Civil War Defenses of Washington Historic Resource Study

War Clouds on the Horizon

As war clouds began to appear, Washington, D.C. was in the midst of the conflict. The city was, for all practical purposes, southern, and many of its citizens had strong southern inclinations. In addition, the Capital was sandwiched between two slave states, both south of the Mason & Dixon Line. Few government troops were in the vicinity and of those that were, some of the officers and men chose to join the new Confederate armed forces and headed south for that purpose. Thus, until more troops arrived, Washington, D.C. was a community under siege. [1]

Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the army, was not particularly concerned over the capital's safety. Regardless, on January 2, Scott appointed Colonel Charles P. Stone, the Inspector General of the District of Columbia. Stone, who had served under the general during the Mexican War, would be responsible for the defense of the city and he had a plan acceptable to Scott. [2]

Stone speedily undertook his duties, including organizing and drilling the District militia. Scott, who didn't trust the district militia, ordered the Army Regulars to Washington. Regular Army units of all arms–infantry, cavalry and artillery as well as Engineer Sappers and Miners– responded to the call and on February 12, the day before the electoral college met, they were guarding the principal government buildings–White House, Treasury, Capitol, Patent Office and Post Office. The next day they kept an unruly mob, composed of Maryland, District of Columbia and Virginia southern sympathizers, from disrupting the deliberations of the electoral college or creating mischief in general. [3]

The president-elect, Abraham Lincoln, arrived in Washington at 6 a.m. on February 23, and traveled to the Willard Hotel, his temporary residence. Lincoln's trip from Illinois was not uneventful, he was secreted through Baltimore, where the train had to slow down and switch tracks, before continuing on to the capital. Upon his arrival, the government finalized its security plans for the imminent inauguration, on March 4, 1861. [4]

Inaugural day arrived and many were apprehensive. Riflemen were posted along the parade route and in the Capitol. Artillery, cavalry and various other military units took station at a variety of points along the route, but out of the citizens' view, to counter any possible mob violence. Unbeknownst to most of the spectators, local militiamen protected the inaugural platform. The inaugural activities concluded without any problems! [5]

Stone's plan for the defense of the city did not include any fortifications except barricades. The plan even excluded Fort Washington, Maryland. The plan, however, did establish "strongpoint" centers at City Hall hill, comprising in its area the General Post Office and the Patent Office, at the Capitol, and Executive Square, which included the White House and the Treasury, State, Navy and War buildings. The Treasury Building would be the enceinte, the last-ditch position, for a final fight. Thankfully, circumstances never necessitated a retreat to these positions. [6]

The inauguration had come and gone but the fear for the Capital's safety continued due to military reverses nearby and the lack of troops in the city. Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, surrendered on April 14, 1861. The burned-out Harpers Ferry armory fell to the rebels on April 19, and the Confederates occupied the destroyed Gosport Navy Yard on April 21. In addition, riots broke out in Baltimore on April 19, 1861, between pro-Confederate and pro-Union citizens. Among other results, the riots cut-off railroad communication with the North.

President Lincoln, on April 1, 1861, had requested Winfield Scott to inform him daily of the military situation throughout the country and the news was not pleasant. On April 15, Lincoln declared that "an insurrection existed," called for seventy-five thousand troops and convened Congress in a special session to begin on July 4. The call for troops caused bad feeling in some southern-leaning states such as Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia. The Virginia State Convention passed "an ordinance of secession" and ordered a May 23 public referendum on it. The Army countered by creating the Department of Washington, encompassing the District of Columbia and the State of Maryland, under the command of Brevet Colonel Charles F. Smith. But, when would more troops arrive to enable control of the department? [7]

Some Pennsylvania militia and regulars from Minnesota arrived in the capital on April 18, to join approximately 600 District of Columbia militia, 200 U.S. Marines and about 600 regulars. The Sixth Massachusetts Infantry Regiment arrived the next day, after experiencing problems and violence in Baltimore. Since some Baltimore citizens destroyed that city's railroad bridges during the riots, land transportation to Washington was stopped. The U.S. Navy offered an alternative route to the capital. [8]

Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, Philadelphia Navy Yard Commandant, initiated a maritime rescue operation. The steamer Boston and railroad ferryboat Maryland would transport troops from Philadelphia and Perryville, where the Susquehanna River flows into the Chesapeake, to Annapolis, Maryland. From Annapolis, the railroad would transport the men to Washington. On April 21, word reached Washington that the First Rhode Island Infantry Regiment, the Seventh New York Infantry Regiment, and a force of Massachusetts troops under the command of Major General Benjamin Butler, were offshore at Annapolis. These troops would land and rebuild the railroad line to proceed to Washington. The Seventh New York Infantry Regiment arrived in Washington on the 25th and the First Rhode Island Infantry Regiment began arriving on the 26th. Numerous other units from a variety of states soon reached Washington also and the citizenry's siege mentality dissipated. [9]

The Navy also had other duties. President Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederacy on April 19 and the U.S. Navy channeled much of its efforts in that direction. But, the Navy, like the Marines, also took an active part in the defense of the Capital. Lincoln visited the Washington Navy Yard on April 2 to discuss its defense with the commandant, Commander John A. Dahlgren. Afterwards, he periodically conferred with Dahlgren on the defense of Washington, including guarding river approaches and safe-guarding the Anacostia Bridge. On April 21, Dahlgren obtained and outfitted four steamers at the Washington Navy Yard for the defense of Washington. The USS Pawnee, which had been at the Gosport Navy Yard before yard was destroyed and capitulated, arrived in Washington on the 23rd to assist in the capital's defense. The day before, Commander James H. Ward, for whom a fort in the Defenses of Washington would later be named, suggested the organization of a "flying flotilla" for the defense of the entire Chesapeake Bay area, including the Capital. In May, Ward arrived at the Washington Navy Yard with the USS Thomas Freeborn and two other vessels in tow to command the "Potomac Flotilla." [10]

Within five days of the Seventh New York Infantry Regiment's arrival in the Union capital, 7,500 volunteers were quartered in the city and by the end of the month, the number had grown to nearly 11,000. Some resided in the Treasury Building, Patent Office, City Hall, Navy Yard and even in the Capitol. As more and more men arrived, troops encamped and drilled wherever unused land was found and supply centers sprang up in a variety of locations. By August, most of the troops that had arrived in Washington were located outside the urban limits of Washington. [11]

In the meantime, important activities were occurring around the District of Columbia. Ben Butler and his forces had stayed in Maryland after their arrival in Annapolis and attempted to insure that state would remain in the Union. On the evening of May 13, Butler arrived in Baltimore with about 1,000 men, including some artillery men with guns. Butler quickly moved his men to occupy Federal Hill, a prominence from which the artillery could shell almost any downtown area, and, as the authors of Baltimore During the Civil War wrote, "armed resistance in the city came to an end." Attention turned to Virginia where Confederate flags were visible from highpoints in Washington, rebel troops' campfires blazed at night, and the citizenry would vote on secession soon, on May 23. Given the large number of troops now in Washington, only a few feared these events in Virginia. Colonel J.F.K. Mansfield, the then commander of the Department of Washington, however, argued for the occupation of Northern Virginia to preclude the possibility of rebels mounting artillery on its heights and shelling government buildings in the capital. He also urged the occupation of Alexandria to insure navigation on the Potomac River and the erection of fortifications on the Virginia side to protect the southern terminus of the Chain and Long Bridges and the Aqueduct. His superiors approved these recommendations but implementation was delayed until after the Virginia citizenry's popular referendum on secession. [12]

On May 23, 1861, the public referendum in the State of Virginia held on the Ordinance of Secession was three to one in favor of leaving the Union. Many in Washington had been sure that the vote would go that way but waited to make sure before launching a military force into Northern Virginia. After months of non-activity in the area, military movements began. [13] The May 25, 1861 issue of The New York Herald included the following article, "THE INSURRECTION. ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS INTO VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, May 24, 1861":

There can be no more complaints of inactivity of the government. The forward march movement into Virginia, indicated in my despatches last night, took place at the precise time this morning that I named, but in much more imposing and powerful numbers.

About ten o'clock last night four companies of picked men moved over the Long Bridge, as an advance guard. They were sent to reconnoitre, and if assailed were ordered to signal, when they would have been reinforced by a corps of regular infantry and a battery.

At twelve o'clock Colonel Ellsworth's regiment of Zouaves embarked in steamers from the Navy Yard for Alexandria, and must have reached there about one o'clock this morning. They landed under the cover of the Pawnee's guns. An attack would have been signalized. No attack was made.

At twelve o'clock the infantry regiment, artillery and cavalry corps began to muster and assume marching order. As fast as the several regiments were ready they proceeded to the Long Bridge, those in Washington being directed to take that route.

The troops quartered at Georgetown, the Sixty-ninth, Fifth, Eighth and Twenty-eighth New York regiments, proceeded across what is known as the chain bridge, above the mouth of the Potomac Aqueduct, under the command of General McDowell. They took possession of the heights in that direction.

The imposing scene was at the Long Bridge, where the main body of the troops crossed. Eight thousand infantry, two regular cavalry companies and two sections of Sherman's artillery battalion, consisting of two batteries, were in line this side of the Long Bridge at two o'clock.

The Twelfth (New York) was the first on the ground. The army crossed the bridge in the following order:

— Twelfth regiment, New York.

— Twenty-fifth regiment, New York.

— First regiment, Michigan.

— First, Second, Third and Fourth, New Jersey, in the order named.

— Two regular cavalry corps, of eighty men each, and Sherman's two batteries.

— Next and last came the New York Seventh, the liveliest party, and with more men than any other regiment. They seemed delighted at the idea that they were to have a show at something that looked like service before returning home.

— Following them was a long train of wagons filled with wheelbarrows, shovels, &c.

Altogether there were at least thirteen thousand troops in the advancing army. This includes the Zouaves who went by steamer, the forces that moved from Georgetown, as well as the main body that proceeded over the Long Bridge.

General Mansfield commanded the movement of the troops until the last corps left the district. The first regiment of the main body that crossed the Long Bridge started at twenty minutes past two, and the last corps left the district at about a quarter to four o'clock.

At four o'clock Major General Sandford and staff left Willard's, and proceeded to Virginia to take command of the advancing forces. He informed me that he should establish his headquarters on Arlington Heights, and should take possession of the Arlington mansion.

Two thousand troops, the New York Zouaves and New York Twelfth, are to occupy Alexandria; the remainder the heights by regiments from the chain bridge to Alexandria.

General Mansfield took the greatest care to instruct the troops just before entering the bridge to take the route step-that is, to avoid marching together, as the solid step together might injure the bridge. . . .

The sun of the 24th of May has risen and exposed to our gratifying gaze the Stars and Stripes floating over Alexandria, where the secession flag has been haunting the sight for weeks past. Truly the past has been a great night's work for the Union. Secession is suddenly doomed, and nothing but an ignominious doom awaits the leading traitors in this great wrong against popular government and free institutions." [14]

For the most part, the occupation of Northern Virginia was peaceful except in Alexandria. There, Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth, commander of the New York Fire Zouaves (Eleventh New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment) and a friend of President Lincoln, ascended the Marshall House to remove the Confederate flag flying above it. As he descended the steps, with the flag, James Jackson, the proprietor, shot and killed Ellsworth with a shotgun making him one of the first Union martyrs. [15]

The Defenses of Washington

One author wrote, "Accompanying the troops was an ample supply of entrenching tools, and by daylight of the 24th ground had been broken for two forts–Fort Runyon to guard the head of the Long Bridge, and Fort Corcoran to guard the head of the Aqueduct." [16] Engineer troops and officers accompanied the force that night to specifically prepare defenses. Engineer officers such as Barton S. Alexander, Horatio G. Wright, Frederick E. Prime and Daniel P. Woodbury, under Major John G. Barnard's leadership, set about laying out the fortifications and supervising their erection. [Cooling, Symbol, 37] Barnard reported that:

"As tetes-de-pont to the Long Bridge and Aqueduct, Forts Runyon and Corcoran, the sites of which had been previously reconnoitered under my directions, were commenced at daylight on the morning, of the 24th. The same day a reconnaissance was made in the vicinity of Alexandria by Captain Wright, Engineers (now, Major-General U. S. Volunteers), and Fort Ellsworth, to secure our possession of that city, was commenced. A couple of weeks later, I laid out Fort Albany (intended to command the Columbia and the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads, and to give greater security to our debouche' by the long Bridge), which was commenced under Captain Blunt, Engineers.

These works were all of considerable magnitude (Fort Runyon having a perimeter of 1,500 yards). They were not entirely completed, though very nearly so, and quite defensible, at the date of the advance of the army under Gen. McDowell (July 16).

I give this brief account of these preliminary works, because they formed the initiation of the system of "Defences of Washington." [17]

Elsewhere, Barnard explained:

"Previous to this movement the army of Washington, yet weak in numbers and imperfectly organized. under General Mansfield, had crossed the Potomac and occupied the south bank from opposite Georgetown to Alexandria. The first operations of field engineering were, necessarily, the securing of our debouches to the other shore and establishing of a strong point to strengthen our hold of Alexandria. The works required for these limited objects (though being really little towards constructing a defensive line) were nevertheless, considering the small number of troops available, arduous undertakings. Fort Corcoran, with its auxiliary works, Forts Bennett and Haggerty, and the block-houses and infantry parapets around the head of the Aqueduct, Forts Runyon, Jackson, and Albany (covering our debouches from the Long Bridge), and Fort Ellsworth, on Shooter's Hill, Alexandria, were mostly works of large dimensions. During the seven weeks which elapsed between the crossing of the Potomac and the advance of General McDowell's army the engineer officers under my command were so exclusively occupied with these works (all of which were nearly completed at the latter date), to make impracticable the more general reconnaissances and studies necessary for locating a line of defensive works around the city and preparing plans and estimates of the same.

