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The Land We Cared For... A History of the Forest Service's Eastern Region |
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CHAPTER IX
THE WAR YEARS
On December 8th, 1941, the entire staff of the Regional Office in Milwaukee gathered around radios to listen to President Franklin D. Roosevelt ask Congress for a Declaration of War against Japan. The mood was grim. The people of the Region were asking themselves what they could do in the War effort. They understood that their role, in the words of the Daily Contact, was "not the kind to inspire rhetorical enthusiasm." What they could do was buy War Bonds and Stamps, do a full day's work and then some, save equipment and supplies, eliminate careless waste, and find some niche in the civilian defense programs. It did not seem like much when American soldiers and sailors were dying and coastal cities were preparing for air attacks, but that seemed to be all the more reason to work hard and sacrifice willingly. [1]
Reorganization for War
The programs of Regions 7 and 9 were completely reorganized to meet the needs of the War. Only those jobs of importance to the War were continued. The National Forests had to keep up their regular protection against forest fire and at the same time rapidly increase production of wood and minerals. This meant longer hours and greater effort by all personnel. Every office in the Regional headquarters and every unit in the field were engaged in the War effort. [2]
The Unit of War Activities
In January of 1942, Region 7 Regional Forester Robie M. Evans set up a Unit of War Activities within the Region. The purpose was to coordinate War activities and work with the Army and Navy. The Unit handled contacts with the military and analyzed new projects presented by the Armed Forces to determine how to best accomplish them. An example of one of the projects was the on-going program of cooperation between the Region and the Army and Navy in forest fire prevention. The Secretary of War requested in August of 1942 that the Forest Service undertake the protection of critical military areas which might be endangered by forest fires. Emergency funds for this program were made available under the Sixth National Defense Appropriation Act and the Clarke-McNary Act. Some of the money was earmarked for protection of the National Forests; the rest was to go to the states on a matching fund basis. [3] In the Region, the Unit of War Activities cooperated directly with the Army and Navy and with the state foresters to see that the program was implemented. State fire towers with lookouts were organized into a network of volunteer observation posts under the Office of Civilian Defense so that the towers served not only as fire but as aircraft and defense lookouts. The job of the Unit of War Activities was to examine the plans for this system, inspect the facilities, and make fund allocations to the states to support the system.
Particular attention was given to the dimout areas along the eastern seaboard where military leaders were anxious to reduce smoke from forest fires because it silhouetted ships offshore and made them better targets for German U-Boats.
As a part of the coordinated fire control program, the Forest Service responded to a request from the Army to provide instructors to train Army personnel as firefighters. In cooperation with the states, the existing system of forest fire weather stations had been reorganized; many stations had been relocated and new ones built. The Army was vitally interested in improving this system for use in forecasting fire weather.
To support these activities, surplus equipment and tools from the CCC or on loan from the Army were reconditioned by both Regions and loaned to the states so they might build up their fire fighting forces to protect critical areas.
The War Production Board
A vital part of the overall War effort was the War Production Board (WPB). This Board had special wartime powers to organize and regulate many aspects of American business and industry. Regions 9 and 7 made their field forces and technical skills available to the WPB. Forest Service personnel made an annual census of lumber produced and used in manufacturing. They conducted a survey of kiln drying equipment, several surveys on veneer equipment, a survey of sawmill equipment, and estimates on the amount of lumber and logs moved on trucks. The latter was necessary because of a critical shortage of rubber to make truck tires in the early part of the War. [4] Other studies made by the Regions for the WPB included one to determine the status of equipment in the pulp industry and another on labor shortages affecting pulp and lumber production. The Regions also worked on locating lumber supplies and prepared reports on the need for access roads to make the supplies available.
