MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

During the period from March 21 to June 1, 1942, Manzanar was administered as an assembly/reception center under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA), the civilian arm of the Western Defense Command. Pursuant to an memorandum of agreement signed on May 17, administration of the Manzanar camp was turned over to the War Relocation Authority (WRA) on June 1. Henceforth, Manzanar would be operated as a war relocation center under the WRA, an independent agency established to administer the ten relocation centers and implement the government's relocation program. During the first six months of WRA administration of the relocation center, the agency attempted to establish a stable working community amid increasing tensions that reached a violent climax in what would become known as the "Manzanar Incident" or "Manzanar Riot" on December 6.

MANZANAR UNDER THE WCCA

Organizational Structure

On March 11, 1942, DeWitt established the Wartime Civil Control Administration as part of the Civil Division of the Western Defense Command to oversee the evacuation of persons of Japanese descent from the west coast and to operate the assembly and reception centers. The WCCA was composed of Army personnel, former Works Projects Administration staff, and Public Health Service personnel (all on loan), as well as other personnel employed directly by the WCCA. The first persons of Japanese descent entered Manzanar on March 21, 1942. These evacuees, commonly known as the volunteer group, were of the opinion that because they had volunteered to help establish the center, certain concessions would be made to them in its operation.

Shortly after its establishment, the WCCA requested Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management to assume its administrative services. The Central Administrative Services office was located in the Furniture Mart Building in San Francisco. Consequently, it took considerable time for administrative functions at Manzanar to be performed, thus tending to reduce efficiency and foster misunderstanding. To operate the assembly and reception centers under WCCA administration, it was necessary that most of the operational functions be performed by evacuees. Because of the distance between the WCCA main office and Central Administrative Services from Manzanar, numerous administrative decisions were delayed. For instance, it was not until mid-May before evacuees were advised of the salaries they would be paid. Furthermore, the center was in operation for nearly two months before a uniform time keeping system was adopted. As each supervisor had been keeping his own time in his own way, there was considerable dissatisfaction on time reporting. Although the volunteer group went to work in March 1942, no payment for services was made until June 1942.

During the 10-week period that the WCCA operated Manzanar, the camp was operated "by practically two separate and distinct staffs." The first group of administrators, known as appointed personnel, was sent from San Francisco. After a short time, however, the WCCA decided to recruit another group of administrative personnel from southern California to handle the supervisory functions of the center. In addition to this "one practically entire change of personnel," there were continual changes in personnel. Because of the instability in the WCCA staff, few of the appointed personnel were able "to give intelligent answers when questioned by evacuees." Thus, when the WRA assumed control of the center on June 1 it had the formidable task of organizing "a Center rilled with evacuees who had become disillusioned, confused, and incredulous." [1]

Status of Center Operations on June 1

When the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, George H. Dean, a WRA Senior Information Specialist, visited the center and prepared a report, entitled "Conditions at Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, I942." This report, which was referred to in Chapter Eight of this study, provides an overall review of Manzanar's administration and operation during its first ten weeks of existence. The report, according to Dean, was "designed to be factual and objective," and there was "no intention of casting reflection or criticism upon any individual or agency." Rather, it was "intended to be a guide post by which we can gauge our own progress in fashioning and operating this community for the best interests of the commonwealth and of the 10,000 Japanese evacuees for whom this will be home for the duration of the war."

Dean observed that evacuee morale "generally speaking, was very good." Among those who were working at occupations for which they had been trained or had a particular aptitude or liking, it was excellent. For those who had not yet found a satisfactory niche for themselves in the camp's activities or occupations for one reason or another, it could be rated as somewhat belter than fair.

With few exceptions, the evacuees, according to Dean, had "shown a strong desire to improve their surroundings to the best of their abilities.

At Manzanar, the WRA, according to Dean, had acquired "a plant consisting of 724 wooden barracks buildings, a hospital group and a children center" to accommodate the total evacuee population of 9,671. In many instances

especially on those days when heavy arrivals of evacuees occurred, assignments to the barracks have been made perhaps inevitably in an indiscriminate manner, resulting in serious overcrowding in some of the buildings. Many cases existed of eight and ten persons of various ages being housed in a single apartment sometimes two and three separate family units. This has resulted in a health and sanitation problem, and in some scattered instances in an unsatisfactory moral problem.

Floors and walls of the barracks reflected considerable deterioration. Linoleum and felt padding had been ordered for installation in the barracks and mess halls, and these materials had been completed in the messes. About three-fourths of the barracks had been supplied with steps before lumber supplies were shut off. There were no partitions in the men's and women's lavatories. Considerable difficulty had developed from sticking plumbing valves. Improper electrical installation and line overloading because of the large usage of electrical devices by the evacuees were creating an extensive number of daily fuse blowouts as well as serious fire hazards in the barracks. The center's fire protection apparatus, however, consisted of one 500-gallon fire engine loaned to the camp by the U.S. Forest Service.

The center's water supply system was not completed. Tests conducted in May had revealed a "rather high degree of pollution and a trace of E. coli." There had "been a comparatively high incidence of dysentery within the project," and studies were underway "to determine whether this was attributable to pollution of the water supply." Dishwashing equipment was "inadequate and unsanitary," and because of an inadequate supply of hot water, the "dishwashing situation" was considered to be the "most serious health menace in the project" by the chief of the "5th Public Health District." New dishwashing equipment had been ordered, and its installation was underway on June 1.

Sewage was siphoned from the camp under the Los Angeles Aqueduct east of the camp and spread over open land, pending completion of a disposal plant. Sectional drainage problems existed, and water was collecting under some of the barracks. Garbage was "dumped in an open pit east of the project, burned and buried." No attempt was "made to use the wet garbage but plans were being drawn for hog and chicken projects to utilize this waste." Paper was "baled for future sale." Tin cans were "segregated, some being used in handicraft and plant propagation projects."

In all phases of the project, Dean reported that there "existed a serious shortage of equipment." Equipment shortages included

the mess halls, the farm and other project operations. In preparing 100 acres of land for cultivation only one plow was available and it was necessary for the evacuees to work three shifts in order to make maximum use of the limited equipment, and to supplement this with a high proportion of hand tilling, to get the planting done before too late in this comparatively short growing season.

Prior to June 1, little landscaping work had been accomplished with the exception of "a limited, voluntary improvised project in front of the guayule experiment and plant propagation stations." The absence of landscaping was due to the lack of both equipment and stock. In this respect, according to Dean, the project was

substantially as it was when the land first was cleared of the native sagebrush growth. Neither had steps been taken looking towards dust palliation. The project possessed no sprinkler wagon and a limited amount of hosing was done by hand. With the destruction of the natural ground cover, the dust problem is acute on windy days. Plans have been drawn for the restoration of the ground cover with alfalfa and other grasses.

Of the 9,671 evacuees at Manzanar on June 1, nearly one-third (3,165) were employed in "operations, services and functions within the project." About 125 were employed in agriculture, while only seven were involved in "industrial projects, with the exception of the staff in the economics planning section."

The "great bulk of the project employment was in community services" which were "being handled on June 1 by an all-Japanese corps working under J. Mervyn Kidwell." Incoming inductees were met "by members of the Volunteer Service Corps who escorted them to their barracks and informed them of the essential facts regarding the camp." Recent "arrivals of evacuees" had been handled smoothly and with little confusion, "though earlier inductions left much to be desired."

Residents of the center were kept informed of announcements "by bulletins posted on boards in each block and each mess hall," and published in the Manzanar Free Press, a six-page mimeographed camp newspaper issued tri-weekly. Bulletins, all signed by the project director or assistant director, were posted both in English and Japanese.

All "inquiries, complaints and suggestions" were made to a "Japanese-staffed information department." This staff held daily morning conferences to handle "simple" matters, while "policy" matters were referred to the project director who attempted to settle all questions promptly. Complaints were made by the camp residents to the Japanese information service, and verbatim copies were made and transmitted to the proper project section. The information service also took care of personal matters for the evacuees, such as writing letters, aiding them in filling out forms, selective service questionnaires, and other documents. This service maintained a principal office and five sub-offices throughout the camp.

