Lake Roosevelt NRA: Administrative History (Chapter 4)

From the beginning, National Park Service administration at Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area (LARO) has been entwined with the interests of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and two federally-recognized tribes — the Colville Confederated Tribes and the Spokane Tribe of Indians. The resulting complex jurisdictional situation has changed considerably over the years and continues to evolve today. Sometimes the three agencies, all siblings within the Department of the Interior, have worked cooperatively toward common goals while at other times they have squabbled like a dysfunctional family. The addition of the tribal voices, on equal footing with the three agencies, has altered the balance, and all five parties have been adjusting to new roles over the past decade.

The most complex administrative relationship at LARO is that between the Park Service and the two tribes. Historians Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek have noted that Park Service-Indian relations nationwide generally fall into four stages: "(1) unilateral appropriation of recreational land by the government; (2) an end to land-taking but a continued federal neglect of tribal needs, cultures, and treaties; (3) Indian resistance, leading to aggressive pursuit of tribal interests; and (4) a new NPS commitment to cross-cultural integrity and cooperation." [1] There are variations in this pattern at LARO, of course; for instance, although Reclamation purchased Indian lands for reservoir purposes, it soon turned these lands over to the Park Service to administer for recreation. Despite these variations, the same general stages appear to hold true, from acquisition of Indian lands for Grand Coulee Dam and its reservoir through the 1990 Lake Roosevelt Cooperative Management Agreement (or Multi-Party Agreement) to the present.

Indians had accumulated numerous grievances well before their lands were condemned for the Grand Coulee project. Their losses began decades earlier with the establishment of reservations and subsequent forced land cessions. Federal policies around the turn of the century encouraged assimilation of Indians into mainstream non-Indian culture. For instance, Indian children were sent to boarding schools in an effort to suppress traditional Indian culture. Similarly, allotment of reservation lands was supposed to encourage Indians to become farmers; it also freed up "excess" land for non-Indian settlement.

During the 1920s, Indian poverty caught the attention of some whites and spawned a number of organizations interested in Indian welfare. Concurrent with the interest of private groups, the federal government began a slow reversal of its assimilation policies. Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work designated the independent Institute of Government Research to report on reservation conditions and federal policy. The group published its report, "The Problem of Indian Administration," known simply as the Meriam Report, in 1928 and set the stage for future reforms. Evidence of desperate health and economic conditions suggested that established Indian policy had done little to create self-sufficient citizens. To counter this dismal situation, the Meriam Report offered ideas to improve education and health programs. The authors also recommended a whole different approach to native people, one that showed respect and understanding of their Indian culture. These conclusions and suggestions repeated those made by other reform groups. Change began with President Herbert Hoover's appointees in the Department of the Interior and accelerated when John Collier was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. [2]

The most important legislation to come out of this period was the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act. It called for tribal elections to either accept or reject the requirements to write a tribal constitution and establish self-government. For those tribes that voted to accept these, the act called for an end to land allotment and provided for additional purchases of lands to replace some of those lost under the Dawes Act. In addition, any lands that had not been allotted were to be returned to the tribal governments. The IRA also established a revolving loan fund for community development, provided educational loans for Indian students, and allowed Indian preference for jobs in the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA). [3]

Although two-thirds of the tribes nationwide voted to accept the provisions of the IRA, not all tribes were pleased with the choice. Among these were both the Colville and Spokane tribes. The Colvilles rejected the IRA in an election in April 1935, with 421 voting in favor and 562 against. Tribal members also rejected a constitution in June 1936, but after revisions, those who came to the polls in February 1938 voted heavily in favor. This established the Colville Business Council with fourteen members from four districts. In addition, it gathered the eleven separate bands of the reservation and renamed them the Colville Confederated Tribes (CCT). The Spokane Tribe of Indians (STI) also voted down the IRA but did not approve its tribal constitution until May 1951. [4]

The Indian Reorganization Act came too late to help the CCT or STI in their dealings with the government during construction of Grand Coulee Dam. With the Colville Business Council just recently organized and the Spokane Tribe still without any officially recognized form of tribal government, neither was in a strong position when Reclamation began the massive Columbia Basin Irrigation Project. Instead, they relied on the OIA to look out for their interests. At the start of dam construction in July 1933, Harvey K. Meyer, Superintendent of the Colville Indian Agency, warned OIA officials that the Indians claimed half of the river. After thorough study, Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman, Jr., agreed, and he promised that the Federal Power Commission would pay careful attention to protecting Indian rights. He asked Meyer to keep him "advised of any important development affecting the Indians' interest." [5] Later that fall, Frank R. McNinch, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, asked for information on how the project at Grand Coulee would affect Colville and Spokane Indian rights. Zimmerman responded that the enormity of the project made it difficult to advise at that point, but he described the potential power production from the dam and concluded that it "could bear a reasonable annual rental . . . for the Indians' land and water rights involved." According to Zimmerman, the Solicitor's Office stated that Reclamation would take care of tribal interests. [6]

Reclamation tried to get a handle on the monetary value of Indian losses. In 1934, L. M. Holt, Supervising Engineer in Salt Lake City, made an initial estimate of the value of Indian lands and timber. He also recognized the importance of salmon to the Colville Tribe and noted that while the value of the annual catch was difficult to determine, $15,000 per year seemed like "the proper figure" to use. More importantly, he acknowledged only the Colville Indians' rights to a share of the undeveloped power, estimating the compensation due at $1 per horsepower, or a total one-time payment of $345,000. He claimed that the amount of water needed for power generation that originated on both reservations was negligible when compared to the total flow of the Columbia. In addition, the dam's location on the north bank was on a white homestead rather than Indian land. He figured that annual payments to the Colville Tribe of $34,419 and just $690 to the Spokane Tribe would compensate them both fairly for the loss of lands and timber and would further compensate the Colville Tribe for their loss of salmon and undeveloped water power. Reclamation, however, found by 1937 that it was busy with other urgent matters, and concern for Indian rights to power revenue and compensation for loss of the salmon runs fell by the wayside. The Indians remembered this promise, though, and in January 1941 Mr. Adolph reminded the Colville Business Council saying, "One of our Indians asked Mr. Wheeler about our royalty. Mr. Wheeler stated that we would be entitled to royalty." [7] Despite these promises, the settlement would take decades to resolve.

Reclamation and the OIA worked together to acquire Indian lands needed for the project. During 1937, the General Land Office surveyed Colville Indian allotments and tribal lands along the projected high-water line. The following year, Reclamation drafted legislation that allowed it to obtain rights-of-way across Indian lands. With the legislation evidently delayed and waters starting to rise behind the dam, Reclamation grew anxious to resolve the issue. It negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the OIA, signed on April 6, 1939, to purchase Indian lands. The MOU noted that some of these lands had already been inundated and the water was approaching others, necessitating the immediate purchase of all Indian interests in these tracts. It stipulated that Reclamation's appraisals be adopted over those of the OIA since they were more favorable to the Indians. Other interbureau agreements during this period covered additional lands as well as relocation of utility lines and roads. [8]

Payment was slow in coming, however, causing worry for Louis Balsam, who served at the Colville Indian Agency as Field Representative in Charge. He claimed that each day of delay caused genuine harm to many tribal members, and he urged prompt payments so that people could afford to relocate at upper elevations. Most of the condemned lands were used for agriculture and grazing and thus were important for subsistence, so Balsam recommended that both commissioners of Reclamation and Indian Affairs consider the annual crop cycle when acquiring lands. "The taking of these lands for clearing, which is absolutely necessary, is causing unrest among the Indians," he wrote. "Any delay now in paying for these lands means that starvation conditions may result during the 1940 crop year." He urged prompt settlement and noted Reclamation had been making payments to fee title holders, most of whom were non-Indians, for more than four years. Doing the same for tribal allottees would help "allay understandable charges that Indians have not been accorded equality in these right of way matters." [9]

With waters rising rapidly, Congress finally enacted legislation, drafted by Reclamation and the OIA, to acquire Indian lands for the Grand Coulee project. A few months prior to passage, John C. Page, Commissioner of Reclamation, had suggested wording to tighten up the language concerning Indian rights. This limitation was needed, he explained, to help the Bureau "sponsor the greatest possible development of reservoirs" by working with other federal agencies. He believed that the limits of any reserved rights had to be clearly defined before the agencies could effectively plan their work. [10] The Act of June 29, 1940 (Acquisition of Indian Lands for Grand Coulee Dam, 54 Stat.703), gave the United States "all the right, title, and interest of the Indians in and to the tribal and allotted lands within the Spokane and Colville Reservations," up to 1,310-foot elevation, except at the Klaxta townsite where the government was allowed to take lands above that line. In addition, the act gave the government the right to take additional reservation lands "from time to time" as needed for utilities and roads in connection with the Grand Coulee project. The Secretary of the Interior was allowed to determine "just and equitable compensation," with payments for tribal lands being transferred to the appropriate tribal account. Compensation due to individual owners was transferred to the Superintendent of the Colville Agency to credit to the person's account. The Secretary of the Interior was then permitted to use these funds to purchase other lands and improvements or move existing improvements to a new site to benefit the allottee. [11]

Section 1 of the 1940 Act contained a key paragraph that has generated more confusion, controversy, and pages of legal opinion than probably any other document pertaining to the Grand Coulee project. It states,

The Committee on Problem No. 26, set up to provide guidance for the recreational development of the reservoir area, wrestled with the implications of this paragraph. What area was included in "approximately one-quarter of the entire reservoir"? What did "paramount use" mean? What rights were Indians giving up in exchange for one-quarter of the reservoir? "Isn't the setting aside of one-fourth of the entire reservoir area for the paramount use of the Indians going to create some serious difficulties?" asked one committee member. [13] The problems became immediately apparent and during the next year, state and federal officials planning the new recreation area realized they needed help, particularly from the Indians. Unable to obtain advice from the tribes, a subcommittee appointed to clarify the 1940 Act concluded that the area reserved for Indians applied to the water only and recommended that this be adjacent to reservation lands. It further determined that "paramount" was not "exclusive," so non-Indians could fish in an area designated for the paramount use of the Indians as long as they had a special license like that needed for fishing on reservation lands. Details for administration of the area set aside for the Indians would be worked out between the OIA and the agency chosen to administer recreation in the new reservoir. [14]

Across the lake, the Colville Business Council tried to make sense of the same issues. Mr. Adolph, a Council member, noted that Indians had not been consulted prior to either construction of the dam or passage of the Act of June 29, 1940. "And still today, we were not asked what did we want," he reminded the Council. "The 1/4 that was offered to us, there is a question as to where it may be taken. Therefore, I say let us take it slowly and consider it thoroughly as far as our lake rights are concerned." Following questions from other Council members, Colville Agency Superintendent Robertson said that one-quarter of the total reservoir area would amount to approximately 22,255 acres, yet if they used the reservation boundary of the middle of the river, the Indians would get over 33,600, an increase of more than 11,000 acres. Mr. Lemery picked up on this point. Remembering the loss of the north half of the reservation, he challenged fellow Council members: "We Indians are dumb and I guess we got to admit it," he said. "If you consent to concede these 11,600 acres, you are conceding your right to the boundary in the middle of the river. I think you should stand on your ground, and if you have to bring a suit, you should do it." Carthon Patrie, OIA Acting Regional Forester with the Colville Indian Agency, agreed that the Council did not need to rush this matter but he applied some pressure by suggesting that the sooner they could tell the Secretary what they wanted, the more favorable response they would get. He thought they could probably get the reservoir area bordering the reservations out to the thread of the river. By the end of the meeting, the Council refused to accept the terms of the Act of June 29, 1940, and instead chose "to retain all rights, powers and privileges heretofore held by them by virtue of previous treaties and/or agreements between said Indians and the United States Government." [15]

