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THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE
Sidney Johnston worked frantically to mold his growing army, but on
the night of April 2 time ran out. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham,
commanding a Confederate division positioned twenty-five miles north of
Corinth, at Bethel Station and Purdy, Tennessee, reported that Lew
Wallace's division was moving west in force—perhaps to make another
raid on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. In truth, Wallace was only
overreacting to an earlier reconnaissance by Cheatham's cavalry. Coupled
with this intelligence came troubling news that Buell's army was at last
beyond the Duck River. Beauregard advised Johnston: "Now is the moment
to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing."
Johnston directed Beauregard to formulate the attack order. The
resulting directive has often been called a formula for disaster. The
Louisiana general planned for an attack in successive waves, with each
corps being in a parallel line behind the other. It was Johnston's
stated objective to maneuver his Confederate army so as to turn Grant's
left, cutting Federal retreat to the river, and then drive the enemy
back into the flooded Owl Creek bottoms. To accomplish such a maneuver,
however, more combat strength would be required on the Confederate
right. Beauregard's plan instead placed equal strength across the entire
front. In postwar years, Sidney Johnston's supporters claimed that this
was not his original plan but that he was forced to accept Beauregard's
proposals because of the pressure of time. This claim is dubious. The
commanding general had been in Corinth for ten days, adequate time to
formulate his own written plans. As it was, Johnston approved and
accepted Beauregard's complex plan.
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A WARTIME SKETCH OF PITTSBURG LANDING. (HP)
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Beauregard's rigid marching timetable also quickly fell apart. Not
all the troops were concentrated at Corinth, and the Confederate plans
required a coordinated movement by thousands of men scattered across a
thirty-mile-wide area to converge by various country roads to the
selected point of concentration, an important intersection on the Ridge
Road fourteen miles north of Corinth. That point, known by a nearby
local farmhouse called "Michie's" (spelled Mickey's in Confederate
reports), lay eight miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing. The movement
of an inexperienced army twenty miles in a single day simply proved
impossible. For complicated reasons that would be debated long after the
war, General Hardee's corps, spearheading the march, held up the
advance until 3 P.M. on April 3. Horrid roads, poor guides, and green
troops caused further chaos. By Friday morning, April 4, as a spring
storm sent rain falling in torrents, both Hardee's and Bragg's corps
were twelve hours behind schedule. In fact, Breckinridge's Reserve
Corps, stationed at Burnsville, Mississippi, did not move northward
until the afternoon of the fourth.
A grim Johnston rescheduled the attack for Saturday morning, April 5,
but that night the heavy rain continued to fall. "As we stood there,
troops tramped by in the mud and rain, and darkness," revealed a
Tennessean. "To us who were simply standing in line in the rain it was
bad enough, but those men who were going by were wading, stumbling and
plunging through mud and water a foot deep."
(click on image for a PDF version)
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CONFEDERATE APPROACH, APRIL 3-5: UNION REINFORCEMENTS, APRIL 6-7
Johnston decides late April 2 to attack Grant at Pittsburg Landing
before Buell arrives. To assemble for battle, the dispersed Confederates
march on Michie's. From Corinth, Hardee and Polk (Clark's division) move
up Ridge Road while Bragg advances through Monterey. Cheatham's division
(Polk's corps) marches from Purdy and Breckinridge moves from Burnsville
to join Bragg's route. Heavy rain, bad roads, and delays prevent
assembly beyond Michie's until nightfall, April 5. At dawn, April 6,
battle begins. At 8 A.M., Nelson (Buell's advance), who reached Savannah
on the 5th, receives Grant's orders to march to the river opposite
Pittsburg Landing to be ferried across. Nelson does not depart until
1:30 P.M., and reaches the river at 5 P.M. Lew Wallace receives Grant's
orders to march at 11:30 A.M. Wallace advances on the Shunpike road until
notified that the Confederates hold the Owl Creek bridge west of Shiloh
Church. Wallace countermarches to the River road and arrives on the
battlefield at 7 P.M. That night, into April 7, three more of Buell's
divisions—Crittenden, McCook, and Wood—move by boat from
Savannah to Pittsburg Landing.
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More maddening delays occurred on the fifth, as the rain continued
until early afternoon. All of Hardee's men were deployed by midmorning,
but Bragg's corps was still not ready by noon. Somehow the general had
lost an entire division! Johnston uncharacteristically exploded and went
in search of the missing troops. He found them on the road, miles in the
rear, blocked by a confusing traffic snarl involving Polk's wagons and
artillery at the Michie's intersection. It was 4 P.M. before the clogged
intersection was cleared and Bragg's missing division could tramp four
miles eastward to its final attack positions. For a second time since
leaving Corinth, the attack had to be postponed.
That night Johnston's army stood poised with General Hardee's forward
line of battle positioned a mile south of the front-line Federal camps.
The only challenge received by Confederates along the entire line of
march came from a solitary mounted stranger who demanded to know who was
advancing. "This is Hardee's corps," came the reply. The stranger asked
for the password. When told that he was holding up an entire corps, he
finally said: "I suppose you can go on; but its agin' orders." Despite
warnings to keep silent, many of the men had carelessly discharged their
wet weapons to see if they would fire. On the afternoon of April 5,
Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, with their staffs, rode along the line,
receiving rousing cheers from the men, despite efforts to silence
them.
