GEORGE ROGERS CLARK Selected Papers From The 1985 And 1986 George Rogers Clark Trans-Appalachian Frontier History Conferences

In the decade before the American Civil War, U. J. Jones wrote a local history of the Juniata Valley of Pennsylvania in which he detailed the various Indian-White confrontations of that valley during the eighteenth century. At one point he almost apologetically introduced a quotation from Col. James Smith's published narrative of his capture by Indians during the Braddock campaign by saying: "Notwithstanding Smith's narrative may have been read by a majority of our readers, [I'll quote him anyway]." [1] Today's reader would probably need to be told just who this James Smith was and why (from among the 500 or so narratives by ex-captives) his account was so particularly popular. This will be the first (and shortest) part of this paper. Then will follow an abbreviated analysis of the central thrust of the least quoted part of that immensely popular Narrative, his analysis of Indian war. Finally, and provocatively, there will be an attempt to begin to prove that James Smith was one of less than a handful of writers who had a rather complete awareness of the tactical sophistication of late eighteenth century Indian-style fighting in the Ohio Valley.

JAMES SMITH'S VITA

James Smith's Narrative gives a number of details of his life. He was captured in 1755 while part of a party building roads for Braddock's forces. In 1759, in the fifth year of captivity, the Indians permitted him to return to colonial society. His captivity experiences quite obviously prepared him for military service. In 1764, he was a Lieutenant in Bouquet's expedition into Ohio. He then led his group of Indian fighters (formed originally in 1763 and called the Black Boys) against those trading whiskey and arms to the Indians. This frontier method of handling a local problem led the Black Boys to make several attacks on Fort Loudon, until it was finally evacuated. Later they captured Ft. Bedford. Finally, Smith was arrested, escaped from prison, tried for murder, acquitted, and elected then to the Pennsylvania Assembly. In Lord Dunmore's War, he was a Captain of a ranging company. In 1775, he was a Major in a unit from Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. In 1777, he was a Colonel on the Pennsylvania frontier.

More than a soldier, his neighbors pushed him into the political sphere. In 1776, he participated in the Pennsylvania Convention. In the late 1780s, he moved to Bourbon County, Kentucky, a state he had explored in 1766, before Daniel Boone's more remembered exploits. There, in the words of the Kentucky historian, Mann Butler, he was "long distinguished in the councils of Kentucky," including a number of years in the General Assembly. [2] His literary side became public, when in 1799 he published his Narrative. In 1812, he published his Treatise, his last statement on Indian war. Fervently religious, he was for awhile a Stoneite. Generally, though, he was a Presbyterian, and spent time as a missionary among the Indians. In 1810, a brace of pamphlets, Remarkable Occurrences and Shakerism Detected, challenged a strong local religious group which his son had joined. Besides these writings on practical military and religious issues, the Narrative gives an example of a poem he composed in 1766. That this was not an unusual expression for such a practical man, might be inferred from the prefatory notes in the 1870 Clark edition that mentions that his second wife began to write poetry mostly after she married Smith.

Smith's Narrative enjoyed the complete confidence of those who knew of him. Contemporaries evidently agreed with John M'Clung's opinion that "his adventures will be found particularly interesting, as affording more ample specimens of savage manners and character, than almost any other account now in existence." [3] Two decades earlier, another Kentucky historian, Samuel L. Metcalf, in his collection of Interesting Narratives of Indian War, showed his high opinion of Smith by giving Smith's Narrative forty per cent of the book. Neville Craig in his Olden Times felt that Smith's account was "unimpeachable" and had been "never contradicted." [4] Smith himself, took pains to answer a charge he must have heard: How can you remember so clearly, things that happened so long before? Smith, he emphasized, possessed the habit of keeping a journal, and this habit is the source of much of his factual assurance. One of the most emotional series of anecdotes of his Narrative deals with the Indian distrust of this captive who placed too much confidence in books. In short, Smith seems — in M'Clung's words — to be "justly entitled to the distinctions which we give him."

