Civil War Defenses of Washington Historic Resource Study

New fortification construction continued until the end of the war and even afterward but it tapered off considerably in 1863. But, in addition to and following the new fortification construction in the Defenses of Washington, much other related work was necessary. Even before the fortifications were completed, alterations, maintenance and repair work was necessary, some almost every day. [1]

Barnard, in January 1862, exclaimed, "I deem it my imperative duty, after many representations to headquarters and to the chief of artillery on the subject of garrisoning the fortifications and preserving them from dilapidation, to call the attention of the Commanding General again to the subject, and to say that unless more effective measures are taken, these works, with their armament, must fall into ruin." Edward Frost, civilian Army engineer employee, reported, in May 1862, " . . . in compliance with your instructions of yesterday, I proceeded on that day to Fort Lyons & made arrangements by which the work of construction & especially of repairs will be recommenced on Monday morning." By October 1862, Barnard felt compelled to state, "The preservation of these works is another important consideration." In December 1862, Frost wrote: "In accordance with instructions given by General Barnard, various changes have been made, and some are still to be made, in the interior features of the several Forts and much incidental work is accomplished from time to time in the way of maintenance." On January 16, 1864, Barnard declared, "The $300,000 ask for of Congress will I think, complete everything in hand and leave a fund available for the ever recurring repairs which such a system demands." Less than a month later, care and preservation of the fortifications became an official duty of the Army as Article 17, in the regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons, issued as General Orders No. 42, War Department, February 2, 1864, stipulated that "Commanding officers will pay special attention to the police and preservation of the works." [2]

In his post-war report on the Civil War Defenses of Washington, Barnard reported; "The operations of 1864 . . . were confined mainly to the repairing, strengthening, and perfecting of existing works." In a March 1864 inspection report of the defenses, Assistant Adjutant General James A. Hardie, later the U.S. Army Inspector-General, remarked: "Every spring repairs will be necessary at every fort." Another observer reported that with some exceptions, ". . . the time was devoted to keeping in good repair those [works] already constructed." Thus, to keep the fortifications combat ready, constant maintenance and repair was necessary. [3]

The works in the Civil War Defenses of Washington required constant maintenance and repair for a variety of reasons. Aging took its toll. The longer the works stood, the more they required maintenance and repair due to deterioration. In July 1864, Alexander observed that, "The defense of the [Long] bridge is very imperfect, owing to the dilapidation and decay of Fort Jackson." Later the same year, he exclaimed, "They [the forts] have all been provided with abatis, but some of it is over three years old, and so rotten and broken as to be almost useless as a means of defense, and so dry as to be easily set on fire." The next year, in 1865, Alexander reported, "An examination of Forts Haggerty & Bennett shows them to be in a very dilapidated condition, requiring extensive repairs if the forts are to be maintained." [4]

Natural elements were the cause of a great deal of the maintenance and repairs. In April 1864, Army Chief of Staff, Major General Henry W. Halleck reported to Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, commanding General of the Army, that, " . . . some of the works are not completed and the recent heavy rains have so injured some of them as to require extensive repairs . . ." Hardie wrote that, "In all older works the frost and rain have done more or less injury . . ." Barnard, in October 1862, observed, "The winter acts severely upon these earthen scarps and exterior slopes." The 59th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment reported, in March 1862, " . . the washing away of the sodding from the Magazine of Fort Franklin." [5]

Water was the most destructive of the elements. Water leaked into most of the structures erected at the fortifications and correspondence quite often contained phrases such as, "One of the magazines in Lyons needs repair . . . it is leaky and too damp for the preservation of powder," and, ". . . found one in such a state from leakage that it was wholly unfit for the storage of powder." In April 1864, a surgeon reported on the leaky and unhealthy condition of the bombproof barrack at Fort Marcy. Alexander, in a report of engineer operations for the year ending September 30, 1864, warned that new magazines were necessary to replace those "built of white pine boards and frame, in the quickest manner" in which the boards "now rotting out" were causing leaks "which render the magazines unfit for the safe keeping of ammunition." In his December 1864 report of the condition of quarters at Fort Whipple, the post commander observed that the roofs on barracks 2 and 3, all the cook houses and two of the officers quarters "leaked badly." [6]

Fire was always a fear. In January 1864, the commander at Fort Ethan Allen issued General Orders No. 1, with the following provision: "I. A barrel of water will be placed at each end of each barracks as a precaution against fire; buckets or camp kettles will be placed near the barrels ready for use." General Orders No. 42, War Department, February 2, 1864, regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons prepared by Brigadier-General William F. Barry, U.S. Army Inspector of Artillery, stipulated in article 22 that "The practice of building fires on the open parades, for cooking and other purposes, is prohibited, as it endangers the magazines." Alexander informed Halleck, in July 1864 that "To guard against fire, barrels of water and buckets are placed on the [Long] bridge at intervals of thirty or forty yards." Regardless, fires occurred, and Major F.H. White, commander of Fort Marcy, reported that defective flues and the bad condition of poor Sibley stoves caused a fire at the fort in the "bomb proof " on January 28, 1865. [7]

With gunpowder, ammunition, guns and other ordnance stored in various places in and around the Defenses of Washington, the chance of fire setting off an explosion was quite real. In 1864, "regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons," in the last part of the eleventh provision warned, "No fire or smoking will be allowed in the vicinity [of a magazine] when the doors or ventilators are open. Too many precautions cannot possibly be taken to avoid the chances of an explosion." On November 5, 1862, the 100-pounder Parrott gun at Fort Alexander fired four times, but the third and fourth shots burst in the tube and the gun tipped over, chassis and all, after the fourth. Perhaps the best known Civil War explosion occurred near General Grant's headquarters, at City Point, Virginia, at noon on August 9, 1864, when a barge carrying ordnance stores exploded, killing 70 men and wounding 130 and destroying 600 feet of warehouses and tearing up 180 feet of wharf. [8]

The worst explosion in the Defenses of Washington occurred on June 9, 1863, when the north magazine at Fort Lyon, in Virginia, blew up. A 26-man detail, under the command of a lieutenant, was using wooden spoons to remove caked powder, caused by moisture in the magazine, from inside shells. The lieutenant, unsatisfied with the slowness of the work, provided priming wire to some of the men to remove the caked powder. Friction from the wire scraping in one of the shells ignited the powder and set off the explosion of approximately 28,000 pounds of powder, about 18,000 pounds in barrels and roughly 10,000 pounds in various types of ammunition. The explosion killed twenty-one men, including two officers, and injured ten men [one account reported twenty men killed and fourteen men injured]. The blast tossed one gun on the rampart "into battery and tipped forward, with its muzzle resting on the parapet." The dirt and logs of the magazine were thrown in all directions. The men found shells as far away as 2,500 yards. Tents and wooden buildings near the magazine were completely destroyed, but most of the garrison, in the bombproof about 75 feet away, was unharmed. The explosion damaged only a small fraction of the fort. The next day, President Abraham Lincoln and his entourage, including Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and General Samuel P. Heintzelmann, visited the fort to see first-hand the results of the blast. [9]

Human error, such as in the case of the Fort Lyon north magazine explosion, indifference, carelessness and laziness were also causes for maintenance and repair. The 1864 "regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons," stipulated, in Article 17:

"Commanding officers will pay special attention to the police and preservation of the works. All filth will be promptly removed and the drainage particularly attended to. No one should be allowed to walk on the parapets, or move or sit upon the gabions, barrels, or sandbags that may be placed upon them. When injuries occur to the earthworks they should be repaired as quickly as possible by the garrison of the work. If of a serious nature, they should be at once reported to the engineer officer in charge of the work. All injuries to the magazines or platforms of the guns will be promptly reported as soon as observed: The abatis, being a most important portion of the work, must be always well looked to and kept in perfect order." [10]

Further, in Article 20, was the following:

"The garrison can greatly improve the work by sodding the slopes of the parapet, and those of the ramps and banquettes, or by sowing grass seed on the superior slope, first covering it with surface soil. The grass-covered or sodded portions of the parapets, traverses, magazines, &c., should be occasionally watered in dry weather and the grass be kept closely cut. Early in the spring and late in the autumn they should be covered with manure." [11]

