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DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH REPORT

ON

THE SARATOGA CAMPAIGN TO SEPTEMBER 19, 1777

John F. Luzader

Park Historian

Saratoga National Historical Park

January 8, 1960

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Introduction: The purpose of this report is to collect and study the data that comprises the story of the main events that attended the progress of the Burgoyne invasion prior to the First Battle of Saratoga. One of the primary purposes of this report is to clarify the story of the planning of the campaign. Another is to correct certain inaccuracies concerning the interpretation of the objective and the mechanics of the invasion. A third is to provide a body of information that may be used in answering requests for information that are frequently received from non-Service sources. A fourth objective is the furthering of the ultimate aim of collecting and studying all of the facts that are obtainable pertaining to the campaign of which the Battles of Saratoga formed a climax.

Because the story, especially that phase concerned with the development of the plan for the campaign and the defining of its objectives, is complex and the sources sometimes incomplete and contradictory, it is hoped that professional review at the Regional and Washington Office levels will assist in correcting deficiencies in content and interpretation.

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The Purpose of the Campaign

While the apparent objective of the northern invasion was the separation of New England from the other colonies, this goal was secondary to the control of the Champlain-Hudson Valley route between Canada and New York City and the adjoining land area. The securing of this waterway would provide the British with an avenue into the interior of the rebellious colonies, control of a region which contained a large number of Loyalists and "Luke-warm Patriots", and make possible the more effective use of the Six Nations. New England would not be insulated from its neighbors, because there was no way to preclude the passage of individuals and small parties, but joint military and naval operations could prevent the movement of supplies and armed parties in a manner that would result in a militarily effective interdiction of the region. More immediate, it would result in bringing additional forces to Sir William Howe's army.

The goal of the invasion, when compared with the philosophy that had guided earlier operations, represented a radical departure. Until late 1776, the British concept of the war as a rebellion that called for police action had limited the character of military operations, just as the American concept of the war as a struggle of loyal subjects of the Empire to secure their rights had imposed comparable limits until after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. After mid-1776, the British were faced with a military challenge that was more fundamental than an insurrection and which called for the conquest of a people-not the polidting of a segment of the Empire. The Saratoga invasion was a response to the new character of the war and the requirements that it posed.

The Origin and Development of the Plan of the Invasion

The plan for the invasion of the northern frontier had its origins in a memorandum of George III in 1776 and in Sir William Howe's plan for the year 1777, which provided for the following:

An army from Canada was to move to Albany via Lake Champlain, reaching

that place by September; Howe's forces were to be used as follows: 10,000 men were to move against Boston; 10,000 were to move from New York to Albany; and 8,000 were to be kept on the defensive to cover New Jersey and to check Washington. For these movements Howe requested an additional 15,000 men.

On December 20, Howe altered his plan, writing:

...the opinions of people begin to be much changed in Pennsylvania, and their minds in general, from the late progress of the Army, disposed to peace, in which sentiment they would be confirmed by our getting possession of Philadelphia, I am for this consideration fully persuaded the principle army should act offensively on that side...

...offensive plans towards Boston must be deferred..., that there may be a corps to act defensively upon the lower part of Hudson's river, ...as well as to facilitate, in some degree, the approach of the Army from Canada. 1

This was the basic plan for the invasion: An invasion of the northern frontier was to bring a British army to Albany, where it would be joined by troops moving northward from New York City, while other forces would operate against Boston and check Washington to the south of New York.

The changes made on December 20 deferred action against Boston and relegated a northward move from New York to a secondary priority in favor of an attack on Philadelphia.

The Burgoyne plan for the invasion represented an implementation of Howe's original plan for the strategy that was to be followed in 1777. The plan, which we will call the Saratoga or Burgoyne plan, was the product of the mind of Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, who had arrived in England from Canada on December 13, 1776, full of ideas of how the campaign of 1777 should be conducted.

For a few weeks after his arrival in London, Gentleman Johnny was made to feel that he was in disgrace, and his name was linked with Sir Guy Carleton's in connection with the failure to attack Ticonderoga in the campaign of 1776. However, the famous Burgoyne charm, aided by the Derby

connections, gained the royal ear; and on February 28, 1777, he presented a memorandum entitled "Thoughts for Conducting the War from the side of Canada". This is an extremely important document, because the plan for the campaign, as Burgoyne conceived it, based upon it. The memorandum was sent to Germain for transmission to the King. The text follows:

When the last ships came from Quebec, a report prevailed in Canada, said to have been founded upon positive evidence that the rebels had laid the keels of several large vessels at Skenesborough and Ticonderoga, and were resolved to exert their utmost powers, to construct a new and formidable fleet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exertions, in such a degree as to imagine the King's troops will be prevented passing Lake Champlain early in the summer, but will suppose the operations of the army to begin at Crown Point.

But as the present means to form effectual plans to lay down every possible difficulty, I will suppose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga; the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thousand men.

I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George with considerable naval strength, in order to secure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take measures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight of artillery with it, and felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though it should not have the power or spirit to finally resist its progress.

The enemy thus disposed upon this side of Canada, it is to be considered what troops will be necessary, and what disposition of them will be most proper to prosecute the campaign with vigor and effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean exclusively of the troops left for the security of Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thousand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcements and victually ships may all be ready to sail from the Channel and from Corke on the last day of March. I am persuaded that to sail with a

fleet of transports earlier, is to subject government to loss and disappointment. It may reasonably be expected that they will reach Quebec before the 20th of May, a period in full time for the opening of the campaign. The roads, and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running off of the snows, are in common years impracticable sooner.

But as the weather long before that time will have admitted of labour in the docks, I will take for granted that the fleet of last year, as well as bateaux as armed vessels, will be found repaired, augmented and fit for immediate service. The magazines that remain of provision, I believe them not to be abundant, will probably be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblee.

I conceive the first business for those entrusted with the chief powers, should be to select and post the troops destined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military stores and provisions with all possible dispatch, in which service the above mentioned troops, if for operation to cantonments, within a few days march of St. John's as conveniently may be. I should prefer cantonments at that season of the year to encampment, as the ground is very damp, and consequently very pernicious to the men, and more especially as they will have been for many months used to lodgings, heated with stoves, or between decks of ships; all these operations may be put in motion together, but they severally require some observation.

I should wish that the troops left in Canada, supposing the number mentioned in my former memorandum to be approved, might be made as follows.

	Rank and File
The 31st regiment, British, exclusive of their light company of grenadiers	448
Maclean's corps	300
The 29th regiment	448
The ten additional companies from Great Britain	560
Brunswick and Hesse Hannau to taken from detachments or complete corps, as Major General Riedesel shall recommend, leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons complete	650
Detachments from the other British brigades, leaving the grenadiers and light infantry companies complete and squaring the battalions equally	600
	<u>3006</u>

My reason for selecting the 31st regiment for this duty is, that when I saw it last it was not equally in order with other regiments for services of activity.

I propose the 29th regiment as it is not presently brigaded.

I propose Maclean's corps, because I very much apprehend desertion from such parts of it as are composed of Americans, should they come near the enemy.

In Canada, whatsoever may be their disposition, it is not easy to effect it.

And I propose making up the residue by detachment, because selecting the men least calculated to fatigue or least accustomed to it, which may be equally good soldiers in more confined movements and better provided situations, the effective strength for operation is much greater and defensive strength not impaired.

I must beg to leave the expeditious conveyance of provisions and stores from Quebec, and the several depositories, in order to form ample magazines at Crown Point, as one of the most important operations of the campaign, because it is upon that which most of the rest will depend. If sailing vessels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay them two months before they pass the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter's Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon and they are only to be obviated by having a quantity of small craft in readiness to work with oars. From the mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblee, rowing and tacking is a sure conveyance if sufficient hands are found. From Chamblee to St. Therese (which is just above the Rapids) land-carriage must be used, and great authority will be requisite to supply the quantity necessary.

A business is complicated, in arrangement, in some parts unusual in practice, and in other difficult, can only be carried to the desired effect by the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and consonant opinion of the governor; and through the former are not to be doubted, a failure of the latter, vindicated, or seeming to be vindicated, by the plausible obstructions that will not fail to be suggested by others, will be sufficient to crush such exertions as an officer of sanguine temper, entrusted with the future conduct of the campaign and whose personal interest and fame therefore consequently depend upon timely out-set, would lead to make.

The assembly of the savages and Canadians will also depend entirely upon the governor.

Under these considerations, it is presumed, that the general officer employed to proceed with the army will be held out of reach of any possible blame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furnished with the proposed supplies.

The navigation of Lake Champlain, secured by the superiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines so established as to make the execution certain, I would not lose a day to take possession of Crown Point with Brigadier Fraser's corps, a large body of savages, a body of Canadians, both for scouts and works, and the best of our engineers and artificers well supplied with entrenching tools.

The brigade will be sufficient to prevent insult during the time necessary for collecting the stores, forming magazines, and fortifying posts; all which should be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to Ticonderoga; to such a degree I mean as may be supposed to be effected in time of transporting artillery, preparing fascines, and other necessities for artillery operations; and by keeping the rest of the army back during that period, the transport of provisions will be lessened, and the soldiers made use of in forwarding the convoys.

But there would only be one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it does not follow that the enemy should remain in a state of tranquillity. Corps of savages, supported by detachments of light regulars, should be continually on foot to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of general officers and engineers, and to obtain the best intelligence of their strength, position, and design.

If due exertion is made in the preparations stated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the summer, and it will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

The next measure must depend upon those taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe's whole forces should act upon Hudson's River, and to the southward of it, and the only object of the Canada army to be to effect a junction with that force, the immediate possession of Lake George would be of great consequence, as the most expeditious and most commodious route to Albany; and should the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort should be tried, by throwing savages and light troops around it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should these efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skenesborough might be attempted, but considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily choaked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, &c. which can only be supplied from Canada. In case of success also by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be necessary to leave a chain of posts, as the army proceeds,

for the securities of your communications, which may too weaken so small an army.

Lest all these attempts should unavoidably fail, and it become indispensable to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outset should be provided with carriages, implements and artificers, for conveying armed vessels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that it be the sole purpose of the Canada army to effect a junction with Lord Howe, or after co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication with New-York, to remain upon Hudson's River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward.

But should the strength of the main American army be such as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode Island remaining there during the winter, and acting separately in the spring, it may be highly worthy consideration, whether the most important purpose to which the Canada army could be employed, supposing it is possession of Ticonderoga, would not be to gain the Connecticut River.

The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon the river, opposite Charles Town, is about sixty miles, and though to convey artillery and provision so far by land would be attended with difficulties, perhaps more than those above suggested, upon a progress to Skenesborough, should the object appear worthy, it is hoped resources might be found; in that case it would be advisable to fortify with one or two strong redoubts the heights opposite Charles Town, and establish posts of savages upon the passage from Ticonderoga to those heights, to preserve the communications and at the same time to prevent any attempt from the country above Charles Town, which is very populous, from molesting the rear or interrupting the convoys of supply, while the army proceeded down the Connecticut. Should the junction between the Canada and Rhode Island armies be effected upon the Connecticut, it is not too sanguine an expectation that all the New England provinces will be reduced by their operations.

To avoid breaking in upon the matter, I omitted in the beginning of these papers to state the idea of the expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which, as a diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, would be highly desirable, provided the army should be reinforced sufficiently to afford it.

It may at first appear, from a view of the present strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of detachment proposed by myself last year for this purpose; but it is to be considered that at that time the utmost object of the campaign, from the advanced season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were necessary than for those first operations. The case of the present year differs; because the season of the year affording a prospect of very extensive operation and consequently the establishment of many posts, patrols, &c. will become necessary. The army ought not to be in a state of number to bear those drains, and still remain sufficient to attack anything that probably can be opposed to it.Should it appear, upon examination of the really effective numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not sufficient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair prospect of success, the alternative remains of embarking the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junction with General Howe by sea, or to be employed separately to co-operate with the main designs, by such means as should be within their strength upon other parts of the continent. 2

Burgoyne based his plan upon the assumption that the Americans would have a large garrison at Ticonderoga, whose works could accommodate approximately 12,000 men; that they would have a large flotilla on Lake George to secure their retreat; and that they would block the roads from Ticonderoga via Skenesborough to Albany by falling trees, destroying bridges, and the construction of fortifications, "Thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight of artillery with it." Turning to a consideration of the numbers required for the invasion, he suggested that the "operating army" should consist of at least 8,000 regulars; artillery; a corps of watermen; 2,000 Canadians; and 1,000 or more savages". Crown Point was to be captured immediately, and Ticonderoga might then be reduced early in the summer, in which event it would serve as a better supply base than Crown Point. After considering other factors concerning the operations, Burgoyne specifically

stated that, "These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that the sole purpose of the Canada army is to effect a junction with General Howe, or after co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication with New York, to remain upon the Hudson's River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward." Thus Burgoyne was posing, in his plan, an alternative set of objectives; a junction with Howe at Albany or action against Albany that would permit Howe to act more effectively against a southern objective.

An interesting feature was the suggestion that, should the strength of the American army be such as to permit the retention of the British force in Rhode Island during the winter and committing it in a separate spring campaign, and after capture of Ticonderoga, the army from Canada might be usefully employed in gaining the Connecticut River. Finally, he proposed that if the numbers available would be insufficient to undertake an invasion along the Champlain-Hudson route, the troops in Canada should be embarked at Quebec to proceed by sea to join Howe at New York City.

Burgoyne's intentions, as stated in his Plan, were to "co-operate" with Howe, either by meeting him at Albany, by acting upon the Hudson River in a manner that would enable Howe to act against Washington, or to meet Howe in New York City via the sea. He left the determination of which of these alternatives would be acted upon to the Colonial Minister and the King. His Plan was a recommendation that included alternative suggestions.

Soon after he received the Plan Germain solicited the King's opinion. In his own handwriting, George III prepared the following memorandum:

"Remark on 'The Conduct of the War from Canada' "

The outlines of the plan seem to be on a proper foundation. The rank and file of the army in Canada (including the 11th of British, McClean's corps, the Brunswicks and Hanover) amount to 10,527; the eleven additional companies and 400

Hanover Chasseurs, the total will be 11,443.

