Indiana Dunes A Signature of Time and Eternity: The Administrative History of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana

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Greetings and congratulations to one of the most unselfish groups of men and women who it has ever been my pleasure to know. It has been an inspiration to have had the chance to work with you and it has given us all keen and durable pleasure at having saved some of the magnificent dunes for this and for future generations. I think I should warn that the enemies of the Dunes have not given up the battle and will probably seek to throw obsticle [sic] after obsticle [sic] by trying to cut appropriations and by other means. We have won the important battle but have not yet won the war and we need to consolidate our gains to keep together and to push on. While I am now leaving public life forever, I want to work with you as a citizen and I hope I may be permitted to continue as a member of the Save the Dunes Council. Thank you dear friends, for all you have done. Let us finish the job.

Senator Paul Douglas, telegram to Dorothy Buell and the Save the Dunes Council, December 2, 1966. [1]

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A Park, But No Money

Following the November 5, 1966, park authorization, the National Park Service submitted a $200,000 reprogramming request for fiscal year 1967 funds for preliminary land acquisition at Indiana Dunes, Pictured Rocks, and San Juan Island National Historical Park. While the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Interior and Related Agencies approved the other requests, it denied Indiana Dunes. The House subsequently endorsed the action, thereby crippling development programs for 1967. The Park Service request for $125,000 in the fiscal year 1968 budget also appeared doubtful. [2]

With the loss of Paul Douglas in the Senate, Indiana Dunes sorely lacked a staunch advocate in Congress. Some Indiana members, angered by the lakeshore's authorization, voted against appropriations. Funding priorities in the Northeast Region continued to be Cape Cod and Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, both of which enjoyed powerful Congressional backers. Regional funding priorities for Indiana Dunes could not be supported by the Service as long as the national lakeshore was perpetually in the Master Planning process. [3]

Project Keyman Allen T. Edmunds attributed the reversal of progress to the "tug of war" between the park loyalists and those sworn to oppose Park Service acquisition and development of the area. He continued to urge that a realty officer be dispatched to help squelch the rumor-mongering. While the local squabbling did not abate, Mother Nature helped to minimize visitation in 1967 as Edmunds explained: "We have been fortunate in one respect this summer; the millions of alewives that have washed upon the shores of Lake Michigan within the area have made it an extremely uninviting place to be. The rush to invade private property has not come as was anticipated by so many." [4]

In July, thousands of mini-folders were distributed throughout the national lakeshore region. One of the Park Service publication's weaknesses was the need to emphasize to a greater extent the lack of Federally-owned land and facilities for public use, especially along Lake Michigan. [5] The possibility of a turnaround in this situation, however, occurred on October 5, 1967, when Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall and Inland Steel Company announced reaching an agreement to purchase a 385-acre Inland Steel tract. Secretary Udall agreed to purchase ninety acres, which comprised the bulk of the West Beach unit, immediately for $1,250,000 with an eleven-month option to acquire the remainder. Inland Steel granted to the Park Service the right of entry to its land for survey and exploration in order to conduct preliminary designs for public use facilities. Udall cited the acquisition as critical to the national lakeshore's development because as the largest single tract, it was closest to Chicago and Gary and featured an outstanding beach. [6]

According to the Park Service's Chief of Land Acquisition Philip O. Stewart who later acknowledged that the purchase of the Inland Steel tract appeared to many as excessive at the time, the transaction soon proved to be "a steal." Six months later, a condemnation action in the Burns Harbor area garnered an enormous court award which, had the result come earlier, would have tripled the cost of the Inland Steel property. [7]

President Johnson's Fiscal Year 1968 line item requests under the Land and Water Conservation Fund included $6,500,000 to purchase the entire West Beach Unit. The House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee expurgated the line item request. The National Park Service appealed to the Senate counterpart subcommittee to restore the entire amount, but succeeded in obtaining only two million dollars. The House-Senate conference committee reduced that amount by $500,000. [8]

