Bandelier Administrative History

The acquisition of the Bandelier National Monument was only a stepping stone for the Park Service. Although Frank Pinkley made a convincing case for keeping Bandelier in the monument category, agency officials retained a vision of a large national park in the region. The area surrounding the monument contained archeological and natural features that the agency coveted. Horace Albright set an aggressive tone that shaped acquisition policy long after he left the agency, and his successors followed his lead in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

As a result, the Park Service continued its efforts to acquire land in the region. During the 1930s, archeological areas dominated agency thinking about the plateau. Puye and the Ramon Vigil Grant became the focus of efforts to expand the monument. After 1939, the agency took a broader view of the attributes of the region. The Park Service developed its vision of a comprehensive national park that included natural and archeological features. The coming of the Manhattan Project put pressure upon the resources of the park, and the agency acquired a buffer zone around Frijoles Canyon. As its ecological perspective developed during the 1950s and 1960s, the Park Service again began to eye the Pajarito Plateau. Soon a new form of the old park proposals appeared, with the Baca Location # 1 as its center.

But with the exception of additions to the national monument during the 1960s and 1970s, acquisition efforts in the region met with little success. Competing interests, including the Forest Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and private landowners, thwarted the agency. Bad luck dogged Park Service attempts on the Pajarito Plateau, and the agency never acquired the lands it wanted.

Even after the transfer of the monument, land controversies continued to rage in the Bandelier area. Like so many of the national park proposals, the transfer itself was a compromise. Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer and, to a lesser extent, Director Horace Albright still believed that the area merited park status, but the compromise that ceded the monument to the NPS limited the options of the agency.

The first years of the Great Depression of the 1930s hurt the Park Service. There was little money for Federal agencies, travel decreased across the nation, and the agency was closely tied to the failing Hoover administration. The crash of the stock market and subsequent bank closures put pressure on the Federal budget, precluding expenditures for land acquisition by the agency. Small-town America was in desperate straits. Mustering the support necessary among local residents to establish new park areas was very difficult in a time when many did not know where their next meal was coming from. With powerful USFS opposition still extant and local economies in the West disproportionately dependent on that agency, Albright wisely put aside many of his plans and waited for a more favorable situation.

Many in the Park Service still regarded the transfer of the monument as a step on the road to eventual park status. The most obvious way to make the area more important in the overall scheme of the agency was to include the Puye ruins in a new national monument. If a new national monument was established at Puye in spite of adverse economic conditions, Albright would have a logical reason to continue to press for a national park that would encompass Puye, the detached Otowi Section, and the main portion of the monument. In this context, consolidation of the site by expansion became an efficient maneuver.

Although Frank Pinkley's report in 1927 undermined the Cliff Cities proposal, it also raised the question of the administration of Puye. Pinkley believed that Puye should be administered by the NPS. On this point, he and Albright agreed. After Roger Toll, Jesse Nusbaum and M. R. Tillotson recommended that the NPS accept the offer of the national monument transfer, Albright set his sights on Puye.

Albright's interest in Puye predated the 1930s. He first visited the area in 1919 and advocated the earliest agency efforts in the area. While still Mather's assistant in the late 1920s, Albright began to lobby for a Puye National Monument as way to get a Pajarito Plateau National Park. In 1928, he envisioned an "'L' shaped [park], which would give [the NPS] all of the canyons, with their hundreds of ruins that lie between Puye and the Bandelier main section." [1] The "monument-first, then-the-park" strategy was not new; William B. Douglass and the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce advocated a similar idea in 1916. Throughout the 1920s, the Park Service used similar methods elsewhere in the Southwest. After he became director of the agency in 1929, Albright aggressively pursued the acquisition of Puye. By early 1931, a side issue to the Forest Service transfer of the existing Bandelier National Monument developed. At Albright's instigation, the Park Service pursued the acquisition of Puye.

The Santa Clara Indians were firmly entrenched at Puye and to avoid acrimony within the Department of the Interior, the Park Service needed a legitimate reason to propose the transfer. In March 1931, Dr. Harold C. Bryant, who headed the Educational Division of the Park Service, spoke with Dr. Bates of Cornell University, who assisted the rebuilding of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Bates made an extensive investigation of conditions at Puye, and determined that the ruins were in disgraceful condition. He advocated NPS administration of Puye if the Santa Clara Pueblo was allowed to keep the proceeds from the entry fee that visitors paid. [2]

This was precisely the kind of ammunition the agency needed. According to an expert, the site required the professional care that the Park Service could offer. NPS officials moved quickly. Associate Director Arthur E. Demaray, the Park Service liaison to the Congressional Appropriations Committee and an early advocate of the proposal, was put in charge of the attempts to create the Puye National Monument.

As liaison officer, Demaray pressed for a reevaluation of the status of the Puye ruins. He arranged for a group from the Congressional Appropriations Committee to make a trip to the Santa Fe area. They visited Puye, where Demaray reviewed the attempts to make a national park of the region. Although the committee was not favorably impressed with the idea of a national park, conditions at Puye convinced the congressmen that the NPS should administer Puye. Bowing to the realities of the situation, Demaray pushed the Puye National Monument idea. "Our principle stumbling block in the past has been our desire for a large national park," Demaray wrote Albright on June 8, 1931. "If we concentrate our efforts to better preserve and protect the prehistoric ruins under national monument administration, we can really get somewhere." [3]

Demaray's perspective shaped the Park Service view of its responsibilities in northern New Mexico. While he did not discount the value of a national park in the Pajarito region, Demaray was eternally a pragmatist. He believed that the Park Service ought to acquire Puye for the value of those ruins, not as leverage to create a national park. If a national park was the eventual result, it would be to the advantage of the NPS. If not, at least the safety of the Puye ruins would be guaranteed. Other opportunities for the Park Service would follow.

Jesse Nusbaum supported Demaray's position on the Puye issue. Prior to the Bandelier transfer, he began to explore the possibility of acquiring Puye. While working with Toll and Tillotson in 1930, Nusbaum approached Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Hagerman and found him favorable to the concept of a Puye National Monument. Nusbaum informed his superiors and together they planned acquisition strategy.

In January 1932, after Demaray refocused agency policy, Albright wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to follow up on Nusbaum's work. Charles S. Rhoades, the new commissioner, referred the matter to the Superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School, Chester Faris. Nusbaum immediately went to Faris's office and discussed the matter with him. With a tentative commitment from the prior commissioner, the position of the Park Service looked strong. Its proposal was designed not to threaten the Santa Claras. As Bates suggested, the agency would only assume responsibility for the administration of the ruins. The Santa Clara Pueblo would continue to receive the revenue collected at the site and its council would retain veto power over potential excavations.

