


“Never Was I So Depressed”

James Longstreet and Pickett’s Charge

Karlton D. Smith



On July 24, 1863, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet wrote a private letter to his uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet. In discussing his role in the Gettysburg Campaign, the general stated:

General Lee chose the plan adopted, and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own.

While clearly not approving Lee’s plan of attack on July 3, Longstreet did everything he could, both before and during the attack, to ensure its success.¹

Born in 1821, James Longstreet was an 1842 graduate of West Point. An “Old Army” regular, Longstreet saw extensive front line combat service in the Mexican War in both the northern and southern theaters of operations. Longstreet led detachments that helped to capture two of the Mexican forts guarding Monterey and was involved in the street fighting in the city. At Churubusco, Longstreet planted the regimental colors on the walls of the fort and saw action at Casa Marta, near Molino del Ray. On August 13, 1847, Longstreet was wounded during the assault on Chapaltepec while “in the act of discharging the piece of a wounded man.” The same report noted that during the action, “He was always in front with the colors. His high and gallant bearing won the applause of all who saw him.”²

On May 9, 1861, Longstreet resigned his commission from the U. S. Army to join the new Confederacy. Appointed a brigadier general on June 17, 1861 and a major general on October 7, 1861, Longstreet commanded troops at First Manassas, Seven Pines, the Seven Day’s Campaign, Second Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. He was appointed a lieutenant general on

October 9, 1862, one day before Thomas J. Jackson, making Longstreet the senior lieutenant general in the Confederate Army.³

Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's Chief of Staff described his commander as:

*...a most striking figure,....a soldier every inch, and very handsome, tall and well proportioned, strong and active, a superb horseman and with an unsurpassed soldierly bearing, his features and expressions fairly matched; eyes, glint steel blue, deep and piercing...*⁴



Capt. Thomas J. Goree
(Sam Houston State Library)

Capt. Thomas J. Goree, Longstreet's aide, thought that Longstreet was "one of the kindest, best hearted men I ever knew." Goree did state that Longstreet could appear to be "short and crabbed" to some people but not when in the presence of ladies, at the table, or on the field of battle. "At any of these places," Goree said, "he has a complacent smile on his countenance, and seems to be one of the happiest men in the world."⁵

Even though Longstreet was usually very "sociable and agreeable" Goree did state that there were times when he did not have much to say and "is as grim as you please." But Goree noted that this usually happened when Longstreet "was not very well or something has not gone to suit him." The staff came to discover that there were times when it was best to leave Longstreet alone unless they found out first that "he is in a talkative mood. He has a good deal of the roughness of the old soldier about him."⁶

Gen. Robert E. Lee considered Longstreet "a Capital soldier" and expressed confidence in his abilities. The two often established their headquarters near each other and became close friends. Longstreet described his relations with Lee as one "of confidence and esteem, official and personal, which ripened into stronger ties as the mutations of war bore heavier upon us." Longstreet stated that Lee wanted his views "in moves of strategy and general policy, not so much for the purpose of having his views approved and confirmed as to get new light, or channels for new thought, and was more pleased when he found something that gave him new strength than with efforts to evade his questions by compliments."⁷

During the Gettysburg Campaign, Lt. Col. Arthur J. L. Fremantle, a British military observer, noted that the relations between Lee and Longstreet "are quite touching - they are almost always together....It is impossible to please Longstreet more than by praising Lee. I believe these two generals to be as little ambitious and as thoroughly unselfish as any men in the world. Both long for a successful termination of the war, in order that they may retire into obscurity."⁸

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Capt. T. J. Goree believed that Longstreet's forte as an officer consisted "in the seeming ease with which he can handle and arrange large numbers of troops, as also with the confidence and enthusiasm with which he seems to inspire them....if he is ever excited, he has a way of concealing it, and always appears as if he has the utmost confidence in his own ability to command and in that of his troops to execute. In a fight he is a man of but very few words, and keeps at all time his own counsels....He is very reserved and distant towards his men, and very strict, but they all like him."⁹

Longstreet was to prove, on more than one occasion, his ability to organize, coordinate, and direct a massive offensive strike, especially when the situation suited him. At Second Manassas, Longstreet struck the Union left with sledgehammer blows, with a line longer than on July 3, and threw it back in confusion. In this fighting Longstreet lost more men in three hours than Jackson lost in three days. At Chickamauga, Longstreet's attack completely disorganized and routed the Army of the Cumberland's right flank. On the second day at the Battle of the Wilderness, Longstreet's troops stopped and then drove back Winfield Scott Hancock's famed 2nd Corps.¹⁰

At Gettysburg, the situation did not suit Longstreet. He maintained "that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but so maneuver that the enemy should be forced to attack us - or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics." Longstreet wanted to swing south of Gettysburg to find good defensive positions. But Lee was determined to drive the Union army away from Gettysburg. Moxley Sorrel observed that Longstreet:

*did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief. As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield.*¹¹

Lee's basic battle plan for July 2, was to launch an attack all along the Union line. Longstreet was to envelop and drive in the Union left. Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's Third Corps was "to threaten the enemy's center" and cooperate in Longstreet's attack. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps was "to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer." By the end of July 2, the divisions of Maj. Gen. John B. Hood and Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Longstreet's Corps, had smashed the Union left at the Peach Orchard and Devil's Den but had failed to take Little Round Top. Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright's Brigade, of Anderson's Division, Hill's Corps, claimed to have penetrated the Union line on Cemetery Ridge just south of a copse of trees but could not hold it. On the Union right, Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson's Division, of Ewell's Corps, captured some of the Union entrenchments on the lower slopes of Culp's Hill. These successes caused Lee to believe that "with proper concert of action,...we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged."¹²

It appears that Lee wanted a continuation of his July 2 battle plan to take place on July 3 with the troops launching their attacks from the positions gained on July 2. The only change was to be the addition of Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett's Division of Longstreet's Corps, which had not yet been engaged.

