

## ***The High Water Mark of an Army***

*The Characteristics of the Army of Northern Virginia during  
The Gettysburg Campaign*

**John S. Heiser**



In the annals of American military history, the *Army of Northern Virginia* is probably the most unique fighting force ever sent to the field. Despite inadequate materials, resources, and political support, its soldiers fought against a numerically superior foe and often won the field. The Confederate government, the lack of human resources, and even command indecision often handicapped it. Yet the *Army of Northern Virginia*, bound only by a common cause, compiled an enviable record and achieved greatness by sheer determination combined with an underlying esprit de corps that has since been rarely matched. Despite the fact that some of this legendary status has been derived from post-war philosophizing and memory, this army was possibly the best in the world in the summer of 1863. So why was this army, whose career span only lasted three years, so unique? What in particular made this army perform so well under such detrimental circumstances? And why had it attained such legendary status within a year of its founding?

It was a yeoman army, composed of a majority of men who a few years before had been civilians. The rank and file was overwhelmingly under-educated with assorted civilian backgrounds- farmers, clerks, and laborers. Their officers were mostly members of the upper class of southern society, gentlemen planters and politicians. This composition of personnel was still true two years into the war and was continual source of friction between officers and men.<sup>1</sup> Battle attrition and loss due to ages or other causes had elevated men into higher ranks who were deserving, but the higher ranks (captains on up) were universally filled by a high percentage of those who were prominent members of southern society back home and included ex-politicians, lawyers, and prosperous planters and property owners. They rallied to the cause of secession and defense of home, freedom, and rebellion. They boasted in their pride of being “rebels” and members of an army led by the greatest commander the south had ever produced.

What made this army so special was its spirit; a special *esprit de corps* of invincibility and pride embodied in its commander. Robert E. Lee was more than a general; he was a strategist who performed his duties with an decisive zeal for honor and duty under the worst hardships. Not only was it his intention to direct *the Army of Northern Virginia* in active field campaigns, but he saw it as the main device in serving the Confederate cause of independence despite the unceasing might of the opposition. As events turned out, Lee was the soul of this army and it was the tool he used to perform his will. Lee's will in the summer of 1863 was an invasion of the North to find supplies, feed his army, and hopefully draw the *Army of the Potomac* into another battle that could produce a major Confederate victory on northern soil. Lee believed the timing was right to employ the strategy of an active offense as the best means to defend the South. The importance of this invasion strategy cannot be underestimated, especially from a southern point of view. We know the military and political reasons for this invasion, so we must understand the tool that was used to fulfill the requirements of the Confederate government and the army commander.

By the spring of 1863, the *Army of Northern Virginia* had reached its pinnacle. It was a massive, well-organized force, deadly on the battlefield and brave to a fault. Between December 1862 and May 1863 the army had twice decisively defeated the largest Union army ever fielded. Its officers were some of the best veteran field commanders the Confederacy had to offer and its soldiers were lean and tough, used to hardships of the campaign trail. These men were southern patriots, soldiers fighting for the cause of independence for which no man could have better reason to fight. It was not a uniform army from the very beginning, and suffered from an inefficient supply system, sectional differences, and dysfunctional objectives. Most of these problems had been resolved by June 1863, but it had been a very long and trying experience for officers and men.

The popular image of a ragged, poorly armed menace sliding into Pennsylvania is misleading. Lee's soldiers were not an undisciplined crowd of wandering armed men. By the summer of 1863, the *Army of*



*Allen C. Redwood's watercolor of "Steuart's Brigade at Culp's Hill " provides an example of how well equipped and uniformed some of Lee's soldiers were. Redwood served in the 33rd Virginia at Gettysburg. (Battles and Leaders)*

## *The Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign*

*Northern Virginia* was the strongest and best organized it had ever been in its year of existence. The participants themselves have guided our perceptions of this army. Post-war memoirs and autobiographies, articles in *Confederate Veteran Magazine* and in *The National Tribune* paint a picture of a ragged, half-starved, barely disciplined band of southern farmers who were able to invade Pennsylvania and almost defeat the Army of the Potomac. This popular image of the typical rebel soldier is far removed from the true condition of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign. The image of the ragged rebel is both a myth and an injustice to the southern fighting man, as well as the ability of southern industry to meet the needs of an army in the field while lacking both raw materials, industrial base, and manpower at home to supply those needs. This paper will seek to explore some of the history of this army and its true condition as it marched to battle at Gettysburg.

The genesis of the *Army of Northern Virginia* began with the first regiments sworn into Confederate service. Sent to Richmond in 1861, the fresh volunteers were filled with fire and enthusiasm. Thousands of young men left their homes to seek adventure in that grand enterprise of war. It was the thrill of a lifetime as Samuel Hawkins, a private in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mississippi Infantry related: “There was never a prouder boy than I when ordered into line for the first time fully equipped. The time for our departure was fixed; all the kith and kin gathered at the depot to bid us good-by. Many were the tears shed... I seemed to be a target, being the youngest member of the company and was given but little encouragement. Little did I care... I was headed for war and could not be bluffed off!”<sup>2</sup>

Hawkins’ excitement was typical of most recruits in the early volunteer units that swarmed into the new Confederate capitol. The men considered themselves from the very beginning to be superior to the northern soldier, a morale boosting idea that gave them a special dash. They came in such great numbers that the newly organized Confederate War Department felt that the number of men under arms was adequate within the first few months of war. The newest Confederates were in uniforms, accoutrements and arms supplied by the particular state from which each organization had been raised. Due to state regulations rather than a national pattern of uniform, the regiments gathered in a conglomeration of clothing styles, accoutrements and armaments.<sup>3</sup> The organization of the army was a huge undertaking, especially when accomplished by a new government with few resources. It was at this time that General Robert E. Lee entered into Confederate service as an appointee to oversee the organization and equipping of this first army.<sup>4</sup> The first problems were those of organization and supply. Organization was easily based on the most common military manuals of the period. Supply was to be another problem altogether.

The *Army of Northern Virginia* was a victim of its own government throughout its existence. Under the articles of Confederation, each state government could easily supply their own state regiments for the duration of a war expected to last only a few short months. Right from the beginning there were problems in fulfilling those requirements. Adequate uniforms, supplies, and medical care for the southern regiments slowed to a trickle as the months dragged on. The Confederate government in Richmond was in a quandary, and suggestions were debated between Jefferson Davis and his advisors. Davis finally turned to the state governors, begging them to forward provisions for their regiments and the others serving there who were in need. Where railroads were more than happy to ship troops northward, there was a reluctance to send supplies exclusively as this was a costly affair and the patriotic fervor of the spring of 1861 was wearing off. Transportation and an inadequate southern rail system would continue to plague the supply difficulties in Richmond throughout the war.