In some instances, troops were quite efficient in carrying out such provisions as when, in January 1862, Barnard reported that both commanding officers and subordinates of the Fourteenth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment (became First Massachusetts Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment), and Fourth Connecticut Volunteer Infantry Regiment (became First Connecticut Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment), "feel pride in preserving their works in perfect order." But, he went on: "Such is not always the case, as the use and importance of the works are not appreciated, and where it is not, we may expect to see the timber work and abatis converted into tent floors and fire-wood." In 1863, Barnard exclaimed that he couldn't " . . . be responsible for the condition of the works if commanding officers assume to alter or destroy what has been done." He also reported that the "Commanding officers of Forts Cass & Woodbury have therefore, without authority, and in direct violation of their duties to preserve the defensive qualities of their works, wantonly impaired the same. . . ." In 1863, Barnard remarked: "On inspecting Fort Ellsworth yesterday I observed that the abattis has been much impaired by the chopping off of branches & indeed in some places had been carried off entirely." Alexander, in June 1863, wrote, "I think it my duty to inform you that the garrison at Fort Cass have removed the abattis from the gorge of that work. I understand that it has been cut up for firewood." The Department commander detailed various infractions at forts Mahan, Meigs and Dupont, in April 1862, including a negligent and careless guard, a leaky magazine, guns without tampions, and muzzles elevated and elevating screws badly rusted. [12]

B.S. Alexander warned, in October 1864:

"Improbable as it may appear at the present time, it is the part of prudence to remember that history repeats itself, and that we should guard against such a contingency in the future. To do this effectually, we must keep the defenses in order. These being built of perishable materials, like a railroad, require constant repairs; old magazines require to be repaired or rebuilt; new bomb-proofs are required in many of the works; decayed revetments must be renewed; worn-out gun platforms require renewal; decayed abatis must be replaced by new; the scarps require constant attention–they must all be sodded, or revetted with masonry before the works can assume a permanent character; all interior earthen slopes of traverses, magazines, bomb-proofs, camps, &c., should be sodded; besides, some additional redoubts and batteries should be built in order to render these already constructed more secure. For these objects, "To keep in repair and render more permanent the defenses of Washington," an appropriation of $500,000 for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1866, will be required." [13]

Thus, maintenance and repair work encompassed a wide variety of duties and activities to preserve the various materials integral to viable fortifications. Each month, Barnard, and then Alexander, submitted reports to the Chief of Engineers outlining the engineer work accomplished during the period. These reports and other correspondence detail the maintenance and repair work that varied from removing the old counterscarp gallery and erecting a new one at Fort Lincoln; to repairing the lunette at Fort Strong; reinforcing parapets and magazines at Forts Strong, Bennett, Woodbury, Tillinghast and Craig; removing the old magazine and building a new stone one at Fort Worth; repairing revetments, platforms, embrasures, etc. at Battery Wagner; rebuilding chimneys at Fort Ethan Allen; repairing parapets, traverses, etc. at forts Craig and Tillinghast; renewing abatis on the gorge line at Fort Cass; repairing slopes of the bastions at Fort Carroll; cutting nineteen embrasures in the revetment at Fort McPherson; trimming and sodding the bombproofs and traverses at Fort Craig, Tillinghast and Battery Garesche; repairing the interior revetment at Fort Albany; sodding the bombproof at Fort Ellsworth; making gabions at Camp Barnard; trimming the exterior slopes at Fort at Kennedys' Hill; trimming the counterscarp and glacis at Fort Morton; altering the parapet at Fort Chaplin for flank defense guns; putting a new roof on the bombproof and covering the same with earth at Fort Marcy; repairing the magazine at Fort Tillinghast; cutting loopholes in the counterscarp galleries at Fort Foote; dismounting the barbette guns and preparing new platforms for the siege guns at Fort Thayer; repairing and sodding the magazine at Fort Cass; anchoring the scarp revetments at Fort Barnard; sodding the crest, embrasures and interior slopes at Fort at Kennedys' Hill; completing platforms and traverse circles for two guns at Battery Rodgers; repairing the interior revetment of the parapet at Fort Reynolds; throwing up rifle pits for the flanking battery at Battery Slough; putting the road between Fort Lyon and the Little River Turnpike in thorough repair; building gun platforms for additional siege and field guns, etc. at Battery Cameron; removing one 32-pounder and one 8-inch howitzer in Fort Runyon from the water side and placing it in position in the fort to command the causeway near Arlington Spring, Arlington House, the Columbia Turnpike and the magazines of forts Albany and Scott; trimming and sodding the slopes and ramps, grading and trimming the terreplein, and reinforcing the parapet at Fort Ward; hauling two 200-pounder and six 30-pounder Parrott guns from the wharf to Fort Foote; and cutting and clearing a large amount of bushes and undergrowth from the front of the works, on both sides of the river. [14]

Experiments

In the midst of everything else going on in the Civil War Defenses of Washington, experiments also occurred. On May 2 1863, Colonel Henry L. Abbot, Corps of Engineers, furnished General Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, diagrams illustrating the four experiments conducted by the First Connecticut Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment, on May 16, to determine the penetration of elongated projectiles into an earthen parapet near Battery Garesche. On August 10, 1863, experiments tested the penetration of shot from a 30-pounder Parrot Gun at Battery Cameron. Eleven days later similar experiments at Battery Cameron occurred with a 4-inch gun. [15]

Mapping

In the course of construction of the fortifications and later alterations, maintenance and repair, the Army Engineers realized that a record of their work was necessary. They, therefore, created numerous maps and plans that, today, are a fairly good record of the fortifications and the work accomplished. Army civilian engineer employee Edward Frost aptly described the endeavor, in December 1862, in the following message to Alexander:

"It becomes a matter of some importance to decide what shall be done in respect to mapping the lines; and preparing some record for reference hereafter of the works as they now stand, as well as for convenience in making thereon notes of future changes or additions." [16]

Magazines

Perhaps, the item that required the most maintenance and repair was the magazine. The magazines' greatest problem was that it leaked and was, therefore, frequently damp, making it impossible to fulfill its main function of storing ammunition and gunpowder. In May 1862, one officer, after inspecting the magazines at Fort Lyon, informed Captain Frederick E. Prime, the Chief Engineer on the Defenses of Washington, that he "found one in such a state from leakage that it was wholly unfit for the storage of powder, which had to be removed to the other which leaked very badly. I do not consider that in their present state they answer the end to which they were designed." No one was surprised when in May 1864, Brigadier General A.P. Howe, Inspector of Artillery, in his report of an inspection of the works in the Defenses of Washington, made frequent derogatory comments regarding the magazines such as for Fort Bennett–"Magazine., one; leaks in places"; Fort Ward–"Magazines, three; two serviceable, one unserviceable; new ones being built"; Fort Sumner–"Magazines, two; only one of which is dry and in good condition."; Battery Vermont–"Magazines, one; not dry; wants repairs"; Fort Meigs–"Magazines, three; two not dry, one dry and in good condition"; and Fort Foote–"Magazines, three, only one of which is completed; completed one in good condition." [17]

The magazines required a variety of maintenance and repair in addition to solving leakage problems. This work included "putting earth covering on magazines"; "trimming and sodding magazines;" "repairing . . . sodding of magazines;" "putting stockade in front of magazine," "framing magazines," "framing roof logs for magazines"; "roofing completed;" "timber revetment of . . . magazine completed;" "shelving magazines;" "inside sheeting of one magazine on;" "making wire gauge doors for magazines," "3 wire gauge doors hung in magazines and screen put on ventilators." Of course, the explosion of Fort Lyon's north magazine, on June 9, 1863, necessitated the construction of a new one. In October 1864, Alexander informed the Chief of Engineers, Richard Delafield, of general problems with many of the magazines:

"The new magazines stated above as needed are to replace those first constructed, which were built of white pine boards and frame, in the quickest manner, when the earlier forts were being hastily thrown up. The boards of these buildings are now rotting out, causing leaks, which render the magazines unfit for the safe keeping of ammunition. They should be rebuilt in a more permanent manner of logs and oak boards." [18]

Bombproofs

Like the magazines, the bombproofs were damp, leaked, and sometimes flooded. But, water was even a greater problem in bombproofs because, in some cases, the engineers made them into living quarters. Water was not, however, the only repair and maintenance problem in bombproofs. Thus, the bombproofs, like the magazines, required constant repair and maintenance. [19]