The Office of Price Administration
Another major wartime agency with which the Regions worked was the Office of Price Administration (OPA). This office, as the name implies, controlled prices on just about every economic activity in the country, including wages, rents, consumer prices and services. In order that the OPA might fix and regulate prices on wood products, the Regions provided experts for fact finding task forces to determine the cost of producing fuelwood and pulpwood. Also, from time to time, the Regions advised the OPA on the effects of its price ceilings on production of lumber and pulpwood. [5]
Wartime Timber Production and Sales
The wartime demands for wood were so great that both Regions 7 and 9 stepped up the production from their National Forests to a level which, in the words of Region 7 Regional Forester Robie M. Evans, was "inappropriate in peacetime." According to Ken Sutherland, a retiree from the White Mountain National Forest, the Forest Service "threw out a lot of management principles because the nation needed more wood." [6] Conservation and good forestry practices had to be sacrificed in order to obtain higher production. At the same time, the Regions did everything they could to encourage increased timber production on private lands. One mechanism was the Norris Doxey Farm Forestry Program, a cooperative effort between the state foresters and the state extension services to help farmers find War markets for woodland products and to harvest at unprecedented levels. Both Regions were encouraged that their State and Private Forestry programs seemed to have laid the groundwork for a successful wartime program to increase private timber production. In fact, past efforts of the State and Private Forestry personnel to educate farmers and woodlands owners in the need for conservation and good forestry had been so successful that the program to increase production was met with strong resistance until the landowners were convinced that the emergency cutting would be done with good forestry practices. [7]
Because of the increased demand for lumber and pulpwood during the War, the Superior National Forest rapidly stepped up its sales. New contracts to cut and process lumber and pulpwood were awarded to several private companies. The Tomahawk Craft Paper Company of Tomahawk, Wisconsin, received a ten-year contract covering approximately 250,000 cords of pulpwood, mostly jack pine. The K.B. Tomlinson Company received a contract for 22,000 cords of pulpwood plus 35,000 tiebolts. Enormous quantities of pulpwood needed to be harvested because it was over-mature. About one-third of all of the jack pine in the Lake States was growing on the Superior along with about one-fifth of all of the spruce. [8]
On the Chequamegon National Forest, the War years for the forests were a time for waiting. "These were the custodial years when the forests were safeguarded from fire and the stealing of timber, but little else." Some logging continued as long as there was any birch because birch veneer was valuable in the manufacture of war planes. [9]
New England Hurricane
The excessive demands on timber resources caused by the War were exacerbated by circumstances in New England. A terrible hurricane in 1938 blew down much timber and caused much breakage. The Forest Service went to work immediately in the effort to salvage the damaged timber and reduce the increased fire hazard caused by the downed trees. Then came the War and the heavy demand on the remaining stands of timber. In New Hampshire, the cutting of white pine in 1943—320 million board feet, some from the 1938 hurricane salvage— was the heaviest of any state. Pulpwood harvesting was also unusually high. The State Forester of New Hampshire estimated that the emergency cutting plus fire, insect, disease, and ice losses during the years 1941 to 1946 averaged 1.3 million cords per year compared to an annual growth of 900,000 cords.
On the positive side, landowners in New Hampshire were showing increased interest in forestry practices, and by 1946 there were definite signs that the forests of New Hampshire were on the way to recovery from the losses sustained in the hurricane and during the War. The recovery was largely attributable to natural recuperative powers of the forests since there had been no replanting programs on the scale of those before the War. [10]
Timber Sales
Despite stepped up sales, nation-wide timber sales by the Forest Service in 1943 do not seem really large today, at least in dollar values. The total for all Regions was $3,232,123, which was twice as much as the year before. The biggest producer was the Pacific Northwest's Region 6, which accounted for more than half of the receipts. The lowest was Alaska's Region 10 with about $68,000; Region 7 was next lowest with $88,802. Then came Region 9 with $92,314. [11]
Stimulating Timber Production for the War Effort
Timber Production War Program
In early 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the War Production Board to initiate a program to stimulate lagging production of lumber and other forest products which were badly needed for the War and essential civilian uses. Regions 7, 8, and 9 of the Forest Service were involved. Unlike other products where the problem was a shortage of raw materials, there was plenty of wood to be harvested. The problem was a shortage of labor in the sawmills and wood products plants. This was especially true with the small mill operations, sometimes called "popgun," "peckerwood," or "pony" mills.
Thousands of these small sawmill operations were located on farms and in back-country areas out of touch with the War Production Board and other federal agencies. To reach them the President approved the new program to be administered by the Forest Service. It was to be called the Timber Production War Program (TPWP) and always spoken of in the Forest Service by the catchy nickname of "TeePeeWeePee." The purpose was to contact the small operators and encourage them to greater production. Field expediters would carry the word and also supply local producers directly with the specific types of forest products which were most critically needed. They would assist in making firm contracts for the output of logs and lumber. This enabled the producers to secure adequate financing through private sources. Just as important they would assist producers in the complicated procurement procedures for government purchase of war material. The "red tape" of government procurement had been a real discouragement to many small producers. The TPWP program was designed to alleviate some of the problems. The expediters were to help find markets for mills which did not have one, plus give technical guidance to the mills in the efficient use of available manpower and facilities.
One expediter named Harry Croke visited a sawmill near Cape Girardeau, Missouri, close to the Clark National Forest. While talking to the owner, Croke noticed that many of the mill workers went into a tavern across the street for lunch from the mill and did not come back to work. Croke told the mill owner, who had reported high absenteeism. "That tavern over there is your problem." The owner said, "I'll fix that," and stalked across the street into the tavern. When the owner came back he had the deed to the tavern in his pocket. Croke assumed that lunch hours would be much shorter in the future. [12]
The Forest Service believed there was plenty of wood to be harvested. The heart of the problem would be in reaching the farmers and landowners who had timber to be harvested. The work of the field expediter gradually converted to that of the farm forester, that is, working with the landowners to encourage production. But true to its basic beliefs, the Forest Service was determined that even though there was great need for forest products, there would be no destructive forestry practices. [13]
Regions 7, 8 and 9 were asked by the WPB to act as agents for the federal government in achieving the goals of the project. This primary responsibility could not be delegated, so the Forest Service set up a new organizational structure. Accordingly, the three Forest Service Regions were divided into Districts. Each was headed by a District Forester who was a Forest Service employee. Under the District Forester were the farm foresters, one for each county. The Farm Forestry Program which provided the county farm foresters developed first earlier under state administration. The foresters were paid half by the federal government and half by the state. [14]
Each of the National Forests was to cooperate fully with the goals of the TPWP—increase the production of saw and veneer logs. To insure cooperation, each Forest Supervisor was required to make a quarterly accomplishment report to the WPB. The reports not only covered log production but the status and availability of labor, absenteeism, production, effectiveness of special wartime programs such as manpower controls, the status of Prisoner of War Camps on the National Forest, status of equipment and stumpage, and black market lumber activities. The reports required that a dollar value be put on the effort being made in each major area, probably so the reports could be evaluated by higher headquarters. [15]
TPWP Crusaders
Part of the TPWP program was a public relations campaign in forest areas known within the Forest Service as "showboats." The purpose was to convince local lumbermen, businessmen, and economic and civic leaders to do everything possible to increase forest production. To carry on this job, Region 9 chose two War heroes who were former employees and who had just returned to work for the Forest Service. The idea was that such men could draw crowds and command respect.