Initially charged with sustaining their respective troops in the field, state governments advertised for contractors to manufacture supplies for their respective state regiments.<sup>5</sup> Supply stores were established as military depots, or state arsenals, and contingencies met to send sufficient equipment to those regiments already shipped to Richmond. Some states were more successful than others. Florida, lacking in many basics of military armament and proper clothing, made great strides to adopt a state uniform and provide

medical care for three state regiments forwarded to the army. A hospital for Florida troops was established in Richmond in 1862 to serve the needs of their native sons with supplies shipped directly from the state.<sup>6</sup> North Carolina was one of the few states to prepare for the conflict long before the state had seceded. A state regulation uniform was adopted, suppliers contracted, and necessary military items secured by June, 1861 so that the first ten regiments of the state's soldiers marched off to war fully equipped.<sup>7</sup> Virginia also had made attempts to prepare for the eventuality of a conflict, though political factors played a major role in the slow establishment of state bureaus apart from what was already established as pre-war US arsenals. It was not until after First Manassas that the state discarded the blue uniforms of a pre-war militia, altering uniforms to a more stylish gray. South Carolina also discarded blue militia uniforms for the standard gray. Georgia, Alabama, and other deep southern states adopted a short-waisted wool or jean cloth jacket and trousers. Initial armament in most southern infantry regiments was exclusively smoothbore .69 caliber muskets or converted 1836 muskets, with M1841 Rifles and M1855 Rifles issued to flank companies.<sup>8</sup> The handful of rifles sent to any infantry regiment was assigned to the two flank companies.

But not all troops received the benefits of quick thinking governors and state armories. It would be nearly nine months from the time that Lee took command of the army in the spring of 1862, that clothing and armament supplies would be adequate for all of his troops. The states were hard pressed during the second summer of the war to adequately supply their men and it came to a near crisis during the Antietam Campaign. The army was in dismal shape, Lee losing nearly a third of his effective force to straggling. Shoes were at a premium and many men broke down without ever firing a shot. Maryland did not supply the stores that Lee had hoped would pour forth. Soldiers scavenged parts of Union uniforms after the capture of the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry and wore them into the battle at Sharpsburg. Discipline was at an all time low, and Lee contributed much of the straggling to cowardly individuals.<sup>9</sup> The lessons learned in Maryland were hard ones. The condition of his veterans troubled Lee who knew just how close it had been at Antietam. Lee and his staff immediately undertook the necessary steps in rebuilding the army to restore its full fighting ability. He also resolved never to allow his men to be so destitute again.<sup>10</sup>

Lee undertook great efforts in the fall of 1862 to properly clothe and equip his army. Lessons taken from the previous month's campaigns were obvious that men's wills to fight were there, but they had to be supplied, clothed, and equipped to do so. By this time, the Confederate Quartermaster Department and its Clothing Bureau were organized into being the main source of uniforms and clothing for the *Army of Northern Virginia*. From manufacturers and small factories throughout the south, clothing arrived in Richmond to be distributed to the armies as required. Lee was firm in his correspondence to department officials that uniforms and materials be supplied to his soldiers as soon as possible to prepare them for the winter months, and the bureau complied.

As efforts were made in Richmond to procure establishments for uniforms and equipment, most of the southern states also made Herculean efforts to manufacture military uniforms. Georgia and North Carolina appear to have been the most successful, due to the fact that each state had internal manufacturing facilities and open sea ports to allow a flow of goods from overseas to run through the blockade. North Carolina agents in England were successful throughout the war in purchasing cloth, metal fittings, and material in large quantities to be shipped to the state. One shipment aboard the steamship "*Lord Clyde*" delivered in November 1862 over a thousand each of cloth jackets, overcoats, and trousers, as well as 20,000 pairs of shoes among other items. Blankets and thousands of yards of "army cloth" were also included in the shipment, most of which was destined for state contractors to make into uniforms.<sup>11</sup> By this time, the old commutation system had ended and the depots established in Richmond and other cities were supplying the needed uniforms to the armies. Similar to the uniform issue system in Union armies, Lee's soldiers were given a uniform allowance per year. If the man did not draw his quota of clothing then he was paid for the difference; overdrew and he was charged for the loss.<sup>12</sup> A

simple system, but also one where the poorly paid soldier was loath to lose any of his hard earned pay for a clothing item no matter how needed the item was.

Shirts and undergarments issued by the depots were not made of cotton, a material that the soldiers considered more comfortable than the wool or rough homespun cloth garments. The practice of writing home for clothing parcels continued for the simple matter of comfort. Officers were not exempt from this desire. Lieutenant George J. Huntley of the 34<sup>th</sup> North Carolina wrote from Fredericksburg, Virginia in June 1863: “A few more lines. I wrote three letters a few days back for some clothes. I want the clothes yet, two nice shirts, two pair drawers, one pair pants, one pair socks, one handkerchief- pants striped or checked, shirts the same way without it is too much trouble, and one fine pair of calfskin shoes. I want them soon for I am you know what.” Huntley was looking after his camp comforts and added: “I would be glad of something to eat at anytime. Dried fruit is the thing.”<sup>13</sup>

Where depot clothing provided for the enlisted men, officers faced the difficulty of providing their own uniforms. Officers relied on the home folks to provide funds or contact a tailor to provide them with the unifrom. Colonel Clement Evans of the 31<sup>st</sup> Georgia Infantry wrote his wife from Fredericksburg on June 3<sup>rd</sup>: “I must begin now to look around for my next winter’s uniform. I wonder if you could hire some one to weave me a good piece of gray. It costs two hundred dollars now to get a coat and pants in Richmond of even ordinary material, and three hundred dollars if I got up in style.”<sup>14</sup> The higher cost of officer’s cloth was probably one reason that many junior officers gave up the more expensive frock coats and chose custom-made jackets minus the skirts. Some even adopted single-breasted privates’ jackets.

Materials may have varied, and uniforms may not have all been of the same exact design, but by the first week of January 1863, the majority of the army was outfitted with new uniforms manufactured in southern depots.<sup>15</sup> One particular photograph that helps document this fact is an image of four South Carolina brothers: William, Thomas S., Lewis Pinckney, and John Alexander Thomas, all members of Company K, 3<sup>rd</sup> South Carolina Volunteer Infantry. Taken during the winter/spring of 1863, the four men pose in well-made gray shell jackets and matching trousers.<sup>16</sup> Sergeant Francis Fleming of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Florida wrote a letter to his aunt on January 9, 1863 to thank her for a jacket she was sending and to remind her, “Many thanks for your kind offer to procure clothing for me. I am just now as well supplied as a soldier in the field should be.”<sup>17</sup>