Another request for funds came on November 6, 1967, when the Service asked for $752,000 in Fiscal Year 1968 funds under the emergency acquisition clause of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. Although the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation approved the request, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) cleared it without recommendation. The BOB action, which was applied across the board, was consistent with the administration's fiscal restraint policy. In January 1968, the Service requested an additional $1,245,000 in emergency funds to acquire the "corridor area" in order to assist in the relocation of a proposed railroad marshaling yard (see the following section). The combined two-million-dollar request would all but deplete the special emergency fund. Further, the Fiscal Year 1969 line item request in the President's budget for Indiana Dunes land acquisition was ten million dollars. It represented the largest single land acquisition request for the National Park System, engulfing twenty percent of the Service's land acquisition budget. [9]

Park proponents were determined to help secure the funding. Save the Dunes Council and other groups sent members to Washington, D.C., to testify before the appropriation hearings to support the Park Service's funding requests. Indiana Dunes Project Keyman Al Edmunds praised their tireless efforts, declaring: "Their enduring spirit and loyalty is a never ceasing wonderment to me." [10] In April 1968, the Congressional committees succumbed to the coordinated, massive lobbying effort. Al Edmunds gleefully reported:"The allotment of $2 million in emergency funds was a great booster to the morale of those who have fought so hard and long for this project, and was a blow to the prestige of those opposed who have predicted no funds for 15 years." [11]

The favorable press coverage and local goodwill toward the national lakeshore multiplied with the assignment of a land acquisition office to Indiana Dunes. Adjacent to Ed's Trading Post on Highway 12 in Porter, the office opened on June 3, 1968, with Land Acquisition Officer James Sewell and Chief Appraiser Morris Spencer facing a deluge of calls and letters to negotiate property sales. Eighteen months following authorization, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore finally had a viable land acquisition program and an office from which to provide valuable information to lakeshore property owners. [12]

By November, five new staff members were added, including an appraiser, cartographer, and three clerical workers. Seventy-nine tracts representing 442 acres were in Federal ownership. One of these tracts, featuring the former Ed's Trading Post, was the new location for the expanding land acquisition office. [13] Clearly, the park proponents were gaining ground in the tug of war over the Indiana Dunes.

The Marshaling Yard Controversy

On May 4, 1967, Al Edmunds and David Turello met with representatives of the Washington Office, Senator Birch Bayh's office, and the Chicago, South Shore and South Bend Railroad Company (locally referred to as the South Shore Railroad) to discuss a proposed freight marshaling yard within the national lakeshore. The National Park Service vigorously expressed its objections to the proposal. [14] The Northeast Regional Office had already evaluated the proposal and recommended against it to the Washington Office. Nevertheless, the railroad's parent company, Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) Railroad, pressed on with its plan to build the 750-car yard on twenty-six acres between U.S. Highway 12 and the existing South Shore tracks, and U.S. Highway 20.

In September 1967, David Turello and Civil Engineer John J. Longworth of the Philadelphia Planning and Service Center investigated all of the proposed marshaling yard sites. They found no other sites outside of the lakeshore boundaries for a large, flat area required to meet minimum requirements for such a facility. Because the South Shore Railroad loomed large in the Service's future transportation and visitation plans, it was important not to deal the company a potentially fatal economic blow. Any marshaling yard, while inconsistent with the purposes of the national lakeshore, would have to be scaled down considerably. [15]

In the meantime, National Park Service Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., met with railroad officials to continue the Northeast Regional Office's efforts to convince the company to move curtail, or abandon the yard. Hartzog subsequently requested that the Northeast Regional Office draft an agreement through the Regional Solicitor to accommodate the company. Associate Regional Director George Palmer then hired Philadelphia environmentalist Jac McCormick to devise the least objectionable facility. McCormick chose ballast granite for the yard's base in order to be compatable chemically with the sand, no nighttime lighting, and extensive vegetative screening. Several meetings were held with railroad lawyers before the proposal went to the Washington Office.

