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Indiana Dunes
A Signature of Time and Eternity: The Administrative History of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana |
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| PART II |
CHAPTER EIGHT:
GROWING PAINS, 1973-1976
Some of the proponents of the bill tell us that no President has ever vetoed a park bill. It is [our] sincere belief that this bill, in its present form, is a likely candidate for that dubious honor! Congressman Gerald Ford voted against the bill (H.R. 51) in 1966. What is there about this bill that would lead one to believe that he would change his mind?
Representatives Joe Skubitz and Steve Symms, presenting dissenting views on H.R. 11455, a bill to expand Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore (February 10, 1976). [1]
Operations, 1973-1976
1973
Natural disaster struck in mid-March 1973 when a fierce storm packing winds up to sixty miles per hour swept Lake Michigan and brought ten- to twelve-foot waves crashing down on the national lakeshore. The severe beach erosion threatened to undermine nearly forty homes and sweep them into churning Lake Michigan, which had risen in recent years to record high levels. At one point, the lake advanced inland and sixty-five feet of beach was lost. As the three-day storm grew steadily worse, area residents appealed to President Nixon for Federal intervention. Superintendent J. R. Whitehouse and Representative Earl Landgrebe requested an urgent meeting with Indiana Governor Edgar Whitcomb. Whitehouse agreed to permit the erection of a temporary retaining wall through the use of riprap (sections of concrete and rock). The debate on the revetment split the Advisory Commission down the middle. John Hillenbrand, a Commission member who also served as Chairman of Indiana's Natural Resources Commission, adamantly opposed the revetment. In retrospect, Whitehouse grew to conclude that although his decision to permit the revetment was mandated by public pressure, it ultimately was a mistake because it perpetuated the status quo: With Beverly Shores Island thus protected, the impetus to add it to the lakeshore diminished and the "temporary" revetment had the potential of becoming permanent. Whitehouse ultimately decided, however, that corrective measures to control the erosion and rebuild the beaches could begin later.
Governor Whitcomb mobilized the National Guard to render assistance, particularly in the area of Beverly Shores where a 3,800-foot section of Lake Front Drive partially washed out. National guardsmen began erecting a three-mile retaining wall along the devastated beachfront by using an abandoned house and roadway as building materials. Workers issued an appeal for more broken concrete or any other debris (including wrecked cars) for the massive revetment.
The Northeast Regional Office allocated $5,000 in emergency funds to assist Beverly Shores' efforts to combat the erosion. The combined labors helped to mitigate the erosion damage. No homes were lost, but seven residential septic systems were damaged and failed to meet State sanitary codes. The Park Service worked with county health authorities to ensure the repaired systems complied with code requirements. [2] Four houses, however, were beyond repair and the residents sought to sell them outright to the lakeshore. Assistant Secretary Nat Reed made the decision to buy them back and set a fair price for the hopelessly wrecked structures. [3]
Causes for the erosion included the rising lake level and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers harbor facility near Michigan City which altered the littoral drift. In a joint effort, the Service and Corps were engaged in studies to identify interim solutions. From fiscal 1973 funds, the Northeast Region allotted $91,000 to the Corps for engineering and design work for shoreline improvements. As an interim protection plan, the Corps called for a five-year replenishment and monitoring program estimated at $3.1 million. Preliminary estimates reached $13.5 million for the completion of shoreline protection and sand fill to restore the beaches between Michigan City and Beverly Shores. [4]
The land acquisition program, forecast to be phased-out by 1973, still operated with a skeleton staff of Land Acquisition Officer Frank Ucman, Realty Specialist Chandler Simpson, and Clerk Stenographer Irene Clayton. A Department of the Interior audit team conducted a three-month investigation in 1973 as part of a Departmentwide review of compliance with P.L. 91-646. The bill, passed in 1971, provided for relocation services to homeowners affected by Federal projects. Unfortunately, P.L. 91-646 did not authorize additional funds for compliance. This, plus the move to expand the lakeshore and raise the ceiling on land acquisition, stalled in Congress awaiting scheduling of hearings. On March 21, 1973, the Department ordered a curtailment of all payment of claims under P.L. 91-646 until funds became available for appraisals, surveys, and title work for all pending condemnation cases. The Indiana Dunes land acquisition program continued at a snail's pace. [5]
Another piece of legislation enacted in October 1972 impacted the Advisory Commission's operations. P.L. 92-436 provided for governmental meetings to be opened to the public. The Commission, which previously held private sessions because it viewed its function as solely advisory to the Secretary, began to hold open meetings in accordance with the so-called "Sunshine" law. Following each meeting the public attendees were given the opportunity to ask questions.
The close relationship between Whitehouse and the Commission continued to develop. Whitehouse made it a practice to call together as many Commission members as possible for lunch every two weeks and to discuss on an informal basis—so as not to violate the Sunshine law—happenings in their lives, communities, businesses, and park areas. This friendly cooperation helped Whitehouse develop additional contacts to help resolve lakeshore-related problems. Commission members Bill Lieber and John Hillenbrand used their connections "down-state" to help Whitehouse. Whitehouse soon entered on a first-name basis with the Director of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). In cultivating close relations with Indiana officials, Whitehouse soon began attending meetings in Indianapolis every four to six weeks at DNR or the Governor's Office. [6]
Nineteen-seventy-three was the "first extensive interpretive year for the Lakeshore." [7] Although Seasonal Interpreter Darryl Blink began giving programs in connection with the Dunes State Park, Goodfellow Camp, and other organized groups in 1971, for the first time an interpretive schedule for the daily visitor was in place. Visitation from the Blink tours was 612 in 1971 and 531 in 1972. With five seasonal interpreters presenting evening programs three days a week over a two-month period, interpretive visitation rose to 2,571 in 1973. The Bailly Homestead also became accessible to visitors, but because of security reasons, only through ranger-guided tours.
The Ranger Division, led by Chief Ranger Rodney Royce, split into two subdivisions: Resource Management and Visitor Protection and Visitor Services. Seasonal workers included nine for the former and seven for the latter. Royce also renegotiated area fire contracts with Porter, Ogden Dunes, and Beverly Shores. Services provided to the lakeshore came to $150 for the first hour and $100 each hour thereafter.
In Maintenance, Howard Culp oversaw a staff of two permanent, one career conditional, and twenty-three seasonal employees. It was likewise subdivided into Roads and Trails and Buildings and Utilities and an interim maintenance area at Furnessville Road composed of three buildings served as a central headquarters. The Roads and Trails subdivision, composed of two five-man crews, thoroughly cleaned five miles of beach each day and provided roadside cleanup and trimming in accord with lakeshore communities. The crews also constructed an interim use picnic area on Highway 12 near Tremont Road and three interim parking areas: two at Beverly Shores (Central Avenue and East State Park Road) and one at Mount Baldy. The Buildings and Utilities crew maintained five government quarters, the Tremont visitor center, and the interim maintenance area. Howard Culp, who served as project supervisor on the on-going building demolition contract, also began planning the course of a horse trail in Tremont.
Maintenance crews also made progress on the lakeshore's trail system in 1973. Trails in the Bailly-Chellberg area were flagged in late spring and cleared by girl scout groups in early summer. The Ranger and Maintenance divisions completed the work by installing steps on hillsides and "log wheels" over stream crossings. At the visitor center, workers flagged the Black Oak Trail (now called the Calumet Dune Trail) with only slight clearing necessary. Some trail-blazing took place in the Cowles Bog and Mount Baldy areas.
Implementation of the sign plan began in 1973 with Maintenance Division-produced signs which related only to interim park installations. Restricted access signs went up at the Bailly Homestead and beach access parking signs were placed at Mount Baldy and Central and State Park Roads in the Beverly Shores area. Boundary, traffic control, and park informational signs received from the Northeast Regional and Washington offices were also installed.