The *Army of Northern Virginia* had undergone a major transition by the spring of 1863. Through the efforts of Lee and the Confederate War Department, the army was better clothed and equipped than it had ever been during its entire existence. The rigors of the Chancellorsville Campaign wore out shoes and uniforms, but the clothing stockpiles made certain that replacement items could be easily drawn. By the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign, the soldiers were wearing a mixture of uniforms from state and depot sources.<sup>18</sup> If there was any want for equipment and supplies in Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps, it quickly ended at Winchester during the march toward Pennsylvania. General Milroy’s Army was soundly defeated and the general himself sent “skeddadling”. Ewell’s men helped themselves to ample stores including tents, blankets, ammunition and shoes. The camps had a great wealth of rations as W.A. Smith of the 14<sup>th</sup> North Carolina recalled: “On reaching their breastworks (we) found the enemy had escaped. Their camp, with all their cooking utensils and other stores, fell into our hands. They were preparing a meal, not scant rations we were accustomed to but pots... full of stewed beef, loaf bread piled in stacks with other edibles (and) condiments. The fires were still burning under the pots. We ate all we could to our entire satisfaction, filled our haversacks and marched on greatly refreshed.”<sup>19</sup> Even the officers benefited. “My health is good,” wrote Colonel Evans of the 31<sup>st</sup> Georgia several days later. “I put on a clean white Yankee shirt and clean collar yesterday,” courtesy of Milroy’s supply depot.<sup>20</sup>

The evidence of the Confederate victory at Winchester was noted a few weeks later in York, Pennsylvania. Major General Jubal A. Early's division reached York on June 29, and encamped in the city for the evening. While Early busied himself with his levy demands on city officials, his troops pulled into the fairgrounds and encamped. A member of the U.S. Sanitary Commission visited the camps and compared what he saw with the Union troops he was used to:

*Their dress was a wretched mixture of all cuts and color. There was not the slightest attempt to uniformity in this respect. Every man seemed to have put on what he could get hold of, without regard to shape or color. I noticed a pretty good sprinkling of blue pants among them, some of those, doubtless, left by Milroy in Winchester. Their shoes were poor, some of the men being barefooted. Their equipment was light compared to our men (and) consisted of a thin blanket rolled up and slung from the shoulder and a cartridge box. The whole cannot weigh more than 12 or 15 pounds. Is it strange then, that with such light loads they should be able to make longer and more rapid marches than our men? The marching of the men was irregular and careless, their arms rusty and ill-kept. Their whole appearance was greatly inferior to that of our soldiers. I visited the fairgrounds and also the camp of a Louisiana brigade, situated about a mile from the city. The supply wagons were drawn up in a sort of a straggling hollow square, in the center of which the men stacked their arms in company lines and in this way formed their camp. There were no tents for the men and but a few for the officers. The men were busy cooking their supper which consisted of fresh beef (part of the York levy) and wheat griddlecakes raised with soda and water. No coffee or sugar had been issued the men for a long time. The meat was mostly prepared by frying and was generally very plentifully salted. The cooking is done in squads, or messes of five or six men and on the march the labor of carrying the cooking utensils is equally divided among them. The men expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this kind of food and said they greatly preferred the bread prepared in this fashion to the crackers issued the Union soldier. I question if their bread is as healthy and nourishing as the army biscuit.*

*"I asked one of the men how he got along without a shelter tent and his answer was: 'First rate. In the first place I wouldn't tote one. In the second place, I feel just as well, if not better, without it.'*

*'But how do you manage when it rains?' I inquired.*

*'Wall,' said he, 'me and this older man has a gum blanket atween us; when it rains we spread one of our woolen blankets on the ground to lie on, then we spread the other woolen blanket over us, and the gum blanket over that and the rain can't reach us.'*"<sup>21</sup>

This interesting description of some of Ewell's troopers is from a Union point of view, and we must remember that uniformity in the 1860's was determined by similarities of color and materials in clothing. The mixture of different state and depot issue jackets and trousers would apply to this different mixture of uniform variations. The state of a unit's dress may have had as much to do with the individuals as the ability of the clothing bureau to supply a unit's uniform needs. Even members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Maryland Infantry- Confederates with no ready source of state issue equipment - were well uniformed at this point of the war. Sergeant James Thomas of Company A recounted an incident during the march to Gettysburg from his diary: "On this day's march (26 June) an old man walked along talking to us. He said, 'They have been telling us you rebs were a ragged set, but you seem to have pretty good clothes; and that you were badly armed... but you have good guns and what's funny to me, all of them have U.S. on them.' Our regiment was better clothed than most and all our guns had been captured on battle fields." Many of

the Marylanders also used knapsacks, a fact much different from the usual image of the Confederate with his usual blanket roll.<sup>22</sup>



*Confederates on the march to Pennsylvania, by Allan Redwood. Note the knapsacks worn by the infantrymen. (Battles and Leaders)*

In Lieutenant General James Longstreet's First Corps there was a surplus of uniforms on hand. Pickett's Division was ordered to issue all of its surplus clothing in mid June to lighten the loads of the division quartermaster.<sup>23</sup> It is possible that Hood's and McLaw's Divisions may have had some surplus stores to issue to the rank and file, though documented evidence is sketchy at best.

Some of the best evidence against the "raggedness" of Lee's men during the Gettysburg Campaign appears in the melancholy photos taken three days after the battle by Alexander Gardner and his team of assistants. The Confederate dead who still littered the fields of the Rose Farm and the "Slaughter Pen" reveal not only the bitter horror of death in battle, but insight as to the dress of the men who made up those units which fought in these areas. Most of the corpses are clad in short depot or state jackets. One subject wears a frock coat, while at least one dead soldier wears an overcoat; indeed a burdensome garment in summer weather. Only two bodies appear not to be wearing jackets and are clad only in shirts. Most of the dead retain their footwear except for two bodies in the Rose Farm area who are shoeless. One man is barefooted, while another stills wears the socks he wore the day he was killed. Obviously his shoes were more valuable to a living survivor. None of these images reveal the ragged uniforms of popular myth.<sup>24</sup>

The other available views of Confederates, those taken at Camp Letterman General Hospital and the three subjects photographed on Seminary Ridge, show fully uniformed soldiers. The latter case is most revealing for the amount of equipment each man carries, including a fully loaded knapsack on two of the figures. All three have acquired Union haversacks and canteens, and exhibit no signs of the raggedness or poor quality of uniforms we expect.<sup>25</sup>

The perception of the Army of Northern Virginia soldier as being perpetually clad in a tattered uniform and poorly equipped was partially the doing of post-war southern writers seeking to explain the Confederacy's defeat. Especially in the Victorian era, and even to this day, the image of the tattered Confederate soldier was more appealing and romantic than the true image. If the Confederate soldier was poorly clothed and equipped it also made his achievements on the battlefield seem all the more remarkable, and helped to soften the sting of defeat.<sup>26</sup> To be sure, the southerners who marched for Lee were individuals and each man was responsible for his own appearance. As humans go, some were more responsible than others were. W.W. Blackford, of General James E. B. "Jeb" Stuart's staff, addressed this in a post-war memoir: "It seems to be the thing to represent the Confederate soldier as being in a chronic state of starvation and nakedness. During the last year of the war this was partially true, but previous to that time it was not any more than falls to the lot of all soldiers in active campaign. Thriftless men would get barefooted and ragged and waste their rations... and thriftlessness is found in armies as well as at

home. When the men came to houses, the tale of starvation... was the surest way to succeed in foraging...”<sup>27</sup> It is apparent from Blackford’s observation that the army wanted for food and proper footwear more than a lack of uniforms and equipment.