One of the TPWP crusaders O. B. (Obbie) Obbhoff was a Marine Corps veteran recently returned from the fighting at Guadalcanal. He drew large crowds at public and civic club meetings. He told about his War experiences and then gave them the TPWP message which was to do everything they could to increase timber production. Farmers were instructed to bring their timber to market and where the markets were. In less than a year, "Obbie" covered 95 meetings in seven states speaking to nearly 10,000 people.
The TPWP traveling show man in Upper Michigan was Cliff Davis. Like other men who did the same job, Davis was a veteran who had seen much action. The District Rangers set up meetings with local civic and lumber industry leaders. Davis spoke about his War experiences, and then made his pitch for the TeePeeWeePee program. Several of the Rangers reported to the Regional Office that Davis' meetings were receiving a favorable reaction. [16] Similar work was carried on by two other recently returned combat veterans. Curley Brooks worked in Minnesota, and Dudley Brice covered the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. They reported increases in production in their areas as a result of their meetings.
There was one problem which was "a tough nut to crack"—absenteeism by loggers in the northern logging camps. Many of these workers were transients and people with few if any family ties. They seldom stayed on one job very long, and they were absent from work whenever they felt like it. Social pressures and the urgings of War heroes meant little to them. [17]
Overall, the TPWP crusaders seem to have done a good job. District Rangers reported to the Regional Office that inquiries reaching their offices about private timber sales had increased dramatically. One Ranger making such a report was Jack Horner, the ever-active District Ranger of the Washburn District on the Chequamegon National Forest. [18] As part of the TPWP the Division of Information and Education of the Regional Office produced a film with the catchy title of "On Felling and Bucking." The idea was to portray to the novice farmer or woodlot owner the proper use of the axe and saw. The film was made near Laona, Wisconsin in the heart of the Nicolet National Forest. [19]
Market Developments
Part of the job of those who worked in the TPWP was to report on market developments. In late 1943, "Obbie" Obhoff reported on a contact in Kirksville, Missouri, with the National Biscuit Company. An official of the Company had told Obhoff that the shortage of cartons for cookies and crackers had become so acute that he had been forced to buy a car load of any kind of paper he could find. The Company had recently bought its own pulpmill because of the paper shortage and was making its own cartons. They were also buying back cartons from merchants for re-use. About 20% of the Company's products were going to supply the Armed Forces. [20]
How's That, Schicklegruber?
At Tomahawk, Wisconsin, the TeePeeWeePee program organized a parade down the main street of the town in October of 1943. In what must have been a vivid wartime scene, the high school bands from Tomahawk and nearby Rhinelander and Merrill marched with flags and stirring martial music. They were followed by mud-splattered trucks loaded with pulpwood and draped with banners which said, "This is not a paper war, but paper will win it." Prizes of "Axe the Axis" War Bonds were offered for the biggest load of pulpwood brought in.
The Region 9 Contact noted with some pride the diversity of the names of the winners of prizes in the Tomahawk pulpwood contest. The names were Polish, German, Swedish, Norwegian Anglo-Saxon and others. The editor of Contact described how one of the winners, a Polish-American named Wallentz T. Kowski, had driven his prize-winning load of pulpwood in the parade with his three-year old son in the truck cab with him. Later he stood on the stand with his son on his arm to receive his prize. "How's that Schicklegruber?" commented the editor, referring to Adolf Hitler's family name. [21]
Cooperative Programs
Under the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 there was a cooperative program funded in part by the federal government to encourage and support state forestry. It was the job of the Division of State Cooperation within each Forest Service Regional Office to supervise and inspect this program. Occasionally, the Chief of the Division of State Forestry in the Washington Office inspected state operations. When he did, he made a report of his inspection to the appropriate Regional Forester. In the summer of 1943, James Fitzwater, Chief of State Forestry of the Washington Office, accompanied by the Regional Forester of Region 7, made such an inspection in Pennsylvania. Joined by the State Forester, the inspection party looked at a number of private woodlots where the owners had been cooperating under the program with the assistance of "farm foresters," who were state employees working in each county. Fitzwater found the state forestry people "enthusiastic about the program." He asked them to make monthly reports on both State and Private Forestry activities. [22]
The State and Private Forestry people of Region 9 achieved what they considered an important victory in a cooperative program when they got the Pioneer Cooperage Company of St. Louis, Missouri, a major timber harvesting company in Missouri, to agree to a selective cutting and continuous forest cropping plan. The emphasis would be on solving the age-old problem of forest fire in the Missouri Ozarks and on improved forestry practices. [23]
In the early 1940's the Cooperative Forest Fire Prevention Campaign was active, promoting its message through the predecessor of Smokey Bear that people were the cause of fires.