The major drawback to Lee's plan was his failure to meet personally with his three corps commanders on the evening of July 2 to ensure that they understood his intentions and their role in the coming battle. Longstreet also admitted that contrary to his usual practice of meeting with Lee he only sent a message on the July 2 action. If any orders were issued for July 3, they were

either written orders which have not survived, or verbal orders delivered by either a staff officer or courier. Richard S. Ewell was the only corps commander who wrote that he received positive orders to renew his attack at daylight on Friday morning, July 3. Given this seeming lack of communication it is hard to see how Lee hoped to achieve his "proper concert of action."¹³

Other than Lee's report, is there any evidence that Longstreet received orders on the evening of July 2? Some time after midnight, Maj. Benjamin F. Eshleman's Battalion was placed in position by Lt. Col. Edward P. Alexander, acting under orders from Longstreet. Maj. Eshleman also reported that as dawn broke "it was apparent that to provide against an enfilade fire, the left wing of my line had better to be thrown a little to the rear." This seems to indicate that part of Eshleman's battalion was presenting its flank to Cemetery Hill and/or to Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery's Union artillery line on Cemetery Ridge and was therefore facing the Round Tops. This may be an indication that Longstreet was prepared to carry out Lee's original plan. The reports of the battery commanders from Col. H. C. Cabell's Battalion, indicate they did not receive any orders until the morning of July 3. Maj. James Dearing's Battalion, encamped in the rear of Longstreet's Corps on the evening of July 2, marched to the field the next morning and was "put in position in the center of the hill immediately in front of the enemy's position..." Alexander reported that he placed his battalion in position for the attack "at dawn." It is not very clear what if any orders Longstreet may have received on the evening of July 2. If he did receive orders from Lee, Longstreet probably felt they were vague enough for him to use his discretion in executing them.¹⁴

In any event, Lee's plan for July 3 was disrupted by the actions of the Army of the Potomac. At daylight, about 4:30 a.m., the Union 12th Corps artillery, positioned on and near Power's Hill, opened fire preparatory to a planned Union counter-attack. This action forced Ewell to launch his attack with Johnson's Division before the rest of the army was ready.. Half an hour after the attack started, and while Johnson was heavily engaged and unable to withdraw, Ewell received word that Longstreet would not be able to attack until at least 10:00 a.m. The fighting at Culp's Hill would not end until approximately 11:00 a.m.¹⁵

Longstreet stated that he had been up most of the night and that his scouts had found a route around the left flank of the Union army that would enable him to attack the Round Tops in flank and reverse. Longstreet admitted that this "would have been a slow process, probably, but I think not very difficult." Just after issuing his orders, or while he was in the process, Longstreet was joined by Lee who countermanded the orders. Longstreet was about to make a major change in Lee's plans without consulting Lee. How Longstreet thought he could make such a move without at least being seen by the Union Signal Corps on Little Round Top is unclear. His scouts apparently failed to notice two brigades from the Union Sixth Corps, plus two batteries of artillery and some cavalry, guarding the back side of the Round Tops. Longstreet's artillery does not appear to have received any orders to accompany the infantry. It should also be noted that Pickett's Division had not yet joined Hood and McLaws.¹⁶

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When Longstreet left Chambersburg to move towards Gettysburg on June 30, with Hood and McLaws, Pickett was left in Chambersburg to guard the army's supplies and trains. At about 2:00 a.m., July 2, Pickett received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. The head of the division arrived in the area of Marsh Creek, on the Chambersburg Pike, about three miles west of Gettysburg, on or about 2:00 p.m.

Pickett reported directly to Longstreet at about 4:00 p.m., about the time of Hood's attack. Col. Walter Harrison, Pickett's Chief of Staff, reported the division's arrival to Lee. Harrison reported that Lee stated that Pickett's men would not be needed that afternoon and that "I will send him word when I want him." When one considers that Longstreet felt that McLaws had been acting under Lee's orders for the march on July 2, Walter Harrison's account of Lee's remarks, and Longstreet's continued debate with Lee over strategy, he may well have believed that Pickett would be moving under Lee's orders and not his.¹⁷



*Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett
(B & L)*

If Longstreet had any uncertainties or questions about his role in Lee's original plan for July 3, or any questions about Pickett's role, he should have asked for clarification from Lee. Failure to get such clarification was uncharacteristic of Longstreet and could be seen by some as bordering on petulance or irresponsibility. Lee also should have made certain that his orders, however transmitted, were clear and concise. Baron Jomini, whose writings Lee would have been familiar with, observed that "Inaccurate transmission of orders,...may interfere with the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts..."¹⁸

All these circumstances forced Lee to rethink his plan of action. Shortly after canceling Longstreet's proposed flank move, Lee met with Longstreet, Hill, Major General Henry Heth, Colonel Armistead L. Long, Maj. Charles S. Venable, and possibly Col. Walter Taylor, the last three members of Lee's staff. Lee proposed using Longstreet's entire corps to attack the Union center. Longstreet objected that Hood and McLaws "were holding a mile along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it..." Lee agreed to leave them in place and assign other troops to join Pickett's Division in the attack. It may be that at this point Hill, and possibly Heth, offered Heth's Division and two brigades from Maj. Gen. William D. Pender's Division as substitutes. These troops were already in the right position to join Pickett. As Heth had been slightly wounded on July 1, his division was under the temporary command of Brigadier General James Johnston Pettigrew. Brigadier General James H. Lane was in temporary command of Pender's Division following Pender's severe wounding on July 2. Lane was subsequently relieved by Major General Isaac R. Trimble. Lee also indicated that he wanted to proceed the attack with a massive artillery bombardment to drive off some of the Union batteries and demoralize the Union

infantry. The objective point was to be a salient angle in the Union line between Ziegler's Grove and a distinctive smaller clump, or copse, of trees to the south.¹⁹

Just which troops and how many Lee intended to use in this attack has always been debated. The main attack was to be made by Pickett, Pettigrew and two brigades under Trimble. Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox's Brigade, of Anderson's Division, Hill's Corps, was ordered to move in rear of Pickett's right flank and "to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it." Col. David Lang, commanding Perry's Brigade, Anderson's Division, stated that at daylight he received orders from Anderson "to connect my right with General Wilcox's left, and conform my movements during the day to those of his brigade." He also stated that he was told that he "would receive no further orders." A total of about 12,891 officers and men were in the attacking column and under the tactical command of Longstreet. What other troops were to be involved, and how much authority Longstreet had over them is harder to establish.²⁰