*Confederate prisoners photographed on Seminary Ridge around July 15, 1863. Although these soldiers have laden themselves with extra equipment for their journey to captivity they offer an image of Confederate uniforms, with the varying shades, and headgear. (LC)*

The *Army of Northern Virginia*’s commissariat was hard pressed from the beginning to supply the basic ration requirements to active troops. By the spring of 1863, daily ration quotas for individuals had been cut again. Lee did not feel that it was the responsibility of his combat soldiers to provide food and rations for the sustenance of the army and he resisted pleas from Richmond to send foraging parties out into the countryside to purchase and obtain food supplies. He finally relinquished during the winter of 1863, directing General W.E. “Grumble” Jones into Hardy County to collect beef cattle. Longstreet’s Corps was in the proximity of Richmond at this time. Lee directed Longstreet to send his troops south of the James River to scour the countryside for surplus beef, bacon, or other stores in what was considered Union-held territory. The results of these foraging expeditions netted 800 cattle, some sheep, hogs, and over 7,200 pounds of bacon, barely enough to sustain Lee’s numbers for about two weeks. In his report to Secretary of War James Seddon, Lee summed up the situation:



*The troops of this portion of the army have for some time been confined to reduced rations, consisting of 18 ounces of flour, 4 ounces of bacon of indifferent quality, with occasionally supplies of rice, sugar, or molasses. The men are cheerful and I receive but few complaints; still, I do not think it is enough to continue them in health and vigor, and I fear they will be unable to endure the hardships of the approaching campaign. Symptoms of scurvy are appearing among them, and to supply the place of vegetables each regiment is directed to send a daily detail to gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lamb's quarters, and poke sprouts, but for so large an army the supply obtained is very small. I have understood, I do not know with what truth, that the Army of the West and that in the Department of South Carolina and Georgia are more bountifully supplied with provisions. I have also heard that the troops in North Carolina receive one-half pound of bacon per day. I think this army deserves as much consideration as either of those named, and, if it can be supplied, respectfully ask that it be similarly provided."* <sup>28</sup>

Seddon was quick to respond with assurances to Lee that the necessary provisions would be forwarded to him, adding, "I am satisfied, from my inquiries, that the great difficulty just now is not so much the want of supplies as of the impediments to their ready transportation and distribution. Our roads have almost defied wagon transportation and our railroads are daily growing less efficient and serviceable," and that the transportation problems would be corrected as soon as possible.<sup>29</sup> Seddon's assurances were well intended but meant little to the men in the ranks who were nearly starving.

After several weeks, and with little apparent rectification of the supply dilemma, Lee again complained bitterly on April 17 to Secretary of War Seddon:

*Their ration... consists of one-fourth pound of bacon, 18 ounces of flour, 10 pounds of rice to each 100 men about every third day, with some few peas and a small amount of dried fruit occasionally as they can be obtained. This may give existence to the troops while idle, but will certainly cause them to break down when called upon for exertion."* After being informed that the sugar ration had not been issued and that sugar and other supplies were waiting in boxcars in North Carolina, Lee was vehement in his request. "I beg that you will take the necessary measures to cause the supplies to be forwarded promptly and regularly. The time has come when it is necessary the men should have full rations. Their health is failing... and it is necessary for them to have a more generous diet."<sup>30</sup>

Providing the Confederate soldier with an adequate diet proved to be a problem that their government never resolved, principally because of an antiquated transportation and supply system that could not move food in sufficient quantity to the army in the field. Lee's men constantly wanted for rations, though it had become near crisis by the spring of 1863. Officers and men alike were effected by the shortage of food. Colonel Clement Evans wrote his wife early that summer: "My health is as good as usual- my looks lean and scrawny."<sup>31</sup>

The army, like most mobile troops of the 1800's, traveled light. To compensate for shortages of wagons and the mules needed to pull them, Lee issued orders in March 1863 directing that all surplus baggage from the army should be moved to store houses in Richmond. Lee hoped to lighten his load to facilitate rapid movement, and make space for the supplies he anticipated gathering in Pennsylvania.<sup>32</sup> The baggage carried by an individual depended upon the willingness and strength of the person carrying the load. The main fighting equipment of the average infantryman was the rifle musket and bayonet. Included in the fighting equipment was the need for a cartridge box, cap box, and bayonet scabbard, which completed a belt set. The remaining items an individual carried were for personal comfort. Most carried the minimum necessary. John Worsham, a private in the 21<sup>st</sup> Virginia Infantry, described his gear, which

he termed, "above the average in our army in quality as well as quantity," due to the fact that much of it was captured Union Army items. "I had a very good oilcloth haversack in which to carry my rations, a tin cup, a splendid rubber cloth, a blanket, a pair of jeans drawers, and a pair of woolen socks- every article captured from the enemy! The socks and drawers were placed in the blanket, the blanket was rolled up with the rubber cloth on the outside, and the ends drawn together and fastened with a short strap. To carry this, we put it over our head and let it hang from the shoulder."<sup>33</sup> Soldiers carried other personal items including soap, toothbrush, towel, comb, and perhaps a razor and mirror which usually wound up in his blanket roll or in the catch-all haversack.<sup>34</sup> Common sense ruled in packing for the march; a lighter load was easier to tote under a hot sun.

The task of arming the men in the ranks was overwhelming. From the very beginning of the war, the main benefactor for small arms was the Union army. Federal arsenals throughout the southern states provided the initial armament, which was supplemented by subsequent captures from the battlefield. During the Seven Days Campaign, 35,000 stands of arms were taken. An additional 20,000 were captured at 2<sup>nd</sup> Manassas, 11,000 from Harper's Ferry, and 9,000 at Fredericksburg.<sup>35</sup> Chancellorsville netted over 19,000 Union-made and imported rifles from Hooker's forces, along with piles of accoutrements, 8,000 cartridge boxes, belts, 11,500 knapsacks and blankets, all of which were cleaned and issued to Lee's victorious troops. Unused ammunition was also retrieved from the battlefield, and soldiers scoured the field for fired bullets that could be remanufactured into new bullets.<sup>36</sup> The army's artillery also benefited. There were 52 cannon captured in operations around Richmond in 1862, and a large number more captured during the Second Manassas and Antietam Campaigns.<sup>37</sup>