Farm Forestry Program
As a part of the effort to increase forest production and in line with the TPWP, Congress passed the "Private Forestry Law" in 1944. The Law arranged for any private woodlot owner who wanted to improve his forestry practices to apply through the county Farm Bureau for assistance from the Farm Forestry program. The Farm Bureau was a private farmer's organization with no official status with the government, but it was very well connected with the Department of Agriculture and the system of county agents. if the local Farm Bureau deemed the application of a land owner to improve his woodland to be legitimate, it was approved. The program gave high priority to land where there was no special fire hazard, where the interest of the owner was high and his ability to cooperate was guaranteed, and where the benefits were valuable from a public relations standpoint. [24]
It must be noted that there was a certain amount of elitism inherent in the Farm Forestry program. The Farm Bureau was well known for being the organization of large and successful farmers. If the Farm Bureau was given control of who received assistance from the Farm Forestry program, the local big farmers who dominated the Farm Bureau would probably see to it that they and their kind would receive the benefits of the program and that poorer and smaller farmers, who were more likely to be members of rival farm organizations, received very little. The curious provision that high priority was to be given to projects that would be valuable from a public relations standpoint can be better understood if one knows that the Department of Agriculture had operated for years on the premise that to be successful, agriculture programs had to be acceptable to the bigger farmers. By the same token, letting the local Farm Bureaus judge whose "interest was high" among the applicants or whose "ability to cooperate was guaranteed" was an invitation to cronyism.
The Forest Service was entering unknown waters, when it went into locally administered assistance programs. Inspection reports and correspondence indicate that Forest Service personnel tried to stay out of local farmer politics. The Service was interested primarily in improved forestry practices and seeing to it that federal funds were reasonably used.
Forest Service Policy on Wartime Production
In December 1943, in a publication called The Agricultural Situation, Chief Lyle F. Watts outlined the wood products needs of the War effort and the contributions already made by the TPWP. He estimated that 1.75 billion board feet of lumber and 3.25 billion square feet of veneer would be needed to pack food and agricultural products in 1944. The timber cut from the National Forests in Fiscal Year 1943 had been 2,359,463,000 board feet, or 83% more production than in 1939. In addition, the Forest Service was doing a "grinding job" of helping thousands of individual farmers and small woods owners get their timber to the mills. Watts was concerned, however, that all of this increased timber cutting was being done unwisely, especially on private lands.
The most pressing problem, according to Chief Watts, was destructive cutting. This needed to be stopped so that the productivity of every forest acre currently bearing or capable of bearing merchantable timber could be maintained or increased. [25] The Chief described how a food growing program on National Forest land called the National Forest Range was making a valuable contribution to the nation's food supply. The Forest Service was also collaborating with the Office of Price Administration, the War Production Board, and other agencies in determining forest products requirements, supplies, and output. He indicated the important role played by the Forest Products Laboratory, Madison, Wisconsin, in designing adequate, efficient, and economical containers and crates, and their work in plastics, plywood and wood chemistry.
Region 9 Field Day on Timber Production
The Regional Office and the Regional Forester of Region 9, apparently concluding that the heavy wartime cutting of state and private forest timber made it necessary for the area foresters of the TPWP to have a refresher course in Forest Service timber production practices, scheduled a field day for all Region 9 area foresters and their assistants. Also present were representatives of the Lake States Forest Experiment Station, Rhinelander, Wisconsin, the Regional Forester, and all of the Regional Office staff concerned with timber production.
The field day was held on a private farm near Milwaukee. The program, conducted by the Regional Office staff, consisted of lumber grading, tree grading, and the method of determining residual timber value by the land owner. After lectures on each topic, everyone went into the woods to grade trees and lumber and to do the timber value calculations. The day ended with a discussion period and then a picnic lunch. [26]
Special Wartime Needs
One wood critical to the War effort was yellow birch, which was needed to make veneer for aircraft (many aircraft, especially gliders, were partly made of plywood during the War). Also in demand was walnut for gunstocks, and hickory for handles. The Regions were aware of such demands and made every effort to meet them.
Black Walnut in the War
Quite a bit of emphasis was put on the production and harvesting of black walnut during the War in the southern forests of Region 9 and Region 7 because the wood was used in making gunstocks. The National Forests involved were the Monongahela, Wayne, Hoosier, Shawnee, Mark Twain, and Clark. [27]
Charcoal Making Revived
Wartime fuel shortages brought about the revival of charcoal making. This had once been an important industry in the hardwood forests of the Ohio Valley and the Ozarks. The industry reached its peak about the time of the Civil War and declined in the decades that followed when coke replaced it as a fuel for furnaces. The usual method was to cut hardwoods in the forest, lay the wood in piles in pits or mounds, and burn it covered with soil. The fuel was used to make the super hot fires needed for blast furnaces and smithing.