The works just mentioned on the south of the Potomac, necessary for the operations of an army on that shore, were far from constituting a defensive system which would enable an inferior force to hold the long line from Alexandria to Georgetown or even to secure the heights of Arlington." [18]

On May 27, Scott established a new department that comprised all of the State of Virginia east of the Allegheny Mountains and north of the James River, except for Fort Monroe and sixty miles around it. It was named the Department of Northeast Virginia and was commanded by Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, who established his headquarters at Arlington House (Custis-Lee Mansion), owned by Robert E. Lee. The troops in this command faced guerilla activity and minor raids and skirmished with rebels in a variety of locations. These events never caused much trouble but they were a nuisance and kept the green Union troops forever on alert. [19]

While the Union concentrated forces behind the new defenses in Northern Virginia, the Confederates amassed troops to protect the railroad center of Manassas Junction. Many at that time thought that one main battle would decide the conflict between North and South. Those in the North clamored for an immediate confrontation before the South could mobilize, train and concentrate troops. In addition, many of the Union troops in the Washington had short terms of service, many for 90 days, so why not use them before they returned home. McDowell moved his troops out toward Manassas on July 16, pursuant to the President's orders. He had organized his army into brigades in five divisions commanded by Colonels Dixon Miles, David Hunter and Samuel P. Heintzelman and Brigadier Generals Theodore Runyon and Daniel Tyler. This Union force clashed with Confederate forces under the command of Brigadier Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston at Manassas on July 21, 1861. [20]

In the First Battle of Manassas, the Union army, at first, appeared to be winning, forcing the Confederate army to retreat. But, later in the day, the rebels made a stand on Henry House Hill and then counterattacked, forcing the Union army into retreat that ballooned into a rout. Besides the troops and their supply wagons, many civilian observers trekked to Manassas in their horse and buggies, and picnic lunches, to see what battle entailed. When the fighting turned into a rout, civilians became entangled with the Union army in its flight back to Washington, aiding and abetting the rout. [21]

Fear returned to the capital. Now that the Confederates had won the first major land battle of the war and the Union army was disorganized and in rout, what would happen. Would the rebels capture Washington? Would they destroy the city? Would they arrest and execute loyal Unionists? Thankfully, in the next few days the confederate army realized that it also had become disorganized by the fighting that occurred at Manassas and could not, immediately, undertake an attack on the Union capital. [22]

This fear of Confederate capture was the impetus for designing and constructing a system of fortifications to encircle and defend Washington, D.C. In the wake of defeat, the Union called Major General George B. McClellan, who had won some battles in West Virginia, to Washington and on July 27, only a few days after the defeat at Manassas, gave him command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. Nicknamed "Little Mac," McClellan, a West Point graduate, had served in the Regular Army from 1846 until 1857, when he resigned his commission and took a position with the railroads. For most of his army service, from 1846 to 1855, he had been an Army Engineer and, therefore, had an appreciation for fortifications and their use. Thus, in addition to reorganizing the army and formulating new plans to fight the enemy, McClellan ordered the erection of a system of fortifications. [23]

Although there are no written orders or instructions from McClellan describing exactly what he wanted done on the defenses of Washington, he did declare: "When I assumed command of the Army of the Potomac I found Maj. J. G. Barnard, . . . occupying the position of chief engineer of that army. I continued him in the same office, and at once gave the necessary instructions for the completion of the defenses of the capital . . ." And Barnard wrote: "I would add that to the great importance attached to these works by the commanding general [McClellan] . . . to his valuable suggestions and prompt and cordial co-operation, the present state of efficiency of the defenses of Washington is in no small degree due." [24]

When McClellan "assumed command in Washington, on the 27th of July, 1861," he found that:

"In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position and numbers of the troops or the number and character of the defensive works. Earthworks, in the nature of tetes-de-pont, looked upon the approaches to the Georgetown Aqueduct and Ferry, the Long Bridge, and Alexandria, by the Little River turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at

the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception not a single defensive work had been commenced on the Maryland side. There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance." [25]

So, Barnard reported:

"On the retreat of our army such was our situation. Upon an inferior and demoralized force, in presence of a victorious and superior enemy, was imposed the duty of holding this line and defending the city of Washington against attacks from columns of the enemy who might cross the Potomac (as was then deemed probable) above or below.

Undecided before as to the necessity, or at least the policy, of surrounding Washington by a chain of fortifications, the situation left no longer room to doubt. With our army too demoralized and too weak in numbers to act effectually in the open field against the invading enemy, nothing but the protection of defensive works could give any degree of security. Indeed, it is probable that we owe our exemption from the real disaster which might have flowed from the defeat of Bull Run–the loss to the enemy of the real fruits of his victory–to the works previously built (already mentioned), and an exaggerated idea on his part of their efficiency as a defensive line.

The situation was such as to admit of no elaborate plans nor previouslyprepared estimates. Defensive arrangements were improvised and works commenced as speedily as possible where most needed. A belt of woods was felled through the forest in front of Arlington and half-sunk batteries prepared along the ridge in front of Fort Corcoran and at suitable points near Fort Albany, and a battery of two rifled 42-pounders (Battery Cameron)was established on the heights near the distributing reservoir above Georgetown to sweep the approaches to Fort Corcoran.

Simultaneously a chain of lunettes (Forts De Kalb, Woodbury, Cass, Tillinghast, and Craig) was commenced, connecting Fort Corcoran and the Potomac on the right with Fort Albany on the left, and forming a continuous defensive line in advance of the heights of Arlington. The wooded ridge which lies north of and parallel to the lower course of Four Mile Run offered a position from which the city, the Long Bridge, and the plateau in advance of it could be overlooked and cannonaded. While our external line was so incomplete, it was important to exclude the enemy from its possession. Access to it was made difficult by felling the forest which covered it (about 200 acres), and the large lunette (Fort Scott) was commenced as soon as the site could be fixed (about the middle of August). The subsequent establishment of our defensive line in advance throws this work into the same category with Forts Corcoran, Albany, Runyon, &c., as an interior work, or second line, but it is nevertheless an important work, as, taken in connection with Forts Richardson, Craig, &c., it completes a defensive line for Washington independent of the extension to Alexandria.

The defense of Alexandria and its connection with that of Washington was a subject of anxious study. The exigency demanding immediate measures, the first idea was naturally to make use of Fort Ellsworth as one point of our line, and to connect it with Fort Scott by an intermediate work on Mount Ida. An extended study of the topography for several miles in advance showed that such a line would be almost indefensible. Not only would the works themselves be commanded by surrounding heights, but the troops which should support them would be restricted to a narrow space, in which they would be overlooked and harassed by the enemy's distant fire. The occupation of the heights a mile in advance of Fort Ellsworth, upon which the Episcopal Seminary is situated, seemed absolutely necessary. The topography proved admirably adapted to the formation of such a line, and Forts Worth and Ward were commenced about the 1st of September, and the line continued simultaneously by Forts Blenker and Richardson to connect with Forts Albany and Craig. Somewhat later the work intermediate between Blenker and Richardson–filling up the gap and having an important bearing upon the approaches to Forts Ward and Blenker and the valley of Four Mile Run–was commenced.

The heights south of Hunting Creek, overlooking Alexandria and commanding Fort Ellsworth, had been always a subject of anxiety. The securing to our own possession the Seminary Heights, which commanded them, diminished materially the danger. As soon, however, as a sufficient force could be detached to occupy those heights and protect the construction of the work it was undertaken, and the large work (Fort Lyon) laid out and commenced about the middle of September.

Previous to the movement of the army defensive measures had been taken at the Chain Bridge, consisting of a barricade (bullet proof, and so arranged as to be thrown down at will) across the bridge, immediately over the first pier from the Virginia side, with a movable staircase to the flats below, by which the defenders could retreat, leaving the bridge open to the fire of a battery of two field guns immediately at its Maryland end, and a battery on the bluff above (Battery Martin Scott) of one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer and two 32-pounders. As even this last battery was commanded by heights on the Virginia side, it was deemed proper, after the return of the army, to erect another battery (Battery Vermont) at a higher point, which should command the Virginia Heights and at the same time sweep the approaches of the enemy along the Maryland shore of the Potomac.

During the months of May and June the country between the Potomac and the Anacostia had been examined mainly with the view of obtaining knowledge of the roads and defensive character of the ground, not in reference to locating field defenses. At the period now in question there was apprehension that the enemy might cross the Potomac and attack on this side. Of course what could be done to meet the emergency could only be done without that deliberate study by which a complete defensive line would best be established. The first directions given to our labors were to secure the roads, not merely as the beaten highways of travel from the country to the city, but also as in general occupying the best ground for an enemy's approach.

Thus the sites of Forts Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Slocum, Totten, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Lincoln were rapidly chosen, and works commenced simultaneously at the first, second, third, and sixth of these points early in August.. The others were taken up as speedily as the clearing of the woods and the means at our disposal would admit, and the gaps in the line afterwards partially filled up by construction of Fort Gaines, Forts De Russy, Slemmer, and Thayer. The works mentioned are at this date essentially completed and armed, though there is still considerable to do in auxiliary arrangements. Our first ideas as to defensive works beyond the Anacostia contemplated only the fortification of the debouches from the bridges (Navy-Yard Bridge and Benning's Bridge), and the occupation of the heights overlooking the Navy-Yard Bridge. With that object Fort Stanton was commenced early in September. A further examination of the remarkable ridge between the Anacostia and Oxen Run showed clearly that, to protect the navy-yard and arsenal from bombardment, it was necessary to occupy an extent of 6 miles from Berry's place (Fort Greble) to the intersection of the road from Benning's Bridge (Fort Meigs).

Forts Greble and Carroll were commenced in the latter part of September, and Fort Mahan, near Benning's Bridge, about the same time. Forts Greble and Stanton are completed and armed; Forts Mahan and Carroll very nearly so. To fill up intervals or to sweep ravines not seen by the principal works, Forts Meigs, Dupont, Davis, Baker, Good Hope, Battery Ricketts, and Fort Snyder have been commenced, and it is hoped may be so far advanced before the winter sets in as to get them into a defensible condition. The occupation of the Virginia shore at the Chain Bridge was essential to the operations of our army in Virginia. It was only delayed until our force was sufficient to authorize it. General Smith's division crossed the bridge September –, and Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy were immediately commenced and speedily finished.

A few weeks later (September 28) the positions of Upton's and Mun-son's Hills and Taylor's Tavern were occupied and Fort Ramsay commenced on Upton's Hill. The enemy's works on Munson's and the adjacent hill were strengthened and a lunette built near Taylor's Tavern.

Comprised in the foregoing categories there are twenty-three field forts south of the Potomac, fourteen field forts and three batteries between the Potomac and Anacostia, and eleven field forts beyond the Anacostia, making forty-eight field forts in all. These vary in size from Forts Runyon, Lyon, and Marcy, of which the perimeters are 1,500, 937, and 736 yards, down to Forts Bennett, Haggerty, and Saratoga, &c., with perimeters of 146, 128, and 154 yards. The greater portion of them are inclosed works of earth, though many–as Forts Craig, Tillinghast, Scott, &c., south of the Potomac, and Forts Saratoga, Gaines, &c., on the north–are lunettes with stockaded gorges. The armament is mainly made up of 24 and 32 pounders on sea-coast carriages, with a limited proportion of 24-pounder siege guns, rifled Parrott guns, and

guns on field carriages of lighter caliber. The larger of the works are flanked, but the greater number are not, the sites and dimensions not permitting. Magazines are provided for one hundred rounds of ammunition, and many of the works have a considerable extent of bomb-proof shelter, as Forts Lyon, Worth, and Ward, in the bomb-proofs of which probably one-third of the garrison might comfortably sleep and nearly all take temporary shelter. In nearly all the works there are either bomb-proofs like the above, or log barracks, or blockhouses of some kind.

It would be impossible to go into any details about these constructions. I am in hopes ultimately to be able to deposit in the Engineer Office drawings of each work with sufficient detail for most purposes. The accompanying sheets, Nos. 1 and 2, will exhibit the general location and bearings of the works.(*) The tabular statement herewith will show the perimeters, number of guns, amount of garrison, &c.(+)

It should be observed that most of the works south of the Potomac, having been thrown up almost in the face of the enemy, have very light profiles, the object having been to get cover and a defensive work as speedily as possible. The counterscarps of all the works, with few exceptions, are surrounded by abatis.

It is impossible, at present, to indicate the exact extent of forest cut down. (The drawings herewith represent the forest as it existed before the works were commenced.)(++) The woods in advance of Forts Worth, Ward, and Blenker have been felled; all surrounding and between the next work on the right and Fort Richardson; all the wood on the ridge on which is Fort Scott– a square mile probably–in advance of and surrounding Forts Craig, Tillinghast, and Woodbury, besides large areas north of the Potomac, &c. This fallen timber (most of which still lies on the ground.) rendered an enemy's approach to the lines difficult. The sites of Forts Totten, Slocum, Bunker Hill, Meigs, Stanton, and others were entirely wooded, which, in conjunction with the broken character of the ground, has made the selection of sites frequently very embarrassing and the labor of preparing them very great.

The only case in which forts are connected by earthworks is that of Forts Woodbury and De Kalb, between which an infantry parapet is thrown up,

with emplacements for field guns. The construction here was suggested by the fact that this was on one of the most practicable and probable routes of approach for the enemy. Infantry trenches have, however, been constructed around or in advance of other works, either to cover the construction (as at Fort Lyon), or to see ground not seen by the work (as at Forts Totten, Lincoln, Mahan, &c.).

The works I have now described do not constitute a complete defensive system.

We have been obliged to neglect much and even to throw out of consideration important matters. We have been too much hurried to devise a perfect system, and even now are unable to say precisely what and how many additional points should be occupied and what auxiliary arrangements should be made.

It is safe to say that at least two additional works are required to connect Fort Ethan Allen with Fort De Kalb.

The necessity of protecting the Chain Bridge compelled us to throw the left of our northern line several miles in advance of its natural position, as indicated by the topography to the sites of Forts Ripley, Alexander, and Franklin. Between these and Forts Gaines or Pennsylvania one or two intervening works are necessary.

Between Forts Pennsylvania and De Russy at least one additional work is necessary.

Fort Massachusetts is entirely too small for its important position. Auxiliary works are necessary in connection with it.

Small tetes-de-pont are required around the heads of Benning's and the Navy-Yard Bridges.

Between Forts Mahan and Meigs one or more intervening works and between Forts Du Pont and Davis another work of some magnitude are required, the ground along this line not being yet sufficiently known. A glance at the map will show it to be almost a continuous forest. It is not deemed necessary to connect the works by a continuous line of parapet, but the intervening woods should be abatised and open ground traversed by a line of artificial abatis, and infantry parapets, half-sunk batteries, &c., placed so as to protect these obstructions and to see all the irregularities of the ground not now seen from the works. Considerable work is also required in the way of roads, the amount of which I cannot state with any precision. Several miles of roads have actually been made. The works themselves would be very much strengthened by caponieres in the ditches, additional internal block-houses, or defensive barracks, &c.

The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles, including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole, requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrisons.

The number of guns, most of which are actually mounted, is about four hundred and eighty, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works.

The total garrisons for all the works (one hundred and fifty-two in number) of the lines of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men; and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of work of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Torres Vedras.

The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe. when the amount of bombproof shelter in ours is considered, more labor per yard of perimeter; but the latter lines involved a greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scraping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, &c., than we have had occasion to make.

The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with five hundred and thirty–four pieces of ordnance (12, 9, or 6 pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with four hundred and eighty pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, 24-pounder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrott), with a few field pieces and howitzers. As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with that of the famous lines mentioned; in weight of metal more than doubles it.