As sickness and other contingencies must be expected, I should think not above 7,000 effectives can be spared over Lake Champlain, for it would be highly imprudent to run any risk in Canada.

The fixing of stations of those left in the province may not be quite right, although the plan proposed may be recommended. Indians must be employed, and this measure must be avowedly directed....

As Sir William Howe does not think of acting from Rhode Island into Massachusetts, the force from Canada must join him at Albany.

The Diversion on the Mohawk ought, at least, to be strengthened by the addition of 400 Hanover Chasseurs.

The provisions ought to be calculated for a third more than the effective of the soldiery, and the general ordered to avoid delivering these when the army can be subsisted from the country.

Burgoyne certainly undervalues the German recruits.

The idea of carrying the army by sea to Sir William Howe would certainly require the leaving of a much larger part of it in Canada, as in that case the rebel army would divide that province from the immense one under Sir W. Howe. I greatly dislike that idea.

George R.

3

This memorandum is an interesting document, showing as it does the personal interest and active participation of the King in the direction of military operations. He sensed the dangers that were inherent in the alternative plan for the transporting of the troops from Canada to New York City by sea. More important, he seemed to select from among the alternatives that Burgoyne had proposed when he wrote: "...the force from Canada must join him /Howe/ at Albany," underlining the words. This, as of the time of the drafting of this memorandum, the King was expecting a junction at Albany. There was, of course, a possibility that the sentence might be interrupted in more than one way; but more concerning that later.

While the King still had Burgoyne's plan under study, Germain wrote

on March 3 to Sir William Howe, with reference to Howe's letter of December 20 altering the plans for operations in 1777, saying, "...the King entirely approves of your proposed deviation from the plan you formerly suggested." ⁴ As has been noted, this deviation called for a movement against Philadelphia. Howe received this letter on May 8, but before it was received, Germain had written to Carleton in Canada on March 26, giving him full instructions for the execution of the invasion, an extract of that letter reads:

You will be informed by the contents hereof, that as soon as you should have driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majesty's pleasure that you should return to Quebec, and take with you such parts of your army as in your judgement and discretion appeared sufficient for the defense of the province; that you should detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne, or such other officer as you should think most proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer so detached to proceed with all possible expedition to join General Howe, and to put himself under his command.

With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected; and therefore, as the security and good government of Canada absolutely requires your presence there, it is the King's determination to leave about 3000 men under your command, for the defense and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diversion on the Mohawk River.

...I am to acquaint you, that as soon as you shall have fully regulated everything relative to these expeditions (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you will be as expeditious as the nature of the business will admit) it is his Majesty's pleasure that you detain for the Canada service

The 8th regiment, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk	460
Battalion companies of the 29th and 31st regiments	896
Battalion companies of the 34th, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk	348
Eleven additional companies from Great Britain	616
Detachments from two brigades	300
Detachments from the German troops	650
Royal Highland emigrants	500
	<u>3770</u>

...It is likewise his Majesty's pleasure that you put under the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne
The grenadiers and light infantry of the army (except pf the 8th regiment and 24th regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier Fraser 1568
First brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21st, and 47th regiments, deducting a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada 1194
Second brigade, battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d regiments, deducting 50 from each corps to remain as above 1194
All the German troops, except the Hanau chasseurs, and a detachment of 650 3217
The artillery, except such parts as shall be necessary for the defense of Canada

7173

Together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought necessary for this service; and after having furnished him in the fullest and completest manner with artillery, stores, provisions, and every other atticle necessary for his expedition, and secured to him every assistance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to pass Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the most exertion of force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Alhany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe.

....I shall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the first packet; but you will never the less endeavor to give him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also to direct Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the same, that they may receive instructions from Sir William Howe. You will at the same time inform them, that, until they have received orders from Sir William Howe, it is his Majesty's pleasure that they act as exigencies may require, and in such manner as they shall judge most proper for making an impression on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience; but that in so doing they must never lose view of their intended junctions with Sir William Howe as their principal objects. 5

In brief, Carleton was to remain in Canada and provide for its defense with approximately 3,700 men; Burgoyne was to be given 7,173 men, with "as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought necessary for this service", with whom he was to proceed "with all expedition to Albany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe." A small diversionary force was to procede along the Mohawk to Albany.

It was necessary for the execution of the campaign that all of the principals should understand and concur in the requirements of the plan and communications among them should favor effective cooperation. A basic problem that had to be resolved was whether the plan required an actual rendezvous of Howe, St. Leger, and Burgoyne at Albany or whether it merely called for a junction of the two latter, and that their placing themselves under Howe's command did not necessitate his being physically present at Albany. Another question concerned whether the various movements against Albany should be simultaneous.

The second problem was whether the communications among the commanders and the Colonial Office were timely enough to expedite the carrying out of the provisions of the plan.

What follows is an attempt to examine these problems and to resolve them in the light of the evidence that is available.

It was necessary that not only Carleton, in Canada, but also Howe, in New York City, should receive detailed information concerning the invasion, indicating the role that he would be expected to play. Germain had promised to supply this intelligence when he wrote to Carleton. "As shall be noted, this intention was not acted upon, but a copy of the letter to Carleton was forwarded to Howe, who received it on May 24 and acknowledged its receipt.⁶ Thus by the last week in May both Carleton and Howe had been informed concerning the plans for the campaign. Carleton had received detailed instructions; and Howe received a copy, including the statement which indicated that he would also receive similarly detailed orders concerning the part that either he or a part of his command would be required to perform.

Howe had received Germain's letter of January 14 which advised him that an earlier request for reinforcements could not be complied with in full. Howe promptly wrote to Carleton warning him that, because he would be in Pennsylvania, he would be able to give little aid to the army from Canada. Howe forwarded a copy of this letter to Germain on April 2, which was received at Whitehall on May 18. Germain, with uncharacteristic promptness drafted a reply which contained approval of Howe's plan for an expedition against Philadelphia, with the reservation that it should not be permitted to interfere with Howe's participation in Burgoyne's expedition, the exact nature of which had not been spelled out in detailed orders. The pertinent paragraph reads:

As you must from your situation and military skill be a competent judge of the propriety of every plan, his Majesty does not hesitate to approve the alterations which you propose, trusting however that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada and put itself under your command.⁷

As of May 24, the locations of the correspondence among the commanders and Lord Germain were as follows: Carleton's reply to the detailed instructions concerning the execution of the campaign was entering the Atlantic from the St. Lawrence; at the same time he was in communication with Burgoyne, who was now in Montreal making arrangements for the invasion. Howe was reading his copy of the instructions to Carleton in New York. On its way to New York was Germain's letter of May 18, quoted above.

What about the letter that Germain had said that he intended to write to Howe when he had written to Carleton on March 20: "I shall write to Sir William Howe from whence by the first packet"? Here begins the story of the "Lost orders" which has been the basis for much of the con-

fusion that has arisen concerning the implementation of the Burgoyne plan.

Perhaps the best place to begin a study of this phase of the story is with the document that is the basis for the accounts that have been presented in explanation for Howe's not receiving orders to move to Albany. In the Knox Manuscripts, William Knox, the Under-Secretary for the Colonial Office wrote:

When all was prepared Burgoyne's appointment as commander of the expedition and other necessary documents and I had then to compare and make up, Lord Sackville Germain came down to the office on his way to Stoniland, when I observed to him there was no letter to Howe to acquaint him with the plan or what was expected of him in consequence of it. His Lordship stared and D'Oyley Deputy Secretary started but said he would in a moment write a few lines. 'So', says Lord Sackville, 'My poor horses must stand in the street all the time, and I shan't be to my time anywhere.' D'Oyley then said he had better go, and he would write for himself to Howe and inclose copies of Burgoyne's Instructions which would tell him all that he would want to know, and with this his Lordship was satisfied as it enabled him to keep his time, for he would never bear delay or disappointment. ⁸

Fitzmaurice, in his Life of Lord Shelburne, enlarged upon the account as follows:

The inconsistent orders given to Generals Howe and Burgoyne could not be accounted for except in a way which it must be difficult for any person who is not conversant with the negligence of office to comprehend. It might appear incredible, if his Germain's own secretary and the most respected persons in office had not assured me of the fact, and what corroborates it is that it can be accounted for in no other way. having among other peculiarities a particular aversion to be put out of his way on any occasion, had arranged to call at his office on his way to the country in order to sign the despatches; but as these addressed to Howe had not been 'fair copied' and he was not disposed to be balked of his projected visit in Kent, they were not signed then and were forgotten on his return to town. ⁹

According to De Fonblanque, "A subsequent despatch containing full and explicit instructions to Sir William Howe as to his co-operation with Burgoyne was written, but by one of these shameful acts of neglect, of which our history unfortunately affords but too many examples, this document was suffered to be pigeon-holed in London, where it was found,

after the convention of Saratoga, carefully docketed, and only wanting
the signature of the minister."¹⁰

Returning to Knox's account, which apparently was the basis for the later versions of the "Lost orders" story, it should be noted that the reference was not to a set of orders, but to a covering letter that inclosed copies of Burgoyne's instructions, "Which tell him Howe all that he would want to know." Secondly, note that D'Oyley's letter and the inclosed copy of Burgoyne's instructions were received by Howe on May 26.

While Fitzmaurice and De Fonblanque may have been referring to another document, their accounts appear to have been based upon the assumption that Knox's story was concerned with Howe's orders. They enlarged upon his narrative by adding that the orders had been drafted, were redrawn in compliance with Germain's instructions, but that the minister failed to sign and despatch them.

The evidence indicates that no orders were issued to Howe directing him to lead a southern army to Albany to meet Burgoyne, the wording of the instructions given to Burgoyne, of which Howe received a copy, was so inexact as to fall short of an order to Howe; and Germain's more specific letter of May 18 expressing the hope that Howe would complete his action against Philadelphia in time to cooperate with Burgoyne was not received until August 16, after the former had committed his army to the southern expedition.

In the light of the apparent absence of any orders for Sir William, it is necessary to attempt to determine the reason why Germain did not provide detailed instructions. If the purpose of the campaign was the effecting of a junction at Albany of Burgoyne's, St. Leger's, and Howe's forces, it would be reasonable to expect that the Colonial Minister would issue orders

to Howe that would give detailed direction for the conduct of the southern phase of the campaign. Therefore, some attention must be given to attempting to determine the intent of the campaign.

Before examining the intent of the campaign, as the three principals understood it, it might be well to note a point concerning which there is some confusion. The question of cooperation between Burgoyne and Howe was concerned with how a junction was to be effected - not whether Howe was to come to Burgoyne's rescue if the latter got in over his head. Naturally, if all three expeditions acted in concert they would be rendering mutual assistance, and if one was in danger the others would be expected to act in a manner that would exert appropriate strategic pressure, but the plan for the campaign did not envisage any "rescue" operations.

Turning first to Burgoyne, the immediate impression is that he understood that the purpose of the invasion of the northern frontier was to effect a junction with Sir William. Early in his State of the Expedition he recalled that upon his arrival in Canada he had written to Howe. His account of that letter read:

From thence/[Quebec/] I wrote a second letter to Sir William Howe, wherein I repeated that I was entrusted with the command of the army destined to march from Canada, and that my orders were force a junction with his excellency.

I expressed also my wishes, "that a latitude had been left me for a diversion towards Connecticut, but that such an idea being out of the question, by my orders being precise to force the junction, it was only mentioned to introduce the idea still resting upon my mind; viz. to give the change to the enemy if I could, and by every feint in my power to establish a suspicion that I still pointed towards Connecticut."

"But," I repeated, "that under the present precision of my orders, I should really have no view but that of joining him, nor think myself justified by any temptation to delay the most expeditious means I could find to effect that purpose.¹¹

Burgoyne related that he wrote a "third letter to Sir William Howe while the troops were rendezvousing advising him of the progress that had been made and stating, "that I should make no maneuver that could
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procrastinate the great object of a junction."

Writing from Skenesborough (Whitehall, N. Y.) on July 11, Burgoyne repeated his oft-uttered complaint that his instructions were too inflexible to permit him to make a "feint" toward New England and that, "If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I will hope this plan may be adopted from Albany; in the meanwhile my utmost exertions shall continue, according
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to my instructions, to force a junction."

At the end of his letter to Germain of August 20, reporting the defeat at Bennington, Burgoyne remarked: "When enabled to move, nothing within my scale of talent shall be left unattempted to fulfill his Majesty's orders, and I hope circumstances will be such, that my endeavors may be
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in some degree assisted by co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe."

This sentence is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Burgoyne had received Howe's letter of July 11 advising him that he intended to act against Philadelphia; unless, of course, he hoped that Howe had by that time received instructions that would alter his plans and direct him or a part of his force to Albany.

Burgoyne wrote privately to Germain on the same day advising him that Howe's letter of July 17 concerning the latter's intention to operate against Philadelphia had been received. The same letter had informed Burgoyne that Sir Henry Clinton would command at New York City and "would act as occurrences might direct."

If Burgoyne had interpreted the plan for the campaign as requiring that Howe meet him at Albany it would be expected that his reaction to Howe's letter would have been one of dismay and anger. While the language of his letter to Germain does not reflect such strong feeling, it does reveal a degree of what might, for lack of a better term, be called chagrin when he wrote:

No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour; the highlands have not even been threatened. The consequence is, that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now strongly posted near the mouth of the Mohawk-River, with an army superior to mine in troops of the Congress, and as many militia as he pleases. He is likewise far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French ships which got into Boston.

Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; but my orders being positive to "force a junction with Sir William Howe," I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer..."¹⁵

The wording of this letter may have been the product of the increasing number of difficulties the invading army was experiencing, not in the least of which was the defeat of the expedition against Bennington. It is possible that as his optimism waned Burgoyne may have become anxious for assistance from the southern end of the Hudson Valley, as his appeals to Clinton for assistance and advice indicate. However, that is not directly germane because the question is not concerned so much with Burgoyne's desire for southern assistance as with whether the campaign was predicated upon a junction of the two forces.