SMITH'S ANALYSIS OF INDIAN WAR

Although the preface of Smith's Narrative emphasized the goal of learning the Indian mode of warfare, most authors prized Smith, however, for the fascinating anecdotal material found in the main text of the Narrative. In 1812 however, Smith made it very clear again that he considered the significant part of his Narrative to be its eleven page appendix entitled "On their discipline and methods of war." In 1812, Smith repeated the points of this appendix and extensively added material in a 59 page book that bore the following exact but longish title:

A treatise, on the mode and manner of Indian war, their tactics, discipline and encampments, the various methods they practice, in order to obtain the advantage, by ambush, surprise, surrounding, etc., ways and means proposed to prevent the Indians from obtaining the advantage. A chart, or plan of marching, and encamping, laid down, whereby we may undoubtedly surround them, if we have men sufficient. Also — a brief account of twenty-three campaigns, carried on against the Indians with the Events, since the year 1755; Gov. Harrison's included. Likewise — some abstracts selected from his Journal, while in captivity with the Indians, relative to the Wars: which was published many year ago, but few of them now to be found.

Smith ends this short book with the oratorical question: "And is it not high time that we should improve in the Indian art of war?" The earlier part of the Treatise (often quoting verbatim the appendix of the Narrative) gives Smith's final description and estimation of that "art." He insists that Indians exhibit both discipline and method in their fighting. He emphatically denies that Indians lack military expertise. Rather, he concludes that "war is their principal study," and "in this they have arrived at considerable perfection." [6]

Making these claims more explicit, Smith informs us that the individual Indian soldier regularly exhibits an important number of skills. They are punctual in obeying orders, they act in concert, they cheerfully and immediately carry out directions. While in a formation, that may be a mile long, they are able to move forward without disorder, and when necessary form circles, or semi-circles, or large hollow squares. Once the battle begins, each soldier fights as though he were to gain the battle himself.

Their officers, Smith continues, plan, order and conduct matters both before and during the action. Officer commands orchestrate the soldiers into retreating or advancing "in concert." In the Narrative there is further anecdotal information on the superior officer's duties. Here Smith's Indian mentor Tecaughretanego, laid down the principle that "the art of war consists in ambushing and surprising our enemies, and in preventing them from ambushing and surprising us." [7] In the Treatise he summarizes it thus:

They say . . . that it is the business of the officers to lay plans to take every advantage of the enemy — to ambush and surprise them, and to prevent being ambushed and surprised themselves; it is the duty of officers to prepare & deliver speeches to the men, in order to animate and encourage them & on the march to prevent the men at any time from getting into a huddle, because if the enemy should surround them in this position they would be exposed to the enemy's fire on every quarter. It is likewise their business at all times to endeavour to annoy their enemy; and save their own men, and ought therefore never to bring on an attack without considerable advantage, or without what appeared to them the sure prospect of victory, & that with the loss of few men: and if at any time they should be mistaken in this, and are like to lose many men by gaining the victory, it is their duty to retreat, and wat for a better opportunity of defeating their enemy, without the danger of losing too many men.

Only in the Narrative does one find Smith alluding directly to "strategic" (i.e. general over-all political control) questions. Even there, Smith seems more interested in what seems like a peripheral question, the role of "witchcraft" in mobilizing public opinion, rather than in the central question of unified organizational response. Nevertheless, he notices that council decisions are arrived at by a process that seems so natural that Indians "are led by instinct to act in concert and to move off regularly after their leaders." [9]

Smith presents us, then, with a model of an Indian military apparatus that builds on the disciplined soldiery, who are competently lead by knowledgeable and seasoned officers who have tactical battlefield experience in the use of tactical principles and which are used for strategical political purposes. Is this an idealized or romantic picture, a natural result of an impressionable young man's experience? But Allen Nevins has pointed out that Smith's tale is "one of the grimmest stories of Indian captivity handed down to us." [10] Smith was never a romantic.