The above applies to our works as now nearly completed, and has no reference to the additional works I have elsewhere mentioned as hereafter necessary. It is impossible to give any other statement of actual cost of the works than the total amount expended thus far. The work has been done partly by troops and partly by hired laborers, the works north of the Potomac being mostly done by the latter. The large amount of carpentry in magazine frames and doors and blindages, barrier gates, stockades, block-houses, defensive barracks, &c., has kept a large gang of carpenters all the time at work, and caused a large expenditure for lumber. The entire amount made available by the Department for these works has been $344,053.46, and this will all have been expended (or more) by the end of the present month. This would give an average of a little over $7,000 for each of the forty-eight works; but of course the real cost of them has been very unequal.

The importance of perfect security to the capital of the United States in the present state of affairs can scarcely be overestimated, and these works give a security which mere numbers cannot give, and at not a tithe the expense of defense by troops alone."

Thus following the defeat at First Manassas, gigantic efforts were directed toward designing and erecting a system of fortifications to protect Washington, D.C., the Union's capital. [26]

After deciding that fortifications are necessary, the first thing to do, hopefully by an Army engineer officer, was to select the right location(s). Dennis Hart Mahan, the Military Engineering professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, wrote:

"As a field fort must rely entirely on its own strength, it should be constructed with such care that the enemy will be forced to abandon an attempt to storm it, and be obliged to resort to the method of regular approaches used in the attack of permanent works. To effect this, all the ground around the fort, within range of the cannon, should offer no shelter to the enemy from its fire; th ditches should be flanked throughout; and the relief be so great as to preclude any attempt at scaling the work." [27]

After the Army engineer officer selected the location of the fortification, he next needed to "throw up the work," "layout the work" or profile it. Some authors have described how to throw up a work:

"56. The foregoing chapters contain all that is requisite to determine the plan and relief of field works under all circumstances of variety of ground. To follow a natural order, the next steps will be to describe the manner of laying the work out on the field, which is termed profiling; the distribution of the workmen to excavate the ditch, and form the parapet; and the precautions to be observed in the construction.

57. Poles (Fig. 18,) having been planted at the angles of the work, and the height of the interior crest-marked on them, a line is traced on the ground, with a pick, showing the direction of the interior crests. At suitable distances, say from twenty to thirty yards apart, cords are stretched between two stout pickets, in a direction perpendicular to the line marked out by the pick; these cords should be exactly horizontal. A stout square picket is driven firmly into the ground, where the cord crosses above the pick-line, and a slip of pine, on which the height of the interior crest is marked, is nailed to the picket. The thickness of the parapet is measured on the cord, and a picket driven into the ground to mark the point. The base of the interior slope and tread of the banquette, are set off in a similar manner; and a slip of deal is nailed to each of the pickets. The height of the interior crest, and the tread of the banquette, are easily ascertained, from the position of the cord, and the interior crest; these points having been marked on their respective slips, the outline of the parapet is shown by connecting them by other slips, which are nailed to the uprights; the banquette slope, and exterior slope, will be determined by a similar process.

58. From the profile thus formed perpendicular to the interior crests, the oblique profiles at the angles can readily be set up, by a process which will suggest itself without explanation.

59. Having completed the profiling, the foot of the banquette, and that of the exterior slope, are marked out with the pick, and also the crests of the scarp and counterscarp. All the arrangements preparatory to commencing the excavation are now complete." [28]

"A stick may be cut to measure lines, and stakes will be driven to show the slope and general form of the profile necessary in each particular case. Whatever the form is to be given to a work, it is traced upon the ground by laying off its angles according to the number of their degrees, and its sides are designated by little furrows dug with the mattock or spade along cords stretched in the proper direction. To profile a work is to figure upon the ground its elevation by means of poles and laths nailed together; (Fig. 127.) The officer who directs the work ought to take with him four or five soldiers who carry mattocks, 100 pickets, twenty poles ten or twelve feet long, twenty laths, some camp colors, and a cord 65 feet in length. There ought to be a carpenter, who carries hammer, nails, and a saw.

Field-works necessary or desirable in the operations of an army in the field to strengthen lines of battle, keep open lines of communication, protect bridges from destruction, &c., will generally be constructed under the supervision of engineers. They may have any extent, from a simple redan, or a battery, to a line or several lines of works, some of considerable magnitude, extending over a position of ten or twenty miles." [29]

"To throw up a work, a line is first traced on the ground with a pick, showing the direction of the interior crest: poles having been planted at the angles of the work, with the height of the interior crest marked on them, cords are then stretched at distances of about thirty yards apart, horizontally between two pickets, perpendicular to the lines." [30]

"The proper height of parapet for the work having been determined, (by the process of defilading, if necessary,) the next step is to plant pickets on the faces, flanks, and angles as guides to the workmen in giving it the suitable dimensions and form. Thus, to the magistral line of each face and flank, trace on the ground perpendicularly at intervals, and on these measure, horizontally, the bases of the slopes composing the profile to be employed. At the points thus set out fix poles or laths perpendicularly in the ground, and saw off their tops at the height which the parapet is to have at that particular part; nail laths to the tops of these poles from one to the other across the direction of the intended parapet; and thus there will be obtained an outline of the slopes, or a profile of the parapet.

For the profile at an angle, lay a rope on the ground bisecting that angle, and produce it outwards; drive pickets along this rope at the points where it is intersected by the prolongations of lines joining the bases of the profiles already set up perpendicularly to the adjoining faces, these pickets mark the bases of the profiles at the salient; the laths may then be set up as before.

When the salient angle is 60%%, the breadth of the base of any slope measured on the capital will be equal to twice the breadth of the same slope taken on a line at right angles to the face." [31]

"The work is commenced by marking on the ground the interior crest, the foot of the interior slope, and the banquette, which is done by a little furrow made with a pick moved along cords stretched in the direction of the lines just mentioned; . . ." [32]

Some soldiers, who observed this construction and often actually worked on the fortifications themselves, penned descriptions:

"On the 29th we were engaged in building a fort on the site of our old camp. The fort or earthwork was a very large one with a ditch or moat all round it. This was filled with water. The outside of the forts were sodded. In building these works the engineers first built a light frame of wood the size and shape that it wanted, and when it is fixed to suit them with the necessary angles, etc. the men are put to work with pick and shovel and digging from the outside throw the dirt between the frame work until it is filled up, some of the men being on the pile to spread the dirt. When it has been graded over nicely, it is covered over with sods. The ditch soon fills with water from the many rain storms, and after the Cheaveaux de Frisse that we employed were large branches of trees pinned to the ground, with the brush outward. The ends of the branches were then cut off and sharpened, and it would have bothered man or horse to get over it." [33]

"A line was laid out by our Engineers and we were ordered to fortify our position. Axes and shovels were furnished and we were soon hard at work. To most of us this was an unfamiliar effort but before our service ended it was one in which we were to become proficient. . . . There was a lot of fallen timber that we gathered and placed lengthwise, then dug a trench behind, with the dirt thrown over the logs. The trench was over two feet deep, wide

enough for the line to stand in and with the embankment the total depth was five feet. These works were quite strong and would protect the men against attack, for an ordinary projectile could not go through the embankment." [34]

Engineers

When the Civil War began, two engineer corps existed in the army–the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical Engineers. Among other duties, the Corps of Engineers planned, designed and oversaw the construction and maintenance of fortifications while the Corps of Topographical Engineers was the Army's surveyors and cartographers, often surveying and mapping fortifications. The two corps combined in 1863 because there weren't enough Army engineers for two to serve on the staff of all the commands within the Union Army. Following the merger, Army Engineers were responsible for surveying and mapping fortifications as well as planning, designing and overseeing their construction and maintenance. [35]

The Army Engineers planned, designed and erected numerous fortifications throughout the country during the Civil War but the Defense of Washington, D.C. was the most ambitious undertaking. Winfield Scott assigned Major John G. Barnard, Corps of Engineers, to the Department of Washington; on April 28, 1861, Colonel J.F.K. Mansfield, the department commander, a former engineer officer, attached Barnard to his headquarters as chief engineer. [36]

When the army moved into Northern Virginia on May 24, 1861, Barnard oversaw the erection of fortifications there. He also accompanied the Army to Manassas in July 1861. McClellan assumed command of the troops around Washington, D.C. at the end of that month. On August 17, all the troops in the vicinity of Washington became part of the Army of the Potomac and, three days later, General Orders No. 1, Army of the Potomac, stipulated that Barnard was attached to the staff as chief engineer. As McClellan formulated his thoughts for fortifications around Washington, D.C., Barnard planned, designed and oversaw their construction. At first, there were many other Army Engineers to assist Barnard including G.W. Snyder, Henry Robert, D.P. Woodbury, Frederick E. Prime, G.W.C. Lee, Miles D. McAllester, C.E. Cross, O.E. Babcock, Horatio G. Wright, Barton S. Alexander, and C.E. Blunt but, before long, all of these officers were off to other assignments except Barton S. Alexander who, except for a few temporary assignments, stayed with the defenses of Washington throughout the war. Army Engineer Lt. James W. Cuyler, for sometime in 1864-65, oversaw the work on outer defenses at Vienna. [37]

Early in the war, the Regular Army Engineer troops assisted in the construction of the Defenses of Washington and in training others to do the same, "Here the men were put immediately to work, superintending the construction of the fortifications of the Capital, being first employed on the rifle battery at Chain Bridge, and afterwards at Fort Pennsylvania (later Fort Reno), and on other works in the vicinity of Upton, Munson, and Mason hills." Even the volunteer Engineer units participated. Volunteer Army Enginner Wesley Brainerd wrote "We constructed a fort. The work was done by the Companies, relieving each other by day and night as in case of actual hostilities with an enemy in front" and "We occasionally took trips across the river for practice in the art of making Fascines [and] Gabions." Captain Henry E. Wrigley, commander of the Independent Company, Pennsylvania Volunteer Engineers, requested that his unit be detailed for service upon the entrenchments, endorsed by Barnard, and, among other accomplishments, they erected a small battery and infantry parapet to connect Fortt Cass with Fort Tillinghast and supervised a party of 600 men constructing fortifications between forts Richardson and Cass. Unfortunately, both the Regular Army Engineer Battalion and the volunteer engineer units left the Washington, D.C. area for the field. [38]

Civilian Employees

Barnard and Alexander, therefore, hired numerous civilian employees to replace the unavailable military engineers. Barnard wrote:

"The civil engineers, William C. Gunnell on the north [side of the Potomac River], and Edward Frost (subsequently A. Grant Childs) on the south [side of the Potomac River], had been prior to the war engaged on the Washington Aqueduct. They exhibited great zeal and intelligence, and soon mastered all those branches of military engineering which concerned their duties of construction. They were required to execute plans prepared in the office of the chief engineer, to exercise close supervision over their respective divisions and generally to act as administrative officers in the details of the work." [39]

The subordinate organizations of each of the civil engineers in charge of divisions consisted as follows:

A draughtsman to prepare plans, maps, &c.

An assistant engineer to assist in laying out the work from plans to make the necessary field surveying for maps.

A clerk to consolidate the daily reports of working force; to make out the monthly pay-rolls, keep accounts of purchases, and to prepare vouchers for payment; and to keep account of property drawn on requisition upon the quartermaster's and other departments.

Two or more superintendents were employed on each division, to whom were apportioned subdivisions of the line. Their duties were to control and direct, through their foreman, the laboring force; to keep the time-books, make daily reports of the occupation of every person employed under them, as well as of the military details; to supervise the camps and depots of material; to make requisition on the engineers in charge (who were the purchasing agents) for materials; and, generally, to aid the civil engineers by giving a closer and more constant oversight to all the operations on each subdivision than they could themselves exercise." [40]

On March 12 and April 29, 1864, Barnard reported on the various types of employees working on the fortifications and their recompense:

"Your communication of yesterday requesting to be furnished with a list of the pay given to employees on these Defences is received and below I give the desired information:

Chief Engineer—In charge of line	$7.00 per day
Superintendent	$5.00 per day
Clerks	$3. And $4.50 per day
Draftsmen	$3. And $5. per day
Overseers	Nothing shown
Foreman of Laborers—same[as above]	$3.00 per day & 1 Ration
Master Carpenter	$3.50 per day & 1 Ration"

"In accordance with your request in endorsement on letter of Colonel Brewerton, I herewith annex a statement of the rates paid by me on the works for defences of Washington:

Carpenters	$2.00 to $2.50 per day & 1 Ration
Masons	$2.50 per day & 1 Ration
Blacksmiths	$2.00 to $2.50 per day & 1 Ration
Foreman laborers	$2.50 per day & 1 Ration
Laborers	$1.00 to $1.25 per day & 1 Ration" [41]

Barnard received a variety of applications for the more experienced jobs under his supervision. A.C. Entrikin, of Brooklyn, New York, with a recommendation from Army Engineer officer, Major C. E. Blunt, applied for appointment as superintendent of fortifications, on October 24, 1864; Leander A. Poor asked for a position as engineer on December 10, 1862; and G.W. Watson, who worked for the New York City Surveyor & Engineer Office, wanted a situation as a draughtsmen, on February 3, 1864. The Sanitary Commission inquiree, on January 1, 1865, if employment could be given to certain discharged soldiers as mechanics. Madam Pountalis requested of Barnard civilian employment for an Austrian officer, Mr. Holleys, who was in U.S. service but on account of wounds found field service too hard, on the works. [42]

On November 6, 1861, Barnard wrote an endorsement, exclaiming "We have now in service on field works around Washington as many laborers as can be usefully employed." But, due to the many men who voluntarily joined the service or were drafted, the Army Engineers generally experienced great difficulty in finding good employees and keeping them. Advertisements appeared in various newspapers around Washington, D. C. and in other cities, including New York, such as this one in the Washington Star, July 1864:

Wanted immediately, 200 laborers, 50 choppers, carpenters, etc., to work on Eastern Branch line of fortifications.

Apply to John Collins, superintendent at Camp Haskins, near insane assylum, or at headquarters chief engineer defences of Washington, Pennsylvania avenue and 19th street.

William Gunnell
Engineer Defences North Potomac [43]

Even the Secretary of War realized how difficult it was to find and keep laborers on the fortifications. In 1863, he asked for a report "as to the just and reasonable rate of advanced wages" for laborers on the fortifications. The two Civil Engineers, Gunnell and Childs, recommended to Barnard "we think the following increase would be proper":

25 per cent on all rates not exceeding $3.00 per day.

15 per cent on all rates exceeding $3.00 and not exceeding $5.00 per day.