According to his State of the Expedition, Burgoyne interpreted the plan as providing for a junction with Sir William's army at Albany. The best statement of Burgoyne's version of his interpretation of the requirements of the campaign, in so far as a junction with Howe is concerned, is

in the summary of the evidence that he presented, in which he blamed the Colonial Minister for failing to provide Sir William with specific orders to take action to effect a junction. The summary reads:

Upon this principle I think it just, at taking leave of the secretary for the American department, briefly to enumerate the only facts and propositions respecting the plan of the expedition from Canada that I think clearly maintainable against him.

First fact. It is clear that the plan of a junction of the greater part of the force in Canada with the army of Sir William Howe, was formed in the year 1776, when Sir William Howe was in full success; when his whole force was in the neighborhood of New York, or in the Jerseys, and Mr. Washington was beaten, and at the weakest.

Second fact. This plan of a junction was continued (and upon just reasoning) in the close of the year 1776, when Sir William Howe's first proposal of operations for the ensuing campaign arrived. These proposals were made upon the datum of a number of troops, sufficient to furnish, besides the main army, an offensive army of 10,000 men, rand and file, to act on the side of Rhode Island, by taking possession of Providence, and penetrating from thence into the country towards Boston; and another offensive army, not less than 10,000 to move up the North River / Hudson / to Albany, exclusive of 5000 for the defense of New York.

In either of the above cases, the plan of Junction could hardly have failed of success.

Third fact. On the 23rd of February, Sir William Howe's alteration of the first plan was received, and he then proposed to act with the greater part of his force on the side of Philadelphia, at the opening of the campaign, and to enable him so to do to defer the offensive plan from Rhode Island till the reinforcements should arrive and to destine only 3000 men to act defensively upon the lower part of the Hudson's River.

Fourth fact. On the 3d of March, the secretary of State signified his Majesty's entire approbation of this deviation from the plan first suggested.

From these facts arises my first proposition, that at the time the change of plan for Sir William Howe's operations was adopted, by which no defensive force was to remain upon the Hudson's River, nor a diversion probably to take place from Rhode Island, the plan of my operations, the success of which would probably depend to a great degree upon co-operation and diversion, ought to have been changed likewise; instead of that, it was enforced and made positive by the refusal of the latitude I had proposed of acting upon the Connecticut, or, in case of emergency, embarking the troops and effecting the junction by sea.

Fifth fact. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir William Howe, by the secretary of State, acquainting him, that a brigade of British and some companies of brigadiers / grenadiers / and light infantry had been withdrawn from Rhode Island, which made the force left there merely defensive. The same letter mentions the prospects the enemy had of bringing 50,000 men into the field.

Sixth fact. I did not leave England till the beginning of April, by which time the secretary must have known, that no dependance could be placed upon reinforcements from England arriving at New York in time for Sir William Howe to resume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diversion from Rhode Island, or of making the force upon the Hudson's River adequate to offensive operation.

Here arises my second proposition, that the latitude I had proposed, or rather expedients of precaution, ought at least to have been adopted; instead of which, I was suffered to sail ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements destined for him. The consequent was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his destination for Pennsylvania [sic.], removed my expectation of co-operation, because I was to suppose, that subsequent to the dates of either of these letters, he would receive orders from the secretary of state respecting the junction, and also timely reinforcements.

Seventh fact. The secretary of state makes no mention of the northern expedition in any of his dispatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, not in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am persuaded will not be contested, that he did not mention any orders or recommendations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aide-de-camp, or any other confidential person who sailed about that time.

The first mention made of the necessity of co-operation was in the secretary of state's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his Lordship "Trusts that whatever he / Sir William Howe / may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada."

The proposition clearly justified by these facts is, that if the secretary of state had thought proper to signify the King's expectation of co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in consistence he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army, and in time for him to have a new disposition; but instead of that, this very material injunction was not dispatched till it was almost physically impossible it should have any effect. And so indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the 16th of August, at a distance from Hudson's River too great for any detachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been spared; and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended to strengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later still - too late (as it has been shown) to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual support. 17

Because the summary is a part of Burgoyne's defense of his conduct of the campaign, it is possible that he was trying to shift the blame for his defeat by reading into the plan a requirement that was not part of the original intent. On the other hand, the content of his letters, written prior to his defeat and cited above, as well as his general orders, lend support to his contention.¹⁸ It is also worth noting that at least some of his officers believed that a junction of the two armies was the object of the campaign.

In brief, Burgoyne asserted that the purpose of the expedition was to effect a junction at Albany through concerted action that would require the "co-operation" of Howe. Whether he thought that the rendezvous was to be accomplished under conditions that would require the latter to be personally present or not is not clear. Certainly, it would be possible for Howe to "co-operate" and accept Burgoyne into his command and at the same time be somewhere other than at Albany.

Having examined Burgoyne's version of the plan's requirements, it is necessary to attempt to determine why Lord Germain did not issue orders directing Howe to Albany. The sources reflecting his interpretation of the plan are not so voluminous as those illustrating Burgoyne's.

In his instructions to Carleton, Germain had promised to write to Howe "by the first packet," outlining the information that Sir William should have.²⁰ However, as has been noted, he failed to do so and the closest that he came to fulfilling this promise was the dispatch of a copy of Burgoyne's orders with the covering note drafted by D'Oyley.²¹

The closest that Germain came to ordering Howe to cooperate with Burgoyne was his response to the latter's letter notifying him of the plan to move against Philadelphia, approving the move, providing "it will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada and put itself under your command." ²² This, while giving permission to act against Philadelphia, would seem to give priority to the northern campaign, inferring that Howe would not go to Pennsylvania if such a move would jeopardize the success of the Burgoyne invasion.

Germain appeared to believe that Howe would make a week-end excursion to Philadelphia, occupy it without a struggle, spend a few days organizing a Loyalist government, return to New York, and dispatch a force up the Hudson to meet Burgoyne. So strong must have been Germain's conviction that Howe would either return in time to cooperate with the northern army, or leave an adequate force for that purpose at New York, that he never notified Burgoyne of Sir William's intentions, nor gave Howe definite orders to aid Burgoyne. Trusting in Howe's military judgement, the minister contented himself with expressing the hope that the general would not let the business at Philadelphia jeopardize the northern campaign. Even the message relaying Germain's hopeful admonition reached Howe on August 16 - too late to be acted upon.

Yet, the matter goes beyond an optimistic leaving of Howe to act at his discretion. Germain's interpretation of the plan for the campaign dictated the course of action that he took. That interpretation did not necessarily require a concerted movement against Albany, although some degree of "co-operation" was envisaged. Rather, Burgoyne and St. Leger were to proceed to Albany, where they would place themselves

under Howe's command, hold the ground that had been gained, and cooperate with the commanding general if he found it necessary. Apparently, Germain did not think that Howe needed to act towards Albany in a manner that would assist the expeditions against that town. In short, the northern and western columns would reach the rendezvous, Howe would eventually effect a junction, and the northern provinces would be secured permitting such future operations as Howe might decide were necessary. The best expression of the minister's interpretation of the plan is found in his speech before Commons of November 18, 1777.

With regard to the Canada expedition, the honourable gentleman was under a mistake when he imagined that General Burgoyne had orders to fight his way to New York then to join Sir William Howe; his orders were to clear the country of rebels as far as Albany, which town was prescribed to him as the boundary of his expedition, unless circumstances might make it necessary to co-operate with General Howe, in which case he was to assist him to the utmost of his power. ²³

From the wording of the last sentence, Germain would seem to have expected that Howe, not Burgoyne nor St. Leger, would need assistance in clearing the Hudson Valley.

Assuming that Germain reflected the thinking of the Government, the absence of direct orders to Howe is understandable. With a copy of Burgoyne's instructions and the secretary's approval of the Philadelphia expedition in his hands, there was no need for Howe's receiving orders to go to Albany to meet Burgoyne.

The lack of specific orders would not excuse Howe for his failure to act on the Hudson, if a reasonable evaluation of the strategic situation would have dictated such a move. Therefore, it is necessary to attempt to determine Howe's concept of his role in connection with the Burgoyne

campaign, whether his concept was valid, and whether his actions were consistent with his concept.

Sir William certainly was aware of the fact that a junction of the armies was contemplated. He had referred to it himself in his first plans for 1777.²⁴ There also had been hints from Germain, even though no definite communication had been sent to that effect. In his letter of April 19, 1777, the secretary advised Howe that the Hessian chasseurs, mentioned in Germain's letter of March 3 as destined for Howe's army were to be part of St. Leger's force, which would join the southern army at Albany.. The minister also assured the general that the brigadiers with the army coming from Canada would hold that rank only until that army had joined him. The hints, however, failed to make a very profound impression upon Howe for as early as April 5, learning that the reinforcements from England would fall short of the number he had requested, and that his own southern campaign had already been so delayed that he could not take Philadelphia in time for cooperation with the northern army, he had written Carleton, advising him that he must not expect a cooperating column to come up the Hudson during the early phase of the campaign.²⁵

The army from Canada must, therefore, make its own way to Albany.

That Howe was aware that he had some obligation to cooperate in the execution of the campaign is apparent in the following paragraph:

The further progress of this Corps, depending so much upon the enemy's movements cannot be foreseen at this Distance of Time; still I flatter myself and have Reason to expect, the Friends of Government in that part of the country will be found so numerous, and so ready to give every aid and assistance in their power, that it will prove no difficult task to reduce the more rebellious part of this Province: In the meanwhile I shall endeavour to have a Corps upon the lower part

of Hudson's River sufficient to open the communication for shipping thro' the Highlands, at present obstructed by several forts erected by the Rebels for that purpose, which Corps may afterwards act in favor of the Northern Army. ²⁶

Thus, Howe, although planning to exert most of his effort against Philadelphia, was promising to secure the lower end of the Hudson Valley and to try to commit a corps from his army that would act in Burgoyne's behalf by bringing pressure against the Americans from the south. Like others, including Burgoyne and Germain, he placed too much confidence in the capabilities of the Loyalists in the area.

Sir William was concerned about the possible effect of Washington's activities on the events in the north. He knew that if the American commander-in-chief should move against Burgoyne the latter would be in great danger. On July 17, Howe advised Burgoyne, "Washington is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan with about 2500 men to Albany. My intention is for Pennsylvania, where I expect to meet Washington, but if he goes to the northward contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after ²⁷ him to relieve you."

Howe's attitude was explained in greater detail in a letter he had written to Germain on the preceeding day. He expected Washington to follow him to Pennsylvania in an effort to shield Philadelphia, in which case, he expected Burgoyne to experience few difficulties in reaching Albany except the logistical problems that would be expected in such a campaign.

....On the other hand if General Washington should march with a determination to force General Burgoyne, the strength of General Burgoyne's army is such as to leave me no room to

dread the event; but if General Washington's intrusion should be only to retard the approach of General Burgoyne to Albany, he may soon find himself exposed to an attack from this quarter and from General Burgoyne at the same time; from both which, I flatter myself, he would find it difficult to escape.

Under the circumstances I proposed going up the Delaware, in order to be nearer his place that I should be by taking the course of Chesapeake Bay which I once intended, or preferred to that of the Delaware provided the enemy had discovered a disposition to defend Pennsylvania. 28

According to Howe, Burgoyne should have had sufficient strength to reach Albany unaided, unless Washington moved against him, in which case, the two British generals would, between them, crush the Americans. It was this happy possibility that persuaded Howe that the Delaware River would be the best route for his southern maneuver.

After having learned that Burgoyne expected, in spite of everything that had transpired, to meet a part of Howe's army at Albany, Howe expressed his surprise at Burgoyne's expectations in a letter to Germain. In that document he recalled that Carleton had been advised that Howe would be too busy in Pennsylvania to act against Albany and that Burgoyne certainly should have been aware of this prior to leaving Montreal. 29

Feeling that he had the Government's approval to act as his own judgement dictated, and content with having advised Carleton and Burgoyne of intentions, Howe felt free to proceed with his favorite project, the capture of the American capitol.

It might be worth noting that there is one point that is seldom considered. In the light of Howe's popularity and his relationship with the King, there is reason to wonder whether Howe would have followed orders to move up the Hudson, even if he had received them. While Germain has been justly criticised for trying to direct the war from Whitehall instead of letting the commanders in the colonies run it, he gave Howe

a freedom of action that was limited largely by the paucity of troops that the Government sent to him. Even when, late in the year, Germain did send what he might have considered tantamount to an order, he worded it so that it came more as a request than a command. ³⁰ And Howe did not hesitate to reply that the request could not be complied with, as when he had earlier put off altogether George III's favorite project of diversion to the coasts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. It is easy to imagine his replying just as politely to an order to advance up the Hudson. That the smallness of his force would not permit him to leave a large enough garrison at New York for that purpose, or that the delay occasioned by his move into New Jersey would prevent his returning from Philadelphia in time to make the advance himself. In fact, when Howe did receive Germain's letter expressing the royal desire that he complete the southern expedition in time to cooperate with Burgoyne, he simply replied that he could not comply because he had found "rebels" instead of "friends" in ³¹ Pennsylvania.

Howe eventually decided to invade Pennsylvania by sea. On July 5, the day of Howe's embarkation, his second in command, Sir Henry Clinton, arrived from England. During the eighteen days that elapsed before the winds permitted Howe to sail, the generals had several conversations. Following a suggestion of Major General William Phillips, that he put everything that he said or did into writing, Clinton recorded these conversations as he remembered them, apparently soon after they had taken place. These reports do not omit even Clinton's guesses which turned out to be wrong; neither do they include mention of subsequent events that proved him to be right. There is only the recorded

conversation, and for the reasons just cited, they appear to possess a high degree of validity.

