National Park Service Confinement and Ethnicity An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites

On December 7, 1941, the United States entered World War II when Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. At that time, nearly 113,000 people of Japanese ancestry, two-thirds of them American citizens, were living in California, Washington, and Oregon. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066 empowering the U.S. Army to designate areas from which "any or all persons may be excluded." No person of Japanese ancestry living in the United States was ever convicted of any serious act of espionage or sabotage during the war. Yet these innocent people were removed from their homes and placed in relocation centers, many for the duration of the war (Davis 1982:27). In contrast, between 1942 and 1944, 18 Caucasians were tried for spying for Japan; at least ten were convicted in court (Uyeda 1995:66).

To understand why the United States government decided to remove Japanese Americans from the West Coast in the largest single forced relocation in U.S. history, one must consider many factors. Prejudice, wartime hysteria, and politics all contributed to this decision (CWRIC 1982; Hirabayashi and Hirabayashi 1984).

West Coast Anti-Asian Prejudice

Figure 3.1. Japanese American family harvesting their strawberry field near San Jose, April 5, 1942. (Dorothea Lange photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Anti-Asian prejudices, especially in California, began as anti-Chinese feelings. The cultural and economic forces that led to the anti-Japanese feelings are discussed in detail by Daniels (1989:2-25), and summarized here. Chinese immigration to the U.S. began about the same time as the California gold rush of 1849. During the initial phases of the economic boom that accompanied the gold rush, Chinese labor was needed and welcomed. However, soon white workingmen began to consider the Chinese, who in 1870 comprised about 10 percent of California's population, as competitors. This economic competition increased after the completion of the trans-continental Union-Central Pacific Railroad in 1869, which had employed around 10,000 Chinese laborers. Chinese labor was cheap labor, and this economic grievance became an ideology of Asian inferiority similar to existing American racial prejudices. Discrimination became legislated at both the state and federal level, including a Chinese immigration exclusion bill passed in 1882 by the U.S. Congress.

The experiences of Chinese immigrants foreshadowed those of Japanese immigrants, who began arriving about the same time the Chinese exclusion bill was passed. Japanese immigrants were called Issei, from the combination of the Japanese words for "one" and "generation;" their children, the American-born second generation, are Nisei, and the third generation are Sansei. Nisei and Sansei who were educated in Japan are called Kibei. The Issei mostly came from the Japanese countryside, and they generally arrived, either in Hawaii or the mainland West Coast, with very little money. Approximately half became farmers, while others went to the coastal urban centers and worked in small commercial establishments, usually for themselves or for other Issei (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Japanese store, Penryn, California. (Francis Stewart photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Anti-Japanese movements began shortly after Japanese immigration began, arising from existing anti-Asian prejudices. However, the anti-Japanese movement became widespread around 1905, due both to increasing immigration and the Japanese victory over Russia, the first defeat of a western nation by an Asian nation in modern times. Both the Issei and Japan began to be perceived as threats. Discrimination included the formation of anti-Japanese organizations, such as the Asiatic Exclusion League, attempts at school segregation (which eventually affected Nisei under the doctrine of "separate but equal"), and a growing number of violent attacks upon individuals and businesses.

The Japanese government subsequently protested this treatment of its citizens. To maintain the Japanese-American friendship President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to negotiate a compromise, convincing the San Francisco school board to revoke the segregationist order, restraining the California Legislature from passing more anti-Japanese legislation and working out what was known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with the Japanese government. In this, the Japanese government agreed to limit emigration to the continental United States to laborers who had already been to the United States before and to the parents, wives, and children of laborers already there.

In 1913, California passed the Alien Land Law which prohibited the ownership of agricultural land by "aliens ineligible to citizenship." In 1920, a stronger Alien Land Act prohibited leasing and sharecropping as well. Both laws were based on the presumption that Asians were aliens ineligible for citizenship, which in turn stemmed from a narrow interpretation of the naturalization statute. The statute had been rewritten after the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution to permit naturalization of "white persons" and "aliens of African descent." This exclusionism, clearly the intent of Congress, was legitimized by the Supreme Court in 1921, when Takao Ozawa was denied citizenship. However, the Nisei were citizens by birth, and therefore parents would often transfer title to their children. The Immigration Act of 1924 prohibited all further Japanese immigration, with the side effect of making a very distinct generation gap between the Issei and Nisei.

Many of the anti-Japanese fears arose from economic factors combined with envy, since many of the Issei farmers had become very successful at raising fruits and vegetables in soil that most people had considered infertile. Other fears were military in nature; the Russo-Japanese War proved that the Japanese were a force to be reckoned with, and stimulated fears of Asian conquest — "the Yellow Peril." These factors, plus the perception of "otherness" and "Asian inscrutability" that typified American racial stereotypes, greatly influenced the events following Pearl Harbor.

Preparing for War with Japan

While the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor came as a shock to most Americans, the U.S. government had already investigated possible actions to take in case of war with Japan. Japanese Americans also had speculated on what would happen to them , fearing as early as 1937 that they would be "herded into prison camps — perhaps we would be slaughtered on the spot" (Daniels 1989). Some Nisei emphasized their loyalty and Americanism, which led to generational conflict with their Issei parents. The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), an influential all-Nisei organization, represented this pro-American attitude in their creed. The JACL creed, an optimistic, patriotic expression written by Mike Masaoka in 1940, was published in the Congressional Record for May 9, 1941 (Daniels 1989:24-25):

I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this nation. I believe in her institutions, ideals and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her history; I trust in her future. She has granted me liberties and opportunities such as no individual enjoys in this world today. She has given me an education befitting kings. She has entrusted me with the responsibilities of the franchise. She has permitted me to build a home, to earn a livelihood, to worship, think, speak and act as I please — as a free man equal to every other man.

Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the majority of the American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such practices, but I shall do it in the American way — above board, in the open, through courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and consideration. I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics. Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times and all places; to support her constitution; to obey her laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a better American in a greater America.

At the same time as the JACL creed was written, the United States government was preparing for war. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 required the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens over fourteen years of age. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) compiled a list of dangerous or subversive German, Italian, and Japanese aliens who were to be arrested or interned at the outbreak of war with their country. In November 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt received a secret report on the West Coast Japanese Americans by Curtis B. Munson, a well-to-do Chicago businessman who gathered intelligence under the guise of being a government official (CWRIC 1982:52). In his report Munson concluded that most of the Japanese Americans were loyal to the United States and that many would have become citizens if they had been allowed to do so. Moreover, the report stated that most of the few disloyal Japanese Americans hoped that "by remaining quiet they [could] avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs." However, Munson also noted that the West Coast was vulnerable to sabotage, since dams, bridges, harbors, and power stations were unguarded; Munson wrote "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves. We grant this, but today they are few." Response to the report by Army Intelligence, although never sent to Roosevelt after the confusion following Pearl Harbor, argued that "widespread sabotage by Japanese is not expected ... identification of dangerous Japanese on the West Coast is reasonably complete" (Daniels 1989:28).

In the Aftermath of Pearl Harbor

Figure 3.3. Aliens at the Camp Sharp Detention Station prior to transfer to internment camps. (Clem Albers photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Beginning December 7, the Justice Department organized the arrests of 3,000 people whom it considered "dangerous" enemy aliens, half of whom were Japanese (Figure 3.3). Of the Japanese, those arrested included community leaders who were involved in Japanese organiza-tions and religious groups. Evidence of actual subversive activities was not a prerequisite for arrest. At the same time, the bank accounts of all enemy aliens and all accounts in American branches of Japanese banks were frozen. These two actions paralyzed the Japanese American community by depriving it of both its leadership and financial assets.

In late January 1942 many of the Japanese arrested by the Justice Department were transferred to internment camps in Montana, New Mexico, and North Dakota. Often their families had no idea of their whereabouts for weeks. Some internees were reunited with their families later in relocation centers. However, many remained in Justice camps for the duration of the war.

After Pearl Harbor, the shock of a sneak attack on American soil caused widespread hysteria and paranoia. It certainly did not help matters when Frank Knox, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy, blamed Pearl Harbor on "the most effective fifth column work that's come out of this war, except in Norway." Knox apparently already realized that the local military's lack of preparedness far overshadowed any espionage in the success of the attack but did not want the country to lose faith in the Navy (Daniels 1989:35). This scapegoating opened the door to sensationalistic newspaper headlines about sabotage, fifth column activities, and imminent invasion. Such stories had no factual basis, but fed the growing suspicions about Japanese Americans (J.A.C.P. 1973). In fact, as far as Japanese attacks on the mainland were concerned, the military had already concluded that Japanese hit-and-run raids were possible, but that any large-scale invasion was beyond the capacity of the Japanese military, as was any invasion of Japan by the U.S. military.