But if the model is true, how could Indians lose? Since the Ohio Valley Indians lost not only individual battles but the war, why believe this model is correct?

Smith seems to have been alert to both of these objections. He observed, for one thing, that historically Whites had often won because the immensely more numerous Colonials had learned how to imitate the Indians. In his introduction to the Treatise, Smith wrote that "if New England had only left on record what they had learned of the nature of the Indian war, then many lives would have been saved in Braddock's time." Although a native Pennsylvanian, Smith in both the Treatise and the Narrative singled out the Virginians of his time for having learned "the knowledge of this kind of war." Indeed, Smith held in both his books that Kentucky could not have been settled except for the expertise of the Virginians who understood the Indian maneuvers. [11] According to Smith, the Indians, who unsuccessfully had attacked General Forbes' army near Ft. Ligonier, blamed the Virginians for their lack of success. Smith also insisted that the only reason Col. Bouquet did not suffer Braddock's fate was the timely advice he accepted from his Virginia volunteers.

The second reason Indians could be defeated was rooted in Indian demographics. According to Smith, "nothing can be more unjustly represented" than the inflated figures given for the number of available Indian soldiers. For quite different reasons, Smith claims, both Indians and their enemies used inflated figures. [12]

Smith himself centered on a third reason why Indians could be defeated. Smith emphasizes the idea that if Indians are allowed to flee unmolested from a disadvantageous battle field situation, they are free to return to war whenever more opportune conditions exist. Engagements that simply chase Indians away, as Wayne did at Fallen Timbers, are dubious victories. Thus, there is a compelling reason for discussing ways of annihilating at least a portion of the enemy. Smith believes that he has devised a certain way of surrounding a large contingent of Indians so that a large number of them could be killed. Although Smith never says why he is so certain, it is apparent that he is promulgating a version of an idea that was widely discussed toward the end of the French and Indian War: that Indians must be forced into a position where they could not run. In Smith's plan, the light-horse and light-infantry are placed in the inside of the oblong square in which the soldiers march, and from which they will sally out and surround the enemy when attacked.

"A CAPITAL MISTAKE"

Smith really believed that Indians were magnificently disciplined troops; indeed, he claimed that "Indians are the best disciplined troops for a wooden country in the known world." [13] Less and less of his contemporaries shared that view, and today's historians generally reflect this contrary view of the overwhelming majority of the Ohio Valley soldiers, politicians and writers. When an order is given by an Indian leader, all the warriors jump up and do as they individually please — the common assumption of most historical works. Go to any library, and the authors you easily find will assure you that Indian battlefield discipline was minimal at best and Indian strategical sophistication was simply unthinkable. [14] In short, Smith's view that it is "a capital mistake" to "call the Indians undisciplined savages" seems incredibly wrong-headed for most (military) historians. [15] For example, a scholarly session of the Ohio Historical Association a couple of years ago ended with a well-known authority asserting that since Indians had no effective battlefield leaders then it made no difference who was or was not in charge of the Indians when they fought Gen. Arthur St. Clair.

So why believe that James Smith knew more than most of his contemporaries and today's professional historians? Because, Smith would undoubtedly say, the historical record proves his side. Take, for example, the 1791 St. Clair defeat. This battle (and Smith points this out) caused more US military casualties than any battle of the American Revolution. Smith seemed enraged at people who could read about Generals Edward Braddock or St. Clair and go away making "a capital mistake" of believing that Braddock or St. Clair must have been incredibly stupid to lose to undisciplined troops. Most American writers hold that leaders like Braddock or St. Clair almost inexplicably lost; Smith argues to the contrary that the Indians won for reasons based on their military expertise. In one sentence Smith said it all: "Could it be supposed that undisciplined troops could defeat Generals Braddock, Grant, Etc." [16]

Smith's basic argument will not easily convince people who have been led to look at the various battles in the Ohio Valley from the traditional European military viewpoint. Smith, as his Narrative made quite clear, had been initiated into the entirely different woodland Indian world, and that expertise is almost impossible to imitate. His Narrative tells of his early tribal experience of having Indian women ducking him into the water in order to wash out his whiteness. However, one could start by accepting the validating epistemological principle of that Albany Highlander, Anne Grant, who believed that nobody should be accepted as an authority on Indian life who had not at least learned their language, perhaps by living as a trader among them, preferably by living among them as a captive. [17] Smith's views begin to be more credible, the more one reads accounts by those few who meet Anne Grant's Occam razor.