As might be expected, these conversations frequently dealt with the campaign in the north, as well as Howe's impending expedition. For his part, Clinton had for many months been opposed to the latter and he recalled:

....And I took the liberty... to say that it was highly probable the fleet was gone to sea that Mr. Washington would move with everything he could collect either against General Burgoyne or me, and crush the one or the other; as neither would be capable of withstanding such superior force unless timely intelligence should fortunately bring the fleet to our relief. My arguments were at first but little attended to, tho' from a conviction of the solid grounds upon which they were founded repeated perhaps oftener than was agreeable. By degrees, however, I thought I was listened to; and the momentary suspense which seemed to have been occasioned by what I said, soon yielded to predilection Sir William had for his own plan, which he told me could not now with propriety be laid aside on account of its having been approved at home. ³²

According to Clinton, Howe was aware of the dangers of the Philadelphia expedition, but felt there was nothing to do but go ahead, since it had royal approval.

In the minutes of a conversation of July 8 Clinton noted:

I told him with regard to his present plan was a good one... but that I thought the time of year bad, and that the better move would be to act upon the Hudson R form, if possible the junction and then the four provinces were crushed. ³³

In a letter for General Edward Harvey, Clinton wrote:

The only thing therefore in my opinion left for us now in the middle of July, is to cooperate in force with the northern army, not by a junction with it (for that I can never advise) but that sort of communication which will give us possession of Hudson's River; As it is, I almost doubt whether the northern army will penetrate as far as Albany. ³⁴

Thus Clinton was differing with Howe's optimistic estimate of Burgoyne's capability and contending that the southern portion of the valley would have to be secured if the northern army was to reach its destination.

Clinton's protests continued, but without any result other than Howe's admitting that he did not expect Burgoyne to advance south of Albany. Clinton's own evaluation of the strategy is found in the following:

When the design of employing an army under General Burgoyne on the Upper Hudson was mentioned to me; I took the liberty of suggesting the Hazard of miscarriage unless it was supported from below; and the consequent propriety of directing an early cooperation of Sir Wm Howes whole force on the lower Distract of that River. For the attacking of Philadelphia (which I understand to be the object of that General Officers first operations in the ensuing campaign) could be undertaken only upon the principal of drawing on a general action with the Rebels; I humbly presumed that End (if anything could effect it) was more likely to be obtained by a vigorous exertion of the two British Armies on the Hudson; the passes of which must consequently fall under their power. 35

Clinton believed that the best move that Howe could make would be to advance up the Hudson and form a junction with Burgoyne, since that seemed to be the purpose, as he saw it, of the campaign. The attention could then be turned toward taking Philadelphia. Howe admitted that he had formerly thought this the best plan, but the report of a large number of Loyalists in Pennsylvania had persuaded him that the southern move would be better. Sir Henry agreed that there might be "friends of the Government" there, but that similar expectations in New Jersey had ended in disappointment. Clinton also pointed out that Howe would have to maintain a defensive force in New York and Rhode Island in order to prosecute an offensive in Pennsylvania. But Howe only replied by falling

back upon the royal approval of his plan, without of course, giving attention to the administrative clause.

Curiously, Clinton recorded that even after Howe's departure he could not bring himself to believe that Philadelphia was the objective, but that he thought the move a feint that would conceal a quick re-
36
turn and a move up the Hudson.

The determination of Howe to act against Philadelphia, although vulnerable to criticism from a military point of view, did not represent any dereliction of duty. Rather, it reflected a lack of enthusiasm for the northern expedition and a misunderstanding of the tactical situation in that he overestimated the British capabilities north of Albany, at the same time underestimating the Americans' capacity for recovery and defense.

Howe certainly knew what the expedition was intended to accomplish, the uniting of his army with those from the north and the latter's comprehension into his command. However, in his failure to take steps to join hands with Burgoyne after the latter should reach Albany he deliberately accepted a postponement of the conquest of the Hudson Valley in order to insure the capture of Philadelphia.

Out of this maze of conflicting evidence of apparent cross purposes a few conclusions may be drawn. The first of these is that Burgoyne believed that some form of concerted cooperation that would be mutually useful in securing the Hudson Valley was envisaged by the plan for the campaign. This may, but probably did not, have required either that Howe personally meet Burgoyne at Albany or that a major portion of Howe's army should move northward. This did not mean that Howe was ex-

pected to "rescue" Burgoyne. However, it did mean that Howe should take effective action south of Albany that would at once secure that portion of the valley and bring pressure against the Northern Department of the American Army from the south that have resulted in presenting Gates with the problem of action on two fronts, rather than one. As shall be seen, Howe's despatching of Clinton to act against the Highlands was a tardy and limited compliance with this strategy.

Secondly, Germain never sent orders - lost, misplaced, nor otherwise - to Howe directing him to ascend the Hudson. The closest that he came to issuing such an order was his hope that the action against Philadelphia could be accomplished in time to permit Sir William to cooperate with Burgoyne - even that hope was expressed so late as to have little effect. While it may have been that Germain was so ignorant of the conditions in America that he thought that Howe could seize the Quaker City and then go north in time to help Burgoyne, it is more likely that he did not see the necessity of for a concerted cooperation between the two generals. If that were so, he probably expected Burgoyne to reach Albany unaided, await the arrival of troops from Howe, and become integrated into the latter's command. The cooperation would eventuate, but it did not need to be simultaneous with Burgoyne's descent from Canada. A juncture would thus occur in the fulness of time. Thus, knowing the intent of the campaign, Howe would need no explicit orders.

Howe's actions, technically correct, reflected a lack of aggressiveness and, more important, a lack of understanding of the strategic implications of the plan for the campaign. He may, as Clinton insisted, have been guilty of poor military judgement in his failure to move against Albany, but he neither violated orders nor ignored the wishes of the

of the Government, as they were expressed by the Colonial Secretary.

That many persons in England believed that the purpose of the campaign was a simultaneous juncture of the northern columns with Howe's army is clear from the tone of the discussions that occurred in Parliament and from the severe criticisms that were directed against Germain during the latter part of 1777 and early 1778. For instance, Edmund Burke told Commons:

Ignorance had stamped every step taken during the course of the expedition, but it was the ignorance of the Minister for the American department, not to be imputed to General Burgoyne of whose good conduct, bravery and skill I do not entertain the shadow of a doubt.

....The intended measure was a conjunction between Howe and Burgoyne, it was to be produced in the strangest way ever heard of: the armies were to meet - yes: Howe was travelling southward, and Burgoyne in the same direction! 37

Fox's attack on the Colonial Secretary's actions was even more violent:

An army of 10,000 men destroyed through the ignorance, the obstinate, wilful ignorance and incapacity of the noble Lord.... A gallant general sent like a victim to be slaughtered, where his own skill and personal bravery would have earned him laurels, if he had not been under the direction of a blunderer, which circumstances alone was the cause of his disgrace, was too shocking a sight for humanity to bear unmoved. The General and the House have been imposed upon and deceived: Burgoyne's orders were to make his way to Albany, there to wait the orders of Sir William Howe and to co-operate with him; but General Howe knew nothing of the matter, for he was gone to a different country, and left the unhappy Burgoyne and his troops to make the best terms for themselves. 38

Even making allowances for the act that the loss at Saratoga was a great blow to British thinking and that Burke and Fox were hostile to Germain's conduct and policies, their interpretations of the philosophy of the campaign can not be ignored. There is nothing in the record to indicate that their attitudes were unusual among the members of Parliament.

The Invasion

On May 6, 1777, General Burgoyne arrived at Quebec carrying the Colonial Minister's instructions to Carleton. In accordance with these, Sir Guy placed Burgoyne in command of the troops designated for service in the invasion of the Champlain-Hudson Valley. Six days later, Burgoyne traveled to Montreal to prepare for the launching of the campaign.

The force with which he was to undertake the expedition was composed of the following, as of June 1:

<u>British</u>	<u>German</u>
General Staff: 10 to 20	General Staff: 22
9th Regiment: 542	Dragoon Regiment: 323
20th Regiment: 528	Grenadiers: 533
21st Regiment: 538	Chasseurs: 552
24th Regiment: 528	Rhetz Regiment: 604
47th Regiment: 524	Riedesel Regiment: 646
53d Regiment: 537	Specht Regiment: 589
62d Regiment: 541	Prinz Frederick: 625
Flank Companies, 29th, 31st, 34th Regiments: 329	Hanau Regiment: 700
Total British Infantry: 4,077	Total German Infantry: 4,594
Royal Artillery: 251	Hanau Artillery: 105
Recruits, Artillery: 154	Total Germans: 4,699
Total British: 4,418	

Thus, there were 8, 671 infantrymen and 516 artillerymen, making a total of 9, 187 regulars. This total was reduced by the retention in Canada of 343 British and 667 Germans, leaving a total of 8, 177 regulars available to Burgoyne for the expedition. By July 1, he picked up fifteen additional regulars and 886 auxiliaries, giving him a total force of 9, 078 men.

In order to have a clear picture of the invading army, a knowledge of British regimental organization is essential. British regiments in North America consisted of twelve companies, of which ten were called "battalion companies". One of these was retained in England, to rejoin the parent unit at a later date. In addition to

the battalion companies, each regiment had two "flank companies", one of grenadiers and one of light infantry. When several regiments served together, these flank companies were usually organized into grenadier and light infantry battalions. Thus when the army left Canada each of the seven British regiments consisted of eight battalion companies serving with regimental headquarters. In addition to the flank companies of the seven regiments, the grenadier and light infantry battalions included the flank companies of the 29th, 31st, and 34th Regiments, whose parent regiments remained in Canada. So, each of these battalions consisted of ten companies. These comprised the "elite" of the army.

The Germans also had "elite" or "advanced" corps, consisting of a grenadier battalion and a light infantry battalion, which included a company of "Yagers", or chasseurs, armed with a short German rifle. The rest of the German infantry was divided into two brigades, the first composed of the Riedesel, Specht, and Rhetz regiments, was commanded by von Specht as brigadier. The second, composed of the Prinz Frederick and Hesse-Hanau regiments, was commanded by Gall.⁴¹

Before chronicling the major events of the advance of Burgoyne's army, it would be well to give some attention to the subject of the American command in the Northern Department of the American Army. Although the story of the Schuyler-Gates rotation in command in the north is unedifying, it is important to the history of the campaign, as well as offering an interesting insight into the inter-relationship of personalities, politics, sectionalism, and military direction.

The story of the command of the Northern Department began in June of 1775, when Congress placed Philip Schuyler, a New York political and social leader, in command of the Continental troops in New York, with the rank of major general.⁴² Late in the next month, when Congress authorized an invasion of Canada, it left the timing to Schuyler's discretion.⁴³ However, Washington's insistence upon the necessity for a Canadian campaign, and not Schuyler's discretion, resulted in the launching of the effort to add a fourteenth member to the rebellious colonies. With Benedict Arnold leading one expedition via the Kennebec, Schuyler was intrusted with the expedition from New York against Quebec. Arnold's and Schuyler's columns were to unite in Canada to form one invasion force. Ill health resulted in Schuyler's committing the field command to Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, and Schuyler undertook to give over-all direction to the invasion from his residence in Albany or from his country estate at Saratoga, now Schuylerville. The Quebec campaign is outside the province of this report, and its collapse is important for the immediate purposes of this study only in that its result was the bringing to the two men who were to share, simultaneously or otherwise, to the task of defending the northern frontier.

By the spring of 1776, the American forces in Canada had been reduced to a thousand small-pox ravaged, dispirited cadavers. Schuyler, in nominal command, had spent nearly the entire campaign at Albany or at Saratoga. New Englanders, of whom most of the invading forces was composed, already loathing his political and social views, now despised

him for what they thought was physical cowardice. Schuyler's pleading poor health did not carry much weight with men who had suffered from small-pox, dysentery, scurvy, and rheumatism and who experienced unspeakable hardships during the winter of 1775-6.

In the first week of May, 1776, Arnold and Sullivan began to move the ghost of the army along the sickening trek southward, At Three Rivers the British, under Fraser, defeated Tomson's forces on June 7. On June 16, Congress directed Washington to order his former adjutant general, Horatio Gates, to Canada to assume command, granting him powers that John Adams described: "We have ordered you to the post of honour, and made you dictator in Canada for six months...."

Believing that he was to exercise plenary command, Gates went to Albany, where he learned that Schuyler interpreted the Congressional resolutions and Washington's instructions as limiting Gates' authority to the operations in Canada, reserving the command of the department to Schuyler. Gates acquiesced and submitted to Schuyler's authority, probably because, in spite of what Adams had written, the phrasing of these documents seemed to support Schuyler's contention, since they seemed to bestow the powers that Adams spoke of in Canada, but not New York. Of course, at the time Congress and Washington prepared the papers it was thought that there would be troops in Canada for Gates to command. By the time he reached Albany, the picture had changed.

For some time a delicate accord existed between the two generals, but the anomalous command situation was rendered more difficult by the

generals' mutually offensive personalities, which resulted in Schuyler's suggesting that Washington seek a Congressional re-
view of the command question. ⁴⁷ When an answer arrived from Congress, it confirmed Schuyler's interpretation of the echelon of command: Gates would command the troops when they were in Canada, which meant that he would have none to command, since the entire army was south of the border. Schuyler would be in command while the forces were in New York. where there was every likelihood that they
⁴⁸ would remain for some time to come.

Gates remained in the north, serving as commander at Ticonderoga, while Schuyler exercised command of the Department from Albany. Relations between the two men worsened as more opportunity arose for differences of opinion and clashes of personalities. Toward the end of 1776, Gates was ordered south, with the Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops that had been stationed in the north, to rejoin Washington. After a stint as commander at Philadelphia and at his old job as adjutant general, Gates was appointed commander of the Northern Department on March 25, 1777. ⁴⁹ Then, on May 22, Congress again appointed
⁵⁰ Schuyler to his old post; and he assumed command at Albany on June 3. Thus the American command in the north was once again Schuyler's when Burgoyne launched his invasion from St. John's on June 17. These changes in the American command did nothing to enhance the stability and military capability of the frontier. Conditions were chronically bad: sickness, paucity of materiel, desertion, and shortages of manpower plagued whomever had the command responsibility, and neither man

during the early part of 1777 was in command long enough to come to grips with the problems, although Schuyler must bear some of the responsibility for conditions that prevailed prior to the winter of 1776-7. Sectionalism that was reflected in mutual animosity between New Englander and New Yorker aggravated the situation; and the changes in command, a product of the effects of that sectionalism on Congress, added to the confusion and weakness.