"Military Necessity"

After the attack on Pearl Harbor martial law was declared in Hawaii and all civilians were subject to travel, security, and curfew restrictions imposed by the military. Japanese fishing boats were impounded and individuals considered potentially dangerous were arrested (Ogawa and Fox 1991).

Politicians called for the mass incarceration of people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii. But the military resisted: one-third of the Hawaiian population was of Japanese ancestry and the military didn't have enough soldiers to guard them or enough ships to send them to the mainland (Weglyn 1976:87-88). More importantly, their labor was crucial to the civilian and military economy of the islands (Daniels 1993:48). In the end fewer than 1,500 (out of a population of 150,000) were confined and eventually removed to the mainland.

One of the key players in the confusion following Pearl Harbor was Lt. General John L. DeWitt, the commander of the Western Defense Command and the U.S. 4th Army. DeWitt had a history of prejudice against non-Caucasian Americans, even those already in the Army, and he was easily swayed by any rumor of sabotage or imminent Japanese invasion (Daniels 1989:36).

DeWitt was convinced that if he could control all civilian activity on the West Coast, he could prevent another Pearl Harbor-type disaster. J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI ridiculed the "hysteria and lack of judgment" of DeWitt's Military Intelligence Division, citing such incidents as the supposed powerline sabotage actually caused by cattle.

Nevertheless, in his Final Report (1943), DeWitt cites other reasons for the "military necessity" of evacuation, such as supposed signal lights and unidentified radio transmissions, none of which was ever verified. He also insisted on seizing weapons, ammunition, radios, and cameras without warrants. He called these "hidden caches of contraband," even though most of the weapons seized were from two legitimate sporting goods stores (Hersey 1988:22).

Initially, DeWitt did not embrace the broad-scale removal of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast. On December 19, 1941, General DeWitt recommended "that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations and remove them" to the interior of the country and hold them "under restraint after removal" (Daniels 1989:39). On December 26, he told Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion that "I'm very doubtful that it would be commonsense procedure to try and intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater ... An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary" (Daniels 1989:40).

With encouragement from Colonel Karl Bendetson, the head of the Provost Marshall's Aliens Division, on January 21, DeWitt recommended to Secretary of War Henry Stimson the establishment of small "prohibited zones" around strategic areas from which enemy aliens and their native-born children would be removed, as well as some larger "restricted zones" where they would be kept under close surveillance. Stimson and Attorney General Francis Biddle agreed, although Biddle was determined not to do anything to violate Japanese Americans' constitutional rights.

However, on February 9, DeWitt asked for much larger prohibited zones in Washington and Oregon which included the entire cities of Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma. Biddle refused to go along, but President Roosevelt, convinced of the military necessity, agreed to bypass the Justice Department. Roosevelt gave the army "carte blanche" to do what they wanted, with the caveat to be as reasonable as possible (Hersey 1988:42).

Two days later, DeWitt submitted his final recommendations in which he called for the removal of all Japanese, native-born as well as alien, and "other subversive persons" from the entire area lying west of the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Mountains (Hersey 1988:43). DeWitt justified this broad-scale removal on "military necessity" stating "the Japanese race is an enemy race" and "the very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken" (Hersey 1988:44).

On February 17, Biddle made a last ditch effort to convince the President that evacuation was unnecessary. In addition, General Mark Clark of General Headquarters in Washington, D.C., was convinced that evacuation was counteractive to military necessity, as it would use far too many soldiers who could otherwise be fighting. He argued that "we will never have a perfect defense against sabotage except at the expense of other equally important efforts." Instead, he recommended protecting critical installations by using pass and permit systems and selective arrests as necessary.

Meanwhile, the Japanese American community, particularly the Nisei, were trying to establish their loyalty by becoming air raid wardens and joining the army (when they were allowed to). Since so many in the Issei leadership had been imprisoned during the initial arrests, the Nisei organizations, especially the JACL, gained influence in the Japanese American community. The JACL's policy of cooperation and appeasement was embraced by some Japanese Americans but vilified by others.

At first, there was no consistent treatment of Nisei who tried to enlist or who were drafted. Most Selective Service boards rejected them, classifying them as 4-F or 4-C (unsuitable for service because of race or ancestry), but they were accepted at others. The War Department prohibited further Nisei induction after March 31, 1942, "Except as may be specifically authorized in exceptional cases." The exceptions were bilingual Nisei and Kibei who served as language instructors and interpreters. All registrants of Japanese ancestry were officially classified as 4-C after September 14, 1942. (USDI 1946).

While the military debated restrictions on Japanese Americans and limited their involvement in the war, public opinion on the West Coast was growing in support of confining all persons of Japanese ancestry (J.A.C.P. 1973). The anti-Japanese American sentiment in the media was typified by and editorial in the Los Angeles Times: "A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched — so a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents — grows up to be a Japanese, not an American" (Hersey 1988:38).

Despite opposition by Biddle, the JACL, and General Mark Clark, on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary in the judgement of the Secretary of War or said Military Commander... ."

In mid-February Congressional committee hearings headed by California congressman John Tolan were held on the West Coast to assess the need for the evacuation of Japanese Americans. The overwhelming majority of the witnesses supported the removal of all Japanese, alien and citizen, from the coast. California Governor Culbert L. Olson and State Attorney General Earl Warren supported removal of all Japanese Americans from coastal areas, stating that it was impossible to tell which ones were loyal (Drinnon 1987:31-32). As de facto spokesmen for the Japanese community, JACL leaders argued against mass evacuation, but to prove their loyalty pledged their readiness to cooperate if it were deemed a military necessity.

Other events in California contributed to the tense atmosphere. On February 23 a Japanese submarine shelled the California coast. It caused no serious damage but raised fears of further enemy action along the U.S. coast. The following night the "Battle of Los Angeles" took place. In response to an unidentified radar echo, the military called for a blackout and fired over 1,400 anti-aircraft shells. Twenty Japanese Americans were arrested for supposedly signaling the invaders, but the radar echo turned out to be a loose weather balloon (Davis 1982:43; Webber 1992).

Even prior to the signing of Executive Order 9066, the U.S. Navy had begun the removal of Japanese Americans from near the Port of Los Angeles: on February 14, 1942, the Navy announced that all persons of Japanese ancestry had to leave Terminal Island by March 14. On February 24 the deadline was moved up to February 27 (Daniels 1989:86). Practically all family heads (mostly fisherman) had already been arrested and removed by the FBI (Weglyn 1976:301) and the 500 families living there were allowed to move on their own anywhere they wanted. Most stayed in the Los Angeles area until they were again relocated by the U.S. Army.

Evacuation

Figure 3.4. The Shibuya family at their Mountain View, California, home. (Dorothea Lange photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Even after Executive Order 9066, no one was quite sure what was going to happen (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Who would be "excluded," where would the "military areas" be, and where would people go after they had been "excluded"?

General DeWitt originally wanted to remove all Japanese, German, and Italian aliens. However, public opinion (with a few vocal dissenters) was in favor of relocating all Japanese Americans, citizen and alien alike, but opposed to any mass evacuation of German or Italian aliens, much less second generation Germans or Italians. Provost Marshall Gullion, who had always supported relocation of Japanese Americans, had only figured on males over the age of fourteen — about 46,000 from the West Coast and 40,000 from Hawaii.

As the military negotiated possibilities, the Japanese American community continued to worry. Most followed the lead of the JACL and chose to cooperate with evacuation as a way to prove their loyalty. A few were vocally opposed to evacuation and later sought ways to prevent it, some with court cases that eventually reached the Supreme Court.

DeWitt issued several Public Proclamations about the evacuation, but these did little to clear up confusion; in fact, they created more. On March 2, Public Proclamation No. 1 divided Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona into two military areas, numbered 1 and 2. Military Area No. 1 was sub-divided into a "prohibited zone" along the coast and an adjacent "restricted zone." Ninety-eight smaller areas were also labeled prohibited, presumably strategic military sites. The announcement was aimed at "Japanese, German or Italian" aliens and "any person of Japanese ancestry," but it did not specifically order anyone to leave. However, an accompanying press release predicted that all people of Japanese ancestry would eventually be excluded from Military Area No. 1, but probably not from Military Area No. 2 (Daniels 1989:84).