Exceptions, of course, are to be expected. For example, I believe I have seen no more concrete description of that basic Ohio Valley Indian tactical movement, the attempt to outflank one's enemies, than in the writings of the obscure Dayton, Ohio pioneer, Benjamin Van Cleve, who neither spoke an Indian language nor had resided among them. [18] Despite exceptions, Indian military insights are most confidently hoped for in the writings of soldiers like Robert Rogers who knew Indians first hand.

If the writer is part Indian, as was the case for Major John Norton, (Teyoninhokarawen) so much the better. Norton's long account of Iroquois military history must have a hundred anecdotes (often accompanied by instructive observations) describing the type of fighting done in the Ohio Valley in the 1750-1815 period. This Iroquoian warlore amply parallels and adds insights to Smith's summary of Algonquian experiences. For example, no concept appears more often in James Smith than his insistence that Indians acted "in concert," and no concept seems more dubious to most authors. Smith merely asserts it as a fact that Indians could move through woodland terrain and maintain order in a line a mile long. Norton alone in the literature that I've seen, shows how this late 18th century battlefield unanimity of movement, even under wretched physical conditions, was achieved. Battlefield maneuverability became a norm, even among tribes speaking quite different languages, because (Norton tells us) a habit of coordinating movements was learned in widely-practiced communal hunts. [19] This is part of the explanation for the otherwise unbelievable speed in which Braddock's troops were outflanked by Indians who were themselves just as surprised at the exact meeting place. A generation later, in Northwestern Ohio, Indians enveloped St. Clair's army so fast that Kentucky volunteers, who had just fled pell mell from an advance post, were not able to escape from the main camp.

In his day, Major Robert Rogers personified the professional soldier who was trying to imitate Indian military practices. His Journals, for example, are particularly valuable because he gives both a long analytical summary of woodland war in his 28 rules, and instructive examples of how difficult these rules were to apply to battlefield conditions. [20] Rogers quite correctly warned for example, that a commander must "prevent the enemy from pressing hard on either of your wings, or surrounding you, which is the usual method of the savages." How little help this theoretical knowledge could be was seen in his extremely candid description of the difficulties his own command often got into. In one sequence of events his successful winter ambush by his forces of an enemy convoy of sleighs was followed by his own entrapment where his advance group and then in short order his main detachment were both outflanked. Fortunately for his command, as soon as nightfall came, he prudently imitated the standard Indian practice for such disastrous situations, a practice that Smith's account emphasized — dropping everything and running away as fast as one could. [21]

Major Rogers' reputation was not universally held in high esteem in his own time, perhaps because professional soldiers judged such practices, as precipitate flight, as cowardice. Smith, however, insisted that this refusal to "stand cutting . . . proceeds from a compliance with their rules of war, rather than cowardice." [22] On the other hand, James Grant showed in 1758 before Ft. Duquesne when faced with a similar situation, just how easily one's command could be destroyed. Since Grant seemed to have no idea of how quickly Indians could outflank an enemy, he was quite stunned when (in his own words) he went from a prepared position "with nothing to fear" to a position where in "less than an hour" he was "fired upon from every quarter." [23] Whereas Rogers before a battle would often have chosen with his officers up to three places to retreat to, Grant does not seem to have considered the possibility that Indians might outmaneuver him.