But in another point of view, if it is considered proper only to give such rates as we are compelled to give in order to command the labor we want, then we would say from $2.00 to $2.50 per day to Carpenters, $1.25 per day to laborers & $1.00 per day to Contrabands with rations to each of the above. All other rates to remain as at present. [44]

A Union draft or conscription threatened to further deplete the ranks of employees. Alexander on October 22, 1862, informed Barnard that "two of the best teamsters" employed on the defenses north of the Potomac River had been drafted by the state in Baltimore County, Maryland and asked for an exemption. In anticipation of a national conscription law, the Engineer bureau, on August 14, 1862, wrote the Secretary of War requesting relief:

"I have the honor to recommend that the following persons, or classes of persons, employed by the Engineer Department or its officers, be placed among those not subject for the present, to be drafted into the active military service of the United States:

1st Agent of the Department in charge of works or operations 2nd Civil Assistants to Officers or Agents 3rd Clerks 4th Overseers 5th Draughtsmen 6th Receivers of Materials 7th Foreman of Laborers 8th Master Mechanics or Workmen

If this proposition is approved, it will still leave the great body of persons employed in our operations, viz, mechanics and laborers. Available for the military service.

Those proposed to be excepted are persons having special acquired skill and generally holding positions of authority. The drafting of any of them might be rather prejudicial than advantageous to the military interests of the Country. Some of them it would be very difficult to replace." [45]

On March 3, 1863, the Union passed its first national conscription act. F.W. Balckford, Commissioner of Enrollment, on December 5, 1863, informed the Commanding Officer at Fort De Kalb that John Nighton, who had been drafted, declined to become a citizen and therefore was exempt from the draft but "In such times, such a man should not be employed by the Government" and recommended his dismissal from the work. Pat Casey, an employee on the fortifications was also exempted from the draft on the "grounds of alienage" in March 1865. In February 1865, W.C. Gunnell, a civil assistant on the defences was drafted but on March 1, the Adjutant General's Office informed the Engineer Department "I have the honor to inform you that, by direction of the Secretary of War, William C. Gunnell, drafted in this city on the 2d ultimo, will be allowed to absent himself from military service, upon his parole of honor to report for duty whenever called upon." James Burke, a master carpenter on the works south of the Potomac was drafted on February 28, 1865 and Alexander, on March 6, wrote the Secretary of War asking that he be excused from the operation of the draft to continue to serve in his present position for "The long experience of a good man on such a line of forts, as you know, cannot be easily replaced." The Army Engineers did not always succeed as in September 1864, superintendent John Collins was informed that his request to have F.P. Endicott excused from the draft could not be granted. [46]

Labor Relations

Labor relations between the employees and the Army Engineers were not always great. On January 5, 1863, Barnard informed Civil Engineer Edward Frost, who supervised construction and maintenance of Defenses of Washington, South and West of the Potomac, "Your services will be no longer required. Please turn over your work and accounts to Mr. Childs who will be directed to assume charge of them." No reason for this change was found. [47]

On December 28, 1862, Civil Engineer William C. Gunnell, who supervised construction and maintenance of Defenses of Washington North of the Potomac, submitted his resignation but did not state his reasons. Barnard instructed Superintendent John Collins, on December 30, to take over Gunnell's duties. Before Collins could do so, however, Gunnell withdrew his resignation and resumed his duties. [48]

In November 1864, Benjamin S. Bryant, a workman on the defences, required a pass to go into Virginia and bring his wife back. Draughtsman Bolton W. O'Grady disappeared on July 9, 1864, purportedly with a woman of "bad character" and left his wife and two children destitute but, hopefully, the $40.00 owed him could be given to them. On July 2, 1863, Barnard reported that his hired employees were deserting and refused to work so guards were sent him "to compel these people to work, and if necessary prevent their desertion." [49]

---

* As Union troops moved south, some slaves escaped their masters and followed the blueclad soldiers, hoping to be set free. On May 24, Union General Benjamin F. Butler refused to return three fugitive slaves who came into his lines because the Confederacy had employed them in constructing fortifications and, therefore, he confiscated them as "contraband of war." Indeed, many slaves in the Confederacy raised food, hauled supplies, and were put to work on fortifications and in mines and munition plants which justified their confiscation as contaband of war. Lincoln's administration quickly approved Butler's actions. The term contraband, applied to fugitive slaves, quickly gained common usage. On July 9, 1861, Congress passed a resolution stipulating that the Union army was not responsible to capture and return fugitive slaves. Congress passed a Confiscation Act on August 6, 1861 providing that the Union Army could confiscate any slave employed directly by the Confederate armed forces. On March 13, 1862, Congress passed an act forbidding Union army officers from returning fugitive slaves to their masters. The Union often employed these contraband and later recruited them into the armed forces. See: Patricia L. Faust, "contrabands," Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia, 161-62; Free at Last: A Documentary History of Slavery, Freedom, and the Civil War. Edited by Ira Berlin , et al. (Edison, NJ: The Blue & Grey Press, 1997), xxviii (May 24), 8-11; Long, The Civil War, 77-78 (May 24); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 354-56, 496-98.

---

On October 28, 1864, Alexander received an anonymous letter "relative to refusing a man work if he did not vote for" George B. McClellan for president. The overseers supervising the erection of the defenses in the Fairfax Court House area had trouble obtaining rations. Alexander, on one occasion, had to appeal to the superior officer (go over the head) of Colonel William Gamble, commander of the troops in that sector comprising the First Separate Brigade. In addition, many commanding officers of forts and batteries, against orders, often refused entrance to employees. For example, in April 1863, "Foreman Franklin Hoyt was refused permission to enter Fort Ward on pass of General Barnard." On August 26, 1864, Assessor P.M. Pearson, U.S. Internal Revunue, requested a list of all officers, subordinates and employees during the year 1863 with the amount paid them to determine income taxes owed. [50]

In spite of the scarcity of employees and the problems associated with them, the engineers used them as they could and when they had money to pay them. Generally, more hired employees were used on the fortifications south of the Potomac River than on those north of the Potomac River. The average number of hired employees in the months for which there are reports follow:

Unfortunately, little more is known about the ordinary laborers on the Defenses of Washington. No good collection of letters, or a diary or reminiscence has been found. Some additional information on the contrabands, who worked as laborers, is known and is provided below.

Contraband Workers

Former slaves or "contrabands,"* as some referred to them, flocked to Washington, D.C., the Union capital. In some instances, though, government agencies even impressed the former slaves and forcibly transported them from areas such as the peninsula, between the York and James rivers in Virginia, and North Carolina to the Washington, D.C. area to work. After arriving in the area, many found work as laborers. Due to the lack of other employees and the fact that contrabands worked for less money, numerous former slaves worked on the fortifications. [52]

In August 1862, contrabands, both men and women, received 40 cents plus rations, at the Quartermaster Departments' expense, a day for their work. By November 1863, Civil Engineers Gunnell and Childs recommended to Barnard that $1.00 per day to contrabands with rations was a fair wage. The Engineers also issued a variety of clothing to those contrabands and their families who worked on the fortifications. Some of the contrabands working on the fortifications lived in Freedmen's Village or other Government housing and sometimes even at the forts such as Fort Lyon, VA, or the shanty village at Fort Albany, VA. [53]

The Army didn't always treat the contrabands fairly. The Department informed Brigadier General Silas Casey, on April 6, 1862, that, in answer to his letter, "all negroes coming into the lines of any of the camps or Forts under his command are to be treated as persons and not as chattle." General A.W. Whipple's Division ADC, on August 25, 1862, called attention to the case of the contrabands employed on fortifications in the command declaring that Brigadier General Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, sent them over with instructions to pay them at the rate of 40 cents for each working day but many had been at work for more than two months and never received pay leaving them destitute of clothing and other necessaries. On July 11, 1862, the commander of the Miltary Defenses Southwest of the Potomac wrote that a great number of contrabands were employed on the fortifications in this command and, per orders from Whipple, they should be paid all that was due them." The aide-de-camp, Whipple's Division, informed commanders, on July 18, 1862, that regimental quartermasters "will make requisitions for funds sufficient to pay those laborers at the rate of forty cents for each days work" and "rations will be issued at the rate of one for each adult detached for service and where necessity required it food will be furnished for children." To make sure that the contrabands were taken care of, commanders received instructions to keep records of service each day and to make a full report on the subject at the end of each month. These reports resembled the following one, submitted on June 19, 1862:

"I have the honor to report the following as the number of Contraband in your command.

Where Employed	Employees	un Employees	Total	Rations Drawn for
Arlington Men	8	10	18
	Women	3	3	6
	Children	1	1	25
14th Mass V		53		53	53
2nd NY Art.		10		10	10
4th NY Arty	Men	13		13
	Women	2		2		15
1st Wis Co. Arty	Men	5		5
	Women	1		1	6
Hospital 4th NY Arty		12		12	12
Hospital Fairfax Sem.	Men	26		26
	Women	6		6
	Children	10	10	42
12th Batty Ft. Lyon	Men	41		41	41
11th NY Batty.	Men	14		14
Ft. Ellsworth	Women	1		1	15
	Total	195	24	219	219	[54]

Generally, the Army Engineers were glad to employ contrabands on the defenses. General Whipple, on May 14, 1862, was informed that "On your recommendation the General commanding has directed one Hundred "Contrabands" be detailed for duty as laborers on the Military defences S.W. of the Potomac." On June 1, 1862, Army Engineer William E. Merrill requested that General Wadsworth issue a detail of "contraband" to him for work on the defenses. B.S. Alexander proposed that about "1000 negroes" organized in three gangs under a general superintendent–one 400-man gang to work on the North side between the river and the Eastern Branch, one 400-man gang for the South side of the river, and a 200-man gang for the east side of the Eastern Branch–could put the roads in good order by Christmas. Further, Alexander wrote that by using the contrabands, which in sufficient numbers "will furnish the true solution of the subject, the estimate of costs to do the work may be reduced at least one-half and probably more." Civil Engineer Edward Frost wrote, on May 9, 1862, that 100 to 150 able-bodied contrabands "might meet the urgent need that exists for working parties in the several Forts . . ." [55]

But, not everyone was happy with the contrabands' work and appearance. Civilian Engineer Edward Frost, on November 10, 1862, wrote that "A portion of the Contrabands remaining in my charge" were "entirely unsuitable for the purpose . . ." Many of the local Northern Virginia citizens did not appreciate the contrabands who often camped on their property and sometimes took their belongings and caused destruction. Anne S. Frobel, one of those citizens, was distraught when "a whole gang of Contrabands had taken possession of Sharon," the chapel on her land. The contraband did not leave so she had to have the Army evict them. [56]

One author wrote that "In general, and in order to save the troops as much as possible, most of the labor was performed, not by troops, but by hired negroes working under charge of engineer officers." Actually, hired laborers, including contrabands, were in short supply and at times there wasn't any money to pay them. The greatest amount of the labor on the fortifications was performed by troops stationed in the defenses of Washington and the Department of Washington, including infantry, artillery and cavalry. [57]

Although most of the fortification work was not done by contrabands, they were used when available. The Military Defenses Southwest of the Potomac reported on July 11, 1862 that "there are a large number of Contraband employed as laborers on the forts and roads in this command." On August 1, 1862, Colonel Wagner, Second NewYork Artillery Regiment, learned that a party of contrabands would join him to "be employed in the new work in process of construction near Ft. Blenker." In November 1862, Barnard reported that he had 2 to 300 contrabands at work along the line from Fort DeKalb to Fort Worth. Alexander reported on July 31, 1864, that a gang of contrabands in the employment of the Quartermasters Department was removing the undergrowth of bushes springing up in front of the works. Thus, it was not strange for Alexander to state in his report of operations on the defenses during the month of July 1864, "This labor has been performed, under the direction of this office, partly by employees of the Q.M. Dept. and contrabands from Freedmen's Village, and partly by the garrisons of the different forts." [58]

At times, the Army Engineers experienced problems in the use of contraband labor on the fortifications. In one instance a commander had been informed that he would receive contrabands to work on the forts but later was told that the "General says he considers their service much more needed here at the Hospitals and in the QM Dept. And he can not spare any for the fortifications." Alexander reported:

"that Colored Laborers at work for Engineer Dept on South Side of Potomac, stationed at Contraband Camp, were by order of Gen Auger taken to the Agricultural Contraband Camp & were informed that all who wished to do so could remain & those who would not would be sent under guard to Washington. They were told that they would not be allowed to work for the Engineer Dept on the Forts or elsewhere, & that they would not be allowed to drive Government teams." [59]

The troops that worked on the fortifications were often glad to see the contraband workers. A member of the 50th New Jersey Volunteer Infantry Regiment reported that "Details of men were sent out every morning" to work on the fortifications but "At length a force of two hundred contrabands from North Carolina were sent to take our places in the ditches, and we willingly turned over to them our picks and shovels." Private Alfred Bellard wrote that "The government had sent a lot of contrabands with us to fell trees and cut them into cord wood, which were afterwards sent by rail to the city to furnish fuel for the army during the winter." [60]

Many of the officers felt that the best work was accomplished when a competent supervisor oversaw the contrabands' work. Upon receiving 100 contrabands to work on the fortifications, General Whipple was "authorized to employ suitable persons as "overseers" to take charge of these laborers not exceeding one overseer to thirty laborers." Whipple informed his subordinates that "you will direct a competent officer to take charge of the contrabands detailed as working parties in and about the forts occupied by your command . . ." Civil Engineer Frost suggested to Whipple "assigning to each regimental or other separate command a limited number of negroes, as a working party not less than ten nor more than thirty in each; placing the same number under the general supervision of a commissioned officer & in the immediate care of a sergeant . . ." Concluding, Frost remarked that "Such portions of the work prescribed as command skill & experience will be done by the usual Force employed by the Engineer Department." Regardless, the contraband were important to the construction and maintenance of the defenses of Washington. Without the contrabands' numbers and labor, the defenses would not have been as successful as they were. [61]

Military Workers

Much of the labor for constructing and maintaining the Defenses of Washington was provided by troops. The author of Alexandria in the Civil War wrote, "Generally, northerners spent their first days in the Old Dominion adjusting to the rigors of camp life. For most troops, this meant drill and digging earthworks to protect Washington." Margaret Leech, author of the beloved book on Washington during the Civil War expressed the same idea, "The soldiers in the vicinity of Washington had at once begun the arduous labor of building earthworks." [62]