Figure 3.5. Newspaper headline. (Dorothea Lange photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

At this time, the government had not made any plans to help people move, and since most Issei assets had been frozen at the beginning of the war, most families lacked the resources to move. However, several thousand Japanese Americans voluntarily did try to relocate themselves. Over 9,000 persons voluntarily moved out of Military Area No. 1: of these, over half moved into the California portion of Military Area No. 2, where Public Proclamation No. 1 said no restrictions or prohibitions were contemplated. Later, of course, they would be forcefully evacuated from Military Area No. 2. Somewhat luckier were the Japanese Americans who moved farther into the interior of the country: 1,963 moved to Colorado, 1,519 moved to Utah, 305 moved to Idaho, 208 moved to eastern Washington, 115 moved to eastern Oregon, 105 moved to northern Arizona, 83 moved to Wyoming, 72 moved to Illinois, 69 moved to Nebraska, and 366 moved to other states (DeWitt 1943:107-111). But many who did attempt to leave the West Coast discovered that the inland states were unwilling to accept them. The perception inland was that California was dumping its "undesirables," and many refugees were turned back at state borders, had difficulty buying gasoline, or were greeted with "No Japs Wanted" signs.

On March 11 the Army-controlled Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA) was established to organize and carry out the evacuation of Military Area No. 1. Public Proclamation No. 2, on March 16, designated four more military areas in the states of Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah, and 933 more prohibited areas. Although DeWitt pictured eventually removing all Japanese Americans from these areas, these plans never materialized.

Public Law No. 503, approved on March 21, 1942, made violating restrictions in a military area a misdemeanor, liable up to a $5,000 fine or a year in jail. Public Proclamation No. 3, effective March 27, instituted an 8:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew in Military Area No. 1 and listed prohibited areas for all enemy aliens and "persons of Japanese ancestry." Public Proclamation No. 3 also required that "at all other times all such persons shall only be at their place of residence or employment or traveling between those places or within a distance of not more than five miles from their place of residence."

Voluntary evacuation ended March 29, when Public Proclamation No. 4 forbade all Japanese from leaving Military Area No. 1 until ordered. Further instructions established reception centers as transitory evacuation facilities and forbade moves except to an approved location outside Military Area No. 1.

Figure 3.6. Map included with Civilian Exclusion Order 108. (Tulare County, California)

The first evacuation under the auspices of the Army began March 24 on Bainbridge Island near Seattle, and was repeated all along the West Coast. In all, 108 "Civilian Exclusion Orders" were issued, each designed to affect around 1,000 people (Figure 3.6). After initial notification, residents were given six days in which to dispose of nearly all their possessions, packing only "that which can be carried by the family or the individual" including bedding, toilet articles, clothing and eating utensils. The government was willing to store or ship some possessions "at the sole risk of the owner," but many did not trust that option. Most families sold their property and possessions for ridiculously small sums, while others trusted friends and neighbors to look after their properties.

By June 2, 1942, all Japanese in Military Area No. 1, except for a few left behind in hospitals, were in army custody. The image of the Japanese Americans is that they passively accepted evacuation. There is a Japanese philosophy "shikataganai" — it can't be helped. So, indeed the vast majority of the Japanese Americans were resigned to following the orders that sent them into the assembly centers which for many was a way to prove their loyalty to the U.S.

But a few cases of active resistance to the evacuation occurred. Three weeks after he was supposed to evacuate, Kuji Kurokawa was found, too weak to move due to malnutrition, hiding in the basement of the home where he had been employed for 10 years. He decided that he would not register or be evacuated, "I am an American citizen," he explained (JACP 1973:18). In another story, perhaps apocryphal, Hideo Murata, a U.S. Army World War I veteran, committed suicide at a local hotel rather than be evacuated (Davis 1982:57).

Three Japanese-Americans challenged the government's actions in court. Minoru Yasui had volunteered for military service after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was rejected because of his Japanese ancestry. An attorney, he deliberately violated the curfew law of his native Portland, Oregon, stating that citizens have the duty to challenge unconstitutional regulations. Gordon Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, also deliberately violated the curfew for Japanese Americans and disregarded the evacuation orders, claiming that the government was violating the 5th amendment by restricting the freedom of innocent Japanese Americans. Fred Korematsu changed his name, altered his facial features, and went into hiding. He was later arrested for remaining in a restricted area (Davis 1982:118). In court, Korematsu claimed the government could not imprison a group of people based solely on ancestry. All three lost their cases. Yasui spent several months in jail and was then sent to the Minidoka Relocation Center, Hirabayashi spent time in jail and several months at a Federal prison in Arizona, and Korematsu was sent to the Topaz Relocation Center.

According to one author, the only act of "sabotage" by a Japanese American was a product of the relocation process. When told to leave his home and go to an assembly center, one farmer asked for an extension to harvest his strawberry crop. His request was denied, so he plowed under the strawberry field. He was then arrested for sabotage, on the grounds that strawberries were a necessary commodity for the war effort (Hersey 1988:5). No one was allowed to delay evacuation in order to harvest their crops and subsequently Californians were faced with shortages of fruits and vegetables. Japanese Americans grew 95 percent of the state's strawberries and one-third of the state's truck crops (JACP 1973:20-21).

Even though the justification for the evacuation was to thwart espionage and sabotage, newborn babies, young children, the elderly, the infirm, children from orphanages, and even children adopted by Caucasian parents were not exempt from removal. Anyone with 1/16th or more Japanese blood was included. In all, over 17,000 children under 10 years old, 2,000 persons over 65 years old, and 1,000 handicapped or infirm persons were evacuated (Uyeda 1995:32).

Assembly Centers

Figure 3.7. Assembly Centers. (click image for larger size (~32K) )

After reporting to collection points near their homes, each group was moved to hastily contrived reception or assembly centers (Figures 3.7 and 3.8; Table 3.1). Two centers on vacant land, at Parker Dam and in the Owens Valley, were originally intended for use as "Reception Centers" to expedite the voluntary evacuation. Both would later become WRA-run Relocation Centers as well (Poston and Manzanar).

The Parker Dam Reception Center was on the Colorado River Indian Reservation in Arizona. Permission from the Department of Interior was contingent on the center being a "positive program ... not merely ... a concentration camp" (Daniels 1989:88). The Owens Valley Reception Center was on land leased from the City of Los Angeles.

The Owens Valley was (and still is) a major source of water for Los Angeles. City officials were worried that the evacuees would poison the water supply, but were assured that they would be kept under heavy guard (Daniels 1989:88).

Generally, the first to arrive at the reception centers were volunteers, mainly JACL leaders and their families. Since the Owens Valley and Parker Dam centers could only hold a small fraction of the West Coast Japanese and little time was available for additional large-scale construction, existing facilities were converted into temporary assembly centers.

Table 3.1.
WCCA Assembly Centers (Tajiri 1990:107, 116; Thomas 1952:84).

Eleven of the assembly centers were at racetracks or fairgrounds. Others were at the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Facilities (Portland, Oregon), a former mill site (Pinedale, California), migrant workers camps (Marysville and Sacramento, California), and an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) Camp (Mayer, Arizona) (Thomas 1952:84).

Two additional assembly centers were partially readied. Toppenish, in eastern Washington, ultimately was not used because of unsuitable sanitation facilities, and because there was enough room in the California assembly centers for the evacuees. A refurbished CCC camp at Cave Creek, Arizona, was not needed due to considerable voluntary migration from the southern part of the state (DeWitt 1943:152).

Living conditions at the assembly centers were chaotic and squalid. Existing buildings were used, and supplemented with temporary "Theater of Operations"-type army barracks, 20-ft-by-100-ft buildings divided into five rooms. These barracks were originally designed for temporary use by combat soldiers, not families with small children or elderly people (USDI 1946).

At the racetracks, stables had been hastily cleaned out before their use as living quarters, but the stench remained. Still, the converted stables were described as "somewhat better shelter than the newly constructed mass-fabricated houses" (McWilliams 1942:361). At the Santa Anita Assembly Center, 8,500 of the total population of over 18,000 lived in stables. At the Portland Assembly Center over 3,000 evacuees were housed under one roof in a livestock pavilion that was subdivided into apartments (DeWitt 1943:183).

Figure 3.8. Arrival at Salinas Assembly Center, April 29, 1942. (Clem Albers photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

The atmosphere in the assembly centers was tense. Many of the evacuees were demoralized, convinced that America would never accept them as full-fledged Americans. Some Nisei who had been very patriotic became very bitter and sometimes pro-Japanese. Most tried to do everything possible to make living conditions better, organizing newsletters and dances and planting victory gardens. Jobs were available in the assembly centers, but the decision was made that no evacuees should be paid more than an Army private (which was then $21 per month) to combat charges of coddling. Initially, unskilled laborers were paid $8 per month, skilled laborers $12, and professionals, $16. These were later raised to $12, $16, and $19, respectively.