The resistance of the tribe to Government interference in their lives quickly dashed Nusbaum's hopes. On February 11, 1932, the Santa Clara Pueblo voted unanimously against turning Puye over to the National Park Service. As a result, Rhoades withdrew the support of the BIA, and Park Service attempts to add Puye to the system ended. There were, however, unanswered questions. For more than a decade, the Santa Clara Pueblo had been divided into a number of factions. Yet in the face of NPS acquisition attempts, the pueblo united. There was clearly more to the story than the vote itself revealed. Puzzled but undaunted, Nusbaum retrenched.

At a dinner party in March 1932, Jesse Nusbaum found out what had happened to his hopes for Puye. Ed Lowrie, a Washington D.C. newspaperman working for the Brookings Institute, had been studying the problem of law and order in the pueblos. Lowrie and Nusbaum had become friends, and Lowrie often made use of Nusbaum's knowledge and contacts. Lowrie saw the factionalization of the Santa Claras as the greatest obstacle to the future development of the Pueblo, and he decided that the best way to get them to put aside their differences was to find a common adversary for them. Unfortunately for the NPS, the first opportunity that arose involved Puye. Nusbaum, now at the Laboratory of Anthropology, was not visibly involved with Park Service efforts to acquire Puye, nor had he informed Lowrie of his role in the project. At the dinner party, Lowrie boasted that his efforts were responsible for stopping the NPS. Nusbaum then explained his interest in the project. Lowrie, who was quite beholden to Nusbaum, was stunned. "It was a terrible blow [to Lowrie]," Nusbaum wrote afterward, "and I thought he would pass out completely." After coming to, Lowrie apologized profusely and professed his loyalty to Nusbaum. But the damage was done, and Nusbaum told Faris to put the project aside. Faris, whom Nusbaum believed approached the project half-heartedly, was glad to oblige.

Nusbaum counselled patience and suggested that the NPS let the issue drop until Lowrie returned to Washington. The Park Service had to "out-wait" the opposition. "We have just to match the patience of the Indian if we are to achieve success," Nusbaum wrote Albright. Then after the uproar died down, Nusbaum hoped the Park Service would begin new attempts to acquire Puye. [4]

But NPS enthusiasm for Puye waned as the reorganization of 1933 became imminent. The acquisition of the remaining national monuments of the Forest Service and War Department, as well as a broad array of other park areas, precluded Park Service interest in Puye. Horace Albright resigned to enter private business, and Arno B. Cammerer became director. Agency morale suffered; Cammerer was noticeably less aggressive than Albright and he faced an entirely different set of management issues. The reorganization of the Federal Government in 1933, which transferred a variety of park-like areas to the Park Service, forced changes in procedure and created confusion. With new responsibilities and an important role in implementing Federal emergency relief programs, NPS emphasis shifted away from acquiring more land in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

The failure to acquire Puye signaled the end of Park Service conceptions of an archeological national park on the Pajarito Plateau. All the proposals between 1900 and 1930 were predicated on the fact that the establishment of a park would affect a small number of people. Most of the land recommended for inclusion in the park belonged to Federal agencies. Before 1930, interagency cooperation could have established a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. By the 1930s, private citizens had a sizable stake in the region. Park proposals now affected the livelihood of more than a few remote settlers. Private landowners became a powerful force that agency planners had to address.

With their options limited by the series of failures, the Park Service moved in a new direction. The Pajarito Plateau also contained the Valles Caldera, one of the largest collapsed volcanic summits in the world. The Park Service had greater success developing natural national parks. As scenic, natural, and geological attributes became the primary features of post- 1932 efforts, archeology became a secondary value on the Pajarito Plateau. All subsequent efforts to create a Pajarito Plateau national park focused on the Valles Caldera. The geological concept meant that the Baca Location #1, which contained the Valles Caldera, became the most important acquisition for the agency.

The first of the attempts to create a geologic national park occurred at the end of the 1930s. In 1938, H. E. Rothrock, Assistant Chief of the Naturalist Division in Washington, D. C., proposed an evaluation of the Jemez region for inclusion as a geologic national park. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) conducted investigations of the area. Based on the findings of Dr. Clarence S. Ross of the USGS and his own cursory inspection of the documents, Rothrock thought the resources warranted park status.

Rothrock's proposal differed from all the previous attempts to create a national park in the region. Aware of the failure of the agency to acquire the area on the basis of its prehistoric value, Rothrock redirected the focus of the Park Service to its natural attributes. He proposed the Jemez Crater National Park as a geologic reserve. In his scheme, archeology took second place to natural values. Instead of comparing the Pajarito to Mesa Verde, the Park Service would now try to compare it to the likes of Yellowstone, Yosemite, and the Grand Canyon.

Other issues complicated the evaluation of the area as a geologic region. Rothrock's suggested boundaries included over 1,000,000 acres of north central New Mexico, making the Jemez Crater proposal more than four times as large as the largest of the earlier proposals. It would have encompassed the entire Valles Caldera, as well as archeological areas both to the north and south of the crater. The Ramon Vigil grant, which the Soil Conservation Service acquired from cattleman Frank Bond in 1932, and the Canada de Cochiti grant were also included. Rothrock's rough boundaries would have required the purchase of almost 400,000 acres from private grants as well as the transfer of nearly 530,000 acres from the USFS, less than a decade after the Forest Service had fought the establishment of a 150,000-acre park in the region. The agency had to overcome major obstacles to land acquisition before a national park could be established.

In essence, the Jemez Crater idea was a proposal for a theoretical national park. Under the best of circumstances, the Jemez Crater proposal represented the "pipe dreams" of the NPS for the Pajarito Plateau. Created in Washington, the proposal took no account of the realities of interagency and agency-community relations. Outside of the Washington Office, no one in the Park Service believed that the proposal would become reality. It was sheer fantasy.

Nevertheless, from September 13-15, 1938, Southwest Region personnel explored the area and reported on the suitability of its geological, archeological, forestry, and wildlife attributes. Charles Gould, the Regional Geologist, believed the extinct volcanic crater was nationally significant enough for park status. Forestry and wildlife were secondary values in considering the merits of a national park. Regional Archeologist Erik K. Reed initially supported the Jemez Crater proposal, but changed his mind after consulting agency documents concerning the establishment of the Pajarito and Cliff Cities proposals. Reed decided that any of the many earlier proposals were more feasible than the Jemez Crater National Park. [5]

The major stumbling block for regional personnel was the fact that the agency had to acquire 95 per cent of the land from sources other than the public domain. There were nine Spanish land grants of which at least a portion was proposed for inclusion in the park. Small communities, including Coyote, Gallina, Youngsville, and Jemez Springs were also to be within the boundaries of the park.