Actually, the soldiers themselves explained it much better. A Seventy-Ninth New York "Highlander" exclaimed that work on the Defenses of Washington "was the hardest kind of manual labor; spades were trumps and every man held a full hand." Private Bellard wrote, "Entrenchments were being dug on all the hills round the city, while more forts were to be put up during the winter. At this time we were building a large fort near Fort Lyons." In his letter from Fort Albany, Virginia, of July 25, 1861, Robert McAllister wrote "The right wing of our Regiment have since been engaged in throwing up breastworks at the Arlington Mills some three miles out from the river at a road and railroad crossing, where we are planting a battery to sweep the road." Company D of the The Forty-Fifth U.S. Colored Troops reported in the Fall of 1864 that "At 7:30 each day the line was formed for fatigue duty and the men (all except the sick and a guard) are marched to Fort McPherson, where they work until 5 p.m." In November 1862, a member of the Fourteenth Vermont Regiment observed that "Fifteen hundred men are detailed from this brigade daily, to work on forts." The author of a history of the Tenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry remarked, "While regimental annals are not over full of dirt-throwing details, it is apparent from casual mention here and there, that all the men were getting their share of work entirely unthought of when they signed their enlistment papers." In the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, "This drill was soon interrupted by our being set to work upon the lines of fortification." In 1863, The First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers "performed a vast amount of labor during the year, having erected fine winter quarters for officers and men; completed and occupied one forty-three gun fort, besides erecting three large bomb-proof barracks, capable of quartering the men." [63]

In December 1862, Charles H. Moulton of the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Volunteers provided a longer description of the unit's work on the fortifications:

"Today the whole regiment is at work on the new forts and rifle pits, busily engaged in throwing up the embankments, so as to hurry up their completion. There is about a month's work on them for the Regt., so people at home need not think that the 34th is out here doing nothing and laying idle. The Regt. Is saving the Government thousands of dollars by doing the work themselves, which otherwise would have to be entrusted to day laborers, who are paid a dollar a day and clothed and fully rationed, and then don't do one-half the work they are expected to accomplish. The Regt. Fell in line this morning at 8 o'clock in their working suit, blouses on etc., and are now actively engaged in shoveling, picking, wheeling, etc." [64]

The Fortieth Regiment New York Volunteers regimental history described what the unit did following First Manassas:

"But we had other duties than those of drilling. There were daily fatigue parties detailed for the construction of the fortifications which were erected to protect Washington from an invading army. These intrenchments were erected in the form of an arc of a circle reaching from Fort Lyon below Alexandria to Fort Corcoran above Chain Bridge. These forts generally crowned the summits of eminence, in front of which the forests were felled by experienced men from Maine. I remember to have watched from our encampment, the disappearance of these forests, and as giant after giant was seen to fall . . . the forests seemed to melt away and disappear as snow gradually dissolves from the hillside in the springtime." [65]

Some units worked on just one aspect of the fortifications or felt compelled to report about only one specific task. Many spent considerable time cutting down trees for the fortifications and a field of fire. The One Hundred Twenty-Seventh New York Volunteers' regimental history reports that "On September 24th [1862] two hundred men were detailed from the regiment to cut down trees in the front of Fort Ethan Allen to afford greater range for the guns of that fort, and many still remember the feelings of regret that the circumstances seemed to require the destruction of the pleasant grove." The Thirty-Third New York State Volunteer Regiment exclaimed "Other troops, to the number of ten thousand . . . and eighteen hundred axes were immediately set to work in felling the dense forest of half-grown pines, where Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen now stand." In the Seventeenth Maine "Details were furnished for the manufacture of gabions, and the boys became quite proficient in basket making." While in the Sixteenth Maine, in early September 1862, "Details were made daily to work on a line of breast-works connecting the forts." "The Second Pennsylvania Veteran Heavy Artillery "regiment commenced building a line of rifle pits near Veitch's House on September 11th [1862], and the following day it built a large masked battery in the copse west of Fort Lincoln, in addition to other smaller works along the line of fortifications, which, when completed, comprised a continuous and impregnable chain of earthworks." "On March 3d [1863] the 127th and 144th N.Y. were sent on fatigue duty, which consisted in digging rifle pits near Fort Ward." "Early the next morning [4 September] we [Seventy-Ninth Highlanders: New York Volunteers] began to build brush huts but were soon detailed to work on rifle pits and fortifications for the protection of our new line." The author of the Ninth New York Heavy Artillery remarked that "The forts, all made and armed, must now be decorated, and consequently by the early part of June they are completely sodded." [66]

Various units basically worked on one fortification and their reports of what they built are instructive. In August 1861, Elisha Hunt Rhodes worked on Fort Slocum:

"The month has been passed in hard work. We have built a large fort and named it Fort Slocum after our first colonel. The city of Washington is now surrounded by a chain of forts and is considered safe from attack. We have shoveled many weary hours but feel that our labor will do some good." . . . "camp life is dull, but I suppose it is part of a soldier's duty, and it will be lively enough before we reach home again. Well it is all for the Union." [67]

George Washington Beidelman, in September 1861, reported construction work at Fort Baker:

"At that time the section of Fort Baker,–which will be perhaps the strongest and most important in the chain of defences of the national capitol,–was just being commenced and we had to take our turn in the trenches. Thus we have been exchanging the musket for the pick and shovel about every other day since, and will continue to do so, no doubt, until the work is finished, which will be soon. It cost a vast amount of labor–the ditches being 14 feet wide and 10 deep–the embankment 10 feet high and very thick–and the whole enclosing a space area of about 4 acres. When completed it will mount 46 guns of large calibre–45 being 24 pounders, and one 64. Some of these are already pointing their "grim visages" in the face of the enemy, ready to give him a warm reception should he have the impudence to advance upon us. The defences on this side of the river will all be completed in a short time, and then we will undoubtedly have " work of another character" to perform." [68]

The Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (41st Regiment of the Line) helped construct Fort Reno:

"Camp Life at Tennallytown and Camp Pierpont. "Details were made from the command to build Fort Pennsylvania, afterwards called Fort Reno, in honor of General Reno, killed at South Mountain, September 14, 1862, a fort which became well known at the time of Early's attack on Washington in June 1864. The formidable appearance of this large fort, which was situated on a commanding eminence, dominating the country for miles in front, had much to do with Early's failure to assault this fortified position. The Writer (who had the honor to command the defences of Washington north of the Potomac at this time) has no doubt that General Early's command could easily have carried these fortifications had it attacked before the arrival of the sixth corps, on account of the lack of defenders, the Union line being held by a small force of hundred-day-men, veteran reserves and convalescents, which force was posted on the picket line about a mile in front of the fort, there not being sufficient numbers to hold both the forts and the picket line. A small detail to fire the hundred-pounder Parrott rifle, located in an angle of the fort, and some citizens, constituted the only garrison of this formidable looking fortification for nearly two days, whilst Early's veterans maneuvered in front of it." [69]

A history of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps reported:

"The Reserves constructed a square redoubt at Tennallytown, mounting twelve guns, which was named Fort Pennsylvania; they also built two lunettes and named them Fort Gaines and Fort Cameron; these works formed part of the fortifications for the defense of Washington." [70]

Slocum's Brigade built Fort Lyon:

"The spot where the regiment encamped from Sept. 15th to Oct. 7th was designated "Camp Lyon," after the hero of Springfield, Mo., and Slocum's brigade built the fort known as "Fort Lyon." A thousand axes soon felled the dense forest of half-grown pines, and in six days heavy siege guns were mounted, to which were added many others as the work progressed. Here the entire camp was surrounded with breast-works, and daily rumors of "the enemy are advancing in large numbers," compelled them to go to their daily work, rifle in hand, and to sleep at night upon their arms, ready to repel an attack at a moment's notice." The long hours of work, the constant vigil, and the low grounds on Hunting creek, produced much sickness, and numerous fatal cases of typhoid fever and long suffering, occurred during the Fall and Winter." [71]

In the history of the Ninth New York Heavy Artillery Regiment is a general account of the construction of the fortifications:

"As fort-building was so prominent a part of the regiment's work, the following description, sent home by a participant, is not amiss: "The forts are simply earthworks enclosing from one or two acres of land. They are made by digging a ditch or moat, fifteen feet wide by from ten to twelve feet deep, throwing the earth up to to form an embankment inside the ditch. This bank is made hard by pounding it as it is thrown up; through the embrasures, guns are run out; on the outside are abatis which hinder the approach of man or horse; within are magazines and bombproofs, also barracks to be used in case of attack; it requires three reliefs to work the heavy guns; all the forts are connected by rifle-pits; entrance-gates are on the side towards Washington; the heavy stockades surrounding are pierced by loopholes." [72]

Individual Experiences

While constructing the fortifications in the Defenses of Washington some of the men and units had some interesting experiences. Elisha Hunt Rhodes reported that, on October 7, 1861, while erecting Fort Slocum, the digging unearthed "a bed of iron ore." While two hundred men of the One Hundred Twenty Seventh New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment "were detailed from the regiment to cut down trees in the front of Fort Ethan Allen to afford greater range for the guns of that fort," on September 24, 1862, "Private Tallman, of company A, was struck by a falling tree which he had been cutting and severely injured." A soldier in the Thirty Fourth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, on December 28, 1862, observed that "An artist of one of the New York illustrated papers, Frank Leslie's probably, was here last week, and took a sketch of Camp Lyon, the cluster of new forts and all the scenery round about, which will make a fine picture worth looking at." For the Second Pennsylvania Veteran Heavy Artillery Regiment, "hearing cannonading, and, at times, musketry, in the direction of Harper's Ferry, and later at points nearer, terminating on the 17th of September with the Battle of Antietam" stimulated "The rapid building of these earthworks." The author of the history of the Philadelphia Brigade wrote that:

"While at work on the trenches, on September 24th [1861], the troops had an opportunity of witnessing one of the uses of balloons in modern warfare. Four miles distant from Fort Ethan Allen, at a station called Falls Church, the Confederates had a considerable body of men. The United States forces at Arlington Heights sent up a captive balloon, and by means of signals directed the battery of Fort Allen how to range its rifled cannon on the camp of the enemy. After a few trials shells were thrown with precision, and the Confederates were discomfited by an unexpected foe." [73]

So much work on the fortifications was necessary that the published histories of the various regiments stationed in the Washington area commonly include statements such as "Fifteen hundred men are detailed from this brigade daily, to work on forts" [Fourteenth Vermont Regiment], "On March 3d the 127th and 144th N.Y. were sent on fatigue duty, which consisted in digging rifle pits near Fort Ward," and "At this time the regiment furnished, once in four days, one hundred and fifty men for picket duty, fifty daily to work on Fort Ellsworth, and twenty-five daily to cut trees and clear the ground for Fort Lyon" [Sixteenth New York Infantry Regiment]. The average number of enlisted men actually employed on the fortifications fluctuated by month as shown below:

The numbers often varied between those employed north of the Potomac River and those employed south of the Potomac River:

Not Enough Workers

Barnard and Alexander pleaded numerous times for more of these men to work on the fortifications. On December 22, 1862, Barnard wrote, "Since I have reassumed charge of the Defenses of Washington, the history of my efforts to complete the Defenses of Washington on the south of the Potomac has been one continual demand for troops to work upon them, which have either not been furnished or furnished only to be taken away, without notice to me, by the time they got into position and acquired some little readiness in their work." On September 17, 1862, Barnard pleaded, "Can you give me a daily detail of 250 men between Forts Richardson & Barnard commencing tomorrow." Alexander, on December 21, 1862, asked for a permanent detail of enlisted men to work on projected fortifications until they are finished." The same day he wrote to Barnard, stating "I think it my duty to inform you that, except at Chain Bridge, we have now no force of enlisted men at work on the fortifications on the other side of the river." Later, in July 1864, Alexander pleaded "Can you not give us a detail of 500 men." [75]

On September 14, 1862, Barnard informed Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, commanding the Defenses of Washington, D.C., that "I need 400 men, at least (a daily detail), around Fort Lyon, and an equal number for work on lines between Forts Ward and Worth, and between Forts Worth and Lyon." In the Fall of 1862 Barnard submitted a requisition for working parties amounting to 3400 men for work along lines from Fort DeKalb to Fort Worth while Captain Henry L. Abbot forwarded another requisition for 1400 men. In September 1864, Alexander requested 600 "colored troops" from Major General Silas Casey, commanding the Provisional Brigade. [76]

The requests for troops were endless but an even greater problem was having a permanent or, at least, prolonged detail of men. In early November 1862 Barnard urged "we should have details permanently on the other side (besides that for Fort Lyon) of two or three thousand men" to complete the necessary work before the winter season. On December 21, 1862, Alexander requested a permanent detail of enlisted men to work on projected fortifications until they were finished and the next day Barnard concurred by endorsement. Barnard remarked, in mid-July 1863, "At Forts Whipple, Tillinghast, and Craig &c. where we are doing considerable carpentry it is desirable to have the details of Carpenters from the garrison as permanent as possible." Alexander, in May 1864, remarked that "The detail of Carpenters should be made permanent and should be exempt from all other duty." [77]

In requesting details of troops to work on the fortifications, Barnard and Alexander usually requested infantrymen for a variety of reasons including the fact that except when attacked, they did not have any other pressing duties unlike the artillery and cavalry. In June 1863, Alexander wrote that he had applied for men to complete work in the vicinity of Fort Thayer and "meant for you to send infantrymen." Barnard, in August 1863, remarked that he knew there wasn't an infantry force to do the work and he hesitated to request an artillery detail. Of course, artillery and cavalry troops did accomplish some of the fortification work and the Army Engineers were glad to have them assigned to the fortification work such as, on August 29, 1862, when Randolph B. Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, informed Barnard that he had ordered 300 men of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment to march to Washington and report to him for duty "as you may deem best." [78]

In an attempt to insure that there were troops available to do the fortification work, the Army Engineers attempted to influence their superiors to issue orders assigning the men to this work. In August 1863, Barnard was glad to be informed that four companies of troops had been ordered to the work at Rosiers Bluff (Fort Foote) as garrison and to assist in completing the work. In September 1864, Alexander received a copy of a Department of Washington order to Major General Silas Casey to furnish such fatigue details from colored troops as may be called for by Lt. Col. B.S. Alexander. Brigadier General C. Grover, on September 15, 1862, informed Barnard that "I am ordered to detail daily four hundred men to work under your direction on additional defences between forts Ward & Worth & Lyon." Barnard wrote the commander, Defenses of Washington, on February 19, 1863, remarking "I understand that you have recently ordered the brigades within our lines of defence on the other side of the river, and I suppose that it is your intention that these troops shall assist in completing these lines." Casey's Division, Defenses of Washington, South of the Potomac, reported on Nov. 24, 1862:

"In compliance with Circular of 21st inst. from your Head Quarters I have the honor to report that pursuant to General Orders No. 6 from your Hd Quarters the following details have been made from 1st Brigade, a detail of one hundred men per day for four days has been at work on roads from this camp to Alexandria, this work has been interrupted by the weather and is not yet finished. From 2nd Brigade a detail of fifty men per day for six days has been at work on roads from this camp to (South of Hunting Creek) to Alexandria and have put the road in good order. From 3rd Brigade, no regular detail could be sparred as every regt. In it but one were under orders to instruct and very heavy details were required for work on line of defences. The road from this camp to Fort Runyon is in pretty good order." [79]

The contents of two orders detailing troops to work on the fortifications follow:

Special Orders No. 6, Headquarters, Department of Washington, September 2, 1862

"At the request of Engineer Frost employed by Genl Barnard to supervise construction and maintenance of Defences of Washington South and West of the Potomac, Commanders of Infantry regiments of this command encamped between Four Mile Run and Hunting Creek will furnish details of men for Engineer work anywhere in the vicinity of their camps.