The Spokane Indians reacted with similar concerns. At a tribal council meeting held in January 1941, Superintendent Robertson gave figures for one-quarter of the reservoir area but explained that if the Indians got all of the Spokane River and half of the Columbia River where they bordered reservations, they would get 40,480 acres. He told them that the Secretary of the Interior had authority to set this much land aside for the tribes, but he wanted to hear views from the Indians. After much discussion, the Council passed a resolution "that we should have all the rights and full control of the entire Columbia Basin Lake, to the 1310 level, where it borders on the Spokane reservation, as long as these rights do not interfer [sic] with the operation of the Grand Coulee project; provided that the acceptance of this area does not jeopardize any claims the Spokane Indians may have because of losses sustained by the tribe." [16] Late in 1941, a delegation of members from both the CCT and STI went to Washington, D.C., to protest the limitation of their rights directly to the OIA. The outcome of this trip is unknown. [17]

Local OIA officials reiterated the Indians' statements and noted that both tribes were more concerned about their rights than the amount of land. They recognized the great potential for both commercial and recreational development of the new reservoir and they wanted to be able to participate. There was still great resentment on the reservations over the way land acquisition had been handled, and Superintendent F. A. Gross warned, "There is far more at stake than the hunting, fishing, and boating privileges interpreted in the strict sense of the meaning of these words." He went on to make several farsighted recommendations, many of which were finally embodied in the 1990 Multi-Party Agreement. These included Indian rights in an area of more than 40,000 acres; full control, including licensing, over activities and concessions for fishing, hunting, and boating between the 1,310 line and the thread of the Columbia and on the entire Spokane River; a deciding vote on decisions to allow commercial, business, grazing, and other uses on the freeboard lands adjoining their reservations; exemption from federal and state fishing regulations; and finally, steps to prevent pollution of the reservoir. [18]

In addition to working through the implications of the 1940 act, many of the same people were working on a memorandum of agreement for planning, development, and administration of recreation in the reservoir area. Both Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and National Park Service Director Newton B. Drury had approved negotiations among the Park Service, Reclamation, and OIA. Indeed, the results were a foregone conclusion, and the announcement that the Park Service would soon be taking over jurisdiction of the reservoir was released nine days before the agreement was drafted. The agency relied heavily on its experience at Boulder Dam National Recreation Area, and Boulder Superintendent Guy D. Edwards played a key role in producing the agreement. Edwards arrived a week early to meet with Claude E. Greider, State Supervisor, and Raymond E. Hoyt, Chief of the Recreation Planning Division. Greider and Hoyt had written a rough draft based on the interbureau agreement used at Boulder Dam. They were joined by Charles L. Gable, Chief of Park Operators Division, and the four men refined the draft to eliminate items that had not worked well at Boulder Dam. Edwards and Greider then drove to Coulee Dam to represent the Park Service at the meeting to formally draft the interbureau agreement. [19]

Attending the meeting on September 25-26, 1941, were F. A. Gross, Superintendent of the Colville Reservation; Carthon R. Patrie, OIA Regional Forester; Melvin L. Robertson, Colville Indian Agency; L. N. Runnels, Colville Business Council; Claude E. Greider, State Supervisor for the Park Service; Guy B. Edwards, Superintendent at Boulder Dam NRA; Frank A. Banks, Reclamation Supervising Engineer; Philip R. Nalder, Reclamation Associate Engineer; and the Land Clerk from the Colville Indian Agency. Edwards warmed up the group with a presentation on Boulder Dam NRA, discussing its history, development, and administration. Greider then took over and presented the agreement. Discussion proceeded paragraph by paragraph, and the group referred as needed to both the MOA for Boulder Dam NRA, approved on October 13, 1936, and the Cooperative Agreement between the OIA and the Park Service concerning the Hualpai Indian Reservation, approved November 11, 1937. [20]

Although they made few changes in the draft agreement during two days of negotiations, each of the three agencies was able to present its views. Reclamation was concerned about its potential liability for injuries or damages due to landslides, so a special clause excluding them from damage suits was inserted into the agreement. The OIA remained concerned about Indian rights and insisted on having the authority to approve any leases or permits for use of the freeboard lands adjoining the reservations. In addition, it wanted to ensure that fees from licenses, permits, and leases for hunting, fishing, and boating in the area were used to benefit Indians. The Park Service balked, however, at the OIA's request to assume total jurisdiction over the Indian lands acquired under the 1940 act and insisted on administering all the lands as the only way to implement Park Service objectives. The agency further argued that a strict interpretation of the 1940 act gave Indians one-quarter of the water surface and only a "reasonable right of ingress and egress across the strip of land between the water surface and the 1310 line." At the conclusion of the meeting, a draft MOA was in place and endorsed by all attendees. [21]

This draft agreement never went into effect because Park Service Director Drury wanted to wait until detailed studies of the recreation area were completed and the agency had resolved the question of the area's national significance. The Director received a copy of the document within a week of its signing in September 1941, along with a memo from the Regional Director who stressed the importance of securing adequate funding to administer the new area before signing the agreement. Formal agreement on management of the recreation area remained in limbo until Reclamation and the Park Service signed a memorandum of agreement on July 22, 1942, that assigned planning and administration of the area to the Park Service. This was renewed annually through 1946. [22]

The question of Indian rights under the Act of June 29, 1940 (Acquisition of Indian Lands for Grand Coulee Dam), continued to concern the agencies working in the newly formed reservoir area. There were calls for a Solicitor's opinion as early as September 1941 when Leroy D. Arnold, OIA Director of Forestry, suggested that such a decision was needed "to obviate any possible unpleasant misunderstandings or disagreements later on." [23] Two years later, Walter V. Woehlke, with the OIA in Chicago, urged the Secretary to define Indian rights soon and went on to offer his interpretation of their paramount rights. These included the right to hunt and fish, without license fees, within the exterior boundaries of their reservations; the right to build and operate docking facilities and rent boats, all without license fees; and the right to use shore lands to water stock. In addition, he urged that the OIA be given jurisdiction over all the freeboard land within reservation boundaries. [24]

Predictably, both the Park Service and Reclamation objected to Woehlke's ideas, particularly the suggestion that the OIA manage reservation shore lands. Greider stressed the need for a single agency to maintain full administrative responsibility throughout the reservoir area, and he claimed that the public interest would not be served by Woehlke's plan to give Indians exclusive rights along the shore. "Undoubtedly, any qualified agency responsible for the administration of the area as a whole could amply provide for all legitimate interests of the Indians," wrote Greider, "and accomplish it in a manner that would not jeopardize certain esthetic, recreational, or other values which should be preserved." [25] Frank A. Banks agreed and added, "I am somewhat concerned because of the change in attitude of the Indian Service officials." [26]

The controversy and bickering ended, at least for a while, with the Solicitor's Opinion of December 29, 1945. Solicitor Warner G. Gardner did not resolve all issues and he left key decisions to the Secretary of the Interior, but he did lay the groundwork for nearly thirty years of jurisdiction at Lake Roosevelt. According to his opinion, the one-quarter of the reservoir area to be set aside for the Indians could include freeboard lands as well as water area, if the Secretary wished. Specific areas had to be allocated to the tribes, either one area to be shared or two separate areas; Gardner suggested that the one-quarter area be divided according to population, with 75 percent going to the CCT and 25 percent to the STI. Furthermore, these lands should be adjacent to or near reservation lands to ensure rights of access to the reservoir. "Other things being equal, this means that they should be located along the former shoreline of the Indian lands," wrote Gardner. The rights of ingress and egress across the freeboard lands should be proportionate with the intended use of the Indians' part of the reservoir. For instance, tribal members would be allowed to build a reasonable number of docks for their boating operations and could build other structures to use in hunting and fishing. On the question of rights, Gardner ruled that "the special rights granted to the Indians under the act were themselves obviously deemed to be a form of compensation for the riparian rights of the Indians for which no separate compensation had been made." While these were not exclusive rights, the Secretary had the power "to make the Indian rights exclusive where necessary to insure the realization of their privileges." Gardner refused to decide whether Indians had the right to grant licenses to others, but he did rule that they should not be charged fees for hunting, fishing, or boating and would be subject only to reasonable regulations to help protect and conserve wildlife. [27]

The uncertainty that had clouded jurisdictional issues for several years dissipated immediately, and federal agencies revived their work on a cooperative agreement. Park Service Director Drury sent a copy of the Solicitor's opinion to Regional Director Owen A. Tomlinson asking for his opinion on areas to be set aside for paramount use of the Indians. Although it was primarily the responsibility of Reclamation and the OIA to delineate these areas, Drury suggested that it would be good for the Park Service to be involved in these discussions. He also urged Tomlinson to revise the draft agreement of September 26, 1941, and have it reviewed by the other agencies. If necessary, the Park Service could negotiate separate agreements with Reclamation and the OIA. [28]

Banks pushed for a commitment from the Park Service, causing it to pull back temporarily. Greider and Raymond E. Hoyt, Regional Chief, Recreation Study Division, had a meeting with Banks on February 16, 1946. When they arrived, they found that not only had he invited Reclamation and OIA officials, but he also expected Hoyt to work out the interbureau agreement so that the Park Service could take over management of the recreation area on July 1st. Both Hoyt and Greider made it clear that they were not aware of these plans and furthermore, they had no authority to commit the Park Service to this. Banks, in turn, was unhappy when he found out that the agency had not budgeted any funds to cover the costs of administering the area in FY1947. Despite these disagreements, the federal representatives reached consensus that one agency should have administrative responsibility for the entire area, including commercial operations. The only exception to this was that the OIA would retain control of agricultural and grazing permits in the Indian Zones. The points discussed that day formed the basis for the eventual agreement. Banks scheduled another meeting for the following month, and Park Service officials realized he wanted action. "The attitude of the Bureau people was one of wishing to be relieved of all administrative responsibility above the dam," noted Hoyt. "We feel from their remarks that they will insist that the National Park Service assume the entire responsibility." [29]

Negotiations continued, and on April 8, 1946, twenty-three people met at Coulee Dam to prepare a final draft of the interbureau agreement, including Supervising Engineer Frank A. Banks, Right-of-Way Engineer Thoralf Torkelson, and Regional Counsel H. Stinson for Reclamation; Herbert Maier, Raymond E. Hoyt, George Collins, and Claude E. Greider for the Park Service; and the superintendents of the Colville and Spokane reservations, other OIA officials, and various members of the tribal councils representing Indian interests. Using a memo from Hillory Tolson as a guide, Maier was pleased to report that seven hours of negotiations produced an agreement that incorporated nearly all of the Park Service proposals. After considerable discussion of a name, the delegates agreed on Coulee Dam Recreational Area. A more difficult point involved funding. Banks argued that Reclamation should not have to fund the work since the Park Service was responsible for recreation development and administration. Maier countered that the agency could not request funding for developing and administering an area that was not part of the National Park System. Banks conceded this point, but Maier noted, "It is my feeling that Mr. Banks acquiesced only with the thought in mind that when he transmits the draft to the Commissioner he will suggest further consideration of this item before final submission to the Secretary." [30]

The OIA continued to have some reservations about the agreement. The agency insisted that it be designated to issue permits and administer log dumping operations within the Indian Zones, after consultation with the Park Service. More importantly, Acting Commissioner John McGue maintained that since Indian rights had not yet been defined, he hesitated to sign a document that might be viewed later as a departmental interpretation of these rights. Until the Secretary defined these rights, McGue wanted the agreement to include "a specific provision to the effect that nothing therein contained shall be construed as a waiver of any rights the Indians may have." [31] This statement was included in the final agreement.