Fortunately for the NPS, regional personnel realized that the park proposal was not politically realistic. Gould quite correctly viewed the transfer of large national forest areas as extremely unlikely. Moreover, funds for the purchase of the privately owned land were virtually non-existent. The NPS would have been on the offensive against both the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service, and all the old USFS arguments against the establishment of national parks would have been revived. Local residents would claim that the whims of the Federal Government intruded upon their lives, and area Native Americans would have felt their lifestyles limited.

The Washington office quickly became aware of the problems with the proposal. Arthur E. Demaray arranged conferences with officials of the Smithsonian Institution, and the participants decided that the old Pajarito National Park ought to be the agency's "real objective" on the plateau. [6] With that, the Park Service set aside its plans for the inclusion of Valles Caldera in the Park System.

In accordance with the old Pajarito Park idea, the Park Service made one final attempt to acquire the Ramon Vigil grant. During the 1930s, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) money financed the purchase of the grant from Frank Bond and the Soil Conservation Service assumed administration. In 1939, U. S. Senator Dennis Chavez introduced a bill to add the Ramon Vigil Grant and other lands in New Mexico to the Santa Fe National Forest. Dr. Arthur R. Kelly, Chief of the Archeological Sites Branch of the Division of Historic Sites, believed that because the grant included two important archeological sites, Tschirege and Navawi, NPS claims on the tract outweighed those of the USFS.

Although the rivalry between the NPS and the USFS again accelerated after 1933, the terms of the conflict changed. As a result of the reorganization of 1933, the Park Service held the upper hand. It controlled Federal preservation, including the national monuments that the Forest Service had previously administered. But the proposal to add large sections of the Pajarito Plateau to the national forest would have altered the existing balance of power in the region. Responding to the threat of an enlarged USFS domain, the NPS asserted its right to the places of archeological value within the area. Even if acquisition of the tract seemed unlikely, there was a chance that NPS opposition might thwart USFS plans.

Navawi and Tschirege were sacred places to the area pueblos. Thus, Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner John Collier believed his agency should be responsible for them. He was more powerful than anyone in the NPS or the USFS, and he opposed transferring the archeological sites to either agency. While the NPS and USFS squabbled, Collier worked behind the scenes. On September 18, 1939, Executive Order 8255 transferred the sacred areas to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Undaunted, the Park Service still had ideas about acquiring land on the Pajarito. As a basis for converting the monument into a national park, NPS Director Arno B. Cammerer proposed adding to the monument 76,960 acres, including the remaining part of the Vigil grant, the Pajarito Division of the Santa Fe National Forest, north and west of the detached Otowi section, and the entire Baca location. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes disliked Cammerer immensely and did not approve of the idea. The proposal to extend the monument went no further. [7]

After the demise of the Jemez Crater and expanded monument proposals, there were no further attempts to acquire additional land in the Bandelier region for more than a decade and a half. The appearance of the Manhattan project, which developed the atomic bomb, the town of Los Alamos and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) forced park managers to respond to differing conditions. The system-wide influx of tourists that followed the Second World War also affected the administration of Bandelier. Such drastic changes meant that park managers had to serve an increasingly larger and more demanding constituency with pre-war staff and facilities. Acquisition of new land meant spreading already inadequate resources even more thinly. Even if the agency leadership in Washington wanted to acquire land, staff at many of the smaller parks were too busy with day-to-day responsibilities to get excited about the idea. Charged with a primary responsibility to preserve archeological resources, Fred Binnewies, the superintendent of Bandelier from 1947 to 1954, decided to concentrate on more efficient management of the resources already within the monument.

Binnewies recognized the beginning of development in northern New Mexico as a potential threat to the integrity of the Bandelier National Monument. Others had also foreseen the problem. After the Second World War, both Jesse Nusbaum and Acting Custodian Chester A. (Art) Thomas began to awaken the regional office to the problems that extensive development of the Bandelier vicinity might present. [8] The monument went from being a remote, rural park to one surrounded by Los Alamos, a dynamically growing community that briefly captured the international spotlight.

By the middle of the 1950s, it was apparent that Los Alamos was going to be a permanent community and that it would continue to increase in size and significance. Binnewies' successor, a lanky wildlife biologist named Paul A. Judge (1954-1962) who had been on the front lines of conservation battles for two decades, was concerned that local demand for housing and recreational land might impinge upon the monument. In 1958, the Park Service began to negotiate with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to acquire the Frijoles Mesa tract, which stretched from the northern boundary of the monument to State Highway 4. Judge saw the 3,846-acre addition as a "protective barrier for Frijoles Canyon," as well alleviating crowding in the Canyon itself. [9] The tract contained the existing entrance station as well as the approach road. The NPS planned to add new visitor use facilities atop the mesa, including a campground, a picnic area, and minor utilities.

Since the end of the Second World War, NPS-AEC relations had been characterized by a spirit of cooperation. The AEC offered little objection to the transfer of the Frijoles Mesa. It acquired the tract from the Forest Service in 1956. Since its closest point was four miles from Los Alamos, the AEC perceived the area as a buffer zone for its testing facilities. [10] As long as the NPS would agree to limit development in the region, the local AEC office had no trouble with the transfer. The Park Service agreed to AEC terms and the transfer was expedited. On October 16, 1958, Associate Director E. T. Scoyen requested that John A. McCone, Chairman of the AEC, authorize the transfer.

Even with the concurrence of both agencies, there were obstacles to the transfer of land between Government agencies. A legal and acceptable way to transfer the land had to be found. In a March, 1959, meeting, the AEC suggested that there were three ways to affect the transfer: a specific act of Congress, a use of the statutory authority of the AEC, or a use of the existing acts of Congress that allowed the General Services Administration (GSA) to dispose of real property. The GSA method was chosen, for it meant that the NPS would not have to reimburse the AEC or GSA for the market value of the land.

As long as the NPS did not impinge upon the activities of the AEC, the Los Alamos AEC office remained cooperative. After the selection of the GSA method, Paul Wilson, the local AEC manager, expedited the transfer by recommending the proposal to the Albuquerque AEC office. [11] AEC officials even helped accommodate Park Service policies before the area was transferred. Although they allowed hunting there during the 1958 season, AEC officials in Los Alamos informed the NPS that their 1959 hunting map of the region would label the Frijoles Mesa a "no hunting" area. The AEC was less susceptible to public pressure than the Park Service, and its declaration of a prohibition of hunting paved the way for similar NPS sanctions. Gestures of this nature made interagency cooperation a simple task.

The paperwork regarding the transfer also went smoothly. The GSA reported shortly afterward that it would consider a qualified declaration of excess by the AEC, but that the declaration would have to be withdrawn if any agency besides the NPS made a claim on the land. At a meeting on June 25, 1959, Curtis A. Ross of the GSA told Park Service officials that the GSA would "probably" find that the addition to the monument would "constitute the highest and best use of the land." [12] The GSA was amenable to the wishes of both agencies and the transfer appeared imminent.

