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THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK STALLS
Between 7:30 and 8:00 Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut began receiving
urgent messages for help. The long roll sounded and by 8:30 two of his
infantry brigades (a third had been dispatched earlier to assist Sherman
at 7:40) consisting of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kentucky troops,
were pushing down the Hamburg-Savannah (or River) road to reinforce
Prentiss. Later, Brig. Gen. William H. L. Wallace dispatched Brig. Gen.
John McArthur with a portion of his brigade, the 9th and 12th Illinois,
who wore rakish Scotchberets, plus the 50th Illinois Infantry (from Col.
Thomas Sweeny's brigade), along with Willard's Battery A, 1st Illinois
Light Artillery, down the River road after Hurlbut.
Meanwhile, moving south on Hurlbut's right, General Wallace advanced
his other two brigades and three artillery batteries down the Eastern
Corinth road. Hurlbut's and Wallace's reinforcements encountered
Prentiss's refugees streaming northward in retreat. "Stragglers were
seen coming down the road which leads to the front of our lines some
wounded, but most of them badly scared," observed a Federal. As the roar
of battle increased, an officer in the 3rd Iowa shouted that any man
seen deserting his post would be shot. The entire regiment gave a
resounding cheer.
At 9:00 General Hurlbut, a former Illinois Republican politician
known for his hard drinking and somewhat shady land deals, formed his
4,400 men on the southern and western edges of Sarah Bell's old cotton
field, located about half a mile north of Prentiss's occupied camps.
Col. Jacob Lauman's brigade filed to the right facing west, to form at a
right angle with Col. Nelson Williams's brigade on the left, which faced
south toward the Hamburg-Purdy road. Three batteriesMyers's 13th
Ohio, Mann's 1st Missouri, and Ross's 2nd Michigansupported the
Union line. "Beyond this field for the first time we saw the enemy, with
red banners flashing . . . through the abandoned camps of Prentiss,"
recalled an Iowan.
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BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN A. HURLBUT (USAMHI)
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Captain John Myer's Ohio cannoneers unlimbered their six field guns
on the southwestern edge of the Bell field, in front of Lauman's
infantry. As they came into position on the north side of Prentiss's
camps, Captain Felix Robertson's Alabama Battery, located eight hundred
yards to the southwest, zeroed in on Myer's position with their six
12-pounder Napoleon guns. A well-aimed shot struck a Union caisson,
resulting in a tremendous explosion. At one impulse Myer's artillery
crews abandoned their cannon and fled the field. Wrote a member of the
battery: "Well father, I have seen the elephant all over and I do not
want to see it again." The company was later disbanded for "disgraceful
cowardice."
The Confederates holding Prentiss's camps did not seriously threaten
Hurlbut's front. Since two brigades of Brig. Gen. Jones Withers's
division had been redirected to the far right, only Col. Daniel Adams's
(formerly Gladden's) brigade, weakened by heavy casualties and
disorganized by its direct assaults on Prentiss's camps, remained in
front of Hurlbut's sector. The Confederates were thus in no position to
challenge the Federals and, indeed, suspected they might be attacked.
Hurlbut, nonetheless, slightly repositioned his troops, refusing
Lauman's left toward the William Manse George cabin located on the
northwestern corner of the Bell field, while Col. Isaac Pugh (Colonel
Williams had been seriously disabled) retired his brigade north through
the Sarah Bell field. Pugh's line now rested in front of a large peach
orchard, which was in full bloom on the northern portion of the field.
Hurlbut's arrival and temporary stand was significant in plugging a
breach in the Union left center. Hurlbut also gave needed time for
Prentiss's survivors to regroup to the rear in Hurlbut's camps.
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THIS PHOTO OF THE PEACH ORCHARD WAS TAKEN A FEW YEARS AFTER THE WAR.
(CHICAGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY)
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As Grant sat for breakfast at the Cherry home, an orderly reported
that artillery fire could be heard upriver. The general suspected that
Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing might be under attack. The
previous afternoon, advance elements of Buell's army, Brig. Gen. William
"Bull" Nelson's division, reached Savannah. Grant sent an urgent note to
Nelson to move his division upriver along the east bank road to a point
opposite Pittsburg Landing, where the few transports available happened
to be moored. Nelson was advised that his men would be ferried across
the river. After sending word to General Buell of his orders for Nelson
to march south, Grant immediately boarded his headquarters steamer the
Tigress and proceeded upstream. Reaching Crump's Landing about
8:00, Grant realized the fighting was upriver at Pittsburg Landing and
Lew Wallace was not under attack. Grant instructed Wallace to hold his
troops in readiness and further orders would be forthcoming once Grant
reached Pittsburg Landing and assessed the problem there.