In January 1864, Barnard informed the Chief of Engineers, Joseph G. Totten, that within the Defenses of Washington, the " . . . magazines and bomb-proofs are now in a very bad condition." In July 1864, Barnard, in reporting that the new bombproof at Fort Ethan Allen was not yet completed, observed that the "frame is up" and the "water proof roof is on" but it still required an earth covering, laying the floors, and putting up the siding. In October 1864, Alexander wrote: "Most of them [the works] are provided with good bomb-proofs . . ." but ". . . new bomb-proofs are required in many of the works . . ." [20]

On June 20, 1862, Edward Frost told the overseer of the Defenses of Washington, South of the Potomac River, that the bombproof at Fort Ward required repair "to prevent the roof from falling in." Repair and maintenance work included: putting earth covering on bomb-proofs at Forts Ward and Corcoran; "trimming and sodding bomb-proof " at Fort Ethan Allen; "hauling and hewing timber for bomb-proof " at Fort Morton; putting a new roof on the bombproof and covering it with earth at Fort Marcy; cutting loopholes on bombproofs at Fort Stanton; erecting a stairway to breast height on the bombproof at Fort Ellsworth; and rebuilding the bombproofs at Battery Jameson. [21]

In April 1863, the First Massachusetts Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment's quartermaster requested lime to whitewash works in the Defenses of Washington. His request was originally denied but, soon afterward, the Chief Engineer of the defenses sent a written communication stating that whitewashing was a necessity. On April 10, Colonel T.R. Tannatt referred the request to Barnard observing that " . . without the lime it is impossible to properly care for and preserve the wood work pertaining to forts, and keep the same in proper condition." Ten days later, Barnard replied that whitewashing was conducive to cleanliness and health in the bombproofs and made them lighter, thereby making all parts of the work clearly distinguishable even in dark. [22]

Since many of the bombproofs served as quarters, the chance of fire within them was great. On December 2, 1863, Barnard informed Augur that the stovepipes in use in the bombproofs were dangerous due to sparks from them. Later that month, civil engineer A. Grant Childs forwarded a sketch showing improvements in the arrangement of stovepipes to act as a spark arrester in bombproofs, suggesting that the Quartermaster Department adopt his idea, if not too late. Following the fire in a bombproof at Fort Marcy, in January 1865, already mentioned, the General commanding the Department of Washington directed his Chief Ouartermaster, Colonel M.I. Ludington, that due to the great danger of "fire in those bomb proofs" occupied as quarters where the use of vitrified earthen pipes as the lower end of the flues, with straight pipes, " . . double elbows be introduced in every case in which bomb proofs are used as quarters and heated by stoves." [23]

Abatis

In General Orders No. 42, "regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons," prepared by Brigadier General Barry, U.S. Army Inspector of Artillery and issued by the War Department in February 1864, article 17 stipulated: "The abatis, being a most important portion of the work, must be always well looked to and kept in perfect order." In January 1863, Barnard declared: ". . . I need scarcely tell you that an abattis is one of the most essential things to the security of a field work." But, as Barnard reported in January 1862, "as the use and importance of the works are not appreciated" . . . "we may expect to see the timber work and abatis converted into tent floors and fire-wood." [24] Early in the war, timber abounded in the Washington, D.C. area so it was common to read directives such as "You are hereby authorized to cut such poles and abattis in rear of Fort Blenker as may be needed for your work in that vicinity." Later, though, much of the timber had been cleared but abatis was still required as Alexander demonstrated in October 1864, writing "These works are, generally speaking, in good condition, so far as their interior arrangements are concerned, the principal defect being the want of good strong abatis around some of the forts." But, scarcity of wood was only one of the problems pertaining to abatis. [25]

In January 1863, Barnard observed "On inspecting Fort Ellsworth yesterday I observed that the abattis has been much impaired by the chopping off of branches & indeed in some places had been carried off entirely." In May 1863, Colonel A. Piper, commanding the Third Brigade, Defenses North of the Potomac, requested that General Barnard be notified that the abatis in front of Fort Baker was 20 yards in front of the glacis, with the public highway breaking its continuous line, thereby allowing the enemy to reach the ditch at two points without passing through it; he suggested that the abatis might be placed immediately in front of the ditch. In June 1863, at Fort Cass, the garrison had "removed the abatis from the gorge" of the work and cut it up for firewood. Colonel Alexander, in October 1864, observed "They [the works] have all been provided with abatis, but some of it is over three years old, and so rotten and broken as to be almost useless as a means of defense, and so dry as to be easily set on fire" and, therefore, the ". . . decayed abatis must be replaced by new . . ." Barnard observed, "The replacing of abattis around our works is getting to be a matter of difficulty & expense . . ." early in 1863. [26]

Thus, the Chief Engineer of the Defenses of Washington monthly reports to the Chief of Engineers included many references to abatis. In the report of operations for June 1864, work included "laying new abatis" at Fort Ethan Allen and relaying the same at Fort Woodbury. In the report of operations for September 1864, work entailed "laying abatis" at forts Tillinghast, Totten and Slocum. In October 1864, the engineers oversaw "renewing abatis on the gorge line at Fort Strong and renewing abatis at Fort Woodbury." At Fort Morton, workers were "excavating for and laying abatis" in November 1864. In October 1864, Alexander submitted a report of operations for the year ending September 1864, showing "abatis repaired" at Fort Marcy; "abatis renewed" at forts Tillinghast, Craig, Carroll, Totten, Slocum and Stevens; and observed that the ". . . abatis requires to be renewed along the whole line from Fort Albany to Fort Lyon, inclusive, with the exception of Forts Berry, Garesche, Ward, and Williams." Abatis work continued until the defenses were no longer required. [27]

Roads

The Washington, D.C. area endured the constant movement of men, animals, supplies, armament and ammunition within the Defenses of Washington for military purposes on many city streets, and county roads in the District, Maryland and Northern Virginia. In addition to the numerous roads in existence in the Washington, D.C. area when the Civil War began, the Army Engineers oversaw the construction of thirty-two to thirty-three miles of roads during the war, between 1861 and 1865, for use within the Defenses of Washington. Both military and civilian streets and roads required continual maintenance and repair. [28]

In November 1862, Barnard forwarded a letter from Colonel Alexander to the Department pertaining to the upkeep of the roads. Alexander observed:

"The necessity of having roads and the importance of having good roads being admitted, we ought not, with the experience of last winter before us, to allow ourselves to be caught in the same condition again. It is an easy matter to say that the roads were horrible; that they were nearly impassable; that the expense of supplying the troops was enormously increased in consequence; that the number of wagons engaged in this business was double what it would have been with good roads; that the wagons were broken down and worn out; that mules and horses were disabled in great numbers; and that the troops were sometimes without provisions & the animals without forage. But all this would not convey any adequate conception of the terrible condition of these roads." [29]

Soon after, on December 2, 1862, Alexander wrote: ". . . I beg to suggest the following plan of keeping it [the road] in repair during the winter so that it may at all times answer the purpose for which it was constructed." As he considered the new road connecting with the line of defenses from Fort Alexander to Fort Massachusetts, he suggested that the road be divided into sections and the garrisons of the nearest fort would keep the road repaired. Elaborating, he stipulated that the garrison of Fort Alexander, using 20 to 25 men every day, could accomplish repairs in section 1, from Fort Alexander to the head of the reservoir. Repair would "consist in filling up the ruts, leveling sunken places, attending to the drainage, &c." Each fort would have a cart, furnished by the Quartermaster Department, with the post's name imprinted on it, along with horse and harness to be used only for repairing the fort and adjacent roads. In conclusion, Alexander suggested that the same plan could be used throughout the whole line of defence. [30]

In response to Alexander's suggestions, the Headquarters, Second Brigade, Defenses of Washington, North of the Potomac, at Fort Pennsylvania, issued Special Orders No. 73 on December 14, 1862:

"The Military road from Fort Alexander to Fort DeRussy is divided into sections for the purpose of keeping it in repair during the winter so that it may at all times answer the purpose for which it was constructed.

Section I. From Fort Alexander to the head of the Reservoir to be kept in repair by the garrison of Fort Alexander.

