoped that national park or national monument status would avoid most of the conflicts over resource utilization. Preservationists, such as John Muir, asserted that the resources inside the borders of any national park or monument were legally fortified against any encroachment. Until 1913, the preservationist belief in this sacrosanct designation had not been tested. In that year, preservation came under fire at California's Yosemite National Park.

In search of better access to more water, the city of San Francisco lobbied federal officials to construct a reservoir in Hetch Hetchy Valley, which was located inside Yosemite's boundaries. The city's leaders wanted to avoid another disastrous fire like the that of 1906, when most of San Francisco burned to the ground for lack of an adequate water supply. City planners saw their solution in Hetch Hetchy Valley. Since very few people visited that part of Yosemite, San Franciscans argued that the scenery might actually be improved by a pristine reservoir. John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, saw the issue differently. The existence of a national park system was the precedent for preservation and the most viable argument against damming Hetch Hetchy. Despite the belief by some that the valley would not suffer any significant loss of beauty or quality, the integrity of all national parks was at stake in Hetch Hetchy, according to Muir. In the end, Muir's belief in national parks as sanctuaries was weighed against the water needs of San Francisco. A reservoir was constructed at Hetch Hetchy and the valley was inundated in 1913. [249]

The controversy over Hetch Hetchy inspired a more philosophical debate, one which had quietly been forming all over the resource laden West. What did Americans value as resources? Traditionally the answer was hard resources such as minerals, timber, and petroleum. But like federal agencies, Americans were also going through changes in their outlook. They were adopting new value structures at the same time that they were prospering in the workplace. Across the economic spectrum, people valued space and recreation as much as revenue and profit. The controversy over Hetch Hetchy revealed a new demand for protected and preserved space. To this end, Congress passed the National Park System Organic Act on August 25, 1916. In addition to authorizing the creation of the National Park Service, the act contributed new language to the dialogue over preservation and development.

In part, the Act stated that the Park Service had a specific mandate. In its "statement of purpose" the Act declared that the a priori purpose of a national park was to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects . . . and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." [250] This language became important to preservationists and their struggle for park and monument sanctity; however, national monuments like Rainbow Bridge were not necessarily protected by the strict language of the law.

The issues of explicit concern to western states during the 1940s and 1950s involved determining which states owned what portion of the Colorado River, the distribution of its water, and the desire to reduce the loss of any unused water. The 1960s controversy over Glen Canyon Dam and Rainbow Bridge NM actually began in 1922 with the signing of the Colorado River Compact. The states bordering the Colorado River were growing rapidly by the 1920s. Los Angeles, California, expanded more than any other city in the West during this period. Severely pressured by an exploding population, southern California needed huge reserves of water to sustain continued development. The Los Angeles Municipal Water District, under the direction of William H. Mulholland, had already "acquired" all the water it could from its northern neighbors in the Owens Valley. But they needed more. California legislators lobbied successfully for the Swing-Johnson Bill, which authorized Boulder Dam on the Colorado River. Given Los Angeles' notorious history in water politics, the rest of the Colorado River basin states feared that California would co-opt all the available water from the Colorado. This was a legitimate fear in light of the western water right doctrine of prior appropriation.

The doctrine of prior appropriation held that whoever first developed a water source for beneficial use held permanent rights to that water, hence the phrase "first in time, first in right." In 1922 the Supreme Court codified this doctrine in law in Wyoming v. California. Delegates from all the basin states embarked on a series of negotiations to develop a system of water allocation that was equitable to all the states that bordered the Colorado. After nearly a year, the Colorado River Compact was signed. The basin was divided into the Upper and Lower Basins, with Lee's Ferry, Arizona as the demarcation point. [251] The Upper Basin states were New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. The Lower Basin included California, Nevada, and Arizona. The only state that did not ratify the Compact was Arizona, which was still afraid of California's consumptive nature. Arizona delegates knew that the Compact only protected Arizona from the Upper Basin states and said nothing about California appropriating Arizona's water rights. Regardless of Arizona's hesitation, Congress approved the Compact for the six signatory states in 1928, and construction on Boulder Dam began in 1931. As a result, the Colorado River was regulated in both law and practice. But California's voracious appetite for water loomed large in the minds of Upper Basin state leaders. How were they going to be sure their allocations from the Colorado were secure? The only answer was to develop the river through a system of dams to the benefit of the Upper Basin. [252]