Both tribal councils passed resolutions approving the April 1946 draft MOA, but they also voiced concern. In fact, the Colville Business Council passed a second resolution the same day asking that Indians of both reservations be allowed to hunt and fish within the Indian Zones without being charged for a license. In addition, they wanted access to, and the right to build and operate, docking facilities within their zones, as well as the right to rent and operate boats without paying any fees. If their paramount interests were later found to be in jeopardy, they requested that the Secretary set aside all or part of the Indian Zones for their exclusive use. [32]

The final MOA, known as the Tri-Party Agreement, was signed on December 18, 1946. It divided the reservoir area into three zones: Reclamation, Recreation, and Indian. The Bureau retained jurisdiction over activities in the Reclamation Zone, including recreation, although the agency was to consult with the Park Service on development of any recreational facilities there. The OIA had responsibility for both the Colville and Spokane Indian Zones, including issuing agriculture, grazing, and log dump permits; fire prevention; and construction and maintenance, in consultation with the Park Service, of any structures needed in conjunction with Indians' paramount rights. The OIA also agreed to provide the Park Service with any help needed in its relations with individual Indians at the new recreation area. [33]

A large portion of the agreement spelled out Park Service duties in the new recreation area. One of the primary functions, of course, was developing and implementing plans for facilities throughout the recreation area. In addition, the Park Service agreed to consult with the OIA in locating and protecting potential recreation sites in the Indian Zones. The agency was also directed to establish policies covering uses of all the land in the recreation area, except for agriculture and grazing in the Indian Zones and special hunting, fishing, and boating rights of Indians. The Park Service took responsibility for issuing and administering permits for special uses, including industrial and recreational, for all the land in the recreation area, and grazing and agricultural uses for lands outside the Indian Zones. The agreement also designated the Park Service as the agency to promulgate rules and regulations governing public uses and protection of resources. Finally, the Park Service agreed to advise both Reclamation and the OIA in recreation matters in their respective zones. [34]

While the federal agencies were still fine-tuning their final agreement at Lake Roosevelt, Congress passed a law that added legitimacy to Park Service administration of the recreation area. Public Law 633, passed August 7, 1946, authorized Park Service appropriations for "Administration, protection, improvement, and maintenance of areas, under the jurisdiction of other agencies of the Government, devoted to recreational use pursuant to cooperative agreements." [35] The Secretary of the Interior issued a statement in July 1947 on the Department's policy for recreation development and administration at Reclamation reservoirs. The Park Service would assist Reclamation on a reimbursable basis to develop preliminary plans for recreational facilities at reservoir areas. As part of this work, the Park Service would submit estimates of construction costs to Reclamation to be included in the annual costs of reservoir construction. If funded by Congress, the Park Service would agree to build these recreational facilities. This information left both Greider and Banks scrambling to determine how it applied to Coulee Dam Recreational Area. Both had just submitted their 1949 estimates to their respective regional offices, and they wondered if Reclamation was to cover Park Service estimates. Regional Director Tomlinson reassured Greider that he believed this new policy did not apply to recreational areas already taken over by the Park Service, so the budgets remained unaltered. [36]

While Reclamation and the Park Service worried about budgets for the newly formed Coulee Dam Recreational Area, Indian tribes had much larger issues confronting them. Faced with their very survival as federally recognized tribes, the Colville and Spokane tribal governments did not have much time during the 1950s and 1960s for issues at the adjoining recreation area. Federal Indian policy changed following World War II and bureaucrats were joined by many Indians, particularly returning war veterans, in favoring full integration of native people into mainstream American society. This led to federal policies of termination (ending federal trust status) and relocation throughout the United States, as well as the work of the Indian Claims Commission.

The push for termination began during President Harry Truman's term and accelerated following the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952. It started with the Zimmerman Plan in 1947 that ranked tribes according to their perceived ability to survive withdrawal of federal trust status. Truman's 1950 appointment of Dillon S. Myer to be Commissioner for the Bureau of Indian Affairs ( BIA, formerly Office of Indian Affairs) put pressure on both the tribes and the agency. Myer proposed training and job placement assistance for those who wanted to leave the reservation, and he offered help in developing industrial programs for those who chose to remain. Both programs shared the same goal, that of making Indians independent of the federal government. Although Myer urged BIA officials to help tribes understand the effects of termination, he insisted on proceeding even without tribal cooperation. Myer also reorganized the BIA, and there was talk of eventually terminating the agency along with the tribes. In 1953, the Republican Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108 with little discussion. Supported by the Department of the Interior, the bill established the policy of termination, ending the tribes' status as wards of the government and moving to withdraw all federal responsibilities to Indian tribes. Bills targeting specific tribes followed. [37]

Under termination, tribes were given two options to dispose of their tribally owned lands: either they could form a corporation to manage the properties under a trustee of their choice, or they could liquidate their assets and distribute the proceeds among tribal members. Should a tribe choose neither option, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to transfer titles to a trustee who would then liquidate the holdings. Once targeted for termination, tribes had two to five years to complete the process. The push to terminate tribes weakened by the late 1950s, especially as states and local governments began to realize that the costs of taking over social services on former reservation lands far exceeded any benefits from taxing these lands. Before the effort ended, only 3 percent of all federally-recognized Indians were terminated. [38]

[The word "termination" spread] like a prairie fire of a pestilence through Indian country. It stirred conflicting reactions among my people; to some it meant the severing of ties already loose and ineffective; others welcomed it as a promise of early sharing in tribal patrimony. Many outsiders realized that it provided a first step towards acquiring Indian resources. The great majority of my people, however, feared the consequences. The action of Congress, accompanied by the phrase "as rapidly as possible," sounded to them like the stroke of doom.

-- George Pierre, former CCT leader[39]

As a corollary to termination, the federal government pushed a policy of relocation to encourage Indians to move from reservations to urban areas where there were more job opportunities and the potential for a higher standard of living. The BIA believed that once tribal members adjusted to their new lives in the cities, there would be no need for reservations. Some Indians volunteered to move and in the decade following World War II, approximately 100,000 left reservations throughout the country. The change proved disastrous for many, however, who suffered profound culture shock and lacked basic urban skills such as knowing how to use a telephone. By the late 1950s, the BIA changed the focus from relocation to employment assistance, attracting interest from Indians wanting vocational training. Indian centers opened in cities to help relocated Indians. Ultimately, the failure of both termination and relocation helped fuel the Red Power movement of the 1960s. [40]

In 1954, a congressional report rated both the Spokane and the Colville Indians as able to handle their own affairs and thus ready for termination. The STI, however, moved quickly to squelch this idea. In a strong statement made to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1955, the tribe said that it was neglected by the federal government. When the Agency had moved from the Spokane to the Colville Reservation nearly thirty years earlier, the tribe had lost many services to which they were entitled. During these years, the STI had only a sub-agency and consequently the tribe had received essentially only what was left after the Colville Agency took first choice. The STI blamed the BIA for this and went on to suggest that the federal government improve services to tribal members instead of withdrawing support. The STI refused to consider termination until their long-standing land claim was settled by the Indian Claims Commission. The tribe later asked to be separated administratively from the CCT in 1966, due to "widely divergent" ideologies. [41]

The CCT was not able to escape the termination effort without a difficult fight that caused great dissension within the tribes. The BIA informed the Colville Business Council in February 1953 that it would assign technical staff to help them work on termination, which the Council had already been studying. The process began in earnest, however, with the passage of Public Law 772 on July 24, 1956. This law returned to tribal ownership over 800,000 acres of former tribal lands that had not been disposed of under the Homestead Act. A condition of this land return was that the Colville Business Council had to propose legislation to terminate federal supervision within five years. Ironically, had the CCT voted in favor of the Indian Reorganization Act twenty years earlier, the Secretary of the Interior could have returned these lands to the tribe without any termination provision, but he was not allowed to do this for a non-IRA tribe. A group within the CCT that favored termination drafted legislation that was introduced in Congress in 1962, but the bill died in committee. Similar legislation was introduced but not passed in each Congress through 1970. The Park Service fully expected termination to pass and planned to assume responsibility for fire protection for lands on the west side of the lake. The movement for Colville termination came as the country was shifting away from this program and tribes across the nation fought against these CCT bills. On the Colville Reservation, however, there were many who supported the move, and some of these supporters were elected to the Colville Business Council. Although termination plans were eventually dropped, hard feelings persisted among pro- and anti-termination factions on the reservation. [42]

The work of the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) provided a partial counterbalance to the post-war federal programs of termination and relocation. The 1946 legislation that established the ICC set a five-year period during which tribes could file claims, followed by another five years during which the three-person commission would reach decisions. The Commission heard 852 cases in the first 5 years. To accommodate the large number of claims, Congress allowed extensions until it finally dissolved the ICC in 1978. The STI, through the law firm of Wilkinson, Boyden & Cragun (later Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker), filed a claim in August 1951, asking for additional compensation for lands taken in 1887. The tribe asserted that the amount paid, totaling thirty-two cents per acre for 3.14 million acres, was too low and the ICC agreed, awarding the tribe an additional $6.7 million in 1967. In addition, the Spokane Tribal Council asked the Secretary of the Interior in 1949 for compensation for the flooding of nearly 3,000 acres of land following completion of Grand Coulee Dam. They waited too long to file this claim with the ICC, however. At the time of the large CCT settlement in the 1990s, the STI asked the House of Representatives to waive the statute of limitations and allow similar compensation to the tribe for its fishery loss and share of power revenue, noting that to compensate the CCT but not the STI "would be an egregious miscarriage of justice." This case is still pending. [43]

The CCT also filed a number of claims with the ICC. Various tribes of the CCT claimed millions of acres had been taken unfairly. After the Secretary of the Interior initially opposed these claims, the CCT finally agreed in 1956 to a settlement of $1 million for a total of 1.7 million acres. Tribal members received a payment of $350 per capita in 1961. The tribes filed another claim in 1973 that dealt primarily with the loss of their fishery due to Grand Coulee and Chief Joseph dams; this claim was settled for $3.257 million in 1978. An even more important case concerned the CCT claim to power revenue from Grand Coulee based on their claim to Columbia River waters. The tribes began negotiating with the government in the mid-1970s, but a special task force found the tribal legal claims without merit in 1980. The tribes sued and eventually won a settlement in 1994 in the Court of Appeals that included a lump sum of $53 million and annual payments of at least $15.25 million. [44]

As the federal government was looking into ways to end its trust responsibility to the tribes, the Spokane Tribe quietly began to test the limits of Indian rights at Lake Roosevelt. The first target was lands on the Fort Spokane Military Reservation, administered by the OIA (and later by the BIA). Department of the Interior (DOI) Solicitor Nathan R. Margold had ruled in December 1939 that the government did not need to compensate any tribe for lands flooded at Fort Spokane, reasoning that there was never any treaty concerning these lands. Furthermore, he wrote, when the President set aside lands for a potential reservation in November 1873, the government assumed that the tribe's acceptance of the reservation meant that they had relinquished title to any lands outside of its boundaries. Local Reclamation and Park Service staff eyed the remaining Fort Spokane lands above the 1,310 line as early as 1943 because of the location's recreation potential, but departmental officials cautioned against trying to withdraw the remainder of the military reservation, noting that the land was not required for the purposes of the Columbia Basin Project. Superintendent Greider raised the subject again in 1947 and noted that he had the support of Wade Head, Superintendent of the Colville and Spokane reservations. While the Commissioner of Reclamation still opposed the idea, Reclamation's Regional Director enthusiastically supported withdrawal of these lands for recreational development as part of the new national recreation area (NRA). [45]

While Reclamation and the Park Service discussed the propriety of adding Fort Spokane lands to LARO, the Spokane Business Council passed a resolution on March 17, 1949, asking for confirmation of their title to these same lands. This claim distressed Park Service officials who believed that the STI was trying to get Margold's 1939 decision reversed. "It is unfortunate that this somewhat belated assertion of rights in the land by the Indians will delay, if not entirely block, the addition of the lands to the recreational area," wrote Paul R. Franke, Acting Director of the National Park Service, in October 1950. He realized, however, that the agency could do nothing until the BIA had completed its study and the Department of the Interior made a decision. [46] Due to the uncertain situation, the Park Service decided to forego any plans for the main fort grounds and instead planned to confine its concession developments there to the lower bench area that it already controlled. BIA Commissioner Myer sided with the STI early in 1951, noting that the 1873 agreement to relinquish lands, including the fort grounds, had never been ratified and there had been no compensation for the loss of this land. He said that the Indians believed that they had never given up their claims to these lands and thus still had "valid rights in and to the lands based on their aboriginal use and occupancy thereof." The BIA agreed that the Indians at least had a "strong moral claim to the land." [47] The Solicitor concurred with this moral claim and went further to say that even though aboriginal title had been extinguished, the STI might be entitled to compensation. He also suggested that the lands could not be withdrawn for recreation purposes unless Congress authorized such action. [48]