They are directed to make the details as large as practicable within the requirements of the Engineers.

By cmmd of MG McC

Signed JG Barnard (BG) Temporarily in command of Defenses of Washington [80]

HEADQUARTERS DE RUSSY'S DIVISION,
Arlington, Va., May 24, 1864.

Brig. Gen. J. G. BARNARD:

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I have complied with your request of the 16th instant, in regard to working parties on the fortifications in these defenses. Also, in compliance with your request of the 19th instant, I issued the following order, No. 76, from these headquarters:

Col. A. Piper, commanding Second Brigade, De Russy's division, will detail a guard sufficient to take charge of, say, 300 prisoners, detailed for work on the fortifications and roads within the limits of his brigade. This guard will be instructed by General Barnard at what hour the prisoners will be taken from the Camp of Distribution, and at what hour relieved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G.A.DE RUSSY, Brigadier-General of Volunteers. [81]

Indeed, many troops did report for fatigue duty on the fortifications. Brigadier General C. Grover wrote "am ready to furnish them 400 men daily, when, where and to whom shall they report." Col. M. Cogswell, commanding the Artillery Brigade, near Fort Corcoran, reported on January 23, 1863, that "In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to report, that five officers, and four hundred men, this day reported to the Engineer officer, near the Red House." Col. Cogswell, on February 4, 1863, exclaimed:

"I have the honor to report that the detail for work on Fort McDowell is as follows:

From 14th Mass HA:      3. Lieutenants      5. Sergeants      12. Corporals      179. Privates

From 2d NY Arty      3. Lieutenants      3. Sergeants      8. Corporals      138. Privates"

[Cogswell to Potter, Feb 3, 1863, another letter filed with the one above]

"I have the honor to report the detail for men of this command at work on the fort styled Fort McDowell, furnished on the 2nd and 3rd insts.

The detail for yesterday was as follows:

From 2d NY Arty      180. Privates      8. Corporals      3. Sergeants      3. Lieutenants

From 14th Mass.      182. Privates      12. Corporals      5. Sergeants      3. Lieutenants

Feby 3rd From 14th Mass      178. Privates      12. Corporals      5. Sergeants      3. Lieutenants

No detail was made from the 2nd New York Artillery to day on account of the regiment being paid off." [82]

The commanders did not always comply with requests for troops to work on the fortifications. In May 1863, the commander of the Defenses South of the Potomac negatively replied to a request for troops to work on the fortifications. He stated that he could not furnish a detail from the Fourteenth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment to work on bombproof at Fort DeKalb, because the unit was required to guard Long Bridge.

On September 3, 1863, the commander of the Third Brigade, at Fort Baker, requested that Lt. Col. Haskin, in charge of the Defenses North of the Potomac, inform Barnard "the impossibility of complying with the Requisition for a detail of 300 men to work at Fort Mahan" because "The total enlisted men present at Fort Mahan is 234 of which 35 are reported sick." The Department of Washington replied to a request from Alexander for a fatigue party remarking that "garrisons are too small as they now are, it will be impracticable to furnish it." G.A. DeRussy, informed Alexander on November 19, 1864 that he was "unable to furnish the detail of 15 carpenters as requested." [83]

Even when troops did report as requested or ordered problems arose. Barnard informed Major General Heintzelmann on November 25, 1862 that two regiments, thought to be available, had been removed the week before, without notice. They had been from General Casey's command and were stationed near Fort Ward and the Columbia Turnpike for work upon the defenses. On September 27, 1862, Alexander reported that the superintendent of the new works, now being constructed between forts Pennsylvania and Alexandria, complained that the "soldiers engaged do not do their duty," and he "has never seen such indifference on part of officers or laziness on part of soldiers." On January 22, 1863, Col. M. Cogswell wrote "I have the honor to report that the detail for work at the Red House was not furnished on the 20th . . ." Civil Engineer Gunnell informed Alexander on October 28, 1862 that "the 17th Conn regiment is of no use for working on the forts . . ." [84]

Superintendent Douglass, in October 1862, reported to Alexander that on the past Monday only 400 men were at work on the rifle-pits and batteries at Chain Bridge and that "yesterday there were only 190 men at work on them." Engineer-in-Charge Childs informed Barnard on June 18, 1863 that at Fort Ethan Allen there was a detail of 30 men the day before with no officer in charge and but 13 men were working while the others sat in the ditch. Gunnell, in December 1862, reported that the One Hundred Thirteenth New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment was supposed to be working on the rifle-pits west of Fort Kearny, but of the 150 men that reported only 50 did any work." In June 1864, Lieutenant Fulkerson, in charge of the working party from Fort Worth, refused to work his men after 4 o'clock because he could not control them. He finally succeeded in coaxing his men to work until 5 o'clock, but did not make them return the tools to the tool box as instructed. [85]

There were further problems including an accident in November 1864 at Fort Runyon where one corporal was killed and several privates wounded, possibly due to the carelessness of the civil engineer in charge, A.J. Robbins.

Edward Frost, Civil Engineer, reported on November 19, 1862 "In answer to your inquiry today I have to state that yesterday morning there were two regiments detailed for fatigue duty by Genl Casey– the 107 Ohio and 143 Penna. Vols., but during the day they were withdrawn."

Superintendent Bennett informed Engineer in Charge A.G. Childs, on April 20, 1863:

"I have one soldier sixty two years old just convalescent as a guard for this camp. Please make application for a guard consisting of one commissioned officer and at least twenty five men. Or else allow me to direct this old man to return to his Regiment. The first night he reported for duty he staid in the camp alone and was nearly frightened to death by the rats. Since that time five carpenters stayed here and protected him. He may possibly be of some service to General Tyler but he is not of the slightest use here–only in our way." [86]

Of course, the troops had their own complaints. According to the Army Regulations, Paragraph 902, [both the 1861 and 1863 editions], troops were to receive extra duty pay when, among other things, they worked on fortifications. Although the men were working for Army Engineers, the Quartermaster actually disbursed the extra duty pay. Thus, for a variety of reasons, the Army was in arrears for paying the troops their extra duty pay. Captain A. Alberti, Fifth Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment, reported that two privates of Company K were employed as carpenters at Fort Lyon for 29 days in October and November 1861 but they had not received their extra duty pay as of October 1, 1862. In March 1863, Colonel Wells asked Lt. Col. Alexander for information as to how his men were to be paid their extra duty pay for work at Fort Lyon. [87]

Due to the demands upon them for fatigue parties to work on the fortifications, the various units suffered. In the Sixteenth New York State Volunteer Infantry Regiment, "The long hours of work, the constant vigil, and the low grounds on Hunting creek, produced much sickness, and numerous fatal cases of typhoid fever and long suffering, occurred during the Fall and Winter." On October 7, 1862, a brigade commander reported "Owing to the drain upon our numbers for fatigue duty on Fort Richardson, I do not propose having Brigade drills except on Sunday mornings until the strength of the regts is increased. The two regiments that do not furnish a fatigue party have Battalion drill at 3 pm daily Sats. And Sundays excepted." [88]

United States Colored Troop Workers

Black troops, designated United States Colored Troops, U.S.C.T., served in the Defenses of Washington. [89] The USCTs, however, did not generally garrison the fortifications in the Defenses of Washington but served in the Provisional Brigade, commanded by Silas M. Casey, encamped at Camp Casey. These troops did, at times, work as laborers, like many other Union units, on the Washington defenses. [90]

On September 15, 1864, the department commander directed that Casey furnish fatigue details as asked for by Alexander. Alexander, on September 18, 1864, specifically requested a detail of 600 men from Casey, with all their officers, to report to Engineer Camp Barnard. Superintendent Clark reported that 1700 colored troops were at Camp Casey , 800 of them unassigned and, therefore, should be able to do fatigue duty. In a June 23, 1863 letter to the chief of staff of the department, in regard to troops that could perform fatigue duty at Fort Thayer, Alexander wrote it "has occurred to me that the regiment of negroes now encamped in Anastolia Island might with perfect propriety be directed to perform it and the more particularly as they understand it well, many of the men in this regiment having left this very work to enlist in the service." [91]

Casey appeared reluctant to furnish troops for fatigue duty on the fortifications at times. On September 19, 1864, he remarked, "the regular garrison of Camp Casey, Va., consists of 343 men and they are constantly required for duty there. The others who may be at the Camp, are recruits in process of preparation for sending to the front. I have not enough officers to distribute the recruits." [92]

On September 14, 1864, the Department of Washington informed Alexander that 800 USCTs could be furnished him if necessary. The next day, then, the Department of Washington issued an order requiring Casey to furnish fatigue details from the USCTs as Alexander might request. Some USCTs, such as the Forty-Fifth U.S.C.T. did furnish fatigue details for fortification work at that time. [93]

Convalescents, Conscripts, Stragglers, Deserters and Prisoners as Workers

In addition to the men serving in the various U.S. Army units stationed in the defenses of Washington, other military personnel were available. Convalescents, conscripts, stragglers, deserters and prisoners were also encamped in the area and, in some instances, the Army Engineers used them in the construction of the fortifications in the defenses of Washington. Most of these men lived in camps near Alexandria. Cooling wrote:

"The second Camp Convalescent was located south of Fort Richardson in the valley . . . The camp replaced the infamous "Camp Misery" which was located on the slopes of Shuters Hill northeast of Fort Ellsworth near Alexandria. The camp was moved to this site and constructed in 1862." [94]

Robert McAllister described the first camp thusly:

"We moved to this place yesterday. It is right at Fort Ellsworth, overlooking Alexandria. It is a beautiful place at the outskirts of the town, and with a fine view. The cause of our coming here is that near here they have a large camp of about 15,000 troops–convalescents, recruits, paroled men, and stragglers. Some of them require guarding, which we are ordered to do. It will take about 100 men for guard duty. This detail is small compared to the detail we had that was so large we could not drill. Now we can have battalion drill. Otherwise, I would rather not have come here." [95]

Charle H. Moulton of the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment also described the first camp:

"The Convalescent and Straggler Camp which is located about half a mile out of Alexandria, when first established some three months since, occupied only a small space and has been constantly enlarging until now it covers an area of over 200 acres, for the accommodation of the convalescent when discharged from the Government hospitals, and as a rendezvous for stragglers until they can be returned to their regiments. Since the establishment of the camp, over 60,000 soldiers have been encamped there, who would otherwise have been straggling all over the country. On Friday last over 600 were dispatched to their regiments, and on Monday 400 more arrived to take the vacant places. The reason for gathering together of such an immense body of men is chiefly occasioned by the wholesale skedaddling from the army on the advance, which is increasing every day by the desertion of drafted soldiers. The sooner these men are pushed forward into an action so much the better, for they are incurring a heavy expense every-day, largely adding to the public expenditures." [96]

The author of the history of the Eleventh Regiment, Rhode Island Volunteers, described the second camp:

"The present camp is in a filthy condition, and a shame to those who have charge of it. The camp was originally located about two miles nearer Alexandria, in the region of what was called the Distributing Camp. When we took possession of Camp Metcalf they were located in the Green Valley. What was filthy before we went there, by the middle of February had become clean, and a very different affair from what it was when the government established it. It was under entirely different regulation. It grew rapidly from a small number to a moderate sized army, and what had been confusion soon became order and system."

"The government sent to this camp all stragglers, all detailed privates, all the men fit for duty at Camp Convalescent, and thence they were sent in large squads to their respective regiments. There were from five to eight thousand men then in the camp. The post was under the command of Capt. Upham. Contiguous to this camp was a camp of recruits, also under the commandant of that post.

Still nearer Alexandria, and distinct from the Distribution Camp, was the camp of paroled 'prisoners, containing not more than five or six hundred men; and we learned that somewhere between Camp Metcalf and Fairfax Seminary, was a convalescent horse camp, where horses that had been under medical treatment and were on the road to sound health, were treated to further rest and a fat pasture." [97]

Unfortunately, when the men from the Convalescent Camp worked on the fortifications, they rarely did good work. Superintendent Clark reported on October 19, 1863, that "Mr Hawkins reports that details of 212 men from the Convalescent Camp done the work of about 20 laborers. The officers informed him that their instructions were to bring the men out, not to make them work." Clark reported, on October 20, 1863, that the detail of 225 men from the Convalescent Camp wouldn't work and that the officers could not compel them to do so. On October 22, 1863, Alexander informed the Chief of Staff of the Department "You will perceive that Mr. Clark still says that the men from the Convalescent camp do not work properly." [98]

Alexander wrote Colonel E.S. Kellogg, the commander of the Convalescent Camp, in October 1863, asking him to take charge of the men to insure that they work. Kellogg declared he didn't "consider the source of the request (Alexander)of importance" and suggested that an order be issued by the Department. Exasperated, Alexander exclaimed "Some officer ought to see that these men do their duty, and there is no one who can so easily do it as Col. Kellogg." "If there is no authority to make these men work, they had better remain in their camp." [99]

Not only did the men from the Convalescent Camp not work, but they caused other problems. Alexander remarked that the convalescents great cry was Whisky and suggested that maybe they should receive 2 jiggers per day. Clark reported that they refused to work one day complaining of the quality of their rations. Barnard reported to the commander of the department that:

"On inspecting Fort Ellsworth yesterday I observed that the abattis has been much impaired by the chopping off of branches & indeed in some places had been carried off entirely. Capt. Langworthy, the Commanding Officer informs me that it was done by convalescents before he took command . . ." [100]

Actually, the convalescents' work improved considerably if a sufficient and competent guard, with good officers, accompanied them. Clark reported on November 6, 1863 that a small detail from the Convalescent Camp reported for work that day because the guard left about 3 a.m. "when there was a general stampede out of Camp." Alexander felt that "a competent officer should be placed in command with a guard strong enough to enforce his orders, and that he is instructed that it is his special duty to see that the men are kept at work." One soldier reminisced:

"Guard duty at Convalescent Camp began at once on Thursday, the 15th, and the men were on duty every other day, either at that camp, the new barracks, not then finished, or our own camp. The service was a heavy one, and the men began to see that there was work to be done more wearing than going to the front." [101]