Without glossing over the personal limitations of both Gates and Schuyler, it must be noted that they were more the victims of a system than the villains of a piece. Each man felt that he was entitled to the command of the Northern Department, and both had certain qualifications for that post. Schuyler's were primarily political, based upon his position in New York; Gates' were more military, based upon his long career as an officer in the British Army, although his friendship with members of Congress, especially among New Englanders was a factor.

Much has been made of the "intrigues" that Gates resorted to in order to obtain the northern command. The truth is that both men had partisans in Congress and that both invoked their political support.

In many ways, Burgoyne launched his invasion under favorable circumstances. One of these was the attitude of Sir Guy Carleton. That gentleman had reasonably expected to command the next invasion of the northern frontier, and his office of Commanding General and Governor of Canada placed him a position to either expedite or hamper the preparations of that expedition. He chose to do the former, and Burgoyne

testified after the campaign that Sir Guy could not have done more to
advance the preparations if he had been acting on his own behalf. ⁵¹

The soldiers were a good physical condition, and the winter of 1776-7 had been mild enough to permit frequent drills and exercise. The army was staffed by an able corps of officers that included such veterans as Powel, Hamilton, Phillips, Fraser, von Riedesel, von Specht, and Gall.

Carleton showed Burgoyne the letter from Sir William Howe that warned that, because he would be in Pennsylvania, he would not be able to render much assistance to the campaign in the north. Perhaps because he believed that Lord Germain had written specific directions to Howe ordering him to provide for the clearing of the valley south of Albany, Burgoyne was not unduly worried. For his part, he wrote another letter to Sir William advising him that he was about to leave ⁵² Canada under orders to force a junction with the commanding general.

Two matters did mar the scene. The first of these was the disappointing response of the Canadians, who had been expected to be of valuable service by virtue of their experience in wilderness fighting. However, not even Carleton could persuade the habitants that the British cause was their's also. Their old prowess as forest fighters had been developed in a setting of loyalty to France and hostility to Protestantism. In the absence of these stimuli, their military tradition had collapsed. Less than one hundred fifty Canadians could be persuaded to

enlist. Burgoyne voiced his concern with this aspect of the personnel problem in a letter to Germain of May 14:

I cannot speak with so much confidence of the military assistance I am to look for from the Canadians. The only corps yet instituted, or that I am informed can at present be instituted, are three independent companies of 100 men each, officered by Siegneurs of the country, who are well chosen: but they have not been able to engage many volunteers. The men are chiefly drafted from the militia, according to a late regulation of the legislative council. Those I yet seen afford no promise of use of arms - awkward, ignorant, disinclined to service, and spiritless. Various reasons are assigned for this change in the natives since the time of the French government. It may be partly owing to the disuse of arms, but I believe principally to the unpopularity of the Siegneurs, and the poison which the emissaries of the rebels have thrown into their minds.... 52

By the time the expedition was ready to move a total of ~~one~~⁵³ hundred forty eight Canadians had been enlisted. The service that they performed during the campaign justified the general's prior evaluation.

More serious, in the long run, than the military slackness of the Canadians was the shortage of wheeled vehicles and horses. The scarcity was apparent at once, although it was not until after the army left Canada that its full import was recognized. Neither Sir Guy nor Burgoyne had taken adequate steps to insure a serviceable transport capability. The former had done nothing during the winter months to supply the animals and carts; and it was until June 7 that Burgoyne made any requisition, when he asked for four hundred additional horses for the artillery and for five hundred carts with two horses per cart, a total of fourteen hundred horses.⁵⁴

In an effort to meet the transportation requirements, five hundred carts were hastily fabricated; but enough horses were never obtained. The resultant weakness was to cost Burgoyne more than he was able to afford, and the slow progress that was made after the second week in July was due, in large part, to this deficiency.

General Burgoyne was also chagrined to find that the plans of the campaign were common knowledge at Montreal and he quite naturally supposed that the Americans knew as much. In a letter to General Harvey, Burgoyne registered his concern and intimated where he thought the blame for this breach of secrecy lay:

One thing more occurs. I had the surprise and mortification to find a paper handed about at Montreal, publishing the whole design of the campaign, almost as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State's letter. My own caution has been such that not a man in my own family has been let into the secret. Sir Guy Carleton's, I am confident, has been equal; I am therefore led to doubt whether the imprudence has not been committed from some private letters from England, and wish you would ask my friend D'Oyley, to whom my very affectionate compliments, whether there is any person within the ministerial communication that he can suspect to be so unguarded? 5b

While Burgoyne was rightly concerned with this compromise of security, his fears that the Americans would be alerted proved groundless. Gentleman Johnny rarely overestimated the capabilities of his adversaries, but this was an exception.

In spite of the delay in providing for land transport, the concentration of the army on the banks of the Richelieu River progressed, and after a slow march from Chamblee, the invading force gathered at St. John's. On June 12, Carleton arrived; and on the fourteenth, in a solemn ceremony, Burgoyne was invested in

his command. The invasion had been launched.

On June 17, the army left St. John's, passed the upper end of the Richelieu, and onto Lake Champlain. Moving easily up the lake, their front scouted and secured by the Indians, under St. Luc and Langlade.

During this advance, Burgoyne issued three dramatic pronouncements. The first of these was a political proclamation to the Americans that reads as follows:

By John Burgoyne Esqr; Lieut. Gen'l of His Majesties Armies in America, Col. of the Queen's Reg't of Lt. Dragoons, Governor of Fort William in North Britain, one of the Representatives of the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament, and Commanding an Army and Fleet on an expedition from Canada.....

The forces intrusted to my command are designed to act in concert, and upon a common principle, with the numerous Armies and Fleets which already display in every quarter of America, the power, the justice, and when properly sought the mercy of the King. The cause in which the British Armies are thus exerted applies to the most effecting interests of the human heart; and the military Servants of the Crown, at first called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the constitution, now combine with love of their Country, and duty to their Sovereign, the other extensive incitements which spring from a due sense of the general privileges of Mankind. To the Eyes and Ears of the temperate part of the Public, and to the breasts of suffering thousands in the Provinces, be the melancholy appeal whether the present unnatural Rebellion has not been made a foundation for the completest system of Tyranny that ever God in his displeasure suffer'd for time to be exercised over a forward and stubborn Generation. Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, persecution and torture, unprecedented in the inquisitions of the Romish Church are among the palpable enormities that verify the affirmative. These are inflicted (by Assemblies and Committees who dare to profess themselves friends of Liberty) upon the most quiet Subjects, without distinction

of age and sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion, of having adhered ~~in principle~~ to the Government under which they were born, and to which by every tie divine and human they owe allegiance. To consummate these shocking proceedings the profanation of Religion is added to the most flagrant prostitution of common reason, the consciences of Men are set at naught and multitudes are compelled not only to bear Arms, but also to swear subjection to an usurpation they abhor. Animated by these considerations; at the head of troops in full powers of health, discipline, and Valour; determined to strike where necessary, and anxious to spare where possible, I by these presents invite and exhort all persons, in all places where the progress of this Army may point - and by the blessing of God I will extend it far - to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting their lands, habitations, and families. The intention of this address is to hold forth security not deprivation to the Country. To those whom spirit and principle may induce to partake the glorious task of redeeming their Countrymen from Dungeons, and reestablishing the blessings of legal Government I offer encouragement and employment; and upon the first intelligence of their associations I will find means to assist their undertakings. The domestick, the industrious, the infirm and even the timid inhabitants I am desirous to protect provided they remain quietly in their Homes, that they will not suffer their Cattle to be removed, nor their corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed, that they do not break up their Bridges or roads; nor by any other acts directly or indirectly endeavour to obstruct the operations of the Kings troops, or supply or assist those of the enemy.

Every species of Provision brought to my camp will be paid for at an equitable rate in solid Coin.

In consciousness of Christianity, my Royal Master's clemency, and the honor of Soldiership, I have dwelt upon this invitation, and wished for more persuasive terms to give it impression; and not people be led to disregard it by considering their distance from the immediate situation of my Camp. I have but to give stretch to the Indian Forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the harden'd enemies of Great Britain and America (I consider them the same) wherever they may lurk. If not withstanding these endeavours, the sincere inclinations to effect them, the

phrenzy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall be acquitted in the Eyes of Mod and Men in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the state against the wilful outcasts. The messengers of justice and wrath await them in the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.

John Burgoyne

By order of his
Excellency the Lt. Gen'l
Rob't Kingston
Secretary

Camp at Bouquet Ferry, June 20th, 1777

56

On the day after the promulgation of his proclamation, Burgoyne called his Indian allies to a council at the falls of the Bouquet River, about forty miles north of Ticonderoga. The substance of his oration, as recorded in his State of the Expedition, reads:

Chiefs and Warriors

The great King, our common father, and the patron of all who seek and deserve his protection, has considered with satisfaction the general conduct of the Indian tribes from the beginning of the troubles in America. Too sagacious and too faithful to be deluded or corrupted, they have observed the violated rights of the parental power they love, and burned to vindicate them. A few individuals alone, the refuse of a small tribe, at the first were led astray, and the misrepresentations, the specious allurements, the insidious promises and diversified plots, in which the rebels are exercised, and all which they employed, for that effect, have served only in the end to enhance the honour of the tribes in general, by demonstrating to the world, how few and contemptible are the apostates. It is a truth known to you all, that these pitiful examples excepted, and they probably have before this day hid their faces in shame, the collective voices and hands of the Indian tribes over this vast continent, are on the side of justice, of law, and of the King.

The restraint you have put upon your resentment in waiting the King your father's call to arms, the hardest proof, I am persuaded, to which you affecting could have been put, is another manifest and affected mark of your adherence to that principle of connection to which you were always fond to allude, and which mutually the joy

and the duty of the parent to cherish.

The clemency of your father has been abused, the offers of his mercy have been despised, and his farther patience would, in his eyes, become culpable, in as much as it would withhold redress from the most grievous oppressions in the provinces that ever disgraced the history of mankind. It therefore remains for me, the General of one of his Majesty's armies, and in this council his representative, to release you from those bonds which your obedience imposed. - Warriors, you are free - Go forth in might of valour and your cause; strike at the common enemies of Great-Britain and America - disturbers of public order, peace, and happiness - destroyers of commerce, parricides of the state.

The circle round you, the chiefs of his Majesty's European forces, and the Princes his allies, esteem you as brothers in the war; emulous in glory and friendship, we will endeavour reciprocally to give and receive examples; we know how to value, and we will strive to imitate your perseverance and inter-prize, and your constancy to resist hunger, weariness and pain. Be it our task, from the dictates of our religion, the laws of our warfare, and principles and interest of our policy, to regulate your passions where they overbear, to point out where it is nobler to spare than to revenge, to discriminate degrees of guilt, to suspend the up-lifted stroke, to chastise, and not to destroy.

This war to you, my friends, is new; upon all former occasions in taking the field you held yourselves authorized to destroy wherever you came, because everywhere you found an enemy. The case is now very different.

The King has many faithful subjects dispersed in the provinces, consequently you have many brothers there; and these people are the more to be pitied, that they are persecuted, or imprisoned, wherever they are discovered or suspected, and to dissemble, is to a generous mind, a yet more grievous punishment.

Persuaded that your magnanimity of character, joined to principles of affection to the King, will give me fuller controul over your minds, than the military rank with which I am invested, I enjoin you most serious attention to the rules which I hereby proclaim for your invariable observation during the campaign.

I postively forbid bloodshed, when you are not opposed in arms.

Aged men, women, children, and prisoners, must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict.

You shall receive compensation for the ~~scalps~~ prisoners you take, but you shall be called to account for scalps.

In conformity and indulgence of your customs, which have affixed an idea of honour to such badges of victory, you shall be allowed to take scalps of the dead, when killed by your fire, and in fair opposition; but on no account, or pretence, or subtlety, or prevarication, are they to be taken from the wounded, or even dying; and still less pardonable, if possible, will it be held to kill men in that condition, on purpose, and upon the supposition, that this protection of the wounded, would thereby be evaded.

Base lurking assassins, incendiaries, ravagers, and plunderers of the country, to whatever army they belong, shall be treated with less reserve; but the latitude must be given you by order, and I must judge the occasion.

Should the enemy, on their part, dare to countenance acts of barbarity towards those who may fall into their hands, it shall be yours also to retaliate; but till severity shall thus be compelled, bear immovable in hearts this solid maxim, it cannot be too deeply impressed, that the great essential reward, worthy service of your alliance, the sincerity of your zeal to the King your father, and never-failing protection will be examined, and judged upon the test only of your steady and uniform adherence to the orders and councils of those to whom his Majesty has intrusted the direction and honour of his arms. 57

The Indians, always responsive to oratory, replied enthusiastically.

After consulting together, an elder Iroquois chief arose to respond, saying:

I stand up in the name of all the nations present, to assure our fathers that we have attentively listened to his discourse, We receive you as our father, because you speak, we hear the voice of the great father beyond the great lake.

We rejoice in the approbation you have expressed of our behaviour.

We have been tried and tempted by the Bostonians; but we have loved our father, and our hatchets have been sharpened upon our affections.

In proof of the sincerity of our professions, our whole villages able to go to war, are come forth. The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone remain at home.

With one common assent we promise a constant obedience to all you have ordered, and all you shall order; and may the Father of Days give you many, and success. 58

The council closed, and the Indians, supplied with liquor, held a war dance.