In the meantime, Director Conrad L. Wirth began to express interest in another tract of AEC land. Adjacent to the Frijoles Mesa tract, the Upper Crossing area, west of the "back gate" road to Los Alamos and mostly south of Highway 4, was previously the subject of closed-door discussion. When Wirth brought up the possibility in a meeting on July 29, 1959, with his Assistant Director, E. T. Scoyen, the latter was not sure to what the Director referred. Judge immediately recognized Wirth's oblique reference and informed the regional office that the AEC was interested in acquiring parts of the Otowi section "on an exchange basis." [13] Judge intimated that if the Park Service considered the elimination of portions of the Otowi section, the AEC would concede the Upper Frijoles tract.

The Park Service faced a difficult choice. It had to compare the relative value of two very different tracts of land. One was an area of pristine wilderness, the other a section of tremendous archeological value upon which the growth of Los Alamos encroached. From Judge's perspective, this meant that the NPS had to "decide how much, if any, of the Otowi Section we would be willing to exchange for the Upper Frijoles area." [14]

Otowi had been an administrative headache since its addition in 1932. Although it contained two important ruins, Otowi and Little Otowi, as well as a cave kiva with 14th century drawings, an aboriginal animal trap, and other archeological features, its distance from the Frijoles headquarters made it difficult to protect. During the 1940s The AEC had cut authorized and unauthorized roads and installed power lines and other utility service structures. The area west of New Mexico Highway 4 was particularly compromised. Others within the Southwest Regional Office hierarchy believed that a portion of the detached section ought to be turned over to the AEC.

The Frijoles Mesa transfer was not yet official, and Judge believed that the completion of that transaction should precede any discussion of the deletion of Otowi from the monument. Hugh Miller, the Regional Director, concurred that two transactions were the best way to achieve the goals of the agency. [15] Park Service officials tried to complete the Frijoles Mesa acquisition while simultaneously working out a policy regarding the possible transfer of Otowi.

Late in 1959, the Frijoles Mesa transaction was completed quickly and easily. On December 4, 1959, the AEC presented Assistant Director Jackson E. Price with the paperwork transferring the Frijoles Mesa tract to the Park Service. On January 9, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower formalized the transfer in Executive Proclamation 3388.

Judge's driving motivation in the acquisition was to prevent the development of the immediate area surrounding the monument. "It is not impossible to assume," he wrote, "that future pressure from sources not now apparent would envisage the crest of Frijoles Canyon an ideal location for industrial or residential development." [16] Judge's astute realization that development beyond the boundaries of the park could affect the experience foreshadowed later concerns of the Park Service. By moving in the 1950s, the agency precluded potential development controversies in the 1980s and 1990s, effectively insulating the primary visitor attraction at Bandelier—Frijoles Canyon—from the careless and uninspired development that has come to surround many parks and monuments.

The acquisition of Frijoles Mesa also afforded the agency additional options in administering the Frijoles Canyon ruins. The mesa provided the Park Service a safety valve through which future crowding in the canyon could be alleviated. The transfer of some employee housing and all of the camping to the top of the mesa meant reduced pressure on the limited space in Frijoles Canyon.

The Upper Frijoles tract, however, temporarily remained beyond the grasp of the agency, largely because the Park Service lacked a policy regarding the Otowi section. The AEC became more aggressive, and in 1960, NPS management personnel made a number of studies to determine the efficacy of NPS administration for the detached section. Bandelier Chief Ranger George Von Der Lippe and District Ranger Edward J. Widmer visited Otowi, and on March 4, 1960, filed a report that recommended that the Park Service either administer the section vigorously or release it to the AEC.

According to the report, Otowi was a disaster. The encroachment of a variety of vehicles damaged vegetation, there was a vast "network of non-designated roads," and there was evidence of substantial vandalism, pot-hunting, and target shooting. Benign activities such as picnicking and camping also existed. Otowi was not being administered as if it were a part of the monument. Because of a lack of visible Park Service presence, conditions in the detached section were abominable.

Von Der Lippe and Widmer felt that the residents of Los Alamos were responsible for most of the damage. Otowi was "a convenient outlet for that group of local residents bent on ignoring the town regulations." [17] On a daily basis, the ruins were protected only by warning signs, which were flagrantly violated. Although rangers issued warnings during their patrols, these were also ignored. From the perspective of Von Der Lippe's and Widmer, the impact of the surrounding community upon the Otowi section was already too great. If the Park Service did not have the time and money to patrol it properly, in their opinion the agency should delete the area from the monument.

The AEC was interested in the Otowi section, the NPS had designs upon the Upper Frijoles tract, and it seemed that the two agencies could work out an agreement. But NPS sentiment about the portion of Otowi to be deleted was far from unanimous. On March 25, 1960, William L. Bowen, Southwest Regional Chief of Recreational Planning, headed a field trip to the Otowi section. Judge, Von Der Lippe, and Park Archeologist Edward Jahns represented Bandelier, while Regional Chief of Ranger Activities Thomas Williams, Regional Archeologist Charlie Steen, Regional National Park System Planning official Leslie P. Arnberger, and Recreational Planner Paul Wykert came from Santa Fe.

After an inspection tour, the group unanimously agreed that portions of the Otowi section should be deleted. There were, however, a variety of ideas concerning the retention of various areas. All agreed that the Tsankawi section of the monument, east and south of Highway 4 and away from AEC development, ought to be retained. One suggestion was for the AEC to administer Otowi and the Little Otowi ruins and turn them into a city park. Believing that these were major ruins under any circumstances, Steen resisted this proposal.

Another plan was that the NPS should retain the ruins, but would give up other land north of the truck road to Los Alamos. The major drawback to this idea was that the transfer would allow the development of Los Alamos to "envelope" the ruins, creating an even stronger possibility that the ruins would be further damaged and desecrated. The third proposal, inspired by Steen's objections, was a corridor arrangement that would allow the AEC to develop its access to a testing site west of Otowi. The corridor would include areas needed by the AEC for "logical expansion." Steen's idea was to enlist the support of the AEC by accommodating its needs. [18]

As Paul Judge pointed out in his report on the trip, the deletion of the section would relieve his staff of much of its guardianship obligation. "Other than archeological features," Judge wrote, "there are no significant Park Service values in the Otowi section." If the agency was to curtail illegal use, it had to consider "proper fencing and sufficient manpower." Without added protection, Judge implied that there was little point in a continued Park Service presence at the Otowi section. His solution was to transfer the section to the AEC, with the stipulation that it adequately protect the ruins. In return, Judge wanted to acquire the Upper Frijoles tract. "It is a scenic wilderness area," he wrote, "completely Government owned and is definitely of Park Service caliber." [19] Since the AEC was willing to transfer the Upper Frijoles area whether or not the NPS decided to give up Otowi, Judge suggested taking over the Upper Frijoles area and then sorting out the Otowi question.