Another type of worker on the Defenses of Washington was the conscript and substitute. As conscription began in 1863, conscripts and substitutes were sent off from hundreds of locations to ultimately join regiments. Centers for conscripts, to prepare them for their future duties and decide upon their ultimate assignments, sprang up in numerous locations including in the vicinity of the nation's capital. The Army authorities around Washington, D.C. sent these conscripts and substitutes to Camp Taylor in Northern Virginia. [102]

The Army Engineers employed conscripts and substitutes on various fortifications including Fort McPherson and Fort Lincoln. The Department of Washington ordered that the commander of the Rendezvous of Distribution "place in camp in or near the ravine between Forts Woodbury and Whipple tomorrow, July 18th all conscripts and substitutes now in your camp to answer requisitions from the Engineer department for working parties." The Commander was to provide a sufficiently strong guard "to control the occupants and prevent their escape." In September 1864, the Department informed Alexander that Camp Taylor was broken up and the conscripts and substitutes sent to their respective commands. [103]

Military prisoners were still another source of labor on the Defenses of Washington. The Army kept these prisoners, of various types, at Camp Distribution in Alexandria. These men had committed various crimes from desertion and murder to sleeping on duty or drunk and disorderly. A General Court-martial found Commissary Sergeant John Jarvis, Sixth Regiment, Veteran Reserve Corps, guilty of "Conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline" and sentenced him "to be reduced to the ranks, to be confined at hard labor on public fortifications for the period of 6 months, and to forfeit his monthly pay for the period of 4 months" and was ordered to be "sent under guard to Arlington House, Va and be delivered to BG DeRussy, Commanding Division, to labor on the fortifications of Washington." [104]

Superintendent Clark reported in mid-October 1863 that 175 prisoners in the charge of a lieutenant and 25 men were at work at Four Mile Run but "From their operations today I do not anticipate a rapid prosecution of the work." Civil Engineer A. Grant Childs informed Barnard, on August 1, 1863, that a number of prisoners were at work at Fort Ethan Allen "and that work is now progressing well." On November 5, 1863, Superintendent Clark reported that 44 deserters at Four Mile Run had "not done as well as usual. In November 1863, Superintendent Clark reported that a detail of 104 deserters, in the charge of Lt. Loomis of the Fourth Pennsylvania Reserves, had worked well. [105]

To obtain good work from the prisoners it was necessary to have a sufficient guard under the command of competent officers. This was much more true for the prisoners than for the convalescents, conscripts and substitutes,. Brigadier General G. A. De Russy reported on May 19, 1864 that it was "impossible" to furnish a guard for deserters because only one regiment was left in line between Fort Richardson and Battery Rodgers. But, on May 24, 1864, De Russy informed Barnard that he had issued Order No. 76 to "detail a guard sufficient to take charge of, say, 300 prisoners," to work on the fortifications. Testifying to the foregoing statements about guards, Private Bellard, in late 1862, wrote in his memoirs "We had now plenty of duty to perform in picket, campground, guarding parolled prisoners and in the trenches." [106]

For better control, one officer reported on September 5, 1863, that all the prisoners in the Defenses South of the Potomac were concentrated in one camp. In July 1864, under the threat of a Confederate attack, the Department ordered De Russy to collect "all the general prisoners in your command" and place "in camp or confined in such work as will be convenient access from the ground between Forts Woodbury and Whipple on which it is proposed to build a battery." Childs observed in early August 1863 that the Evening Star reported about "500 prisoners deserters &c have been sent to Genl De Russy to work on Fortifications." I would respectively suggest that this whole force be set at work to construct the covered way across the valley of four mile run." [107]

In 1864, Alexander received a December 21 Circular from the Engineer Department asking how many military convicts he could employ in the Defenses of Washington. On December 28, Alexander replied that he had no guards except those necessary to preserve order and guard against fire and, therefore, "I am convinced therefore that the defences of this city will not furnish suitable places upon which to work military convicts." Alexander continued:

"If I had a military organization as I ought to have on such a system of intrenchments say two or three regiments of Engineer troops, I would find no difficulty in working all the military convicts in the country unless the number should amount to several thousand, which I suppose can hardly be the case." [108]

Confederate Workers

In a few instances, Confederate deserters worked on the Defenses of Washington. In March 1864, Provost Marshal T. Ingraham suggested that three Confederate deserters, who had taken the oath of allegiance and desired employment on government works, could work on the defenses of Washington. On March 24, Ingraham forwarded six "rebel deserters" who desired employment on government works. The work and reliability of the Confederate deserters was not always good as demonstrated by James Dunn, an employ on the defenses, who, on a Saturday, procured a pass from the Provost Marshal near Fort Albany to visit the city to purchase clothing but did not return. [109]

Still other military personnel were available, at times, to work on the defenses of Washington. The last chapter discussed the U.S. Marines that garrisoned Fort Washington. On August 28, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Wells, ordered Commander Dahlgren to send 300 seamen to garrison Fort Ellsworth in Alexandria. Dahlgren dispatched 400 seamen aboard the steamboat Philadelphia to Alexandria that day. These sailors served at Fort Ellsworth until November 1861, at least, and worked on the fortifications. One author remarked that a complete frigate's crew was at Fort Ellsworth "and they have been spending the past two months in putting the fort in complete order, just as sailors do, sodding, and whitewashing everything and planting evergreens, until the inside of the works is the very picture of neatness . . ." On September 3, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy ordered Colonel John Harris, commanding the U.S. Marine Corps, to "Detail a guard of thirty marines in command of an officer to report to Commander Wainwright as part of the garrison of Fort Ellsworth under his command" and like the seamen, they also worked on the defenses. [110]

Supplies

The acquisition of supplies and equipment became more difficult as the Civil War progressed due to the great numbers required and the financial restraints imposed to prevent fraud. Various branches of the Army–Engineers, Quartermaster, Commissary of Subsistence, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry–acquired and procured supplies and equipment used on and in the defenses of Washington, D.C. Some supplies and equipment could only be used by one branch while in some instances one branch procured items that would be mostly used by another. Chief Engineer Joseph G. Totten, Corps of Engineers, informed the Secretary of War on August 5, 1861, that "no contracts have been made by this Department since the 4th of March last and that no military supplies have been purchased since that date except Intrench tools, wheel barrows, sand bags, shovels, spades, picks, &c, &c required for the hasty construction of Intrenchments for the defences of Washington" and the necessary "purchases were made in the market here at reasonable prices, wherever found for sale, or they could be manufactured by citizens of known loyalty to the Union without practicality or other regard to persons" but the bulk was "being supplied by the wholesale hardware establishments of E.M. Lithicum & Co. of Georgetown, and Campbell and Son of Washington, and, to the extent of their ability, by the retail houses of Sibley & Guy, L.L. Savage & Co., and others of Washington." [111]

To do all the construction and maintenance on the Civil War Defenses of Washington, a variety of tools, building materials and miscellaneous other items were necessary. Although the army cut down acres and acres of timber, additional lumber was required. Thus, a Moses A. Commins submitted a bill for 1096 hardwood trees 14 inches in diameter at $2.50 each for a total of $2,740. On September 18, 1862, J.T. Lenman reported that he had lumber on hand as required. William McLean, on September 16, 1862, wrote that he could furnish lumber as required. In June 1863, Lt. Col. Alexander reported back to the Secretary of War that timber cut from Mr. S.R. Colby's land near forts Stevens and Slocum "was done to open a view for our guns" and that some of it was used in construction of forts and that the owners should be paid, but there was no authority to do so. Special Orders No. 18, August 27, 1863, attempted to alleviate this problem by ordering that no timber would be cut "for the express purpose of construction without first referring the circumstances to the general commanding." Further, wherever timber is required for construction "an arrangement must be made with the owner thereof " or the property must belong to a "known Secessionist" and "authority must have been obtained from the general commanding to enter upon such property." On August 31, 1864, Samuel Strong offered to sell timber to the Engineer Department and upon request, he wrote that he would sell it for "50 cents per lineal foot." [112]

The Engineers didn't need to purchase stone because they quarried it at Cloud's Mill dam on the right of the Leesburg turnpike about two miles in front of Fort Ward and at Fort Totten to be used on the fortifications and in some of the buildings used. Edward Sowers reported on September 16, 1862, that he couldn't furnish the roofing presently required. Johns & Crosley, though, submitted requested information relative to supplying "gutta percha cement roofing" on November 24, 1862. The commander of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, on May 9, 1864, received instructions to get nails from the regimental quartermaster "to put up the Stables at Fort Simmons." [113]

Barnard requested that the Engineers pay Richard Cruickshank, Esq., 50 cents each for 685 gabions used at forts Ethan Allen, Marcy, and others. Tens of thousands of sand bags were procured. Captain E.L. Hartz, in October 1862, submitted invoices and receipts for 24 grindstones. In May 1861, one regiment "hired on its own account, out of private means, some wagons to procure its supplies." In July 1862, the engineers in the defenses spent $13.35 for stationery while for August and September, the cost was $43.70. [114]

A major expense was tools for constructing and maintaining the defenses of Washington. E.M. Lithicum, in October 1862, informed Barnard that he did not have as many sledges as required but he would order more from Baltimore. Barnard requested the following tools on May 7, 1861: "1000 shovels, 500 Picks, 300 Axes, 200 ax handles, etc." On July 13, 1864, at the time of Jubal Early's raid, Barnard exclaimed that entrenching tools were unobtainable in Washington, D.C. and recommended that 5000 shovels, 2000 picks, 5000 axes and 6000 handles be ordered from one of the northern cities. Through most of the war, the New York U.S. Engineer Agency, an engineer depot, in New York City had been supplying a great amount of tools. In addition, the Quartermaster Department furnished entrenching tools and for specific purposes, even the Ordnance Department had some. Despite these supply sources there were never enough entrenching tools. [115]

The engineers working on the defenses of Washington purchased much of the supplies and equipment that they used. Barnard reported on December 30, 1862, that $550,000. had already been expended on the defenses mainly for employment of a large number of civil assistants, superintendents, overseers, troops and laborers and the purchase of lumber and other materials required. The engineers, therefore had to keep ledgers of their purchases such as the following:

Certified Bills Sent to Mr. Eveleth, October 1862

Tools

To accomplish the work necessary to construct and maintain the defenses of Washington, a variety of tools were necessary. Author David V. Miller wrote that the defenses of Washington "were constructed by manual labor (some 3,000 men in 1862) using pick, shovel and heavy carpenter tools." On May 7, 1861, Barnard wrote that he desired "the following entrenching tools":1000 shovels, 500 Picks, 300 Axes, 200 ax handles, etc. On the same day, Barnard asked for shovels, picks, axes, axe handles, hand saws, cross cut saws, augurs and wheel barrows. Other tools frequently requested were spades, broad axes, sledge hammers, hatchets, drawing knives, crow bars, tape lines, and transits. [117]

The soldiers who worked on the Defenses of Washington, frequently mentioned the tools in their letters, memoirs, books and in regimental histories. In 1862, the First Maine Heavy Artillery Regiment quickly erected Fort Sumner with "the diligent use of axes in front, with the teams hauling timber, with pick and shovel, crosscut saw, broadax, and other tools which the Government furnished." Alfred Bellard wrote that " . . . the men are put to work with pick and shovel . . ." The Twenty-Seventh New York Infantry Regiment "put aside . . . drilling, and exchanged . . . guns for the pick and shovel." George Washington Beidelman, in September 1861, exclaimed "we have been exchanging the musket for the pick and shovel about every other day since, and will continue to do so, no doubt, until the work is finished, which will be soon." The Fifteenth New Jersey Volunteer Regiment was happy when " . . . a force of two hundred contrabands from North Carolina were sent to take our places in the ditches, and we willingly turned over to them our picks and shovels." The Sixteenth Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment, in September 1862, worked daily ". . . on a line of breast-works connecting the forts" and the regimental historian felt that "Many of them, reared on farms, had a natural propensity for digging holes and shoveling dirt, which had been fully satisfied by details to dig "sinks" and tent drains" but they " . . . were glad of a chance to exhibit their artistic qualities on something less degrading than a camp sink." [118]

One author wrote that when the Army crossed the Potomac into Northern Virginia on May 24, 1861, "an ample supply of intrenching tools" accompanied them. But Barnard reported that there was a "want of tools" and he "found the Sixty-ninth N. Y. S. M. halted in position, waiting for the arrival of the entrenching tools in order to commence the works of defense which had been projected by the U.S. Engineers." At the time of Jubal Early's raid on Washington, Barnard remarked that intrenching tools were unobtainable in Washington, D.C. [119]

Manuals

The West Point graduates and some of those who attended other military schools had taken military engineering, had some fortification drawing and possibly, had some practical experience in erecting them. A variety of Regular Army officers and men, and some volunteers, who had served in earlier wars, oversaw or actually constructed field fortifications. Others observed them in other countries as at least 150 U.S. Army officers had visited Europe between 1815 and 1861, some even witnessed fighting there. [120]

But, many of those officers and most of the enlisted men, who served in the Civil War had no experience with fortifications whatsoever. But, a variety of manuals and other technical literature were available. For an extensive list of mostly foreign language fortification manuals and other technical literature see pages 374-77 in Henry W. Halleck's Elements of Military Science, 1859 edition. Numerous pertinent British texts were extant and some officers used them. In 1861, when the war started, available fortification manuals published in the United States were: Louis von Buckholtz, On Infantry, Camp Duty, Field Fortification, and Coast Defence (Washington, DC: Selmar Siebert, 1860); Dennis Hart Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, with the General Outlines of the Principles Regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defense of Permanent Works (New York: Wiley & Long, 1836) and subsequent editions with the title A Treatise on Field Fortification, Containing Instructions on the Method of Laying Out, Constructing, Defending, and Attacking Intrenchments, With the General Outlines Also of the Arrangement, the Attack, and Defence of Permanent Fortifications in 184, 1856, and 1861; and Chapter II entitled "Field Fortification." in Henry D. Grafton's A Treatise on the Camp and March with Which Is Connected the Construction of Field Works and Military Bridges. With an Appendix of Artillery Ranges, &c. for Use of Volunteers and Militia in the United States (Boston: W.P. Fetridge and Co., 1854), pages 23-38; Chapter III. entitled "Fortifications." and Chapter XIV. entitled "Field Engineering" in Henry W. Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, adapted to the use of Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846 & 1859), pages 61-87, 342-77; "Field Works" and shorter sections under other headings in Henry L. Scott, Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; Information on Raising and Keeping Troops; Actual Service Including Makeshifts and Improved Material; and Law, Government, Regulation, and Administration Relating to Land Forces (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), pages 283-99; and Chapter IX, entitled "Field Fortifications." in Egbert L. Viele. Hand-book for Active Service; Containing Practical Instructions in Campaign Duties, for the Use of Volunteers (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), pages 92-148. [121]