The third pronouncement was in the form of a general order that was issued on June 30, reading:

The army embarks to-morrow, to approach the enemy. We are to contend for the King, and the constitution of Great Britain, to vindicate Law, and to relieve the oppressed - a cause in which his Majest's Troops and those of the Princes his Alliea, will feel equal excitement. The services required of this particular expedition, are critical and conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur, in which, nor difficulty, not labour, nor life are to be regarded. This Army must not Retreat. 59

It is very easy to ridicule Burgoyne for the verbosity and purple prose of these declarations. The Americans, naturally, found little to admire in them, and Francis Hopkinson replied to Burgoyne's proclamation with the following parody:

Most high, most mighty, most puissant and
sublime General

When the forces under your command arrived at Quebec in order to act in concert and upon a common principle with the numerous fleets and armies which already display in every quarter of America the justice and mercy of your King, we the reptiles of America were struck with trepidation and astonishment. But what words can express the plenitude of our horror when the Colonel of the Queen's regiment of light dragoons advanced towards Ticonderoga. The mountains shook before thee, and the trees of the forest bowed their heads - the vast lakes of the North were chilled at thy presence, and the mighty cataracts stopped their tremendous career and were suspended in awe at thy approach. - Judge, then, oh ineffable Goevernor of Fort William in North Britain, what must have been the terror, dismay and despair that over-spread this paltry continent of America and us its wretched inhabitants. Dark and dreary, indeed, was the prospect before us, till like the sun in the horizon, your most gracious, sublime and irresistable proclamation opened the doors of mercy, and snatch'd us, as it were, from the jaws of Annihilation.

We foolishly thought, blind as we were, that your gracious master's fleets and armies were come to destroy us and our liberties; but we are happy in hearing

from your - and who can doubt what you assert? that they were called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the constitution to a forward and stubborn generation.

And is it for this, Oh sublime Lieutenant General, that you have given yourself the trouble to cross the wide Atlantic, and with incredible fatigue traverse uncultivated wilds? And we ungratefully refuse the proffer'd blessing? - To restore the rights of the constitution you have called together an amiable host of Savages and turned them loose to scalp women and children, and lay our country waste - this they have performed with their usual skill and clemency, and we yet remain insensible of the benefit and unthankful for so much goodness.

Our Congress have declared independence, and our Assemblies, as your highness justly observes, have most wickedly imprisoned the avowed friends of that power with which they are at war, and most profanely compelled those, whose consciences will not permit them to fight, to pay some small part toward the expenses their country is at supporting what is called a necessary defensive war. If we go on thus in our obstinacy and ingratitude, what can we expect but that you should, in your anger, give a stretch to the Indian forces under your direction, amounting to thousands, to overtake and destroy us; or, which is ten times worse, that you should withdraw your fleets and armies and leave us to our own misery, without compleating the benevolent task you have begun, in restoring to us the rights of the constitution.

We submit - we submit, most puissant Colonel of the Queen's regiment of light dragoons, and Governor of Fort William in North Britain! We offer our heads to the scalping-knife and our bellies to the bayonet. Who can resist the force of your eloquence? Who can withstand the terror of your arms? The invitation you made in the consciousness of christianity, your royal master's clemency, and the honor of soldiership, we thankfully accept. The blood of the slain, the cries of injured virgins and starving wretches, now languishing in gaols and prison-ships of New-York, call on us in vain while your sublime proclamation is sounded in our ears. Forgive us, oh our country! Forgive us, dear posterity! Forgive us, all ye foreign powers who anxiously watching our conduct in this important struggle, if we yield implicitly to the persuasive tongue of the most elegant Colonel of her Majesty's regiment of light dragoons.

Forbear then, magnanimous Lieutenant General! Forbear to denounce vengeance against us. - Forbear to give a stretch

to those restorers of constitutional rights, the Indian forces under your direction. - Let not the messengers of justice and wrath await us in the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror bar our return to the allegiance of a Prince who, by his royal will, would deprive us of every blessing of life, with all possible clemency.

We are domestick, we are industrious, ~~we~~ are infirm and timid, we shall remain quietly at home and not remove our cattle, our corn or forage, in hopes that you will come at the head of troops in the full powers of health, discipline, and valour, and take charge of them yourselves. Behold our wives and daughters, our flocks and herds, our goods and chattels, - Are they not at the mercy of our Lord the King, and of his Lieutenant General, Member of the House of Commons, and Governor of Fort William in North Britain. 60

Circulated in both America and Britain, the parody occasioned considerable mirth at Burgoyne's expense.

His address to the Indians was even more roundly ridiculed; and it did represent Burgoyne at his worst. An intelligent and articulate man, this oration verged on the silly, The employment of the "savages" did not set well with many English consciences, including Burgoyne's. Their use had been bitterly condemned by Pitt and Burke, and the opposition in Parliament fixed upon the issue to level violent criticism of the Government. Edmund Burke arose in Commons to attack the policy and the general's address. He imagined a riot on the Tower Hill, with the keeper of the lions that were housed there adminishing his charges before he loosed them on the rioters: "My gentle lions, my humane bears, my sentimental wolves, my tender-hearted hyenas, go forth: but I exhort you as ye are Christians and members of a civilized society, to take care not to hurt, man, woman, or child." ~~Walpole~~ related that fat Lord North was so amused that he "almost suffocated with laughter."⁶¹

The Americans, as might be expected, were violent in their condemnation of the practice, because the fear of Indian warfare was never far from their thoughts, and few things struck more terror to the whites than the threat of an Indian war. Few among the older families that did not number either relative or acquaintance among the victims of frontier fighting.

While it was and remains easy to condemn the utilization of the Indian in the suppression of the Revolution, it is also necessary to remember that to have failed to employ them, and any other resource available, would have meant that the British government would have fallen short of its obligation to exploit every potential in its effort to bring the war to a successful close. The Americans also sought, with little success, to bring the Indians into the war as allies, or at least to secure their neutrality. The Indians realized that the Americans posed a greater threat to their interests than the British, and they, like others before and since, took counsel of their interests. Then too, the British Indian policy, as expressed by the Treaty of Easton and by royal proclamation and executed by John Stuart and Sir William Johnson, had been more humane than had been the conduct of the Americans, many of whom looked upon the Indian as something to be driven out or exterminated.

High-flown and ridiculous as it was, Burgoyne's address represented an effort to regulate the activities of his allies and to humanize warfare. Neither motive of which was culpable. For that matter, his oratory was no more bombastic than that of most of his critics on both sides of the Atlantic - and the Indians probably loved it.

If Burgoyne had been successful his declarations would have been more admiringly remembered: they might even have become models. Because he lost, they sound hollow and pompous.

By the time Burgoyne had issued his general order, the army had reached Crown Point, within nine miles of Ticonderoga, the key-stone of the defense of the northern frontier. The advanced guard, under Fraser, had moved within sight of the fortress. Because the position that Burgoyne was to attack extended on both sides of Lake Champlain, it was necessary to divide his army in order to forestall an American retreat by land. Accordingly, the British units were sent to the western shore, and the major portion of the Germans crossed to the eastern side of the lake, while the dismounted German dragoons remained in the rear as a headquarters guard.

On July 1, the army, except for the advanced corps, embarked upon the lake and sailed to within four miles of Ticonderoga.

Ticonderoga, the "Gibraltar of the North", is a prominent, blunt promontory, three-quarters of a mile wide and a mile long, that juts out of the western shore of Lake Champlain. At the foot of its southwest shoulder a narrow, mile-long gorge carries the waters of Lake George into Champlain. At its highest point, the promontory is slightly more than seventy feet above the lake.

From across the lake, Mount Independence, about fifty feet high, juts into the lake towards the southwest corner of Ticonderoga. The passage between these headlands, about a quarter of a mile wide, is the gateway between upper and lower Champlain and to Lake George. Once through it, the way is open by water into the narrow upper end of Champlain, and from its extremity, up Wood Creek to within a few

miles of the northern reaches of the Hudson River. Or one may turn westward at Ticonderoga into Lake George and follow it to a point equally near the Hudson.

Two miles northwest of Ticonderoga, Mount Hope commands the road to Lake George. A mile northwest, Sugar Loaf, renamed Mount Defiance, rises seven hundred fifty feet above the water. In 1777, the countryside, except where Ticonderoga had been cleared for fortifications, was heavily forested.

In 1755, the French had built a star shaped fort, with bastions, on Ticonderoga. Attacked by Amherst in 1759, its garrison retreated, blowing up a large portion of the works. Although the British repaired it, the fort was again allowed to fall into disrepair after the Peace of Paris ended the Seven Years War in 1763. During the period between wars, the post was usually manned by a very small garrison, and the absence of an Anglo-French colonial frontier had reduced its military importance. However, the opening of the Revolution restored the fort to a position of importance, and its capture early became an objective of the Americans, leading to its seizure by Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, accompanied by Benedict Arnold, on May 10, 1775.

After its capture, considerable effort was made to enlarge and strengthen the post's defenses. The remains of the old fort were repaired. The "French lines", that had been constructed in a circle across the promontory, about three-fourths of a mile behind the fort, were enlarged. New blockhouses were erected to cover the flanks and rear of these lines; and the lower slopes on the north and south

were defended by blockhouses, redoubts, and breastworks.

Mount Hope was protected by a new barbette battery, covering the outlet from Lake George, swamills powered by the waters of the outlet, and the road that lay between the lakes.

Mount Independence was protected in the rear by a stream and a swampy morass. Batteries, stone breastworks, and an eight-pointed star fort comprised its defensive works.

The water passage to the southern end of the lake was closed by a boom of heavy logs, bound together by massive chains. Behind the boom ran a bridge of boats, and both were protected by water batteries on either shore.

The ominous presence of Sugar Loaf, more often remembered as Mount Defiance, posed a threat that was discounted by the Americans because, in spite of the fact that it had been scaled by Wayne and Arnold, a decision was made that it was so inaccessible as to preclude any necessity of securing the summit.

The American garrison, as of the end of June, 1777, consisted of ten Continental and two militia regiments; however, they were considerably below strength, ranging in number from 45 to 265, present and fit for duty, the average strength being 160. There was also a body of nineteen scouts, under Major Benjamin Whitcomb, twenty-three of Thomas Lee's Rangers; one hundred twenty-four artificers; and two hundred fifty artillerymen.

Thus, the total garrison came to about two thousand, five hundred
64 men. The exterior lines around Mount Independence and the old French

lines behind Ticonderoga extended more than two thousand yards; meaning that, without any reserve and excluding Mount Hope, the blockhouses, and other works, the Americans could man the post at the average of about one man per yard: approximately one-fifth of the number required.

Since June 12, the commander of the fort had been Scottish-born Arthur St. Clair, a former British officer and veteran of the Seven Years War.

Conditions at Ticonderoga were chronically unsatisfactory. Not only were there not enough men; but, in spite of all of the attention that the fort had received, there was a shortage of every necessity. What had happened to most of the supplies that had been destined for fort by way of Albany has never been satisfactorily explained.

General Schuyler, whose leadership had been under severe criticism for the conduct of the campaigns of 1775 and 1776 for a number of reasons, not the least of which was his practice of exercising his command from his homes at Albany and Saratoga, came up from Albany and held a council of war on June 20. That meeting resulted in a decision that there were not enough troops to hold the entire works. However, they were to attempt to hold out as long as possible and then to concentrate on defending Mount Independence. The bateaux were to held in readiness in the event that this position should prove untenable to carry the troops to the south.

Several significant questions were neither posed nor resolved. How were the troops to be taken from Ticonderoga to Independence in the face of an enemy that had driven them out of the former? How were

the bateaux to be preserved and used to effect a retreat with the enemy in possession of Ticonderoga, Independence, and the watergap?

Having provided for this defensive strategy, Schuyler returned to Albany, leaving St. Clair to conduct the defense as best he could.

On June 26, Fraser's advance corps left Crown Point, and the main body of the army followed on the first day of July. Three miles above Ticonderoga, the British landed and encamped. Fraser was a mile in advance. Operations against the fort began on July 2.

The British advance point started for Mount Hope, whose garrison prudently fired the works and fled to the old French lines. The British, failing to cut off this retreat, took up a position within less than one hundred yards of these lines, took cover, and opened fire. The American commander thought that this action was the prelude of an assault and ordered his troops to remain under cover and hold fire until a command for concerted fire should be given. The lack of firing encouraged one of the British marksmen to crawl very close to the American lines, and Colonel James Wilkinson, who had something less than a passion for anonymity, ordered a sergeant to fire at him.

The sergeant complied, and the shot was taken as a signal to open fire, and the whole line leaped to their feet and poured one volley after another at the enemy. They were joined by the artillery. When control was finally restored, the British had retreated to three hundred yards, leaving Wilkinson's target lying alone on the field. At least 3,000 musket shots and eight pieces of artillery had been fired at a force of five hundred men, killing one man and wounding two - all within a range of one hundred yards. The original target

proved to uninjured, although the burial party that went out to dispose of him found that he had "passed out" in a drunken stupor.

While this distracting business was in progress, Riedesel's Germans advanced close to the creek behind Independence, halting when darkness fell. During the next day, Mount Hope was occupied. In the meantime, both sides engaged in an indecisive artillery fire whose only result was the depletion of the American magazine.

More significant events were taking shape on Sugar Loaf. His interest in the promontory aroused, Burgoyne sent his engineer, Lieutenant Twiss, on a reconnaissance to determine its potential. The lieutenant climbed the hill and came back to report that it commanded Ticonderoga at a distance of fourteen hundred yards and Independence at fifteen hundred yards, and that he could open a road to the summit and have guns there within twenty-four hours. With Phillips in charge, the work was begun on July 4.

St. Clair had a brief period of optimism occasioned by the arrival of nine hundred militiamen. He expected an assault upon some part of his fortifications, but could not detect activity that would indicate the direction from which it might come.

Burgoyne was not idle. He shifted Gall's brigade from Riedesel to the Ticonderoga side of the lake, giving Riedesel, in exchange, Fraser's Canadians, Tories, Indians, and Alexander Fraser's marksmen. The German commander was directed to move around Independence and close the route of retreat by the road on the eastern side of the lake, the guns being placed on Defiance being expected to prevent any re-

treat by water. Fortunately for the Americans, Riedesel had not yet started on his round-about move.