Faced with these opinions and tribal opposition, the Park Service attempted to reach a compromise on Fort Spokane lands. The agency realized that it might not need all of the 331.31 acres and decided to propose a division of the lands designed to achieve legislative approval. They hoped to secure a water supply for recreation development and in return were willing to offer the Indians a concession there for the sale of arts and crafts. BIA representatives supported this proposal as long as the United States agreed to recognize tribal ownership of the fort lands outside the recreation area. They believed that the Indians might support the settlement once they recognized the advantages of federal money used for recreation development, along with a display for local handicrafts. The STI refused to capitulate, however. At a meeting in April 1952, Council members reiterated that they still were not sure of their rights to the Fort Spokane lands and until this was cleared up, "they could do no horse trading without horses to trade." [49]

Despite this setback, Park Service officials continued unilaterally to make plans for the development of the Fort Spokane lands during the next few years; these plans covered not only the strip of land owned by the Park Service, but also the entire fort grounds administered by the BIA. Their concern increased in 1957 when they discovered that the BIA recently had abandoned the old fort buildings. LARO Superintendent Hugh Peyton pointed out the historical significance of the area and warned that removal of any part would be tragic. He asked the BIA to hold off any disposal until the Park Service could assess the site and its preservation possibilities. Because the public was increasingly interested in historic sites, Peyton believed that tourists to the fort would benefit the reservation's economy. [50]

While the STI was hoping to negotiate an agreement with the Park Service over Fort Spokane lands, some tribal members continued to push for an expansion of their rights on the reservoir. William Kieffer, a Spokane Indian who operated a small gas station on Highway 25, wanted to install a dock with gas pump on the Spokane Arm in 1958. LARO officials discouraged this and viewed the action as an indication that the STI was questioning the Park Service's authority to regulate and administer concessions within the Indian Zones. BIA representatives warned the Park Service that the Spokane Tribal Council was "considerably agitated" by the ruling against Kieffer. They had changed their thinking on Fort Spokane and now wanted to trade these lands for shore lands bordering the Spokane Reservation. LARO Superintendent Homer Robinson referred Kieffer's request to the Field Solicitor who ruled in favor of the Park Service, saying that the 1946 agreement gave the agency sole responsibility for approving and supervising concessions catering to the general public on any site in the recreation area. [51]

Attorneys for the STI issued a lengthy opinion strongly disagreeing with the Solicitor's conclusions. They argued that before construction of the dam, Indians had exclusive rights to license non-Indians for hunting and fishing on reservation lands, and the 1940 Act did not terminate these rights. They also had the right to exclude non-Indians from such activities, and "if the Indians could exclude, they could license." They concluded that Congress did not intend to limit Indian rights further with the 1940 Act since this

The attorneys concluded that the Park Service could neither prohibit nor regulate concessions in the Indian Zones. Although such control would be advantageous, the agency must not trample Indian rights to gain it. The Indians were willing to cooperate and negotiate agreements with the Park Service, but until then, "they resist any attempted abridgments of their rights." Soon after this, tribal representatives met with Department of Interior (DOI) officials, and all agreed to have the Solicitor consider the issues. [53]

Superintendent Homer Robinson downplayed this disagreement, saying that he did not know of any actual plans that Indians had for concessions on the lake. Instead, he believed that they only wanted to establish a policy allowing them to provide services to the general public. Nonetheless, he worried that the Park Service might have to give Indians "preferential contracts to protect them from marginal operations intended only to skim the cream from the available business." [54]

The STI's request for a Solicitor's determination of their rights languished for nearly a year, during which time the Park Service was moving closer to acquiring the Fort Spokane lands from the BIA. A tribal attorney complained about this, saying that the Indians wanted to be part of any recreation plans for the area near their reservation and they hoped to work out an agreement with the Park Service. They were unable to proceed with this, however, without a determination of their rights. Because the STI was so poorly compensated for the loss of their lands, the attorney believed it was only fair for the Park Service to share the economic potential of the new recreation area. When the Solicitor's opinion finally arrived in May 1960, however, once again it went against the tribe. Deputy Solicitor Edmund T. Fritz concurred with the Field Solicitor's 1958 opinion that Indians, "like anyone else," needed to get a Park Service permit before developing or operating public concessions in the Indian Zones. [55]

In the spring of 1960, the Park Service not only prevailed with the Solicitor's office but also acquired the entire 331.31 acres of Fort Spokane. Public Land Order No. 2087 of May 9,1960, revoked the 1882 Executive Order that had established the military reservation, along with the Executive Order of November 17, 1887, that modified the boundaries, and turned the lands over to the jurisdiction of the Park Service "for use as an administrative, museum and historic site in connection with the Coulee Dam National Recreation Area." [56]

The CCT briefly raised the issue of fishing rights in 1963 when a tribal game officer stopped a non-tribal member who was fishing within the Indian Zones without a reservation permit. The officer did not prohibit the man, who had a state fishing license, from fishing, but he told him to purchase a tribal permit and forward the information to the tribe or risk having his case turned over to the U.S. Attorney. When Superintendent Robinson heard about the incident, he asked the Field Solicitor if the tribes had the right to require special permits within the Indian Zones so the Park Service could inform visitors to prevent such misunderstandings. The Solicitor replied that although the BIA required a special permit to fish on any waters within the reservation, he did not believe that it had yet been decided if this applied to the waters of Lake Roosevelt. He thought that this was probably an isolated incident brought on by a tribal game officer who was unclear about his authority. He offered to write an opinion if there were a repeat incident, but the issue remained dormant for several years. [57]

Despite its loss over Fort Spokane lands, the STI continued to push for both definition and expansion of Indian rights at Lake Roosevelt. The tribe hired a consulting firm in 1967 to complete a land-use study of reservation lands, including shore lands. According to the tribal attorney, the consultants needed to know what rights tribal members had to shore lands and if there were additional rights that they could negotiate with the Park Service. Tribal attorney Robert D. Dellwo met with LARO Superintendent David Richie in August 1968 to discuss mutual rights and responsibilities in the freeboard lands within the Indian Zones. During the evidently cordial meeting, they worked out an agreement under which Park Service rangers would issue permits on the spot to tribal members camping on freeboard lands, allowing them to have campfires except when fire danger was high. Dellwo explained that the tribe did not intend to provoke a controversy over Indian rights at this time and instead assumed that the Park Service would recognize these rights and cooperate with the tribe as it went ahead with its plans. The tribe understood "that the best safeguard of its rights is in cooperation and in the ultimate exercise of the tribe's responsibilities in regard to them." [58] Richie responded that he believed that the interests of the Park Service and the tribe were "in essential harmony" and that they would be able to reach mutual understandings. [59]

The issues became more difficult, however, as the STI moved from campfire permits to water rights in 1969. Dellwo complained to Richie that the Park Service had charged tribal member William Wynecoop $25 for a water pump permit to withdraw water from the lake. He believed that tribal members retained the right of free access across freeboard lands to use the water and thus should not be charged. In addition, he warned that such actions were "a real irritant" to both the tribe and the Business Council and should be left dormant until a decision was reached on water rights. [60] Superintendent Wayne Howe compounded the problem two years later when he informed Wynecoop that he needed a pump permit from the Army Corps of Engineers in addition to his Park Service permit. Dellwo complained again that it had been difficult enough for the STI to develop a consensus of operation with both the Park Service and Reclamation, and he believed that it should not be forced to work with the Corps as well. He asked the Corps to reconsider this requirement to avoid a legal confrontation over Spokane tribal water rights at Lake Roosevelt. The STI was concerned that if the Corps had the right to grant permits, it also had authority to refuse them, causing a clash with tribal property rights. Dellwo suggested that the Corps delegate its regulatory authority at Lake Roosevelt to the Park Service. The Corps at first reiterated its authority in this situation but subsequently deferred such permits to the Park Service. [61]

While the debate over permitting Wynecoop's pump was irritating to the STI, the more serious water rights debate centered on a proposed withdrawal for a uranium mill on the reservation. Western Nuclear, Inc., conducted a feasibility study for a processing plant in 1969, which included a daily requirement of 17,500 tons of water or 45,000 acre feet/year, with most coming from Lake Roosevelt. The STI, which was leasing land to the company, argued that there should be no charge for this water since the tribe believed it retained water rights to the Columbia River. Dellwo said that the "unconscionably low" financial compensation paid to the STI in 1940 for lands taken for reservoir construction indicated that the government intended the tribe to be compensated instead with liberal rights, including the same water rights as before the Act of June 29, 1940. [62]

In making his case, Dellwo cited the Winters Doctrine, a precedent quoted in most Indian water rights cases. The doctrine stemmed from a 1906 decision, upheld by the Supreme Court two years later, in a case brought by the government against a group of Montana farmers who had appropriated so much water from the Milk River that there was not enough left for Indian use downstream on the Fort Belknap Reservation. The court ruled that establishment of a reservation implied that sufficient unappropriated water was reserved for the tribe to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was established. These rights began the day the reservation was established and continued in perpetuity. The Indians could use the water in any way that fulfilled the purposes of the reservation, and they could not lose these rights if they did not use the water. Thus, tribal water rights usually superceded those of farmers since the reservations were established before most western waters were appropriated. Despite this powerful precedent, the federal government generally did not assert tribal rights under the Winters Doctrine for over fifty years. The 1963 Arizona v. California case reaffirmed the doctrine, and both the STI and CCT soon recognized its applicability to Lake Roosevelt. [63]

The STI's request drew a mixed response from Reclamation officials. One of them took exception to the tribe's claim that it had not been fairly compensated for lands lost to the reservoir and suggested that it could take its case to the Indian Claims Commission. He noted that these waters, raised "at great expense," were now available for irrigation and were "no longer in or being maintained in their former less advantageous natural state." [64] Grand Coulee Project Manager W. E. Rawlings pointed out that water users were not charged for water withdrawal, and he asked for advice on whether or not to continue this policy. Reclamation Regional Director Harold T. Nelson reassured him that there was plenty of water to meet project needs, and he saw no conflict between Reclamation interests and the proposed mining development. More important to him was the need to avoid application of the Winters Doctrine, which was being invoked at other federal reclamation reservoirs. "We see no need to involve this large-scale battle of 'principles' in this situation," he wrote, since there was plenty of water for both Indian and non-Indian uses. [65]

After Reclamation officials appeared to approve a free water withdrawal for Western Nuclear, the STI upped the ante. In its proposed lease to the mining firm, the tribe included a statement that "the tribe will make no charge for these waters and asks that lessee not make any payment for them to any department or agency of the United States Government or to any one else." This concerned Field Solicitor Paul Lemargie, who believed it might create a precedent that was inconsistent with the views of the Solicitor. [66] Assistant Solicitor J. Lane Morthland met with tribal attorney Dellwo in February 1971, and assured him that there would be no charge for water used by Western Nuclear as long as either the company or the tribe obtained a valid state water right along with a special use permit from the Park Service. But Dellwo informed him that the "Indians do not want to recognize the need for securing a state water right in their own name." Morthland then suggested the alternative - and circuitous - solution of having the tribe work out an agreement with Reclamation for water to irrigate a selected tract of land; once approved, the water could be used by either the tribe or a lessee for uses other than agriculture, at no charge. This "would in effect be a recognition by the Department of a Winters Doctrine right without adjudication," noted Morthland. Dellwo agreed, "provided it would not jeopardize or prejudice the Indians' claim to additional waters under a Winters Doctrine adjudication." [67] Later, however, a Reclamation official granted the STI the right to divert 646 acre feet of water annually, but added that Western Nuclear still would need to get permits from the Park Service and the Corps and pay required fees. It is not known how the STI reacted to this requirement. [68]