The negotiations proved to be very difficult as the company demanded a facility which in no way could "blend" with the national lakeshore. Nevertheless, Director Hartzog held the trump card. One of Hartzog's first actions following the 1966 authorization was to authorize the Washington Office's Chief of Land Acquisition, Philip O. Stewart to send in his staff in order to thwart the yard. [16] Director Hartzog later credited this move as the "turnaround in fortunes" for Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. Hartzog recalled that it was:

...a silent coup engineered by Phil Stewart and his intrepid troops in closing off the transportation corridor. While we had to plan and negotiate for compromise, we also prepare[d] for battle, namely: acquire control of the transportation corridor by optioning all the private property in a straight line from boundary to boundary. [17]

The Save the Dunes Council had already warned Park Service officials that C&O appraisers were contacting landowners in the proposed marshaling yard area. Stewart sent his "best troubleshooter appraiser" Waverly S. Wheeler to determine all the ownership within the U.S. Highway 12 and 20 corridor. Wheeler acquired options on several key tracts and appraised several others. Appraiser Brooks Hamilton from Midwest Region's Herbert Hoover National Historic Site, Iowa, arrived to acquire a large parcel strategically spanning land between the two highways. Ironically, Hamilton arrived at the owner's residence simultaneous with the C&O appraiser. The owner, Owen Crumpacker, was no friend of the new national lakeshore, but given the choice between the two, he favored selling to the government in order that the beauty of his land would be preserved. The frenzied action by Service appraisers netted the bulk of the key parcels within the transportation corridor within ten days. [18]

The day following the "coup," Director Hartzog received a telephone call from the president of the South Shore Railroad who remarked, "I don't know what you're up to, but if you're trying to get my attention, you have." [19] Ironically, Hartzog's crafty move almost came to naught had Great Lakes Area Office Secretary Barbara Jenkins and future Advisory Commission member Celia Nealon not acted quickly. The women, upon learning the thirty-day option was about to expire, telephoned the Washington Office which hurriedly dispatched a courier with a check to purchase the property. In short, with some of the land already in Park Service ownership, any deal struck would have to meet with the bureau's approval. If not, the Service would acquire the area through a declaration of taking.

In a meeting between Northeast Regional Director Lon Garrison, Al Edmunds, and George Nelson of the Indiana Port Commission (Burns Port Authority), Garrison and Edmunds became "fighting mad" by the attitude of the State of Indiana. Nelson wanted to speed up the realignment of U.S. Highway 12 to accommodate the marshaling yard, a tremendous asset for the port in that the railroad could supply the prodigious amounts of coal needed by the nearby industries. Edmunds recalled that Nelson "uttered in no uncertain terms that he and the Burns Port Authority and everybody else was against us and would fight us every step of the way." [20] Both Park Service men were determined that the yard would never be built—even if the last resort, a declaration of taking, had to be used. [21] In November 1967, Director George Hartzog concurred with this position. [22]

It was the National Park Service's quick foot work in thwarting the marshaling yard that convinced Inland Steel Company to abandon its dune development plans. In a telephone call to George Hartzog, Inland lawyer J. Edward Day (former Kennedy Administration Postmaster General) declared his client was ready to stop fighting the Park Service, settle all differences, and sell its lakeshore property to the Federal Government. [23]

Political pressure from industry and the State of Indiana, however, dictated that steps continue to be taken publicly to reach a compromise. Additionally, the railroad threatened to abandon all passenger service if it could not have at the minimum a three-mile marshaling yard. For the next two years, extensive meetings were held and the Save the Dunes Council and other conservation groups joined the fray. Environmentalists argued that the alkaline from the yard's gravel base would cause an imbalance in the acidity levels of nearby Cowles Bog. Council member Herbert Read, the engineering chairman, identified alternative sites, all of which were rejected. Upon the Save the Dunes Council's demand that the South Shore contract go before the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Advisory Commission, the Commission voted to amend the language to include environmental guarantees. The railroad protested the action and soon after scuttled the project. [24]

The passage of time and the park supporters' stubborn persistence in advocating the national lakeshore's raison d'etre had again saved the dunes. A benefit of the controversy was the ignition of concern by the Northeast Regional Office towards Indiana Dunes, recognizing it as a park which required constant vigilance to protect.