On the morning of July 5, St. Clair noticed some activity on the crest of Mount Defiance that caused him to take a longer look. What he saw dashed all of his recently acquired optimism. The British were in the process of mounting two 13-pounders on the summit.
66

Calling a council of war, St. Clair solicited the opinions of his staff, and an unanimous decision to retreat as soon as darkness fell was reached.
67

The invalids and supplies were to be taken up the lake to Skenesborough by the boats that were anchored behind the bridge. The main body of troops was to march from the eastern side of the lake by a road that ran from behind Independence southeast to Hubbardton, thence to Castleton and west to Skenesborough.

To conceal the noise of the evacuation, a continuous cannonade was maintained in the hopes that it would divert the enemy's attention. While it probably drowned the noise of preparation, it also led Burgoyne to suspect what was being attempted, although it was not until the following morning that Fraser learned from deserters that the retreat was actually under way. By that time, the destruction of the fort on Independence by General Roche de Fermoy had alerted the British to the fact that some general movement was being undertaken.

Fraser's headquarters were on the Ticonderoga side of the lake, one mile and a half from the bridge to Independence. After learning from the deserters that the retreat was under way, he hurried to the bridge and found that it was partially razed, with cannon aimed along

its length. The cannon were manned by four gunners who had been detailed to fire a volley at the enemy whenever they should attempt to cross the bridge, and then to retreat. However, the gunners attacked some spirits while awaiting the enemy, and by the time Fraser's men approached the bridge the detail was too drunk to anything but sleep. An Indian accidentally discharged one piece which was elevated so high that the only effect was to startle the attackers.⁶⁸

Thus did Burgoyne's army capture the Gibraltar of the North for the Crown. The conduct of the defense and evacuation did nothing to enhance the prestige of American arms. Nor did the fall of Ticonderoga fill Americans with pride, and the search for a scapegoat began with mutual recrimination flying among Schuyler, St. Clair, Gates, and the Congress. Eventually, both St. Clair and Schuyler were courts-martialed and cleared of misconduct.

Burgoyne ordered Fraser's light infantry and grenadiers, supported by Riedesel's and Breyman's grenadiers and light infantry, to pursue the main body of the retreating Americans. Leaving the 62d Regiment at the Prinz Frederick's Brunswickers at Independence, Burgoyne took the balance of his force toward Skenesboro (Whitehall).⁶⁹

Burgoyne has been severely criticised for choosing the Skenesboro route rather than taking the waterway from Champlain to Lake George and thence over the portage to the northern reaches of the Hudson.

Nickerson and others have asserted that the decision to go by way of Skenesboro was made upon the advice of Philip Skene, prominent Loyalist and political advisor to the expedition. Skene owned extensive properties at Skenesboro, and it has been alleged that his advice to Burgoyne was the result of selfish interests associated with his desire to have a road cut through his holdings. So far as this writer has been able to determine, there is not enough direct evidence to make so sweeping an assertion.

Burgoyne's reasoning in favor of the route chosen was based upon the argument that the choice of Lake George would have required a retreat to Ticonderoga and that Fort George was strong enough to delay the advance. There may have been some psychological justification to his reluctance to retreat, even under such strategic conditions. It is also true that Fort George was not strong enough to delay Burgoyne to any appreciable extent. On the other hand, Burgoyne had to rely upon others for his evaluation of the post, and the evidence that he had at hand seemed to justify his belief in the strength of the fort.

There were other factors that made the choice of the Skenesboro route less foolish than has been represented. One of these was the fact that Lake George is two hundred twenty-one feet above the level of Lake Champlain, and up this rise artillery, stores, and boats would have to be dragged through the gorge separating the lakes for a distance of more than three miles. Choosing the Lake George route would also mean the abandoning of the threat to New England, upon which Burgoyne placed considerable emphasis. Taking the Lake George way would have revealed to the Americans his intentions and made clear to all that he had no designs upon New England. A second factor was that the Ameri

cans had retreated to Castleton. If Burgoyne were to pursue them, he would need to move east and south, unless he could be certain that a movement by Lake George would result in cutting the American retreat before they could reach the Hudson, a certainty that he did not have. If Burgoyne did get south of the Americans, the latter would then be between him and his base of supplies, and Burgoyne did not know enough about their capabilities to feel certain that they could not do his expedition considerable harm, believing, as he did, that they could be supplied and reinforced from New England.

Finally, regardless of which route he chose, there would be a portage to the Hudson, either from Lake George or from Wood Creek. If the Lake George route were followed there would be two such portages. If Wood Creek were used, there would be one: that at Fort Edward.

Meanwhile, St. Clair's army sweated its way through the sweltering, heavy heat along the rutted trace that served as a road to Hubbardton. Leaving Seth Warner at Hubbardton under orders to bring in the rearguard, St. Clair drove his tired, disheartened men on to Castleton, six miles away.

Warner, long on courage and short on discipline, disobeyed his ~~orders~~, and rather than bringing in the rearguard, he and its commander, Colonel Francis, spent the night at Hubbardton. So Warner's Vermonters, Francis' 11th Massachusetts, Colonel Hale's New Hampshire Regiment, and some stragglers from the main body bedded down without even bothering to provide for any security. ⁷¹

Fraser had lost no time in following the Americans. Starting at four o'clock in the morning, he marched his corps along the road

to Hubbardton until nearly one o'clock in the afternoon. Riedesel was following with equally vigor. When Fraser paused to give his men a much needed rest, Riedesel, accompanied by a company of Jägers and eighty grenadiers, came up. The march was resumed, and at a short distance from the Americans the pursuers went into bivouac.

As the Americans were preparing breakfast, the enemy attacked. The surprise was complete. Hale's men, the first to be hit, fled in complete disorder. Warner and Francis managed to rally their men, and a fierce fight began.

The scene of the fight was heavily wooded. While this suited the interests of the Americans, it presented the Europeans with a maddening maze of brush that snagged their gear and which seemed to shield an American behind every tree, stump, and bush, and in which there could be no orderly unit action. Warner's men held the left of an irregular line, with steep Zion Hill on their left. Francis held the right on a lower elevation. The whole of the American line measured about a half mile in length.

Fraser moved to turn the American left by drawing his men left to reinforce his right. When this shift was accomplished, he ordered the grenadiers to climb Zion Hill. The ascent was so steep that an orderly charge up the slope was impossible; and the grenadiers slung the pieces, grasped trees, bushes, and rocks, scrambling up the hill on all fours. Breathlessly gaining the summit, they took a position behind Francis and across the road to Castleton.

If Francis had not adopted Fraser's tactic in reverse, his position would have been untenable. As it was, he moved against the weakened British left. The action of the grenadiers was negated, and these troops suffered severe losses from a withering fire. The British situation

was becoming serious; and in desperation, Fraser was about to order a bayonet attack when a strange sound reached the ears of the fighting troops. A band was was playing and lusty German voices were singing a German hymn. The Brunswickers had arrived.

The baron heard the firing as he approached Zion Hill and brought his advance guard onto the field on the double. Without waiting for the main body of his corps, he sent his Jügers against the American right. He then ordered his grenadiers against the extreme flank to turn it. With thair band playing, as if on parade before the ducal palace, the Jügers advanced in formation against a vicious fire. Francis' men poured volley after volley into the German, but they closed their ranks and kept advancing. Francis held until the turning movement enveloped his right, when he fell. Fraser's troops delivered thair bayonet charge, and the Massachusetts regiment broke and disappeared into the woods. The Vermonters had maintained their position, but when the right broke, they could hpld no longer, and at Warner's command, they evaporated into the wilderness to meet and reform at Manchester.

St. Clair, at Castleton, had heard the sound of firing, but he had no hymn-singing regulars to send against the enemy. What he did have were two regiments of militia, who, with their customary freedom from discipline, had dropped out of the line of march and encamped two miles from Hubbardton. He sent these orders to go Warner's aid while he prepared to take a force back to the fight. The two regiments refused to obey and hastily rejoined the column which they had not been eager to keep up with the day before. His troops at Castleton had no stomach in a forced march and a fight, and thair reluctance

was increased with the arrival of the mutinous militia. While trying to get his force underway, St. Clair received word of Warner's retreat, and the issue was settled - they would go on to Skenesboro.⁷³

This battle was marked by very shapp fighting. The British lost fifteen officers and one hundred eighty three men, killed and wounded. The Americans lost, including captured, were twelve officers and three hundred twelve men out a force, which after Hale's flight, ~~numbered~~⁷⁴ slightly more than six hundred. In miniature, Hubbardton was as bloody as Saratoga.

Meanwhile, the American fleet of batteaux was leisurely sailing up Lake Champlain to Skeneboro. They felt no urge to hurry; there was the great boom of logs strung along the massave chain of inch and half iron bars, backed by a bridge supported by twenty-four piers of timber at Ticonderoga. Between the piers were log floats fastened together with iron bolts and double chains. It would certainly take time for the British to cut through that barrier; and Colonel Long, in command of the boats, saw no need for trying to block the narrow channel.

His confidence in the boom was misplaced. As soon as the American retreat from Ticonderoga was discovered, British gunboats were brought up, and a few well placed shots from cannons broke the great chain. The bridge piers were then cut; and within a few hours after Long's boats had started, the British fleet was running before a northerly wind up the lake after them. The Americans landed at Skenesboro at one o'clock. By three o'clock the British were within three miles of the place.

Burgoyne landed three regiments with orders to cross Wood Creek and to occupy the road to Fort Anne, the only road leading southward. After a brief delay to permit this to be accomplished, he moved his fleet to attack Skenesboro.

However, Colonel Long had decided that the weak stockade there was not strong enough to withstand an attack, and he sent his invalids and women up Wood Creek. Taking the rest of his force, he destroyed the fort. Burgoyne arrived in time to capture the Trumbull and the Revenge; however, the Enterprise, Gates, and Liberty, along with everything that would burn, went up in flames. What could not be burned was abandoned. Short of equipment as the Americans were, these were drastic but necessary steps that had to be taken, if they were to make good their escape.

Believing that his three regiments had gotten into position to cut off Long's retreat, Burgoyne sent Lieutenant with the 9th Regiment in pursuit of Long. However, the regiments had experienced so much difficulty in crossing the heavily forested countryside that Long reached Fort Anne without being intercepted. Nevertheless, Hill⁷⁵ pressed on in pursuit.

Fortunately for Long, Hill's advance was painfully slow. The road to Fort Anne was worse than most frontier tracks, which meant that it was practically impassable; and the bridges had been broken down. The result was that the 9th Regiment covered only ten miles on July 7, stopping that night within a mile of the fort. Early on the following morning, an American entered the British camp, said

that he was a deserter, and informed Hill that there were a thousand men at Fort Anne. Because he only onehundred nintety men, Hill sent to Burgoyne for reinforcements. The "desert" promptly slipped back to the Americans and informed Long of Hill's weakness.

By this time, Long had been reinforced by approximately four hundred New York militiamen. Aware of the smallness of Hill's force,
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Long attacked about 10:30 in the morning.

The scene of the action was a narrow defile about three quarters of a mile northeast of Fort Anne. The British were caught in a narrow area with the creek on their left and rising ground on their right. As at Hubbarton, the woods were so thick that the British could not form a regular line, nor scarcely see the Americans. Some of the latter crossed the creek and fired into the British left, recrossed the creek, and came into the British rear. In order to avoid being surrounded, Hill ordered his men to climb over the steep slope that hemmed them in against the creek. Once on the summit, they held the Americans at bay for two hours. Just when Hill's men were running out of ammunition, they heard an Indian war whoop. The Americans also heard it, beat a hasty retreat for Fort Edward, setting fire to Fort Anne as they withdrew.
77

There had been a war whoop, but no Indians - just a lone Englishman, Captain Money, who had been sent with a party of Indians. These had been so unenthusiastic about getting involved in a pitched battle that they had lagged behind; and Money left them to go ahead. When he got to the scene of the fighting he gambled on his luck and gave a yell. The Americans, by now low on ammunition, had no desire to take

on a fresh Indian war party, and, feeling discretion the better part of valor, they retreated.

Shortly after the American withdrawal, the 47th and 53d Regiments, under General Phillips, arrived and escorted the remnants of the 9th back to Skenesboro. The wounded were left at the scene of the fighting under the care of Sergeant Lamb and a soldier's wife. Here in this lonely spot they remained until three of the twenty-four wounded were dead and the rest fit for duty.

St. Clair, at Castleton, upon receiving word of the defeats at Hubbarton and Skenesboro, could do nothing but try to save his army from utter destruction by retreating by a circuitous route to Fort Edward, the "Great Carrying Place", reaching that point on July 12.

Although he had assembled the main body of his army at Skenesboro on July 10, Burgoyne did not succeed in reaching Fort Edward until the 30th of that month. What were the circumstances that produced this extremely slow advance? The answer may be found in two accounts. Sergeant Lamb recorded:

The British were now obliged to suspend all operations for some time and wait at Skenesboro for the arrival of provisions and tents; but they employed this interval clearing a passage of the troops, to proceed against the enemy. This was attended with incredible toil. The Americans, now under the direction of General Schuyler, were constantly employed in cutting down trees on both sides of every road, which was in the line of march. The face of the country was likewise so broken with creeks and marshes, that there was no less than forty bridges to construct, one of which was over a morass two miles in extent. 78

Coupled with these difficulties were the transportation deficiencies. The shortage of horses and the sub-standard character of the carts that had been constructed in Canada were beginning to make themselves felt.

On July 10 Burgoyne wrote: "The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their provisions for two days, almost the whole of their tents and baggage)...⁷⁹ The five hundred carts seem to have broken up; for according to Money's testimony, when asked by the Parliamentary committee, "How many carts and Ox-teams could be mustered at any one time?" his answer was, "I think only 180 carts ... the number⁸⁰ of ox-carts I really forget, but I believe between 20 and 30."

In addition to the necessity of clearing the road and repairing the transport facilities, Burgoyne needed supplies. The wilderness could not yield enough for the army to subsist upon, and the line of supply was long. Aggravated as it was, by the breakdown of the transport capability, the logistical problem was almost impossible to solve.