Ralph Iorio entered on duty as the Administrative Officer bringing the total staff to fifty-three (excluding the three in land acquisition): seven permanents, three career—conditionals, and forty-three seasonals.
Two studies, a Baseline Water Resource Study by the U.S. Geological Survey, and a Natural Resource Study by the University of Indiana Foundation, also began in 1973.
Two significant visits occurred in 1973. On September 25, former Senator Paul Douglas made his first visit to the national lakeshore since its authorization. On May 16, new National Park Service Director Ronald Walker* and his staff arrived for a brief visit. [8]
*Ron Walker formerly worked at the White House where he scheduled President Nixon's travels to such places as the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Whitehouse recalled that Walker was nonplused by Indiana Dunes: "Ron Walker just sort of walked into the park and took a cold look around with his two boys that carried his bags. He got out of his car and looked over the Lake and said, 'Uh huh,' and got back in and left." See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
1974
Effective in March 1974, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore came under the direction of the Midwest Regional Office, headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska, and led by Regional Director J. Leonard Volz. The new Regional alignment of the National Park Service resulted in the Midwest Region shifting its focus away from the Rocky Mountains to envelop the nation's heartland, including the Great Lakes States of Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The old Northeast Region subsequently became the Mid-Atlantic Region. Its northern tier shifted into the newly-established North Atlantic Region with headquarters in Boston. [9]
The administrative juggling met with no opposition. The Save the Dunes Council expressed optimism at the move. President Sylvia Troy informed the House Appropriations Committee, "Our initial contacts with the Regional staff have already revealed an increased interest in the dunes at the Regional level. We trust that with increased interest will also come increased sensitivity to the problems and potential of this valuable park." [10] Except for the de facto loss of George Palmer, the change pleased J. R. Whitehouse who commented:
I've always felt that Omaha has been much better for us than Philadelphia because we were closer and, toward the last few years, we ended up being one of the big parks within the Region and that helped. We had more support in Omaha. I look back on Omaha, and there were times when I'm sure some of the Associate Directors wished that Indiana Dunes would go away, but all in all, I have nothing but good memories about Omaha and the Regional Office. [11]
Area politicians* were also pleased, commenting that now a more amenable and geographically compatible regional center oversaw the dunes. [12]
*Headquarters for the Midwest Region would have been moved to Chicago had Representative Sidney Yates of Illinois had his way. The Nebraska Congressional Delegation, however, launched a successful campaign to keep the office in Omaha. See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
Before the Northeast Regional Advisory Committee (NRAC) underwent its own reorganization, the group met in Philadelphia on February 27 to tie-up loose ends. Representing the Midwest Region, Deputy Regional Director Merrill D. "Dave" Beal agreed to the transfer of four Northeast Regional Advisory Committee members to a similar Midwest Region committee. One of the transferees was William Lieber, the Chairman of the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission (an NRAC member since June 1972). Dave Beal and Bill Dean, Associate Regional Director for Cooperative Activities, told Lieber that Indiana Dunes ranked at the top of the Midwest Region's agenda. The meeting resulted in the appointment of George Palmer. Palmer, who had retired on June 30, 1973, but continued to serve in Philadelphia as a rehired annuitant, was appointed to serve as an advisor on dunes-related issues in order to ease disruptions during the transition. In a final resolution, the Northeast Regional Advisory Committee recommended that Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and the two new Gateway parks in San Francisco and New York be developed before progressing with other urban recreational parks. [13]
Administration of the Chicago Field Office, headed by Assistant to the Regional Director Robert S. Chandler, also shifted to Omaha's supervision.* To reassure the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission on the smooth transition and to introduce themselves, Beal, Dean, Chandler, and John Kawamoto, Associate Regional Director for Professional Services, attended the August 21 meeting. Introduced at the same session was the national lakeshore's new Assistant Superintendent, Don H. Castleberry (former Superintendent of Timpanogos Cave National Monument). Castleberry's appointment became effective on August 21 after the transfer of Stan Lock to the Washington Office; Lock's vacant position permitted Castleberry's coming on board. [14] Bringing Don Castleberry to Indiana Dunes as Assistant Superintendent indicated Midwest Region's commitment to the new area as well as a recognition that the national lakeshore had progressed beyond the "project" stage. [15]
*The four-member Chicago Field Office in Des Plaines, Illinois, operated from May 30, 1971, to December 31, 1977. During the early years of Whitehouse's superintendency Bob Chandler (who did not possess line authority) attended all of the meetings of the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission and provided valuable assistance in networking with Chicago-area conservation groups and government agencies on Dunes-related matters. Following Chandler's departure in March 1975, however, the office became irrelevant to Indiana Dunes affairs. See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987; and Historical Listing of National Park Service Officials, May 1, 1986 (National Park Service, 1986), p. 42.
The curtailment of the land acquisition program because of payment of relocation claims under P.L. 91-646 continued in 1974. A move to complete the Indiana Dunes land acquisition program came under a Servicewide omnibus acquisition bill which cleared Congress in the fall. President Gerald R. Ford signed the measure raising the lakeshore's acquisition ceiling an additional $7,625,500 on October 26. Unfortunately, the bill did not include authorization for appropriations, a separate process to undertake.
While the program remained on hold, the incumbent land acquisition officer changed. Frank Ucman transferred to the Washington Office at mid-year and Fred Meyer, from the Land Acquisition Office at Cape Cod National Seashore, took Ucman's place. Other position changes included the administrative officer (T. B. Taylor filled Ralph Iorio's position) and Rae Gilbert became the new administrative assistant. The shifting prompted the Advisory Commission to caution against frequent staff turnover, fearing that the loss of too many professionals experienced in urban park development would prove detrimental.
The interpretive program continued to expand during its second extensive year of activities. A new emphasis during the off-season saw interpreters focusing on school and other organized groups, stressing environmental education and helping to make the national lakeshore and the National Park Service better known in the community. The number of evening programs increased and the weekly five-hour hike through Cowles Bog was rescheduled to Saturday mornings in order to permit more participation. Instead of limiting visitor programs and activities to the summer months, the interpretive schedule spanned all twelve months.
The American Youth Hostel Center relocated to the Coronado Lodge in May 1974.
In maintenance, two additional government quarters were authorized bringing the total to seven. Increasing growth resulted in each maintenance subdivision establishing its own maintenance area. The laborers completed a four-mile interim horse trail in the Tremont area before the May 25 opening. The trail also featured a thirty-car capacity parking lot adjacent to U.S. 20. Another trail at the Bailly Homestead connected the landmark to the cemetery with a one-mile loop.
At mid-year, the U.S. Army announced plans to deactivate its NIKE missile base in the Bailly Unit. The Midwest Regional Office immediately began negotiations with the General Services Administration to arrange the transfer of the buildings and land to the National Park Service. The park staff began preparing plans justifying the use of the complex. [16] Assistant Superintendent Castleberry proposed that the facility be adapted to serve as the new administrative headquarters for the National Lakeshore. As the staff continued to grow, the Tremont visitor center became increasingly cramped and the large Army facility on Mineral Springs Road would be an ideal, centrally located, focal point from which to conduct Lakeshore operations. [17]
From November 4 to 8, an operations evaluation team visited the Lakeshore. The Midwest Region team was composed of Maintenance Generalist Thomas L. Weeks and Personnel Management Specialist Kenneth G. Schaefer from the Midwest Regional Office; Administrative Officer Charles D. Goode from Ozark National Scenic Riverways, Missouri; and Superintendent Hugh P. Beattie of Isle Royale National Park, Michigan. The team's report identified a number of problem areas, most of which concerned a staff preoccupied with land acquisition and site restoration problems, public relations pressures, and a paucity of facilities. Of primary concern was the lack of implementation of the Service's Management System, especially in regard to staff organization and supervision. The team recommended that Assistant Superintendent Castleberry assume full control of park operations as soon as possible in order to allow Superintendent Whitehouse to dedicate attention to external affairs as well as over-all direction of lakeshore development and operations. The operations evaluation report criticized the short-circuiting of the communications process by the many direct contacts with citizens, advisory groups, and the Washington and Secretary's offices without input from the park or Region. The report stated, "It is incumbent on all to establish effective lines of communications which preclude the possibility of making erroneous assumptions or of making commitments or decisions without adequate communications with local park management, which may leave park management in a difficult position." In brief, the team recommended the following ten points be implemented:
1. Improve inter-park communications.
2. Prepare a new staff organization chart for Regional approval.
3. Prepare performance standards for all positions.
4. Redescribe and update the Supervisory Park Ranger (Chief Park Ranger) position to GS-025-11.
5. Rewrite and update position description for the Clerk-Stenographer GS-312-04.
6. Require aircraft pilot certification for employees using aircraft for official duty; maintain tighter controls on purchasing.