Support from the Great Lakes Area Field Office

In the early post-1966 period, Northeast Associate Regional Director George Palmer was the preeminent Park Service heralder of Indiana Dunes. The native Hoosier loved the dunes and in his position of coordinating day-to-day Northeast Region operations, Palmer kept intensely involved in Indiana Dunes affairs. Palmer, supported by Regional Director Lemuel (Lon) Garrison, headed an office which was almost totally unenthusiastic about the new Great Lakes parks, which experienced little activity following their authorization. With the exception of popular Isle Royale National Park, the Northeast Regional Office staff, in the absence of appropriations for the Great Lakes parks, concentrated its attention on parks in its eastern states. [25] Regional Director Garrison never visited the park. Garrison and his successors, Henry G. Schmidt and Chester L. Brooks, abdicated all Indiana Dunes-related matters to Palmer. Telephone calls from Sylvia Troy, for example, were automatically referred to George Palmer. [26]

Perhaps to counterbalance this attitude, upon the urging of Senator Phillip A. Hart (Democrat-Michigan) an auxillary office opened in East Lansing, Michigan, on July 3, 1967. The Great Lakes Area Office primarily served to help organize the two national lakeshores authorized by the 89th Congress, Indiana Dunes and Pictured Rocks, as well as to help administer Isle Royale National Park in Lake Superior. While the Philadelphia Office still held sway over the entire sixteen-state Northeast Region, the East Lansing Office was better equipped geographically to oversee the five Great Lakes States to the west: Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The Great Lakes Area Office was also established to help with the other Congressionally-pending National Lakeshores (notably Apostle Islands and Sleeping Bear Dunes). Adding to the significance of this office, within these five states were twenty-four existing, authorized, or proposed National Park Service units.

With the concurrence of Director George Hartzog, Regional Director Lon Garrison chose Allen T. Edmunds to head the Great Lakes Area Office. Edmunds, who held the title of Associate Regional Director, possessed extensive credentials in the planning of the Tennessee and Cumberland River basins and establishing shoreline parks. Because of the great distance from Philadelphia, Edmunds operated like a director of a sub-Region. Edmunds was a native of Michigan and an alumnus of Michigan State University, where the Park Service office was headquartered. Edmunds counted the Governor of Michigan among his wide circle of friends; a former classmate was Michigan's Director of the Department of Natural Resources. With his intimate familiarity with the region garnered through the Great Lakes Survey, Edmunds was indeed an ideal choice.

Additional duties of the Great Lakes Area Office included coordination with other agencies in the on-going River Basin studies and the Registered National Historic Landmark Program. In Indiana and Michigan, the office inspected recreation areas relinquished to the states under the former Recreation Demonstration Area Program. Edmunds also became State Coordinator for Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, reporting to Philadelphia significant events and contacts with these states. Edmunds oversaw a small support staff: Management Assistant James L. McLaughlin and Secretary Barbara J. Jenkins. [27]

One of the Great Lakes Area Office's earliest duties involved review of the State of Indiana's Outdoor Recreation Plan as it related to the Indiana Dunes State Park. One troubling provision was the future goal of expanding the boundaries to the east to connect with Beverly Shores,* conflicting with the national lakeshore's authorized boundaries. The Park Service criticized the lack of action to correct the deficiency in camping sites in the Dunes State Park. The Service disagreed with Indiana's desire for it to assume stewardship of camping activities, even to the extent of taking over the state park's campground. The position was in keeping with an early draft of the National Lakeshore's Master Plan which called for camping in the Tremont area. Director George Hartzog, however, vetoed the proposal, thus establishing the Park Service's no camping policy in the national lakeshore. [28]

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*The proposed expansion of the Dunes State Park to abut Beverly Shores had some local residents up in arms. The National Park Service received numerous offers to donate land in the area to the national lakeshore in order to block the move.

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Park Service meetings with Indiana officials were held in the spring of 1968 to discuss these concerns. On the camping issue, both sides agreed to look to private enterprise to furnish camping facilities. As for the expansion of the Dunes State Park, Department of Natural Resources Director John Mitchell indicated the plan had low priority and probably would be reassessed. Negotiations on the donation of the Dunes State Park, however, were fruitless. Indiana was not interested in discussing it, [29] but Director Mitchell privately predicted that a favorable atmosphere for such a transfer would some day materialize.