While the STI was pursuing its claims with the assistance of tribal attorneys, unrest was starting to sweep through reservations across the country. In Washington, state officials did not recognize many Indian treaty rights and attempted to tightly control Indian fishing. Indians began to protest in the 1950s, staging "fish-ins" on the lower Columbia as a form of civil disobedience. Arrests led to test cases in court and finally to what became known as the Boldt Decision in 1973, in which the federal government represented fourteen tribes in a suit against Washington state, defended by Attorney General Slade Gorton. Judge George H. Boldt ruled in favor of the tribes, saying that they were entitled to half of the catch that migrated through their usual and accustomed fishing sites. This meant that the government had to limit ocean fishing to prevent decimation of river runs. In addition, Boldt affirmed tribal rights to regulate and manage their share of the fishery. [69]

Nationally, the civil rights movement began to resonate with American Indians, especially the younger generation. Discontent increased as spending cuts diminished popular anti-poverty programs that had benefited many young Indians. The American Indian Movement (AIM) formed in Minneapolis in 1968 and urban Indians soon began to rally to the cry of "Red Power!" Three major incidents galvanized Indians across the country and drew worldwide attention to Indian demands. These included the takeover of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay in November 1969; the Trail of Broken Treaties Caravan to Washington, D.C., in 1972 and the subsequent takeover of the Department of the Interior building; and the bloody occupation of Wounded Knee that began in February 1973, lasted seventy-two days, and resulted in the deaths of two Indian men and the paralysis of a federal agent. [70]

During this time, the push for Indian rights at Lake Roosevelt took on an active dimension to counterbalance the previous legal approach. The CCT joined the fray in August 1971 when the tribal council banned all hunting on reservation lands, complaining of trespassing by non-tribal members along with a basic lack of respect shown to tribal members and their lands by these uninvited visitors. CCT Game Officer, Howard "Doodle" Stewart did not favor such a closure but noted, "We are sitting on a powder keg." [71] The hunting ban expanded in November to include the requirement for a tribal fishing license, first for waters within reservation lands and later for Lake Roosevelt. Stewart followed guidelines from the tribal Fish and Wildlife Committee but kept local Park Service officials informed of the changes. LARO Superintendent Wayne R. Howe appreciated the information since he wanted to keep the public informed of the new requirements to avoid inadvertent violations, but he knew that the issue would have to be resolved in court eventually. The Washington Department of Game reacted more vigorously and claimed that the state owned the waters of Lake Roosevelt and thus there was no special license required. The CCT disagreed, however, and believed that all of the waters adjoining the reservation belonged to the tribes. "Let someone else prove they're not [ours]," challenged CCT Chairman Mel Tonasket. He noted that although they would have to fight for their rights, "we're not going to back up any more. We're not going to stop making waves." [72] BIA Superintendent Sherwin Broadhead supported the CCT claim while other officials went so far as to imply that the agency believed that the purchase of Indian lands for the Grand Coulee Dam had been "accomplished illegally." [73] During this time of confusion, Howe appealed for help. "I hope that some statement can be forthcoming from the Director's office or Secretary's office before too long," he wrote, "as this whole thing can get a bit sticky by next summer." [74]

The situation had already become sticky, however, as trouble erupted at Sanpoil campground during the summer of 1971. Apparently a contingent of Indians from outside the area spent time there and hosted loud parties that lasted so late that others no longer enjoyed camping at Sanpoil. Campers had to be evacuated after one incident, which may have involved threats with guns. Prominent CCT members, backed by BIA officials, aired their concerns at a November meeting with Park Service officials. At that time, the CCT expressed interest in taking over operations at Sanpoil campground. Howe agreed that this was possible under the Tri-Party Agreement, and he said he would send any formal request through channels to see if it could be accomplished. [75]

In an effort to stave off further trouble, LARO staff met with members of the Colville Business Council, a CCT Game Officer, and BIA officials in April 1972. Superintendent Howe acknowledged that he wanted to avoid any trouble like the recent Sanpoil campground incidents and he asked for cooperation from the CCT to avoid responding with Park Service law enforcement. CCT members suggested several solutions: turn the campground over to the tribes to run, provide full-time staffing to keep tourists from trespassing on Indian lands, or shut it down. Underlying these suggestions were long-standing grievances, including a belief that the lands had been taken illegally and resentment over exclusion of the tribes from the Tri-Party Agreement. BIA officials supported the CCT claims and fanned the embers of resentment. George Davis, Programs Officer with the BIA, suggested that Sanpoil campground should be closed to see if "we can get the issue hot enough to get it settled." LARO Chief Ranger Paul Larson countered that such an action would generate negative publicity and might "build up so much . . . resentment that you would never be able to take it over." Despite the tensions, the meeting ended on a positive note with discussions about establishing a program of cultural demonstrations. [76]

With the campground controversy still unresolved, the CCT renewed its push for control of fishing by passing an ordinance to require all non-Indians to purchase a tribal license before fishing in waters claimed by the tribes. These included all of the Okanogan River and half of each reservoir, including Lake Roosevelt, bordering the Colville Reservation. Despite the Regional Solicitor's opinion that there was no basis for this action, the CCT threatened to arrest anyone caught fishing without a tribal permit. Local LARO staff felt caught "on the horns of a dilemma: Responsible for keeping the public informed, but unable to sanction, or dispute the issue." [77]

The public did not take kindly to CCT demands. In March 1972, Superintendent Howe warned of the possibility of violence against any tribal game warden who arrested a non-Indian. Some non-Indians felt strongly about what they saw as high-handed actions by the CCT, causing Howe concern that Lake Roosevelt had "the potential of becoming a battleground with the Service in the middle." After CCT's Law and Order Committee asked if the Park Service would allow CCT officers to sell and enforce tribal licenses within the Sanpoil campground, Howe again appealed to the regional office for guidance on ramifications of enforcing tribal law in the Indian Zones and emphasized that he needed answers as soon as possible. [78]

Problems at Sanpoil were not easily resolved, however. Incoming Superintendent William N. Burgen described the campground as a "festering thorn in the side" of both the Park Service and the CCT and he noted that "only close coordination with the Council and mutual respect have prevented an unpleasant showdown at the site." In 1972, the site required three people per day to prevent weekend disturbances, more staffing than any other LARO area. [79] As rumors of tribal takeovers spread to neighboring towns, the Wilbur Chamber of Commerce came out in opposition to control by any ethnic group. The dam, lake, and recreation facilities had been built with taxpayers' money "and the combined efforts of all citizens regardless of race, color, or creed," the Chamber wrote. "By the same token, these facilities should be for the equal and non-discriminatory use of all citizens." [80]

Increasing tension at Lake Roosevelt led Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton to appoint a Task Force to hear tribal complaints and attempt to find solutions for the conflicts plaguing the recreation area and adjoining reservations. Chaired by Emmet E. Willard, Morton's Field Representative in Portland, the Task Force included members of the Colville Business Council and Spokane Tribal Council; tribal attorneys; various specialists from both the Colville and Spokane agencies; local and regional representatives of the Park Service, Reclamation, and BIA; representatives of the Corps of Engineers and Bonneville Power Administration (BPA); specialists with the Department of the Interior; and various Washington state officials.

Task Force members heard about the reality of reservation life from a passionate and angry Mel Tonasket. He described the terrible poverty and 40 percent unemployment rate on the Colville Reservation and wondered why just 5 Indians were employed at the dam with its workforce of nearly 290 people. "The more I talk the more angry I get, because I see my people hungry, I see my people living in shanty houses and I go off reservation and I see new . . . homes going up all over," he said. "I see a white man cry if he only makes $6,000 a year. I could cry everyday." [81]

When the Task Force first convened on February 7, 1972, tribal representatives raised issues of concern, giving agency personnel a chance to hear their grievances. Mel Tonasket, CCT Chairman, touched on many hot-button issues: losses of land, buildings, cemeteries, and fish stemming from reservoir construction; lack of compensation for these losses; and the claim of rights under the Winters Doctrine for the use of Indian waters for power production. He also discussed the frustrating irony that Grand Coulee was built to facilitate irrigation and generate electricity, using Indian land and water, yet the reservations had no irrigation projects and paid high electrical rates. Others mentioned the irritations caused by both the Park Service and the Corps requiring permits for the same project, but LARO Superintendent Howe noted that neither he nor STI attorney Dellwo had been able to change this. Dellwo said that he would like to see the Task Force reevaluate the Tri-Party Agreement and clarify the issue of paramount rights. [82]

When the discussion turned to Indian employment, Howe noted that he had hired two Indians for his permanent staff using excepted appointments, as the BIA had also done. He admitted that this might not be legal but said that Civil Service in Seattle knew of his actions. Willard assured him that DOI officials believed such use of excepted appointments was legal, and Sherwin Broadhead, Superintendent of the Colville Agency, expressed his appreciation for Howe's initiative. [83]

After this first meeting, Willard evidently asked members to submit written questions to help guide the direction of the Task Force. Some dealt with topics brought up in the first session, such as land acquisition and the need to revise the Tri-Party Agreement, while others headed into new areas. Park Service Regional Director John A. Rutter was concerned about jurisdictional issues. What were the implications of the CCT move to require tribal fishing licenses? What were the geographical limits of this tribal authority? What court system would try these cases? Would the tribes honor the established responsibilities of the Park Service and Reclamation within LARO boundaries? Would they allow the Park Service to help with recreation planning on reservation lands that adjoin LARO? Did the tribes honor the original acquisition of Indian lands by the federal government? [84]

The STI, largely quiet at the first Task Force meeting, presented a lengthy formal statement to members of the group in May 1972. Drafted by attorney Dellwo and signed by tribal chairman Alex Sherwood, the document built a case for liberal interpretation of Indian rights, with far-reaching associated rights under the Winters Doctrine. Since the tribe had received so little monetary compensation for lands taken, the "remaining values must be reflected in the rights and property interests the Spokanes still retain in the resulting reservoir area." Specifically, the tribe claimed title to the riverbeds and banks up to the pre-dam average high-water mark, as well as the land between this high-water mark and the 1,290-foot level. In addition, it retained all but exclusive ownership of the freeboard lands between the 1,290 and 1,310 levels. The STI wanted the Indian Zone expanded to include all of the Spokane Arm and the east half of the Columbia River, and it claimed all but exclusive rights to control the use of this area, including regulations, licenses, and permits. The tribe asked for compensation for the loss of the fishery, the original taking of both tribal lands and waters, and the continued use of these for project purposes. In addition, the tribe claimed the right to share revenue from the operations of Grand Coulee Dam. Because of these claimed rights, the STI announced that it would now take over control of water pumps, docks, marinas, concessions, and other commercial enterprises through tribal permits, and that it was considering requiring licenses for boating and fishing in tribal waters. It also planned to take eventual control of all recreation in the Indian Zone, with immediate control of both Pierre and Little Falls campgrounds, by issuing permits and charging for public use. Although these claims ran counter to the 1946 Tri-Party Agreement, the STI claimed no involvement with this agreement and stated, "No Indian leader to this date recalls any tribal approval in 1946, and the instrument itself did not come to light again until recent years." [85] (Despite this claim, both the CCT and STI tribal governments had approved the draft agreement formally in 1946.) [86]

The Task Force hit rougher waters within a few months. The group decided in May to investigate tribal water rights, assisted by William Veeder, an attorney for the BIA specializing in the subject. Both tribes asked the various governmental agencies to outline their jurisdiction and administrative authority prior to a meeting on August 1st. Willard, however, responded that the agencies were just in the stage of compiling facts and were not ready to outline jurisdictions. He consequently recommended postponing the meeting until all were ready to participate. The tribes were unwilling to wait, though, and warned Willard that they planned to continue with the meeting. They believed that Willard was not cooperating in their efforts to define their rights since no definition was possible until the tribes understood where they had jurisdiction. Neither Willard nor representatives from the Park Service, Reclamation, or BPA attended the August 1972 meeting, where much of the discussion involved representatives from the Douglas County Public Utility District and its Monse Dam on the Colville Reservation. Other topics included fishing rights and the importance of establishing boundaries for tribal and agency jurisdiction. Tonasket expressed regret that other agencies did not attend and warned, "There better be some drastic changes or this whole task force is undermined by lack of communication, cooperation, and respect." [87]