Judge's Boundary Status Report (BSR) of June 28, 1960, reflected his views. He recommended the addition of the Upper Frijoles tract, which was "entirely wilderness in character." He wanted to delete all of Otowi except the Tsankawi portion, "the only part of the Otowi Section which still has potential for orderly park development." [20] Judge compared the value of the two tracts and made his decision. The addition of an unimpacted wilderness tract outweighed the value of keeping the severely impacted archeological area. From a management standpoint, the Upper Crossing tract was more valuable than the detached area.

Trading the parts of Otowi upon which Los Alamos impinged for the Upper Frijoles tract was a logical outgrowth of Judge's management philosophy. Before he came to Bandelier, he worked at Glacier National Park, Jackson Hole National Monument and Grand Teton National Park. A wildlife biologist by training, Judge had little experience with archeological areas and focused upon the natural side of Bandelier. In his view, the value of the upper canyon area far outweighed that of the Otowi section.

While the Park Service favored the acquisition of the Upper Canyon area, the Otowi question was not so easily resolved. When submitted to the regional staff, the boundary report evoked a broad range of response. Land managers in the regional office supported the deletion. Les Arnberger remarked that the Upper Crossing area was "marvelous wilderness country . . . [and] a particularly desirable objective," but he said little about the loss of the archeological values of the Otowi section. Jerome Miller thought the proposal was "radical . . . but o.k.," while George Kell wondered why the agency needed to retain even the Tsankawi section. [21]

Charlie Steen led the "keep Otowi" faction. "I am strongly in favor of keeping the sw corner of Otowi section, (south of 'back' road.) Bandelier was established for its archeological values. It is very well to add a patch of wilderness but at the same time this proposal will eliminate an unusual feature - the game trap. . . . [W]e have no other example of one in Bandelier, or so far as I know, in the National Park System." Steen's argument was based upon the organic legislation establishing Bandelier, and made important points concerning the future of the site. "There exists in the present southwest corner of the Otowi section . . . a very nice group of structures which could easily be developed for interpretation; the game-trap, some cavate rooms and a small, mesa-top pueblo. We do not need these now —but two or three generations hence they may be quite valuable." [22] No other Federal agency had the archeological experience of the Park Service. Steen believed that turning the ruins over to the AEC was tantamount to suggesting that Otowi had no value. He effectively positioned the needs of the future against the expediency of the present.

Associate Regional Director George Miller agreed with Steen, saying that Otowi "was important enough for the Service in the 30s to have it set aside [and] there is nothing . . . to indicate that most of the values are not there now. Because Los Alamos is nearby - resulting in an additional protection problem, does not justify the deletion of any part of the monument." [23] Steen and Miller argued that the encroachment of Los Alamos did not compromise the absolute value of the ruins.

In essence, the argument came down to comparing archeological and recreational values. The recreational planners could clearly see the advantage of an additional tract of mountain wilderness. While the wilderness was indeed a fine tract, Steen was right to point out that Bandelier was an archeological park. If the funds and work power to maintain Otowi were not forthcoming, Judge, Von Der Lippe, and the rest of the Bandelier staff had a valid point when they suggested that it might be better to let the AEC protect the ruins. Each proposed alternative fell within the boundaries of agency policy, and there was ample precedent for any combination of proposed courses of action.

Before the regional staff had a chance to comment, Regional Chief of Recreational Planning William Bowen initially approved the Boundary Status Report. In light of the objections, he reconsidered. On August 3, 1960, he laid out the options that he believed were available to the NPS. He preferred to approve Judge's report and be done with the issue, but listed three other possible alternatives. The most desirable of these was to modify the report to continue NPS management of the southwest corner of Otowi. Bowen's major objection to keeping the game trap was that it required that the NPS purchase adjacent private lands, in order to protect the "park values" of the ruins. [24] Less advantageous was to approve the addition, but disapprove the deletion. The least effective option Bowen could see was to preserve the status quo by disapproving the entire Boundary Status Report. With the options clearly articulated, Miller turned the problem over to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen.

No stranger to questions of land acquisition, Allen passed on a recommendation of no concurrence with the boundary report to the Washington office. He knew how hard the Park Service fought to acquire Otowi and the rest of the monument during the 1920s and 1930s. Allen was instrumental in the acquisition of a number of southwestern parks. He was also a veteran of many controversies with the Forest Service and recognized the role of the Park Service in protecting archeological sites. In his view, good forest land did not constitute a significant enough reason to add the Upper Canyon area to the monument. Allen believed the threat of forest fire in the new addition would present a greater protection problem than the one that existed at Otowi. He presented the proposals as intrinsically linked. Either the Park Service would have Otowi or the Upper Canyon area. From his perspective, the whole project was flawed. The Park Service was merely trading one headache for another. [25]

In Judge's eyes, Allen's manner of presenting the issue to Washington narrowed the choices available to the agency. By not offering a recommendation on the proposal, Allen furthered the notion that one could not happen without the other. Judge objected to this, pointing out that the "AEC does not expect nor require the Otowi Section in exchange for the Upper Frijoles area." [26] He urged that the agency evaluate the two proposals separately, on their individual merit. The separation of the two proposals made the acquisition of Upper Canyon likely even if the Park Service decided to keep all of Otowi.

On May 26, 1960, Bowen, Judge, Arnberger, Wykert, and John J. Burke, the AEC manager for the Los Alamos area, met and discussed the transfer. Agreement seemed close at hand, but on June 21, 1961, Burke wrote NPS Regional Director Allen that Forest Service Supervisor R. E. Lattimore requested that the same tract be added to the Santa Fe National Forest. Burke felt that AEC, NPS, and USFS representatives should meet to iron out the transfer. By the early 1960s, Forest Service animosity to Park Service attempts to enlarge Bandelier was legendary. Rather than battle it out with the USFS once again, on June 28, 1961, Allen put the entire proposal on hold. [27]

The proposal remained in limbo until early the following year, when high-level interest in the project put pressure upon the Forest Service. In January, 1962, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, New Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson, United States Representative Joseph A. Montoya, USFS Regional Forester Fred Kennedy, and Allen met in Albuquerque to discuss lands on the Pajarito Plateau. The interest of such important officials put Kennedy in a difficult spot. He was pressured to relinquish all USFS claims to the Upper Frijoles tract.