Nothing was left of the charcoal industry by 1918, but during World War II it revived. Charcoal was used in the manufacture of rayon, black powder, and munitions of several kinds. As a result, charcoal making operations returned to the Wayne Purchase Unit in 1944. Foresters of the Purchase Unit saw many advantages to this revived industry. The limbs from improvement cutting and thinning could be used to make charcoal. and this had the added bonus of making the remaining trees better candidates for saw logs and veneer stock in the future. The charcoalers could also use the tops and limbs left from logging operations and the side slabs from portable sawmills. [28]
Portable Saw Mills
Wartime need for lumber caused the development of a new type of portable sawmill in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Ohio. The sawmill traveled from farm to farm much in the manner that threshing machines did in these days. The mills could saw an average of 4,000 board feet of lumber in one place, and then be moved in about 30 minutes and set up again in another location. The mill was moved on a trailer which weighed only 2 tons with the mill on it. This made it easier to move into difficult places. [29]
Tires From Dandelions?
In the early stages of World War II a critical problem developed over rubber. The normal source of supply for crude rubber in Southeast Asia had been cut off by Japanese conquests, and rubber was badly needed for tires for military vehicles and many other wartime uses. Because of this situation, the Department of Agriculture was assigned the task of finding other plants capable of producing large amounts of rubber. There were two experimental projects carried on by the Forest Service. One involved the growing of guayule, a shrub which could be grown in the Southwest. The other dealt with kok-saghyz, or Russian dandelion.
Reports from Russia, where over 2 million acres of kok-saghyz had been planted, indicated that the cleaned roots of the plant yielded a milky juice from which rubber could be made. It could be grown in the cooler temperate climates and would yield 150 to 200 pounds of rubber per acre. [30]
In July of 1943 a party of officials from the Washington Office visited the Region 9 Regional Office to confer with Regional Timber Management Chief H. Basil Wales, and the staff concerning the kok-saghyz program. Involved in the conferences were experts in silviculture, plant genetics, forestry, timber management, and others including the Forest Supervisors whose National Forests were to be given the tasks of growing the plants. [31] Earlier, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, several tons of seed had been brought from Russia by airplane to Washington. There, the seeds were examined, repackaged, and sent by plane to 60 prepared test fields in National Forests in the northern states. All of this happened within three weeks because of the urgency of the rubber problem. The seeds went to Chippewa, Chequamegon, and Upper Michigan National Forests. Forest Service workers planted 35 acres at Cass Lake, Minnesota, 10 acres near Butternut, Wisconsin, and 23 acres at Manistique, Michigan. Other plots were planted elsewhere in the Lake States. The plants grew well but ripened unevenly, causing problems in harvesting seed and requiring special machinery. [32]
Later that season, about nine tons of kok-saghyz roots were harvested from the nurseries. On the basis of this program the Department of Agriculture announced that the plant could be grown successfully in the northern tier of states from Vermont to Oregon. The report also found that kok-saghyz required a fertile soil and was especially adaptable to organic soils such as mucks and peats. Average production had been two tons of roots per acre, about what the Russian reports had indicated. The largest harvest was reported from a plot near St. Paul, Minnesota, where four tons per acre was produced. Seed production was satisfactory in the moist soil of the Lake States and with irrigation in Montana and Oregon. The rubber produced by compressing the roots of the kok-saghyz was of high quality, and the amount acquired in 1942 was thought to be sufficient to permit experiments to test the rubber in specific uses. [33]
The optimistic report of the Department of Agriculture concerning kok-saghyz did not lead to a rapid conversion by large numbers of Lake States farmers to cultivation of the plant. It was a labor-intensive product, and the only reason to consider it was the critical shortage of rubber. That shortage was alleviated by discoveries of American scientists who had been working desperately to develop a synthetic rubber. When this was accomplished using petroleum-based compounds, the need for alternate plants quickly diminished. Years later, it became a standard joke among the Forest Service people who had taken part in the kok-saghyz program that all of their efforts had produced only one truck tire. [34]
Christmas In Wartime
At Christmas time in 1941, some of the key people of the North Central Region gave some thought to the importance of Christmas trees. Every year, about 10 million Christmas trees were cut, but the War had put heavy pressure on the use of the balsam fir, Douglas-fir, spruces, cedar, hemlock, and all of the pines—the trees used for Christmas trees. At the same time, the War had cut off the flow of these woods from Scandinavia. The firs were needed in the War for shipping crates, building materials for military camps, veneer wood, mine timbers, railroad ties, silos and tanks, and timber for ship construction. The cedars were needed for posts and poles, ties, and planking for boats and canoes. Hemlock was used for general construction and paper pulp, and the pines were used for just about all purposes from matches to posts, or from pattern making to ship building.
The timber management people of Region 9 predicted the market for Christmas trees for the season in 1941 and asked if this demand threatened the supply of conifers needed for the War effort. They decided that there were enough coniferous trees available to see the United States through a dozen wars—if they were cut wisely. They sent out word throughout the Region that cutting Christmas trees was permissible. The big job of the Forest Service was to see that both America and the spirit of Christmas endured. [35]
Activities Which Had to Wait
Land Purchases
During the War, purchases under the Weeks Act came to a virtual halt. In 1943, the land purchased nationwide amounted to only 8,759 acres. This was the smallest amount acquired by the Forest Service in any year since the program began in 1912. Clearly, in the War years the federal government had more important needs for its money than land purchases.