Section II. From the head of the Reservoir to Tennallytown to be kept in repair by the garrison of Fort Mansfield.

Section III. From Tennallytown to Broad Branch to be kept in repair by the garrisons of Fort Pennsylvania and Kearney.

Section IV. From Broad Branch to Rock Creek to be kept in repair by the garrison of Fort DeRussy.

The work of repairs will consist in filling up the ruts, leveling sunken places, tending to the drainage, &c From twenty to thirty five men daily might be advantageously employed on each section.

Regimental Quartermasters will make requisitions for carts, horses, harness, one for each Post, the name of the Fort will be painted on the cart and orders issued that these carts are to be used exclusively for repairs of the Forts or the adjacent roads.

Regimental Quartermasters will be held responsible that these orders are obeyed and that the roads are kept in repair." [31]

In many instances, Barnard and Alexander insisted that it was ". . . indispensable to begin work immediately before winter rains are upon us . . ." The December 1862 report of the Commission, "to examine and report upon the plan of the present forts, and sufficiency of the present system of defenses for the city," echoed these beliefs; in one place, the Commission report declared: "On the south side of the Potomac there are roads enough, or nearly so; but they require much work, such as widening, raising, constructing of culverts, &c., to make them practicable for winter." Elsewhere the report included the following remark: "Much work, however, is required on the main stems leading from the city, to make them practicable in the winter." Near its end, the Commission report offered the following: "It has been estimated that the work on roads about Washington requires ten regiments for twenty days, and efforts have been made to obtain this or an equivalent of labor in some other shape." In October 1864, Alexander emphasized the need for road repair when discussing the defenses north of the Potomac River: "The present length of the military road, with its branches, is about eighteen miles. It is in a passable condition, but needs repairs in some places." [32]

In a few instances, the Army Engineers were more interested in obstructing roads than repairing them. Annie S. Frobel, a Confederate sympathizing Northern Virginia civilian observed, in June 1863, "More barricading fixed up in the roads again to day . . . These great immense piles of brush and things are fixed up here and there and every where and the roads, completely stopped, but still there are ways left to go round the barricades." Barnard, in his report of monthly operations, for January 1864, to the Chief of Engineers, reported that the force south of the Potomac was employed in building stockades on the roads leading to Aqueduct, Chain and Long Bridges. In March 1864, Army Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck directed the obstruction of all wood roads leading to the exterior and not required for military transport to confine travel through the lines to the main roads. [33]

Quartermaster Department

The Army engineer officers, men and employees were not the only ones that performed maintenance and repair work in the Civil War Defenses of Washington. In fact, the Quartermaster Department undertook a large part of that work. The Quartermaster Department accomplished much of the road maintenance and repair. In late 1862, Alexander observed: "I am aware that the improvement of these roads does not properly belong to the Engineers. Nor does it belong to the QM, Commissary, or any other Department Exclusively but all would benefit . . ." About the same time, John P. Slough, Military Governor of Alexandria, who "upon a personal examination" found that ". . . two roads leading out of Alexandria required attention" requested that Captain C.B. Ferguson, the depot quartermaster, have them repaired. The Quartermaster Department also furnished wagons, carts, horses and harness to be used in repairing the roads. [34]

The Quartermaster Department was also responsible for most of the buildings erected and removed within the Civil War Defenses of Washington. In January 1864, Lieutenant Colonel Elias M. Greene, the Department Quartermaster, received instructions that the quarters and mess house at Battery Cameron required pitch and the quarters and mess halls at batteries Parrott and Kemble required other materials for completion. In October 1864, Lieutenant Colonel Horace G. Thomas, at Fort Bunker Hill, applied for permission to move the large two story building now occupied as Headquarters at Fort Slocum and the building adjoining to this post to be re-erected as Brigade Headquarters; Captain Arthur S. Nesmith, Assistant Quartermaster, Hardin's Division, recommended the action with changes and Hardin approved. In 1864, upon request, Quartermaster Daniel H. Rucker ordered Captain Elisha E. Camp, Assistant Quartermaster, to send a carpenter to make the repairs asked for that included repairing the sentry boxes, erecting a shelter for the horse of the detailed Mounted Oderly on duty and to make repairs on quarters of officers and men at the south end of Long Bridge. In August 1864, Alexander requested of the Department Acting Quartermaster, Captain Elisha E. Camp:

"Will you please send & have the roof of the building occupied by these Head Quarters repaired. It is in a very leaky Condition. So much so that unless repaired in heavy rains it will be impossible to occupy it." [35]

The Quartermaster Department undertook much additional maintenance and repair work including cutting bush in front of fortifications. In July 1864, during the threat of a Confederate invasion of the Washington, D.C. area, quartermaster teamsters were put to work cutting the underbrush and new growth in front of the fortifications. In addition, the Quartermaster Department furnished implements, such as scythes, to help in the clearing. [36]

Another important Quartermaster Department duty was to dig, maintain and repair wells in the defenses. In October 1864, Alexander reported that the Quartermaster's had been so slow in cleaning, deepening and curbing wells in the forts South of the Potomac that he was considering doing the labor at Fort Ward "if the Chief Qr Master will supply us with the materials." The Fort Morton commander, in March 1865, reported: " . . . the well within this Fort was left by the Quartermasters Dept. In an unfinished Condition and consequently the Brick work in the interior of the Well is giving away." He then requested that it be repaired "without delay." [37]

In order to accomplish the maintenance and repair work within the Civil War Defenses of Washington, constant requests to the Quartermaster Department for tools and supplies were necessary, as discussed elsewhere. But, the Quartermaster Department received some interesting additional requests such as one in November 1864 for "2 to 3 hundred loads of manure from the Eastern Branch stables to put on the sod on forts across Eastern Branch." The Quartermaster Department also furnished any transportation required, including the wagons, horses, harness and forage. [38]

Moving and Destroying Buildings

From the beginning of the Civil War Defenses of Washington, in May 1861, the Army had to deal with numerous houses and other structures that impeded fortification construction and restricted the field of fire. In many instances the Army destroyed the structures, but in some cases, they moved them to other locations. Similarly, after the construction of structures in the defenses, such as barracks, quarters, mess houses, etc., the Army, in some instances, decided that it no longer needed them or wanted them relocated. Depending on the structure, various departments such as Army Engineers, Quartermasters Department, Signal Corpsmen and Ordnace Corpsmen, were responsible for their destruction or relocation. [39]

Imminent danger motivated some of this work. In August 1864, civil engineer William C. Gunnell requested the issuance of orders for the removal of company quarters from Forts Carroll and Greble so that the ammunition could be safely placed in magazines. General Hardin, commanding a division in the Defenses of Washington, requested, in September 1864, the removal of the Signal Station at Fort Lincoln to Fort Bunker Hill where it would be of much better use. [40]

In a "Memoranda compiled for the Guidance and Information of Officers Serving in the Defenses of Washington," drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Barton S. Alexander, but never issued, article 3 stipulated that "When any part of the line of the defense is threatened with an attack all houses, trees, bushes, and in general everything that could be used as a cover by the enemy's sharpshooters, should be removed for a distance of at least 600 yards from the line." Thus, some remaining structures were to be removed or destroyed upon the approach of an enemy. "In case of any demonstration of the enemy making a dash along the road from Bladensburg toward Benning's Bridge," . . . the "dwelling-house and barn close to the work [Fort Mahan] is highly injurious to the defense, particularly with a small garrison." A memorandum for Colonel Haskins in June 1863 on the situation at Fort Mahan recorded that, "A few days' notice ought to be given, and the buildings removed." In July 1864, at the time of Jubal Early's raid on the defenses, the house, barns, etc. near the counterscarp at Fort Mahan were removed. [41]

The necessity for the relocation or destruction of structures was a neverending problem. In July 1863, Barnard informed his superiors that "The strength of Fort Stevens and of the line between it & Ft. Slocum is most seriously impaired by the existence of a dwelling house & orchard on the right, and of a dwelling and outbuildings immediately in front " and urged that the Army "sweep away these obstructions at a few hours notice, and the occupants of the dwellings should be aware that in case of an advance of the enemy towards Washington, the buildings must be destroyed." Barnard, in May 1864, informed the Department commander that a collection of huts, probably erected by General Silas Casey's men, and now occupied by contraband, located immediately in front of the line of rifle pits crossing the Columbia Turnpike, "should not have been permitted in the first place," and must be removed henceforth as this "is one of the most probable approaches for an army and there are important batteries for field guns which would be entirely masked by the buildings." [42]