Recreational activities were conducted "under severe shortages in equipment." No funds had been "expended up to June 1 for the purchase of athletic or other equipment," and activities "were conducted with facilities which had been donated to the project or had been provided by the evacuees themselves." Although there was "no dearth of desire to participate in athletics, arts and crafts, music, dancing and other such pursuits" among the evacuees, the "limitation was the absence of sufficient means to keep them engaged."

Japanese arts and crafts instructors worked with their own tools and material and in some instances furnished them to their pupils. The baseball and volleyball equipment in the camp was donated, as were the equipment and toys for the nursery schools. Simple toys, small benches, and tables were made from scraps of wood gathered around the newly-erected barracks. Definite locations for softball and baseball diamonds were impossible to establish. They had been laid out in the firebreaks, but had to be moved frequently just ahead of farm or maintenance equipment which had come to level and prepare the ground for planting. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the evacuees quickly organized a variety of recreational activities.

The overcrowded conditions existing "in a large number of the barracks had fostered many problems in family relationships," which, according to Dean, were "being handled by a Japanese evacuee, Mrs. Kikuchi." Juvenile situations, however, "were comparatively few and most of the cases coming to the attention of Mrs. Kikuchi involved child disobedience and recalcitrance apparently arising out of the changed surroundings, the lack of education facilities to occupy them and the heterogeneous composition of the people residing in the same apartments."

Self government by the evacuees at Manzanar was, according to Dean, "little more than an embryonic state." Block leaders had been elected, and they had organized a project council which, in turn, had elected its officers. A constitution for community government was being prepared, but no evacuee-conducted judicial system had been established to deal with "offenses of a comparatively minor character."

Dean observed that Manzanar housed "an undetermined number of professional and other gamblers." Fifteen evacuees were arrested and pleaded guilty on June 1 before Justice of the Peace C. H. Olds of Inyo County Township who held court in the center's police building. Olds had been brought from Lone Pine "in the absence of any internal judicial setup in the project." This development was the "only instance since the opening of the camp in which evacuees were involved in an offense sufficiently serious to justify the services of a civilian justice." Each of the 15 evacuees was fined $25 and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail. All but $5 of each fine was suspended, subject to good behavior. Olds indicated that his lenience was due to the fact that it was the defendants' first offense, but he warned that in the future punishment would be more severe. According to Dean, no "liquor nor narcotics have been in evidence in the area."

Considerable criticism, according to Dean, had been voiced by evacuees relating to the "procedure followed in permitting evacuees to receive visitors." Outside visitors, mostly white, were allowed by the WCCA to "see the Japanese only on Saturday afternoons and Sundays and then in the police headquarters in the presence of a police officer." On June 1 the WRA issued new visitation policies "permitting the evacuees to receive visitors in their quarters, after automobiles are parked in the police area."

In response to evacuee complaints that they had been "separated from their furniture and other family possessions," the WRA promptly asked evacuees to prepare inventories of their belongings and conducted a survey to determine the amount of warehouse space available. Of the 40 warehouses constructed at Manzanar, eight or nine were available for this purpose. Many of the warehouses, however, were not being utilized to their fullest capacity "because of the danger of overloading the flooring and causing it to collapse."

Dean observed that the WCCA's "evacuation and resettlement program" did not provide for the inauguration "of a full education program for the Japanese until this autumn." Although no "regular" schools were in operation on June 1, classes in English and in arts and crafts and music were underway. Americanization classes had been organized with an enrollment of about 250 aliens.

Dean noted that under the WCCA, passes to outsiders for admittance to the camp were handled by both the police department and the project director. When the WRA assumed control of the camp, however, orders were issued immediately that all passes must be signed by the director. All passes issued to Japanese on errands outside the camp were signed by the project director and the Japanese were required at all times to be accompanied by a Caucasian.

Twenty mess halls were in operation on June 1, each accommodating approximately 500 persons. Sixteen additional mess halls, although constructed, were inoperative because of the lack of plumbing facilities and mess equipment. Messes had not been built for the hospital or appointed personnel.

Dean found the rate of flow of supplies from the warehouses to the mess halls was satisfactory, the menus adequate, and the food well prepared. Food and other supplies, however, were frequently "issued from the warehouses without proper requisitions resulting in a large amount of confusion in accounting and inventories."

Because of the sixteen inoperative mess halls, there was "considerable overloading of the messes" in operation. It was necessary for the evacuees to stand in line for 20-45 minutes in temperatures averaging around 90 degrees. Thus, the WRA immediately took steps "to evolve a staggered system of meal hours until such time as the additional mess halls can be opened."

Dean reported that there was no system of identification in effect which would require persons to take their meals in the mess hall in their particular blocks. Menus in the operating mess halls were not standardized. Thus, there was a "considerable 'shopping around' for the mess hall that served the meal most to their liking, resulting in overcrowding of some messes and slight underloading in others." There were numerous cases "of persons doubling up on their meals from one mess hall to another, particularly at breakfast."

Different menus were in effect for the appointed personnel's "Mess No. 1." This mess "was obviously much better than the menus served to the evacuees," resulting in "considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese who observed the fact or were informed of it by the white personnel." Steaks and other elaborate dishes were served at a cost of 25 cents per meal. Accordingly, the WRA took immediate steps to standardize the mess menus "between the Japanese and the staff personnel."

Dishes, utensils, and cooking equipment were in short supply. Table service was generally satisfactory, although "greatly overstaffed." There were an insufficient number of sinks and occasional shortages of hot water. Two more sinks were necessary in each mess hall for the proper disposition of dishwater. Careless disposal of dishwater resulted in an unsanitary condition in the vicinity of the mess kitchens.

On June 1 the hospital facilities at Manzanar consisted of a "10-bed improvised hospital in one of the barracks buildings, an isolation ward, an out-patients' clinic and a children's ward." Ninety-two patients were hospitalized. Of these, there were 42 cases of "uncomplicated measles," three cases of "German measles," and nine cases of "chickenpox." Under normal circumstances and with proper residential facilities, these cases "might have been treated outside a hospital." The other 38 cases "in the professional judgment of Dr. James M. Goto, chief of the medical staff, hospitalization was absolutely necessary."

Syphilis and tuberculosis "were known to exist among the evacuees, probably in about the same proportion as among the general Japanese population." No personnel with sufficient training, however, were available to conduct a comprehensive survey. No syphilis nor typhoid tests had been given to any of the persons employed in the mess halls. Immunization of all evacuees for smallpox had been nearly completed by June 1, but diphtheria immunization had just begun and no vaccine for whooping cough, which was "quite prevalent" in the camp, had been received. Immunization for other communicable diseases was not contemplated because of the lack of sufficient staff and facilities.

Respiratory ailments "showed a tendency to spread among families housed in overcrowded apartments." In some instances, "where eight or ten persons" had been housed in the same unit, "severe respiratory diseases" had "afflicted as high as five or six members of the family."

Manzanar did not have a trained dietician or sanitarian as of June 1, although several students had received some training and were acting as "sanitary inspectors under the direction of Dr. Togasaki." Prenatal and post-natal work was carried on by the hospital staff, and formula and immunization was provided for babies under two years of age and special diets for children under five years.

"A rather high incidence of athlete's foot existed" at Manzanar, the source of "infection apparently being in the shower rooms." Dysentery "was occurring at a sufficiently high rate to indicate there was some contamination of the water supply." Investigations by the state health department indicated the "probability the contamination occurred east of the intake." The water supply line traversed "an area through which pass bands of sheep on their way to the mountains." A chlorinator had been installed prior to June 1, but it apparently had not been in constant operation.

Since its opening, Manzanar had "had three deaths." The deaths included "one from advanced tuberculosis, one from a heart attack probably attributable to the altitude, and a third from a kidney ailment of long standing." This number was "considered low for a community of this size."

According to Dean, approximately 100 acres had been prepared for cultivation and about 75 acres had been planted "to diversified vegetable crops, including fifteen acres of tomatoes." "Crops on sixteen acres were above ground." Some 125 Japanese were employed in the plowing and planting, working three shifts a day with a single Fordson tractor and plow." "About 1,000 fruit-trees, mostly apple and pear, which were on the property when it was taken over by the government" were "being revived and will bear some fruit this fall, though they had not been watered for nearly fifteen years except by the ordinarily scant precipitation of the area."