Tensions continued at a meeting, outside the Task Force, with CCT committee members, Colville Agency Superintendent Sherwin Broadhead, and LARO Superintendent William Burgen and Chief Ranger Paul Larson. Much of the discussion centered on problems at the Keller campground where children had been shooting birds on nearby reservation lands and campers had been riding bicycles outside boundaries. Tribal representatives believed that the Park Service should control its campers, and tribal member Al Aubertin asked the agency to close the campground. Indian concerns also included the Tri-Party Agreement. When Burgen reminded them, "We are operating under the agreement and you people don't recognize it," Broadhead replied, "If you continue to operate under that agreement you can operate and ignore us." He suggested reexamining the agreement. [88]

Water rights and jurisdictional issues dominated the discussion at the Task Force meeting held on September 19, 1972, in Wellpinit. Indian advocates wanted to clarify tribal rights under the Winters Doctrine, and CCT attorney Alvin Ziontz warned both state and federal officials not to try to regulate water rights issues on reservations. "This is . . . a political struggle," he explained. The tribes found cooperation from Reclamation in their request for help with irrigation projects on the reservations, but they challenged the agency over its taking of Indian lands for both the dam and the reservoir, and its continued takings for slide areas within the project boundaries. They also challenged the BPA to pay the tribes for the use of their water, just as the agency paid Canada. Once again, the Indians claimed title to the river beds and full access across freeboard lands. They believed their jurisdiction included "exclusive access and full control by the Tribes subject only to those elements imperatively required to maintain and operate the project." [89]

The Tri-Party Agreement also came under fire at the September meeting. When Jack Christopher, with Reclamation in Boise, asked if the tribes wanted to reopen the Tri-Party Agreement, William Veeder responded, "Oh, we are trying to destroy that." Christopher, along with Wayne Howe from the Park Service's regional office, indicated willingness to discuss the agreement. Howe acknowledged that it was "a very hard document to work with" because it was out-of-date and thus probably should be redone. [90] Later that fall, Regional Director John A. Rutter reported to the National Park Service Director about the situation at Lake Roosevelt. While there had been no physical confrontations, feelings were still running high on both sides. He warned that confrontations were possible given the recent national incidents connected with the Caravan of Broken Treaties. The tribes were impatient with the glacial pace of the Task Force, while non-Indians believed the Park Service should take things slowly. "We feel that both the Secretary and the Service could be embarrassed if the situation is not addressed promptly," added Rutter. He suggested a revision of the Tri-Party Agreement as a good way to start to resolve the issues, but he noted that any such work should involve legal advice from the Office of the Solicitor as well as input from both LARO and regional office staff. [91]

While the agencies were looking into revision of the basic operating agreement, the STI pursued a strategy of objectives effectively designed to revise the way that the Tri-Party Agreement applied to the Spokane Tribe. These included receipt of revenue from all leasing of freeboard lands; recognition of tribal jurisdiction over all activities in the freeboard area, such as hunting, fishing, and camping, as well as the right to collect revenue from these; and recognition of the tribe as the agency issuing permits in the freeboard area, with no charges made for tribal members. Attorney Dellwo suggested that these jurisdictional questions would be resolved if the Secretary recognized the "all but exclusive ownership" approach to freeboard lands. [92]

R. K. Seely, Bureau Operations Manager at Coulee Dam, disagreed with the STI's requests because of the precedent they might set. For instance, the CCT had sold much of the valuable lands bordering the lake to non-Indians. "To give the Indians any control over the freeboard area would put them between the landowners and the lake," he wrote, "which of course is completely unacceptable to the white landowners." Seely did not believe the tribes should be allowed to keep revenue from freeboard leases since the Park Service had to turn over all the fees it collected. He worried that tribal control of the freeboard area might restrict Reclamation from controlling lands in dangerous slide zones. Furthermore, Seely was concerned that the tribes might restrict non-Indian use of these lands. He concluded by emphasizing the need for Reclamation and/or the Park Service to keep control of the freeboard area. [93]

The STI had an opportunity early in 1973 to take control of some contested ground. When the tribe heard that the Park Service planned to close Little Falls campground, it asked to take over management of the site, popular with tribal members. The Park Service then reversed its decision, claiming that it should keep the campground open since it was so popular and that because it lay within freeboard lands, it was up to the agency to manage the area. The tribe met privately with Reclamation to discuss management of the freeboard area and was encouraged when the agency asked them to submit a management plan. LARO Superintendent Burgen recognized that the tribe was serious about its request and noted, "Our credibility with the Tribe, solidifying or shattering our relationship, is on the block." He recommended getting approval from Reclamation and "political figures" for this transfer and any others, and he outlined how such a deal could take place with revisions in the Tri-Party Agreement. [94]

The Regional Director recommended approval of a special use permit to allow the STI to manage Little Falls campground. Although relations between the Park Service and the tribe were generally good, he warned that "disapproval of this request could easily escalate ill will felt by the Spokane Tribe and radical elements of the Indian Rights Movement into a highly publicized and possibly dangerous confrontation." [95] The Washington office granted approval. Before the transfer was completed, however, the STI angered Burgen by passing a resolution to impose fees for fishing, camping, and picnicking on the Spokane Arm. He told Glenn Galbraith, STI Executive Director, that he would "vehemently object" to such fees for any area, especially Pierre, administered by the Park Service. He noted that once the tribe had taken over management, they could assess fees at Little Falls, but if they tried to do the same at Pierre campground, the Park Service would close the site. [96]

The STI also took its concerns directly to the Secretary of the Interior in June 1973. In addition to jurisdictional control of the freeboard area, the tribe asked for exclusive rights to protect and control archaeological remains; transfer of Fort Spokane, along with the freeboard area on the opposite side of the Spokane Arm, to tribal control; and revenue from both water storage and power production. [97]

At the same time the STI was pushing to expand tribal rights, the CCT also revealed its concerns and objectives. The tribes had given up on the Task Force, called for the dismissal of Emmet Willard, and asked to deal directly with the Secretary of the Interior. Their goals included employment for tribal members at Grand Coulee Dam; preferential power rates for planned development on the reservation; irrigation projects for the reservation; tribal use of freeboard areas; and return of slide areas where there was no danger of slides. They reiterated their claim to a percentage of the power produced at the dam using their water rights and riverbed, as well as the valuable dam site. Finally, they wanted exclusive jurisdiction over hunting, fishing, and boating within the reservation boundaries, and they requested negotiations to phase the Park Service out of the reservation by allowing the CCT to take control of Park Service facilities there. One agency official worried that loss of the campgrounds in the Indian Zones would lead to fragmented administration at Lake Roosevelt, changing it into more of a recreation area for local groups instead of a national area. He noted that over the years since 1946, "many non-Indians have come to feel that this area belongs to all persons." [98]

Activists jumped into the jurisdictional dispute again in the spring of 1973. The Colville Agency issued a special use permit to a CCT member for Barnaby Island, as well as an island to the northwest and a small area of freeboard lands. The BIA did not notify the Park Service of the lease, and the agency discovered it entirely by accident when a maintenance man stopped at Barnaby on April 27 and found two people there. Stephanie Fuller, a Nespelem resident, mentioned possible development of the site and said that both the BIA and Colville Business Council were willing to make it a test case. Paul Larson, LARO Chief Ranger, called the BIA and talked with Bob Jones, who was surprised that the Park Service knew about the lease. Jones admitted that the BIA had approved it in January but had not planned to tell either the Park Service or Reclamation yet. He asked that Larson not tell Reclamation, but Larson refused. Larson then talked with George Davis, Acting Superintendent of the Colville Agency, to protest the BIA action and ask that nothing be done to interfere with public use of the developed site. Davis later told Larson that the CCT was unwilling to wait any longer for clarification of their rights. The BIA supported the tribe's contention that it had a right to these lands. At a subsequent meeting in early May, CCT and local BIA officials continued to challenge Park Service authority and pushed Larson to admit that the Tri-Party Agreement needed revision. Larson said that he hoped nothing would happen on Barnaby Island to provoke an "emotional confrontation" and reiterated the need for continued dialogue to work through differences. Council members, however, said that they would back Fuller in her lease. [99]

In the last six weeks a series of events have taken place within the Colville and Spokane Tribal Councils that makes the management of Coulee Dam National Recreation Area nearly impossible on lands and water adjacent to the two reservations. In effect, the Tribes, who in the past have stated that they consider the Tri-Party Agreement null and void, are now exercising rights that they claim to be virtually exclusive and have taken actions that usurp National Park Service responsibilities and create an uncertain situation for the general public.

-- William N. Burgen, LARO Superintendent, June 7, 1973. [100]

For LARO Superintendent Burgen, things were getting out of hand. In addition to the Barnaby Island incident, the Spokane Business Council passed a resolution claiming all the water surrounding the reservation and extending to the far banks instead of the midpoint of the reservoir. The Park Service had been working on a special use permit to allow the STI to manage the Little Falls campground, but the tribe decided not to sign at the last minute and instead announced that it might start charging visitors to use both Little Falls and Pierre camping areas. In addition, a group of young Spokane Indians who claimed to be starting a cultural area had been given permission from the Tribal Council to bulldoze a launch ramp at the site. Burgen warned the regional office that both the CCT and STI had decided to take control of the Indian Zones and, in the case of the STI, claim even more. "Neither Tribe places any weight on challenges to their right by this office," he continued. "The situation obviously discards the Tri-Party Agreement and with it any workable management of the Indian Zone on our part." Burgen was concerned about the Park Service not having a sufficient response to help visitors who faced potential restrictions by the tribes. [101]

In the midst of this uncertainty, the regional office requested a reexamination of the Tri-Party Agreement. The Washington Office responded that they were unclear just what part of the present agreement seemed unsatisfactory, and they asked for further detailed information and recommendations. The Regional Director had sent information through memos and phone calls to alert the Washington staff to a situation that could become "newsworthy and possibly embarrassing to the Secretary." He assured them, however, that "We feel fully competent to handle it at this level." [102]

Release of the Solicitor's draft "Opinion on the boundary and status of title to certain lands of the Colville Indian Reservation" in the summer of 1973 injected a measure of calm into the situation at Lake Roosevelt. This draft, which ruled that the CCT had the right to regulate and license hunting and fishing in its portion of the Indian Zones, was followed a year later by the Solicitor's opinion that brought an end to the Tri-Party Agreement. On June 3, 1974, Kent Frizzell, DOI Solicitor, reversed much of the 1945 opinion that formed the basis of the 1946 agreement. His key conclusion was that

Thus, in addition to exclusive rights to hunt, fish, and boat in the Indian Zones, the tribes also had the authority to regulate use of the area by others.