Quarters

Quarters for both officers and men required constant attention. At Battery Cameron, the quarters required pitch in January 1864. The commander at Fort Whipple, in December 1864, reported that the roofs on barracks Nos. 2 & 3 and on two of the officers quarters leaked badly, the flooring required repair and many of the bunks within were "unservicable by the subtraction of various parts . . ." The commander of the guard at the south end of Long Bridge applied for carpenters to make repairs on the quarters of both officers and men in October 1864. [43]

Not all officers and men serving in the Defenses of Washington had satisfactory quarters. Many bombproofs in the defenses served as quarters. Others lived in camps of huts or tents nearby. But these living quarters had their limitations as at Fort Worth, where the men lived in Sibley tents, about which one officer reported that they were " . . . worn and no longer habitable . . " In some instances, the Army moved barracks from one fort to another but elsewhere, such as at Forts Carroll & Greble, the Army requested necessary orders be issued for the removal of company quarters. By late 1864, the War Department had decided to stop erecting barracks in the works around Washington. [44]

Living quarters even caused combat deficiencies. On June 29, 1863, Barnard, in reporting on the Eastern Branch defenses, remarked "I look upon the quarters as a great source of weakness . . . they are on the very point most favorable for an assault, and the matter is becoming worse every day by the addition of new buildings" and recommended that the troops move out of them into a nearby camp or ". . . the works themselves." A July 2, 1863 report on the condition of Fort Totten and the defenses on the right observed that many of the troops are outside of the forts "in very comfortable quarters," with the exception of forts Snyder and Carroll, that "could bring misfortune to them coming to be shelled by the enemy." [45]

Underbrush, Bushes and Vegetation

In the 1861 Army Regulations, with an Appendix containing the Changes and Laws Affecting Army Regulations and Articles of War to June 25, 1863, published in 1863, under "Care of Fortifications," Article IX, Number 42 stipulated that:

"All grassed surfaces, excepting the glacis, will be carefully and frequently mowed (except in dry weather), and the oftener the better, while growing rapidly–the grass never being allowed to be more than a few inches high. In order to cut the grass even and close, upon small slopes a light one-handed scythe should be used; and in mowing the steep slopes, the mower should stand on a light ladder resting against the slope, not upon the grass. Crops of hay may be cut on the glacis; or, if fenced, it may be used as pasture; otherwise it should be treated as other slopes of the fortification. On all the slopes, spots of dead grass will be cut out and replaced by fresh sods. All weeds will be eradicated. A very little labor, applied steadily and judiciously, will maintain the grassed surfaces, even of the largest of our forts, in good condition."

In addition, Number 43, on the same page prohibited "The burning of grass upon any portion of a fortification is strictly forbidden." War Department General Orders No. 42, February 2, 1864, in Article 20, stipulated that: "The grass-covered or sodded portions of the parapets, traverses, magazines, &c., should be occasionally watered in dry weather and the grass be kept closely cut." [46]

So, in April 1862, an inspection report showed that a hill, near Fort Mahan, commanded the inside of the fort and "was covered with trees and thick underbrush." Barnard, in September 1862, sent a memorandum to Frost, ordering that the heavy second growth should be cut immediately and to use bank scythes to do it. Later, in June 1863, in a memorandum to Colonel Haskins, Barnard suggested, "Commanding officers should be instructed to clear the bushes which have grown since the first cutting of the timber." And in June 1864, Barnard reported that he had "directed that one scythe with a stone be furnished to each fort on your line" so that "One man ought to cut all the grass on the slopes of any of our forts, even the largest, in three or four days and the scythes can then be used in cutting the grass and weeds from the slopes of the batteries and rifle pits between the forts." [47]

Actually, though, not much was said about the growth until the time of Early's Raid on Washington in July 1864. On July 5, 1864, the Department informed Colonel Haskins, commanding a division, that the Chief Engineer, Defenses of Washington, had reported " . . that brush is growing on the approaches to the works constituting your line in such quantities as to militate against the proper use of the means of defence given to them" and that he should begin removing it. On July 18, the Chief Engineer, Defenses of Washington, directed that the trees and bushes 'be cleared out of the ravines and from vicinity" of forts Dupont and Davis. On July 19, the major general commanding the Department, directed that " . . . "all men who can be spared from the garrisons of the works constituting the front, east, and south of the Eastern Branch, be employed in clearing the approaches of brush, &c., commencing on the crests, &c., where the enemy, in developing himself, would naturally establish sharpshooters and his skirmishers." The commanding general of the Department wrote Brigadier General G.A. De Russy, commanding a division, on July 28, asking him to inform these headquarters what " . . . progress has been made in clearing the approaches to the works on your line of brush, he desires also to know approximately the height of this brush." On the same day, M.D.Hardin, commanding a Division, ordered Colonel William H. Hayward, commanding the Second Brigade, to assign all the available force that could be spared "to cut brush" in his command area. Again on the same day, Hardin informed the Department:

"In reply to your communication of the 27th instant, I have the honor to report, from my observation of the line yesterday, that the brush in front of Forts Sumner, Mansfield, and Reno has been nearly cleared, although more work should be done on that front. On Rock Creek and in front of Fort DeRussy, and from Fort Slocum east to Fort Lincoln the brush is not cleared. A great amount of work remains to be done on that line. On account of the limited number of troops in this command it has been impossible to complete the work, although all my available force has been engaged on it. I most respectfully request 300 workmen, or as many as can be furnished, be sent at once to clear the brush now remaining, as above stated. The brush is from five to eight feet in height." [48]

At the end of July and into August, this activity continued. On July 31, Alexander reported that he had received a communication from Army Chief of Staff General Henry W. Halleck, to General U.S. Grant, in reference to the undergrowth of bushes springing up in front of our defensive works, and he reported to the Engineer Department that the Department of Washington issued an order on the subject, "but still the bushes do not come down as rapidly as they ought" . . . and remarked 'that scarcely any cutting has yet been done on the line over the Eastern Branch." On August 8, the Department commander directed an examination, on August 9, of the " . . . approaches to the works north of the Potomac. . . and report to these Head quarters the progress . . . made in clearing the brush away; also the probable time . . . to clear the approaches to a distance of one thousand yards from the parapet of the works." On the same day, he ordered General De Russy "to send out inspectors to examine progress of clearing brush on approaches from Corcoran to Willard," and they should specify the time to clear the whole front to a distance of 100 yards from the parapet, and their report should be received by August 9. [49]

For sometime afterwards, Alexander's reports of engineer operations, addressed the clearing of underbrush, bushes and other vegetation in the defenses. Alexander reported that in July 1864, "there has been a large amount of bushes and undergrowth cut and cleared from the front of the works, on both sides of the river." In his October 1864 report of engineer operations for the year ending September 30, 1864, Alexander wrote: "Great quantities of bushes have been cut in front of the works, and some woods and orchards felled in the neighborhoods of Forts Stevens, Slocum, and Mahan." In January 1865, Alexander's force worked at cutting wood and brush in Eastern Branch swamps. Nearly the whole force, employed upon the North side of the Potomac River, in February 1865, completed work in clearing the brush from the Eastern Branch swamps. [50]

Sodding

War Department General Orders No. 45, February 16, 1863, Regulations for the care of the Field works, and the Government of their Garrisons, pointed out the importance of sodding in Article 18:

"The garrison can greatly improve the work by sodding the superior (upper) slope of the parapet, and also the exterior or outer slope, or by sowing grass seed on the superior slope, first covering it with surface soil. The grass-covered or sodded portions of the parapets, traverses, magazines, &c., should be occasionally watered in dry weather, and the grass kept closely cut." [51]