Arriving at Pittsburg Landing sometime between 8:30 and 9:00, Grant
found a confused scene. Hundreds of idle soldiers stood huddled in
groups around the bluff and landing. To the field officers he found
ashore, Grant issued instructions to put the landing area into order.
Riding inland a short distance, Grant met with Brig. Gen. William
Wallace. Wallace informed Grant the entire encampment was under a
full-scale Confederate attack. Grant then sent a messenger by boat for
Lew Wallace to bring up his division and wrote additional instructions
to General Nelson, advising him to "hurry up your command as fast as
possible." Notably calm, Grant also ordered ammunition wagons to head
inland before he rode toward the front to oversee his embattled army.
Inspecting Sherman's and McClernand's position first, Grant barely
escaped serious injury when an artillery fragment deflected off his
sword scabbard. Undaunted, he moved on and met with his other division
commanders fighting on the Union center and left.
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FEDERAL TRANSPORTS AT PITTSBURG LANDING A FEW DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE. THE
SECOND STEAMER FROM THE RIGHT IS GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS BOAT THE
TIGRESS. (USAMHI)
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WOUNDED UNION SOLDIERS RETREAT TO THE LANDING WHILE AMMUNITION WAGONS
HEAD TO THE FRONT. (BL)
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By late morning the initial Confederate drive was beginning to lose
momentum. Many Southern soldiers had stopped to plunder captured Federal
camps. When General Johnston discovered an officer looting in Prentiss's
camps, he chided him: "None of that, sir. We are not here for plunder."
Observing that he had shamed the man in front of his men, the general
softened his tone and, picking up a tin cup, quipped: "Let this be my
share of the spoils today."
Serious tactical problems had also developed for the Confederates.
Since the capture of Prentiss's camp, the initial sweeping right flank
movement had degenerated into a series of massive frontal assaults.
Hundreds of men had been killed and wounded in the opening assaults on
Prentiss and Sherman, and attrition was already a serious Confederate
problem.
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Serious tactical problems had also developed for the Confederates.
Since the capture of Prentiss's camp, the initial sweeping right flank
movement had degenerated into a series of massive frontal assaults.
Hundreds of men had been killed and wounded in the opening assaults on
Prentiss and Sherman, and attrition was already a serious Confederate
problem. The organization of several brigades had been broken; Patrick
Cleburne's and Bushrod Johnson's brigades were shattered in furious
disorganized frontal attacks against the Union right defending the main
Corinth road.
At this point in the battle, Albert Sidney Johnston directed five of
the eight brigades he had moved into Prentiss's camp to advance
northwest and attack a second line of Union camps behind Shiloh Church,
visible to the left rear of Prentiss's camp. This mass movement was
intended to cut off the retreat of thousands of Federal soldiers
resisting the advance of the Confederate left on the Corinth road.
Johnston may have assumed he had already turned the Union left flank and
was now free to begin the task of forcing the Union army back into Owl
Creek.
Another urgent problem developed for Johnston on the Confederate
right. Capt. Samuel H. Lockett, an engineer on Bragg's staff, sent a
message to Johnston that a Federal division camped north of the mouth of
Lick Creek threatened to overlap, or turn, the right flank of the
Southern line. In response, Johnston instructed both General Chalmers's
and Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson's brigades, of Brig. Gen. Jones Withers's
division, along with two remaining brigades of General Breckinridge's
Reserve Corps, to redeploy to the right and attack the new Union threat.
The enemy "division" which Lockett reported was actually only an
isolated brigade. By committing the reserve to that vicinity, Johnston
now advanced a third of his army directly against the true Union left.
His master plan of a right flank sweep might still be achieved.
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BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE (VM)
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Before noon, Breckinridge's troops, along with Jackson's brigade,
slammed head-on into Hurlbut's division and McArthur's brigade at the
Bell farm. This left only Chalmers's Mississippi and Tennessee brigade,
along with Col. James Clanton's 1st Alabama Cavalry, to attempt a sweep
around the true Federal left flank deployed on a commanding ridge north
of the confluence of Locust Grove Branch and Lick Creek.