Evacuees worked as cooks, mechanics, teachers, doctors, clerks, and police. At the Santa Anita and Manzanar assembly centers, camouflage net factories, managed by a private company under military con tract, were set up. Only citizens could be employed on this war-related work.

Privacy at the assembly centers was next to non-existent, with communal lavatories and mess halls and thin walls in the barracks. Families were crowded into small apartments, usually 20 ft by 20 ft. The evacuees fixed up their new homes as best they could with salvaged lumber and other supplies that they could find, in an attempt to make them more liveable.

Shortages of food and other material and deplorable sanitation were common at many of the centers (Weglyn 1976:80-82). The 800 Nisei working at the net factory at Santa Anita conducted a sit-down strike complaining about weakness due to lack of food as well as low pay and unfair production quotas (Weglyn 1976:81).

Some opportunities for leaving the assembly centers were available. California educators made an effort to allow college-age Nisei to attend school outside of the prohibited area. Many colleges refused to accept them, but around 4,300 students were eventually released from the assembly and relocation centers to attend school (Daniels 1989:99-101). The war had created a massive labor shortage, so the WCCA agreed to allow seasonal agricultural leave for those they deemed loyal. Over 1,000 evacuees were granted temporary leave to harvest cotton, potatoes, and sugar beets.

The evacuees for the most part took their hardships in stride. However, the effects of overcrowding and stress became apparent at the Santa Anita Assembly Center on August 4, 1942. On that day a routine search for contraband (including Japanese language books and phonograph records), and an unannounced confiscation of hot plates turned violent. Rumors and complaints spread as crowds gathered. The internal police and suspected informers were harassed and one suspected informer was severely beaten. In the end 200 military police were called in to silence the 2,000 protesters (Davis 1967:79). That night the residents were confined to their barracks and no meals were served. The military patrolled inside the center for three days (Lehman 1970).

Setting up the Relocation Centers

To reduce the diversion of soldiers from combat, a civilian organization, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), had been created on March 19, 1942. Once the military made the decision to relocate Japanese Americans en masse from Military Areas No. 1 and 2, this civilian agency was left to figure out how to implement this policy. Milton S. Eisenhower, then an official of the Department of Agriculture, was chosen to head the WRA. Eisenhower initially hoped that many of the evacuees, especially citizens, could be resettled quickly. He expected that evacuees could be either directly released from the assembly centers and sent back to civilian life away from the military areas, or sent to small unguarded subsistence farms.

However, after meeting with the governors and other officials from ten western states on April 7, Eisenhower realized that anti-Japanese racism was not confined to California. No governor wanted any Japanese in their state, and if any came, they wanted them kept under guard. The common feeling was expressed by one of the governors: "If these people are dangerous on the Pacific coast they will be dangerous here!" (Daniels 1993:57). But, their chief concern was that the Japanese would settle in their states and never leave, especially once the war was over. However, at a meeting with local sugar beet growers on the same day, a different view prevailed. Desperate for labor, S.J. Boyer of the Utah Farm Bureau said that farmers "don't love the Japanese, but we intend to work them, if possible" (Daniels 1989:94).

Eisenhower was forced to accept the idea of keeping both the Issei and Nisei in camps for the duration of the war. The idea of incarcerating innocent people bothered him so much, however, that he resigned in June 1942. He recommended his successor, Dillon S. Myer, but advised Myer to take the position only "if you can do the job and sleep at night" (Myer 1971:3).

Relocation Centers

The relocation centers were located in isolated areas, most in deserts or swamps, perhaps unwittingly following newspaper columnist Henry McLemore's vitriol, "Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give them the inside room of the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it" (McLemore 1942).

The assembly centers at Manzanar and Poston were redesignated relocation centers and eight new sites in seven states were selected (Figure 3.9; Table 3.2). Over 300 possible sites were reviewed; primary consideration was given to locations with railroad access and agricultural potential (Madden 1969:23-25). Site selection was made by the WRA, but site acquisition was left to the War Department. The Relocation Centers were primarily on unused or underutilized federal lands. With the exception of the California Relocation Centers, all were in sparsely populated areas, making them some of the largest "communities" in their respective states.

Figure 3.9. Relocation Centers.
(click image for larger size)

Table 3.2.
WRA Relocation Centers (Daniels 1993:131; Thomas 1952:88).

The Tule Lake Relocation Center in California, the Minidoka Relocation Center in Idaho, and the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming were located on undeveloped federal reclamation projects. The Jerome and Rohwer Relocation Centers in Arkansas were partially on land meant for subsistence homesteads under the Farm Security Administration; the balance of the site at Rohwer was bought from local farmers.

The Colorado River (Poston) and Gila River Relocation Centers in Arizona were both on Indian Reservations. Both Tribal Councils opposed the use of their land on the grounds that they did not want to participate in inflicting the same type of injustice as they had suffered, but they were overruled by the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). In fact, in a verbal agreement Eisenhower had turned over administration of the Colorado River Relocation Center to the BIA. The WRA later resumed control of the center when Dillon Myer became WRA director.

The Central Utah Relocation Center (Topaz) had been part public domain, part county owned, and part privately owned. The Granada Relocation Center in Colorado had been privately owned and was purchased by the Army for the WRA (Daniels 1989; USDI 1946). The Manzanar Relocation Center was located on unused land held by the City of Los Angeles for its water rights.

Evacuees at assembly centers which had only pit latrines or which presented a fire hazard were the first priority for transfer to the relocation centers (DeWitt 1943:280). In theory, evacuees would be sent to the relocation center with the climate most similar to their home, and each relocation center would have a balance of urban and rural settlers. Evacuees were transferred from the assembly centers to the relocation centers by trains; this mass movement was carefully choreographed to avoid interrupting major troop movements.

The transfer process lasted from early June to October 30. Following the transfer of evacuees and supplies to the relocation centers all but two of the assembly and reception centers were turned over to various Army agencies or the U.S. Forest Service (Table 3.3).

Concurrently with the transfers from the assembly centers, the military decided to remove all Japanese Americans from the remainder of California. The eastern portion of California had been designated Military Area No. 2, and was not supposed to be as sensitive as Military Area No. 1, where all Japanese had already been removed from their homes to assembly centers. But, within the California portion of Military Area No. 2 there remained two concentrations of Japanese Americans immediately adjacent to Military Area No. 1, vital military installations, and important forests (DeWitt 1943:360). Over 9,000 people were directly moved from this area to the Tule Lake, Poston, and Gila River relocation centers between July 4 and August 11. This included many who had voluntarily moved out of Military Area No. 1 prior to Public Proclamation No. 4. Alaskan Japanese who were not picked up by the Department of Justice after the attack on Pearl Harbor were airlifted to Washington and then moved to Minidoka. Of the 151 people of Japanese ancestry removed from Alaska, about 50 were seal- and whale-hunting half-Eskimo or half-Aleut (Weglyn 1976:57).

Relocation Center Layout and Building Design

General plans for the construction of the relocation centers were developed prior to the establishment of the WRA. Initial facilities were constructed by the War Department, which also procured the initial equipment. Per capita construction costs ranged from $376 at Manzanar to $584 at Minidoka. The total construction cost, for all centers, was over $56 million.

The relocation centers were designed to be self-contained communities, complete with hospitals, post offices, schools, warehouses, offices, factories, and residential areas, all surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers. Since the centers were supposed to be as self-sufficient as possible, the residential core was surrounded by a large buffer zone that also served as farmland. As at the assembly centers, the Military Police (MPs) had a separate living area adjacent to the relocation center, to reduce fraternization. The civilian employees also had living quarters available at the camp, but these were usually supplemented by whatever housing was available in the nearby towns.

The layout of the relocation centers varied, but certain elements were fairly constant. The perimeter was defined by guard towers and barbed wire fences. There was generally a main entrance leading to the local highway, and auxiliary routes to farming areas outside the central core. Some of the major interior roads were paved, but most were simply dirt roads that were dusty or muddy depending on the weather.

The layout of the two Arizona relocation centers differed from the others. Located on dead-end roads, rather than along a major highway, there were no watch towers and little or no barbed wire. The Poston Relocation Center consisted of three separate camps at five- mile intervals (Poston I, II, and III) and the Gila River Relocation Center consisted of two separate camps (Butte Camp and Canal Camp).