The controversy over Rainbow Bridge and Glen Canyon Dam blossomed alongside the plans to develop the upper reaches of the Colorado River. Immediately following World War II, the nation teemed with returning veterans. Part of President Truman's "Fair Deal" involved federally sponsored development projects which put many of those veterans to work. The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) was the byproduct of the post-World War II fever to develop natural resources coupled with the Upper Basin states' needs for secure water rights. The Bureau of Reclamation proposed that it and the Upper Basin states construct a series of dams along the Green, Yampa, and Colorado Rivers. Two of those dams were of particular import to the story of Rainbow Bridge. At the southern end of the chain were plans to dam Glen Canyon, then an obscure and seldom visited series of canyons just north of Rainbow Bridge. At the northern end was Echo Park Canyon. The dam at Echo Park was planned for a stretch of canyon inside the boundaries of Dinosaur National Monument (NM). Dinosaur NM was authorized in 1915 but was expanded to over 200,000 acres by presidential proclamation on July 14, 1938. The expanded area included the confluence of the Green River and the Yampa River—the proposed site of Echo Park dam. [253]

Figure 25 Echo Park Canyon (Alex and Dorothy Brownlee Collection, NAU.PH. 93.37.20, Cline Library, Northern Arizona University)

Using the defeat at Hetch Hetchy as their battle cry, preservation groups rallied around stopping Echo Park. David Brower, then executive director of the Sierra Club, and Olaus J. Murie and Howard Zahniser of the Wilderness Society, launched a public relations assault on federal and state leaders. Letter writing campaigns, books featuring Dinosaur NM, and direct pressure wherever possible were the weapons of the new environmentalism. The issue was the same at Echo Park as in Yosemite decades before: preservationists believed that the integrity of the national park system hinged on keeping every possible unit free from commercial or civic resource development. Brower, Murie, and Zahniser were not alone in their fight. NPS Director Newton P. Drury adamantly opposed building dams inside national monuments. But the CRSP was a foregone conclusion to Michael Strauss, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation. [254] Strauss actively pursued the favor of Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, and Chapman's successor, Douglass McKay. The administrative pressure to complete the CRSP in some form was too great for Drury. He resigned in early 1951. [255]

After Drury's resignation, Arthur Demaray became Director the Park Service. Demaray's position on the CRSP was dictated by his professional commitment to the Secretary of the Interior. Whatever his personal opinions on reclamation projects might have been, Director Demaray wanted the Park Service to be part of Interior's larger plan for western water management. The infighting of to the previous directorate was not part of Demaray's leadership. Conrad L. Wirth, Demaray's successor, expressed much the same tone. While Director Wirth opposed Echo Park dam, he followed Secretary Chapman's instructions to forbid NPS employees from publicly criticizing the CRSP or any of its provisions. Even in 1955, when the Echo Park unit of the project was in serious jeopardy, Wirth made it plain to all Park Service personnel that he would not tolerate their criticism of either the CRSP or the Secretary's policies related to reclamation in general. [256] Some historians have made the judgement that this policy line constituted apathy by the Park Service, abrogating responsibility for derailing Echo Park Dam to environmentalists. On the contrary, the decisions made for the Park Service by the Secretary of the Interior during this controversy demonstrates how complex the playing field was for various federal agencies. The Secretary was faced with balancing the competing missions of two agencies under his direct charge, with Reclamation dedicated to resource development and the Park Service committed to resource protection. [257] This complexity played out in the Director's decision to join forces with Reclamation in the attempt to protect Rainbow Bridge from encroachment by Lake Powell.

For the next four years preservationists waged all-out war against everyone who supported the CRSP: state leaders from all the Upper Basin states, Reclamation and Interior officials, and every key member of Congress. Under the direction of the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, as well as the newly formed Council of Conservationists, the campaign was grass roots. In truth, popular support for the Echo Park Dam among Colorado and Utah residents was deep and widespread. But Upper Basin legislators were attacked from extra-regional directions as the campaign against Echo Park Dam went national. The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society solicited pressure from all of their members. Residents of states as geographically diverse as Wisconsin, Washington, and Alaska voiced their opinions about an environmental issue that was totally removed from their own local concerns. [258] In the fight over Echo Park, environmentalism blossomed into a philosophy that did not depend on geographic proximity for its moral suasion.

As pressure mounted against building all the projects in the proposed CRSP, Brower and the Council of Conservationists faced a dilemma. Though very few people had seen Glen Canyon, there was a general understanding of how big the dam would be if constructed. Many participants in the debate realized that when water backed up behind the dam it might encroach on the boundaries of Rainbow Bridge NM, maybe even to the bridge itself. The Utah Committee For A Glen Canyon National Monument briefly acknowledged this threat in a written statement to Congress in 1954:

As previously mentioned, the elevation of the maximum level of the proposed lake [behind the dam] is 3707'. According to the figures of the Bureau of Reclamation, this is 53' higher than the canyon bed at Rainbow Bridge, which is 3654' above sea level. This dam will result in the submergence of the lower end of the National Monument a hundred feet. Parts of Rainbow Bridge National Monument will thus be flooded whenever the lake is within 100' of capacity. [259]

Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay wrote to Brower to assure him that the Bureau of Reclamation would take all necessary steps to protect Rainbow Bridge, including a barrier dam one mile down canyon from the bridge. [260] McKay also indicated that protective measures would be part of the CRSP's authorizing legislation. In fact, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation recognized early on that protecting Rainbow Bridge would be necessary. In November 1954, a Memorandum of Understanding between NPS and Reclamation acknowledged the "problem of protecting Rainbow Bridge when the Glen Canyon Dam is constructed" and the need to look toward minimizing future risks to the bridge. By 1954 it no longer mattered if members of the Park Service were opposed to damming Glen Canyon. The simple fact was that dam would be built, and the Park Service needed to take steps to protect Rainbow Bridge. To this end, the Park Service became actively involved in researching and planning what would be involved in preventing Lake Powell waters from entering the monument. [261]

The Congressional hearings surrounding the CRSP included discussion of the possible impacts to Rainbow Bridge from damming Glen Canyon. The Bureau of Reclamation anticipated this criticism. E.O. Larsen, regional director for the Bureau, testified that at a maximum capacity of 26 million acre feet, the lake behind the dam would back up into Bridge Canyon, even under Rainbow Bridge itself. But the water would never elevate to the abutments of the bridge. [262] Various Reclamation officials also testified about contingency funds in the dam's budget for construction of three protective measures: a barrier dam below the bridge, a diversion tunnel above the bridge (Bridge Creek to another canyon), and a catch basin at the tunnel outlet. [263] Though the plans for protective measures were discussed in painful detail, the CRSP hearings in March 1955 revealed two important facts. First, the Bureau of Reclamation was shifting its focus from the losing battle at Echo Park to the less controversial Glen Canyon. Second, the hearings revealed the need for and promise of protection for Rainbow Bridge.

The Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation actively pursued plans for protective measures during 1955. In May of that year, key Reclamation and Park Service personnel attended a field study and planning meeting. The group traveled to Rainbow Bridge by horse as well as various sites proposed for protective structures. They assessed various locations for a diversion tunnel and barrier dam, visiting four potential sites during the three-day study. The trip yielded numerous alternatives that were ultimately forwarded to many Park Service and Reclamation directors. Given the testimony of Reclamation officials before Congress, NPS personnel believed that protective measures would be constructed and based on that belief took an active role in preparations and planning. [264] The report represented the Park Service's firm belief that they could prevent Lake Powell water from entering the monument. It also revealed a definite opinion regarding the outcome of the CRSP. Leslie P. Arnberger, then a Park Service naturalist, and Harold A. Marsh, NPS landscape architect, wrote to the General Superintendent for Southwestern National Monuments: "we suggest that reconsideration be given to the proposed height and location of the Glen Canyon Dam. Either a new location downstream or a decrease in the height should lower the level of the reservoir to the point where there would be no adverse effect on Rainbow Bridge." [265] However, if Reclamation could not be convinced to move the dam, the Park Service was committed to protecting Rainbow Bridge. This commitment was expressed in numerous memos as the plans to protect the bridge were evaluated over the entire summer of 1955.

The desire to protect Rainbow Bridge also became a matter of law during the battle over the CRSP. Environmentalists had successfully manipulated public opinion against Echo Park dam. The thousands of letters people sent to Congress were reportedly running eighty to one opposing the dam. [266] Even Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay withdrew his support for Echo Park dam in late 1955. [267] To solidify their imminent victory at Echo Park, the Council of Conservationists and Brower agreed to back off of the proposed dam at Glen Canyon. Glen Canyon was not protected with any federal designation and the threat to Rainbow Bridge was distant at best. Brower grudgingly was convinced that the Bureau of Reclamation would keep its promises to protect Rainbow Bridge, but not without certain provisos. [268] In October 1955, Brower and the Council of Conservationists agreed to cease opposition to the CRSP on two conditions. First, Reclamation had to remove all language regarding Echo Park and Dinosaur NM from the CRSP. In addition, the CRSP had to include language designed to protect Rainbow Bridge and to protect any other national parks or monuments from Reclamation projects. The Bureau of Reclamation accepted the offer. Congress fast-tracked the legislation and a bill that included all the necessary protective language was approved on March 28, 1956. Two weeks later, on April 11, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the CRSP into law. Construction on Glen Canyon Dam began October 15, 1956. [269]

Figure 26 Glen Canyon, 1909 (Julius F. Stone Collection, NAU.PH.97.34.152, Cline Library, Northern Arizona University)

The legislation that authorized Glen Canyon Dam was specific regarding both Rainbow Bridge and the national park system at large. The last line of Section 1 of the CRSP assured "as part of the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Glen Canyon unit the Secretary of the Interior shall take adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument." [270] Section 3 stated "it is the intention of Congress that no dam or reservoir constructed under the authorization of this Act shall be within any national park or monument." [271] In theory, these stipulations were as clear as they could be. The provisos were specifically included to assuage the fears of environmentalists and to guarantee that a battle like the one fought over Echo Park would never be fought again. In practice, however, this was not what happened.