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MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM J. HARDEE (LC)
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MAJOR GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK (VM)
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In a meeting of Confederate generals that evening, Beauregard openly
expressed his concern. The enemy surely had been alerted to their
presence, he argued, since several skirmishes had been fought between
the Confederate advance and Federal pickets. He warned that the element
of surprise had been lost. Also, the men were exhausted from their
three-day march and some had used up all their rations. In Beauregard's
opinion, the army should retire to Corinth. Bragg concurred in the
assessment. Johnston, perhaps sensing his great hour was at hand,
reasoned that the Federals could have no greater front between the two
creeks than his army. "I would fight them if they were a million," he
resolutely declared. The attack would begin at dawn as planned.
That night young George Jones of Stanford's Mississippi Battery
jotted in his diary: "I have the shakes badly. Well, I am not
alone—in fact, we all look like shaking Quakers. Scared? Oh, no;
only an old fashioned rigor . . . . I do pray that our Heavenly Father
will shield and protect every one of us." Years later a Louisiana
soldier recalled that he shivered that night (no fires were allowed) as
he listened to a Yankee band in the distance play "Home Sweet Home."
By Saturday evening, April 5, the Federals were aware that a Southern
army was concentrating at Corinth; Grant placed enemy strength between
60,000 and 80,000. Confederate cavalry patrols had become bold,
advancing up to the very edge of the Union encampment. Despite this
knowledge, a business-as-usual atmosphere prevailed in the Northern
camps. No earthworks had been constructed, and only a light picket line
extended forward of the camp.
An incident occurred on April 4, that foreshadowed trouble. About
2:30 P.M., sharp firing was heard at one of Sherman's picket posts.
When Col. Ralph P. Buckland, commanding the Fourth Brigade of Sherman's
division, went to investigate, he found that all seven pickets had been
captured. Two companies of the 72nd Ohio Infantry pursued but quickly
bumped into the 1st Alabama Cavalry. In the midst of a near blinding
rainstorm, a Federal battalion of the 5th Ohio Cavalry came to the
rescue. The carbine-toting Buckeyes scattered the Rebel troopers and
chased them for a quarter of a mile. Cresting a knoll, the Federals
uncovered a long line of Confederate infantry, backed by artillery.
Fired on by what they determined to be a superior force, the blue
horsemen hastily withdrew to the main line. Sherman angrily chided
Colonel Buckland for almost bringing on a general engagement. Although
he reported the incident to Grant, Sherman dismissed the action as
nothing more than an enemy reconnaissance. What his men had actually
encountered were the advanced elements of Hardee's corps.
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THE CONFEDERATE COUNCIL OF WAR, APRIL 5, 1862. SHOWN (L—R) ARE
BEAUREGARD, POLK, BRECKINRIDGE, JOHNSTON, BRAGG, AND MAJOR J. F. GILMER.
(LC)
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BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN (LC)
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Several sizable detachments of Confederates were spotted on April 5.
When Col. Jesse J. Appler of the 53rd Ohio heard distant shots, he had
the long roll sounded, calling the men to arms. Sherman reacted with a
stinging rebuke: "Take your damned regiment back to Ohio. There is no
enemy nearer than Corinth." That night a conference was held at division
headquarters, in which Sherman grew angry at the suggestion that
the enemy might attack. "General Sherman's positive manner of uttering
his opinions had the effect to quiet apprehensions of some of the
officers present," remembered one colonel who was present.
Why did Sherman remain so adamant in his position? In defense of his
inaction, he later commented: "For weeks old women had reported that
Beauregard was coming, sometimes with 100,000, sometimes with 300,000."
His attitude, to a degree, was also based on his contempt for militia
officers and volunteer soldiers. Recently accused by the press of being
insane, for making what many Federal authorities considered were
irrational reports of Confederate movements and intentions, perhaps the
nervous Sherman compensated by acting overly confident and in
control.
Grant, likewise, missed the warning signs. On the dark rainy night of
April 4 he severely injured his ankle in a fall from a horse at
Pittsburg Landing. Although now on crutches, he visited the front the
next day. Apprised of enemy activity by Sherman, Grant remained
confident his front was secure. That night, as he sat in the Cherry home
awaiting the arrival of Buell's army, Grant penned a note to Halleck: "I
have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made
upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place."
Not everyone in the Northern camps remained confident. Col. Everett
Peabody, commanding the First Brigade of General Prentiss's division,
suspected the Confederates were nearby in force. On the night of April
5, he went to his contentious division commander Prentiss and suggested
the troops be placed in readiness to receive an attack. Prentiss quickly
dismissed the suggestion. Peabody, nonetheless, did not intend to be
caught unprepared. In the early morning hours of April 6, he organized a
patrol of five infantry companies under Maj. James E. Powell. Totally on
his own authority, Peabody directed Powell, an experienced Old Army
officer, to march down the Seay Field road and seek out the enemy.
Quietly the Federals filed off into the darkness.
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