Rogers' much surer grasp of the intricacies of the Indian military world was particularly shown in his understanding of the political environment that could on occasions strengthen Indian military resolve and alter drastically the battlefield code. Most writers follow a practice illustrated, for example, by U. J. Jones in portraying Indian war simply as a sickening account of various massacres and atrocities devoid of tactical and strategical significance. Of the dozens and dozens of Indian-White confrontations in Jones' book, there is not a single anecdote that clearly illustrates large-scale Indian military sophistication. In contrast, Rogers states in his A Concise Account that Indians also carry on "national" war which is entered into only after great deliberation and solemnity; and "prosecuted with the utmost secrecy, diligence and attention, both in making preparations and in carrying their schemes into execution." [24] Unless one really believes this significant distinction and sees that Indians in the generally described "petite" war are following rules of war which often are quite different from "national" war, the defeat of Braddock, Grant, St. Clair, etc. remains incomprehensible. The group of thirty Indians that George Washington saw exulting over a petite mission that had netted one scalp were most certainly under different military operational (and strategical) codes than, for example, those Indians fighting Bouquet. [25]

One major tactical difference was seen in Indian resolve in the presence of a determined enemy. Petite war participants did everything possible to avoid such situations. Even famous war chiefs found no humiliation in describing how on some such raiding party they had met a larger force and had fled so precipitously as to leave everything behind. But this common frontier experience often led to the view that Indians were cowardly and/or incompetent. Assuming some such premise, a number of theoreticians, for example, have felt that Braddock could have won in 1755 on the Monongahela simply by a firm bayonet charge. Bouquet's clearing the Bushy Run battlefield by a charge of his Highlanders or Gen. Wayne's straightforward charge at Fallen Timbers seem like later proofs of this analysis of Braddock's incompetence. To the contrary, Smith asserts vigorously as we have seen, that on battlefields [in a 'national' war, I would add] Indians retreated and advanced according to plan. In Norton's words, like "blackbirds," the soldiers systematically advanced, fired, loaded, advanced past another who had just fired. [26] They retreated the same way. Only when the situation turned impossible, as it suddenly did at Bushy Run in 1763 or at Fallen Timbers in 1794, did they exit in full flight. Fallen Timbers is a complicated story, and surely it is not simply a case of routing undisciplined Indians by showing cold steel. Stephen Riddle, the White-Indian from Kentucky who fought as a chief on the Indian side against Wayne at Fallen Timbers, summarized the battle in these terms: "we tryed to out flank them and surround them, but to our astonishment the whites out flanked us and all of a sudden made a charge on us." [27] St. Clair, for example, tried two years earlier to bayonet his way to victory, but his professional forces found that the technique by itself was too simple to work. Indians retreated in good order before St. Clair's soldiers, and in fact, "pursued their pursuers" (in Norton's phrase) [28] by moving quickly toward surrounding and decimating the charging soldiers. That chastening experience, perhaps, explains why St. Clair surprisingly reported to the Secretary of War after his army's total rout, that if he had had more professional soldiers in his command that day on the tributary of the Wabash River, there just would have been more dead American soldiers. [29] Actually St. Clair's contemporaries should have not been so surprised at this Indian ability to neutralize bayonet charges since another Smith (William) in his An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764 emphasized the idea that Indians always gave way when pressed but returned as soon as possible so that an army always found itself "surrounded by a circle of fire," a description of Col. Henry Bouquet's Highlanders charging up and down hills to no advantage that first day of the Bushy Run battle. [30]

"UNDOUBTEDLY SURROUND"

The Treatise amplified the Narrative's description of the Indian Art of War, and insisted on its reality in a large number of large-scale Indian-White encounters, only because Smith wanted to explain a way to entrap Indians. Everytime Ohio Valley Indians had been maneuvered in the past (except for Bushy Run) into a losing position, they simply evaporated. Grant's fear that the Indians would NOT fight, was the major reason he acted so strangely in his defeat opposite Ft. Duquesne that Indians later assumed that he had been drunk. Significantly, James Grant regained his prestige by outgeneraling Lee at Monmouth in 1778, and by serving with distinction on St. Lucia in 1778. He was, in fact, a fine officer, but only when he did not hold his foes in contempt. Grant worked closely with Bouquet, whose 1764 Orderly Book (complete with diagrams also seen in William Smith's work) would seem to show him to be the author [31] of the Historical Account's theoretical description of how the Indian could be forced to stand and be destroyed.