The greatest amount of time the Great Lakes Area Office committed itself to was resolving land acquisition problems at Indiana Dunes. Local residents provided tremendous assistance in this regard. Whenever public meetings were announced in the local media—particularly zoning board sessions in hostile Porter County—prompt telephone calls to East Lansing brought Al Edmunds driving south to protest any zoning changes. [30] In Porter, for example, Edmunds repeatedly protested the zoning board's approval of petitions to rezone tracts within the authorized boundaries from residential to industrial. Written requests from the Secretary and the Director and pleas from Edmunds before the town planning commission and town board still resulted in unanimous votes against the Park Service position. In private discussions, Edmunds learned of the town's deep resentment that the Service gave priority to purchasing the Inland Steel tract rather than the 180 acres within Porter. [31] Edmunds reported:

The petitions for rezoning of properties within the Lakeshore from residential to industrial or commercial will continue. They will be based on a hope for increased values, quicker purchase through condemnation, and a continuing hard core resentment of the action taken by Congress. The strength of the Service will be tested many times in the immediate future and I sincerely hope we will have the "financial muscle" available to meet the tests. [32]

By October 1968, Edmunds' hard work began to pay off. A new spirit of cooperation emerged in Portage in Porter County. Unfavorable rezoning petitions were rejected. [33] The Michigan Office also sponsored numerous public meetings. Edmunds or other park planners were present to keep the public informed of progress on appropriations, Service plans, and to answer landowners' questions. [34]

Another controversy Al Edmunds helped resolve was in Beverly Shores, a town whose core was omitted from the lakeshore under the 1966 Act. Known as "the Island" because the park surrounded the small enclave, Beverly Shores' tax base was heavily impacted. It even lost its town hall and fire station which fell within the boundaries. The park's legislative history indicates the Congressional subcommittees wanted an uninterrupted eleven-mile stretch of shoreline from the west end of Dune Acres to Michigan City upon which visitors would not trespass on private property. Whereas a series of dunes separated Lake Michigan from Ogden Dunes and Dune Acres, no barriers existed at Beverly Shores. Homes appeared on the front line of dunes, some even were built over the beach. The boundary designation in the beach areas, "from the toe of the dune to the water's edge," was not feasible at Beverly Shores and therein lay the controversy.

A sizeable number of homeowners with properties north of Lake Front Drive faced losing possession of their homes under the Park Service policy to establish the unimpeded stretch of public beach. Thirty-two homes were along the beach north of Lake Front Drive. In a November 15, 1968, meeting with 150 Beverly Shores residents, Edmunds listened to the homeowners' complaints. They asserted that during the years prior to park authorization, many proponents, including Senator Paul Douglas, assured them that all residents could sell and lease back their homes for a retention of fifteen years. (Douglas informed the Service that this was indeed his understanding which, when conveyed to the people of Beverly Shores, helped blunt opposition to the park bill.) To allay their fears, Edmunds promised to recommend to Director Hartzog that the property owners along Lake Front Drive be permitted to sell their homes to the government and select a use and occupancy reservation for a period of up to fifteen years on homes where construction began prior to January 4, 1965. In fact, Edmunds believed, the action was advantageous to the government. The area was not needed immediately for development; considerable savings could be realized through the lease backs as well as eliminate potential condemnation actions; and public perceptions of an unyielding Park Service could be allayed. [35]

Edmunds' proposal met with Director Hartzog's and Secretary Udall's approval. Through mitigating adverse public tensions, the event marked yet another example of the wisdom of opening the Great Lakes Area. [36]

Birth of the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission

One of the provisions of the 1966 act was for the convening of an "Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Advisory Commission" to assist the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out the wishes of Congress. According to the bill, specified state and local governments submitted nominees to the Secretary for his consideration. To the considerable dismay of the Save the Dunes Council and other conservation groups, five of the seven Commission members were originally opposed to the national lakeshore. The two members who helped in the pre-park lobbying effort were Chairman Thomas Dustin and William Lieber. [37] The other members were John R. Schnurlein, William J. Tobin, John Hillenbrand II, Mrs. Celia Nealon, and Harry Frey.