Kennedy did not bow to the pressure and the USFS once again obstructed NPS plans for the Bandelier region. Regional Director Allen was adamant about completing the transfer quickly, for he was aware that a bill to include the Baca location in a Bandelier-vicinity national park was about to be introduced in Congress. The introduction of such a bill would immediately arouse the ire of the USFS, cause it to resist the Upper Canyon transfer, and make the entire project into a visible controversy. Although the Upper Frijoles transfer was really not the concern of the USFS, the AEC wished to maintain good relations with all Federal agencies in the Pajarito Plateau region. It was not prepared to offend the USFS to satisfy the NPS. Allen was aware of this and wrote Wirth that he believed the AEC would not make the transfer until the USFS relinquished all claims to the tract. Although he thought that the USFS position would delay the transfer, he wrote: "we will, however, keep trying." [28]

But the AEC and the NPS circumvented the USFS. The two agencies created a compromise that gave both sides what it wanted. In June 1962, the Upper Frijoles tract was declared "excess to needs of [the] AEC." Local AEC officials informed Superintendent Albert Henson that they would try to acquire all of Otowi except the Tsankawi section. The NPS decided that this was an equitable transfer and the Acting Director of the Southwest Region, George W. Miller, opined that AEC officials believed that the proposed Valle Grande National Park bill, S. 3321, gave the AEC "justification for [the] transfer without USFS concurrence." [29] There remained, however, a major problem. S. 3321 did not call for the deletion of Otowi and its passage would therefore not cause the simultaneous transfer of the two areas.

Director Wirth quickly solved this problem. He assured Miller that a Presidential Proclamation to exclude Otowi and restore it to the public domain could be arranged. [30] The Secretary of the Interior would then issue a Public Land Order, reserving Otowi for the AEC. If the Valle Grande bill was not enacted, then the Presidential Proclamation excluding Otowi would also include the Upper Frijoles tract. After the Valle Grande bill died in Congress, a Presidential Proclamation on August 10, 1962, included the Upper Frijoles area. The GSA again applied the deletion procedure used to acquire the Frijoles Mesa, and on February 15, 1963, the GSA authorized the transfer. On May 27, 1963, after four years of maneuvering, President John F. Kennedy issued Presidential Proclamation 3539, accomplishing the transfer.

During the maneuvering aimed at arranging the transfer of the two tracts, the long-dormant effort to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau began to revive. The new attempt, which proposed the inclusion of Valles Caldera, began when Bandelier concessionaire Mrs. Evelyn C. Frey wrote Senator Dennis Chavez on February 26, 1961, to inform him that the 100,000-acre Baca Location no. 1 was for sale. Chavez contacted the Park Service, and the agency began to dust off old plans for the region. Meanwhile, Chavez got Clinton P. Anderson, the other senator from New Mexico, interested in the project.

The ranking Democrat on the Senate Public Lands Committee, Anderson was an influential figure on Capitol Hill. His conservation credentials stretched back to the 1920s, when he was instrumental in bringing the Teapot Dome scandal to light. Once in the Senate, Anderson became a power on Capitol Hill. By the 1960s, he was a fixture. Tall, forceful, and tubercular, Anderson began to promote the project.

NPS officials in Washington also explored the park possibilities of the Pajarito Plateau for the first time in a number of years. In June 1961, Director Wirth wrote a memo limited to office use to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen, to inform him that the agency was interested in acquiring the Baca and changing Bandelier from a national monument to a national park. "Confidentially," Wirth added, "Senator Anderson is very much interested in this and so is the Secretary [of the Interior, Stewart Udall]." [31] The Baca was for sale, but the owners, the Bond family, held it off the market, waiting to see if a national park in the region was feasible. The Canyon De San Diego grant, also a part of the Jemez Crater proposal, was also for sale, but Wirth thought there was little in that tract suited for park status.

Conditions upon the plateau had changed since the Second World War, and as a result, the options of the agency were limited. Allen responded by informing Wirth that the one- million-acre Jemez Crater proposal of 1939, the basis upon which the agency relied for its justification of the new national park idea, was "certainly not feasible [in 1961]. . . . we should recognize that the proposal today is not the proposal recommended as nationally significant in 1939." Allen also believed that the Valle Grande bill was an extremely controversial measure, for it would encounter bitter resistance from the Forest Service. He pointed to the Frijoles Mesa acquisition as evidence. Although the land in question in that case belonged to the AEC, the Forest Service opposed the transfer to the NPS. "We ought to be very sure of our ground before we get further involved," the battle-seasoned Allen wrote. "We can expect a real fight on this larger proposal." [32]

The Forest Service continued to oppose the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau, while the Park Service explored new alternatives. Among the proposals advanced was one that made the larger area a national recreation area instead of a national park. The USFS had more trouble opposing the recreation area. It would not arouse the ire of the hunting constituency of the USFS, whose sport would be prohibited by the creation of a national park. [33]

NPS regional officials, however, were not really interested in a national recreation area. They began to look for other ways to accommodate the USFS. The initial Bandelier-Valle Grande proposal, S. 3321, would have added a total of 185,383 acres to the existing monument to make it a national park. Of the total, 100,000 would be purchased from the owners of the Baca ranch, while the USFS would transfer another 67,500 acres. Forest Service opposition to a project of this magnitude was sure to be fierce and unending. NPS officials knew they would have to cut back on the amount of land that they requested.

The Forest Service was no more interested in allowing the establishment of a large national park on the Pajarito Plateau in 1961 than it had been during the 1920s. Nevertheless, Park Service officials tried to get their old foes to acquiesce. On August 25, 1961, NPS and USFS regional officials met to discuss the issue. Both sides agreed to a joint study of the area, but there was little other common ground. The NPS could not yet count on the support of USFS officials.

NPS officials knew that a compromise that insured USFS support of the position of the Park Service was essential to the success of the park effort, but Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall was the person who found the middle ground. In October 1961, supporters of the park proposal, including Anderson, Udall, New Mexico Congressmen Joseph A. Montoya and Thomas G. Morris, USFS and NPS representatives, and George W. Savage, who represented the estate of Frank Bond, toured the Baca area. Aware of potential USFS resistance, Udall proposed that about 30,000 acres of the Baca be incorporated in the new national park, while the remaining 67,000 be attached to the Santa Fe National Forest. In essence, Udall's proposal gave both agencies what they wanted.

As a result of Udall's stance, the NPS modified its stance in hopes of achieving a compromise. The Department of the Interior and the Park Service reviewed the proposed Valle Grande National Park and reduced its size considerably. Instead of 185,383 acres, the new proposal included only 30,745 acres of the Baca tract, the 3000-acre Upper Frijoles tract which the AEC was still in the process of transferring to the NPS, and the 30,649 acres of the existing national monument. The new proposal called for the transfer of the remaining 69,000 acres of the Baca to the Forest Service.

After public hearings in Santa Fe in September 1962, the USFS and NPS appeared to be reconciled to Udall's compromise. Both agencies testified in favor of the bill, as did other Government departments and members of the public. Will Orndorff, the President of the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association, was the only important objector. Orndorff and the livestock lobby preferred to see the land put to unrestricted commercial purposes.