Plans were based on a grid system of blocks. Block size varied in the non-residential areas such as the administrative area, ware houses, and hospital. The remainder of the central cores were made up of residential blocks separated by empty fire breaks. Each residential block consisted of ten to fourteen barracks, a mess hall, latrines for men and women, a laundry, and a recreation hall (Figure 3.10). Eventually, large sewage systems were built; sometimes these modern facilities (necessary because of the population density of the centers) aroused the ire and envy of the local rural residents who relied on septic systems or outhouses.

Figure 3.10. Typical layouts of relocation center evacuee residential blocks.
(click image for larger size)

The design of buildings for the relocation centers presented a problem since no precedents for this type of housing existed. Permanent buildings were not desired. The military had available plans for semi-permanent "Cantonment"-type buildings and temporary "Theater of Operations"-type buildings. A set of standards and details was developed by the Army, modifying the "theater of operations"-type buildings to make them suitable for housing women, children and elderly people while still meeting the requirements of quick construction, low cost, and restricted use of critical materials.

These standards and details of construction were put in place by the WCCA on June 8, 1942, and provided for uniform construction after that date. However, Manzanar, Tule Lake, Poston, and Gila River were already under construction. Construction also varied because different local Engineer Divisions interpreted the rather vague standards differently, and these local offices were responsible for developing or contracting out the plans and specifications for each center.

Local craftsmen were used, but the requirements were not always stringent; in Millard County, Utah, near the Topaz Relocation Center, the term "Topaz Carpenter" is still a derogatory term, since anyone who showed up at the site with a hammer would be hired. Supplies were also difficult to come by in such large quantities during wartime. In addition, some suppliers were reluctant to use valuable resources for "Japs," making construction somewhat makeshift at times.

The five-room 20 ft by 100 ft plan of the assembly center barracks was supplanted by 20 ft by 120 ft barracks plans with six variably-sized rooms. The barracks thus built followed standard plans, with different sized apartments to accommodate different-sized families and groups of single people. Each barracks had two apartments at each of the following sizes: 16 ft by 20 ft, 20 ft by 20 ft, and 24 ft by 20 ft. Partitions between the apartments extended only to the eaves, leaving a gap between the walls and the roof. Each apartment had a heating unit, either coal, wood, oil, or natural gas. Furnishings included a single drop light, army cots, blankets, and mattresses.

The exterior walls and roofs of the barracks were generally of boards covered with tarpaper on frames of dimension lumber. In the colder climates wallboard was provided for insulation. The raised floors were wooden boards, which quickly shrank and allowed dust and dirt to fly all over the barracks. Eventually, "Mastipave" flooring was provided for use at the Tule Lake, Manzanar, Gila River, and Poston Relocation Centers to help seal the drafty floors. The window configurations varied, but were typically either sliding square windows or double hung, with divided lights. The gabled ends of the buildings had rectangular vents — a standard Army construction detail.

Barracks construction varied only at the Granada and the Arizona centers. At Granada the barracks had weatherized wallboard exterior walls and brick floors. The barracks at the Arizona centers had double roofs for insulation and the Gila River Center even had white wallboard exterior sheathing. Clearly the Gila River Relocation Center, visited by Eleanor Roosevelt in April 1943, was a showplace (Inoshita 1995).

Most other buildings were variations on the same theme. Recreation halls and community buildings were basically the same as barracks, but 20 ft by 100 ft and without interior partitions. Mess halls were 40 ft by 100 ft, and included a kitchen, store room, and scullery.

Block latrine and laundry facilities at the earlier constructed relocation centers differed little from that of the assembly centers. At Manzanar, Poston, Gila River, and Tule Lake there were three separate buildings in each residential block for the men's bathroom, women's bathroom, and laundry. These army-type facilities had no toilet partitions or bathtubs and very little hot water. A separate ironing room was added as an afterthought after numerous power outages. At Tule Lake later- constructed blocks had a combined laundry and ironing room and a combined men's and women's bathroom.

Block latrine and laundry facilities at the relocation centers built after the WCCA standards were established consisted of a large centralized H-shaped structure. One side of the building contained the block laundry, the other side contained the men's and women's bathrooms. The crossbar of the H contained the hot water heater. In addition to the standard toilets, sinks, and communal showers provided in the earlier constructed facilities, the women's bathroom was equipped with toilet stalls and four bathtubs.

Administration buildings were similar to evacuee barracks, but with white clapboard exteriors rather than tarpaper. Staff housing, also with clapboard exteriors, was divided into self-contained one, two, or three bedroom apartments each with its own kitchen and bathroom.

Community buildings such as schools and churches were left to be constructed by the evacuees, who initially used empty barracks for these functions. Often entire blocks of barracks were devoted to schools. The block recreation halls, originally intended for use by that block, were usually converted to other general community purposes, such as churches or cooperative stores.

Buildings that were later designed or built by the evacuees were often far more individualistic, and often built of more permanent materials. For instance, school buildings at Poston were built of adobe brick made by the evacuees. These later buildings were typically set at acute angles to the uniformly gridded relocation center roads.

Agricultural enterprises at all of the centers provided much of each center's food, with surpluses sent to the other relocation centers. However, over 40 percent of the rice produced in the U.S. went to the relocation centers (Smith 1995:185). Most of the centers also had hog and chicken farms, and beef or dairy cows were raised at Gila, Granada, Topaz, and Manzanar (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4.
Relocation Center Agricultural Enterprises, June 1944 (W.R.A. 1944).

Figure 3.11. Camouflage net factory at the Manzanar Relocation Center. (National Archives photograph)

The relocation centers were subject to the same rationing as the rest of the country. Victory Gardens supplemented the rations and evacuee crews recycled fats, metal, and other material considered vital to the war effort.The WRA intended to have industries supporting the war effort at the relocation centers, but these plans were thwarted by industries and unions who feared unfair competition. The only venture that enjoyed even a modest degree of success was the short-lived manufacture of camouflage nets at three of the centers (Figure 3.11; Smith 1995:176). The Manzanar net factory, supervised by the Corp of Engineers, was closed following a December 1942 riot. Privately run net factories at the Poston and Gila River relocation centers were discontinued in May 1943 after the completion of their original contracts.

Other war-related industries at the relocation centers included a ship model factory at Gila that produced models for use in training Navy pilots and a poster shop at Granada. Other planned industrial projects were put on hold, due to outside pressures and to encourage relocation out of the centers.

Industry for internal use included garment factories at Manzanar, Heart Mountain, and Minidoka, a cabinet shop at Tule Lake, sawmills at Jerome and Heart Mountain, and a mattress factory at Manzanar. In addition, factories for the processing of agricultural products were common at all of the centers. For instance, Manzanar made all the soy sauce it used (Smith 1995:244).

Life in the Relocation Centers

Figure 3.12. Evacuee barracks at the Manzanar Relocation Center. (WRA photograph, National Archives)

The physical surroundings, while not having as profound an impact as political and philosophical issues, had a great effect on everyday life. When the evacuees arrived at the camps, they found identical blocks of identical flimsy barracks (Figure 3.12). They quickly improved and personalized their new lodgings, first to make them habitable, and later to make them into homes. The physical changes the evacuees made in their environment were important ways of taking control over their own lives. The changes also helped personalize the identical barracks, to relieve the monotony.

Physical elements could also be reminders of their lack of freedom. The guard towers and especially the barbed wire fences delineated the difference between inside and outside the camps, freedom and confinement. Even a WRA re port admits this: "... the contrast between the barbed wire and the confinement within Manzanar and the observable freedom and motion for those immediately outside, is galling to a good many residents" (W.R.A. 1943).

The weather was another element that greatly affected the evacuees' lives. Both contemporary and later accounts stress dust, mud and extremes in temperature that came as great shocks to West Coast residents used to much more temperate climates. The dust, caused by the massive disturbance of the soil from construction of hundreds of buildings at once, eventually settled, but the harshness of the climate stayed the same.

Originally, block leaders were appointed by the relocation center director. But, the WRA decided that the evacuees should participate in governing their own communities as much as possible. WRA policy called for a community council with one elected representative from each block, an executive committee, and a judicial committee. Issei were not eligible to hold an elective office. Manzanar was the only center that never elected a council. Instead it relied on elected block leaders who served as an advisory group for the center director (Myer 1971:39-40; Smith 1995:253).