Lee's staff officers, most notably, A. L. Long and Walter Taylor, maintained that Lee expected Longstreet to use his whole corps to support the attack. But there is no direct or contemporary evidence to this effect. Hood's Division, under the command of Brigadier General Evander Law since Hood's wounding on July 2, was deployed to protect the army's extreme right flank. In McLaws' Division, Kershaw's Brigade was stationed in the area of the Peach Orchard. Wofford's Brigade was west of the Emmitsburg Road and Semmes' Brigade was in the area of Rose's Woods. Barksdale's Brigade was deployed in a skirmish formation from Trostle's Woods to somewhere between the Klinge House and the Rogers' House. Major James Dearing, stationed with his battalion in the area of the Rogers' House, stated that during the morning he had no infantry to protect his front and had to order Capt. R. M. Stribling's battery to drive in the advance of Union skirmishers. The units of Hood and McLaws were thus not positioned to join the attacking column and none of the commanders reported receiving any orders to do so.²¹

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes' Division, Ewell's Corps, was stationed in Long Lane, north of the Bliss Farm and east of Seminary Ridge, with the brigades of Doles, Ramseur, and Iverson (about 2337 men). Rodes reported that his orders for July 3 were the same as for July 2. That is he was to "co-operate with the attacking force as soon as any opportunity of doing so with good effect was offered." He said nothing about being under Longstreet's orders.²²

A. P. Hill reported that he was "directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's...Anderson had been directed to hold his division ready to take advantage of any success which might be gained by the assaulting column, or to support it, if necessary." Major Joseph A. Engelhard, Assistant Adjutant General of Pender's Division, reported that only two brigades, Lane and Scales, were to report to Longstreet. Brigadier General Edward L. Thomas' and Colonel Abner Perrin's, Pender's other two brigades, who were located in Long Lane to the right, or south, of Rodes Division, said nothing about being under Longstreet's orders or what their roles were to be in the assault.²³

It would appear that the only troops designated for the attack and thus directly under Longstreet's authority were Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble, Wilcox, and Lang. It does appear that if the attack succeeded, Lee intended for other units to exploit the break-through and the anticipated Union retreat. An action which Lee's army had executed at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville with some success.²⁴

Once Lee had determined the point of attack and the troops to make it, Longstreet still raised objections. E. P. Alexander wrote his father that Longstreet opposed the attack because the

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“enemy’s position was so powerful, entirely sweeping the 1200 yards over which we had to advance, that it was of doubtful success.” Longstreet told Lee:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.

Whether these were Longstreet’s exact words or not is unimportant. What is important is that Longstreet had no faith in the plan, believed that it would not work, and felt justified in telling Lee so. Especially as three-fourths of the troops came from outside his command, “and had been in a severe battle two days previous,” Longstreet later wrote that Lee “knew that I did not believe that success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of position and the ground; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his plans”. But with Ewell occupied at Culp’s Hill and Hill sick there was no one except Lee’s most senior, experienced, and trusted commander. Although there is no direct evidence, I believe that Lee, at some point, took Longstreet aside and issued an unequivocal order that left Longstreet with no option but to execute Lee’s plan. Longstreet then proceeded to carry out his assignment to the best of his ability.²⁵



Col. James B. Walton
(CWLM)

Longstreet had the responsibility of organizing and deploying over 12,000 men from two different corps, in a line over a mile long and have them maneuver so as to converge on a narrow front of the Union line. Longstreet escorted Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge to show him where to shelter his men, the direction and the point of the attack. Pickett “seemed to appreciate the severity of the contest he was about to enter, but was quite hopeful of success.”²⁶

Colonel James
B. Walton, Chief
of Artillery,
Longstreet’s

Corps, was sent for so he could learn the plans and arrange the signal for the start of the cannonade. Walton and Alexander organized 75 guns from Longstreet’s corps for the opening cannonade. Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, the army’s Chief of Artillery, issued orders for Hill’s and for some of Ewell’s artillery to assist in the cannonade. The batteries of Longstreet, and apparently Hill, “...were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attack closely.”²⁷



Lt. Col. Edward P. Alexander
(NA)

The officer responsible for determining the effect of the cannonade, and thus the timing of the assault, was to be E. P. Alexander and not James B. Walton. Longstreet justified Alexander’s increased responsibility by explaining that in this situation he considered Alexander as more of an engineer staff officer than a battalion commander. Longstreet said that Alexander was more familiar with the ground and was an

officer of “unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence.” At about 11:00 a.m., Alexander reported that the artillery was posted and ready. He was then “ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.”²⁸

Col. Birkert D. Fry, commanding Archer’s Brigade, Pettigrew’s Division, reported that during the forenoon, Lee, Longstreet, and Hill seated themselves on a fallen tree near Spangler’s Woods to examine a map. After, the trio remounted staff officers and couriers issued orders for the coming assault. Longstreet later reported that Lee rode with him at least twice to see that everything was properly arranged. Longstreet also told Lee:


*...that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for, and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack, and fully understand it.*²⁹

Moxley Sorrel remembered that the staff noticed how Longstreet, on occasion, “looked after Pickett, and made us give him things very fully; indeed, sometimes stay with him to make sure he did not get astray.” After the troops were in position Lee again rode over the field with Longstreet “so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes.” Longstreet “rode once or twice along the ground between Pickett and the Federals, examining the positions and studying the matter over in all its phases so far as we could anticipate”³⁰

Pickett’s Division left its July 2 bivouac at about 3:30 a.m., July 3, and began to deploy along Seminary Ridge by 7:00 a.m. As Pickett’s Division was moving into position it was discovered that Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett’s Brigade would overlap part of Pettigrew’s line and prevent Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead from continuing the line of Garnett’s Brigade. Col. Walter Harrison, not finding Pickett, saw Lee and Longstreet on top of the ridge in front making a “close reconnaissance.” Harrison needed to find out if Armistead should hold his position or push out. He found Longstreet in “anything but a pleasant humor at the prospect of ‘over the hill’” When Harrison asked about Armistead, Longstreet “snorted out ‘Gen Pickett will attend to that, sir.’” Longstreet, then suspecting that he may have hurt Harrison’s feelings, added that Armistead could stay where he was and could make up the distance when the advance started.³¹

Capt. Louis G. Young, aide-de-camp to Pettigrew, wrote that the division had been directed by Longstreet “to form in rear of Pickett’s Division and support his advance” but that the order “was countermanded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was instructed to advance upon the same line with Pickett, a portion of Pender’s Division acting as supports.” Harrison and Young seem to imply that Pickett’s Division was originally to deploy into a division front with all three brigades (Kemper, Garnett, and Armistead) in one line and with Pettigrew as a support.³²

Pickett’s Division was finally deployed into two lines. Brig. Gen. James Kemper and Garnett in front with Armistead in a second support line. Longstreet, probably through Hill, arranged Pettigrew and Trimble into three lines. Pettigrew’s regiments appear to have been deployed into division columns thus forming two battle lines with Trimble’s two brigades in support. This was probably done to add more weight to the center of the attacking column. Wilcox was ordered to move on the right flank of Pickett “to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.”³³



Confederate Lines

Federal Lines

FIELD OF LONGSTREET'S ASSAULT.
Gettysburg, July 3, 1863.