But, maintenance and repair of sodding was continual and demanding. Barnard, in October 1863, informed the Secretary of War that the work outlined by the Commission was "either finished or brought to a state of efficiency; still a system of works of this character demands constant watchfulness and expenditure to keep it up, and there are yet some works that require overhauling, and all of them ought to have their scarps either revetted or sloped and sodded." In October 1864, Alexander reported that "Revetment of scarps will be required either by sodding the whole exterior slopes at all the forts on the line not already revetted on an angle of 45 degrees by a scarp wall of brick or stone, or by a scarp revetment of plank." Alexander also stated that because the works are "being built of perishable materials" they would "require constant repairs" pointing out that they "must all be sodded, or revetted with masonry before the works can assume a permanent character" and "all interior earthen slopes of traverses, magazines, bombproofs, camps, &c., should be sodded." [52]

On April 14, 1865, the Department informed Alexander that people were cutting sod in Virginia, on the property of a loyal man, Mr. Millard, for repair of Fort Foote. In November 1864, Captain George P. Thyng, commanding Fort Foote, received orders to furnish an officer and detachment of men for "daily duty in sodding." Engineer in Chief, Defenses South of the Potomac, A. Grant Childs, requested a detail of men from the various garrisons to commence, among other things, sodding, and more specifically to repair the sodded slopes on the forts to the right of Columbia Pike. Still later, in late May 1865, Alexander requested an increase in the detail for sodding at Fort Whipple to 100 men. [53]

Thus, the monthly reports of engineer operations in the Defenses of Washington, included much sodding work. In June 1864, men repaired the parapet and sodding at Fort Lincoln. In April 1865, laborers repaired the sodding of traverses and magazines at Fort Morton and repaired and sodded the magazine at Fort Cass. During the year ending September 30, 1864, Alexander reported that his work force had repaired the old revetment, parapets, and sodding at forts Lincoln, Thayer, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, and Slemmer; repaired the parapets and sodding at forts DeRussy and Kearny; and repaired and sodded the parapets at forts Reno, Bayard, Simmons, and Mansfield. At most of the works, a great deal of new protective sodding was completed. [54]

Ordnance and Artillery

In addition to the fortifications and the many structures and facilities around them, the guns, armament and associated materiel required maintenance, repair and alteration. Barnard, on October 6, 1862, reported that the defenses mounted "four hundred and forty-three guns." In December 1862, Barnard stated: "The total armament in the different works, at the date of this report, is six hundred and forty-three guns and seventy-five mortars " In October 1864, Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Alexander wrote, "The present armament is 762 guns and 74 mortars." The numbers of guns, ammunition and associated materiel were, therefore, immense. [55]

The guns in the Defenses of Washington ranged from 6-pounder field guns to 200-pounder Parrots. The armament included 24- and 32-pounder seacoast guns, 10- to 100-pounder Parrotts, 42-pounder James Rifle, 30-pounder rifles, 24-pounder flank defense howitzers, 24-pounder siege guns, and 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. Smaller guns included the 12-pounder Whitworth breechloading rifles, 12-pounder James rifle, 12-pounder heavy guns, 12-pounder mountain howitzers, 12-pounder field howitzers, 12-pounder light Napoleon field guns, 10-inch Siege Mortars; 8-inch siege howitzers, 8-inch seacoast howitzers, 6-pounder James guns, and the 4-inch rifles. Some forts had a wide range of guns meaning they required a variety of carriages or platforms and ammunition but one Artillery commander felt that three calibers of guns along with mortars, possibly making a total of five, was favored. [56]

Due to new requirements and mistakes, guns were transferred from one fortification to another. A Northern Virginia civilian, on November 27, 1862, observed: "Six heavy pieces of ordnance were taken up there [forts on the opposite hills] today." In September 1862, Colonel William B. Greene, Fourteenth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, received an order from the Department directing him to remove a 30 pounder Parrott gun from Fort Craig to Fort DeKalb, to replace the same by one of the 24 pounders that had been left on the outside of Fort Corcoran and to put the other 24 pounder either into Fort De Kalb or Fort Woodbury. At the same time, Barnard instructed Mr. Frost, the civilian engineer, to transfer the "32 pdr looking to the right & near" "to the place of the 24 pdr on the other side" at Fort Barnard. On July 1, 1863, Colonel H.L. Abbott, First Connecticut Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment, reported that he had transferred the ". . . four 4-inch ordnance guns of our siege train remaining in park at Fort Ward to Ft Scott, as they will be of some service there, and are of no use in their former location." In January 1864, General W.F. Barry, Inspector of Artillery, transmitted to the Department of Washington the changes to be made in the armament of the fortifications promulgated by the Board of Officers, over which he presided, and approved by the War Department in December 1863, asking that General DeRussy and Lieutenant Colonel Haskins be directed to instruct the commanding officers of posts to pay special attention to the interchange ordered to be made and to make sure that for each gun, howitzer or mortar sent away or received, the proper carriages, implements, equipments and ammunition accompany it. Colonel Alexander, in January 1865, when "Referring again to the armament of the Block Houses," stated that "their embrasures were not made for heavy guns" and, therefore, the "boat howitzers" . . . 'now in place ought to be changed" to "12 pdr Napoleon's "or if they are unavailable, "any other field guns will answer the purpose." In the Spring, 1865, Colonel Alexander asked permission " . . . to remove the guns and ammunition from forts Haggerty and Bennett and by constructing platforms, and embrasures, to convert them into Batteries of field guns, to be armed when the emergency may require it." Much artillery materiel was transferred along with the guns, like in June 1864, when Colonel Haskins, commanding Haskins' division, directed that the necessary orders be issued "for transfer of the following surplus ordnance stores" from Battery Vermont to Fort Sumner: two 8-inch howitzers breechsights; 2 sponge buckets wood; 3-fuze mallets; 1-fuze plug reamer; 2-fuze setters (bronze); 45-fuze plugs (wood); 3 gunners quadrants (wood); 2 budge barrels. [57]

With the transfer of guns from one fortification to another, pertinent changes in the works were often necessary. In September 1862, Barnard informed Frost that at Fort Ward, the new seacoast platform was to be converted into a siege platform so arranged as to fire well to the left. Barnard, in October 1862, reported that "When these works were commenced, neither field nor siege guns could be obtained in any adequate numbers; hence the only resource was to arm them with sea-coast 24's and 32's from the arsenal" but " it is probable that many of these guns should be dismounted, and it is certain that a great many emplacements should be prepared for field & siege guns" meaning "that 200 platforms should be made, embrasures cut &c. for field & siege guns, which (earthwork included) is alone a very considerable work." In May 1863, Barnard told Gunnell that "At Fort Slocum the 2 24-pdr barbette guns on left face of old work must come down and siege platforms & embrasure be substituted" because "This face is the only one which will bring a cross fire to bear upon the heights immediately North of Fort Stevens." [58]

Such alterations and repairs continued throughout the war. In August 1863, Barnard instructed Childs that the "Embrasure to be made on flank of Fort Corcoran where the two 8" guns have been removed." General W.F. Barry, Inspector of Artillery, wrote Brigadier General De Russy, commanding the Defenses of Washington, South of Potomac, in late January 1864, suggesting that he inform Barnard what materials were required for the alteration of platforms and embrasures due to the change of armament recommended by the board of officers. Colonel Alexander Piper, commander of the Tenth New York Artillery Regiment, in March 1864, pleaded that Barnard's attention should be directed to the subject of new platforms and embrasures for his line because the ordnance already delivered is "useless otherwise." In July 1864, Gen. C.C. Augur, commanding the Department of Washington, informed General Henry W. Halleck, the Chief of Staff of the Army, that " . . . any material changes in the armament [in the Defenses of Washington] would require changes in the platforms or embrasures, involving considerable work, and be likely to produce confusion in the ammunition, besides introducing to the garrisons pieces with whose ranges they would be unacquainted." [59]

In July 1864, the Department asked Barnard to " . . send a competent officer to Fort Sumner to superintend the remounting of a hundred pounder Parrott Gun dismounted by firing yesterday" during Early's Raid on Washington. In August 1864, Major J.G. Benton, commanding the Washington Arsenal, proposed to send two working parties, in a few days, to repair 100 and 200 gun pounder platforms and the carriages of some of the flank defense howitzers in the forts around this city, and asked that commanders of the forts afford assistance in labor. Brigadier General M.D. Hardin, commanding a division, requested in September 1864, that Colonel Alexander send a man from his department to superintend the relaying of one siege platform at Fort Totten and one 10-inch Siege Mortar bed at Fort Sumner. [60]