A couple of times, James Smith respectfully enshrines a Virginian, Lemuel Barrett, as the author of the battlefield scheme that had made Bouquet's reputation. [32] Barrett's insight that the way to get Indians to commit themselves on the battlefield is to appear to be disintegrating, is incorporated in James' schema in an incidental way. That is, James Smith says that even if there is a collapse of part of the square in which the soldiers are fighting and the Indians rush in, they will be rushing deeper into a trap.

But James Smith's thought is different from both the Barrett and William Smith plans in an important way. Large-scale formations of late Eighteenth Century Ohio Valley Indians regularly attacked in half-moon formation. Although Smith never mentions this practice, his plan assumes an attack in this formation. As the two enveloping movements of the Indian half moon formation were taking place, Smith would have his cavalry move out of the part of the square not under direct attack and envelop as much of the two flanking parts of the Indian army as it reasonably could do. Perhaps the plan might have worked, perhaps not. But the plan's sure knowledge of how the Indians would fight, shows that among published authorities, James Smith almost uniquely knew Ohio Valley Indian battlefield tactics.

ENDNOTES

¹U. J. Jones, History of the Early Settlement of the Juniata Valley (Harrisburg, 1889), 154. Smith's narrative has been republished recently as Scoouwa: James Smith's Indian Captivity Narrative (Columbus, 1978). Smith also published the quite unknown A Treatise on the Mode and Manner of Indian War (Chicago, 1948 reprint). Some early collections reprinted the Narrative in its entirety: for example, J. M. M'Clung or Joseph Pritts, Border Life (Abingdon, VA., 1849).

In 1937, Neil H. Swanson recast Smith's diary into the format of a novel entitled, The First Rebel, but which Henry S. Commanger clearly identified as "a carefully documented historical biography, based on sources, substantiated by footnote references, and bolstered with appendices." Books July 18, 1937, p. 1. Swanson's title comes from his emphasis on the conflict between the Black Boys and British authorities and which formed (according to Swanson) the first overt act of the American Revolution.

In addition, New York Times reviewer R. L. Duffus, commented on this attempt to rescue Smith's name "from near oblivion." Nevertheless, a decade later a review of a bibliography of James Smith philosophized: "One is amazed that a man could occupy so great a part in the national and local life of the pioneer period, contributing so widely to its military, religious, and cultural phases and fall within a century into almost complete oblivion:" Even a number of today's historians of Indian captive narratives, however, ignore James Smith. For example, the Narrative is not found in either Richard VanDerBeet's Held Captive by Indians (Knoxville, 1973) or James Levernier and Hennig Cohen's The Indians and Their Captives, (Westport, 1977). VanDerBeet's, The Indian Captivity Narrative (New York, 1984) does, however, refer to Smith's "admittedly didactic purpose," the "observations on the Indian mode of warfare."

²Mann Butler, Valley of the Ohio, ed. G.G. Clift & Hambleton Tapp (Frankfort, 1971), 43.

³John A. M'Clung Sketches of Western Adventure (Cincinnati, 1839), 10. See, for example, how more instructive of Indian life in general is Smith's account over the narrative of Robert Eastburn, who was also captured in the French and Indian War.

⁴Samuel L. Metcalf, A Collection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives (Lexington, 1821); Neville B. Craig, The Olden Time (New York, 1976 reprint), 72.

⁵J. M'Clung, 9.

6J. Smith, Narrative, 171.

⁷J. Smith, Narrative, 118-9; Treatise, 4.