Map showing the deployment of the brigades for the July 3 assault and their subsequent line of advance. (Clark, *North Carolina Regiments*, volume 5).

Longstreet appeared to have worked closely with Hill in arranging Hill's troops. Although some historians claimed that Longstreet and Hill did not get along, Longstreet's staff denied this. After the Seven Days Battles in 1862, reports were published in the Richmond papers that gave credit to Hill's Division at the expense of Longstreet's Division. Longstreet blamed Hill for their publication. This dispute caused Hill to ask for a transfer to T. J. Jackson's command. But, Longstreet's aide, T. J. Goree, wrote that the relationship between the two generals remained strained for only a short time and they became "warm friends until the day of General Hill's death."³⁴

Longstreet wrote that Pickett, “who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind” the artillery, reported that the troops “were in order and on the most sheltered ground.” Longstreet also stated that Pickett had been ordered to form his line “so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position.” Pickett was to be the guide for the attacking column and was to “attack the line of the enemy's defenses.” Pettigrew was to move on the same line as Pickett and “was to assault the salient at the same moment.” The only change to these orders, of which Longstreet may not have been aware, was to make Fry's Brigade, Pettigrew's Division, the brigade of direction, not Pickett. This arrangement was made by Pickett, Garnett, and Fry prior to the cannonade.³⁵

Longstreet stated that he was never so depressed as on July 3. He felt his men were to be sacrificed and that he “should have to order them to make a hopeless charge.” If Longstreet was feeling depressed he appears to have maintained his professional objectivity and not to have transmitted his feeling of depression to any of the field commanders, with the possible exception of Alexander.³⁶

At 12:00 noon, Longstreet sent a note to Alexander stating “if the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Gen Pickett to make the charge.”³⁷

Longstreet, “being unwilling to trust myself with the entire responsibility” appears to have come close to abnegating his duty by placing the responsibility for ordering the attack on the shoulders of a 26-year old lieutenant colonel. Alexander, who also wanted to avoid the responsibility, began to see “overwhelming reasons against the assault.” Alexander discussed these points with Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright, who helped him draft a reply. Alexander, who did not keep a copy of his reply, stated, in effect, that he would only be able to judge the effect of his fire by the enemy's return fire and if there was any alternative to the attack “it should be carefully considered.”³⁸

This note seems to have brought Longstreet back to his sense of duty. He replied that it was the intention to advance the infantry if the artillery could drive off the enemy. When that happened Alexander was to advise Pickett and advance such artillery as he could to aid the attack.³⁹

Alexander still felt uncomfortable. Wright told Alexander “that the difficulty was not so much in *reaching* Cemetery Hill, or taking it - that his brigade had carried it the afternoon before - but that the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal army was massed in a sort of horse-shoe shape and could rapidly reinforce the point to any extent.” Alexander next visited Pickett “who seemed to feel very sanguine of success in the charge, and was only congratulating himself on the opportunity.” In his last message to Longstreet, Alexander said that when “our artillery fire is at its best, I will advise Gen Pickett to advance.”⁴⁰

After receiving this last message, at about 12:40 p.m., and having done everything he could to get the men ready, Longstreet took a nap. It could not have been a very long nap, for at about 1:00 p.m. the following message was sent to Col. Walton:

*Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking let them open on the enemy on the Rocky Hill.*⁴¹

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Shortly after the batteries opened the Union artillery responded. Longstreet, perhaps to help steady his men while under this fire, started to ride along Pickett's front. Brig. Gen. James Kemper remembered that Longstreet:

sat his large charger with a magnificent grace and composure I never before beheld.-This bearing was to me the grandest moral spectacle of the war. I expected to see him fall every instant. Still he moved on, slowly and majestically, with an inspiring confidence, composure, self-possession and repressed power, in every movement and look, that fascinated me.

When Kemper, concerned for Longstreet's safety, told him that "this is a terrible place" but that it was "the very safest place about here", Longstreet replied that he was greatly distressed by the shelling. He told Kemper to hold on; that "we are hurting the enemy badly, and will charge him presently." When Longstreet left, he seemed to Kemper "as grand as Arthur to Guinevere, when he lead his hosts 'far down to that great battle in the west.'"⁴²

Capt. John Holmes Smith, 11th Virginia, Kemper's Brigade, also remembered Longstreet riding in front of the brigade. To Smith, Longstreet appeared "as quiet as an old farmer riding over his plantation on a Sunday morning, and looked neither to the right or left."⁴³

Longstreet rode to Maj. James Dearing's artillery position near the Rogers' House along the Emmitsburg Road to observe the effect of the cannonade at close range. It was at this point that Longstreet decided that if the attack had any chance of success it had to be made soon. He gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests and to follow the advance. Longstreet next rode to Alexander's position and finding that Alexander had already advised Pickett to advance he reported that "I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault." Although this is a very positive statement every other account, including later ones by Longstreet, paint a slightly different picture. After talking with Alexander, it appears that Longstreet rode to Spangler's Woods to meet Pickett. When Pickett asked permission to advance, Longstreet was so overcome with the certainty of what lay ahead for his men, that he could not speak and could only bow his head in approval.⁴⁴

After issuing the attack order, Longstreet rode back to Alexander's position and found "that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege." This statement is confirmed by Alexander who said that Longstreet wanted him to stop Pickett until the artillery ammunition had been replenished. Alexander responded to his chief that this:

would involve sufficient delay for the enemy to recover himself, and moreover, that the supply of ammunition in the ordnance trains was not sufficient to support a fifteen minutes' fire or to either renew our present effort, or attempt another, he recalled the order and allowed the division, then just approaching...to advance, saying, however, to me, that he dreaded the result and only ordered it in obedience to the wishes of the Commanding Generl.