The engineer workforce actually accomplished a great amount of this work. In July 1864, it repaired the revetment, platforms, embrasures etc. at Battery Wagner. It laid platforms at Fort Ethan Allen, cut 19 embrasures in the revetment and hewed 11 platform sleepers of which five were laid at Fort McPherson; took up the traverse circles at Fort Albany; removed platforms at Fort Worth, and mounted a 24-pounder at Fort Chaplin, in October 1864. In November 1864, it laid platforms at forts Ethan Allen, McPherson and Albany. In April 1865, it dismounted the barbette guns at Fort Thayer and prepared new platforms for siege guns. Work continued even in the Summer of 1865 as the workforce laid gun platforms and made embrasures at forts Worth and Ellsworth and raised the parapet of the right front bastion at the latter in June. In July, it laid platforms at forts Ethan Allen, C.F. Smith, Lyon and Ellsworth, removed platforms at Fort Strong and cut embrasures at Fort C.F. Smith. In August 1865, the workforce laid two gun platforms at Fort Reno and laid other gun platforms at retained forts south of the Potomac River, in August 1865. [61]

In October 1862, General W.F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, Defenses of Washington, recommended that a special order be issued directing the numbering of the guns in all the field-works constituting the Defenses of Washington: "The guns in each work to be numbered in a regular series from right to left as you enter the gateway. (And not from left to right as in the case in many instances now) and the numbers to be legibly painted either upon the breach of the gun in white paint or upon the interior slope of the parapet (if practicable) in black paint." So, in November 1863, Colonel Schrimer, commanding the 2nd Brigade and the Fifteenth New York Artillery Regiment, reported I have the honor to forward according to your request the outline sketch, of the Forts, under my command" pointing out that "The embrasures, are numbered from right to left and the Pieces at each Platform, now in position, are specified in Black Ink." The mounting of some of the guns was difficult and required special procedures so, in the spring of 1864, Alexander forwarded to the Chief of Engineers, Richard Delafield, photographs "showing the manner of mounting 15" guns by means of purchase falls" and a tracing showing the method used for mounting 200-pounder rifled guns at Battery Rodgers using the same principle for mounting the 15" gun by making the parts somewhat larger. Similarly, a circular issued by the First Brigade, De Russy's Division, on April 3, 1865, directed that "Commanding officers of Posts will at once repair the Targets belonging to their respective Forts and put them in condition for target practice."

Garrisons

During the war, the garrison of the Defenses of Washington changed in size, extent and composition. Likewise, the garrisons of the individual forts also changed in numbers and composition. Many troops served in the defenses of Washington for a while and then received orders to serve elsewhere. Thus, the Defenses of Washington seemed to experience frequent, if not continual, change. "Major General George B. McClellan, on October 18, 1861, directed Brigadier General J.G. Barnard, Engineer of the Defenses, and Brigadier General William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, to "determine the minimum strength of garrisons–artillery and infantry– required for the various works in and about Washington to satisfy the conditions of a good defense." Barnard and Barry sent a summary estimate to McClellan on the 22nd, and two days later they submitted their finalized report calling for a total of 33,795 including 11,045 total for the garrisons, based on "the rule, which experience showed to be satisfactory for the lines of Torres Vedras," of "Two men per running yard front covering line and one man per running yard of rear line, deducting spaces occupied by guns, and 22,750 reserves. Barnard submitted additional thoughts on the required garrisons of the Defenses of Washington on December 1, 1861; December 10, 1861; and January 13, 1862. [62]

In February 1862, the Army of the Potomac return showed 5,106 officers and men present in the field works and artillery about Washington, D.C. along with 160 officers and men present at Fort Washington but the total number in the Washington, D.C. area was 177,556. On March 8, 1862, President Lincoln's General War Order, No. 3., stipulated: ". . . no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure." Brigadier General James Wadsworth, commander of the Military District of Washington, reported, on April 2, 1862, that the forces left in his command, when McClellan took the Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula, for the "defenses of Washington" was 15,335 infantry, 4,294 artillery and 848 cavalry totaling 19, 022 after subtracting those sick and in arrest and confinement but ". . . nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined . . ." During the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia, correspondence between McClellan and the War Department and the President frequently concerned the Defenses of Washington and the number of men left behind to defend them; similar correspondence occurred between the Army of the Potomac commander and the War Department and the President during the Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns. [63]

The U.S. Army return, of June 30, 1862, showed 4,358 officers and men present for duty in the Defenses of Washington although the Army of Virginia, under the command of Major General John Pope, totaling 77,087, was in the vicinity. On August 31, 1862, the Defenses of Washington included 25,771 present. Major General N.P. Banks, commander of the Defenses of Washington, informed the Commander in Chief of the Army, Major General Henry W. Halleck, on September 11, 1862, that the Defenses of Washington comprised 15,515 officers and men "in garrison" with a total of 73,300 "Troops for the defense of Washington." The December 31, 1862, return of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, commanding the Military District of Washington, showed a total of 66,603 officers and men present for duty but a much smaller number of them were actually in and near the fortifications. [64]

As is evident from some of the numbers given above, tens of thousands of troops that were technically counted as part of the Defenses of Washington, did not serve in the fortifications but, theoretically, could do so if necessary. On January 26, 1863, Heintzelman wrote Halleck, stating "There does not appear to be much connection between the Army of the Potomac and the troops for the defenses of Washington," and asking ". . . cannot the defenses be made into a separate department with such limits as may be convenient." Thus, on March 31, 1863, Brigadier General J.G. Barnard submitted a tabular statement of, among other things, the garrisons "of the forts constituting the Defenses of Washington" as 10,305 artillery and 16,420 infantry for a total of "full garrisons for all the forts" as 26,725 men. He also included a statement addressing the required garrison for the defenses. The following extract from the "report of the commission ordered last autumn by the Secretary of War to report on the Defenses of Washington may be interesting:"

"The total infantry garrison required for their defense, computed at 2 men per yard of front perimeter, and 1 man per yard of rear perimeter of works, is about 25,000. The total number of artillerymen (to furnish three relief 's for each gun) required is about 9,000. It is seldom necessary to keep these infantry supports attached to the works. The artillerymen, whose training requires much time, having learned the disposition of the armament, and computed the distances of the ground over which attacks may be looked for, and the ranges and service of their guns, should not be changed; they should remain permanently in the forts." [65]

In his 1871 report, Barnard wrote "When Early marched on Washington in 1864 the defenses had been stripped of the disciplined and instructed artillery regiments (numbering about 18,000) which had constituted their garrison, and their places supplied by newly raised 100-day regiments, (Ohio National Guard,) insufficient in numbers and quite uninstructed. In a March 8, 1864 inspection report, ordered by the Secretary of War, Assistant Adjutant General James A. Hardie reported "Theoretically, the garrisons are not strong enough, in as much as they do not afford three relief 's of gunners and there are no reserves" and the numbers were 11,011 men for the garrisons south of the Potomac, comprising one division under Brigadier General Gustavus A. DeRussy with four brigades under colonels John C. Tidball, Thomas Tannatt, Henry L. Abbot and L. Schirmer; and 7,852 men, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, forming one division under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Haskins, Aide de Camp, with three brigades under colonels Louis O. Morris, Augustus. A. Gibson and Alexander Piper, (Eastern Branch,) for a total of 18,863 men. On April 17, 1864, Henry W. Halleck, Army Chief of Staff, informed Lieutenant General U.S. Grant, Commander-in-chief of the U.S. Army, that the Defenses of Washington were garrisoned ". . . by 10 regiments and one battalion of heavy Artillery; effective force of about 14,000 or deducting regiment ordered for Burnside, about 13,000." Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, Commander of the Department of Washington, on May 17, 1863, aptly spelled out the problems of stating numbers in the Defenses of Washington writing that "From the last morning report of the troops in the Defenses of Washington, dated May 10, 1863, the aggregate present amounts to 52,629" but, after deducting "those on special or other duty, sick, and in arrest or confinement, there are only 32,982," and of that number there are "the guards on the railroad from here to Baltimore, 1,530," the "Corps of Observation on this side of the Potomac, guarding the river as far as the Monocacy, 1,177," "[Major] General J. [ H ] Stahel's cavalry division, 3,739," and "the force under Brigadier General John J. Abercrombie, including the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, of 8,581," leaving under 18,000 men to actually man the defenses and perform related duty. That number generally remained the same until Early's Raid on Washington when the numbers swelled. [66]