The peak year for Weeks Act purchases in the North Central Region, Region 9, was 1934. That year, 1,760,489 acres were bought at an average price per acre of $1.97. In 1926, the Region paid the lowest average price per acre—one dollar—for 50,403 acres. The highest average payment was in 1942 when the Region purchased 92,864 acres for $4.08 per acre. As of 1944, the total acreage purchased in Region 9 was 6,280,273 acres at an average price of $2.68 per acre. While all of these prices seem unbelievably low compared to land prices in the 1980's, it must be remembered that the land being purchased in the 1920's, 30's, and 40's was, by the constraints of the Weeks Act, cut-over, denuded, and badly eroded land. [36]
Land Exchange Program
In 1943, the state of Michigan and the Forest Service exchanged lands in Michigan under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act. These lands had been purchased by the Farm Security Administration, a New Deal agency which carried on programs to alleviate farm tenancy. Most of the FSA programs had ended by 1943, so the lands involved were exchanged for certain land utilization project lands in Michigan. The lands received by the Forest Service were added to the Huron, Manistee, Ottawa, Marquette, and Hiawatha National Forests by Presidential Proclamation on August 12, 1943. [37]
Recreation
When World War II began, funds for recreation dried up. Forest Service employees involved in recreation planning, such as Robert L. Clayton on the Hiawatha National Forest, had to leave the Forest Service to find work elsewhere. [38] Even so, recreational use of National Forest facilities increased during the War. Occasionally the job of recreation guard could become violent. A recreation guard at a beach in the Vesuvius Recreation Area, Lillian Armstrong, saw a group of six people on the beach drinking hard liquor, a violation of Forest Service rules. When Armstrong told the party to quit, they ignored her, and when she tried to enforce her order a fight broke out in which she was hit in the back of the head with an iron pipe. A concessionaire at the beach, Carl Malone, came to Armstrong's aid and was hit in the mouth and knocked down. Law enforcement officials were called and they arrested five of the group, one of them having fled from the scene. Neither Armstrong nor Malone were permanently injured. The worst trouble makers of the group were two women who were put in jail. They were sentenced a month later to 30 days in the county jail and a fine of $50 each. [39]
Fire Prevention
Fire prevention was an important part of the Forest Service's War effort. Since wood products were crucial War materials, it was important to prevent forest fires which could do inestimable damage to the source of supply. As it had always been, one of the keys to fire prevention was getting the message to local communities. The North Central Region had a program in 1944 by which the District Rangers and others in the field contacted local newspaper editors to encourage them to make use of page proofs supplied by the Forest Service to run special issues on fire prevention.
The Regional Office was especially pleased when reports came in that special issues had been published in several Missouri and Wisconsin newspapers which were widely read in counties with high proportions of National Forest land and with histories of forest fire problems. Often the newspapers involved were the only ones read in the county. The thinking in the Regional Office was that the program was reaching people who otherwise might not have been reached. These rural people were the ones who could do the most to prevent forest fires. [40]
Cooperative Fire Fighting
With the help of the state foresters, the Forest Service directed a public forest fire prevention campaign consisting mostly of posters and printed matter distributed throughout the Regions. It also took part in the organization of the Forest Fire Fighters Service, which gave assistance to Civilian Defense in setting state fire control systems and in planning training. Dave Godwin, a Region 7 official, was national coordinator for the Forest Fire Fighters Service.
All of these efforts in the area of forest fire protection were a job which the Forest Service was well fitted to accomplish, not only by the nature of its work but because of the previous experience in working with the states under the Clarke-McNary programs.
Both Regions 7 and 9 helped the Army and Navy in purchasing lands needed for cantonments, training camps, and ammunition dumps. An important part of Army training was effective camouflage. For advice on what would work in forests and what kinds of plants to use, the Army Corps of Engineers turned to the Forest Service. The Service conducted extensive studies on forest camouflage and also on the use of plant growth substances to stimulate growth on planted camouflage. [41]
The Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 provided for a cooperative program of fire protection administered by the states but funded by the federal government and coordinated by the Forest Service. During the War, an Emergency Fire Protection Fund was set up by the federal government under the administration of the Forest Service Regions. One of the main functions was to inspect the operation of the state organizations and the fire protection districts (called CM-2 districts because the authority came from Section 2 of the Clarke-McNary Act).
Such an inspection was conducted by Region 7 State and Private Forestry personnel in 1943. The inspection included Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The inspectors were interested primarily in how each state's fire protection system worked. The organization in Maine was typical. When a fire was discovered by a lookout, he or she notified the first town selectman (equivalent to councilman) he or she could find in the nearest town. There were also two or three contact persons in each town and at least one fire warden. The warden's immediate duty was to summon a crew of local fire fighters, probably both firemen and volunteers, and go to the fire. After contacting the town authorities, the towerman was to notify the county warden, who was a state employee.
Each town had fire fighting tools purchased through the CM-2 program and nearly all towns had organized fire fighting crews with some training. Basically, the burden of the fire fighting program was borne by the town governments in forested areas.