Alexander felt that Longstreet would have stopped the charge with "a word of concurrence from me." These statements lead this writer to believe that Lee had given Longstreet no option. The only person who could stop the attack was Lee.⁴⁵

Longstreet later wrote:

When your chief is away, you have a right to exercise discretion; but if he sees

*everything that you see, you have no right to disregard his positive and repeated orders. I never exercised discretion after discussing with General Lee the points of his orders, and, when, after discussion, he ordered the execution of his policy. I had offered my objections to Pickett's battle and had been overruled, and I was in the immediate presence of the commanding general when the order was given for Pickett to advance.*⁴⁶

It needs to be asked, at this point, if Longstreet and/or Lee knew of the artillery shortage before the attack began. Apparently no one inquired about the quantity of artillery ammunition. Gen. William Pendleton, the army's Chief of Artillery, if asked, might have been able to supply an approximate answer after checking with the various corps chiefs of artillery and taking a quick inventory of the army's supply train. Pendleton did report that Longstreet's ordnance train had been moved further to the rear from "the convenient locality I had assigned it" necessitating a longer time in refilling the caissons. He also noted that the "train itself was very limited, so that its stock was soon exhausted, rendering requisite demand upon the reserve train, further off. The whole amount was thus being rapidly reduced." Alexander did imply the shortage in his first note to Longstreet when he stated that "...ammunition is already very low & it will take it all to try this attack, & we wd have nothing left for a new one." Dearing reported that just before the infantry advanced "my ammunition became completely exhausted, excepting a few rounds in my rifled guns." Dearing also stated that he had sent his caissons back for a fresh supply "an hour and a half before" but they were unable to get any. If Longstreet had known of this situation earlier he would have had his best argument against the attack.⁴⁷



*Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton
(B & L)*

As Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble started to advance Union artillery began to hit the flanks of the column. Longstreet with "...his soldierly eye watched every feature of it. He neglected nothing that could help it." Longstreet observed that the "advance was made in a very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation." When he saw a threat to Pettigrew's left flank he sent Maj. Osmun Latrobe, of his staff, to warn Trimble. Latrobe's horse was shot from under him and by the time he delivered the message Trimble had already detached two regiments from Lane's Brigade to protect the left. Longstreet sent Moxley Sorrel to warn Pickett about a threat to his right. In the confusion Sorrel failed to find Pickett but he did find Armistead and Garnett on the way to the front. Sorrel also had his horse shot from under him when a shell burst took off both hind legs.⁴⁸

Wilcox and Lang did not advance at the same time as Pickett. The reason is unclear. It may be that Wilcox misunderstood his role. Wilcox reported that he did not receive any orders to support Pickett until about 20 or 30 minutes after the advance started. At that time "three staff officers in quick succession (one from the major-general commanding division) gave me orders to advance to the support of Pickett's division." Lang reported that Pickett's Division had already fallen back when he and Wilcox began their advance. Since the advance of Wilcox and Lang appears to have been a case of too little too late, the question has to be asked why they were ordered forward or why the order was not rescinded. This is another question that defies a clear and reasonable answer. It may be that Longstreet's attention was focused on Pickett's Division as it was falling back and that he was not completely aware of Wilcox's move.⁴⁹

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What was clear to Longstreet was that the attack had failed. Longstreet thought that the left of the column was staggered by artillery fire and ordered Anderson to move forward “to support and assist” Pettigrew and Trimble. Anderson was ordered to halt when it was realized that Pickett’s withdrawal would expose him to assault. Anderson reported that he was about to order forward the brigades of Wright and Posey when Longstreet stopped the movement. Longstreet added “that it was useless, and would only involve unnecessary loss, the assault having failed.” Anderson placed his men in line “to afford a rallying point to those retiring.” Longstreet reported that Wright “with all the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson’s division.” Longstreet also directed his staff to assist Wright.⁵⁰

Longstreet feared a possible counter-attack and rode to the front of his batteries, along Alexander’s front, “to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.” He felt that his presence “would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity.”⁵¹

Lt. Col. Arthur J. L. Fremantle, the British Army observer, felt that no one “could have been more calm or self-possessed than General Longstreet under these trying circumstances....I could now thoroughly appreciate the term bulldog, which I had heard applied to him by the soldiers. Difficulties seem to make no other impression upon him than to make him a little more savage.” Sorrel remembered that Longstreet “was like a rock in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed flying to pieces.”⁵²

Fremantle also remembered Longstreet meeting with another general, possibly Wilcox, who told Longstreet that “he was unable to bring his men up again. Longstreet replied: ‘Very well; never mind then, General; just let them remain where they are: the enemy’s going to advance, and will spare you the trouble.’” When Longstreet asked for something to drink, Fremantle offered him some rum from a silver flask and then told Longstreet to keep the flask “in remembrance of the occasion.”⁵³

What were the troops of Rodes' Division, and Perrin's and Thomas' brigades, stationed with their troops in Long Lane, doing during the charge? These were some of the troops that Lee’s staff officers later said were to have taken part in the assault. Rodes reported that when the “favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand” he sent word to Ewell, not Longstreet, “that in a few moments I should attack.” When Rodes realized that the troops on his immediate right, Perrin and Thomas, had not “made any advance or showed any preparation” it was announced and apparent to Rodes that the attack had failed. Perrin did not report on the attack specifically, but did speak of heavy skirmish fighting. He also stated that at “one time the enemy poured down a heavy torrent of light troops”, probably a strong skirmish line, necessitating the deployment of the 14th South Carolina to charge the enemy. Although Thomas reported that his brigade made no movement, the 35th Georgia did advance, perhaps in support of the 14th South Carolina or in support of Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s withdrawal.⁵⁴

Longstreet sent Moxley Sorrel to order McLaws and Brig. Gen. Evander Law to retire to Warfield Ridge, their original attack positions of July 2. McLaws argued that there was no necessity for the order and that it was important to hold the ground that had already been won. When Sorrel explained that the order left no room for discretion, McLaws began to pull his brigades back to Warfield Ridge. After reoccupying the ridgeline, Sorrel returned and asked McLaws if he could reoccupy the position he had just left. When asked for an explanation, Sorrel said that “General Longstreet had forgotten that he had ordered it, and now disapproved the withdrawal.” These orders may indicate some confusion on Longstreet’s part. Sorrel, himself,



*Col. Moxley Sorrel
Longstreet's Staff
(Sorrel, Recollections of a
Confederate Staff Officer)*

never wrote of this incident. Longstreet did report that after night his line “was withdrawn to the Gettysburg road on the right, the left uniting with Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill’s right.” On the evening of July 4, Lee and Longstreet led the army on a retreat from Gettysburg and on the road that would eventually take them to Appomattox.⁵⁵

Since Appomattox there has been debate, at times acrimonious debate, as to why the Confederates lost Gettysburg. The debate has centered largely around the actions and personality of James Longstreet. His performance throughout the Civil War, but particularly at Gettysburg, has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism, brought about by partisan politics and the writings of Virginia authors of the “Lost Cause” myth.