Commanding the isolated Federal brigade Captain Lockett had earlier
observed was forty-six-year-old former Chicago lawyer Col. David Stuart.
Assigned to Sherman's division, Stuart's brigade of three regiments had
been posted by General Sherman to guard the Hamburg road ford over Lick
Creek. The 55th Illinois Infantry, the extreme left of Grant's army, had
pitched their tents in Larkin Bell's peach orchard. To Stuart's right,
Hurlbut's division deployed slightly northwest at Sarah Bell's farm,
several hundred yards away.
About 11:00 Stuart's infantry, unsupported by artillery, received the
full brunt of Chalmers's and Jackson's attacks. As a result of the
initial Confederate artillery bombardment, Stuart lost all contact with
one of his regiments, which retreated several hundred yards northward to
a new defensive position behind the camp. Heavily outnumbered, Stuart
was forced to retire his remaining men several hundred yards to a
prominent wooded ridge located east of his camp. There, under the cover
of the trees, he pieced together a stable defense, with his two
shorthanded regiments. For two hours this small force of 1,200 men
stubbornly contested Chalmers's further advance north.
Finally, having suffered heavy casualties and with their ammunition
exhausted, Stuart ordered his hard-pressed soldiers from the line.
Moving northwest through several deep ravines, Stuart's men retreated to
the River road behind Hurlbut's and McArthur's men, who now assumed full
responsibility for holding the Union left. Reaching the road, Stuart
marched his survivors to the landing, where he obtained ammunition for
their depleted cartridge boxes. Each side produced many heroes that
bloody day at Shiloh. Col. David Stuart, fighting a prewar reputation as
a scoundrel, would be one of them. With Stuart driven from his position
anchoring Grant's left to the river, north of Lick Creek, Clanton's
Alabama Cavalry reached the bank of the Tennessee River. There they
watered their horses, thus fulfilling General Johnston's morning
prophecy.
(click on image for a PDF version)
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FEDERAL DEFENSE STIFFENS: APRIL 6 10:304:00 P.M.
Their corps organization lost, Confederate leaders divide the
three-mile front into sectors to reestablish lines of authority. On the
left, Hardee, Polk, and Bragg hurl a massive assault on Sherman and
McClernand, reinforced by Veatch (Hurtbut's division). The Federals
retreat (11 A. M.) to Jones field. On the Confederate right, Chalmers
and Jackson attack Stuart and McArthur (William Wallace's division). The
Federals hold, but Stuart is cut off at noon. Johnston advances
Breckinridge (Bowen, Slatham) against Hurlbut and McArthur. The
Southern attacks are repulsed. Sherman and McClernand counter-attack at
noon. Beauregard reorganizes around his reserve, Trabue, and halts the
Union advance at Wool field. In close-quarter fighting, the combatants
grapple for McClernand's camps until 2:30, when their ranks
depletedSherman and McClernand retire across Tilghman Branch. In
attacks against Grant's left, Albert Sidney Johnston is mortally
wounded. Command passes to Beauregard. Stuart retreats, forcing Hurlbut
and McArthur to retire beyond the Bloody Pond. The Confederate right,
now under Bragg, continues to press Grant's left. At 4 P.M. Chalmers
turns the Union left and Hurlbut retreats to Pittsburg Landing.
INSET MAP: THE HORNETS' NEST, APRIL 6
Reinforcements under William Wallace and Hurlbut encounter
Prentiss's division at 9 A.M. Wallace's brigades (Sweeny, Tuttle) along
with two regiments of Lauman (Hurlbut's division) deploy behind an oak
thicket along an old wagon trace "sunken road." Prentiss reforms between
Wallace and Lauman, and five regiments are held in reserve. From 11 A.M.
to 4 P.M., Confederate brigades charge into the dense underbrush. Each
assault is shattered by a "murderous storm" of Federal musketry and
artillery. Confederate survivors label the position "a hornets' nest."
The Federal reserve is detached to Hurlbut (left) and McClernand
(right). In the late afternoon, the Confederates concentrate artillery
(Ruggles' Battery) against the position. By 4:30, cannon from eleven
batteries bombard the thicket, while Southern infantry maneuvers around
the Union stronghold.
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The rugged terrain across the battlefield, combined with pockets of
stiff Federal resistance, continued to stall the Confederate advance.
Since the Confederate corps had become badly intermingled, the corps
commanders were forced to divide the wide three-mile front into four
sectionsHardee held the left; Polk, the left center; and Bragg the
right center. Behind them, Beauregard continued to monitor the battle
from his field headquarters on the Corinth road south of Shiloh Church.