7. Regularly inventory government property.
8. Each division should develop comprehensive programs with chiefs involved in setting priorities and objectives.
9. The Maintenance Supervisor should program more time for field supervision.
10. A Lakeshore sign program should be prepared and approved. [18]
J. R. Whitehouse concurred with the operations evaluation report and initiated steps to correct the deficiencies. He responded:
We agree, in principle, regarding the need to review workload priorities. It should be recognized, however, that this area, perhaps much more than most others, is subject to intense overview by local interests, including conservation groups, Congressional delegations, etc. Frequently our activities are influenced by interests beyond our control. With the exception of some "reservations in use" matters, we have not been able to identify functions which can be relegated to lower priority. [19]
Whitehouse concluded by stating it was his decision to indoctrinate Assistant Superintendent Don Castleberry with operations from the superintendent's vantage point for three to four months and then gradually ease him into the "Chief of Operations" position. With this accomplished, Whitehouse believed his assistant superintendent would exercise a tighter management grip on lakeshore operations and thereby alleviate many of the problem areas. [20]
1975
On January 1, 1975, the National Park Service received a Special Use Permit from the General Services Administration for the deactivated NIKE missile base. The permit became void the following month when the entire facility passed into Park Service ownership. The lakeshore asked for Midwest Region funds to rehabilitate the base structures into headquarters for administrative and land acquisition offices, the environmental education program, seasonal dormitory space, and a future Youth Conservation Corps center.
Notice to proceed for rehabilitation and construction at the Tremont visitor center came on August 4. The $430,000, six-month project resulted in the rehabilitation of the auditorium, basement, and front building facade; installation of a "bio-disc" sewage treatment plant; relocation, black topping, and landscaping of the parking area; construction of restroom facilities; and construction of an interpretive trail with handicapped accessibility.
Two weeks later, construction activities began at West Beach following completion of the environmental impact statement (EIS).* Tonn and Blank, Inc., of Michigan City began a $1.9-million development scheduled to be completed by August 16, 1976. West Beach facilities included a bathhouse with a capacity of 3,500 people, an entrance and service road, 600-car parking lot, and utilities.
*The Service and Department were accused of unduly delaying the EIS to stall West Beach development. Whitehouse noted that an EIS typically was so complex and reviewed at so many levels that it would inevitably be sent back several times to be redone—a practice not unique to Indiana Dunes. See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
The land acquisition program finally moved ahead after two years in the doldrums. With three million dollars in fiscal 1976 funds available on July 1, the program faced the disheartening specter of a Federal hiring freeze. Receiving a special exemption, the lakeshore was able to hire between fifteen to twenty temporary employees to administer the program funds. Because of the remodeling of the visitor center and the general lack of space there, the Land Acquisition Office moved to an office building in Michigan City's Marquette Mall complex.
In maintenance, 1975 saw three more government quarters added bringing the total to ten. Workers renovated a building in the Roads and Trails maintenance area for curatorial storage. The Neighborhood Youth Program began and, although no new activities or facilities were initiated in 1975, the youths assisted lakeshore maintenance crews with various projects. Area Eagle Scouts assisted the division in building foot bridges across streams and spreading wood chips along trails. For one month during the summer, a non-residential Youth Conservation Corps (YCC) program also rendered maintenance assistance.
Early in the year, Superintendent Whitehouse began negotiations with the District Engineer of the Indiana State Highway Department to transfer a 5.2-mile segment of Highway 12 to Park Service ownership. The scenic roadway, which stretched from west of the Bethlehem Steel entrance east to Kemil Road, was to serve as a parkway under the Lakeshore's Master Plan. By mid-year, the highway commission announced the relocation of Highway 12 from the intersection of U.S. 212 and 20 east of Michigan City west to where Highway 12 and 20 converge in Gary. In this area, U.S. 12 would follow U.S. 20.
Two additions to the interpretive staff had positive implications for the park as well as the Region. Interpretive Planner and Specialist Robert Foster and Communications Specialist Helen Steeves entered on duty in 1975 assigned to help not only Indiana Dunes's interpretive/naturalist program, but those of Lincoln Home National Historic Site (Illinois), Lincoln Boyhood National Memorial (Indiana), George Rogers Clark National Historical Park (Indiana), Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore (Michigan), and Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore (Michigan) as well. [21]
Securing ownership of the beach at Ogden Dunes was always a Lakeshore goal—one which became clouded in January 1975. At that time, the Ogden Dunes Home Association, owner of the beach, deeded it to the town of Ogden Dunes. Taking advantage of the 1966 lakeshore organic act that public lands within the lakeshore boundaries could only be acquired through donation, the deed suggested that the Ogden Dunes beach could not be purchased without the town's consent—an unlikely event. [22] However, the park's legislative history includes a stipulation in Senate Report 94-991 that the Service can acquire private property "when private property is transferred to public ownership subsequent to the authorization of federal acquisition." While the move seemed to be designed to frustrate acquisition by the national lakeshore, the effort did not succeed. [23]
Another public relations concern involved Northern Indiana Public Service Company's (NIPSCO) Michigan City generating station. The company installed strobe lights at regular intervals up and down the stack. The strobe lights, intended to serve as a beacon of safety for low-flying aircraft, attracted even more attention to the plant from scenic vantage points in the national lakeshore. Concerned about the visual blight, the Indiana Dunes Advisory Commission requested that J. R. Whitehouse investigate the matter. In discussions with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials, Whitehouse discovered that the elaborate strobe lighting was unnecessary. Contacting NIPSCO, Whitehouse secured an agreement whereby the company removed all but the top tier of lights. [24]
1976
An amendment to the Operation of the National Park System (ONPS) appropriation provided $296,000 for Indiana Dunes to cover operating costs of the new Bailly Administrative Area (the former NIKE missile base); monitor air, water, and noise pollution; removal of structural debris; and beautifications along the new U.S. 12 scenic parkway. During the year, four new permanent full-time positions were filled from an authorized five add-on positions. Four less-than-full-time positions were converted to permanent full-time bringing that total to thirteen. [25]
Rehabilitation of the NIKE base came to $186,000 and was administered by the Midwest Region's Office of Planning and Resource Preservation which provided specifications and contract supervision. Interior modifications were performed by day-labor contracts.
Maintenance activities became more refined in 1976 as more structures and areas became operational. The maintenance staff grew only slightly. Permanent employees totaled two, less than full-time stood at six, and seasonal laborers numbered twenty-seven. The division added another unit to maintain landscaped areas. With the contractual activation of three buildings at the NIKE base, the Maintenance Division incorporated the following areas into its jurisdiction: 1) ranger activities* and YCC storage and office space; 2) a YCC dormitory; and 3) a mess hall. Workers continued cleaning five miles of beach each day, seven days a week; maintained three and a half miles of the Tremont horse trail and three miles of other foot trails; and maintained all park buildings including ten government quarters, five maintenance area buildings, and the visitor center and headquarters buildings. Laborers also installed water and sewer lines and enlarged the parking lots at East State Park Road and at Central Avenue.