Controversy over Rainbow Bridge and the effect of Glen Canyon Dam on the monument erupted even before the CRSP legislation was authorized. The National Parks Association took the stand that the Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation had not considered all the threats to Rainbow Bridge. Protective structures, such as a barrier dam, built north of the bridge in Bridge Creek, would only keep water from coming up the canyon to the bridge. What about the water coming down the canyon that would back up behind the barrier dam? In response to such criticisms, Reclamation and NPS planners explored provisions for pumping apparatus to be installed at the barrier dam. [272] Critics also charged that other impacts were not addressed at any of the Congressional hearings, such as the effects of building protective measures on the surrounding landscape. There were no roads to any of the possible barrier dam sites, and every site required a dam at least 150 feet high and 100 feet in span. While these were only small projects in comparison to Glen Canyon Dam, the relative effect of a "small" dam on the fragile sandstone ecosystem of Bridge Creek could be enormous. In July 1955, NPS Director Conrad Wirth received a letter from Acting Regional Director Hugh Miller detailing the possible effects of building various protective measures at Rainbow Bridge. In the margins of the letter, Wirth made a handwritten notation of his feelings about the proposal: "What an unholy mess they are going to make of a once wonderful national monument." [273] The problem of protecting Rainbow Bridge was expanding even as President Eisenhower signed the CRSP into law.

Over the next three years the Park Service worked closely with Reclamation and U.S.G.S. personnel on substantive plans and cost estimates for the protective works which Reclamation was required to construct. While high-ranking members of NPS were politically hamstrung in any effort to stop construction of the dam, they did actively pursue planning for protective measures. The documentary evidence between 1956 and 1959 indicates that during this period Park Service personnel at every level were in nearly constant contact with counterparts at the Bureau of Reclamation. Together they explored numerous plans, alternatives, and technologies that would allow Rainbow Bridge to remain untouched by Lake Powell. All this effort was in preparation of some kind of finalized report on how the agencies involved could best protect the bridge.

Figure 27 Proposed Sites For Protective Measures (Courtesy of Glen Canyon NRA, Interpretation Files. Photo by A.E. Turner)

In August 1959, the Bureau of Reclamation finished its report on the alternatives for protective works at Rainbow Bridge. Four separate sites were examined for a barrier dam on the southern side of the monument. A year of research and cost analysis produced a nearly predictable conclusion: all four of the prospective sites were imperfect at best. In the 1955 hearings before Congress, the Bureau of Reclamation's E.O. Larsen estimated that a barrier dam and diversion tunnel might cost between $2,000,000 and $4,000,000. The 1959 report estimated the least expensive of the four sites at $15,000,000. Anxieties over access to the protective works were also an issue in the report. The report concluded that fifty to eighty miles of roads would have to be constructed. The only consensus in the report concerned the minimum number and type of works necessary to protect the bridge: a barrier dam with pumping facilities at the north end of Bridge Creek; a diversion dam at the south end of Bridge Creek; and a diversion tunnel twenty-one feet in diameter and 4,800 feet long. [274] There was no easy method of complying with Sections 1 and 3 of the CRSP.

Forces on both sides of the debate rallied after the report was published. By the end of 1959, attitudes were changing regarding protecting Rainbow Bridge. Given the realities of difficult access and high expense, the prospect of preventing Lake Powell from entering the monument was no longer very appealing. Even federal officials followed this new line in their intention not to protect Rainbow Bridge. In an October 1959 newspaper article, Floyd Dominy, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, stated that Rainbow Bridge would be more aesthetically appealing with water under it. In the same article, Colorado Senator Wayne Aspinall questioned whether or not the cost of saving Rainbow Bridge was in the nation's interest. Texas Representative Walter Rodgers said flatly, "the money could be much better spent for other things." [275] On March 9, 1960, Representative John P. Saylor, a member of the House Appropriations Committee, telephoned David Brower with some disturbing news. The Committee had reached a consensus that protective measures were unnecessary for Rainbow Bridge. Despite the concerns of Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Seaton regarding the CRSP's legal imperative to protect the bridge, the Committee felt protecting Rainbow Bridge "was unnecessary." [276]

The Senate was also less than sympathetic to the deal struck between Reclamation and environmentalists. In May 1960, Senator Frank E. Moss (D-UT) introduced a bill to amend the CRSP and remove its protective language. The bill, S. 3180, would have changed the Section 1 phrase "any impairment" to "any structural impairment;" additionally, it would have amended the Section 3 phrase "any dam or reservoir" to "any dam." [277] The bill's intent was to release the Secretary of the Interior from the legislative obligation to protect the bridge. Moss testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1960 that no threat to Rainbow Bridge existed. He argued that simple math dictated the waters behind Glen Canyon Dam would never reach the bridge and even if they did, nothing would happen. [278] Environmentalists were sure that if the bill made it into law, they would have to fight the Echo Park battle all over again. Without the protective language regarding Rainbow Bridge, any national monument or park was subject to resource development. Although S. 3180 did not make it out of the Senate, one thing was clear: the concept of what constituted "impairment" was at issue.