Some conflicts within the Japanese American community were caused by relocation, while others were merely brought to the surface. Many Japanese Americans had supported the United States and were loyal and patriotic until their government decided that they were untrustworthy and guilty until proven innocent. Their feelings of betrayal sometimes caused formerly loyal citizens to renounce their citizen ship, in extreme cases, or merely to sympathize with the Japanese government. It was probably most difficult for the Issei, who often still had feelings of loyalty to Japan, even though they also felt American. Other Japanese Americans continued to feel loyal to their country, even though they had lost their homes and freedom. Their major goal was to find ways to prove their loyalty to the outside world.

Inter-generational tension was also a major problem in the relocation centers, especially since Issei and Nisei were very distinct generations. There was a large shift in the balance of power from the Issei to the Nisei, for many reasons. The majority of the Issei leadership had been arrested after Pearl Harbor, and the Nisei gained power and influence, both within families and in general. Once the relocation centers were set up, many of the Issei were released to join their families in the centers. However, use of the Japanese language was very restricted: all meetings had to be con ducted in English, and all newsletters and other publications were in English. Since many Issei did not speak English, or were not very fluent, this was a further handicap. The Issei also often lost more in the arrests and relocation, since they usually had established farms or businesses. The Nisei usually had less to lose, and some saw the entire experience as an adventure or merely a temporary setback.

Resistance within the relocation centers took many forms. Ethnic churches, Japanese language schools, and unofficial unions flourished. More overt resistance came in the form of strikes and protest demonstrations. How far these went depended on whether an acceptable compromise could be reached (Okihiro 1974).

In November 1942 Heart Mountain was beset by protests over the erection of a barbed wire fence and watchtowers around the relocation center. A petition signed by over half of the adults in the center stated that the fence was an "insult to any free human being." The fence stayed, but the protests continued (Daniels 1989:115).

That same month Poston came close to open revolt. When two suspected informers were beaten, administration officials arrested two Kibei men. Crowds demanded they be freed, workers went on strike, and the police station was picketed. Demonstrators flew flags that from a distance resembled the Japanese flag. However, the protest ended peacefully as the Issei leaders of the protest saw things getting quickly out of hand and a compromise settlement was reached.

The most serious disturbance erupted at Manzanar in December 1942, following months of tension and gang activity between Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) supporters of the administration and a large group of Kibei. On December 6, a JACL leader was beaten by six masked men. Harry Uneo, the leader of the Kitchen Workers Union, was arrested for the beating and removed from the center. Soon afterward, 3,000 to 4,000 evacuees held a meeting, marched to the administration area, and selected a committee of five to negotiate with the administration. In exchange for a promise of no more demonstrations, the center director agreed to bring Uneo back to the relocation center jail.

However, when Uneo was returned a crowd formed again. Fearing the worst, the director called in the military police, who then used tear gas to break up the crowd. When a truck was pushed toward the jail, the military police fired into the crowd, killing one and wounding at least ten others (one of whom later died).

A group of 65 "outspoken patriots" (Myer 1971:64) who supported the Manzanar administration were on a reported death list, including the JACL leader who had been beaten. For their protection, these evacuees were removed to an abandoned CCC Camp in Death Valley. Sixteen alleged troublemakers, including Uneo, were removed to local jails and then to another abandoned CCC Camp at Moab, Utah. This so-called "Isolation Center" was later moved to an Indian boarding school at Luepp, Arizona, in April 1943.

Others from Manzanar and other relocation centers were also sent to the Isolation Center, for "crimes" as minor as calling a Caucasian nurse an old maid (Drinnon 1987:104). No formal charges had to be made, transfer was purely at the discretion of the relocation center director (Myer 1971:65). At Luepp, the military police outnumbered the inmates 3 to 1.

The Minidoka Center was continually plagued by strikes and protests. The evacuees organized a labor council, termed the Fair Play Commit tee, to represent them. The main objection was the low wage scale and the difference in wages between the evacuees and the Caucasian staff. A strike by evacuee coal workers was broken by employing other evacuees from the center who volunteered, and a strike by hospital workers was broken by sending the strike leaders to Luepp. Similar conflicts later arose with block maintenance staff, mail carriers, gatekeepers, telephone operators, warehouse workers, and other groups. A never-finished gymnasium stood as a reminder of administration-evacuee conflict. The construction crew walked out over a dispute about work hours and no volunteers could be found to replace them (Sakoda 1989:263).

Even with suspected troublemakers shipped out at a moment's notice, a crisis could erupt at anytime, as at the Topaz Relocation Center. On Sunday, April 11, 1943, 63-year-old James Hatsuaki Wakasa was fatally shot just before sunset by military police. Either distracted or unable to hear or understand the sentry's warnings, he was near the perimeter fence about 300 feet from the watchtower, when he was shot in the chest. The sentry, a disabled veteran of Pacific combat, claimed that Wakasa was trying to crawl through the fence and that he warned him four times before firing a warning shot (guards had fired warning shots on eight previous occasions).

The relocation center residents were shocked and outraged by the killing and a general alert was called by the military in case of trouble. However, relative calm prevailed as both the administration and the Topaz Japanese American leadership wanted to avoid a confrontation. After a brief work stoppage, compromises on the funeral location (near, but not at, the spot of death) and limits placed on military police were reached. The military were subsequently restricted in their use of weapons, no MPs would be allowed inside the center, and Pacific veterans would be withdrawn and no more would be assigned. Nevertheless, a little more than a month later, a sentry fired at a couple strolling too close to the fence (Taylor 1993:141).

Indefinite Leave Clearance

One of the goals of the War Relocation Authority was to determine which evacuees were actually loyal to the United States, and then to find places for them to work and settle away from the West Coast, outside of the relocation centers. At first, each case had to be investigated individually, which often took months, since each person had to find a job and a place to live, while convincing the government that they were not a threat. Eventually, to streamline the process, every adult evacuee was given a questionnaire entitled "Application for Indefinite Leave Clearance" whether or not they were attempting to leave. Unfortunately, these questionnaires had originally been intended for determining loyalty of possible draftees, and were not modified for the general population, which included women and Japanese citizens. The controversial questions were Numbers 27 and 28:

No. 27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?

No. 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

The first question was a bit strange for women and the elderly, but otherwise relatively straightforward. However, the ambiguity of the second question was especially inappropriate. For Issei, who were not allowed to become American citizens, saying yes effectively left them without a country. On the other hand, some of those who already felt loyal to the United States considered it to be a trick question. No one was sure what the consequences would be, but each family debated how to answer these questions.

Many of the relocation center directors saw the dilemma in the loyalty questionnaire and got permission from the Washington Office to change the wording. At Manzanar the wording was changed to "Are you sympathetic to the United States and do you agree faithfully to defend the United States from any attack by foreign or domestic forces?" With this change many Issei at Manzanar answered "yes" (Smith 1995:292-293).

However, even with the changed wording controversy remained. While some of the "no-no boys" were truly more loyal to Japan than to the United States, in many cases people compromised to keep families together. Others answered "no" as a way of protesting the injustice of the entire relocation rather than suggesting loyalty to Japan. Some did not want to imply that they wanted to apply for leave, since now that they were settled in the relocation centers, they considered them to be a safe haven and did not want to be forced out into the unknown. The questionnaire and segregation was one of the most divisive events of the entire relocation.

Those who answered "yes" to the loyalty questionnaire were eligible to leave the relocation centers, if they found a sponsor. One of the largest single sponsors, Seabrook Farms, was also one of the largest producers of frozen vegetables in the country. The company, experiencing a labor shortage due to the war, had a history of hiring minorities and setting them up in ethnically segregated villages. About 2,500 evacuees went to Seabrook Farms' New Jersey plant. They worked 12-hour days, at 35 cents to 50 cents an hour, with 1 day off every 2 weeks. They lived in concrete block buildings, not much better than the relocation center barracks, and had to provide for their own food and cooking (Seabrook 1995).

Through the indefinite leave process, the overall population of the relocation centers was reduced. On June 30, 1944, the Jerome Relocation Center was converted into a POW camp for Germans, after the 5,000 residents remaining were transferred to other centers. This closure not only saved administration costs, but also was used to show that the relocation program was working. Over 18,000 evacuees moved out of the relocation centers in 1944. By the war's end over 50,000 Japanese Americans had relocated to the eastern U.S. (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5.
Relocation Center Statistics (Tajiri 1990:117).

Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean

The mass evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was only part of the removals undertaken throughout much of the Western Hemisphere. At the outbreak of World War II there were some 600,000 ethnic Japanese living in the Americas (Daniels 1991:132).