*Energy conservation measures mandated that this division relocate to the basement of the Tremont visitor center, only to return to the former NIKE base in mid-1977. See former Special Assistant to the Chief Ranger John Townsend to author, review comments, February 1988, Cultural Resources Management files, Midwest Regional Office.
Interpretation and Resource Management programs focused on observing the United States Bicentennial of the Revolution while striving to garner increased participation and awareness in the national lakeshore. The division launched an intensive five-day orientation training course for the fifteen-member seasonal interpretive staff. While the visitor center renovation progressed throughout the year, an open house on June 5 and 6 featured a discussion by Pulitzer Prize-winning author Edwin Way Teale and sneak previews of the Harpers Ferry Center-produced audiovisual program," A Patch of Green."
Restoration activities at the Bailly Homestead began in January 1976 following public hearings and final reviews. Professionals at the Denver Service Center completed a historic structure report which determined the historic period for Homestead restoration at 1916 and 1820s for the other structures. A primary interpretive theme was to show the progress of the Bailly family through several generations. Work performed included demolition and removal of a concrete block addition; reconstruction of the front and rear porches; installation of a new heating system; installation of a new roof; painting; replacing deteriorated logs and adding wood shingle roofs to the historic out-buildings; construction of a trail system uniting the Bailly complex; and installation of three audio-visual stations and wayside exhibits. [26]
Completion of the exterior restoration of the Bailly Homestead occurred in time for a Bicentennial-flavored dedication on July 11. Two-hundred-fifty people attended the brief ceremony led by Superintendent Whitehouse with dedicatory remarks by Representative Floyd Fithian. Following the ceremony, the National Park Service-sponsored traveling play "We've Come Back for a Little Look Around" performed on the Bailly Homestead grounds. [27]
Behind the scenes, however, a controversy raged within the Park Service over the historical significance of the Bailly Homestead. Based on the history and significance section of Denver Service Center Historian A. Berle Clemensen's Historic Structure Report, Midwest Regional Historian David A. Clary believed the Bailly Homestead's popular significance did not reflect historical accuracy. In response to Clemensen's conclusion that the property be deleted as a National Historic Landmark from the National Register of Historic Places, Clary recommended a review of the Bailly Homestead's original statement of significance. The controversy was nothing new. For several years, historians in the Midwest Regional Office, Washington Office (including Chief Historian Harry Pfanz), and the Denver Service Center were dubious about the national significance of Bailly Homestead. Clary stated, "The significance of Bailly Homestead at the time of its landmark designation [1965] seems to have lain in issues more recent than historic." [28]
The issue struck a nerve at the lakeshore. For many citizens, the Bailly/Chellberg complex represented the "heart" of the Federal park because the enormously popular festivals were held there. Bailly/Chellberg was a place where Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and industrialists came together and achieved a oneness seldom realized in the area. According to Whitehouse:
There was a meeting of the minds and all at once Indiana Dunes became a viable thing in a lot of minds that wouldn't even consider it before. Had nothing to do with historical significance. The only thing that a lot of people would have said, "Well, look, they're backing out; they're backing out of Indiana Dunes and they're saying nothing's of consequence any longer." [29]
While not objecting to any reevaluation, Superintendent Whitehouse informed Midwest Region:
Our only question is whether this is a propitious time. We suggest it is not, primarily because of the restoration work now being done, the large amount of publicity associated with it and the developments that are to be started this fall.
Whether the site is on the Registery of National Historic Landmarks or the National Register of Historic Places probably would not mean a great deal to the general public. It is only that the process of formally changing the designation might be construed by some as unnecessarily lowering the status of a locally cherished symbol.
Regardless of whether the request for restudy goes forward promptly, our suggestion is that the formal redesignation be delayed for perhaps a year or so. [30]
No reevaluation took place; the Bailly Homestead remains listed as a National Historic Landmark.
A team of Park Service historical architects visiting the lakeshore evaluated buildings within the boundaries against National Register criteria of eligibility. In the team's opinion, six houses in Beverly Shores transplanted from the 1933-34 Chicago World's Fair were eligible for nomination to the National Register. This set in motion a process which culminated in 1986.
In another preservation vein, Advisory Commission Chairman William Lieber successfully lobbied Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel P. Reed to utilize the Secretary's Contingency Fund to purchase Hoosier Prairie. Arguing that the ecologically unique Hoosier Prairie was in danger of commercial or residential development, Lieber believed acquiring the area expeditiously would lower the cost of any future park expansion bill. Whitehouse agreed. Even though Hoosier Prairie was ultimately included in the 1976 expansion bill, he believed the detached unit, some thirty miles away, should be managed by Indiana. The lakeshore simply could not spare the manpower. At the Commission's May 22 meeting, Lieber proudly announced Secretary Morton had approved the use of the Contingency Fund. With matching State funds, the Hoosier Prairie could become a State Nature Preserve under Indiana's administration.
Coordination of programs between the national lakeshore and the Dunes State Park began in earnest following an initial strategy meeting in Indianapolis in January 1976. Meeting with Department of Natural Resources staff and the Dunes State Park Manager, a new spirit of cooperation between the two parks emerged. [31] The group approved signing for Interstate 94 indicating "Indiana Dunes Recreation Areas"; once visitors arrived in the area, more specific signage would direct them to their choice: the national lakeshore or the state park. [32] The festering question of the Dunes State Park donation—a thorn of contention locally—had faded over the ten years since the national lakeshore's authorization. Advisory Commission Chairman William Lieber believed the issue was moot. The Dunes State Park was among the top money-makers in the Indiana State Park System, supporting those units with low visitation. Because two-thirds of the state park operated as a nature preserve, donation of the nature preserve segment would be more complicated than the remaining one-third. Federal acquisition would not only require approval of the Indiana Legislature, but decommissioning by the Indiana Department of Natural Resources Commission and final approval by the Governor as well. Lieber did not believe the donation would ever transpire. Reassuring a fellow Hoosier, Lieber wrote,
It is the "crown jewel" of the National Lakeshore but it will remain in state hands. Naturally, the National Park Service would like to have the best part of our Lakeshore but the State of Indiana has too much heritage and pride plus the need for economic support derived from this marvelous facility. [33]
Nathaniel P. Reed Visits the Dunes
In August 1970, NIPSCO filed an application with the licensing board of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for a permit to construct a nuclear power plant adjacent to its fossil-fuel Bailly generating facility at Burns Harbor. The proposed 685-megawatt nuclear reactor, called Bailly Nuclear I, bordered the national lakeshore on the west and the Bethlehem Steel Company plant on the east. The environmentalists' uproar over Bailly I reinvigorated the passions of the port versus park controversy. Industrialists pointed to the growing demand for energy to fuel the factories and homes in northern Indiana. While conservationists did not initially dispute the area's electrical needs, they vociferously objected to putting Bailly I in the back yard of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore.
The conservation group most active in opposing Bailly I was the Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League led by Herbert and Charlotte Read. While the Save the Dunes Council focused its attention on promoting the lakeshore expansion effort through Congress, the Izaak Walton League conducted a series of legal challenges to NIPSCO's plans. Some of the principal members of both organizations' however, were involved in both efforts, namely the Reads, Sylvia Troy, and Edward Osann. Because the majority of public opinion favored Bailly I and its positive economic benefits, the initial fight took place exclusively in the courts. [34]
Anti-Bailly I forces participated in the AEC/NIPSCO licensing permit process by filing petitions establishing a legitimate interest in the affair by showing how they as groups and individuals could be potentially harmed by the plant's construction. The group, called the "Joint Intervenors," had the support of the Chicago-based public interest group called the "Businessman for the Public Interest" (BPI), later renamed "Business and Professional People for the Public Interest." BPI, which used its tax-exempt status to accept donations on behalf of the Joint Intervenors, advised that at least $100,000 would be needed over several years to litigate all of the contentions. Edward Osann initially accepted the task of presenting the Joint Intervenors' case at a significantly reduced fee. The enormous amount of time the case required almost jeopardized Osann's position with his law firm. In later years, BPI assumed most of the legal responsibility.