The Region 7 inspectors had the task of checking the system, determining if it worked, and seeing that it justified the expenditure of federal funds. Generally, their conclusions were positive about the system in Maine and in the other states. [42]
Fire Guard Sees Army Plane Crash
One day in November of 1944, Nick Wynn, a Forest Service Fire Guard on the Huron National Forest watched from his tower while a formation of Army Air Corps planes from the Oscoda Army Base flew over the Forest—a bomber and three fighter planes as escort. Suddenly the bomber went out of control and dived straight into a stand of Norway pine not far from the fire tower. It plowed down several rows of trees and exploded, starting fires in four places from burning wreckage. Wynn and a fire crew left immediately for the scene of the crash and put out the fires after three or four acres of trees had burned. Four Army Air Corps fliers died in the crash. [43]
Region 9 Answers the Call
The wartime draft had taken so many young men into the armed services—over 10% of the population—that there was resentment toward those who had not been drafted. The federal Civil Service, which was generally not exempt, was occasionally charged with being a place for draft dodgers and slackers. To answer such charges, a study made in 1943 showed that of the 2,825,000 Civil Service and other civilian employees of the federal government, almost 2 million worked for the War and Navy Departments. Only 84,000 of all federal employees had been given draft deferments for occupational reasons. Of the non-deferred employees, 315,000 were in the Post Office Department, leaving only about 200,000 others, about half of whom were women. There were about 119,000 men of draft age among the non-military federal employees, and only 13,992 of them had received draft deferments. Also, there were 238,154 federal employees in the Armed Forces.
These figures about military service were circulated widely in publications of both Region 7 and Region 9 so that Forest Service people would know that the charges about being draft dodgers were just not true. [44]
An example of new and different ways which the Forest Service cooperated in the War took place in the Jonesboro District of the Shawnee National Forest. Some very important long distance telephone lines of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ran for 50 miles through the District. Ranger Ty S. Gill agreed to report all fires along the line to AT&T immediately so their crews could see that the long distance lines were kept in service. The lines, according to Jay H. Price, were important because they were "kept hot these days with national defense business." [45]
During World War II, German Prisoners of War were held at several abandoned CCC camps on National Forests such as the White Mountain, Chippewa and Shawnee. For a time on the Chippewa and White Mountain, the POW's worked for local loggers who were short of manpower. [46] There was a Conscientious Objector Camp and a Prisoner of War Camp established on the Allegheny National Forest. Frank Rudolph was the foreman of the Conscientious Objector Camp after his years as CCC Camp foreman.
Region 7 at War
By September of 1942, less than a year after U.S. entry into the War, the Regional Office of Region 7 estimated that the Region was "better than 80% into strictly War activity." Some 117 men from the Region had joined the Armed Forces, and others had left to work in War industries and for the War Production Board. Many Forest Service positions left vacant by these departures had been unfilled or filled with untrained people which presented a sizable wartime job for the Forest Service in itself. [47]
Forest Service Men Killed in Action
In 1947, an 80 acre tract of virgin timber on the Chequamegon National was dedicated in a Memorial Day ceremony to four Forest Service men killed in World War II: Edward S. Kafka, Arnold A. Lundstrom. Steve J. Nanjestnik, and Maurice L. Blair. [48]
Planning for the Postwar Years
Postwar Readjustments
As early as December of 1943 the Forest Service was concerned about postwar personnel readjustments. At a conference held in St. Louis, Missouri, agency personnel officers laid out a postwar policy was later confirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture. There would be a 39 hour work week after the War with time and a half for overtime. Veterans returning from the War were to be given the benefit of automatic promotions and every other gain they would have had if they had remained on the job. Employees who voluntarily left for civilian jobs with other government agencies would not be given re-employment benefits; those who went into the military service would. Temporary Forest Service employees would be terminated when furloughed people returned from the military, but this would be done on an individual basis. Temporary employees who had "made good" could be retained.
Management also allowed for increased delegation of authority in the future. This was done to allow field offices greater latitude in employment and disciplinary matters and in determining the wage rates of temporary employees. These changes were adopted throughout the Department of Agriculture. The Forest Service was proud of the fact that many of its policies with regard to decentralization were adopted by the entire Department. [49]
Postwar planning began early in the War in some areas. One enthusiastic report informed the Region 9 Regional Office in November of 1943 that postwar planning had been going on for two years in the Shawnee National Forest, which was jokingly called "the annex to the Region." This would mean that postwar planning began there before the War started. The burden of such far sighted planning was being borne by the Egyptian Planning Commission (southern Illinois is sometimes called "Egypt" because like Biblical Egypt, the region supplied corn to settlers in northern regions during a year of crop failure in the early 19th century). The Commission had been meeting monthly for more than a year with 35 to 40 people in attendance. The main theme of the meetings was conservation.
The same report noted that the Egyptian Planning Commission had helped the local people to cope with wartime disruptions. When the Ranger at the Jonesboro Ranger Station left and could not be replaced for several months, the Commission told everyone that since there would be no Ranger they would have to protect their own land from fires. The report was happy to note that there had been no forest fires during the interim period between Rangers. [50]
Based on the CCC experience, the Region 9 leaders began planning for the use of demobilized soldiers and workers after the War on what they called "wild lands." They reasoned that conditions after the War would have great potential for "public action in the entire field of wild land use." To that end, Loren T. Murphy of the Region 9 Division of Operations was assigned the task of making plans for the postwar activities in this area. [51]
Postwar Plans
In the midst of World War II, the leaders of Region 7 became increasingly aware of the special problems the War was creating for American forestry. The War was placing such great demands on these resources that unless there was a coordinated program to restore the forests in the postwar period, there was great danger to the resource.