Longstreet, born in South Carolina, raised in Georgia, and appointed to West Point from Alabama, did not fight for any one state but for the whole South, nor has any one state claimed Longstreet as a native son. Robert E. Lee and T. J. “Stonewall” Jackson, on the other hand, are proudly claimed by Virginia.

Unlike some ex-Confederates, Longstreet did not wish to dwell on the past. He believed it was time to heal old

wounds and look to the future. He thought this might entail ex-Confederates joining the Republican Party in order to control the Negro vote and the South’s future. Longstreet discussed this idea with other ex-Confederates, such as P. G. T. Beauregard, and his uncle, August Baldwin Longstreet and both advised Longstreet from making his views public. But after passage of the Reconstruction Acts in 1867, Longstreet wrote:

My politics is to save the little that is left us, and to go to work to improve that little as best we may. I believe that the course that some politicians have pursued, tends to increase our humiliation and distress, and leads us to greater trouble, until we finally shall have confiscation & expatriation. Since the negro has been given the privilege of voting, it is all important that we should exercise such influence over that vote, as to prevent it being injurious to us, & we can only do that as Republicans. As there is no principle at issue now that should keep us from the Republican party, it seems to me that our duty to ourselves & to all our friends requires that our party South should seek an alliance with the Republican party...

Most of Longstreet’s fellow Southerners missed his point about controlling the Negro vote and saw only Longstreet’s support of the Republican Party - the party that, in their view, had prosecuted the war and had instituted Reconstruction. Longstreet, true to his convictions, joined the Republican Party and was promptly labeled a traitor to the South.⁵⁶

On October 12, 1870, Robert E. Lee passed away. The man who had assumed full responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg was to be very rapidly raised to the pinnacle of Southern heroes and the embodiment of the “Lost Cause” myth. In order to raise Lee, however, it became necessary to find a scapegoat for the defeat at Gettysburg. Because of his political

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apostasy, Longstreet became the perfect choice. Because of some comments in William Swinton's History of the Army of the Potomac Longstreet was seen as being disloyal to Lee.

Two of the leaders of this anti-Longstreet crusade were Jubal Early and William N. Pendleton. Early, who had opposed secession, had been fired by Lee after the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, and who issued the order to burn Chambersburg, became president of the Southern Historical Society and led the movement to elevate Lee. Pendleton, who had come to Longstreet just prior to Appomattox with the suggestion that Longstreet advise Lee to surrender, a suggestion strongly rejected by Longstreet, may have had some personal motives behind his attacks on Longstreet. Both of these men, for various reasons, had decided that they had to defend Lee's reputation and champion what has become known as the "Lost Cause" myth. Part of this "myth" holds that by losing Gettysburg the South lost its' chance at independence. Therefore, Longstreet by losing Gettysburg cost the South its' independence.⁵⁷

In his writings, Pendleton charged that Longstreet failed to attack at dawn on the morning of July 2. He also questioned Longstreet's conduct throughout the battle and his loyalty to Lee. Pendleton's own official report, however, and the testimony of Lee's staff officers, clearly show that Lee never issued a "dawn attack" order. T. J. Goree, and other Longstreet supporters, felt that Pendleton was presuming upon Longstreet's unpopularity to make these charges. Goree also thought that it was:

*preposterous and absurd, and must to every soldier of the Army of Virginia the idea of such an old **granny** as Pendleton presuming to give a lecture or **knowing anything about** the battle of Gettysburg--Although nominally Chief of Artillery, yet he was in the actual capacity of Ordnance Officer, and, as I believe, miles in the rear. I know that I did not see him on the **field** during the battle.⁵⁸*

Jubal Early, in a letter to Jefferson Davis, claimed that through his articles in the Southern Historical Society Papers, that he had "fully demonstrated the falsehood of many of Longstreet's statements, and the absurdity of his pretensions and criticisms." Early also wrote that Longstreet's articles for *Century* magazine "has demonstrated his want of sense as well as his utter disregard for the truth, as he had before shown his utter want of principle by his political course."⁵⁹

Some of Lee's former staff officers, feeling that Longstreet's articles had unjustly criticized Lee's performance, wrote their own accounts of what they thought happened on July 3. Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys, who had assumed command of Barksdale's Brigade at Gettysburg, felt compelled to refute Walter Taylor's charges in the margins of his copy of Taylor's book, Four Years with General Lee. Humphreys questioned the charge that Lee had ordered Longstreet to order McLaws and Hood to support Pickett. Humphreys wanted to know who gave the orders and why they apparently were not transmitted to Longstreet. He also questioned Taylor's assertion that "it is not apparent" how McLaws and Hood were needed to protect Longstreet's flank. Humphreys wrote:

"Not apparent" to whom? To General Lee? Did Lee ever say so? "not apparent" to whom? To W. H. Taylor? Wonderful, with 40,000 watchful, vigilant Yankees on Round Top, not over 1 mile off and overlooking every movement of McLaws and Hood, "yet" it is not apparent" to W. H. Taylor--"how they were necessary to defend his flank and rear."⁶⁰

For a variety of reasons, the survivors of Pickett's Division also showed little or no interest in elevating Lee at the expense of Longstreet. In 1874, James Kemper won election as governor of Virginia on a Conservative ticket. He, like Longstreet and Pickett, believed that it would be best for the South to look to the future instead of dwelling on the past. But hard-core "Lost Cause" advocates, who lead the anti-Longstreet forces, and remained loyal Democrats, saw Longstreet, Kemper, and Pickett as traitors to their Southern heritage.⁶¹

Throughout the 1870's and 1880's, the editorial board of the Southern Historical Society Papers, essentially controlled by Jubal Early, kept most accounts by Pickett's men out of their publication unless it could somehow be used to attack Longstreet. Pickett's men never blamed Longstreet for what happened on July 3 and refused to join the anti-Longstreet crusade.⁶²