Herbert Read's extensive activity on behalf of the Joint Intervenor's did cost him his job as an architect with a Chicago firm. Both Herbert and Charlotte Read assisted Edward Osann greatly. Herbert Read masterfully showed how NIPSCO's site map minimized the area's population. He exposed NIPSCO's misrepresentation of the proposed nuclear site in what the company described as in the middle of an industrial complex with no nearby residential centers. Entire communities were omitted with Dune Acres, Ogden Dunes, and Miller appearing only as "forest cover." Distances to cities like Gary—10 miles as opposed to the actual 5.2 miles—were blatantly in error.
The citizens of Dune Acres were unanimously against the siting of Bailly Nuclear I adjacent to their community. NIPSCO's existing fossil fuel plant and problems associated with air and water pollution had already antagonized the residents who formed the "Concerned Citizens against the Bailly Nuclear Site." The Concerned Citizens conducted fund-raising drives to assist the Joint Intervenors' legal effort. James E. Newman, professor of history at Indiana University Northwest, and Edward Osann co-chaired the Dune Acres organization. The Concerned Citizens was not an anti-nuclear group, but were simply opposed to the siting of the plant. They objected to the proposed two cooling towers, each two stories tall, overlooking their town and the national lakeshore. Some were afraid of it. What about radioactive leaks? How could an orderly evacuation take place on traffic-congested Highway 12 during a shift change at Bethlehem Steel? How hazardous would the roads become in winter when the steam from the cooling towers froze on them? [35]
The concerns of the Joint Intervenors and the Concerned Citizens were shared by the National Park Service, but with it outside the boundaries, there was little the Service could do except monitor the activity and express its position. Before any official Department of the Interior policy could be formulated, however, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation began investigating the matter in mid-1971. The Advisory Council had three concerns pertaining to Bailly Homestead National Historic Landmark. First was the visual impact of two 450-foot-high and 400-foot-wide cooling towers looming 1.8 miles away. The difference in elevation further exacerbated the problem, especially in winter when the trees were bare. Second, with the prevailing northerly winter winds, the fogging and drift from the plant would enshroud the Bailly Homestead. Third, the historic setting would be adversely impacted from humidity and temperature changes caused by Bailly I. Because the Department of the Interior was still gathering information from its various bureaus, the Park Service recommended the "Council to take no action which might weaken the Department's position with reference to the impact of the plant on the National Lakeshore." Speaking for the Northeast Region, George Palmer added, "There is no doubt in our own mind that the environmental effects of the plant will be detrimental to the Landmark itself."* [36]
*Soon after his retirement in mid-1973, Palmer prepared a position paper against Bailly I and submitted it to the Washington Office. The paper formed the basis of the agency's stand against the nuclear power plant which was soon to be adopted by the Department. Palmer subsequently reflected that had his recommendation not been formulated and presented to the Atomic Energy Commission, the momentum of Bailly I would have proven overwhelming before opposition forces could mobilize against it. Palmer considers his memorandum the most important during his eighteen-year tenure in the Northeast Regional Office. See George A. Palmer interview, 12 October 1987.
One key official responsible for formulating Departmental policy was Nathaniel P. "Nat" Reed, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. Reed's first visit to Indiana Dunes came at the invitation of Save the Dunes Council lawyer Edward Osann. The visit came early in Assistant Secretary Reed's tenure, probably April 1972. Reed later recalled:
I was dumbfounded, totally ill-prepared for the beauty and the multi-ecotones of Indiana Dunes. We walked from the Lakeshore up and over the bluff and went through the wind-swept Blackjack forest and up and down through the sand dunes into a ponded area. Positively walked miles and miles and immediately fell in love with Indiana Dunes. [37]
Reed, a young, outspoken Republican conservationist from Florida, accepted his position in May 1971 following a White House meeting with President Richard M. Nixon. Reed's position that no unit of the National Park System should serve as a buffer zone for a nuclear power plant met opposition within the Nixon Administration. [38] Powerful circles within the Republican Party which promoted industrial development campaigned for the Department's endorsement of Bailly I and the firing of the stubbornly outspoken Assistant Secretary. Nat Reed formulated his decision to fight Bailly I in the aftermath of President Nixon's reelection landslide in November 1972:
I decided that I had to oppose the Bailly nuclear power plant.... My staff was not too keen to have me oppose Bailly. Bailly still had some political muscle. Quite a bit of political muscle! The Nixon Administration was pretty strongly supporting nuclear power. I made the case at the White House with [Assistant to the President John] Ehrlichman one afternoon that I was not opposed to nuclear energy, that I had licensed three nuclear power plants in Florida when I was head of DER [Department of Environmental Resources] so that I could not be accused of having any nuclear bias. But I was absolutely determined that that nuclear power plant, plus its cooling tower could not invade either the aesthetic qualities of the park or, equally important, could not affect the park adversely through the tremendous amount of water coming out of those cooling towers.... But I considered it, nevertheless, a fundamentally important struggle in the sense that the Park Service and their Assistant Secretary said, "It is not a case of being pro or con nuclear energy. We are going defend the borders of the National Park System." [39]
It was not until Reed threatened to resign that Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton allowed him to go to Indiana in 1973 to testify before an AEC hearing.
For two days, September 19-20, 1973, Nat Reed visited Indiana Dunes and testified before the AEC hearing in Valparaiso. He had done his homework. Prior to testifying, Reed ignored NIPSCO's threat to prosecute trespassers and explored the entire area in order to etch the landscape firmly in his mind.* What he saw convinced him of the accuracy of his position, concluding, "There was no way you could say, 'We'll plant some trees around the cooling tower.'" [40] Appearing before the AEC panel, Reed first established the national significance of the area, then declared:
Since November 5, 1966, the Federal Government has invested $27,900,000 of Land and Water Conservation Funds for land purchases in the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and $1,710,600 for operation and development planning purposes. It is anticipated $5,981,500 will be obligated or expended in the fiscal year 1974 for operation, development and resource protection. Beyond fiscal year 1974, we contemplate costs of $49,000,000, a sum which does not include such additional monies as may be needed for continued costs and land acquisition.
The Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore is situated near a densely populated urban region which is heavily industrialized. It offers greatly needed recreational opportunities and a refuge of open space to this growing population, many of whom cannot afford to go to national parks more distant from the region.
Siting the proposed Bailly nuclear plant on the border of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore would appropriate one and one-half miles of the most outstanding natural area of the Lakeshore for the plant's low population buffer zone. In the event of accidental discharge of radioactive waste from the nuclear plant into the atmosphere or into the waters of Lake Michigan, visitors to the National Lakeshore would be subject to emergency evacuation. In view of the capacity of the Lakeshore to accommodate 87,000 visitors per day, evacuation would represent a major operation as well as a massive interference with their use and enjoyment of the park. I do not believe that the Congress intended the National Park System to be used as a buffer zone for industrial accidents, and, as a matter of policy, the Department is opposed to such use. [41]
*Whitehouse recalled the unusual visit: "We went up into Dune Acres where you can get up on a high ridge and look down below and see all of Cowles Bog and see all of NIPSCO, and the hole they were digging, and the whole bit. Now, to really see it properly, you've got to get out of your car and you've got to walk down a long dunes and circle around, and walk through the dunes grass and the swampy, bog-like landscape and I mean with vegetation over your head! You've got to work your way through four or five miles which is really tough. You know what the man did? That gentleman from Washington walked, and hands-on, through that disputed area. Walked it and saw it! And he came out of it with a smile on his face! A remarkable person and a remarkable day that one was, and the next day, too, at the hearing. Yes, he's a man that, if you didn't have enthusiasm, he would soon inspire you with it!" See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
Reed was particularly concerned about the nearby Cowles Bog National Natural Landmark and its surrounding dunes and wetlands. He cited adverse effects which the AEC's own Environmental Impact Statement did not identify. Aside from the highly objectionable aesthetic intrusion from the massive cooling tower, ecological damage would result from the mixing of emissions from the two NIPSCO plants (fossil-fuel and nuclear) forming acid rain. The salt emissions would also result In defoliation, Reed argued, and seepage from waste ponds as well as alterations in the water table would also harm the national lakeshore. Reed concluded:
When one weighs costs and benefits, given alternatives to the Bailly site, it is clear that moving the site is the only way to consistently uphold both Congressional policies involved, namely protection of the National Lakeshore, and promotion of nuclear power.