Preparations for the summer campaign included a thorough inspection of the weapons in the ranks. Older model or poor quality weapons were replaced as G.W. Nichols, a soldier in the 61<sup>st</sup> Georgia recalled: "The last of May we drew plenty of clothing and shoes. Every gun was examined and if they were not all right we had to get one that was. Our cartridge boxes were filled, and we knew something was up."<sup>38</sup> The captured Union weapons, combined with the uneven flow of southern manufactured weapons from the arsenals in Richmond, Fayetteville, North Carolina, and Augusta, Georgia provided a modest stockpile of newer rifles for Lee's infantry. Imported arms run through the blockade, mostly Enfield Rifle Muskets and a handful of the prized Whitworth Rifles, made their way to the army within the first few months of 1863. By the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign, few infantrymen in the *Army of Northern Virginia* were without a rifle, a claim that the Army of the Potomac could not make. Some evidence of what the Confederates were armed with is contained in Union reports. The capture of most of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mississippi Infantry by the 6<sup>th</sup> Wisconsin Infantry on July 1<sup>st</sup> netted 225 Enfield Rifle Muskets.<sup>39</sup> Soon after the close of the battle, teams collected 2,500 arms from the front of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps on Cemetery Ridge. Overwhelmingly, they were: "for the most part the Springfield and Enfield Rifled Musket, Calibre(sic) 58. & 57. with a small number of Austrian and Remington Rifles."<sup>40</sup>

Replacing lost manpower proved more difficult for Lee than improving his infantry's firepower. Beside battle losses there was also attrition from disease and physical breakdown of men from exposure, all of which thinned the ranks of the army. The outlook for filling the vacancies in the ranks was becoming more problematic by the beginning of 1863. Lee sought replacements from every available source. At this time the *Army of Northern Virginia* was still an army composed principally of volunteers, though the Conscription Act of 1862, had brought in conscripts and substitutes who helped replace some losses. Veterans looked suspiciously upon these new men, untried in battle and whom they considered lacking in patriotism. The veterans' attitude frequently was well founded. Many of the substitutes that joined the army during the winter of 1862-1863 were found to be totally unreliable. Most of them deserted, having no stomach for the realities of soldiering. It became such an epidemic that on May 8, 1863 army headquarters issued Order No. 60:

*In consequence of the great number of desertions among the substitutes in this army and since few men who are exempt from military duty by reason of their age or... other cause can be equal to the soldier who has been tried in the field, captains of companies and colonels of regiments will conform strictly to orders of the War Department and accept no substitute unless his moral, physical, and soldierly qualifications are clearly equal to those of the soldier for whom he is offered...*<sup>41</sup>

Though different from the substitutes who joined for money, the veterans frequently lumped the conscripts in the same category beneath the volunteer.<sup>42</sup>

Lee felt the manpower need acutely, especially after his losses of over 12,000 officers and men at Chancellorsville. Jackson's Corps suffered heavily, especially in the brigades of Ambrose P. Hill's Light Division. Stephen D. Ramseur's North Carolina brigade suffered such grievous losses that Lee went to the extraordinary effort to contact Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina to ask for recruits specifically for the brigade, including any conscripts that might be available. Secretary of War James Seddon forwarded the telegram with his signature and plea for Vance's help in recruiting the brigade up to a respectable strength.<sup>43</sup>

While Lee scrambled to fill empty ranks, the dismal situation at Vicksburg was drawing attention away from the victories in the east. The Confederate War Department considered detaching Pickett's large division and sending it west, further complicating Lee's manpower woes. Imploring Seddon not to withdraw this force from his army, Lee wrote Seddon on May 10: "Its removal from this army will be sensibly felt. Unless we can obtain some reinforcements, we may be obliged to withdraw into the defenses of Richmond. We are greatly outnumbered by the enemy now."<sup>44</sup> This caused the War Department to reconsider, and Pickett's men remained with the army and their destination with glory.

Lee's efforts, combined with the recruitment of some volunteers and the addition of many conscripts, raised the ranks of the army to a strength of over 81,500 by May 20. Including men absent and on detached duty, the *Army of Northern Virginia* carried over 125,000 officers and men on its rolls. Within a few weeks, this number was slightly reduced by a wave of desertions prior to the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, most of whom were substitutes with a sprinkling of conscripts.<sup>45</sup> Despite this, as he commenced his march north toward Pennsylvania, Lee fielded one of the largest armies in the Confederacy.

On the eve of this great campaign, Lee and his officers had done all that is possible to bring the *Army of Northern Virginia* up to its full fighting potential. By June 1<sup>st</sup>, the army was described to be in "admirable condition."<sup>46</sup> The army was well equipped, uniformed and armed. Shortages in proper footwear and adequate rations still existed, but it was hoped these supplies could be garnered from the Union-held territory ahead. With equipment slung and blanket rolls across their shoulders, Lee's army filed onto the dusty Virginia roads and swung north.

Riding on the tide of great victories within the past nine months, the army's columns flowed over the landscape and across the Blue Ridge Mountains. General Henry Heth summed up the high spirits then existing: "It has been said that the *morale* of an army is to numbers as three to one. If this be correct the Army of Northern Virginia was never stronger than on entering Pennsylvania, and I am perfectly satisfied in my own mind, that this fact entered very largely in determining General Lee to make the attack on the 3d of July at Gettysburg; for there was not an officer or soldier in the Army... from General Lee to the drummer boy who did not believe when we invaded Pennsylvania... that it was able to drive the Federal army into the Atlantic Ocean. Not that the fighting capacity of its great adversary was under-estimated, but possibly the Army of Northern Virginia had an over weaning(sic) opinion of its own prowess."<sup>47</sup>

Spirits soared as the lean troops neared the Potomac and crossed into Maryland. Within a day, the advance units were near the Pennsylvania border. Major Eugene Blackford, riding with 5<sup>th</sup> Alabama Infantry, exploded with pride at the event. Writing his father from Greencastle on June 22, Blackford announced: "I hail it as the proudest day of my life- the day for which I have been looking so long when Confederate infantry would invade this State. As we approached the line the band prepared to play and just as the column reached it, they struck up the 'Bonnie Blue Flag' most cheerily."<sup>48</sup> The spirit of the moment was not lost on the enlisted men. Despite the rigors of the march, the excitement of the campaign swept the rank and file. Private Eli Landers of Company H, 16<sup>th</sup> Georgia, wrote: "There's hardly any sickness or straggling in the army for the last few days but during them hot days there was hundred of our boys fainted and fell... We have a large army now in Pennsylvania and it is good and in fine spirits. We intend to let the Yankey Nation feel the sting of the War as our borders has ever since the war begun."<sup>49</sup>

Though morale, uniforms and equipment were in ample supply, shoes proved a nagging problem. Poor quality leather and poorly made shoes provided by scurrilous suppliers wore out quickly on the hardened Pennsylvania pikes. Food was easily had in Pennsylvania, but shoes were not. Even short marches of less than ten miles wore heavily on the veterans. After a short march to the Chambersburg area, Samuel Pickens, of Company D, 5<sup>th</sup> Alabama complained for numerous days of his feet which "hurt me very much."<sup>50</sup> W. A. Smith of the 14<sup>th</sup> North Carolina wrote from Pennsylvania: "Many of our boys have worn out our shoes and our feet are in bad condition, bruised and bleeding... We often wonder if the Yankees would bear this hardship."<sup>51</sup>

The invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania was cause enough for celebration within the ranks of the army for a number of reasons. After months of combat in Northern Virginia and its attendant lack of rations and proper forage for animals, Pennsylvania seemed to be bursting at the seams with supplies. Literally, it was the land of milk and honey for a group of ever-hungry soldiers. Lee's intentions were simple as far as sustenance and supply was concerned. The army was to gather supplies and forage as necessary, but only on an official basis. Lee issued General Order No. 72 on June 21 to assure his intent was carried out. These orders forbid the theft of private property and pillaging of northern homes.<sup>52</sup> The order had a two-fold purpose, one, to prevent the private soldier from committing depredations to private property. Lee believed, as southern gentlemen were taught, in the sanctity of the hearth and was repulsed by the vandalism done to southern homes by Union soldiers. He found the behavior of Union troops in Fredericksburg, during the battle there in December 1862, where they went on a rampage of looting and destruction of private and public property, to be particularly disturbing. Lee would not allow his men to lower themselves to what he believed to be pure thievery and would not allow himself the humiliation of answering to any criticism of that nature. His second motive in issuing G.O. 72 was to maintain discipline in the army. Lee well understood that permitting unauthorized and uncontrolled foraging weakens the bonds of discipline, and reduces the fighting efficiency of an army.

Remarkably, Lee's soldiers generally adhered to the order though there were some instances of minor theft. Private David E. Maxwell of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Florida wrote his father on June 28: "General Lee's orders are very strict against committing any depredation upon private property." Maxwell also noted that most of the Floridians cheerfully obeyed Lee's orders, enforced by a strict provost marshal, though it did not prevent he and his messmates from acquiring food from local farmers to supplement their evening mess.<sup>53</sup> Samuel Hawkins of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mississippi also noted that there were few infractions. While in camp near Hagerstown, "We made only a few arrests. The reason we had so little trouble was that General Lee had issued very stringent orders about molesting private property and committing deprevations (sic) and his men well understood him." Major Eugene Blackford, of the 5th Alabama offered additional evidence of the behavior of the army, writing his mother from Carlisle, Pennsylvania on June 28; "I was in hopes that I would have been able to buy many things that you need at home, but we are not allowed to buy things, unless the owners are willing to take Confederate money."<sup>54</sup>

When the *Army of Northern Virginia* crossed the Potomac River it entered a land that offered a pleasing contrast to the devastated Virginia countryside. Samuel Pickens of Company D, 5<sup>th</sup> Alabama, recorded the delights of the countryside. "We saw the finest kind of wheat all along the road, & some fields of Oats, rye & barley. Also the richest fields of clover & hay grasses. This is a great country for small grain & stock," he wrote on June 24. The next day he recorded that "we remained near Chambersburg to-day in order, as usual, to impress every thing found there necessary for the use of the army." Pickens and his comrades took advantage of streams to bathe and read northern newspapers including the *Philadelphia Enquirer*. Cherries, chickens, and such luxuries as apple butter were found, and much to Pickens surprise, the farmers refused the Confederate money, "as they said our money would do them no good."<sup>55</sup>

Major Eugene Blackford of the 5<sup>th</sup> Alabama Infantry wrote his mother from Chambersburg on June 28:

*I can scarcely believe that a rebel army has actually left poor Virginia for a season... and is living upon the substance of its enemies. The valley thro' which we have moved is densely populated... almost entirely Dutchmen with immense barns and small inconvenient dwelling houses. All drink 'lager' and eat 'sauer-kROUT' from one year's end to the other. Of course there is no end of milk and butter which our soldiers enjoy hugely. Besides these there are an immeasurable number of fowls which our men have stolen at some times, with which exception, our Army has behaved with much more propriety than I have ever observed in Virginia. The inhabitants were more terrible scared as we advanced than I could ever have imagined. We would go up to a house asking civilly for butter, eggs, etc. The woman of the house would rush out screaming (begging) us not to take everything but not to murder the children. Think of a great Dutch woman, large enough to whip me in a moment, begging your son not to murder the child she has at her breast and actually in her gratitude refusing to take any compensation for butter and eggs! All we leave behind have a very different idea of the rebels from that (idea) entertained... before.*

Blackford witnessed the work of Confederate quartermasters and representatives in scouring the countryside to purchase cattle, hogs, and horses to supply the immediate needs of the army and to send "thousands" south, and in obtaining materials from stores and businesses with Confederate notes. He also regrettably noted that some gave into the temptations of plenty by theft and general "rascality".<sup>56</sup>

While individuals filled their haversacks and stomachs, designated teams of soldiers led by officers searched for government stores and supplies. Eli Landers reported on the wholesale seizures:

*"Our officer has pressed in a vast quantity of Government Property of all kinds, some of the finest horses I ever saw and some of the finest beeves you ever saw. We draw plenty of good beef now. We intend to press all we can while we are in the Union. Us soldiers treats the people with respects when we want anything and we offer them our money for it and if they refuse it we just take it at our own price. We have only marched six miles today (and) stopped to rest and cook up rations and get the Government Property out of town."<sup>57</sup>*

The few weeks of bounty were all too short. The invasion culminated in the decisive Battle of Gettysburg, after which Lee withdrew into Virginia. The carnage of this battle sent a shudder through the army. The defeat and subsequent retreat to Virginia also closed Pennsylvania as a supply source to the army. The bounty gathered during the few weeks spent above the Potomac River did not last as long as hoped, and supply shortages were once again felt by the fall of that year. The shortcomings of adequate food supplies would be a constant concern for the *Army of Northern Virginia's* commander throughout the remainder of the war. Lamenting his army's continual sustenance problems in 1864, General Lee confided in Henry Heth: "If I could do so...I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I

believe it to be our true policy, not withstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence... while we subsist while there on his resources. The question of food for this army gives me more trouble and uneasiness than anything else combined."<sup>58</sup>

Apart from the subsistence problems faced by Lee, the effect of the battle on his officer cadre was dramatic. The loss of Generals Hood, Trimble, Archer, Pender, Barksdale, and all three of Pickett's brigadiers cut deep into the army's limited pool of trained, experienced officers who were battle-wise and effective field leaders. Hood was sorely missed as a division commander, and his reassignment to the western armies would be an unhappy and unsuccessful experience. Lee keenly felt the death of General Pender. In a conversation with Major Seddon and others, the army's chieftain remarked wistfully, "I shall ever believe if General Pender had remained on his horse half an hour longer we would have carried the enemy's position." Instead the change of command in the heat of battle caused such confusion that Lee felt there was breakdown in command, leading to the failure of the day's attack.<sup>59</sup> Exact and demanding, Pender always got the job done and showed no fear in the heat of combat. His promising career and future contributions to the *Army of Northern Virginia* can only be theorized. The fact that this bright and energetic officer was lost equals the fact that the North Carolina regiments of his division, reconstituted after their heavy losses at Chancellorsville, were nearly annihilated at Gettysburg. It was only through the efforts of the surviving officers, including Generals Lane and Scales that their brigades marched into the battle of the Wilderness the following year in excellent order with ranks filled by new volunteers and conscripts.<sup>60</sup>

Other officers were perhaps affected by the arduous campaign by what we term today as battle fatigue. Lafayette McLaws may be cited as an example of such officers whose conduct in future battles was less than what was desired by the army commander. The dash of General Pickett and steadiness of R.H. Anderson were lost in controversy and dismal field decisions during the following year of the conflict. So much so, that Lee was personally dismayed and angered over their poor conduct. Lee did not have the luxury of scientific studies that show the psychological effect and stress of combat on the human mind; especially the type of fighting which typified the Gettysburg battle. Did the Gettysburg battle have something to do with a lack of confidence and overly cautious behavior in later battles? More than likely it was a culmination of many factors, but Gettysburg had contributed in a major way.

