PART ONE
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER, 1862 (continued)
Lee's plan of attack. Painting by
Sidney King.
The Seven Days Begins
McClellan's plan probably would have succeeded had
Lee been willing to stand still for it. But the Confederate commander
did not intend to let McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote
to Jackson: "Unless McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments he
will move by positions under cover of his heavy guns within shelling
distance of Richmond." It was almost as if Lee had read McClellan's
letter to his wife.
Lee's plan to drive McClellan away from Richmond was
bold and daring, and strategically brilliant. He would bring Jackson's
forces down from the valley quickly and secretly to turn McClellan's
right flank at Mechanicsville. At the same time Gen. A. P. Hill's
division would cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, turn east and
clear the Federal forces from Mechanicsville, thereby opening the
Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge for D. H. Hill and Longstreet's troops to
cross. Then, in echelon, the four divisions would sweep down the north
side of the Chickahominy, annihilate Porter's corps, capture the supply
base at White House, then turn and destroy the rest of the Union army.
With Jackson's forces and other reinforcements from farther south, Lee
would have about 90,000 men, the largest army he would ever command in
the field.
To protect Richmond, he planned to leave about
one-third of his army, under Generals John B. Magruder and Benjamin
Huger, in the entrenchments around the city to hold back the main part
of McClellan's force, about 70,000 men, from marching into the
Confederate Capital. If this force started to withdraw, then Magruder
and Huger would attack.
Lee apparently believed that McClellan would try to
retreat to his base at White House, or failing that, would retire back
down the peninsula. He assured Jefferson Davis that "any advance of the
enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear
and crippling and arresting his progress." The strategy was just about
perfect, but, unfortunately for Lee, the tactics were not.
On the morning of June 25 the Seven Days began with
the advance of Hooker's division along the Williamsburg road at Oak
Grove, preparatory to a general advance McClellan planned for the next
day. But Hooker ran into strong opposition from Huger's troops, and when
McClellan received intelligence of Jackson's approach, Hooker was
ordered back. McClellan wired Washington: "I incline to think that
Jackson will attack my right and rear." He had delayed too longthe
next day Lee wrested the initiative from him.
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