Through all these disputes regarding the protective clauses of the CRSP, the Park Service remained a loyal supporter of building protective measures and following Congress's intent as defined in Section 3. But in August 1960, the Park Service and environmentalists lost an important ally in the fight to protect Rainbow Bridge. In a letter to Wayne Aspinall, Stuart Udall, then a Congressman, urged that doing nothing at Rainbow Bridge was the most ethical course of action. In his capacity as a member of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Udall was in an influential position regarding the decision to fund protective measures. He had long been in the forefront of the contemporary conservation movement. But since there was absolutely no hope that the Bureau of Reclamation would abandon the Glen Canyon project or modify its proposed location, Udall reasoned that trying to protect the bridge violated one of the cardinal principles of conservation: destroying more to save less. He wrote to Aspinall:

As I conceive it, from my study of the history of conservation in America, the one overriding principle of the conservation movement is that no works of man (save the bare minimum) should intrude into the wonder places of the National Park System. A corollary of this principle is that even the waters of a man-made lake or reservoir constitute an unwarranted Park invasion. Therefore, as I see it, building either of the two proposed dams near the artificial "boundaries" of the Monument would sacrifice the cardinal principal in order to save its corollary. [279]

Figure 28 Glen Canyon Dam under construction (Bill Belknap Collection, NAU.PH.96.4.210.4, Cline Library, Northern Arizona University)

Eventually Udall had to make some difficult decisions regarding Rainbow Bridge. Appointed Secretary of the Interior by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, Udall inherited the CRSP and all its associated political baggage. Udall was immediately placed in the awkward position of balancing highly competitive interests between the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service. The Department of the Interior was supposed to represent the philosophies of all its subordinate agencies. But in the case of Rainbow Bridge, there was little room for policy compromise. The simple fact was that Section 1 of the CRSP left to the Secretary of the Interior the decision over what constituted "adequate protective measures" at the bridge. No standard had been established to gauge how far the Secretary needed to go in protecting Rainbow Bridge. As he had expressed in part of his letter to Aspinall in 1960, Udall reasoned that he could interpret the intent of Section 1 of the CRSP to mean doing nothing was the best alternative. Even certain members of the Park Service, such as Regional Director Jerome Miller, were advising Director Wirth that the impacts from building access roads and constructing protective measures might be more deleterious to Rainbow Bridge ecosystem than water from Lake Powell. [280] Secretary Udall understood that Rainbow Bridge NM, at only 160 acres, was not large enough to warrant national park status and any plan to increase the monument's boundaries would include complex and difficult negotiations with the Navajo Nation. Barring park status, the fight with Congress for funds to protect the bridge was a losing battle.

Ultimately, Congress removed from Secretary Udall's hands the decision over whether or not to protect the bridge. In 1961, Congress revealed it had no intention of funding the protective measures stipulated in the CRSP. In March 1961, Senator Wallace F. Bennet (R-UT) introduced another bill designed to strip the CRSP of its teeth. S. 1188 mimicked the language of the infamous Moss bill. At the same time, Moss introduced his bill again, this time as S. 175. [281] While these two measures failed, Congressional appropriations committees knew how to block the protection of Rainbow Bridge: they simply refused funding in Reclamation and Park Service appropriations acts. In fact, Department of the Interior budgets in 1960, 1961, and 1962 were approved by Congress only after the addition of a line item that specifically denied funding of protective measures. [282] As a result of the appropriations process, as well as the continued legislative efforts to rewrite the CRSP in the Senate, the Department of the Interior did not include any requests for funds for protective measures in its 1963 budget proposal. [283] Without changing a single word in the CRSP, Congress made protecting Rainbow Bridge a moot issue with respect to completing Glen Canyon Dam. After 1962, the Secretary of Interior was no longer in a position to actively pursue protecting Rainbow Bridge; however, environmental groups were not ready to abandon the fight. Brower and Packard lobbied everyone they could think of to compel federal officials to honor the protective terms of the CRSP. Brower believed that Congress and the Secretary of the Interior would never skate past the legal imperative of protection. To Brower, not protecting Rainbow Bridge was the same thing as wantonly breaking the law. Until 1960, Secretary Seaton was sending Brower all the right messages: while Congress was defunding protective measures, the Department of the Interior announced it would lobby Congress for funds at Rainbow Bridge. In early 1960, Seaton penned a personal note to Brower at the bottom of a press release that said, "let me assure you that it is my firm policy, as well as that of all personnel of my department, that any actions or activities of this Department will be in conformance with existing law." [284] Commissioner Dominy even wrote to Senator Bennett in 1961 to assure the Senator that Reclamation could build the protective measures for under $8,000,000 "as soon as the Congress appropriates the funds." [285] Brower was understandably panicked at being told everyone supported protecting Rainbow Bridge while watching Congress refuse funding year after year.