A propagating nursery was in operation at Manzanar, "chiefly with plantings from native seeds, and seeds brought into the relocation center by the evacuees themselves." Seeds for landscaping stock were on order. [2]

MANZANAR UNDER THE WRA

Organizational Structure

The War Relocation Authority assumed full administrative responsibility for the Manzanar War Relocation Center on June 1, 1942, with a skeleton staff, consisting only of a project director, assistant project director, administrative officer, supply and transportation officer, procurement officer, and telephone operator. At that date, the WRA had not made a decision as to what staff was necessary for the operation of the center. Thus, the WCCA agreed to leave some of its employees at Manzanar until June 15 to permit the WRA time to determine its administrative needs and recruit a staff.

On June 1 there were approximately 55 WCCA employees at Manzanar, most of whom had come from the Works Projects Administration. Twenty-five were temporary as work foremen (6), Caucasian police (10), Caucasian firemen (4), and truck drivers (5). Of the remaining 30, Nash recommended the employment of 14, five of which were approved by the WRA office in San Francisco by June 6. [3]

On June 6 a master chart for the administrative organization each of the relocation centers was issued by the WRA. This chart provided for a project director as the chief administrative officer of each center. He was assisted by an assistant project director who had direct supervision of the transportation and supply, maintenance and operations, employment and housing, and administrative divisions. The transportation and supply division included motor pool, mess management, and warehousing sections. [4] The maintenance and operations division included building and grounds maintenance and garage sections. The employment and housing division supervised the occupational coding and records, quarters, and placement sections. The administrative division included procurement, property control, personnel records, office services, and budget and finance (cost accounting, fiscal accounting, and audit units) sections. [5]

This organizational chart remained in operation until October 1, 1942, when an agency reorganization plan was implemented. At that time three divisions at each center — employment and housing, transportation and supply, and administration — were placed under the supervision of the assistant project director. The maintenance and operation section was discarded and the motor pool, warehousing, equipment maintenance, and moss operation units were placed under transportation and supply. The building and grounds maintenance section was transferred to the public works division which was under the direct supervision of the project director. This organization remained in effect until December 15 when the entire staff at Manzanar would be reorganized in the wake of the "Manzanar Riot." [6]

Appointed Personnel

The WRA encountered serious problems in recruiting administrative staff for Manzanar throughout 1942. Aside from an acute manpower shortage on the west coast during the war, other contributing factors included: (1) higher rates of pay, plus overtime and double-time, in west coast war-related industries; (2) isolation of the project; (3) adverse climate; (4) temporary nature of employment (Many felt that project would close long before it did); and (5) the fact that some people did not wish to work with persons of Japanese ancestry.

Staff recruitment at Manzanar "was made extremely difficult" since prospective employees had to be approved by the 12th Civil Service District that administered the entire west coast. The center was from two to three days by mail service from the San Francisco office of the Civil Service Commission, making it virtually impossible to obtain approval of an assignment in less than one week. The Civil Service Commission offered Manzanar its cooperation, but it often did not have applicants interested in working at Manzanar.

Thus, the burden of recruitment was left largely to center management. Recruitment of Manzanar staff was conducted by the assistant project director through personal contacts, by the personnel officer through contacts principally in Los Angeles, and by soliciting the cooperation of project staff members who referred to the personnel management section persons they could interest in employment at the center.

Despite these problems, the WRA recruited a total of 229 employees during 1942. Of this number, 209 were new employees and 20 were transferred from other government agencies. The staff at Manzanar averaged about 200 during its first six months under the WRA.

At the time of their appointment new employees were given considerable information on the purpose and philosophy of the WRA. However, there was never time or sufficient personnel staff to arrange for more than one such conference with each new employee "to learn how they were adjusting to their assignments and their new surroundings, and whether they were properly placed."

Recruitment for various positions was difficult because salaries established by the organizational chart in accordance with Civil Service classification procedures were inadequate when compared with salaries being paid for similar work on the west coast. This problem was illustrated by the position of elementary teacher. In an attempt to staff the elementary school, Manzanar camp administrators wrote letters to every known teacher placement bureau in the United States. The majority of the elementary teaching staff was recruited from the South and Middle West where the salary scales were less than that established on the Manzanar organizational chart. Most of these teachers, however, taught for only several months at Manzanar and then transferred to public school systems in California where the pay scale and living conditions were more attractive.

Housing for appointed personnel also posed a problem for recruitment and retention at Manzanar during 1942. On August, housing quarters for administrative staff at Manzanar consisted of nine housekeeping apartments and 16 bachelor quarters. The latter were adequate for two single employees each. It was obvious that the quarters provided were not sufficient for a staff of approximately 200 people. The problem was met during 1942 by the decision to house employees and their families in the evacuee barracks, thus exacerbating the already overcrowded housing conditions in the camp. Families of three or more persons were assigned to two-bedroom apartments, while two-person families received one-bedroom apartments. Single women were housed in dormitories, and single men in bachelor quarters two to an apartment. The only exceptions were for single section heads who received one-bedroom apartments and single employees who secured medical certificates from the Principal Medical Officer showing that they required diets different from those served in the administrative mess. The latter were assigned to one-bedroom apartments with the understanding that each share the same with another single person.

Another problem that hindered recruitment and retention of appointed personnel was related to the issue of recreation at Manzanar. The camp was located 5 miles from Independence and 12 miles from Lone Pine. Those employees who had their own transportation, even with gas rationing, had access to various forms of recreation in these small towns. However, many employees had no means of transportation, and no recreational facilities were available to them, thus contributing to their sense of isolation and low morale. [7]

New Manzanar Administrator

On May 20, 1942, Roy Nash, former superintendent of a large Indian agency in California, arrived at Manzanar to assume the office of Project Director for the War Relocation Authority, replacing Clayton E. Triggs, the former WPA administrator who had served in that position under the WCCA since inception of the camp in March. This change of administration, while the camp was still being constructed and evacuee contingents were still arriving, was, according to the "Project Director's Report" in the Final Report, Manzanar, prepared by Brown and Merritt, "a confusing time to 'switch horses.'" The evacuees, beset by scores of petty, as well as fundamental, problems and worries, and the camp management struggling to help resolve those problems and cope with administrative issues, were "just beginning to understand one another and to understand a few things which should be done to put the machinery of management in high gear."

The War Relocation Authority brought in new organizational ideas and new managers who, according to Brown and Merritt, had "no knowledge of the road already traveled." Although not the "best strategy," this operational methodology was "understandable when one remembers WRA set up new centers, ready for occupancy, and staffed before any evacuees were sent there, in all instances except Manzanar." While the WRA had "a new start with each other group of people," at Manzanar it "took over a going institution, stopped most of the wheels at one stroke, and started off on a new track." The abrupt change in camp administration would have repercussions for both camp management and the evacuee population during the coming months. [8]

Only six persons in supervisory or managerial capacity were carried over from the WCCA management to the WRA management. The WCCA managers who were replaced were generally bitter about being terminated, and they spread rumors about the WRA in nearby Owens Valley towns. The rumors left the impression that the WCCA, as a result of its connection to the Army, knew how to handle "Japs," but the WRA was a "social welfare outfit who will coddle 'em'." Before leaving Manzanar, some of the outgoing WCCA employees destroyed "valuable records" and sowed seeds of dissension, stirring up their evacuee assistants and helpers by spreading other rumors — "especially one they would not get paid by WRA for what they had done." According to Brown and Merritt, the WCCA employees "left the place in a bad state of confusion." [9]

According to Brown and Merritt, the decision by Nash to remove virtually all WCCA employees, even though there were no immediate replacements, was indicative of his "determination and ability to make quick decisions." Nash, a dynamic personality, had a "tendency to make fast decisions" and a determination "to carry these out in the face of any amount of difficulty." Some of his decisions "were faulty and some excellent," but "no course could be charted by any regularity of goodness or badness from that time out." Two other developments early in Nash's tenure as Project Director illustrated his tendency to make snap decisions that would have repercussions for camp operations during the ensuing months. [10]