Meanwhile, Breckinridge had moved to the right of the line where Sidney
Johnston provided overall leadership.
Since early morning, Johnston's presence on the front had inspired
Southern troops, but by attempting to give direction to individual units
on this flank, he lost overall coordination and control of his army.
Since 10 A.M., over half of the eleven Southern brigades available on
the field had been maneuvered into line on the Confederate left, west of
the Eastern Corinth road. On that front, the commingled organizations
falling under Hardee, Polk, and Bragg, headed a massive frontal assault
across the Hamburg-Purdy road north of Shiloh Church, attacking the
Union right defended by forces under Sherman and McClernand. From left
to right the Confederate attack was formed using the somewhat
disorganized brigades of Cleburne, Anderson, Johnson, and Russell on the
left, joined by A. P. Stewart, Wood, and Shaver on the right. In support
of this attack were the brigades of Pond (occupying McDowell's camp on
the far left), Robert Trabue (behind Anderson), Randall Gibson (behind
Shaver), and William Stephens (behind Shaver's left). The line extended
from Owl Creek on the left to the Eastern Corinth road on the right, a
distance of one and a half miles.
Between 11.00 and 11:30, in close-quarter hand-to-hand fighting,
the massive assault by the Confederate left overran the Union right,
inflicting horrendous Federal casualties . . .
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Between 11:00 and 11:30, in close quarter, hand-to-hand fighting, the
massive assault by the Confederate left overran the Union right,
inflicting horrendous Federal casualties, and capturing seventeen cannon
along with most of McClernand's camp. "The enemy were seen approaching
in large force and fine style, column after column moving on us with a
most terrible precision," stated Col. C. Carroll Marsh, commanding
McClernand's center brigade. Marsh added that the Confederates "opened
on us with a most terrible and deadly fire, unequaled by any which we
were under during the subsequent engagements . . . . During the first
five minutes I lost more in killed and wounded than in all other
actions." The Union line retreated 1,500 yards north into Jones field,
where Generals Sherman and McClernand worked frantically to reform their
shattered ranks.
Rallying their ravaged forces in Jones field, McClernand and Sherman
managed to secure much needed fresh soldiers. Sherman located McDowell's
missing brigade in Sowell field to the west and quickly advanced his
Illinois-Iowa-Ohio brigade south against the Confederate left. On
Sherman's left, General McClernand's battered division, now reinforced
by two Iowa regiments sent forward from the landing by Grant, also
advanced. At noon, a united counter-charge by the Union right rolled
across the rugged terrain moving south toward Woolf field, where the
Federals captured the guns of Cobb's Kentucky Battery. General
McClernand stated that his men drove "the enemy . . . for half a mile
with great slaughter over the ground occupied by my artillery and a
portion of my infantry camps. Within a radius of 200 yards of my
headquarters the ground was almost literally covered with dead bodies."
Caught off-guard, the Confederates were pressed back to the
Hamburg-Purdy road. Alarmed by this new threat, Beauregard located Col.
Robert Trabue's brigade, the only fresh brigade left in the army, and
advanced it against the Union right to stem further advance. Meanwhile,
along with Hardee and Polk, Beauregard worked to reorganize the
disorganized and commingled forces on the Confederate left to regain the
initiative from the determined Federals.
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THIS WATERCOLOR OF THE 11TH ILLINOIS INFANTRY FIRING ON ADVANCING
CONFEDERATES WAS PAINTED BY FREDERICK RANSOM, A PRIVATE IN THE REGIMENT.
(COURTESY OF THE ILLINOIS HISTORICAL LIBRARY)
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BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM H.L. WALLACE (BL)
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For nearly two hours the tide of
battle rolled back and forth, first one side gaining ground, then losing
it back to the enemy. Thousands fell on both sides.
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"The combat here was a severe one, remarked Colonel Trabue, "and
lasted an hour and a quarter . . . . The enemy appeared to out-number us
greatly . . . . I was reluctant to charge . . . as he was in the woods .
. . with some advantage of position." Trabue stated that his men killed
and wounded 400 to 500 of the enemy but at the price of losing many men
and several officers himself. For nearly two hours the tide of battle
rolled back and forth, first one side gaining ground, then losing it
back to the enemy. Thousands fell on both sides. By 2:30, however, the
Federals had once again been pressed back north into Jones field.
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