For these reasons, it is the position of the Department of the Interior that construction of the proposed Bailly Generating Station Nuclear—I on the border of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore does not serve the highest public interest. We accordingly request that the Atomic Energy Commission withhold issuance of a construction permit for Bailly Nuclear—I at the proposed site and recommend a more suitable site for the project. [42]
Following the AEC hearing, Nat Reed told reporters he agreed NIPSCO needed more electrical power in the area, but "after spending a hell of a lot of the taxpayers' money on a national park, I'm concerned about putting a nuclear facility only 400 feet away from it." [43
Reed was amazed by the depth of polarization between industrialists and preservationists he witnessed during his visit. The polarization similarly split the Advisory Commission. Chairman William Lieber, who believed the Commission's responsibility was principally to advise the Secretary, had kept the Bailly I controversy off the agenda. Other members, who believed their first allegiance was to the special groups they represented, wanted to debate the Department's position. [44] Of all of the Commission members, John Schnurlein strongly supported NIPSCO's plans to build Bailly I because he believed at the time that it was environmentally and economically sound. Schnurlein thought that Reed was voicing unfounded "scare tactics" and needlessly "meddling" in local affairs. [45] Lieber pinned his hopes on Nathaniel Reed's vow to help the national lakeshore, as he told a fellow commissioner: "By the way, Reed is very interested now in doing something for the Dunes. He had never been out before and was impressed with its beauty and also with its lack of development. We'll see just what he can accomplish back in Washington." [46] (See following section on West Beach development.)
After convincing his boss of the justness of his Bailly I stand, Nat Reed enjoyed the full support of Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton whose self-admitted favorite bureau within the Department of the Interior was the National Park Service. Morton's management philosophy was to state his ideas on a controversial subject, then turn it over to his Assistant Secretary to handle. Morton stayed in the background, but provided valuable insights garnered from Capitol Hill as well as his broad-based political support. The Secretary rarely reversed any of Reed's decisions. According to Reed, "He would stand with you and fight with you at the White House, at OMB [Office of Management and Budget], and on the Hill." While Secretary Morton endured the political "heat" within the Nixon Administration over the Bailly I dispute, Nat Reed was in the public limelight engaged in "hand-to-hand combat"—principally against NIPSCO and its chairman of the board who swore not only to build Bailly I in the dunes, but to strip Reed of his job. Nonetheless, the Morton/Reed position proved to be vitally important to the future course and resolution of the Bailly I conflict. [47] Much to the environmentalists' dismay, however, the Department would not enter the legal dispute by joining the Joint Intervenors against NIPSCO's Bailly I. [48]
The three-member AEC licensing board heard sixty days of testimony over an eleven-month period, the longest in AEC history. The Joint Intervenors objected to a wide range of environmental and safety issues. In the end, it became obvious that the panel was biased in favor of nuclear power. The Joint Intervenors were prepared to litigate all the way to the Supreme Court. [49] On April 5, 1974, the AEC licensing board rejected all of the Intervenors' contentions and approved NIPSCO's construction permit for Bailly I. In effect, AEC concurred with NIPSCO's claim to 640 acres of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore as a "buffer zone" in the event of a nuclear accident. The move angered Congressmen Henry Reuss (Democrat-Wisconsin) and Guy Vander Jagt (Republican-Michigan) who wrote to AEC:
We are unaware of any provision in either the Atomic Energy Act or the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act which authorizes your agency... to grant, by executive fiat, an easement over these federal lands without the express approval of Congress. We believe the Board's action is illegal and should be promptly reversed. [50]
The Intervenors appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit Court in Chicago which rescinded the decision on April 1, 1975. The landmark decision represented the first judicial reversal for the construction of a nuclear power plant. NIPSCO appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, and in November 1975, although it did not hear the case, the Supreme Court did overturn the ruling by affirming the AEC's right to establish and execute its own policies. [51]
With its AEC construction permit restored, NIPSCO alerted its contractor and construction began in late 1976. Meanwhile the Joint Intervenors regrouped and filed new lawsuits.
Bailly I appeared to be unstoppable.
Fiasco in Indianapolis: West Beach Development
At the conclusion of the January 19, 1973, Advisory Commission meeting held in Indianapolis, the National Park Service unveiled a Development Concept Plan (DCP) for West Beach. Up to this time, as with other Service plans, there was no established mechanism for public review and comment. It enjoyed the highest level of review both in the Service and the Department. Assistant Secretary Nat Reed remembers clashing violently with Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., over the first development plans at both Indiana Dunes and Cumberland Island National Seashore, Georgia:
In both cases, I had the privilege of sitting with the planners well in advance of the plan. We went over philosophy, discussed sizing, discussed the State's interest in both places where the State had equal opportunity to do something much more intense, the Park Service would do something much less intense, much more creative, much more simple and with stronger emphasis on protection of natural values than on recreation. In both cases, the planners came back with Disney Worlds, total Disney Worlds! I remember at Cumberland Island I threatened to throw the Chief Planner out the window! I terrorized the poor man. I screamed, "My God, what have you brought? This is the most terrible thing I have ever seen in my life!" [At] Indiana Dunes. . . I said to George [Hartzog], "That's the most awful thing I have ever laid eyes on; and to prove to you that it is absolutely awful, I'm going to authorize you to take that to public hearing."
He said, "The people in northern Indiana are going to love it. What are you going to do when they all are supportive?"
I said, "I'll worry about that later." [52]
Robert Steenhagen, member of the Denver Service Center's Northeast Team, introduced the A/E representative from the Milwaukee firm of Howard, Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff who explained a series of photographs, maps, and architectural plans.