Figure 29 Glen Canyon Dam, June 1963 (Woodrow Reiff Collection, NAU.PH.99.5.149, Cline Library, Northern Arizona University)

By 1962, the environmentalist rhetoric regarding the bridge was at a fever pitch. In a March press release sent to every member of the Sierra Club as well as Congress, Brower surmised that "no park or monument will be safe from destruction if this betrayal of promises and flouting of the law is allowed to continue." [286] This was the tone of all future environmentalist rhetoric regarding Lake Powell and the bridge. The issue at Rainbow Bridge was larger than one stone arch; to environmentalists it represented a threat to the national park system as a whole and an indictment of the veracity of any agreement with the federal government. If Congress did not mean what it said when it passed laws, Brower concluded, "we might as well close up shop!" [287]

Rainbow Bridge was at the center of a storm. Nothing the Sierra Club or others did worked. Despite huge letter writing campaigns and direct pressure on key committee members reminiscent of the Echo Park battle, Congress continued its tactic of ignoring funding requests from Interior. By the end of 1962 there was no movement on the issue from Secretary Udall or from Congress. In December 1962, the supporters of protection went to court.

The Sierra Club and the National Parks Association (NPA) knew that innundation of Glen Canyon was only a year way. Their only mission was to prevent the diversion tunnels from being gated, keeping the Colorado River flowing around the dam until protective measures could be funded and constructed. Anthony Wayne Smith, then executive secretary and general legal counsel for the NPA, wrote to Udall in August to urge Interior to comply with the legal and moral requirements of the CRSP and avoid litigation. Most interested parties understood that Udall could only demand funding and not appropriate funds. Environmentalists decided that if they could put the Secretary in a sufficiently public legal dilemma Congress might be forced to bail him out by funding protective measures. Smith anticipated that litigation would be expensive and would have to be pursued to the Supreme Court level and so began soliciting financial support from various environmental groups. [288] In November, Udall wrote to Smith, saying his inability to stop the closing of the gates on the diversion tunnels was unavoidable. Udall maintained that he had tried to secure funds for protective measures and that all his requests were not just denied by Congress but forbidden as a condition of general appropriations. He pointed to riders in the annual appropriations acts that stated "no part of the funds appropriated for the [CRSP] shall be available for construction or operation of facilities to prevent waters of Lake Powell from entering any national monument." [289] Congress had made it impossible for Interior or Reclamation to fund any protective proposal. For Smith and Brower, litigation was the only remaining option.

On December 12, 1962, the National Parks Association filed suit against Stuart Udall in United States District Court for the District of Columbia. [290] NPA filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent Udall from authorizing closure of the diversion tunnel gates. The NPA relied on the case of Nichols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, which held that under Massachusetts law an individual citizen had standing to compel a public official to carry out the duties of that official's office. The NPA reasoned that the defined scope of the duties of the Secretary of the Interior had been expanded by the legal stipulations of the CRSP. Judge Alexander Holtzoff ruled against the preliminary injunction for two reasons. First, the NPA lacked standing to sue. Based on Massachusetts v. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), the Massachusetts rule in Nichols did not equate to a federal rule. Citizens only shared a "general interest" in the carrying out of federal laws and the "general" nature of that interest did not confer on them standing to sue the federal government or its appointed representatives. Secondly, the functions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking measures to preclude the impairment of Rainbow Bridge were discretionary and not ministerial. The specifics of how and when to protect Rainbow Bridge were intended to be determined by the Secretary, not the Court. Consequently the Court could not enjoin the Secretary from actions related to those discretionary powers. [291] What the Court meant was that Secretary Udall was free to make any and all decisions necessary to preclude Rainbow Bridge from impairment—even if environmentalists viewed those decisions as wrong.