In his first public address, Nash informed the evacuees at Manzanar that they could take advantage of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, some ten miles west of the center. This statement was received "with loud cheers by the evacuees who had their eyes on the streams and lakes of the region," but it was also received "with loud cries of protest by the local people who feared more than anything lax control by the new management." Individuals and organizations immediately telegraphed DeWitt and the Western Defense Command, and "a reprimand came flying back to the new Director — who had acted in good faith, but blindly — which made him countermand his order of allowing visits to the mountains." Describing the impact of this matter on the evacuee population, Brown and Merritt observed:

Although many of the residents understood the situation, still it was a bad start for the new management. To have the green fields of heaven thrown open with unrestricted invitation on one week, and then to have these same fields barred forever the next week was a bitter pill to swallow . . . and even those who understood were heard to mutter,' I wonder if it was done on purpose?" [11]

According to Brown and Merritt, the rumor started by the fired WCCA employees on wages began "to bear fruit shortly after the new management took over." Many evacuees had money in savings accounts, but they were running out of available cash needed to purchase "simple incidentals." Some who had lost most of their possessions in the evacuation, such as those from Terminal Island, were "in acute need for simple necessities such as toothpaste, soap, tobacco, and cosmetics." The lack-of-pay rumor, starting first as a whispering campaign but later growing to a rumbling storm, disturbed the new WRA administrators. As continuing discussions at the highest levels of the federal government resulted in no immediate solution to the amount and method of pay checks for the evacuees, Nash "on his own responsibility made an agreement with the Canteen to honor script to the extent of five dollars per person, the script to be redeemed later when these persons received their first pay checks." Nash immediately had "five-dollar script coupons printed in the local printing establishment and 'paid' all workers the five dollars on account," thus temporarily relieving tensions and placing the "new management back in the confidence of the people." [12]

Deteriorating Morale and Public Relations at Manzanar

On June 6 to 8, at the end of the first week of the WRA's operation of the Manzanar camp, Colonel C. F. Cress, deputy director of the WRA, visited the relocation center to observe its operation and gain firsthand knowledge about the progress of the WRA takeover of the camp. Although he felt that the WRA was making "satisfactory progress," he was concerned about the deteriorating morale both in the camp and the surrounding region. He observed:

that the situation in the Owens Valley Area may suddenly become very unsatisfactory or even dangerous, due to the attitudes of individuals of any one of four groups. These groups are: The civilian residents of Owens Valley, the disgruntled discharged employees of WPA still in the Valley, the employees of WRA and the Japanese themselves. In my opinion, words alone can do immeasurable damage at this time.

Cress observed that the Owens Valley residents felt

that the Federal representatives have not kept their promises that the Relocation Center should cause no additional expense to Inyo County and that the Japanese would be kept under close guard and thus cause little inconvenience to the local inhabitants. In this connection Congressman Leland Ford emphasized to his constituents during his visit on May 5th that the agreement between Congress and the War Department called for 50 Caucasian civilians to be kept as internal police and for a close guard of the Japanese at all times.

According to Cress, the Owens Valley residents also maintained

more than a slight interest in the WPA project personnel who have lived among them for over three months. When WRA assumed control at Manzanar and discharged certain WPA employees, the local paper charged politics. However, the Editor's definition of politics was - the running in of a new gang while using the Civil Service gag and the cut in salary racket to force efficient WPA employees out. This feeling was intensified by the fact that the local residents have strong prejudices against Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel.

At this time the policy of our organization with reference to Owens Valley people should be close mouths and no speeches or loose promises. We should also seek to have WCCA formally declare the Manzanar relocation area a military area and to work out, ourselves, some procedure whereby the expenses to Inyo County will be minimized and the possibility of Japanese voting in this county eliminated.

Cress also commented on the disruptive influence of some discharged WCCA employees that were still in Owens Valley. He noted that some

of them are bitter over the loss of their jobs and have expressed their feelings to both the local residents and the Japanese. They are the potential interpreters of any loose talk by WRA employees, or any untoward incidents.

Cress also described the problems caused by the new WRA employees and managers at Manzanar during the first week of the WRA's administration of the camp. He stated:

Our own WRA employees at Manzanar are not yet an integrated group. Our greatest weakness is a lack of procedures and policies and a tendency to make changes rapidly. There are leaks in our organization. I felt that some of our employees still have a paternalistic attitude rather than the idea of helping the Japanese help themselves. However, this idea is not shared by the Project Director.

One incident, according to Cress, had caused "considerable confusion related to project area restrictions." Echoing the aforementioned observations by Brown and Merritt, Cress noted:

. . . On May 17th at public meeting of the Japanese in Manzanar, Mr. Triggs and Mr. Nash made speeches. Mr. Triggs announced that WRA would make some relaxation of the confining restrictions on the Japanese. Mr. Nash then told the crowd that Colonel Magill, Provost Marshall, Fourth Army, had agreed that there would be a freeing of the limits; that a fence would be erected along the front of the relocation area and half way along each side and that the back area would be left open, although patrolled by military police, so that the Japanese would be free to wander from camp to the mountains if they desired. The following Sunday some of the Japanese went out of camp toward the mountains and were brought back by the military guards. Either the Japanese misunderstood or they were trying out the management. Shortly before, a military police guard had shot a Japanese who attempted to pass beyond the camp limits and who failed to obey his order to halt. These two incidents alarmed the residents of Owens Valley and caused considerable repercussions among the Japanese.

Cress also noted that the Japanese evacuees had been "disturbed by the situation," observing that they "do not understand why the management of their camp was changed, nor why their Caucasian friends were fired." The urgent needs of the evacuees were "relief from the present overcrowding in quarters and the materials to fix up their homes." In addition to these tensions, there was general alarm in the camp because of the "possibilities of an epidemic" "when the fly and mosquito period begins."

Cress sensed that "we have a number of Japanese evacuees sniping at us." This sniping could "easily be turned into active opposition and into positive acts, if we provoke it." On the other hand, the "bulk of the evacuees want their problem of satisfactory living to be solved and will welcome constructive action."

Cress was "convinced if WRA stops talking and gives the Japanese a chance to help themselves, the situation will be solved." However, he was "also satisfied that all of the explosive elements are present in Owens Valley for real trouble." Policy changes "must be placed into effect slowly and with due regard to the public reaction of the various groups concerned." [13]

Brown and Merritt also discussed the declining morale in the camp and its deteriorating public relations in Owens Valley in their "Project Director's Report" in the Final Report, Manzanar. According to their assessment, much of the goodwill in Owens Valley communities that had been developed by Triggs during March and April 1942 was dissipated during the early weeks of WRA management as a result of "the failure on the part of the Project Director to understand the position of the local people." During his first week of administration, Nash had a brief visit with Merritt chairman of the Citizen's Committee, but he had no further contacts with that organization. Several months later, after public relations with the valley towns "were completely severed," he asked the committee to meet. When the members "pointed out the true state of affairs and suggested the Committee disband," Nash "was in hearty accord with the decision."

In an effort to restore outside community and camp management relationships, Brown arranged for Nash to speak at several luncheon clubs. The speeches, however, only served to antagonize the communities because the general theme of the talks was that "Most of these people are American citizens and are entitled to all the rights you enjoy, but other American citizens, including you people, want to deny them these rights."

Public relations with Owens Valley communities, according to Brown and Merritt, reached rock-bottom after two incidents which received considerable publicity in the local press. Nash authorized the Chief of Community Services to take a number of evacuees up one of the canyons west of the camp for a picnic. The group was eating lunch on the porch of a cabin owned by a local man who arrived unexpectedly to find it "swarming," to use his words, "with Japs." Later Nash, accompanied by an Army colonel, took Dr. James Goto, the chief evacuee doctor at Manzanar, and his wife to a restaurant in Lone Pine "where a too-obvious display was made of serving cocktails and the "de luxe' dinner." [14]

The deteriorating public relations also resulted from the fact that the Army and WCCA had contracted much indebtedness in the nearby communities, none of which had been paid by June 1. After the WRA takeover, the center finances were handled by Central Administrative Services in San Francisco. Payment of project obligations was so slow that most of the community did not desire to deal with the project, and some merchants went so far as to indicate that they did not desire the business of the appointed personnel. [15]

On June 26, less than a month after the WRA took over administration of Manzanar, George Savage, editor of the Inyo Independent and a member of the original local advisory committee for the camp, wrote a stinging editorial rebuke of Nash and WRA management policies. Prior to this time, his editorials had provided strong support for the Manzanar camp, but Nash's activities had turned that support to disgust and frustration, if not outright opposition. This editorial reflected the growing widespread opposition to Manzanar by the Owens Valley populace, and, according to Brown and Merritt, that disgust was "to be found with the employees at the project and was beginning to infiltrate in the evacuees." Among other things, Savage observed:

Milton Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority ... is reported to have resigned last week as Director. . . .