On November 4, 1967, the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission first assembled in Washington, D.C., to receive instructions from Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. Also present were key National Park Service officials from the Washington and Northeast Regional Offices. Secretary Udall told the Commission that Indiana Dunes was a pioneer, the first of many more National Park Service areas in the Midwest. Udall offered some advice of his own: "The best way to resolve our problems is not to create conflicts. You will find that there is a high degree of acceptability by the people as they see [the park] grow, as they see the way [the] National Park Service interprets it." [38] Director George Hartzog added:

You are going to be faced with hard choices on this Commission. We expect this Commission to be creative. Indiana Dunes was the very first area Director Stephen Mather recommended be established as a national park. It has great meaning to the National Park Service. We are glad to have the people of Indiana represented by you. As we work with you, we expect to seek your counsel, guidance, and advice. Advisory commissions are of great benefit to park management. [39]

Three principal topics were discussed which resulted in an equal number of recommendations to the Secretary. First, in considering the marshaling yard controversy, the Commission recommended the Indiana State Highway Department, South Shore Railroad, and National Park Service meet to consider alternatives in which park values and transportation needs could both be accommodated. Chairman Thomas Dustin supported an electrically-operated yard further west in the area bordering Bethlehem Steel and NIPSCO in an effort to lessen the encroachment on the national lakeshore. Second, it called for expedited funding for the orderly establishment of the national lakeshore. Finally, the Commission encouraged good relations between the Service, Department of Natural Resources, and local communities and utility companies in determining area land use. [40] Upon viewing the Advisory Commission in action, Edmunds later commented: "It would be difficult to find a more enthusiastic group than this Commission, and the feeling of responsibility for the role it is playing in effectuating the establishment of the National Lakeshore." [41]

The infant Commission floundered as members struggled to understand their individual and collective roles. Members like John Schnurlein perceived that he represented the constituency from whom he received his appointment, the Porter County Board of Commissioners. Therefore, Schnurlein acted as the Commission's spokesman for the business community of Porter County, not an advocate for the entire Indiana Dunes region. Schnurlein, a businessman, soon learned that the antagonism was not between the Park Service and area industry because he observed only a high level of professionalism and mutual respect. Animosities existed at the union, chamber of commerce, and environmental group level. While land acquisition concerns dominated most of the early meetings, answers were provided by Edmunds and/or Palmer. [42]

Conservation groups remained wary and critical of the Commission. Although it was a good tool for keeping the public informed, many viewed the Commission as a waste of time and thought it was slanted toward industry. Some grumbled [unfairly] that members like John Schnurlein served only to protect the interests of Bethlehem Steel, the principal employer in Porter County. [43]

During a September 1968 meeting in Indianapolis, the Commission discussed a proposed third Chicago regional airport to be built near Chesterton. The airport would be of prime importance to the Port of Indiana's development. With an approach over Lake Michigan, however, the passage of heavy jets over the national lakeshore would significantly diminish the visitors' park experience. The adverse noise factor would impact the entire lakeshore, but especially the West Beach and Cowles Bog areas where the jets would pass directly overhead. Substantial developments related to the airport would also impact the area. The Commission voiced its opposition to the proposed facility as damaging to both the state and national parks. [44]

The Advisory Commission's adamancy on the proposed Chesterton jetport bolstered the Department of the Interior's own position as the controversy continued through the following year. When the jetport planners proposed altering the runways to an east-west orientation with secondary routes pointed toward the lakeshore, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel appealed to Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe to use his influence to veto the Chesterton location: "We are fearful that planning of this jetport near the Lakeshore by the local authorities and sponsors may gain momentum and establish commitments in site selection and land acquisition similar to the situation related to Everglades National Park." [45]

The growing number of opponents stemmed the developer's enthusiasm. The jetport proposal never went beyond the drawing board stage.