As the war progressed, new works were available. Mahan's Field Fortification appeared in new editons. In James C. Duane's Manual for Engineer Troops (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862) there was Part II, "Rules for Conducting a Siege," pages 51-144; Part III, "School of the Sap," pages 147-204; Part IV, "Military Mining," pages 207-37; and Part V, "Construction of Batteries," pages 241-65. William P. Craighill's The Army Officer's Pocket Companion (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863) included Article 98– "Field Works," pages 219-40. Even the Confederates, with poor supplies of paper, etc., published field fortification manuals such as Egbert L. Viele, Hand-Book of Field Fortifications and Artillery; Also Manual for Light and Heavy Artillery with Illustrations (Richmond, VA: J.W. Randolph, 1861). In addition, as had occurred before the war, technical articles on fortification appeared in periodicals such as "Fortification–Land Defences– Profiles," Army and Navy Journal, 1 (November 14, 1863), page 182; James R. Willett's "A Method of Determining a Plane of Defilement." United States Service Magazine 1 (June 1864), pages 618-21; and "The Defence of Field Works," in Army and Navy Journal, 2 (September 3, 1864), pages 20-21. Immediately after the war, still more technical literature appeared on field fortifications: Francis J. Lippitt, A Treatise on Intrenchments ( New York: D. Van Nostrand, Publisher, 1866); F.P.J. Piron, "The Systems of Fortification Discussed and Compared," United States Service Magazine, 5 (January 1866), pages 34-40 (February 1866), pages 108-14; (March 1866), pages 225-34; (April 1866), pages 328-32; and "Field Intrenchments," Army and Navy Journal, 6, (November 7, 1868), pages 184-85. [122]

Generally, the U.S. Army considered Mahan's Field Fortification as the official manual but officers consulted other publications at times. Major General Henry W. Halleck, an Army Engineer for many years who became commander-in-chief of Union forces in July 1862, wrote that Professor Mahan's Treatise on Field Fortification "is undoubtedly the very best work that has been written on field fortification, and every officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy," in both the 1846 and 1859 editions of his Elements of Military Science. [123]

Acquisition of Land

Margaret Leech, author of Reveille in Washington 1860-1865, in discussing the days following the Union's move across the Potomac River into Northern Virginia on May 24, 1861, wrote:

"The soldiers in the vicinity of Washington had at once begun the arduous labor of building earthworks. On both sides of the river, the farmers were ruined. Not only were their orchards and vegetable gardens trampled and their fields filled with tents, but the very face of their land was changed, as its soil was shifted into high mounds, and deep ditches." [124]

On December 10, 1861, Barnard wrote Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, and, among other subjects, exclaimed:

"I should have mentioned, in connection with my statement of the amount actually expended, that the Treasury Department has advanced over $20,000 on account of the defenses of Washington, which should be refunded. I feel it my duty in this place to urge that Congress should take immediate measures to assess the land and other damages arising from these works and from the occupation of troops. In most cases the owners are ill able to bear temporarily the losses to which they have been subjected." [125]

Later, in his published 1871 report on the Defenses of Washington, Barnard elaborated on this terrible treatment of the land owners:

"OCCUPATION OF LANDS–The sites of the several works being determined upon, possession was at once taken, with little or no reference to the rights of the owners or the occupants of the lands–the stern law of "military necessity" and the magnitude of the public interests involved in the security of the nation's capital being paramount to every other consideration. In one case a church, and in several instances dwellings and other buildings were demolished, that the sites might be occupied by forts. Long lines of rifletrenches and military roads were located and constructed where the principles of defense or the convenience of communication required them, without regard to the cultivated fields or orchards through which they might pass. In addition to the ground immediately occupied by the defensive works, the lands in front for a distance of two miles were cleared of standing timber. At this work alone there were employed in the autumn of 1862 details of troops numbering from 2,000 to 3,000 men for a period of several weeks. The timber so cut down was used, so far as it was found to be suitable, in the construction of the forts, or for abattis.

The injuries thus inflicted upon the citizens living along the lines, in the destruction and use of private property, were in the aggregate very considerable, and there were probably individual cases of extreme hardship; but, however much these evils might be deplored, they could not be avoided. No compensation for such damages or occupation of lands was made or promised, nor was it even practicable to make an estimate of their pecuniary amount. In some instances a statement of the number of acres denuded of timber, and a general description of its kind and quality, and in others of the number and kind of trees cutdown, was given to the owners, upon request being made therefor, as a supposed basis for future indemnity by the Government; but no general system of estimating, damages was attempted." [126]

Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commanding the Department of Northeastern Virginia, on May 29, 1861, wrote the Adjutant General's Office in Washington, D.C. reporting that, "The troops are occupying houses in some cases, and fields, and cutting wood for fuel. Shall not rent and compensation be paid? If so, funds are needed for that purpose . . ." That same day, McDowell wrote another message, also to the Adjutant General's Office, and begged that his message be sent on to the "General-in-Chief " stating that there were "rumors of outrages committed by volunteers in Alexandria" and testimonials of "several cases of trespass, depredations, and attempts at burglary" in Northern Virginia. Confederate Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, commanding the Department of Virginia, on June 5, 1861, cited these Union depredations in an attempt to incite the "good People of the Counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Prince William to rally to the standard of your State and country, and by every means in your power compatible with honorable warfare to drive back and expel the invaders from your land." [127]

Even before Beauregard issued his plea, McDowell had already attempted to alleviate the situation by issuing General Orders, No. 4, on June 27, 1861. The order required that "Statements of the amount, kind, and value of all private property taken and used for Government purposes, and of the damage done in any way to private property by reason of the occupation of this section of the country by the U.S. troops, will, as soon as practicable, be made out and transmitted to department headquarters by the commanders of brigades and officers in charge of the several fortifications." Further, these "statements will, as far as possible, give the value of the property taken or of the damage sustained, and the name or names of the owners thereof. Citizens who have sustained any lessor damage as above will make their claims upon the commanding officers of the troops by whom it was done, or in cases where these troops have moved away, upon the commander nearest them." Additionally, the statements were to exhibit:

On July 18, McDowell issued General Orders, No. 18, reiterating his orders for the "preservation of the property of the inhabitants of the district occupied by the troops under his command." His troops had committed additional depredations and he felt the "deepest mortification." The order provided that commanders of regiments select an officer as provost-marshal along with ten men as a police force to preserve property. The least punishment for infractions would be incarceration in the Alexandria jail." [129]

But, even by October 1, 1861, depredations continued. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, issued General Orders, No. 19, on that date, remarking that the "attention of the General Commanding has recently been directed to depredations of an atrocious character that have been committed upon the persons and property of citizens in Virginia by the troops under his command." Further the order provided that "all persons connected with this army who are detected in depredating upon the property of citizens shall be arrested and brought to trial" and he "will admit of no remission of the death penalty which the military law attaches to offenses of this nature." In subsequent years more land was confiscated as the Army Engineers erected new fortifications and cleared land for fields of fire and although additional incidents of depredation occurred in Northern Virginia, there were far fewer incidents. [130]

Plans and Details of the Fortifications

Reed Hansen, who researched and wrote a history masters degree thesis on Fort Marcy states that the planners of the Defenses of Washington:

"meticulously based their work on D.H. Mahan's A Treatise on Field Fortification, Barnard's principal reference book and the classic syllabus of its day. Mahan, a West Point professor, explicitly outlined those defensive procedures, specifically the embrasure and barbette, which Barnard put to good use in his fortifications." [131]

Barnard, in his 1871 report, mentions Mahan's manual a number of times. In one place he stated in a section entitled "PROFILES": "The works were originally profiled in accordance with the general section given in Mahan's Field Fortifications." In the same section he offered, "In some instances the scarps of the older works were revetted, either with plank, after the plan given in Mahan's Field Fortifications, or with vertical posts, as hereafter to be described." Later on in a section entitled "MAGAZINES, BOMBPROOFS" Barnard wrote, that the interior structures of the fortifications, magazines, bomb-proofs, etc. "were in accordance (with some variation in details) with the plans given in Mahan's Field Fortification." [132]

It is likely, that inexperienced young Regular Army Engineer officers and those green volunteer Army Engineers most often used Mahan's book. For most of the older Regular Army Engineers, their education at West Point, duty assignments, which during their career meant some experience in planning, erecting and maintaining fortifications, readings and official and unofficial trips provided them with a much fuller technical background upon which to plan and erect the defenses of Washington. Barnard, as well as the two Civil War chiefs of engineers, Joseph G. Totten and Richard Delafield, and other Army Engineers had visited Europe where they visited fortifications and some had the chance to observe their construction and use in warfare. [133]

In the development of the system of fortifications erected around Washington, D.C. that included the forts, batteries, blockhouses, trenches and rifle-pits, Barnard looked to historical examples, especially the Lines of Torres Vedras. Napoleonic scholar and expert David G. Chandler wrote that the Duke of Wellington had instructed his Army Engineers to construct a line of fortifications north of Lisbon. Colonel Richard Fletcher, Royal Engineers, and 17 other engineer officers, beginning in October 1809, oversaw the construction of a line of forts from the sea on the west to the Tagus estuary on the east including 108 redoubts, to which 42 were later added, in three lines mounting 447 guns, at a total cost of £100,000. Manned by about 25,000 men, the fortifications halted Napoleon's troops under the command of Marshal Andre Massena from October 10, 1810 to March 5, 1811, when the French troops withdrew. Barnard, on December 30, 1862, in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, stated "There has been but one other system of field works that I know of that is analogous to this in extent and character–the famous lines of Torres Vedras." In January 1863, he wrote:

"The theory of these defences is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based; the only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within cannon range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches. These forts furnish the secure emplacement of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be obstructed that the enemy's troops cannot penetrate the interval without being exposed, for considerable time, to the effects of artillery or musketry fire of the forts." [134]

In a report on the defenses of Washington, dated December 10, 1861, and another of January 26, 1863, addressed to Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, Barnard provided a number of comparisons to the Lines of Torres Vedras:

The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles, including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole, requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrisons.

The number of guns, most of which are actually mounted, is about four hundred and eighty, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works.

The total garrisons for all the works (one hundred and fifty-two in number) of the lines of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men; and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of work of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Torres Vedras.

The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe. when the amount of bombproof shelter in ours is considered, more labor per yard of perimeter; but the latter lines involved a greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scraping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, &c., than we have had occasion to make.

The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with five hundred and thirty–four pieces of ordnance (12, 9, or 6 pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with four hundred and eighty pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, 24-pounder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrott), with a few field pieces and howitzers. As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with that of the famous lines mentioned; in weight of metal more than doubles it. [135]

Twice, on December 11, 1861 and December 30, 1862, Barnard, in reports to General George B. McClellan and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, attempted to demonstrate the monetary value of the work on the defenses of Washington by comparing it to the relative costs of the Lines of Torres Vedras:

I mentioned in that letter that our defensive system thus far consisted of about forty-eight works, mounting over 300 guns, some of which are of very large size; and I may add that the actual defensive perimeter occupied is about thirty-five miles, exceeding the length of the famous (and hitherto the most extensive fortified by extemporized field-works) lines of Torres Vedras by several miles. The amount which has been expended will not, therefore, considering the pressure under which the works have been built, appear extravagantly large.

These [lines of Tores Vedras] frustrated the design of Napoleon of driving the English from the Peninsula. They consisted of a greater number of works, but the works were smaller, and much less expensive in workmanship; yet on these lines, in a country where labor commanded but one tenth of what is paid in this country, $1,000,000 was expended from first to last. [136]

McClellan, in the Fall of 1861, asked Barnard and Brigadier General William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, to determine the number of men necessary "for garrisons and reserves 'for the various works in and about Washington to satisfy the conditions of a good defense'." In a supplemental report, of October 24, 1861, to McClellan through his Assistant Adjutant General General Alpheus S. Williams, Barnard and Barry explained that the example of the Lines of Torres Vedras had helped them calculate the number of men necessary to man the defenses of Washington:

It seems proper to exhibit more clearly the grounds on which our estimate is founded. We have adopted the rule, which experience Showed to be satisfactory for the lines of Torres Vedras, in computing the garrison of the various works, viz: Two men per running yard of front covering line and one man per running yard of rear line, deducting spaces occupied by guns. Computed in this manner, the total of the full garrisons of all the works would amount to 19,789 men, of which 6,581 should be gunners, in order to furnish three reliefs to each gun. [137]

Barnard further compared the defenses of Washington to the Lines of Torres Vedras in his 1871 report. The defenses of Washington were "originally thrown up under pressure; hence, they were sometimes laid out without prepared plans, and not infrequently paced off on the ground. Under such circumstances coordination of plan, or even symmetry and perfection of design, was not to be expected." He felt that this unsystematic origin constituted an important distinction between the defenses of Washington and "other works of like extent to which they would be referred in comparison," such as the Lines of Torres Vedras that were carefully surveyed, located, planned and essentially finished, before Wellington's army took its position behind them. Both the defenses of Washington and the Lines of Torres Vedras "belong to the class of 'field works' and are illustrative of what can be done mainly by the use of earth and timber furnished by the locality . . ." Further, Barnard remarked that the British built practically all of the Lines of Torres Vedras in a year, from October 1809 to October 1810, while the Union spent about four years erecting the Washington defenses. The Lines of Torres Vedras were erected for a specific purpose –"to meet a foreseen contingency"–but the Washington lines were to protect a city against a possibility of incursion, siege or attack by unknown numbers of the enemy. Finally, Barnard argued that the "defenses of Washington exceeded even the length of the lines of Torres Vedras" "due to the large area over which the city, with its public buildings, arsenals, navy yard, &c., is spread, to the incidental necessity of covering Alexandria and holding the Chain Bridge, and of protecting the reservoir of the Washington Aqueduct, and to the vastly increased ranges of modern artillery." [138]

In spite of Barnard's heavy reliance on the Lines of Torres Vedras, he did consider the fortifications at other locations such as the Caucasus and Silestria and especially "Sebastopol" erected during the Crimean War. He remarked that the field fortifications at Sebastopol were "feeble earth-works." Although Sebastopol field fortifications did "prevent an immediate seizure of the place by the allied armies" they could only be protractedly held against a formal siege by the "most extraordinary exertions, combined with a lavish expenditure of the materials of war and an appalling sacrifice of lives of the brave defenders . . ." Later, Barnard wrote, "Sebastopol, a vast intrenched camp defended by field fortifications of heavy profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as is found only in a great maritime arsenal, and from a numerous army which always maintained its communications open with the interior of Russia." Sebastopol was not "secure against escalade" due to the lack of scarp walls in the defenses. But, the allies were still unable to overrun the Sebastopol defenses for a variety of reasons including their own shortcomings. [139]

Many plans, drawings, and photographs of the fortifications in the defenses of Washington gleaned from Barnard's 1871 report, the National Archives and other repositories and a variety of other sources appear elsewhere in this study.