Figure 3.13. Seized fishing boats impounded on the Fraser River. (Public Archives of Canada, Adachi 1976)

Canada, already at war with Germany and Italy, declared war on Japan within hours of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and British Hong Kong. Of the 23,000 people of Japanese ancestry in Canada, 75 percent were Canadian citizens. In the beginning, only Japanese aliens were arrested, but over 1,200 Japanese-Canadian fishing vessels, all owned by citizens, were impounded and later sold to finance the relocation (Figure 3.13; Daniels 1989:182-184).

By January 14, 1942, all Japanese alien males over 16 years of age had been removed from Pacific coast areas. When British Columbia politicians learned of the U.S. decision to evacuate all people of Japanese ancestry, including U.S. citizens, from the West Coast they demanded Canada do the same (Hirabayashi 1991).

A total evacuation was ordered on February 24. However, exceptions were made for those married to non-Asians (Daniels 1989:185). On March 16, eight days before the first evacuation of Japanese Americans by the U.S. Army, the removal of all Japanese-Canadians in British Columbia began. Over 21,000 were sent through the Hastings Park clearing station, the Canadian equivalent of an assembly center. From Hastings Park, half of the Japanese-Canadians were sent to Interior Housing Centers at six abandoned mining towns. The remaining were relocated to sugar beet farms, lumber camps, road construction camps, and other work camps in interior Canada (Figure 3.14). Even after the war, the Japanese-Canadians were not allowed to return to British Columbia until April 1949.

Figure 3.14. Japanese Canadian relocation sites.
(click image for larger size)

In Mexico people of Japanese ancestry along the Pacific Coast and the U.S. border were required by the Mexican government to liquidate property and move inland to resettlement camps (Weglyn 1976:57). They were eventually required to resettle in Mexico City or Guadalajara (Daniels 1991:132).

The U.S. pressured many Central and South American counties, even those not at war with Japan, to turn over Japanese immigrants and nationals to U.S. authorities for transportation to the U.S. (Weglyn 1976:57). The U.S. cited the safety of the Panama Canal as the rationale for this removal, but the use of the Japanese as pawns for exchange was not overlooked. During the early part of the war some 7,000 U.S. citizens had been captured by Japanese forces in the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, and China.

In all, 2,264 Japanese were sent to the U.S. from Latin American and Caribbean counties; over 1,000 were from Peru (Gardiner 1991). Brazil's 300,000 Japanese, the largest population outside of Hawaii, were left largely alone (Daniels 1991:132), as were persons of Japanese ancestry in Chile and Argentina. Cuba incarcerated all adult male Japanese.

The first transfer to the U.S. occurred in April 1942. Most of the Japanese sent to the U.S. from Latin America were confined at Crystal City, Texas, a special family facility operated by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

During the war the Swedish ship Gripsholm made two voyages to exchange 2,840 Japanese for American citizens. Nearly half of the Japanese exchanged were from Latin America. Alarmed at the number of Japanese being sent to the U.S. and with the exchange of citizens with Japan at a standstill, the Department of Justice ended the deportations to the U.S. in early 1943 (Weglyn 1976:63-64). After the war, many of the deportees were denied reentry to their sending country, and as a result many returned to Japan or stayed in the U.S. In 1946 many went to work at Seabrook Farms in New Jersey.

Tule Lake Segregation Center

Those who answered "no" to the loyalty questions were considered "disloyals." In response to public and congressional criticism, the WRA decided to segregate the disloyals from the "loyals." One of the Poston camps was originally chosen, but eventually, the disloyals were segregated to the relocation center at Tule Lake, which already housed the highest number of disloyals.

The half of the original evacuees at Tule Lake who answered "yes" to the loyalty questions were supposed to choose another relocation center to make room for more disloyals at Tule Lake. But 4,000 loyals at Tule Lake chose to stay; some didn't want to leave California and others were just tired of being pushed around (Myer 1971:77), so the loyal and disloyal remained together. The 1,800 disloyals at Manzanar could not be moved to Tule Lake until the Spring of 1944, when additional housing was completed.

Ray Best, who had run the Isolation Centers at Moab and Luepp, was named the new director of Tule Lake. The 71 inmates at Luepp were transferred to Tule Lake (Myer 1971:77). Additional troops were assigned to Tule Lake, including eight tanks (Drinnon 1987:110). A "manproof" fence around the relocation center perimeter and more guard towers were eventually added as well.

The Tule Lake Segregation Center maintained the same internal democratic political structure as at the relocation centers, and the new arrivals became active in center politics (Figure 3.15 and 3.16).

Figure 3.15. Residents of the Tule Lake Center post signs to welcome the arrival of transferees from other centers. (Charles E. Mace photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Figure 3.16. Demonstration at Tule Lake. (WRA photograph, National Archives)

A tragic accident set off a chain of events that fueled dissension in the center, and culminated in the Army taking over control of the Tule Lake Segregation Center. On October 15, 1943, a truck transporting evacuees from agricultural fields over turned, killing one evacuee. The center administration was blamed since the driver was underage, and evacuees were outraged that the widow's benefits amounted to only two-thirds of $16, the deceased's monthly wage.

A massive public funeral was conducted without administration approval and ten days later agricultural workers decided to go on strike. The strikers did not want to harvest food destined for other centers. They saw themselves as the "loyals" and the pro-U.S.Japanese Americans at the other centers as traitors to Japan.

The administration brought in 234 Japanese Americans from other relocation centers to harvest the crops. For their protection, the "loyals" were housed outside the center at a nearby former CCC camp. Further inciting the strikers, the strike breakers were paid $1 per hour rather than the standard WRA wages of $16 per month (Weglyn 1976:162).

When WRA Director Dillon Myer made a routine visit to Tule Lake on November 1, a crowd assembled in the administration area. During the assembly a doctor was beaten and some cars were vandalized. A group-appointed "Committee of 17" met with Myer, but all of their demands (including removal of director Best) were rejected. Further, future evacuee meetings in the administration area were forbidden. On November 4 the administration began work on a fence between the administration and evacuee areas.

That evening a crowd of around 400 tried to prevent trucks from being used to take food to the strike breakers (Weglyn 1976:163) and later the mob headed to wards the director's residence. The Army, arriving with tanks and jeeps mounted with machine guns, used tear gas to disperse crowds throughout the center. Many evacuees were arrested and a curfew was established. The next day schools were closed and most work was stopped.

When an assembly called by the Army on November 14 was boycotted, more evacuees were arrested and martial law was declared. On November 26 a center-wide dragnet was conducted to find the leaders, who had been hidden by sympathetic evacuees.

A stockade was built in the administration area to house those arrested. The stockade had 12-ft-high wooden walls to obstruct the view and prevent communication with the rest of the center population. By December 1 the last of the leaders turned themselves in to authorities in a show of solidarity with those already arrested. On January 1 those incarcerated in the stockade initiated the first of three hunger strikes.

Within the rest of the center, however, the protests waned. On January 11, while over 350 dissident leaders were in jail, the center residents voted to end the protests. The vote was close (and one block refused to vote) but the moderates had retaken control. In response to the vote martial law was lifted on January 15. The center administration, except for the stockade, was returned to the WRA.

The April 18 Tokyo Declaration, in which the Japanese government officially protested the treatment of the disloyals, provided some recognition to those within the stockade. Shortly thereafter, 276 were released from the stockade and on May 23, 1944, Army control of the stockade was turned over to the WRA.

Eventually, over 1,200 Issei were removed from the Tule Lake Segregation Center to Justice Department internment camps at Bismarck, North Dakota, and Santa Fe, New Mexico (Culley 1991; Myer 1971:90). But tension still ran high. On May 24, James Okamoto was shot and killed during an altercation with a guard, and in June the general manager of the Business Enterprise Association, one of the most stable elements in the evacuee community, was murdered.

On August 19, 1944, soon after the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) demanded to see those in the stockade, all were suddenly released and the fence removed. The stockade jail was used again for a short period in June 1945 when five teenagers were sentenced by the center director to the stockade for blowing bugles and wearing Japanese-style clothing.

Nisei in the Army

The initial aim of the registration questionnaire had been to deter mine loyalty of draft-age males before calling for volunteers for the army, and then to reinstate the draft for Japanese Americans. In early 1943, President Roosevelt declared that" ... Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry... Every loyal American should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution — whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service , or other work essential to the war effort." While the initial call for volunteers resulted in a much smaller group than initially expected by the government, approximately 1,200 Nisei volunteered from the relocation centers at the initial registration (Figures 3.17-3.19).