We wonder if Mr. Eisenhower hadn't come to realize that the WRA is a hot potato, just a little too warm to handle with bureaucratic tongs.

The WRA, with its social service approach to Japanese problems plus its very evident examples of maladministration, already had two strikes against it. ...

We believe wholeheartedly that the administration of the Japanese, in all camps, whether they be relocation areas or assembly centers, should be under direct charge of the United States Army, with an agency like the WCCA, which was directly answerable to the Army. . . .

In regard to the present administration at Manzanar, we cannot understand how Director Roy Nash can completely ignore the people of this county on the policies he is establishing there.

He is releasing Japanese to go on picnics and parties to points other than in the relocation area. A number of Japanese were taken last Sunday to Seven Pines and Kearsarge Valley. Another group was on George's Creek, fishing.

In view of the fact that federal jurisdiction has not yet been settled, insofar as Manzanar is concerned, and that Army responsibility is being ignored in permitting Japanese to leave the camp, Mr. Nash can hardly expect to have his program welcomed with open arms by the people of Inyo.

We would like to ask why Mr. Nash has not been more cooperative with the Ross Aeronautical School, which is seeking a small water supply for Manzanar airport use? Does Mr. Nash and the WRA think it more important to ignore the training of pilots for Army service in favor of the Japanese who have been evacuated here?.. . .

Mr. Nash promised some time ago to discuss local problems with the Board of Supervisors. To date he had not done so.

We would like also to ask why Mr. Nash hung up the telephone on the Inyo county deputy district attorney recently? A good administrator is at least courteous.

And why is it, Mr. Nash, that a truck laden with Japanese, can go almost a hundred miles round trip from Manzanar to near Darwin to secure a Joshua tree for use in adorning a rock garden being built at Manzanar. And here we are joining with the nation in a scrap rubber drive to secure rubber to keep the needed wheels of our nation moving. Maybe it's more worth while to get Joshua trees by driving many miles on valuable rubber than it is to conserve rubber.

But, this is only one sample of the kind of waste one sees every day in and around Manzanar.

Why is it that Manzanar has to be in such a state of turmoil? Queer, isn't it, that most of this has occurred since Mr. Nash and WRA arrived on the scene.

We are thoroughly disgusted with the whole deal. [16]

MANZANAR CAMP OPERATIONS DURING 1942

Despite the declining morale in the Manzanar camp and its worsening public relations with Owens Valley residents, the new WRA staff began to assemble at the center during early June 1942. Although construction of the camp was not complete, the many facets of its operation, elements of which had first begun under the WCCA in March, slowly developed throughout the remainder of 1942.

Reports Division

The Reports Division at Manzanar, which evolved out of the "Information Service," was the first administrative unit to be developed at any assembly or reception center during the evacuation program under the WCCA. [17] The first evacuees arrived at Manzanar on March 21 in two busses containing 84 people. In this group were two former newspapermen who had been, respectively, the assistant editor and the English section editor of a daily Los Angeles Japanese newspaper. The day following their arrival, the two men offered their services to the Project Director, recommending that they set up an information booth where all incoming evacuees could get instructions and information and where administrative notices could be posted. The plan was accepted by Project Manager Triggs and on March 23 Manzanar's Information Service was established.

Earlier on March 15, 1942, Robert Brown, executive secretary of the Inyo-Mono Associates, was appointed as Public Information Officer for Manzanar. His duties included public relations with the small communities in Inyo County as well as the dissemination of information within the camp. Thus, supervision of the Information Service became his responsibility.

Manzanar Free Press. As evacuees began pouring into Manzanar in late March and early April, the need arose for some means of disseminating information throughout the center in addition to the efforts of the Public Information Office. Brown recommended to his superiors in San Francisco, after obtaining the concurrence of the Project Director, that a daily mimeographed newspaper be established. The suggestion was forwarded to DeWitt who denied permission to print a newspaper. In spite of the denial, the need for dissemination of information became so great at Manzanar that the WRA's Chief of Public Relations in the San Francisco and Robert Brown "decided to launch a newspaper on their own authority and present the accomplished fact to the office of the General, hoping that the product would be so good that it would force that office to recognize the need and accept the answer to the need."

The name, Manzanar Free Press, was suggested by the Chief of Public Relations in San Francisco. According to Brown, it "was hoped that the name would give the people who were later to work on the paper a feeling of pride and that they would strive to uphold the best in newspaper tradition in writing news honestly, fearlessly, and with complete freedom of mind." [18]

The first issue of the Manzanar Free Press was printed on a mimeograph press on April 11, 1942, when the center had, according to the headline, 3,302 residents. This newspaper was the first of its kind to be printed in an assembly or relocation center. It was a two-sheet, four-page, two-column edition, put together by a hastily recruited staff of five evacuees by Brown whose work records showed some experience on newspapers.

A small article on page one of the newspaper was addressed to DeWitt, complimenting him on his understanding and humane operation of the mechanics of the evacuation. [19] According to John D. Stevens, an associate professor of journalism at the University of Michigan who researched assembly and relocation center newspapers, these were the "first and only kind words which ever appeared in an evacuee publication about the man most" evacuees "blamed for their removal." A week later DeWitt, perhaps influenced by the article in the Manzanar Free Press, gave official blessings to issuance of newspapers in all centers. [20]

According to Brown, during the first several months of the newspaper's publication, various individuals representing groups within Manzanar attempted "by every method from persuasion to threat" to gain control of the newspaper. Despite these attempts, Brown asserted that "at no time did any special interest or special group 'control'" the newspaper, although he believed that prior to December 6 "its pages and its editorials were aimed perhaps too exclusively at the Nisei." In its earliest days, "when it was accused of being totally Nisei, the FREE PRESS had served a greater cause, as many of its editorials were reprinted in daily papers from coast to coast enlightening thousands of readers to whom the evacuation was merely a wire-service dispatch from the West Coast."

The first issue of the Manzanar Free Press contained an editorial describing its editorial policies. The editorial noted:

We don't have a 'policy'. . . . Politics are out! We don't have to worry about what our advertisers think! We will have no circulation department worries .... This to a newspaper man or woman is plain Utopia. We should be able to devote all our creative effort to make this sheet one of the liveliest ever printed and one of the most democratic .... So far we don't even have an editor to worry us, so without this last bothersome detail, we should have a lot of fun. . . [21]

According to Brown, this editorial was "written purposely to allay fears that the paper was a 'voice of the management,' or the 'voice of the Nisei,' or the voice of anything." There was no editor, because management "was slowly feeling its way toward solving the complexities of leadership." Soon after the first issue, an "editorial board" was established consisting of the original four reporters — Joe Blarney, city editor; Sam Hohri, feature editor; Chiye Mori, news editor; and Tomomasa Yamasaki, editorial. [22] On May 19, six weeks after the first issue Yamasaki, was named the editor. [23]

After two weeks as editor, Yamasaki was elected a Block Leader. He left the newspaper, and the editorial board again functioned as a group.

On June 9 the Manzanar Free Press printed an editorial announcing a "new policy." The editorial stated:

We want to repeat again that the Free Press belongs to the people of Manzanar, that, instead of being merely the mouthpiece of the administration, it strives to express the opinions of the evacuees in the solution of immediate and foreseen problems.