Secretary Udall, momentarily victorious, prepared for the NPA to appeal. The Court did make a point of something very important to the environmentalist plaintiffs. In the Conclusions of Law, Judge Holtzoff stated, "The provisions of the Colorado River Storage Project Act remain in force. Their execution lies within the discretion of the Secretary." [292] In the appeal, this opinion might have been troubling for Udall. To help prepare a response, the Secretary employed the opinion of Interior solicitor Frank J. Berry. Berry analyzed the precedents relevant to the Rainbow Bridge funding problems and concluded that Congress' act of defunding protective measures through prohibitive provisos constituted a suspension of Sections 1 and 3 of the CRSP. Berry noted that in United States v. Dickerson (310 U.S. 554, 1939) Congress avoided its commitment to provide monetary bonuses to military re-enlistees by attaching provisos in subsequent appropriations acts limiting the use of available funds. "Not only are you not under any Congressional mandate to keep the diversion tunnels open," Berry wrote, "but your failure to effect closure would be at complete variance with the present state of the law applicable to the Glen Canyon Unit, for the Congress has effectively suspended the pertinent of the [CRSP] and has manifested the intention that construction and initiation of storage should proceed on schedule." [293] Based on this advice, Udall felt prepared for the appeals process.

Udall did not have to wait long for a final answer. Within a month, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld Holtzoff's opinion that the NPA and their fellow plaintiffs had no standing to sue and that the discretionary powers of the Secretary were not a matter of judicial concern. [294] On January 19, 1963, after the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the case, Brower telegrammed Secretary Udall and urged him to keep the diversion tunnels open until some kind of compromise could be worked out. [295] But the Secretary, in his dual capacity as conservationist and preservationist, could not do more than he already had done to protect Rainbow Bridge. Regardless of Secretary Udall's personal belief in the value of protecting Rainbow Bridge, he knew that Congress would never fund construction of protective measures. Two days later, on January 21, 1963, BOR personnel shut the gates of the diversion tunnel on the west bank; the Colorado River rose thirty-four feet behind Glen Canyon Dam. [296] Brower and his fellow environmental activists had enjoyed their greatest victory at Echo Park but suffered their most agonizing loss at Rainbow Bridge.

For its part, the Park Service spent the period between 1960 and 1963 preparing for the development of Glen Canyon NRA (see chapter 7). Park Service personnel knew that they could do little regarding the controversy over protective measures. Memos during this period tended to be concerned with the more practical aspects of park management, such as trail maintenance inside the monument, sanitation, and planning for the inevitable flood of visitors that would come to Rainbow Bridge via Lake Powell. The Park Service understood that it operated under direction from the Secretary of the Interior regarding the issue of protective measures; therefore, the Secretary's policy of pursuing funding while still accepting the reality of Lake Powell was the official line the Park Service also followed. Local Park Service personnel familiar with the topography of the Rainbow Bridge area knew that even if protective measures were constructed, visitors would be able to boat to within a mile of the bridge via Lake Powell. This inevitable rise in visitation compelled the Park Service during the early 1960s to complete a Memorandum of Understanding with the Bureau of Reclamation regarding management policies and authority at Glen Canyon. Regardless of the outcome of the conflict over protective measures, Glen Canyon Park Service personnel knew that new management policies, modified budgets, and increased funding would be critical to handling increased visitation at Rainbow Bridge.

Figure 30 Rainbow Bridge in relation to Lake Powell (Courtesy of Intermountain Support Office)

The mood of the nation changed after 1963. In November of that year, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, providing vivid evidence of life's temporal nature. During the 1960s Congress passed a large number of environmentally sensitive laws. Some scholars have described this period as the "green revolution." Between 1963 and 1970, two presidential administrations and Congress made enormous strides toward protecting scenic and natural resources. During this "green revolution" Presidents Johnson and Nixon signed the Wilderness Act (1964), the National Wildlife Refuge System (1966), the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), the National Trails Act (1968), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1970). The NEPA authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and also contained language requiring environmental impact statements (EIS) for federal development projects or non-federal projects on federal land. The mood during the last seven years of the 1960s was optimistic with regard to the environment. Scenic landscapes were regulated by numerous agencies and protective laws. In this climate of national environmental sentiment David Brower returned to the fight for Rainbow Bridge.

During the 1960s, Lake Powell rose slowly behind Glen Canyon Dam. By 1970, the waters from Lake Powell threatened to cross the boundaries of Rainbow Bridge NM. Brower, in his new capacity as director of Friends of the Earth, decided the time was right for a new lawsuit. Brower never forgot that the only real reason NPA lost the previous suit against Udall was the Court's ruling that NPA lacked standing to sue; the merits of the case were never tried. In November 1970, Friends of the Earth, the Wasatch Mountain Club, and Kenneth G. Sleight filed suit in Utah Federal District Court against two parties: Ellis L. Armstrong, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, and Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton. The suit alleged that the Bureau of Reclamation and the Secretary of the Interior were still legally required to prevent impairment of Rainbow Bridge from Lake Powell. [297]

In the 1970 suit, Friends of the Earth claimed that the water from Lake Powell had risen much further into the monument than anyone had anticipated. Evidence presented during proceedings in 1971 indicated that the water was flowing back and forth into Bridge Canyon. The plaintiffs argued that this represented a clear threat of impairment to the bridge and that stipulations of the CRSP had been ignored.