Lee sorely felt the loss of important officers though their losses may be secondary to the attrition in the ranks of the line soldier caused by the campaign and battle. One veteran sadly noted: "The South was not defeated because she lacked generals, but because she lacked men. Every battle she fought- every victory she won- robbed her ranks of men whom she could not replace. As this process of attrition went on, her lines finally became so thin and weak that they could not possibly withstand the overwhelming numbers of the constantly repleaded armies of the North. (Even) had Jackson been with him, without the men the battleflags of the Army of Northern Virginia would have been furled in defeat just the same."<sup>61</sup>

The Gettysburg Campaign had caused extremely heavy losses to the veteran rank and file of the army. As many as 19,000 men were permanently lost, either killed or disabled by wounds. Combined with casualties incurred at Chancellorsville and men lost due to illness and breakdown, Lee found himself in another manpower quandary the winter of 1863-1864. The need for replacements could not be met by conscription as Confederate officials had hoped it would. Lee again was hard pressed to fill his ranks and petitioned the War Department for any available men to be armed and sent to the army before the spring campaign opened. There were even incentives for Lee's veterans to pull in recruits as Clement Evans recorded in his journal that winter: "General Lee has offered a furlough of thirty days to every soldier who procures an able bodied recruit and has him mustered into service in this army. In consequence of this, numerous are the letters written home, numerous the arrangements attempted to be made, and heavy

are the bounties offered.”<sup>62</sup> Though recruits and conscripts did filter into the army, they were not in the numbers needed to fill all the vacancies caused by the campaigns of 1863. The new faces tended to be either much younger or much older, than the volunteers of 1861 and 1862. And though the *Army of Northern Virginia* was able to field over 61,000 effectives at the opening of the Wilderness Campaign, the strength of his army would be in continual decline from this point on.<sup>63</sup>

Arguing against later assertions that the 1863 invasion was a mistake on the part of the Confederate war plan, Lee’s former military secretary Colonel A. L. Long maintained that it had little effect upon the course of the war and the army. Manpower lost at Gettysburg was replaced and was adequate to resist the *Army of the Potomac* that fall and during the opening campaigns of the following year.<sup>64</sup> But, what Long ignored was the quality of the men who replaced the Gettysburg losses. They were not the enthusiastic, dedicated volunteers of the early war who made the army such a fearsome fighting force.<sup>65</sup> There is little doubt that the losses at Gettysburg effected Lee's physical force and contributed heavily to his strategic and tactical decisions in 1864.



The final curtain fell on the *Army of Northern Virginia* for a number of reasons- the eventual failure of the food supply system, the breakdown of the Confederate political machine, the dismal southern economy, and the eventual bleeding of southern human resources. The great army was never again as physically strong, organized, or as well led as it was during the Gettysburg Campaign. And though it suffered physically, its spirit never died even after the signing of the formal surrender at Appomattox Court House. Perhaps that spirit is what made this army so fascinating and one of a kind.

## NOTES

---

<sup>1</sup> Bell Irwin Wiley, Embattled Confederates, An Illustrated History of Southerners at War, (Bonanza Books: New York, 1964), p.337.

<sup>2</sup> Samuel Hawkins, “Simple Story Of A Soldier”, *Confederate Veteran*, Nashville, 1912, p.9.

<sup>3</sup> E. A. Pollard, The Lost Cause, (E.B. Treat & Company: Baltimore, 1867. Bonanza Books reprint, New York), pp.116-118. Clement Eaton, Jefferson Davis, (The Free Press: New York, 1977), p.141.

<sup>4</sup> Pollard, The Lost Cause, p.119.

<sup>5</sup> Wiley, Embattled Confederates, pp.105-107.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Lindstrom, “Perry’s Brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia”, University of Florida, 1966, p.3 (GNMP)

<sup>7</sup> Greg Mast, State Troops and Volunteers, A Photographic Record of North Carolina’s Civil War Soldiers, (North Carolina Department of Archives and History: Raleigh, 1995), pp.24-25.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.25. Walter Clark, Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War, 1861-1865, State of North Carolina, 1901, Four Volumes, Volume I, pp.3-7. North Carolina troops were better armed than some southern troops due to the seizure of the Federal arsenal at Fayetteville and its huge stock of weapons as well as gun parts.

<sup>9</sup> *O.R.*, XIV, Pt.2, pp.597, 605-606.

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.633. Lee added emphasis to his request with, "History records but few examples of a greater amount of labor and fighting than has been done by this army during the present campaign. If arrangements could be made the arrearage due the troops, and furnish them with clothes, shoes, blankets, we could yet accomplish a great deal this fall."

<sup>11</sup> Clark, North Carolina Regiments, Volume 1, pp.32-33.

<sup>12</sup> Leslie Jensen, "A Survey Of Confederate Central Government Quartermaster Issue Jackets, Part I", *Military Collector and Historian*, The Company of Military Historians, Volume XLI, No.3, Fall, 1989, P.12.

<sup>13</sup> Greg Mast, "Six Lieutenants- Vignettes of North Carolinians in America's Greatest Battle", *Military Images*, Volume XII, No.1, July-August, 1991, p.8.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Grier Stephens Jr., Intrepid Warrior, Clement Anselm Evans, Confederate General from Georgia, Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years, (Morningside Bookshop: Dayton, Ohio, 1992), p.180.

<sup>15</sup> Jensen, "Quartermaster Issue Jackets", pp.110-111.

<sup>16</sup> John Mills Bigham, "Four Brothers at Gettysburg", *Military Images*, Volume XII, No.1, July-August, 1990, p.9.

<sup>17</sup> William C. Williamson, ed., "Francis Fleming in the War for Southern Independence", *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Volume XXVIII, No.1, July, 1949, p.49 (GNMP)

<sup>18</sup> See Jensen, *Survey*, pp. 112-113.

<sup>19</sup> W.A. Smith, The Anson Guards, Co. C, Fourteenth Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, 1861-1865, (Boone Publishing Company: Charlotte, NC, 1914), pp.198-199.

<sup>20</sup> Stephens, Intrepid Warrior, p.205.

<sup>21</sup> James Gall, US Sanitary Commission account, GNMP.