If possible, we want to be the open forum for discussion of administration policies because these policies will directly affect every individual here. We know that the administration will welcome a healthy and active interest on the part of the residents as it is only with harmonious cooperation that our Shangri-La can be built. [24]

On July 22 the Manzanar Free Press was the first relocation center newspaper to change its format and become an independent journal, changing from a mimeographed sheet to a four-page printed newspaper in tabloid form. Chiye Mori became the new editor and served in that capacity until the December "incident." [25]

Since the newspaper staff members were able to relocate with relative ease, there was a continuous turnover in its staff. Because of this turnover it was necessary to carry on a program of in-service training. Young untrained people came to the newspaper office for training at the same time doing a day's work for the organization. During the first year the Brown gave considerable personal attention to training. Journalism classes were organized and held at night, using daily copy as text material. Shorthand classes taught by one of the secretaries on the staff were also offered. The chief mimeograph operator took one untrained person a month to train on mimeograph work. The head artist held weekly classes in illustrating and use of the stylus on stencils. Typists were coached in form and style by the senior typists.

From the beginning of the newspaper, many Issei evacuees at Manzanar complained that, because the newspaper was written exclusively in English, it was only for the Nisei and that it meant nothing to them since they could not read English. For a period it was felt that this might be a means of inducing those Issei who could not read English to study the language, but, according to Brown, "it was soon discovered that this was an idle dream."

Both camp management and the editorial staff of the newspaper understood the difficulties of issuing a Japanese edition of the Manzanar Free Press. Most of the Nisei on the newspaper could not read Japanese, and those who could cautioned against issuing such an edition because of attempts which might be made to write with "double meaning."

Nevertheless, camp management realized that only the younger people in the center were being reached by the newspaper. Efforts were undertaken to find some means for issuing a Japanese language supplement which would be a "strict translation of the English version, but which would get the news across to the older residents." In May and June 1942 two persons joined the appointed personnel who could read Japanese. In July the Catholic Church appointed a priest to aid the Catholic congregation at Manzanar who could also read Japanese. Using these staff members as a "board of censors," management felt it could begin issue of a Japanese language edition. An editorial board, composed of an Issei, Kibei, and Nisei, was chosen for this section of the newspaper. Copy had to pass all three for clarity, form, and content before it was submitted to the appointed personnel board and printed.

The WRA office in San Francisco was informed of the decision to publish the paper in Japanese. That office informed various security agencies and requested that management forward copies of all Japanese language editions to these agencies. The newspaper published 11 issues with Japanese sections in June 1942 before Washington ordered it to stop. The section resumed August 21, but like similar sections in other centers, it was supposed to carry only translations of material published in the English section. That policy changed on October 1 when it was announced that the four-page Japanese language supplement would publish original as well as translated material subject to WRA guidelines. [26]

The goal of the newspaper's original staff was to replace the mimeographed format with a printed sheet as soon as finances could be found to fund such an operation. When the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises was established in June 1942, the newspaper staff approached the cooperative's board, asking that it underwrite the cost of six printed issues with the understanding that (1) as outside advertising came in, the cost would be reduced to the cooperative, and (2) that advertising space would continue to be available until the initial underwriting cost was absorbed. It was agreed that if advertising revenue did not cover the cost of the paper, the cooperative would absorb the difference. In return, the newspaper would make available to the cooperative enough space to balance the cost at regular advertising rates. This space could be used for an educational or news column with material exclusively aimed at developing interest in the cooperative movement at Manzanar. Outside advertising revenue was not sufficient to cover the entire cost for each issue, and the cooperative continued to underwrite or take enough advertising to keep the newspaper in printed form until near the closing of the center in 1945.

After this agreement with the cooperative, the masthead of the newspaper carried a statement that described its publishing status. The statement — "Official Publication of the Manzanar Relocation Center Administration, and Newspaper of Manzanar Community Enterprises." According to Brown, this differentiation between editorial control and ownership continued until the end of the publication — "not without its struggles, by any means — but the status was maintained."

The newspaper was supplied free of charge to all evacuees. Extra copies sold at five cents each, while initial mail subscriptions and subscriptions to appointed personnel were six dollars a year or 50 cents per month. Advertising rates initially were 35 cents an inch. At its height, circulation reached 3,700 copies, and mail subscriptions covered virtually every state in the nation. The financial support provided by the cooperative, which was in effect owned by the residents, made it possible to produce a newspaper at a cost of less than one cent per person per month. Advertisers included many local firms in Inyo County that sold merchandise to the cooperative and many national firms such as Sears, Roebuck and Company, the Wool Trading Company of New York, and the Golden State and Borden milk companies.

The Chalfant Press, owned by George Savage in nearby Lone Pine, printed the Manzanar Free Press from July 22, 1942, onward. Difficulties developed because the newspaper's evacuee editors could not leave the center to go to the print shop when the copy was ready for printing. Nor was it possible to run proofs to bring them back to the center to make up a dummy for retransmission back to the printer. The printer, in turn, was handicapped by a small staff.

These difficulties were worked out by careful editing of typewritten copy and by giving the linotype operator and printer a concentrated education in Japanese names and phrases. The linotype operator edited most of the copy as he cast the slugs, and the printer filled in where he missed. The cooperation of this firm "went far to make the paper the success that it was from a layout and production standpoint." [27]

Documentary Reports. Soon after the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, 1942, Brown recommended that a documentary record be started that would be more of a summary of the life in the center than was being documented by the Manzanar Free Press. He believed that the reports should be written to provide background for events or currents in center life, and that they should emphasize the evolving life of evacuees in the camp, provide an interpretation of life in the center, and occasionally provide evacuee opinion sampling.

Joe Masaoka, an evacuee who as a Japanese American Citizens League leader had gained considerable recognition before the evacuation in newspaper circles in Southern California as a result of his cooperation with military and naval authorities, was chosen to prepare the documentary reports. As his assistant, he chose Togo Tanaka, the prewar English-language editor of the Los Angeles-based Rafu Shimpo newspaper. According to Brown, as "events turned out, the wisdom of choosing the latter could be questioned, but the choice of the former paid good dividends to the management of the Center and to the national program."

This team turned in its first report on June 9, 1942. Reports, written in a "news-magazine style," were submitted at a rate of two or three a week until December 7, 1942. Excerpts from the reports, or at times the complete reports, were sent to the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco to keep that office apprised of events at Manzanar. After the December 6 incident, the authors of the special documentation were relocated for their protection. Thereafter, a system of reporting from the blocks was instituted, which "probably gave a better overall picture of daily events, but which lacked the color of the earlier reports." [28]

Daily Block Reports. The aforementioned Information Office was destined to play a vital role in the early administration of the Manzanar camp. Under the general supervision of the WCCA's Welfare Section, the Information Office established four branches in the center, employing 57 people, and performing a variety of services. The office handled inquiries and complaints, translated letters for residents from Japanese to English and vice versa. For a period, it handled mail before establishing an independent mail system within the center. It wrote all bulletin material in both English and Japanese, and handled a "Volunteer Service Corps" which grew to include 450 persons who worked without pay helping incoming evacuees to get settled.

Shortly after administration of the center was taken over by the WRA, the first attempt at representation within the blocks was started. Block Leaders were appointed by the administration from candidates who were nominated by the block residents. The Block Leaders met and elected a chairman. Out of this came a "Town Hall" organization and a weekly meeting of Block Leaders with the Project Director.

Conflicts arose between the Block Leaders and the managers of the Information Service. The residents had become comfortable with taking their problems to the Information Office, and the staff had either answered questions and complaints or forwarded the questions to the camp administration for discussion with officials. Because the system worked smoothly, residents were slow to fake their troubles to the newly-elected or appointed Block Leaders.

On May 20, 1942, supervision of the Information Office was transferred from the Welfare Section to the Information Office. By June 1, when the WRA took over, it was apparent that the conflict between the Block Leaders and the Information Office workers had to be settled. A plan was developed to break up the Information Office as a unit and transfer its personnel to the Block Leader organization. In the new organization they would act as clerks for the Block Leaders, carrying on the type of work they had been doing, while the Block Leaders were left free to work with people in the blocks, attend meetings, and supervise the work of their assistants.

The two top men of the Information Office were offered positions, one as chief clerk in the "Town Hall" or main office of the Block Leaders, the other as assistant to the reports officer. It was determined that the clerk in the Block Leaders' office would make daily reports of happenings, conditions, complaints within each block. The reports would be forwarded to the chief clerk in the Town Hall, who would answer most questions, discuss questions of importance with the reports officer and his assistant, and prepare a daily summary of activity which the reports officer would circulate to staff members and forward to the Regional Office in San Francisco.