The case proceeded slowly through pleadings and discovery. Federal attorneys argued much the same as they had in 1962. They contended that Friends of the Earth had no standing to sue and that defunding of protective measures constituted a reversal of the CRSP's Congressional intent clause. But Friends of the Earth seized on a minor point of contention in the 1962 decision: even if the plaintiffs had standing to sue, they could not prove injury sufficient to compel the court to enjoin Udall from closing the diversion tunnel gates. In the 1970 suit, Friends of the Earth felt they had evidence to support a claim of injury, that Rainbow Bridge was being "impaired." In 1973, the plaintiffs filed for a summary judgement in the case. On February 27, 1973, Chief Judge Willis W. Ritter granted summary judgement in favor of the plaintiffs.

Figure 31 View of Rainbow Bridge from Lake Powell, January 17, 1971 (Courtesy of Glen Canyon NRA, Interpretation Files. Photo by W.L. Rusho)

Ritter's decision validated a number points: that they had standing to sue; that the merits of the case should be tried; the Intent Clause of the CRSP (Section 3) had not been repealed by implication; and, Secretary Morton was bound by the statutory duty to not only protect Rainbow Bridge from Lake Powell but to remove any and all Lake Powell waters from the monument. Ritter issued a judicial order directing Armstrong and Morton "to take forthwith such actions as are necessary to prevent any waters of Lake Powell and the Glen Canyon unit from entering . . . the boundaries of Rainbow Bridge National Monument and they . . . are permanently enjoined and restrained from permitting or allowing the waters of Lake Powell . . . to enter or remain within the boundaries of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument." [298]

The day after the Ritter decision, Senator Frank Moss introduced S. 1057 in the Senate. The bill amended the CRSP by deleting the prohibitive language from Section 3. Environmentalists anticipated this move. Within two days of the Moss bill, messages and telegrams were sent between key members of Congress and Brower and the Friends of the Earth. By March 15, Brock Evans of the Sierra Club assured Brower that the Moss bill would come before Senator Alan Bible's Interior Committee and "be buried for a very long time." [299] The mood regarding Glen Canyon also shifted in the Lower Basin states. To comply with Ritter's decision, which required the removal of Lake Powell water from the monument, meant lowering the lake's maximum elevation. The only feasible way to achieve this end was to release large quantities of water from Lake Powell to the Lower Basin. The prospect of nearly a million more acre feet of water naturally appealed to Arizona and California. [300] Newspapers called the situation a "classic confrontation between conservationists and the federal government." [301]

Figure 32 Aerial Photo of Rainbow Bridge, August 16, 1981. Water is not far from the bridge (Courtesy of Glen Canyon NRA, Interpretation Files. Photo source unknown)

The Department of the Interior decided to appeal Ritter's decision. They solicited the Justice department's opinion on how to stay Ritter's order and filed for appeal on March 14. Ritter denied federal requests that he voluntarily stay his own order until the appeal was heard. [302] To comply with Ritter's order, the Bureau of Reclamation began large water releases from Glen Canyon Dam at the end of March 1973. [303] They did not have to comply for long. That summer, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver reversed Ritter's decision and ruled in favor of Armstrong and Morton. The Bureau of Reclamation stopped releasing extra water from Lake Powell. The appellate court decision followed the same line as the 1962 decision, ruling that the power to protect or not protect Rainbow Bridge was discretionary to the office of the Secretary of the Interior. The court also concluded that Congressional defunding of protective measures was tantamount to a modification of Section 3 of the CRSP and the Secretary could no longer be bound by its stated intent.

On January 21, 1974, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari and did not hear the case, which Interior and Reclamation interpreted as tacit validation of the appellate court decision. As long as Rainbow Bridge remained vertical, the protective clauses of the CRSP were no longer an issue. Other groups, such as the Navajo Tribe, also filed suits seeking restriction of Lake Powell's water from the monument. The significance of Rainbow Bridge, as a unit of the national park system, was in its role as a playing field for competing public and federal interests. Secretary Udall entered the debate in 1961 with history of activism for both conservation and preservation. But in his capacity as Secretary, he was in charge of two different agencies with different agendas regarding Rainbow Bridge. The Colorado River Storage Project, a massive edifice of water reclamation that affected millions of people, proved too powerful a consideration during the debate over water inundating a small portion of Bridge Canyon. In one of the other important cases involving Rainbow Bridge, Badoni v. Higginson, the courts ruled that the considerations of the CRSP were so important that even infringing on the First Amendment could be allowed (see chapter 5). The Park Service's management goals and policies for the monument evolved quickly during the litigious 1960s and 1970s. After Lake Powell water finally moved under the bridge, the Park Service embraced a management style marked by flexibility and adaptivity.