Some of the troops that arrived in Washington to meet Early's Raid remained for a while but the numbers soon returned to those of pre-July. In December 1864, the Department of Washington return revealed a total of 29,741 officers and men present for duty with 13,165 staff and infantry, 4,215 cavalry, 14,207 artillery, and 76 men in a Signal Corps detachment. The February 1865 return for the Department of Washington showed a total present for duty of 28,347 comprising 12,365 artillery, 11,473 staff and infantry, 4,363 Cavalry, and 146 men in a Signal Corps detachment. But, with the war winding down and many troops falling back from the front, the April 1865 Department of Washington return showed a total of 68, 118 men present for duty. [67]

The numbers of troops stationed at the various forts, batteries and other fortifications in the Defenses of Washington also varied for a variety of reasons. Colonel Thomas D. Doubleday, commanding the Defenses of Washington, North of the Potomac, sent Lieutenant Colonel Peter Fritz, Jr., commanding the Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, on April 16, 1862, directions for the care of works and armament under his charge instructing him that "Not less than twelve men should be stationed at any Fort and fifteen will be required for Fort Carroll and its redoubt." Army of the Potomac Assistant Adjutant-General, Brigadier General A. Seth Williams, notified Barnard on August 30, 1862, that General McClellan had learned " . . the forts on the east side of the Eastern Branch are garrisoned by but a single company each" but he " . . thinks they should be immediately occupied by garrisons commensurate with their armament and importance, and wishes you at once to call upon General Silas Casey for the troops necessary for that purpose." General Amiel W. Whipple, commanding a brigade in the Defenses of Washington, in May 1862, was so disturbed by the lack of troops in the forts that he requested authority from General James Wadsworth, department commander, " . . to recruit to the Maximum strength the regiments within this command." [68]

The size of a fortification also helped determine the number of troops assigned. In late August 1862, Major General George B. McClellan, Army of the Potomac commander, informed Barnard that one of his staff officers had reported that forts Thayer, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Slemmer and Totten were garrisoned by "one small company" of the One Hundred and Twelfth Pennsylvania Volunteer infantry but they were all under marching orders that morning but he thought that instead of abandoning these works, " . . . they should be occupied with much larger garrisons . . ." On September 14, 1862, Barnard wrote Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, then commanding the Defenses of Washington, reporting that Fort Lyon was " . . . a very large work . . ." now garrisoned by three companies of the Third New York Artillery Battalion, numbering between 300 and 400 men, " . . requires a garrison of 1,400 men for defense, at a minimum estimate." [69]

But, ultimately, the exigencies of the war determined the number of troops assigned to each fort, battery, blockhouse or trench. In the late Summer of 1862, Barnard philosophically wrote: "My duties as the engineer do not permit me to keep myself informed as to the dispositions and changes of dispositions of troops, and I can only state the necessity [of the number of troops to garrison the defenses], without being able to say exactly how to meet it." Civil War correspondent Noah Brooks, in early July 1863, wrote from Washington: "These forts are now garrisoned by detachments of regiments . . . and it can thus be seen that the garrison in each must be quite small." In addition to the lack of sufficient troops, the quality, at times, left much to be desired as General Halleck reported, in April 1864, that of the effective force in the Defenses of Washington, "Very a few of the men have ever been under fire and one-third of them were raw recruits." [70]

Other Military Personnel

On February 2, 1864, War Department General Orders No. 42, regulations for the care of field-works and the government of their garrisons, stipulated in Article number 19: "No person not officially connected with the garrisons of the field-works will be allowed to enter them . . ." Certain exceptions were provided for in that those who were visiting the defenses on duty, or had passes "signed by competent authority" could enter. Besides actual garrisons of the fortifications and the troops officially assigned to the Defenses of Washington, that, at times, included Navy and Marine Corps personnel, other officers and men had duties that brought them into the fortifications also. [71]

Fortification construction, maintenance and repair required Engineer, Quartermaster, Ordnance and Signal Corps officers and men to visit the defenses. New recruits, before assignment to a unit; recovering convalescents; and imprisoned men and officers often worked in the defenses. Special ceremonies, military reviews, demonstrations and exhibitions brought officers and men into the defenses. Military courts- marital, inspections, investigations and the like, were additional reasons for visits by officers and men. [72]

Civilians

Like non-garrison military personnel, civilians were generally excluded from the defenses but some, for various reasons, did enter them. Perhaps the most often seen civilian was the sutler, officially appointed for each post and regiment, according to Army Regulations. Located in the vicinity of the units' camps, the sutler legally sold food, clothing, tobacco, newspapers, razors, books, stationary, etc. and was generally the only source for such items unless the officers and men received a "pass" allowing them to leave the area. Article 29 of the 'Articles of War" provided that "No sutler shall be permitted to sell any kind of liquors or victuals, or to keep their houses or shops open for the entertainment of soldiers, after nine at night, or before the beating of reveille, or upon Sundays, during divine service or sermon, on the penalty of being dismissed from all future sutling." Some sutlers, who usually made good money, were also unscrupulous and, therefore, the Second Brigade, Defenses North of the Potomac, Defenses of Washington, in Special Orders No. 46, stipulated that "Sutlers will hereafter have a copy of the 29th Article of War posted in a conspicuous place in their stores." Liquor, purchased from the sutler, led to many ugly incidents and grave problems and was the cause of various incarcerations. But, ultimately, the sutler was an important, if not the only, source of a variety of necessities and extras. [73]

Many civilians, black and white, male and female, officially worked in the fortifications; some of these civilians were laborers, others were cooks or laundresses, and still others performed additional necessary functions. At times, these civilians even slept in the defenses or near them and ate their meals in the immediate area. Although their status was tenuous, these civilians were absolutely necessary for the preservation of the defenses and the health and spirit of the men. Additionally, civilians employed by the Engineer, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal Corps, and Commissary departments, at times, visited the fortifications while on duty. [74]

Wives, girlfriends and prostitutes visited the defenses, whether legal or not, at times. On June 2, 1863, the Second Brigade, Defenses North of the Potomac, ordered: "The wifes (sic) of Soldiers not performing the duties of laundresses beyond the allowances by regulations are hereby ordered to leave all Posts garrisoned or to be garrisoned in this command." A similar issuance, from the Second Pennsylvania Volunteer Heavy Artillery Regiment, First Brigade, Defenses North of the Potomac, stipulated: "Soldiers wives not now on duty as Laundresses will leave the garrisons" but "Those acting as cooks for officers alone [are] excepted." Girlfriends and prostitutes even served as laundresses or cooks or in some other capacity but their standing was even more tenuous that the wives. [75]

Newspaper reporters, photographers and illustrators were often observed in the area of the fortifications. Some had obtained official passes, but many others just took their chances in order to obtain a great illustration or story. Charles Moulton reported that on December 28, 1862: "An artist of one of the New York illustrated papers, Frank Leslie's probably, was here last week" sketching Camp Lyon, the new forts in the area and the scenery roundabout. A little over three months later, the officer of the day at Fort Albany observed D. Grover sketching the fort and the surrounding hills, ravines, etc. The sketch showed the guns, abatis, and contour of grounds in detail and when the "artist" was approached, he "secreted" his work. The artist was informed that if he wanted to get the sketch back, he would have to report to General Heintzelman, commander of the defenses. Most likely, the "artist" was a spy and never reported to Heintzelman. [76]

Almost anyone might show up in the Defenses of Washington. Charles Moulton noted that on April 5, 1863, a "genealogist" was visiting the different Massachusetts units in the Defenses of Washington practicing his trade. He was taking the name of each soldier, birth date, enlistment date, hometown, age, and names, including maiden surnames where appropriate, of the father, mother, grandmothers, grandfathers and earlier decedents if known. The genealogist had been at work for over a year, but had only gathered information from about 19 regiments so far due to the time involved. He hoped " . . . to form a record which will afford a great medium and render certain assistance to the soldier or his parents in procuring pensions, bounty, gratuities, etc., which might never be gotten otherwise." Moulton had furnished all the information he could but asked his parents for additional data. [77]