The Washington Artillery of New Orleans was prestigious enough to overcome the anti-Longstreet forces and secure invitations on Longstreet's behalf for the unveiling of the Lee statue in Richmond. In 1890, they insisted that Longstreet be invited to the unveiling or they would not attend. Longstreet wrote:

*My carriage attracted more attention I suppose than was expected and we were sidetracked, but that only made it more unpleasant for the managers. Generals Fitz Lee, (John B.) Gordon, and other grandees rode along, but little noticed by the troops in line, but as they passed our carriage they broke and crowded about us and hurried around in such crowds as to block the street, which threatened to break up the procession, and when urged on tried to take the horses from the carriage, and pull it along with them, and it was all that Latrobe and Cullen could do to urge them on, and preserve their line of order.*⁶³

In 1892, at the third annual meeting of the United Confederate Veterans in New Orleans "...the business was interrupted by calls for opportunity to come up and shake my hand, and ended by hurrying (John B.) Gordon and others of the managers from the stand in order to make room for the soldiers to come up and meet me."⁶⁴

Clearly, when Longstreet attended these functions, most ex-Confederate soldiers were able to rise above partisan politics and the anti-Longstreet rhetoric and remember the Longstreet who had led them through four years of war. T. J. Goree probably spoke for most veterans when he wrote to Longstreet:

*With my heart full of gratitude, I often think of you and of many acts of kindness shown me, and the innumerable marks of esteem and confidence bestowed upon me by you during the four long and trying years that we were together. Although we may differ in our political opinions, yet I have always given you credit for honesty and sincerity of purpose, and it has made no difference in my kindly feelings towards you personally, and I trust that it never will.*⁶⁵

But because of the controversies surrounding Longstreet's career there are still those who blame Longstreet for the defeat at Gettysburg. This anti-Longstreet attitude has prevailed among historians, most notably Douglas Southall Freeman and Clifford Dowdey, until recent times. Some writers, such as Donald B. Sanger, Edwin B. Coddington, William G. Piston, and Carol

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Reardon, have tried to be more objective in their approach to the events of July 3 and to Longstreet's role in the battle.

While we might normally leave the last word on Longstreet to these historians, I think it is more appropriate to give the last word to a veteran of Pickett's Charge. Speaking to the Buffalo Evening News, during the 75th Anniversary Reunion at Gettysburg, a former officer in Pickett's Division said:

Longstreet opposed Pickett's Charge, and the failure shows he was right.... All these damnable lies about Longstreet make me want to shoulder a musket and fight another war. They originated in politics and have been told by men not fit to untie his shoestrings. We soldiers on the firing line knew there was no greater fighter in the whole Confederate army than Longstreet. I am proud that I fought under him here. I know that Longstreet did not fail Lee at Gettysburg or anywhere else. I'll defend him as long as I live.⁶⁶

NOTES

¹ James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania", Annals of War, (Philadelphia, 1878), p. 414. Hereinafter cited as "Lee in Pa."

² 30th Congress, 1st Session. House Executive Document #8. *Message from the President...at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirtieth Congress*, page 183. Jeffery Wert, James Longstreet, The South's Most Controversial Soldier, pp. 43-45.

³ D. B. Sanger & T. R. Hay. James Longstreet. (Baton Rouge, LA, 1952), p. 18. Hereinafter cited as Sanger and Hay. Charles C. Jones, Jr. "A Roster of General Officers", Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 1A (1876), pages 10 & 14, and Vol. 2A (1877), p. 54. Hereinafter cited as SHSP.

⁴ G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, edited by Bell Irvin Wiley (Jackson, 1958), p. 17. Hereinafter cited as Sorrel.

⁵ Edited by Thomas W. Cutrer. Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree. (Charlottesville: 1995), p. 39. Hereinafter cited as Goree.

⁶ Ibid, p. 60.

⁷ D. S. Freeman, ed., Lee's Dispatches, (New York, 1915), p. 11. William G. Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History. (Athens, GE, 1987), pp. 22-23. Hereinafter cited as Piston. James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. (New York, 1897), p. 158. Hereinafter cited as Longstreet. Sorrel, p. 26.

⁸ Sorrel, p. 69. Col. Arthur J. L. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States. (New York, 1864; Reprint: Lincoln, NE, 1991), p. 198. Hereinafter cited as Fremantle.

⁹ Goree, p. 60.

¹⁰ For modern studies of these battles see: John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run (New York: 1993); Peter Cozzins, This Terrible Sound (Urbana, 1994); Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. (Baton Rouge, 1994).

¹¹ "Lee in Pa.," p. 414. Sorrel, p. 157. See also James Longstreet, "Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania", Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buell, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: 1884-1889), Vol. 3, p. 247. Cited hereinafter as B&L and Volume 3 unless otherwise noted.

¹² U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, DC, 1890-1901), series I, vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 318-319. Hereinafter cited as OR. All references are to series I unless otherwise stated.

¹³ OR., 319, 447; “Lee in Pa”, p. 429; Longstreet, p. 385.

¹⁴ Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. (Wilmington, 1995), vol. 5, page 363. Hereinafter cited as Supplement; OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 375, 379, 380, 384, 388, 430, 434; B&L, page 361. See also Col. H. L. Scott, Military Dictionary. (New York, 1864), p. 256, where enfilade is defined as, "To sweep the whole length of the face of any work or line of troops, by a battery on the prolongation of that face or line."

¹⁵ OR., vol. 27, pt 1, pp. 761, 775, 780; OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 447, 504. See also Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg - Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill (Chapel Hill, 1993).

¹⁶ “Lee in Pa.,” p. 429. B&L, p. 342. Longstreet, p. 385. The flank is the right or left of a formation or position and the reverse is the rear of a military force.

¹⁷ OR., vol. 27, pt 2, p. 358; Walter Harrison, Pickett's Men: A Fragment of War History (New York, 1870), pp. 87-88. Hereinafter cited as Harrison; LaSalle Corbell Pickett, Pickett and His Men (Philadelphia, 1913), pp. 205-206. Harrison wrote that he reported to Pickett at division headquarters. Mrs. Pickett, who presumably received her information from Gen. Pickett, wrote that Pickett was still with Longstreet when Harrison reported.

¹⁸ Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War. (Novato, CA, 1992), p. 196.