<sup>22</sup> Ross Kimmel, "Enlisted Uniforms of the Maryland Confederate Infantry: A Case Study, Part 1", *Military Collector and Historian*, Volume XVI, No.3, Fall, 1989, p.106. The regiment was initially armed with Model 1841 "Mississippi" Rifles, but these were soon replaced with Springfield and Enfield rifle muskets. Surviving brigade reports reflect that rifles were predominant in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Maryland until the end of the conflict. (Ibid., p.108)

<sup>23</sup> *O.R.*, XXVIII, Pt. 3, p.888.

<sup>24</sup> William Frassanito, Gettysburg, A Journey In Time, (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1975), pp. 177-191, 202-217. William Frassanito, Early Photography At Gettysburg, (Thomas Publications: Gettysburg, PA, 1995), pp. 334-335, 348-349.

<sup>25</sup> Frassanito, Journey In Time, pp. 70-71.

<sup>26</sup> Jensen, "Quartermaster Issue Jackets," p.109.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.109; Blackford's account is found in, War Years With J.E.B. Stuart, (New York, 1945), p.99.

<sup>28</sup> *O.R.*, XXV, Pt. 2, pp. 686-687.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 693.

<sup>30</sup> Lee to Seddon, *O.R.*, Vol. 25, Pt. II, p. 730

<sup>31</sup> Stephens, Intrepid Warrior, pp. 184-185.

<sup>32</sup> *O.R.*, XXV, Pt.2, pp.681-682. This was General Orders No.43, dated March 21, 1863. Extra baggage for any of Lee's officers on the march was a rarity after 1862-63.

<sup>33</sup> John Worsham, One of Jackson's Foot Cavalry, edited by James Robertson Jr., (McCowat-Mercer Press, INC., Jackson, TN, 1964), p.86.

<sup>34</sup> Kimmel, "Enlisted Uniforms of Maryland Confederates," *Pt. 1*, p.108 (footnote 53)

<sup>35</sup> Wiley, Johnny Reb, p.289.

<sup>36</sup> *O.R.*, XX, Pt. 1, pp. 818-819.

<sup>37</sup> Wiley, Johnny Reb, p. 298.

<sup>38</sup> G. W. Nichols, A Soldier's Story of His Regiment, (reprint of 1898 edition by Continental Book Company, Kennesaw, GA, 1961), p.112.

<sup>39</sup> Report of Colonel W.W. Robinson, 7<sup>th</sup> Wisconsin Infantry to Captain E.P. Halstead, A.A.G., 1<sup>st</sup> Division, 1<sup>st</sup> Army Corps, 13 September 1863. (GNMP)



- <sup>40</sup> Report of M.E. Potter to Captain D.W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance Office, Army of the Potomac, 7 July, 1863. (National Archives)
- <sup>41</sup> *O.R.*, XXV, Pt.2, p.787.
- <sup>42</sup> Wiley, Johnny Reb, pp.342-343. It was a mutual feeling in the northern ranks as far as disdain for conscripts. Not all were unwilling or unfit soldiers and both armies finished the war filled with men who had been drafted.
- <sup>43</sup> *O.R.*, XXVII, Pt.3, pp.871-872, 874-876.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, XXV, Pt.2, p.790.
- <sup>45</sup> *O.R.*, XXV, Pt.2, pp.814-815.
- <sup>46</sup> A.L. Long letter of April, 1877, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Volume 4, p.119. The condition of the army, “was chiefly due to the unaided exertions of General Lee.”
- <sup>47</sup> Henry Heth letter of June, 1877, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Volume 4, p.151.
- <sup>48</sup> Eugene Blackford to his father, 22 June 1863; Lewis Leigh collection, Book 33, U.S. Army Military History Institute, copy Vertical File V7-AL5, Gettysburg NMP Library. (hereafter cited as Blackford)
- <sup>49</sup> Elizabeth W. Roberson, ed., Weep Not For Me Dear Mother, (Pelican Publishing Co., Gretna, GA, 1996), p.109.
- <sup>50</sup> Samuel Pickens diary, Vertical File V7-AL5, GNMP Library.
- <sup>51</sup> Smith, Anson Guards, p.199.
- <sup>52</sup> *O.R.*, XXVII, Pt.3, pp.912-913.
- <sup>53</sup> “Some Letters To His Parents By A Floridian In The Confederate Army”, edited by Gilbert Wright, *Florida Historical Quarterly*, Volume XXXVI, No.4, April, 1958.
- <sup>54</sup> Samuel Hawkins, “Simple Story of a Confederate Soldier”, *Confederate Veteran*, Nashville, 1912, p.41. Eugene Blackford to Mother, June 28, 1863, Vertical File V7-AL5, GNMP Library.
- <sup>55</sup> Pickens Diary, Vertical File V7-AL5, GNMP Library.
- <sup>56</sup> Letter of Major Eugene Blackford, 5<sup>th</sup> Alabama Infantry, Vertical File V7-AL5, GNMP Library.
- <sup>57</sup> Roberson, ed, Weep Not For Me, p.109.
- <sup>58</sup> Heth, *SHSP*, Volume 4, p.152.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p.154. Heth added that Lee spoke of Pender’s loss as being the reason that his division did not support Pickett’s Division on July 3<sup>rd</sup> in the attack. This recollection of a conversation written over 15 years after the event may not be reliable as to the exact content as General Heth’s memory often failed him in later years. Still, the gist of the message is that Lee did feel the loss of talented young officers such as General Pender.
- <sup>60</sup> Clifford Dowdey, Lee’s Last Campaign, (Bonanza Books, NY, 1965), pp.112-113. See also Dr. Louis Manarin, North Carolina Troops, 1861-1865, A Roster, (North Carolina Department of Archives & History, Raleigh, 1971-1992, Volume VIII), p.108 and Volume IX, p.446 for losses and rebuilding examples in these brigades. In the 34<sup>th</sup> North Carolina of Scales’ Brigade, “the decimated ranks of the regiment were partially refilled, mostly with recruits in their early forties” during the winter of 1863-1864. North Carolina Troops, Volume IX, p.249.
- <sup>61</sup> Walbrook D. Swank, Raw Pork and Hardtack, A Civil War Memoir from Manassas to Appomattox, (Burd Street Press, Shippensburg, AP, 1996), p.44.
- <sup>62</sup> Evans, Intrepid Warrior, p.341
- <sup>63</sup> Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Way to Appomattox, Volume 4, (*The Century Magazine*: New York. Reprint by Castle Books, NY, 1956), p.184, 187. Lee’s forces were reinforced by Hoke’s and Breckenridge’s Divisions in June 1864 which raised the total number of effectives on paper, but the losses during the Wilderness Campaign had reduced Lee’s effective strength by over a third.
- <sup>64</sup> A.L. Long, April, 1877, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Volume 4, pp.118-119.
- <sup>65</sup> John M. Priest, Victory Without Triumph, The Wilderness, May 6<sup>th</sup> & 7<sup>th</sup>, 1864, Volume II, (White Mane Publishing Company, Shippensburg, PA), 1996, pp.247-257; this number is 8,000 less than the 1863 return compiled by Walter Taylor. *O.R.*, Volume XXV, pt.2, pp.845-846.