Figure 3.17. Japanese American women in the armed forces.
(WRA photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

Figure 3.18. Japanese American soldiers in Italy. ((U.S. Army photograph, National Archives)

These volunteers and the later draftees became the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The 442nd combined with the 100th Infantry Battalion of the Hawaii National Guard, which had originally been transferred to the mainland and given only wooden guns to train with. The government had hoped creating a predominantly Japanese American unit would help impress the general public with Nisei patriotism and bravery, but some Japanese Americans opposed joining the army in a segregated unit.

The combined 100th and 442nd became the most decorated regiment in American history, with 18,143 individual decorations and 9,486 casualties in a regiment with an authorized strength of 4,000 men (Chuman 1976:179; Uyeda 1995:73). Both units fought in Italy and France, and were responsible for the rescue of the "Lost Battalion" of the 36th Texas Division. Ironically, the 522nd battalion of the 442nd/TOOth Regiment discovered and liberated the Dachau Concentration Camp, but were ordered to keep quiet about their actions (Noguchi 1992; Uyeda 1995:75). The next day, another American battalion arrived and "officially" liberated the camp.

In addition, more than 16,000 Nisei served in the Pacific and in Asia, mainly in intelligence and translation, performing invaluable and dangerous tasks. Not only were there normal risks of combat duty, they risked certain death if captured by the Japanese. Nisei women also served with distinction in the Women Army Corps, as nurses, and for the Red Cross.

In general, the initial Japanese American opposition to serving in the Army turned into pride in their accomplishments, partly through the efforts of the soldiers' families. Almost every camp built "Honor Rolls" listing men who were serving in the Army and many windows displayed service flags. Awareness of the accomplishments of the 442nd/100th outside the camps varied according to how closely one followed the news, but those who followed military progress closely were impressed by the accomplishments of the 442nd "Go For Broke" and the 100th Regiments.

Figure 3.19. Honor roll at the Minidoka Relocation Center. (WRA photograph, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley)

While many Nisei joined the Army as a method of proving their loyalty, others resisted volunteering and the draft to protest the relocation. Nationwide, 293 interned Japanese Americans were tried for draft resistance (Daniels 1993:64). The resisters did not oppose the draft itself, but hoped that their protest would clarify their citizenship status. The best organized draft resistance was organized by the Fair Play Committee at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center, where 54 of 315 potential draftees did not show up for physicals (Daniels 1989:125). Committee leader Kiyoshi Okamota was branded disloyal and transferred to Tule Lake. Another leader, Isamu Horino, was arrested as he tried to walk out the front gate to dramatize his lack of freedom. Horino was also sent to Tule Lake. A third leader, Paul Nakadate, was sent to Tule Lake after an administration interrogation determined his disloyalty.

The 54 draft resisters, and nine additional people who counseled the resisters, were arrested. All 63 were found guilty in the largest mass trial for draft resistance in U.S. history. Seven members of the Fair Play Committee were found guilty of conspiracy, as well. However, the verdicts did not silence the resistance: 22 more Heart Mountain evacuees were later arrested for draft evasion. In all, 85 evacuees at Heart Mountain were convicted of draft evasion and were sent to federal prison. However, at Heart Mountain more than 700 evacuees did report for physicals, and 385 were inducted. Of these, 63 were killed or wounded in combat (Daniels 1989:128).

Supreme Court Cases

The constitutional questions raised by the relocation of Japanese Americans were left to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide. The Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo cases respectively dealt with the curfew, evacuation, and detention (tenBroek et al. 1954:211-223).

In Hirabayashi v. United States on June 21, 1943, the court unanimously decided that due to "the gravest imminent danger to the public safety" the military did have the right to enforce a curfew for a specific group of people, on the grounds of military necessity. They ruled that the curfew was not motivated by ethnic identity or race, but by an actual threat.

The final two cases were decided December 18, 1944. In Korematsu v. United States, in a split decision, the court upheld the government s right to exclude people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast based on military necessity. "Military necessity" was purposely not defined — if the military did it, it must have been necessary.

In Endo v. United States it was unanimously decided that Mitsuye Endo, a loyal U.S. citizen, should be released unconditionally, that is, without having to follow the indefinite leave procedure established by the WRA. The court stated that the WRA "has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure." The government therefore did not have the right to confine any loyal Japanese American. While sidestepping the constitutional question of the right of government to hold citizens without cause in wartime, it did in effect free all loyal Japanese Americans still held in Relocation Centers. The WRA had simply exceeded its authority.

Closing the Relocation Centers

Figure 3.20. Abandoned evacuee barracks at the Tule Lake Center. (Bureau of Reclamation photograph, Mid-Pacific Regional Office, Sacramento)

During the war, the Japanese American evacuees had wondered what would be the ultimate fate of the relocation centers. Some expected them to close when the war ended, while others, particularly the elderly, felt the government owed them a place to stay, now that they had been forcibly removed from their own homes. Anticipating the Supreme Court decisions, on December 17,1944, the War Department announced the lifting of the West Coast exclusion orders, and the WRA simultaneously announced that the relocation centers would be closed within one year. Initial reactions of the evacuees varied: some immediately returned to the West Coast, some at the other end of the spectrum vowed never to leave the centers.

Some of the first to return to the West Coast encountered violence and hostility and difficulty finding housing and jobs. Others had more success and encouraged people to leave the camps and return. Many who feared returning to the West Coast found refuge in other parts of the country, especially Denver, Salt Lake City, and Chicago.

Evacuees had to relocate on their own. The WRA provided only minimum assistance: $25 per person, train fare, and meals on route for those with less than $500 in cash. Many left when ordered and by September over 15,000 evacuees a month were leaving the various centers. But many had no place to go, since they had lost their homes and businesses because of the relocation. In the end the WRA had to resort to forced evictions.

At the Minidoka Relocation Center, laundries, latrines, and mess halls were progressively closed until the few remaining people had to search for food to eat. Evacuees were given 2-week, 3-day, and 30-minute eviction notices. If they still did not leave on their own, the WRA packed their belongings and forced them onto trains (Sakoda 1989).

Figure 3.21 Transporting building materials from the Manzanar Relocation Center. (Los Angeles Times photograph)

Eventually the centers were emptied out, and all were finally closed by the end of 1945. The Tule Lake Segregation Center operated longer, until March 20, 1946, because many evacuees there had renounced their citizenship.

Enacted on July 1, 1944, Public Law 504 had allowed U.S. citizens to renounce their citizenship on U.S. soil during time of war. Of the 5,700 Japanese Americans requesting renunciation, 95 percent were from Tule Lake. A third of all those interned at Tule Lake applied for repatriation to Japan; 65 percent of those requesting repatriation were born in the U.S. (Daniels 1989:116). On February 23, 1946, the first 432 repatriates set sail for Japan. Over 4,000 would follow. However, over the next five years all but 357 would apply for a return of their U.S. citizenship (Smith 1995:444).

After the last internees were released, the Tule Lake facility was placed on standby use during the Cold War for potential McCarran Act detainees, but was never used (Roger Daniels, personal communication, 2000). All the other relocation centers lie abandoned. If the land had been privately owned, the original owners were generally given the option to re-purchase the land. Otherwise, the land reverted to the control of the previous land-managing agency (Table 3.6). Buildings were sold to veterans, auctioned off, or given to local schools and hospitals (Figures 3.20 and 3.21). On May 15 the last WRA field office was closed and on June 30, 1946, the WRA was officially disbanded.

Table 3.6.
Disposition of WRA Centers (Myer 1971:348).

Retrospect

Figure 3.22. Fred Korematsu, Minoru Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi.

Six of the former relocation centers are listed on the National Register for their historical significance. Two sites are also National Historic Landmarks: Manzanar, and the memorial cemetery at Rohwer. Plaques and small monuments are the only memorials. People still debate whether the exclusion orders and the relocation centers were just, reasonable, constitutional, or justifiable responses to war (Baker 1991, 1994; Smith 1995; Uyeda 1995). However, in 1982 the California legislature passed a bill to provide $5,000 restitution to 314 Japanese Americans who were fired from their state jobs in 1942. Significantly, the three Japanese American who had been convicted of violating curfew and not reporting to the relocation centers were exonerated. Evidence surfaced that the War Department and the Justice Department had altered blatantly racist reports and submitted false information to the Supreme Court about the potential danger posed by the Japanese Americans. With this newly discovered information Federal District Courts overturned Fred Korematsu's conviction in 1984, Minoru Yasui's conviction in 1985, and Gordon Hirabayashi's conviction in 1986 (Figure 3.22). In 1989 the U.S. government officially apologized and granted redress of $20,000 to each surviving evacuee.