⁸J. Smith, Treatise, 12; Narrative, 169-70. This is N. Swanson's one direct quote from the Narrative; Swanson uses it to summarize Smith's own command of the Black Boys. N. Swanson, The First Rebel 299.

⁹J. Smith, Narrative, 99. Two excellent sources for understanding how the stateless woodland Indian political structure worked are found in the works of two Jesuit priests, Antoine Silvy (thirty-six years among the Eskimos, Iroquois and Western Algonquians) and Joseph Lafitau (five years among the Iroquois and confidante of the Jesuit, Julian Garnier, who spent sixty years among Indians): Antoine Silvy, Letters From North America, trans. Ivy A. Dickson (Belleville, 1980) and Joseph Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians, ed. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore (Toronto, 1977).

The authenticity of the linkage of war leadership and religious authority that Smith reported of the Indians has recently been argued at length by Lothar Drager, "Chieftainship and Religious Authority Among the Central Algonkin," in ed. Pieter Hovens, North American Indian Studies (Gottingen, 1981), 37-58. Young Alexander Henry was a captive for awhile during Pontiac's Rebellion, and his account of the consultation with the Great Turtle on the issue of peace with England shows exactly how religious leaders and public questions intertwined among the Algonquians. Attack at Michilimackinac 1763, ed. David A. Armour, (Mackinac Island, 1971), 105-108.

¹⁰The Saturday Review, 16, p. 7.

¹¹J. Smith, Treatise, 3; Narrative, 168.

¹²J. Smith, Narrative, 164-65.

¹³J. Smith, Treatise, 9.

¹⁴But see Thomas L. Connelly, "Indian Warfare on the Tennessee Frontier, 1776-1794: Strategy and Tactics," East Tennessee Historical Society, 36 (1964), 3-22 for another part of the Eastern woodlands, and see Keith F. Otterbein, The Evolution of War (Human Relations Area Files, 1970) for a study of fifty societies that buttresses the possibility that Smith knew what he was talking about. Wiley Sword's President Washington's Indian War, (Norman, 1985) incorporates the Indian tactical world in his descriptions, and at one place (p. 182) he quotes James Smith on the discipline possessed by Indians.

¹⁵J. Smith, Narrative, 161; Treatise, 4. This is a first sentence of the appendix of the Narrative, "On Their Discipline and Method of War."

¹⁶J. Smith, Narrative, 163.

¹⁷Anne Grant, Memoirs of an American Lady (Albany, 1876), 71.

¹⁸Benjamin Van Cleve, "Memoirs," in Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, XVII (1922), 18.

¹⁹John Norton, Journal ed. Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman (Toronto, 1970), 182.

²⁰Robert Rogers, Journals (Ann Arbor, 1966 reprint).

²¹R. Rogers, Journals, 62, 85-7.

²²J. Smith, Treatise, 12; Narrative, 170.

²³Hugh Cleland, George Washington in the Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh, 1955), 207.

²⁴R. Rogers, A Concise Account of North America (New York, 1966), 220. See also J. Norton, 128-9.

²⁵The Diaries of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Boston, 1925), 1, 7.

²⁶J. Norton, Journal, 139, 185.

²⁷Westward into Kentucky: The Narrative of Daniel Trabue, ed. Chester R. Young, (Lexington, 1981), 141.

²⁸J. Norton, 178.

²⁹The letter is found, for example, in S. Metcalf, Collection, 129.

³⁰William Smith, A Historical Account of an Expedition against the Ohio Indians, in the Year 1764 (Ann Arbor, 1966), V III, X, 44.

³¹The Orderly Book, ed. Edward G. Williams, (Pittsburg, 1960). For a contrary view, see Don Doudelin, "Numbers and Tactics at Bushy Run," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 68(1985), 153-179.

³²J. Smith, Treatise, 6-7, 21. While not perfectly clear, it seems likely that "Ensign" Smith was talking of Bouquet's command when he wrote: "they knew no more about fighting Indians, than Indians do about ship building." Treatise, 52.