The existing legislation still posed an obstacle. The original bill, S. 3321, did not reflect the Udall's compromise and died at the end of the Congressional session. New bills followed when Congress reconvened at the beginning of 1963. At the opening of the new session on January 9, 1963, Anderson introduced S. 47, which incorporated many of the new changes. Morris followed it with H. R. 1941 a week later. All the objections to the proposal had been satisfied, and the chances of the bills looked good.

But disaster struck, and the project began to disintegrate. On January 29, 1963, the Santa Fe New Mexican reported that a group of Texas investors, headed by James P. (Pat) Dunigan, had purchased the entire Baca tract. Although he announced that "the Government [was] not precluded from negotiating for a portion of the tract," Dunigan upset the balance of power. [34] The 66,000 acres that Udall wanted to add to the Santa Fe National Forest were no longer for sale, and the USFS had no reason to support Federal attempts to purchase 30,000 acres to create a new national park. The Forest Service lost interest. From its perspective, without something to sweeten the arrangement, it had no reason to support a proposal that enlarged the domain of its chief rival.

In any event, Dunigan had other plans, and he quickly encountered local animosity. He began work on a master plan for the development of the Baca. The local newspaper, the Los Alamos Monitor got hold of portions of his plan and publicly quoted it. In April 1963, the newspaper reported that Dunigan planned a ski area, racetrack, and resort community for the Baca. Upset at the prospect, representatives of Los Alamos County contacted state officials, and Dunigan's project received considerable scrutiny. The following day, the newspaper reported that the state racing commissioner was not aware of plans for a racetrack. Dunigan was not used to having his private business discussed in public. He angrily responded that his representative got carried away. His plans were not that extensive, but this did little to quell rumors of the beginning of a "little Texas" on the Pajarito Plateau. The rumors escalated, and the pressure increased. Finally, Dunigan abandoned development plans in June 1963, deciding that a working cattle ranch offered a better alternative.

The attempt to establish a national park was not yet dead. On July 15, 1963, both New Mexico Senators, Anderson and Edwin Mechem, introduced a new bill, S. 1870, that allowed the purchase of the 30,000 acres for the national park while eliminating the part of the Baca that the USFS was to acquire. Entitled the "Valle Grande-Bandelier National Park bill," Mechem claimed that the proposed park would be the biggest thing ever to happen to northern New Mexico.

The bill seemed likely to pass Congress. On October 21, 1963, the Department of the Interior reported favorably on it, and Anderson called a Senate Public Lands subcommittee meeting on the subject. When Anderson's Senate Public Lands subcommittee met to consider the bill on May 29, 1964, Pat Dunigan's opposition strangled the proposal. He testified in front of the committee, opposing the project on the grounds that a national park would stifle the economic potential of the area. Even with the persuasive Anderson as an advocate, subcommittee members believed the bill should be put aside. The subcommittee authorized the Department of the Interior to offer Dunigan $750,000 for the 30,000-acre tract. He refused to consider the offer.

The Park Service was out of options. The land it wanted for the Pajarito Plateau national park was not for sale. Dunigan was angry at both the Federal Government and the Los Alamos community and held the trump card in the region. There was little that Congress, the Department of the Interior, or the National Park Service could do. Anderson felt that the opportunity to acquire the Valle Grande had passed. [35] Despite Mechem and Anderson's urgings of grass roots support, the bill died at the end of 88th Congress. No one reintroduced a bill in the next session.

After the demise of the Valle Grande proposal in 1964, interest in new acquisitions at Bandelier waned. Without congressional action of any kind, grass roots advocates could not maintain local enthusiasm for the project. Park Service officials were aware of the possibility of Forest Service resistance, and Pat Dunigan did not appear willing to negotiate. Once again, efforts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were stymied.

Even though the plan to establish a national park in 1964 progressed no farther than a subcommittee hearing, acquiring the Valle Grande remained part of NPS thinking. Agency officials continued to eye the Baca. In October 1969, Bandelier Superintendent Stanley T. Albright overheard a conversation at a Los Alamos Rotary Club meeting that led him to believe that Dunigan planned to sell the Baca. Park Service acquisition machinery began to gear up, but Dunigan never put the ranch on the market. The NPS was again thwarted.

Yet attempts to enlarge the monument continued. In 1971, the Park Service made a feeble effort to reacquire the game-trap, the cave kiva, and the Otowi ruins. The AEC was under pressure to dispose of some its holdings in the Los Alamos area. By February 1971, area pueblos and the USFS already expressed interest in the land. "If the NPS desires certain of these lands," wrote Acting Chief of NPS Environmental Planning and Design John S. Adams, "it had better move immediately and stake claim." [36] Park Service officials approached the AEC, and in a meeting on March 8, 1971, Los Alamos officials agreed to inform the NPS of any plans to dispose of the Otowi section.

But there was little pressure to dispose of Otowi. Thus, more than a year later, the NPS had no new information. On April 26, 1972, Bandelier Superintendent Linwood E. Jackson contacted "Bud" Wingfield of the AEC and found that the AEC had no plans to give up any part of the Otowi Section. Despite repeated attempts by Bandelier staff members to initiate negotiations, Otowi remained beyond the pale of NPS administration.

Dunigan did not fare as well as he had hoped with his ranch on the Baca. In 1964, he sued the New Mexico Timber Company, charging it with improperly caring for the land while it exercised its rights under a 99-year timber lease. According to the suit, the New Mexico Timber Company destroyed the surface value of Dunigan's land by cutting unnecessary roads, leaving the slash on the land, and denuding the region of mature trees. Dunigan was sensitive to the aesthetic values of his land and resented the tactics of the New Mexico Timber Co. [37] In 1970, the court ordered the timber company to pay Dunigan $200,000 for damages to 5000 acres that it harvested after he filed the suit. In the end, the suit was resolved to Dunigan's satisfaction. The court allowed him to purchase the lease of the New Mexico Timber Company.

The Park Service feared the destruction of the upper Frijoles Canyon watershed, and it tried to purchase a portion of the Baca. The insensitive land practices of the New Mexico Timber Company drove home the vulnerability of the park. In order to prevent the canyon from the flooding and large-scale erosion that would occur downstream the Park Service sought to include the entire El Rito de Los Frijoles watershed in the monument. If grazing and timbering were not restricted in the mountains, Bandelier was at risk.