On July 24, supplies having been collected, the main body marched to Fort Anne and encamped there; Fraser and the advanced guard moving on to within two miles of Fort Edward. Then, on the 29th, the army moved again, arriving on the Hudson River the next day.

Just before the British reached Fort Edward, the fabled murder of Jane McCrae was committed. The details of this event are so obscure and contradictory that, unless new contemporary accounts are located, the story can not be related with any assurance of accuracy. While the McCrae murder has been credited with bringing militia into the American camp and persuading some people who inclined toward neutrality or the royalist cause that they should go over to the Americans, no contemporary sources support this interpretation. Its impact seems to have much greater upon later generations than upon the participants in the campaign. Almost the only matter of significance that was directly associated with the event was the defection of some of Burgoyne's Indians following

the administration of a reprimand. This resulted in the loss of a substantial part of his reconnaissance capability; although, in view of the limited value of the Indians' service prior to that time, it is difficult to see that the departure of the Indians made any great difference in the outcome of the campaign.

After some insignificant skirmish activity, Shuyler, who by this time had arrived from Albany to take personal charge of the retreat,⁸¹ pulled his army back to Stillwater.

While the Americans were at Stillwater, events to the southward were occurring that would eventually strengthen the northern defenses. Additional troops, supplies, and finally a new commander were sent northward.

In the meantime, Burgoyne's supply problem was becoming his most difficult. Upon arriving on the Hudson, he determined to collect all of the animals that he could, if possible to mount his German dragoons, as well as to replace draft horses that had been lost during the course of the advance. Persuaded by Skene, Burgoyne, somewhat reluctantly decided to launch a raid on the Connecticut River for beeves and horses. Skene had seriously misinformed the commander by exaggerating the sympathy of the local people. Believing that most of them were Loyalists, Burgoyne expected little or no opposition and a probable flocking to his standard of a people just waiting the appearance of the King's arms. The result was that, on August 9, Burgoyne detailed Lieutenant Colonel Baum to lead the expedition, in spite of the fact that Baum could speak only German. After giving him detailed instructions, Burgoyne despatched Baum from Fort Miller. Shortly

after Baum departed on his mission, Burgoyne rode after him and changed the detination to Bennington in the Hampshire Grants(Vermont), where it was reported horses and supplies had been collected by the Americans.

Baum's force was weak, both from the stand-point of numbers and because of its structure. It consisted of one hundred seventy un-mounted Branswick dragoons, approximately one hundred infantry, a detachment of gunners with two 3-pounders, and fifty of Alexander Fraser's sharpshooters: a total of three hundred seventy-four regulars,⁸² accompanied by three hundred Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians.

Moving slowly without any impulse to hurry and misled by Skene's optimism, Baum accepted the professions of loyalty of persons who came and went freely within his force, but who proved to be operating in the American interest. The Indians of the expedition nullified the intent of the mission by looting everything that was in their way and by slaughtering herds of cattle, rather than bringing them into the camp.

Slowly the advance continued until the 14th, when, hearing that the Americans were in strength at Bennington, Baum sent back to Burgoyne for reinforcements. Colonel Bremann and five hundred fifty German dragoons, accompanied by two 6-pounders, were sent out on the 15th; but on account of the rain and their ponderous equipment, they failed to cover much ground during the first day's march. In the meantime, Baum, who advanced his column to the Walloomsac, entrenched his men on its northern bank and awaited Breymann's arrival.

Shortly after Baum's departure from Fort Miller, John Stark was gathering the militiamen of the Grants. On August 8, he marched into Bennington at the head of approximately fifteen hundred troops. Eight days later he came into contact with Baum, who at first mistook Stark's men for a party of Loyalists on their way to offer their services to the Royal army, and instead of opening fire, he permitted them to wander around his entrenched position.

After making this peaceful reconnaissance, Stark divided his command into three columns. The central one under his personal command, supported by Colonels Stickney and Hubbard, was to move up the Walloomsac and make a frontal attack, while the other two - the right under Colonel Nichols and the left of Colonel Herrick - were to move out to the flanks and then close in on the Germans' rear. The result was that Baum was surrounded before he had chance to realize it.

Beginning at about three o'clock in the afternoon, the battle lasted for nearly two hours, ending with the destruction of Baum's column.

Breymann, who was six miles away before the battle began, did not reach the scene of the action until after Baum's force had been destroyed. When he did arrive, he found Stark's men looting the enemy camp. Deploying his force, he swept the Americans out of the entrenchments. At this point, Warner suddenly appeared, and Stark's men rallied, forcing Breymann to retire under the cover of darkness.

The effect of the Battle of Bennington was two-fold: First, the success of American arms - militia at that-- was a welcome and refreshing experience after the defeats of Hubbardton and Wood Creek. Secondly, the losses that Baum and Breymann experienced were costly

to a degree that serious because there was hope for reinforcements from the north. The effects upon the morale of the Germans, and even the British, while impossible to assess, were a factor in the American favor.

While the interests of brevity do not permit a definitive study of the fate of St. Leger's force on the Mohawk, an important story in its own right, it is necessary to note briefly the events that occurred at Oriskany and Fort Stanwix.

It will be remembered that a part of the plan for the invasion provided for an advance along the Mohawk. St. Leger, after reducing Fort Stanwix (near present day Rome, N. Y.), was to proceed to Albany and join the main army. Stanwix, which had been constructed at the portage between Wood Creek (not to be confused with Wood Creek northeast of the Hudson) and the Mohawk River, was held by a force commanded by Colonel Gansevoort. Setting out on July 25 from Oswego, St. Leger arrived at the fort on August 3, at the head of force of about eight hundred fifty Regulars, Loyalists, and Canadians, accompanied by one thousand Indians. ⁸⁶ Nicholas Herkimer had roused the militia of Tryon County for the organization of a rescue of the garrison of the fort; and, on August 6th, this expedition tumbled into an ambush that had been laid in a ravine at Oriskany. The Americans were almost destroyed, and Herkimer was mortally wounded. Gansevoort sent out Willett, his second in command, to fall upon the Indian camp. Brant's Indians, hearing the firing behind them fled. St. Leger surrounded the fort, but was ⁸⁷ unable to make good an attack against it.

Upon learning that Fort Stanwiz was hard pressed, Schuyler, at Stillwater, sent out an expedition of relief of twelve hundred men under Benedict Arnold, who had recently been sent to the Northern Department by Washington. Advancing rapidly to German Flats, fifteen miles east of the fort, he captured one of the less prepossessing members of the numerous Schuyler clan, a semi-embacile named Hon Yost, sentenced him to death, and then reprieved him on the condition that he go to the British camp and spread the rumor among the Indians that the Americans were attacking in overwhelming numbers. This was done, and the Indians, who had joined the expedition under the impression that there would be much loot, but little fighting, deserted the British commander. On the 22d, St. Leger abandoned the siege and retired to Oswego.

Following the Battle of Bennington, Burgoyne was forced to stay encamped upon the Hudson in order to assemble supplies, because he realized that once a forward movement was undertaken and the river crossed to the western side, he would be forced to abandon his line of communication. By September 11, he had accumulated five weeks' provisions, which had been brought from Quebec by road and water; and on the 13th of that month, he crossed the Hudson north of Old Saratoga, now Schuylerville.

Meanwhile, Schuyler, his force reduced by the despatch of Arnold to the Mohawk, withdrew to the junction of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers. By this time, Schuyler was the object of a rising volume of criticism and abuse. All of his lack of aggressiveness; his direction of affairs, until a rather late date, from the comfort of his Albany and Saratoga residences; his peculiar strategy for the defense of Saratoga; and

the hostility of New England united in bringing down upon him the
censure of both military and civil leaders.⁹⁰

After some discussion that was more heated than illuminating, Congress requested Washington to select a new commander for the Northern Department. The commander-in-chief politely declined. Congress then ordered a secret ballot to determine the matter. The secretary, Thomson, announced the result and recorded in the Journal: "the ballots being taken, Major General Gates was elected to that
command by the vote of eleven states."⁹¹

While Gates has been charged with intrigue in gaining the command, contemporary sources do not seem to support this contention. Immediately contemporaneous comments were mainly approving; and the storied of intrigue, except those emanating from Schuyler partisans, appeared after Gates became unpopular as a result of the so-called Conway Cabal
and the disastrous campaign at Camden.⁹² Just why Gates would have conspired to obtain the command of the Northern Department is not clear. It certainly did not hold much promise of glory; and with the prospects that appeared in the summer of 1777 there was every likelihood of failure. There were other more desirable posts; and there are some hints in Gates' papers that he was less anxious to become once again
identified with the campaign in the north than were his supporters.⁹³ Be that as it may, Congress had once again resorted to the old pattern of rotation, and Gates was sent the New York.

After stopping to confer with Putnam at Peekskill, Gates assumed

command.

No sooner was he at the main camp of the army than a period of feverish activity began. Letters went out to the executives and legislatures of New York and the New England states asking for men and supplies. Attention was directed toward the medical services, which had been chronically bad. Efforts were directed at persuading John Stark to bring his force to join the main army; and when flattery failed to move that veteran of Roger's Rangers, Gates got stern, and reminded him that failure to act for the general good would tarnish the glory gained at Bennington. The result was that Stark eventually did act with some degree, limited and sporadic though it was, of co-operation.
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By early September, the plans for a strategy to employed against Burgoyne were matured. Realizing that the terrain at the junction of the two rivers was too flat and open to provide a sound defensive position, Gates intended to move his army to Stillwater. Lincoln and Stark were to operate eastward of Fort Edward.
95

Following his plan, Gates moved to the village of Stillwater; but finding it less suitable than he wished, he moved three miles northward to Bemis Heights, where the road to Albany was squeezed between the river and the hills. There, he took up a position on September 12, and
96
and fortified camp was prepared.

Burgoyne crossed the Hudson on the 13th, and while Lincoln hung near his rear, but just out of reach. Brown was sent against Lake George. Burgoyne, still determined to press on against Albany, pitched camp at Coveville (Dovegat) on the evening of the 15th. Four days later he had reached Sword's House, and was preparing to move against Gates'

fortified camp on Bemis Heights. The stage had been set for the Battles of Saratoga.

Conclusion. As has been noted, the purpose of this study was not to provide a definitive account of the Burgoyne invasion prior to the Battles of Saratoga. Many incidents, some of at least secondary importance have not been discussed in the report. The objective has been to chronicle the most significant of the events, as they influence the story of the Battles of Saratoga.

The most important portion of this report is concerned with the study of the development of the plan for the campaign and the effort to develop the story of the role that Howe was expected to play. It is this portion of the park story that has been weakest, and several facets of it will need revision in the light of the research reported in this study.

This project, as it developed, pointed up the need for careful programming of research. The writer simply did not have the time nor the source material available in a manner that would make for a scholarly, useful piece of work. Without making apologies for the report and the research that it represents, it must be admitted that a better product would have resulted if a more realistic programming for research had been possible.

This report is also representative of the need for research by National Park Service personnel. Published accounts of the Saratoga campaign have not included many of the facts that are found in this study; and several of the sources that have been examined have not been exploited by non-Service writers.

FOOTNOTES

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12. Ibid., p. 7.
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16. Andesson, Troyer S., The Command of the Howe Brothers during the American Revolution, Oxford Univ. Press, New York and London, 1936, p. 261.
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22. Supra., p. 14.
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30. Supra., p. 14.
31. Germain Papers, ltr. Howe to Germain, August 3, 1777.
32. Clinton, Sir Henry, Historical Detail of Seven Years Campaigns in North America from 1775 to 1782, Manuscript, Wm. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich, pp. 76-7; Saratoga Microfilm Roll No. 10.
33. Clinton Papers, Wm. L. Clements Library, Saratoga Microfilm Roll No. 10.
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38. Ibid.
39. Snell, Charles W., A Report on the Strength of the British Army Under Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, July 1 to October 17, 1777, And on the Organization of the British Army On September 19 and October 7, 1777, February 28, 1951, p. 86.
40. Ibid., p. 87.
41. Ibid., p. 94.

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43. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 109-110.
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57. Burgoyne, op. cit., Appendix No. VI.
58. Ibid.
59. Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, (ed) E. B. O'Callaghan, J. Munsell, Albany, 1860, p. 17.
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65. Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library.
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67. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
68. Anburey, Thomas, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1923, Vol. I, p. 193.
69. Burgoyne, op. cit., Appendix xxi.
70. In this instance, we have an excellent example of the deficiency of Burgoyne's intelligence capability. Neither the Indians nor the Loyalists were competent military scouts when it came to the assessment of defense potential. The best qualified person in Burgoyne's force was von Riedesel, and his unfamiliarity with the country and the burdens associated with an active corps command limited his value in this regard.
71. Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 186-7.
72. Ibid., p/ 188.
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75. Lamb, Roger, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurences during the late American War from its Commencement to the Year 1783, London, 1809, ;. 1438.
76. Anburey, op. cit., pp. 192-210.
77. Fortesque, Sir John, A History of the British Army, Vol. III, 226.
78. Lamb. op. cit., p. 144.
79. Burgoyne, op. cit., Appendix xix.
80. Ibid., p, 41
81. Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library.
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83. The Annual Register, 1777, p. 159
84. Ibid., 160.

85. Nickerson, Hoffman, The Turning Point of the Revolution, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1928, pp. 256-9.
86. Burgoyne, op. cit., Appendix No. XIII.
87. Ibid.
88. Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library
89. Amburey, op. cit., p. 239.
90. Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library; Journal of the Continental Congress.
91. Journal of the Continental Congress.
92. The reactions of the troops of the Northern Department, in so far as they are reflected by the journals and diaries that have been preserved, indicate that there was wide-spread approval of the change in command. For an examination of the attitude of the political figures, an extensive review of the various collections of private papers would be necessary. The stories of the intrigues involved in the shift of command are based upon later interpretations and were first advanced by historians of Federalist predilections, with whom Gates was not popular. The development of a "Washington cult", naturally, did not present a favorable assessment of the character and abilities of Gates, who had been suggested as a possible successor to the object of patriotic adulation.
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