For the Save the Dunes Council and most Advisory Commission members present, it proved to be a great shock. The A/E proposed twenty-six facilities including two swimming pools and steel bathhouses, a three-story parking garage for 2,000 automobiles, a pavilion, assorted sports fields, an amphitheater, maintenance and administration buildings, and sixteen homes for Service employees. Steenhagen commented the Service had already approved the design concepts and an environmental impact statement was underway. The Council and some members of the Advisory Commission were angered by the fait accompli approach. They resented being shutout of the planning process and were surprised that a public agency operating with public funds acted so secretively. According to Herbert Read:
It might have been some kind of ingrained, bureaucratic feeling that the Park Service planners considered themselves the experts and they weren't going to let any ordinary person come in and tell them what to do. But, in reality, of course, we were the experts. We knew what could go here. There weren't any Park Service planners or any other planners that knew better or what could go here than we. We knew what to do! We were the experts here. [53]
Following the meeting, the design plans were whisked away and Save the Dunes Council members were denied a chance to review them closer. The Council, decrying the intensity of developments and use, demanded an opportunity for the public to review and comment on the plans. Area planning boards, namely the Gary and Michigan City Planning Commissions and the Northwest Indiana Regional Planning Commission (NIRPC), expressed outrage at being shut out of the planning process. Strategizing to change the plans, a coalition of groups in Indiana and Illinois launched a massive press and letter-writing campaign; enlisted the support of other conservation groups; and lined up Congressional support. The strategy worked. Less than two months later, the Service made the West Beach development plans available for public review.* [54] Reed's prediction proved correct. He later recalled:
The Park Service officials barely got out of the room alive! I mean, you talk about the return of the massacre of a Red Indian! My God, they took one look at this. Here they had spent all these years fighting for the preservation of the sacred Indiana Dunes. And now, it was going to be defiled by masses of swimmers and cars and campers. It was going to be the rec[reation] area of all rec[reation] areas. It wouldn't fly. So the Park Service put its tail between its legs and very wisely went back to the drawing boards. [55]
*According to Whitehouse, "I think the first, full-blown hearing occurred at Portage, Indiana, and boy, it was a wild, swinging outfit! Everybody, almost to a person, was opposed to this thing. So Save the Dunes Council didn't shoot this thing down; it was shot down by northern Indiana and Illinois." See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
New Assistant Superintendent Don Castleberry also recalled the heated meeting and his shock at the villification of the Park Service by the public which charged the bureau with high-handedness and misreading the intent of Congress. [56]
J. R. Whitehouse subsequently accepted full responsibility for the fiasco. In his first superintendency, Whitehouse did not fully understand his role in the planning process. Assigning primary responsibility to the planners, who were not sensitive to local concerns and unfamiliar with the fragile resources, the concept naturally became so grandiose that Whitehouse knew it would never fly. Even the Advisory Commission openly condemned it. The bitter lesson compelled Whitehouse to take charge of the lakeshore's development planning and, henceforth, no more West Beach-type public relations disasters occurred. [57]
At a December 6, 1973, meeting of the Advisory Commission, Dr. Richard Curry, Nathaniel Reed's Special Assistant, informed the Commission that the planning process had been changed Servicewide to accommodate public review during, rather than after formulation of plans. Dr. Curry, elaborating on Reed's pledge to get West Beach operational by the summer of 1975, outlined the stages of developments beginning with one bathhouse with a capacity of 3,400 and an 850-car parking lot. The conservationists' desire to preserve natural values at all costs prevailed. In an effort to limit concrete, the elaborate plans of 1973 were scaled down. [58] Subsequently, the Save the Dunes Council objected vigorously to NIPSCO's plan to run West Beach utility lines into Ogden Dunes by carving a straight swath across the dunes. After lengthy negotiations, the Council, Park Service, and NIPSCO agreed to bury the utility lines parallel with the winding road. In addition, planners limited pavement in the bathhouse area in order to exclude a pond and the maintenance area was placed elsewhere. [59]
Campaign for Lakeshore Boundary Expansion
Having presented its own blueprint for lakeshore expansion in 1971, the Save the Dunes Council entered a new stage in its history. From its inception in 1952, the Council was exclusively a voluntary organization. In 1973, however, the Council hired its first full-time employee, Edward Osann, Jr., to lobby for a favorable expansion bill in Washington, D.C. The Council used proceeds from its sale of Cowles Bog as well as income from a sales item shop it opened in the Beverly Shores post office to pay Osann's salary. In the fall of 1974, a second employee, Executive Secretary Charlotte Read, came on board. The wife of the Council's Engineering Committee Chairman Herbert Read, Charlotte Read exhibited an equal zeal in fighting for dunes preservation. Along with Executive Director Sylvia Troy, Charlotte Read soon established herself as a dominant figure in the Council and its effort to expand the national lakeshore. [60]
In 1973, a National Park Service study team evaluated the more than 5,000 acres for proposed Lakeshore expansion included in Congressman J. Edward Roush's and a host of other bills. While the team recommended a little more than 1,900 acres be considered, Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Reed, based on his own inspection of the area, only approved 944 additional acres. Seizing this opportunity, Congressman Earl Landgrebe introduced a bill and, using the Department of the Interior's low acreage recommendation, called it the "Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Completion Act." [61]
Assistant Secretary Reed advocated using the Land and Water Conservation Fund and agreements with lakeshore neighbors to ensure proper land use. Reed wanted State and local planning commissions to assume a greater degree of responsibility for Indiana Dunes area land use. He argued the burden for establishing buffers around National Park Service units rested with local communities, not the Federal Government. [62] Concurrent with his decision to oppose Bailly I, Nat Reed resolved to back a responsible expansion of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. He later recalled:
The problem was the administration forecasted, and accurately forecasted, if you were for half-a-loaf, you were going to get a whole loaf. So, the battles with OMB as to what could be added, should be added, and could be managed once added bordered on internecine warfare. We had lengthy meetings. The Sierra Club was very important. There were some marvelous citizens groups who came to lobby me in my office.... I agonized.
I think the toughest ones... were those God-awful maps of the places that the citizens groups wanted. And of course, their cross figures never quite were accurate; you could add this, this, and this for only a million-and-a-half dollars, and you'd say, "Only a million-and-a-half dollars?" It would turn out to be five million dollars! And you would turn to the Superintendent and you'd say, "How are you going to manage that thing? It's way out in the boondocks!"
I remember there was agitation among the citizens that they wanted me to support more. You couldn't help but like these people! These were marvelous people. I went back you know. I kept going back. I kept getting lured back by them. I'd bet you no Assistant Secretary has ever been to Indiana Dunes four times before. [63]
The Roush bill was the first of eighteen lakeshore expansion bills which were introduced over a three-year period. As late as March 1974, no official Departmental report had been submitted to Congress. This impeded the progress of hearings. When the report did become available after May 1, [64] the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation held its first hearing on June 17, 1974, to consider H.R. 3571 (5,328 acres). The Department's report recommended against enactment of the bill because it proposed acreage of less than national significance and superfluous to the lakeshore's primary purpose. The report decried the consideration of environmentally-impacted areas around Ogden Dunes, Beverly Shores, and the Gary airport. Areas like the Little Calumet River and Salt Creek were units which should more properly be managed by State or local governments. Richard Curry, who left the Department to become Associate Director for Legislation with the National Park Service, reported that H.R. 3571 was too costly and difficult to administer. The revised acreage total the Department and Service recommended stood at 1,152 acres. Superintendent Whitehouse later commented on the peculiar political machinations:
Park Service and Interior's position on Indiana Dunes had no effect on what Congress did. Really it didn't. Never did. It would pass Congress if the votes were there. Political, entirely. The fact that the bill didn't pass in the early 1970s didn't mean anything other than the fact that they didn't have enough political support to pass it. They really were asking for too much. In the early 1970s, Save the Dunes Council had sold Senator Bayh and Congressman Roush on this big, elaborate thing where they were going to take in all of the Salt River area, south of Indiana Dunes, south of the existing park, [and] all of the Bethlehem Steel lands for expansion. They were going to take in Mud Lake, all these fringe areas and include Beverly Shores Island. There was no way that bill would have ever passed. Too expensive and too much land. With opposition of the park still right there in front of us, it couldn't have happened at all. [65]
One of sixty witnesses in the jammed hearing room, Representative Roush blasted the Department for promising developments at West Beach and failing to obligate the appropriated funds: of $3,405,000 made available by Congress over three years, only $527,000 in planning money had been used. Reed's promise to get people on the beaches had apparently gotten sidetracked by other national priorities. Representative John F. Seiberling (Democrat-Ohio) compared the critical need for open space near large urban centers to his own bill for the proposed Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Area between Cleveland and Akron, as well as the Chattahoochee River near Atlanta and the Santa Monica Mountains outside of Los Angeles. Seiberling added:
I am disappointed that the Department of the Interior has not given this bill its wholehearted support, particularly as it would increase and enhance an existing federal park. Unfortunately, the Department has long treated the dunes as a stepchild, giving it low priority in the heirarchy of the National Park System. The Department has consistently rejected urban park proposals [because of the expense of acquisitions]. I think this represents a defeatist attitude, which clings to the park policies of the past and ignores the urgent needs of a rapidly changing, increasingly urban society. [66]
On the contrary, Representative Earl Landgrebe described the lakeshore as a "$27 million jungle in the heart of one of the fastest growing areas in America"—without significant development and ill-defined boundaries. Stating that the Roush bill will "do even more violence to our community," Landgrebe urged the subcommittee to consider his bill, H.R. 11699, which advocated a smaller area to even out the lakeshore's boundaries. [67]
Advisory Commission member John Hillenbrand and Indiana Department of Natural Resources Director Joseph D. Cloud unveiled a compromise plan to the subcommittee. Endorsed by Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen, the plan proposed adding 2,447 acres, including halting the NIPSCO fly ash seepage by incorporating the property into the lakeshore. The move represented the first endorsement by the State of Indiana to enlarge the national lakeshore. [68]
While the subcommittee favorably reported H.R. 3571, the full committee did not act on it in time before the last session of the 93rd Congress expired in late 1974. [69] In early 1975, Roush reintroduced his bill which became known as H.R. 4926. One significant change came with the defeat of Earl Landgrebe and his replacement by Floyd Fithian, the first Democrat elected by Indiana's Second Congressional District since 1932. Pledging to find a compromise for lakeshore expansion, Fithian held well-attended public hearings even before he took office.* Recommending an addition of 4,686 acres, Fithian tried to gain approval of his bill, H.R. 5241, from the State of Indiana, Save the Dunes Council, and Bethlehem Steel Company. [70]
*One account erroneously states that Fithian ignored the National Park Service in the public hearings he conducted as well as the composition of his expansion legislation. J. R. Whitehouse asserted that he attended every public meeting and was intimately involved in the process. According to Whitehouse: "Floyd Fithian involved me totally. We would sit down and discuss item by item various segments that he wanted to include and then I would give him my input as to what I thought should or shouldn't be included on an informal basis. We would meet constantly on that." See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
On May 9, 1975, the House subcommittee considered the two bills, [71] and later in the month, journeyed to Indiana Dunes for three days to see the proposed expansion areas by helicopter and bus. Accompanied by Superintendent Whitehouse, Advisory Commission Chairman Lieber, and a representative from the Governor's office, the committee members for the first time fully understood the ramifications of each proposed parcel. In August, the Secretary's Advisory Board also came for a three-day visit. While the increased activity resulted in the House subcommittee's recommendation of the Fithian bill, there was no action by either the full House or Senate in 1975. [72]
In January 1976, the House committee voted to switch the identical text of H.R. 11455-sponsored by Fithian, Roush, and twenty-three others-for H.R. 5241. The new compromise bill's 4,340 acres had a price tag of $53,488,400. It included an initial limitation of $8,500,000 for development with an understanding that a new Master Plan spelling out additional costs would be submitted to Congress later. Dissenting views, which included many House Republicans, pointed out the cost was fifty times more than the Ford Administration requested and $32 million more than authorized in the 1966 act. [73]
When the House passed H.R. 11455 on February 18, 1976, attention focused on the Senate and S. 3329, submitted by Senator Birch Bayh on behalf of Senator Vance Hartke. S. 3329 provided for 4,686 acres at a cost of $57,855,900. Like its House counterpart, the bill would expand the Advisory Commission from seven to eleven members; permit rights of way for roads, utilities, pipelines and water mains; allow both use and occupancy for twenty-five years or a life estate for an owner and spouse; and non-payment of property taxes by use and occupancy residents provided grounds for automatic termination of rights by the Secretary. While the House bill allowed unrestricted condemnation, the Senate version prohibited it for improved property as long as there was approved zoning and if the owner granted the government first rights of purchase.
Testifying before the May 26, 1976, hearing of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Assistant Secretary Nathaniel P. Reed recommended against both bills and for the immediate addition of 203 acres, including two tracts west and east of West Beach and Pinhook Bog, determined eligible as a National Natural Landmark. Reed requested the subsequent addition of 784 acres, including the Furnessville Marsh, glacial lake dunes and marshes, and the West Beach High Dune owned by Midwest Steel. Reed told the committee that the House and Senate bills contained unnecessary acreage:
In many areas highly concentrated industrial and/or residential development has despoiled any natural, scientific, or recreational potential that the land might have once offered. For example, those areas east and southeast of the town of Ogden Dunes, Beverly Shores, and the areas near the Gary Airport. Other areas that would be added to the Lakeshore by these bills would either be unmanageable or contrary to the purposes of the Lakeshore.
This is one of the most difficult bills I've ever seen. It is one of the most difficult areas I've ever seen bar none. There are no simple solutions here. We are 50 years, 70 years late. We are in a numbers game with tremendous supporters, dedicated men and women and children, who have worked to preserve this area and who have seen their chances erode over the years. They are in a numbers game with us. They want us to buy acres, regardless as to the quality of the acres because in some way, it makes up for the lost opportunities.
But I cannot bring back the lost opportunities for the Committee.... As somebody who has to be responsible for the fiscal side of the acquisition program, I am deeply concerned about putting $57 million in here when I see areas that are in pristine condition, that are of National Park System significance, that are available to the American people.
...I cannot believe that a slag dump is a worthwhile addition to a National Park area. [74]
Herbert Read of the Save the Dunes Council and the Izaak Walton League discarded Assistant Secretary Reed's testimony and those who concurred with Reed as afflicted by the "if-you've-seen-one-dune-you've-seen-them-all syndrome." Read commented:
The statement made by the Department of the Interior represents the political views of the present administration and is not an impartial analysis of the potential park value of the various areas. The National Park Service and Department of the Interior recommendations have changed back and forth according to the political winds. Statements made at this last hearing are, in many cases, directly opposite from previous statements sometimes made by the same persons. This flip-flop has occurred even when there has been no change in the field conditions. [75]
Representative Floyd Fithian explained to the Senate committee that he wished to secure a final solution, fair and equitable for industrialists as well as conservationists which accommodated both jobs and recreation. Fithian pointed out that it was imperative the expansion question be settled by the 94th Congress; with retirements and political position changes in the House, the whole process would have to begin again from scratch. Congressman J. Edward Roush, the instigator of lakeshore expansion, also testified to lend his full support to S. 3329. [76]
The following month, two members of the Senate committee visited the national lakeshore accompanied by National Park Service Director Gary Everhardt. In July 1976, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Russell Train and Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) Director John Crutcher visited and toured the lakeshore by helicopter. [77] The additional information garnered from these visits, however, did not prevent S. 3329 from stalling in the Senate. Democrats encountered stiff opposition from Republicans united behind the White House's complaint that the bill was far too costly. Many feared that President Gerald R. Ford would veto an Indiana Dunes expansion bill just as Congressman Ford had voted against the 1966 bill.
In a last-ditch effort to break the stalemate, Senators Bayh, Hartke, Percy, and Stevenson introduced an amended bill calling for 3,663 acres which rapidly found its way to the Senate floor for consideration on September 24, 1976. Senator Charles Percy took the floor to announce the sad news of Paul Douglas' death. Like a whirlwind, expansion of Douglas' beloved Indiana Dunes transformed into a memorial to the deceased senator. With his death, Douglas gave life to an expanded national lakeshore. Receiving a unanimous Senate vote, the measure sailed through the conference committee and on to Gerald Ford's desk where it faced a certain pocket veto. During the final weekend in which the bill could be approved, Superintendent Whitehouse* maintained a tense, hourly telephone contact with Donna McGrath, the administrative assistant of Senator Charles Percy. Percy flew back to the capital after the session to solicit President Ford's approval. Confronted with the bill's association with Paul Douglas and its strong bipartisan support, the President signed it into law on October 18, 1976. [78]
*J. R. Whitehouse credits Republican Charles Percy (who defeated Paul Douglas in 1966) to the list of supporters who unfortunately never received due credit. Whitehouse believes Percy subsequently became embittered and turned a deaf ear to the Lakeshore because conservationists were too accustomed to the traditional political animosity to acknowledge support from a Republican. See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.
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Last Updated: 07-Oct-2003