Approximately half of the staff of the old Information Service joined the new Block Leaders' organization which continued until the center closed in 1945. This organization served as a two-way channel of information — from the residents to Town Hall and the management and from the management, through Town Hall, back to the residents.

The daily reports of the Block Leaders are one of the principal sources of information for an understanding of the daily activities, concerns, and issues facing the evacuees at Manzanar. A digest of the block reports for October 1942, for instance, states that the "35 Block Managers turned in 424 daily reports" during the month — "an average of 12 reports for each block for 27 business days of the month." The digest indicated that (I) improvements to the barracks and a variety of recreational programs were underway, (2) some evacuees were requesting an explanation of the WRA's organizational structure and demanding to know how soon their private furniture would be delivered from private storage, (3) evacuees were interested in having photographic and watch repair shop services as well as weekly movie entertainment established in the camp, and (4) one of the principal problems facing the evacuees was what to do with their leisure time. [29]

Administrative Reports. When the Washington Office of the WRA developed standard monthly report forms in late 1942, the Reports Division handled this routine duty. Two evacuee staff members were detailed to work with division and section heads to prepare the forms for mailing to Washington. Material for the standardized reports was generally forwarded in rough draft form or telephoned to the Reports Office, and the forms were compiled and edited by the reports officer.

Mess Hall Operations

Under WCCA. On March 19, 1942, Joseph R. Winchester began work at Manzanar as Chief Project Steward, a job he would hold throughout the duration of Manzanar's operation under both the WCCA and the WRA. The next day food was unloaded from trucks and stacked on the ground under "military guard." Stoves and kitchen equipment were stacked beside partially-constructed Mess Hall 1 where they would remain for several days.

While talking with the "volunteer" evacuees on March 21, Winchester met "an alien Japanese who had managed a restaurant." Within two hours, about 30 evacuees "with restaurant experience or a willingness to do kitchen work temporarily placed a stove in the middle of the first mess hall, prepared food there, and served the first camp meal," composed of "canned goods, Army 'B-type rations.'"

Perishable food was not acquired for almost a week, except for bread which was delivered on March 21. To protect the bread from the ever-present Manzanar dust, Winchester placed it "in a panel truck." Mess hall 1 was completed on March 22, and Winchester instructed his embryonic crew, because 710 evacuees would arrive the following day via a motor caravan from Los Angeles.

Dishes were washed in small household-type dishpans in water heated on coal stoves, some of which were set up in the open. Water was trucked from "a well half a mile away." Not until "about April 4, when there were 3,286 people in residence and the sixth kitchen was open, were sinks, sewers, and water-main connections completed."

To find additional help for the expanding mess operations, Winchester, with the aid of an interpreter, met arriving evacuees and questioned them as to their work experience. Those selected for mess operations were allowed a day to unpack and settle before starting work. An evacuee typist was hired for clerical work, and an appointed storekeeper was employed to handle food supplies.

Around April 18, when ten mess halls were in operation, Winchester was sent to other assembly centers to aid in organization of their mess operations. A newly appointed staff employee, having been trained for mess management at another center, assumed charge for a short time at Manzanar. He, in turn, was replaced by another steward who came for a week's training before taking over the mess operations.

The first kitchens each fed an average of more than 600 people per day. To feed incoming evacuees, the messes remained open until after midnight during the early months of Manzanar's operation. Newcomers ordinarily arrived so late that their processing was not completed until "10 or 11 o'clock and sometimes later." The practice was to feed them before they were assigned to their quarters for the night, thus resulting in long hours for the mess workers. Two crews, totaling 60 men and women, were needed to staff each mess hall.

When new mess halls were opened, Winchester selected "a capable-appearing cook" with orders to organize a crew for the mess hall. Men were chosen for the new crew largely from operating facilities, while replacements were made from among the new evacuee arrivals.

By early April food storehouses were established beside the mess halls. Several months later, warehouses at the edge of the residential area were allocated to the Mess Operations Section.

Under the WCCA, Army B-type rations that were served to the evacuees included a "few perishables such as milk, potatoes, bread, and lettuce." There was no refrigeration at the center until around July 1; thus, two refrigerator cars were placed on the railway siding at Lone Pine to serve that purpose. A contract was made with the Lone Pine Ice Company to re-ice these cars every morning. Two trips a day were made by truck from Manzanar to the refrigerator cars for food supplies.

While Manzanar was administered by the WCCA, food was supplied by the Army Quartermaster Corps "in accordance with needs as the Army saw them." This at first produced some difficulties. The Quartermaster Corps, for instance, purchased large quantities of cottage cheese and buttermilk for the evacuees, but the residents, "unaccustomed to these foods, would not eat them." Instead, they wanted rice. According to Winchester, "It took several weeks to convince the Army that the rice requirement would range upward from a half-pound per day per person."

Under the WRA. When management of the center was transferred to the WRA on June 1, there was little change in mess operations except that the Chief Project Steward was replaced temporarily by a new man. A Mess Operations Section was established "to secure food supplies and to feed the evacuees." This section operated 36 mess halls, a kitchen in the hospital, and another in the Children's Village. The block kitchen next to the hospital was a special diet kitchen for the care of ambulant persons who, for reasons of disease or ill health, required special feeding, but did not need complete hospitalization. In addition, because the camp was isolated from ordinary community facilities, the section supervised "a cooperative dining-hall for appointed staff personnel who did not find it possible or desirable to eat in their living quarters." Food and labor at the appointed personnel dining hall were paid for by those who used the facilities. The Mess Operations Section also supplied the military post adjoining the camp with perishables and all supplies until 1944.

Under the WRA, food for the Manzanar mess halls continued to be requisitioned from the Army Quartermaster Corps, although for a time each requisition required approval from WRA officials in San Francisco. This practice, according to Winchester, resulted in difficulties, "because people away from the Center did not appreciate the eating habits of evacuees," frequently substituting "an un-ordered item for an ordered item." For instance, officials in San Francisco "considered it good business to accept 110 tons of cracked wheat which was obtainable in return for the payment of freight and handling charges." The evacuees did not care for cracked wheat, and the shipment arrived marked "unfit for human consumption." The result was that it was fed to poultry and livestock. Similarly, dried figs were substituted for other fruits "for so long that they were refused by tired appetites and a dangerously large over-supply accumulated on the Project." In August 1942, San Francisco approval of requisitions was no longer required.

Construction of the kitchens and mess halls was slow and equipment was often inadequate. When Winchester returned to his position as Chief Project Steward at Manzanar on July 1, only 23 mess halls were open. Although construction of the others was complete, a shortage of equipment delayed their opening. All of the mess halls were placed in operation, however, during the succeeding weeks. Winchester commented on some of the early problems facing operation of the mess halls:

From the first, and in spite of makeshift facilities, mess halls functioned smoothly. Supply was not always perfect but there was never a shortage of good wholesome food. Great concern was felt, however, because of inadequate facilities for sanitation, and this condition was watched closely and with considerable fear. Fortunately nothing developed except two very mild epidemics of diarrhea.

A problem in food arose out of conflict in food tastes between the desires of the first-generation Japanese and their American-born children. The older people were accustomed to, and desired, larger amounts of rice and Japanese food than were acceptable to the younger people. Limitations on the money granted for food, made it possible for the older people to have things more nearly their way, for Japanese food is economical.

Policies: Cost — The policy of the Mess Operations Section, governed by a WRA administrative instruction issued on August 24, 1942, was to "provide good wholesome, nutritious, palatable food at a daily cost of not more than 45 cents per day per resident, and to maintain high standards of sanitation and cleanliness." During 1942, consumption of "a large quantity of home-produced vegetables" enabled the section to more than meet that cost policy. The Mess Operations Section purchased these home-grown vegetables and melons from the Agriculture Section at Manzanar at approximately Los Angeles market prices.