On May 3, 1973, Brewster Lindner, the head of the Division of Land Acquisition, wrote Pat Dunigan to explain the long-term plans of the NPS to acquire a portion of the ranch. He wanted to avoid any chance of misunderstanding. Dunigan was interested in selling the small parcel that the Park Service wanted. After ordering an appraisal in early 1975, Lindner tendered an offer to purchase 3,076 acres of the southeast corner of the Baca for $1,350,000, subject to legislative approval. [38]

Yet there were obstacles in the way of even this small acquisition. While Dunigan considered the offer, the Regional Office submitted the proposal to the NPS Washington Office for review. Three conditions concerned all levels of the Park Service. Dunigan previously conveyed a one per cent general royalty on the property to the Magma Power Company in 1963, and unidentified parties owned 11 1/4 per cent of all minerals, steam, geothermal and thermal energy. On April 4, 1971, Dunigan had granted Union Oil of California a 99-year lease of geothermal rights to the entire ranch. In response to questions from the Washington Office, Lindner opined that the 11 1/4 percent royalty was not a problem for the agency and said that Union Oil representatives expressed a willingness to release their claim on the 3,076-acre section unless an unusual find was discovered. Further correspondence with Dunigan convinced Lindner that the concession to Magma Power did not pose a problem for park management.

Satisfied with Lindner's assessment, Southwest Regional Director Joseph C. Rumburg Jr. recommended the acquisition in January, 1976. Rumburg believed that the cost of the tract would only increase if the project was delayed. Even though the agency had no written commitment from Union Oil, it would most likely follow through on its verbal commitment. After completion of the legislative process, the agreement was signed on January 28, 1977, and the acquisition of the headwaters of the Frijoles was complete.

The headwaters bill also gave the agency the authority to acquire the Canada de Cochiti Grant, south of the monument. A number of earlier park proposals included the tract. The building of the Cochiti Dam near the southern tip of the monument led the agency to consider a presence there. Moreover, the Park Service coveted the area for administrative purposes. It offered a potential buffer between the lake and the delicate ruins in the Bandelier back country. It also presented the Park Service with a way to expand its interpretive scope.

Once again, the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau gathered momentum. Dunigan's earlier suit against the New Mexico Timber Company was highly publicized. The controversy over the destruction of the forest resource led to another grass-roots move toward the creation of a park. New Mexico Congressional Representative Manuel Lujan received letters from Los Alamos area residents. Then on December 28, 1970, he requested that the National Park Service congressional liaison follow up on the issue.

During the middle 1970s, park proponents got a lift from a new law. The passage of PL 94-458, the General Authorities Act of 1976 required the NPS to select a minimum of twelve areas a year for inclusion in the National Park System. Although these were disparagingly called "the park-of-the-month" proposals, some important areas were included. The Valle Grande was on the first list the agency submitted to Congress. Among the evidence that the agency offered was the designation of the Valle Grande as a national natural landmark in 1975, and the recommendation of the National Parks Advisory Board in 1962 that the area be included in a national park.

In the late 1970s, Department of the Interior and Park Service officials took one more serious look at the merits of the Baca location. In August, 1978, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior David Hales, and Southwest Regional Director John Cook visited the Baca location as guests of Pat Dunigan. After the trip, Hales had the Fish and Wildlife Service and the NPS prepare a prospectus that summarized the discussion. As it would give him an excellent tax advantage, Dunigan appeared ready to work out an agreement with the agency.

But high-level Park Service officials had other priorities. Dunigan wished to meet with NPS Director William Whalen to discuss the transaction. Whalen, however, was not interested in the project, and Dunigan was deflected towards Assistant Director Ira J. Hutchinson. [39] Quite rightly offended, Dunigan left Washington, withdrew his offer, and began negotiations with the Forest Service.

But despite Dunigan's anger, the park proposal gained credence on Capitol Hill. Rep. Phillip Burton, the Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced a Valles Caldera National Park bill in early 1979 without approaching either the Park Service or Pat Dunigan. Dunigan discussed the proposal with Sierra Club Southwestern Representative Brant Calkin, and they decided the bill was "premature." [40]

Even though the purchase of the entire tract would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000,000, the new proposal made headway. A new-area study of alternatives was drawn up with a focus on the interpretation of geothermal and energy-producing activities. This was applauded by the manager of the Harper's Ferry Center of the agency as an "excellent area for industry and the National Park Service to get together and proceed in the same direction." [41]

But in the view of others in the agency, the Valle Caldera was already compromised, and they questioned the efficacy of the park proposal. Lorraine Mintzmeyer, Acting Regional Director of the Southwest Region, turned back the national park idea in favor of establishing a national preserve. "The almost blanket uses of the area for geothermal exploration and development," she wrote, "would make preservation and management of the area as a national park or monument very difficult." Her argument paralleled that of Paul Judge during the discussions over Otowi. The level of development in the Baca equalled that in the old Otowi section. Questions over its suitability for a place in the park system needed to be addressed.

In an unfortunate coincidence, the option to purchase the Baca disappeared. In early 1980, Pat Dunigan collapsed and died of a heart attack. His death dashed the hopes of the Park Service. The Baca Location passed to the trust he set up for his two underage sons. The trustees were not interested in disposing of the property.

After eighty years, the attempts to preserve large sections of the Pajarito Plateau within the boundaries of a national park ended. A number of opportune moments came and went, and a series of unusual coincidences and circumstances thwarted the plans of the agency. It was as if Park Service efforts in the region were jinxed. Every time the agency came close to acquiring its national park, something got in the way.

The problems grew out of competing interests in the region. Each opportunity for the agency offered its competitors an equal chance. In many cases, other interest groups were more powerful than the Park Service. John Collier and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were influential during the 1930s, the creation of the Manhattan project in Los Alamos superseded Park Service interests in the region, and the Forest Service was always ready to thwart the NPS.

Another problem was that the agency never fully accepted the concept of archeological areas as national parks. The Park Service did not exist when the only archeological national park, Mesa Verde, was established in 1906. From Mukuntuweap to the Petrified Forest, most of its efforts centered upon acquiring national park status for natural areas. While on occasion, archeological park areas received nomenclatural designations like national historic park, other than the Pajarito Plateau efforts, the NPS rarely proposed archeological areas for park status. As a result, its efforts to change its perception of the plateau seemed somewhat hollow, as if the emphasis on natural attributes was an elaborate rationale for the creation of a national park in the region. To outsiders like the Forest Service, the change in the focus of the agency offered evidence of the lack of merit in the entire idea. The more the Park Service tried for a national park, the smaller its chances of success became.

Like many areas within the park system, Bandelier was the focus of a variety of land acquisition attempts. What makes Bandelier distinct was that attempts to acquire land at the park ultimately changed the purpose for which the monument was established. The early attempts to create a national park, as well as most of the land acquisition attempts, focused on acquiring archeological resources or providing a buffer area to protect them. Beginning with the Jemez Crater proposal, later efforts to establish a national park looked to create a national park that subsumed archeological values to natural ones. Handed a mandate when it assumed jurisdiction of the site in 1932, the Park Service repeatedly tried to expand boundaries of the monument as it widened its interests and responsibilities at Bandelier.