¹⁹ A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee. (New York, 1887), p. 288. Longstreet, p. 386. Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With General Lee. (New York, 1878), p. 103. OR., vol 27, pt. 2, pp. 320, 359, 665-666. A salient angle is defined as an angle in a battle line with its apex toward the enemy.

²⁰ OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 320, 359, 632; John H. Busey and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. (Hightstown, NJ, 1994), pp. 144-146, 173, 181, 182, 185. Hereinafter cited as Busey & Martin.

²¹ Long, pp. 289. Taylor, pp. 103. OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 370, 388.

²² OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 557. Busey & Martin, p. 163.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 608, 659, 663, 669.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 320, 359.

²⁵ George T. Baldwin, The Alexander Letters. (Savannah, 1910), p. 249. “Lee in Pa.,” p. 429. See also B&L, pp. 343. OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 359.

²⁶ B&L, p. 343.

²⁷ OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 320, 351-352. B&L, p. 343. William Miller Owen, In Camp and Battle With the Washington Artillery of New Orleans. (Boston, 1985), p. 247. See also D. H. Mahan, Out-Post. (New York, 1861), pp. 72: “The artillery takes position where it can silence the batteries of the assailed, and prepare the way for the advance of other troops....A part of the artillery advances either in one body, or in echelon, on the flank of the column of attack;...”

²⁸ OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 360. “Letter from Colonel J. B. Walton”, *SHSP*, Vol. V (1878), pp. 50, 52, 53.

²⁹ “Lee in Pa.,” pp. 431&432. B. D. Fry, “Pettigrew’s Charge at Gettysburg”, *SHSP*, Vol. VII (1879), p. 92. Hereinafter cited as Fry.

³⁰ B&L, p. 343. Sorrel, p. 48.

³¹ Kathleen R. Georg and John W. Busey, Nothing But Glory: Pickett’s Division at Gettysburg. (Hightstown, 1987), pp. 23-25; Harrison, p. 92.

³² Supplement, Vol. 5, p. 418-419.

³³ O.R. 27(2), p. 359. See Silas Casey, Infantry Tactics (New York, 1862; reprint Dayton, 1985), pp. 202-209 and diagram following page 196 for deployment into division columns. Mahan also stated: “The flanks, being the weakest points of a body of troops, must be secured from being turned, or attacked;...” p. 65.

³⁴ Goree, pp. 168-170.

³⁵ OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 359; Fry, p. 59.

³⁶ “Lee in Pa.,” p. 430.

- ³⁷ Supplement, vol. 5, pp. 418-419.
- ³⁸ “Lee in Pa.,” p. 430. Supplement, p. 360. “Letter from General E. P. Alexander”, *SHSP*, vol. IV (1877), pp. 104. Fighting for the Confederacy, p. 254.
- ³⁹ Supplement, vol. 5, p. 360.
- ⁴⁰ Supplement, p. 360. David L. & Audrey J. Ladd, editors, The Bachelder Papers, 3 vols, (Dayton, OH, 1994), vol. 1, p. 486. Hereinafter cited as Bachelder Papers. *SHSP*, Vol. IV (1877), p. 105.
- ⁴¹ Fremantle, p. 263. OR., vol. 51, p. 733.
- ⁴² Kathleen R. Georg, “A Common Pride and Fame”: The Attack and Repulse of Pickett’s Division at Gettysburg. (GNMP, no date), pp. 57-58.
- ⁴³ Captain James H. Smith, “The Battle of Gettysburg, and the Charge of Pickett’s Division”, *SHSP*, vol. XXXII (1904), p. 190.
- ⁴⁴ OR., vol. 27, pt.2 , p. 360. “Lee in Pa.,” pp. 430-431. B&L, pp. 344, 345. Longstreet, p. 392.
- ⁴⁵ OR., vol. 27, pt 2, p. 360. Bachelder Papers, vol. 1, p. 490; Supplement, vol. 5, pp. 361.
- ⁴⁶ B&L, p. 345. Lee was probably near the site of the present-day Virginia Monument. See also Regulations for the Army of the Confederate States, 1863. (Richmond, 1863; Reprint, Harrisburg, 1980), p.408, Article 9.
- ⁴⁷ OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 389, 352; Bachelder Papers, vol. 1, pp. 485. See also Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. (Dayton, OH, 1979), pp. 501. Coddington notes by contrast that Gen. George G. Meade had a chief of artillery, Gen. Henry J. Hunt, who could provide him with the necessary answer.
- ⁴⁸ Sorrel, pp. 40, 333. B&L, page 345. Longstreet p. 393. OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 360, 659-660, 666.
- ⁴⁹ OR., vol. 27, pt 2, pp. 620, 632; *SHSP*, vol. XXVII (1897), p. 196.
- ⁵⁰ OR., pp. 360, 615
- ⁵¹ OR., vol 27, pt 2, p. 361. “Lee in Pa.,” p. 431. B&L, p. 347. Longstreet, p. 395.
- ⁵² Fremantle, p. 266. Sorrel, p. 26.
- ⁵³ Fremantle, pp. 266 & 267.
- ⁵⁴ OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, pp. 557, 663, 668. James Madison Folsom, Heroes and Martyrs of Georgia: Georgia’s Record in the Revolution of 1861. (Macon: GE, 1864), pp.138 & 139.
- ⁵⁵ Lafayette McLaws, “Gettysburg”, *SHSP*, Vol. VII (1879), page 87-88. OR., vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 360.
- ⁵⁶ Piston , p. 106.
- ⁵⁷ See Sanger & Hay, Chapter 5, pp. 410-436, for the complete story.
- ⁵⁸ Goree, p. 159.
- ⁵⁹ Sanger & Hay, p. 428.
- ⁶⁰ Frank E. Everett, Jr. “Delayed Report of an Important Eyewitness to Gettysburg-Benjamin G. Humphreys”, *The Journal of Mississippi History*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, Nov. 1984, p.318.
- ⁶¹ Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory. (Chapel Hill, NC: 1997), p. 86.
- ⁶² Ibid, p. 87.
- ⁶³ Piston, p. 165. Osmun Latrobe was one of Longstreet’s former aides and J. S. D. Cullen had served as medical director of Longstreet’s Corps.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 165-166; See also Goree, p. 177.
- ⁶⁵ Goree, p. 158.
- ⁶⁶ Wert, p. 297.