The impact of Frizzell's opinion was so profound that Secretary Morton immediately directed that the agencies take all appropriate steps to implement his conclusions, including nullification of the 1946 Tri-Party Agreement and negotiation of a new agreement that included the tribes. Despite this directive, the status of the Tri-Party Agreement was in question for the next sixteen years. The tribes acted as if the agreement had been nullified while the Park Service and Reclamation maintained that the agreement was in effect until replaced by another. The result was years of disagreement, with the tribes probing the limits of the Solicitor's 1974 Opinion and the agencies, especially the Park Service, struggling to find a balance. (One later LARO official, frustrated by years of attempting to make sense of Frizzell's ruling, described the 1974 opinion as "a political decision dressed in legal clothing.") [104]

Efforts to negotiate a new agreement hit a dead end immediately. At a high-level meeting on July 2, 1974, tribal representatives said that they were not prepared to discuss a new agreement at that time, but they assured the other attendees that they would call a meeting when they were ready. Despite the lack of negotiations during 1974, both Reclamation and the Park Service remained anxious to reach a new agreement that winter to facilitate future management of the NRA. [105]

While the agencies hoped that a new agreement would clarify jurisdictional issues, both tribes continued to resist negotiations. When the tribes passed resolutions concerning jurisdiction in the Indian Zones, LARO Superintendent Burgen realized that the councils intended to continue adopting ordinances until they effectively replaced the Tri-Party Agreement. Thus the tribes would assume responsibility over the Indian Zones without negotiating a new agreement with the Park Service or Reclamation, an option essentially available to them under the 1974 opinion. STI attorney Dellwo confirmed this assessment. He believed that while the 1974 opinion was a step forward, it left participants with many unanswered questions. Dellwo discouraged consideration of a new agreement at that point, fearing continual disagreements during negotiations. "The Tribes need a period of testing," he suggested. "What the Tribe is doing is probing the limits of the Solicitor's opinion and implementing it step by step. Each item is a controversy in itself." [106]

The issue of Park Service campgrounds in the Indian Zones was a relatively simple issue to resolve. Because the Solicitor's Opinion came right at the beginning of the summer recreation season, all parties recognized the need to work out temporary solutions for the summer months. At a meeting on June 25, 1974, representatives from both the CCT and STI agreed not to regulate boating, water skiing, or swimming that summer; they discussed permit prices and agreed to recognize both tribal permits; and they came up with a solution for campground operations: the tribes would encourage the Park Service to operate the campgrounds during 1974 only, as long as the agency was willing to recognize the rights of the tribes to assume control of these areas. When the tribes met later with the Park Service, the agency agreed to continue operations in the Indian Zones for the remainder of the recreation season. LARO officials asked about the problem of Indians harassing non-Indians in the parks as well as acts of Indian vandalism, and tribal council members assured the Park Service that they would tell their people that the agency was operating "at the invitation of the Councils" to prevent further incidents. [107] The tribes planned to prepare handouts to inform the public that the Indian Zones were for exclusive Indian use except where permitted by tribes. The actual transfer of the campgrounds to tribal ownership took place in May 1975, after Reclamation and the BIA concurred with the Park Service. [108]

Throughout the next years, the tribes tested a variety of tougher issues as a way of establishing their rights as well as proving their status as equal players at Lake Roosevelt. The CCT viewed its effort to enforce regulations through the tribal court system as a way for it to demonstrate that it was a viable sovereign government that could assert its jurisdiction like other governmental units as well as protect the rights of its members. The STI and the Assistant Regional Solicitor argued late in 1974 about the tribe's need to get permits from the Park Service before operating concessions in the Indian Zone. C. Richard Neely, the government attorney, argued that the area was still under Park Service jurisdiction, as stipulated in the Tri-Party Agreement. He said that the recent opinion gave tribes exclusive rights to hunting, fishing, and boating in the Indian Zones, but not the right to manage the area. STI attorney Dellwo challenged Neely's interpretation of the June 3, 1974, opinion. He claimed that the Solicitor's opinion had confirmed the existence of both exclusive rights and the authority to regulate, and the tribes did not need to wait for a new agreement before implementing these. Neely realized that the tribes essentially were claiming ownership of freeboard lands, with no intention of negotiating a new agreement. Instead, they planned to "assert what jurisdiction they wish to take, which will leave the balance of the management for the freeboard lands under a cloud of uncertainty," he claimed. He believed that these circumstances made it nearly impossible for the Park Service to manage the shore lands adjacent to both reservations. [109]

Codification of tribal policies began early in 1975 when the STI, followed later that spring by the CCT, passed nearly identical resolutions pertaining to hunting, fishing, and camping in the Indian Zones. While the STI believed that it would eventually have exclusive jurisdiction over an enlarged Indian Zone, they chose to move forward slowly and carefully, continuing to work with the Park Service and other federal agencies in areas where the tribe was not yet ready to assume jurisdiction. Under the resolution, tribal permits were needed for camping, picnicking, and fishing, although additional shoreline areas would be set aside for casual picnicking with no permit needed. The tribes took exclusive jurisdiction and control over Indian boaters within the Indian Zones but acknowledged concurrent jurisdiction with the Coast Guard, Park Service, and the state over non-Indian boaters. In addition, the tribes took exclusive jurisdiction over permits for concessions, docks, pumps, and other structures in the Indian Zones. They assumed control of Park Service campsites in their areas and set these aside for use by non-tribal members, but they also designated certain other areas for the exclusive use of Indians. [110]

LARO Superintendent William Burgen seemed wary of these changes and their implications. He wondered what the tribes meant by suggesting that the Indian Zones be enlarged. He pointed out that they could not have it both ways on jurisdictional issues. If the tribes indeed had exclusive jurisdiction in the Indian Zones, then they had to accept responsibility for these areas since no other agency had a legal right to operate there. As the tribes moved to take control of Park Service campgrounds, he grumbled, "It would be nice if they could at least ask that we relinquish our delegated responsibility." He saw a number of problems with the proposed resolutions and asked the regional office to respond soon because silence could be construed by the tribes as acceptance of their terms. [111]

After the initial flurry of activity, the tribes and agencies settled down to work within the tenuous balance developed at Lake Roosevelt. There was no suggestion of restarting negotiations for a new agreement until the Park Service drafted its General Management Plan (GMP) in 1979 and sent it out for review. After receiving comments from the CCT, Superintendent William Dunmire met with the tribal Fish & Game Committee where the discussion centered on the need for greater cooperation, especially in law enforcement. Several committee members recommended beginning negotiations for a new agreement, and Dunmire promised to pass on their interest to Reclamation, the lead agency. Within a few weeks, an attorney for the CCT called Dunmire to discuss the GMP and to notify him that the CCT was preparing to ask the Secretary of the Interior to restart negotiations on the Tri-Party Agreement, with the tribes to be a formal signatory party. He also planned to request that the GMP not be implemented until the agreement was finalized, but it is not known if he asked for this delay. [112]

Despite the CCT's renewed interest in negotiations, the Tri-Party Agreement remained unchanged and the GMP went into effect as planned. The CCT did not put out feelers again until late in 1984 when tribal attorney Alan C. Stay asked LARO Superintendent Gary Kuiper what the Park Service would like to see in an agreement between the agency and the tribes. Kuiper expressed interest in having some functions returned to the Park Service, such as administration of campgrounds and all special use permits in the Indian Zones, as well as safety patrols for the entire reservoir. In addition, he wanted consistent administration of recreation and shoreline development around the entire lake, with extensive areas remaining undeveloped; he supported public boating and camping in the Indian Zones while still maintaining recognized Indian rights; and he was concerned with protection of archaeological and historical sites. While the tribes were not willing to cede any control over the Indian Zones, they did express interest in working with the Park Service to develop standards for selection of recreational sites; consulting with the agency over special use permits; instituting joint law enforcement efforts; and finding ways to use Park Service personnel and expertise to help the tribes manage their parks. Attorney Stay suggested that the tribes should negotiate with the Park Service while also starting negotiations with Reclamation over the return of all freeboard lands, hoping to put pressure on the agencies to reach an acceptable agreement. [113]

Meanwhile, the Park Service was exploring a variety of options to resolve the long-standing uncertainty at LARO. At a high-level meeting in January 1985, National Park Service Deputy Director Mary Lou Grier met with Reclamation officials to discuss management options for the recreation areas operated jointly by the two agencies. Grier asked Reclamation for help in determining the feasibility of having either state or local recreation agencies take over the management functions currently handled by the Park Service at three areas: LARO, Curecanti NRA, and Lake Meredith on the Canadian River Project. Superintendent Kuiper had other ideas, with his preference being legislation authorizing Park Service operations at Lake Roosevelt. This seemed unlikely, however, given the current political climate, so he recommended instead negotiation of a five-party agreement to include the tribes. Failing this, the Park Service could always negotiate a separate agreement with Reclamation to manage all the freeboard lands outside the Indian Zones. [114]

Actual negotiations for a multi-party agreement began October 30, 1985, following an invitation from Reclamation. Both tribes sent delegations, as did the BIA, Reclamation and the Park Service; the LARO team included Superintendent Kuiper and Assistant Superintendent Kelly Cash. At the first meeting, representatives agreed on procedural matters and briefly probed into potential issues including Park Service funding for tribal campgrounds, tribal management of the entire recreation area, and lake-level fluctuations. The mood soured by the second meeting when both tribal and BIA representatives expressed displeasure with the Park Service, claiming that the agency did nothing in the Indian Zones and allowed Indians no input in its operations. Cash reminded participants that, following the 1974 Opinion, the tribes had asked LARO to cease all activities on the Indian side of the lake and the Park Service had respected this request. Unmollified, one tribal member suggested working on a four-party agreement "because we don't need the National Park Service." On a more positive note, both agencies expressed interest in the issue of Indian preference for jobs at LARO. [115]

Following the meeting, George M. Davis, Superintendent of the Colville Agency, elaborated on the expressed tribal concerns. He reminded both Reclamation and the Park Service that they shared trust responsibilities with the BIA for the trust assets of tribal lands and resources, and he accused them of overlooking these. Jobs were an important issue, and with unemployment running as high as 70 percent on the Colville Reservation, Indian preference was vital to the tribes. They also were concerned about the damaging effect of the annual drawdown on archaeological resources and were upset that the agencies gave visitors no information about Indians living next to the NRA. [116]

The CCT provided a focus for the negotiations when it set out a list of seven principles in January 1986 and asked Reclamation and the Park Service to respond. These included 1) adoption of Indian preference in hiring policies; 2) acceptance of the tribes' exclusive rights to manage and control development in the Indian Zones, with the right to be included in operations and maintenance funding from the federal government; 3) recognition that development in the non-Indian areas of Lake Roosevelt affects the reservations and thus must be subject to tribal concurrence and/or input; 4) restrictions on development outside the Indian Zones that would limit the ability of tribes to develop recreation on the reservations; 5) agreement from Reclamation to consider alternatives to having the Park Service manage recreation at Lake Roosevelt; 6) agreement from both Reclamation and the Park Service that tribes would have equal voice in any new agreement; and 7) agreement to work together on concessions management and shoreline management plans that would identify particular Indian lands suitable for recreational development. [117]

Little progress was made on any of these issues at the January 1986 negotiations, and following the March session the tribes called a halt to any future meetings. While they wanted to keep doors open at the local and regional levels, they believed they needed to take their case to Washington, D.C. Despite this withdrawal, all three federal agencies followed up on the issue of Indian preference. Research by the Park Service's regional office found that the agency's system of hiring and promotion, with the need for career status, formed a barrier for minorities, especially since seasonal positions did not carry career status. The BIA, under the authority of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, was the only agency allowed to exercise Indian Preference Hiring Authority, so the Park Service came up with a plan of its own to increase Indian employment at LARO. The agency committed itself to developing a new Affirmative Action Plan that would include seasonal employees and meaningful goals based on the local population of Indians. The staff would work with local Indian organizations to help those interested in applying for work, and the Superintendent or his designee would review and approve all seasonal hiring to ensure that goals were met. In addition, the regional office looked into other non-competitive hiring authorities, such as Vietnam Era Veteran, Contiguous Area, and Summer Aid, that might be used to hire Indians. The Park Service also agreed to work with the BIA to provide training programs to help Indians qualify for Park Service jobs, and it promised to consider using non-competitive hiring authorities to find qualified American Indians for permanent positions before filling them with normal merit promotion. [118]