In 1943, Regional Forester Robie M. Evans told a, women's group, "We need to quit wasting wood." He added that, "most of the waste occurred in production." Steps had been taken to eliminate waste but much remained to be done. The problem was that because of the War, the nation was using 17 billion cubic feet of lumber each year from forests which were growing only 11 billion cubic feet of wood each year. All of the wood was going for military and essential civilian uses, and Evans said, "We shall not deny a stick of it as long as it is taken from helpful cuttings such as thinnings of mature trees which have had their growth."
The wartime cutting was a necessary drain amounting to 50% more than new growth. Government studies showed that before the War the National Forest resource was losing 2.3 billion cubic feet of wood more than was being grown due to fire, insects, disease, and consumption. Postwar demands for wood would be ever greater than before. There would be better wood products—more attractive finishes, stronger woods, and with better architectural use. "Greater pressure put on the wood resource", Regional Forester Evans said, "meant that more effective measures would have to be taken to protect the resource; we have got to be more careful with fires, and we have got to tackle more effectively the problem of controlling devastating insects and disease."
Evans had a seven point program for forestry in the postwar period:
1. Protect the forests from fire, insects, and disease.
2. Provide for adequate re-stocking after cutting by natural regeneration.
3. Prevent premature or wasteful cutting of young stands of valuable species.
4. Leave enough young growing stock to keep the forest productive.
5. Prevent damage to young trees by careless logging operations.
6. Prevent damage by grazing to woodlots.
7. Prevent clearcutting except where the land was to put to some higher use or where clearcutting was indicated as the best forestry practice.
Because so much of the eastern forests were owned by private owners, it was clear that the Forest Service could not meet the postwar needs by management of federal lands alone. The cooperation of private landowners was absolutely essential. The Chief of the Forest Service had proposed a three point program for the postwar period: one, expanded public aid to forest land owners in such matters as fire prevention and reforestation; two, increased public ownership of forest lands; and three, control of cutting and other management practices on privately owned lands.
Behind the Chief's program lay the conviction that only with improved management of its forest resources, would the nation be able to meet its future needs. Evans agreed with the Chief that this would mean much greater participation by the Forest Service and state and local forestry agencies in the management of forests on private land. Also, Evans pointed out that prosperous wood products industries would mean many jobs for the millions of servicemen and women returning to civilian life from the War. [52]
Summary
As it was for most segments of American life, World War II was a major shift in direction for Regions 7 and 9. The wartime demands for wood products were so great that basic principles of forest management had to be abandoned temporarily. The TPWP program was a coordinated effort to stimulate forest production on private lands and to improve industry practices. The Russian dandelion experiment, although unsuccessful, proved Region 9's willingness to go all out on a project deemed essential to win the War. Many Region employees entered the Armed Forces leaving both Regions short handed; those who stayed on the job worked long hours and helped in the War effort with volunteer work. It was a time of waiting, anxiety, and greater than usual unified effort. When peace came, both Regions had made plans and were ready to resume their usual work.
Reference Notes
1. Daily Contact, December 9, 1941
2 G. H. Lentz, "War Activities of the Forest Service in Region Seven," unpublished article, February 26, 1943, 95-A-0036, Box 22, PRC, RG 95.
7. G. H. Lentz, "War Activities."
8. Contact, May 25, 1944, Regional Office Files.
9. "Making of the Chequamegon ...," p. 9.
10. GRI Inspection Report, White Mountain National Forest, October 1948, 95-A-0036, PRC, RG95.
11. Contact, November 2, 1943.
14. Handbook for the Timber Production War Project, 66-B-72, PRC, RG-95.
15. Quarterly Accomplishment Report, Green Mountain National Forest, August 21, 1945, 66-B-72, PRC, RG 95.
17. Ibid., March 30, 1944, Regional Office Files.
22. James Fitzwater to Regional Forester, Region 7, August 28, 1944, 66-B-72, PRC, RG 95.
24. "Plan of Procedure Relative to Doing Work Under the 'Private Forestry Law,'" 66-B-72, PRC, RG 95.
34. Interview with Milwaukee Retirees.
35. Contact, December 23, 1941.
38. Diane Y. Aaron, "A People's Legacy," p. 11.
39. Contact, July 26, 1944 and August 24, 1944, Regional Office Files.
42. J. B. Hasting to Earl S. Pierce, November 20, 1943, 66-B-62, PRC, RG 95.
43. Contact, November 17, 1944.
46. "Creation, Development and Administration" (Chippewa National Forest, n.d.).
47. G. H. Lentz, "War Activities."
48. "Chequamegon: "The Making...," p. 10.
49. Contact, December 29, 1943.
52. Robie M. Evans, Speech to a Women's Club, ca. 1943, 95-A-0036, Box 22, PRC, RG 95.
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