The agencies also considered using Excepted Service Appointing Authority to provide Indian preference. The BIA was convinced that this could be used by Reclamation and the Park Service for any position "directly and primarily related to the providing of service to Indians." [119] The Park Service asked permission to use this authority and worked out a formula, based on estimated number of Indian visits to LARO, to justify three seasonals for six pay periods each, hired under this special authority. "This request is particularly critical to the situation here in the Grand Coulee Dam area where the nearby Indian tribes suffer from acute unemployment," wrote Acting Regional Director, William J. Briggle in 1986. [120] The BIA encouraged the Park Service on the hiring issue, adding that tribal members would be a valuable asset to the agency in dealing with the public at the NRA. Reclamation, however, did not see how it could use the Excepted Service Appointing Authority since there were no positions at Grand Coulee that pertained strictly to service to Indians. Its workforce at the dam was already 6.6 percent Indian, and the agency aggressively advertised any openings with the BIA and the tribes. [121]

While there was virtually no progress toward a new agreement, the Park Service and the tribes did begin work on a Concession Management Plan (CMP) in 1986. Park Service officials saw negotiations for the CMP as helping to pave the way for the final approval of the new agreement governing overall management of Lake Roosevelt. The agency delayed the start of the CMP process to allow inclusion of the tribes as co-producers of the document, beyond the normal consultation role under the National Environmental Policy Act. By early 1987, two LARO concessions were tribally owned and operated, and the tribes were working jointly with the agency on the lakewide CMP that they hoped would be "a model for cooperation on the reservoir." [122]

Negotiations for a new management agreement remained on hold at the local level as the tribes took their case to the Secretary of the Interior. In mid-1987, Regional Director Charles Odegaard noted that the tribes were trying to negotiate unilaterally to reach an agreement that would be binding on both Reclamation and the Park Service, and he asked that the agency be allowed to participate in anything that might affect Park Service operations at Lake Roosevelt. Odegaard and others had good reason for concern since the agreement proposed by the tribes greatly reduced Park Service influence. They recommended that five parties manage the lake, with Reclamation having jurisdiction over the Reclamation Zone, the Park Service over the Recreation Zone, and the tribes over the Reservation Zone. All five parties would participate on a coordinating committee to manage the area, but only Reclamation and the tribes would be allowed to vote. The tribes would receive 100 percent of all fees collected in the Reservation Zone, supplemented by one-third of the fees from the other zones. The Park Service would work with the tribes to manage recreation; Indian preference would be required; and archaeological resources would receive special protection. [123]

The Park Service, needless to say, took a dim view of the proposed 1987 agreement that allowed the tribes to dictate future management at Lake Roosevelt since they would have a two-to-one voting majority. The agency believed that the funding proposal had no basis "in law or logic." More importantly, one Park Service official objected to the power given the coordinating committee, which could even vote to "reduce the authority of the NPS to administer any and all phases of its recreation responsibilities on the lake. This is preposterous!" The Park Service believed that such a committee should have no power of its own and should only advise signatory parties of interpretations of the basic agreement. Instead, "the 'power' should be vested in the agreement itself which should clearly outline the role and function of each entity." [124] The Solicitor's Office also found fault with the tribal proposal, noting that exclusive tribal rights did not include matters of policy and management that legally remained the responsibility of the Secretary. Committees could advise but not implement policy. In addition, user fees by law had to go into the Land and Water Conservation Fund while concession fees went to the government; thus none could go directly to the tribes. Besides these legal problems, the Park Service believed that non-Indians opposed what they perceived as an Indian "takeover" of parts of Lake Roosevelt. [125]

The tribes remained encouraged by the process, which included a working committee of three Assistant Secretaries to help resolve certain policy concerns. Among these were the acceptance of the tribes as co-managers at Lake Roosevelt, with funding to carry out all management responsibilities; implementation of Indian preference with Reclamation and the Park Service; return of archaeological and historical resources to the tribes, who would participate substantially in any future cultural resources management; return of all lands taken for the project but no longer needed; and mitigation of fish and wildlife losses. [126]

The agencies were asked to respond to these issues when negotiations reopened in November 1987. The Park Service took a hard line against the tribal demands and argued against designating the tribes as co-managers. It wanted tribal rights limited to those specifically outlined in the 1940 Act and applied to only 25 percent of the reservoir water and freeboard lands instead of the more than 40 percent claimed by the tribes. The Park Service believed that all management responsibilities rested with the Secretary, not the tribes, but if they were able to conclude a successful management agreement, Congress might provide funding to the tribes through the normal budgetary process. Neither the Park Service nor Reclamation believed that they were required to give Indian preference in hiring, although the Park Service continued "to aggressively seek equal opportunities in the job market." [127]

The BIA, on the other hand, supported tribal claims. In a strong statement, one official urged the DOI to negotiate a new management agreement that included the tribes "as resource co-managers . . . consistent with the Tribes' governmental and proprietary interests in Lake Roosevelt resources." She warned that failure to do this would essentially revoke the 1974 mandate to negotiate a new management agreement that included the tribes. She offered to have the BIA work with the other agencies to revise and implement affirmative action plans in relation to local tribes, in addition to providing technical job placement help to the tribes. Such actions could, she suggested, satisfy the tribes' Indian preference objectives in addition to helping the agencies meet their federal minority hiring obligations. [128] Locally, the Colville Agency Superintendent urged the Park Service to share funding with the tribes and encouraged the agency to contract with the tribes in FY1988 for services in the Indian Zones. [129]

The tribes began gaining ground in the negotiation process. Park Service officials hoped to keep Reclamation in charge of the working committee and worried that the BIA was trying to take over leadership. Their concerns were well founded because early in 1988, Patricia Keyes, from the BIA, was appointed to facilitate negotiations as a representative of the Secretary and all three Assistant Secretaries. She met with the tribes briefly in March and then spent five days in May for intensive government-to-government meetings with them. During this period, she held two breakfast meetings with LARO representatives but did not discuss Park Service concerns about the new agreement. At the end of her May visit, Keyes was pleased with the results and suggested that a new agreement would be finalized in July. Shortly after this, Keyes dropped out of the complex negotiating process. [130]

When negotiations did not proceed as rapidly as Keyes had predicted, the tribes asked Congress to step into the fray by including a requirement in the House Appropriations Bill that the Secretary of the Interior provide a progress report explaining the lack of agreement after nearly fifteen years of negotiations. The Park Service was concerned that the language in the bill used the 1974 Solicitor's Opinion as the basis for agreement, despite subsequent case law that invalidated many key conclusions of the opinion. This would provide credibility for Indian claims to 45 percent of the NRA lands and waters, all of which lay within the original reservation boundaries. The bill was modified, at the request of the Park Service, so that it merely require a new agreement along with a progress report. [131]

The final round of meetings began late in 1988 and continued for a year and a half until the new agreement was signed. While many of the issues, such as disagreement over the size and jurisdiction of the Indian Zones, had been concerns since the start of negotiations, this time the tribes and agencies were able to compromise enough to reach a final agreement. Many of the meetings took place in Washington, D.C., with a DOI official as chairman. The other members of the negotiating team were from the regional level of government, joined by the chairmen of the tribal councils. [132]

Three individuals worked to resolve the contentious issues for the Park Service and the tribes, resulting in the preparation of a final agreement. Alan Stay, CCT attorney, wrote the final document with recommendations from John Rydzik, a local BIA official (who had formerly worked for the CCT and retained their trust), and Kelly Cash, LARO's negotiator. The collaboration of these individuals in fine tuning the language resulted in a document that could be sent to Washington, D.C., for final approval. [133]

Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan, Jr., signed the Lake Roosevelt Cooperative Management Agreement on April 5, 1990. The agreement addressed many concerns raised by the tribes for several decades: reservation boundaries had not been changed by acquisition of lands for Grand Coulee Dam, and the tribes retained "certain governmental authority and responsibility" within these exterior boundaries; the tribes retained the right to exercise governmental authority within their reservations; and the tribes could assert regulatory authority over issues such as fish and wildlife, recreation, and cultural resources on their reservation lands. In addition, the agreement recognized the tribal argument that development in one part of the reservoir affected areas and/or cultural resources in other areas. The Park Service also scored an important victory with the official recognition in the agreement of LARO as an existing unit of the National Park system. [134]

Members of the Negotiating Team, who approved the agreement before sending it to the Secretary of the Interior for signing, included: Chairman William A. Sinclair, DOI; John W. Keys, III, Reclamation Regional Director; Lawrence E. Cox, DOI Regional Solicitor; William J. Briggle, NPS Deputy Regional Director; Stanley M. Speaks, BIA Area Director; Jude C. Stensgar, Chairperson, Colville Business Council; and Joe V. Flett, Chairperson, Spokane Tribal Council. [135]

The five parties to the agreement, all referred to as "governmental parties," included the Park Service, Reclamation, BIA, CCT, and STI. The agreement allowed these parties to coordinate management of the lake and surrounding federal lands, identified in the agreement as the Lake Roosevelt Management Area, "and to plan and develop facilities and activities on Lake Roosevelt and its freeboard lands." Like the Tri-Party Agreement, this one divided the reservoir area into three zones: Reclamation, Recreation, and Reservation. As before, Reclamation was given management responsibilities for the Reclamation Zone and the Park Service for the Recreation Zone. Unlike the earlier agreement, however, the Reservation Zone was turned over to the tribes for management, with each tribe responsible for its own reservation lands and the BIA available for assistance. The agreement called for periodic meetings to coordinate management activities and an annual meeting to monitor compliance. In addition, it set up a process to resolve disputes among the parties. The Park Service and the tribes agreed to "review, coordinate, communicate and standardize the management plans, regulations and policies" and permits to provide uniform management. Although the National Environmental Policy Act already required federal agencies to accept public input on planned activities, the parties placated other governmental entities by acknowledging the need to take comments from state and local governments as well as citizens' groups and individuals. [136]

The parties reached compromise on the issue of funding, agreeing to share budget, cost, and technical information. Each party, however, was responsible for securing funding for its own management responsibilities. In the event that extra funds became available, the agencies pledged to make "an equitable portion" available to the tribes for their compliance work. While the agencies did not agree to implement an Indian preference for employment, they did agree to notify the tribes of opportunities to contract with the agencies for projects or services. [137]

This Agreement is a significant milestone indicating a recognition by the Federal government that the Colville and Spokane Tribes are equal partners in the management of Lake Roosevelt. This type of government-to-government relationship will be beneficial for all citizens whether living in the area or visiting it for the many recreational opportunities that Lake Roosevelt offers.

-- Jude C. Stensgar, Chairman, Colville Business Council, April 4, 1990 [138]

The agreement also addressed cultural resources. This issue was so important to the tribes that the team drafting the new agreement recognized that most points were not open to negotiation. Under the Cooperative Management Agreement, all parties agreed to develop a Cultural Resources Management Plan to identify and protect resources, as well as develop a procedure for returning artifacts, removed under governmental authority, to the tribes for curation. The federal agencies also agreed to notify and consult with the tribes while planning "any survey, monitoring, or removal of Indian Resources" from the reservoir lands. In addition, the tribes would have the chance to participate and/or undertake these activities themselves. [139]

A local ceremony celebrated the new agreement. Jude C. Stensgar, CCT Chairman, invited Superintendent Gary Kuiper to a signing ceremony on April 20, 1990 - Earth Day - at Grand Coulee Dam. Stensgar praised the agreement that recognized both the CCT and STI as equal management partners at Lake Roosevelt. He believed that all citizens, both local residents and visitors, would benefit from the government-to-government relationship established by the agreement. Close to two hundred people attended the ceremony, which featured Indian drumming, dancing, and singing. [140]

Years of hard work by dozens of federal and tribal officials finally reached fruition with the signing of the Lake Roosevelt Cooperative Management Agreement, also known as the Multi-Party Agreement. The end of negotiations finally freed LARO staff to carry out other responsibilities at Lake Roosevelt. The Multi-Party Agreement has not resolved all issues at the NRA, of course. During ten years of operating under its provisions, the parties have worked through many jurisdictional and management concerns, with no legal challenge to the agreement. A few disagreements, such as jurisdiction over the south half of the Spokane Arm, remain unresolved. Still other issues, such as cultural resources management, pose continuing challenges. The five parties are equal partners now, each with its own management responsibilities. The action of one affects the others, and the coming years will further test how well they work together to manage the varied resources of Lake Roosevelt.