Policies: Menus — Menus at Manzanar, as at all centers, were based on those prepared by the Subsistence Section of the Service of Supply Division of the Army. An attempt was made to satisfy both the Americanized tastes of the second-generation evacuees and the predominantly Asian appetites of their alien elders. Fancy grades of provisions, however, were expressly prohibited, and rationing restrictions were strictly enforced.

Meals at Manzanar averaged from 2,800 to 3,500 calories per person per day during 1942, With the exception of short periods when ration-point values were very low, meat consumption remained "approximately at the level allowed by rationing." Although "Japanese menus" contained "a greater amount of starch" than was "customary among Americans in general," every effort to provide palatable foods was made by the evacuee stewards who prepared menus which the Chief Project Steward approved." A considerable part of the menu consisted of "rice, sukiyaki, miso, tofu, chop suey, chow mein, shoyu sauce, and pickled vegetables of all kinds."

Special facilities were established for feeding of babies, nursing mothers, invalids, and hospital cases. Because of acute dairy shortages, fluid milk was served ordinarily only to evacuees, such as the aforementioned, who had a need for special dietary treatment.

Policies: Sanitation — The sanitary conditions in the kitchens never satisfied the Chief Project Steward. While some kitchens maintained high sanitation standards, others did not. To improve conditions, regular inspections were conducted by evacuee inspectors, When the position of sanitarian was filled by an appointed staff member, he assumed the inspection task. Signs, posters, and meetings with chiefs "all played their part in a campaign for greater cleanliness." As a result, a few unsatisfactory kitchens were closed down for several days to enforce better conditions.

Service — Food was served cafeteria style "on heavy restaurant-ware dishes." A gong announced meal times, after which lengthy lines formed. In good weather a long line formed outside and in poor weather inside. At times, problems arose as some persons attempted to "get ahead of their neighbors."

One kitchen in four was staffed with two to three nutrition aides who, on doctors' prescriptions, prepared formulas for babies, and special meals at 10 and 2 for children too young to eat the regular center diet. Supervised by an evacuee woman, this service was at first under the technical guidance of the hospital, but later it was placed under the direct management of the Chief Project Steward.

Food Supplies: Procurement — At the request of the Army, and in an effort to conserve transportation facilities, food for Manzanar was obtained largely in carload quantities. The WRA attempted to keep a 90-day food supply on hand. Staple products were purchased through quartermaster depots of the Army, while perishable commodities were bought generally on the open market or produced at the center. Each morning the mess hall chef turned in a requisition for supplies that would be needed the following day. The Chief Project Steward and his assistants went over the requisitions, making deletions or additions to conform to the menu planned. Food was then withdrawn from storehouses and delivered to the mess halls.

Food Supplies: Warehousing — Supplies arrived at Manzanar by truck and were tallied in to one of nine warehouses, one of which was reserved exclusively for rice. When an invoice was received, a receiving report was made and submitted to the Fiscal Section for payment. For each commodity a bin card was kept at the place of storage, and a property card was kept at the office to show all receipts and withdrawals. To insure accuracy, a daily check was made between the two cards.

Food Supplies: Refrigeration — Perishable foods were stored in two refrigerating rooms constructed at the center about July 1. One refrigerator was for vegetables and the other for meat which was received in the whole carcass. In a connecting butcher shop the meat was cut to fill requisitions, and efforts were undertaken to insure that each mess hall received a "proportionate share of good cuts."

Personnel: Appointed — When the WRA took over, two persons, the Chief Project Steward and an Assistant Steward, were the only staff appointed to supervise the activities of the Mess Operations Section. In November 1942, however, a second assistant steward was hired to supervise the operation of the mess halls. This assistant made daily trips to each mess hall to inspect supplies and sanitary conditions and observe whether rules and regulations were complied with, such as those governing hours of employment and rates of pay. In August 1942 a head butcher was employed to supervise the recently-constructed meat refrigerator, butcher shop, and cutting and distribution of meat.

According to Winchester, "The major part of inspection and all supervision involving the issuance of direct orders was the responsibility of the appointed staff insofar as central control was concerned."

Personnel: Evacuee — Attached to the office of the Chief Project Steward were six evacuees in supervisory positions, five of whom held the title of senior steward. Each had specialized responsibilities relating to labor, menu preparation, warehouse supervision, food and cleaning supply distribution, and technical supervision of chefs. Each mess hall was under the supervision of a chef "who had complete charge" and was "responsible for the satisfactory operation of his kitchen and dining room."

When Winchester returned to Manzanar as Chief Project Steward on July 1, he found that the staff in each of the mess halls had grown to 50-60 workers even though long hours were no longer necessary to take care of late arriving evacuees. Accordingly, he made minor cuts in personnel in each kitchen. As new mess halls were opened, he recruited the new staffs from operating facilities. When all 36 mess halls were opened he made an additional cut of two persons in each kitchen. At intervals this process was repeated until a staff of 28 was allowed for every 300 persons to be fed. An additional worker was allowed for each 20 in excess of 300, and one worker was removed for each 20 under 300. This ratio was maintained throughout the rest of the war.

According to Winchester, the majority of the workers in the mess halls were aliens, and "as time went on the preponderance of aliens over citizens gradually increased." The workers were generally older, "a number of them being in their 70's." Many were women "who spoke only Japanese and who had never previously been employed outside of their own homes."

The WRA undertook efforts to train young people as cooks. Under the "job title of junior cook," new workers with a desire to acquire a knowledge of cooking were given "practical on-the-job training" beginning in 1942. [30]

Fire Protection

Under the WCCA, a Fire Protection Section, consisting of trucks provided by the Motor Pool and a small crew, was established soon after the camp opened under the supervision of the Assistant Project Director in charge of operations. The equipment consisted of 50-foot sections of 3/4-inch garden hose, water buckets, and long-handled shovels. Hydrants were constructed by the Corps of Engineers who supplied 2 1/2-inch firehose and nozzles.

When the WRA assumed administration of Manzanar on June 1, the fire department crew consisted "of a fire chief, three Caucasian captains and thirty Japanese firemen split among three eight hour shifts." The camp had no fire alarm system or inter-barracks telephone system "over which the occurrence of fires might be reported." At night, the camp was patrolled "by one Japanese for each area of three blocks." To report a fire, the patrolmen had "to go by foot to the fire station." Each squad was drilled one hour daily "in the use of the fire equipment and extinguishers."

Foamite extinguishers had been installed "in the hospital units, each boiler room, laundry building and mess kitchen." Buckets of sand had been placed in the boiler room in each block. All "available water barrels with buckets" had been placed "at strategic locations throughout the center," and residents had been instructed in the use of "the improvised equipment until the fire department" arrived.

Locks had been ordered for fuse boxes "to prevent solid fusing with pennies or other devices." Open fires were not allowed without a permit, and no permits were issued "on windy days after 2 P.M." [31]

Under the WRA, the Fire Protection Section was expanded, and on July 11 the U. S. Forest Service provided a Ford V-8 pumper with a capacity of 500 gallons per minute. During the summer, a Fire Protection Adviser attached to the San Francisco office of the WRA visited Manzanar, inspecting the equipment and assisting the center fire departments in the removal of fire hazards. [32]

The WRA expanded the firefighting force at Manzanar. From July 1 through December 31 the average number of evacuee firemen on regular duty was 28, while the number of volunteer fire fighters was 34. Twelve fire inspectors conducted 30,449 inspections, identifying 782 fire hazards and issuing 755 violation notices. The fire department provided technical advice on 27 occasions and conducted 34 fire drills. The WRA increased the amount of training that the regular firefighters received. Regular firemen received an average of 5-6 hours of training, but the volunteer firemen received none. During this period fire reports indicate that the fire department responded to 27 (11 grass; 7 mess halls; 4 living quarters; 4 service buildings; 1 other buildings) fires in the camp in which $120 worth of property was lost. The principal causes of the fires were defective oil heater stoves, open lights, flames, and sparks, defective or overheated chimneys and flues, smoking, electrical appliances, matches, and sparks on roofs. [33]

Postal Service

When Manzanar opened in March 1942, the problem of mail delivery for the evacuee population became immediately apparent. As the WCCA was dominated by the Army, a system was worked out with the U.S. Post Office Department that was similar to mail installations in military camps. Under this system, mail would be delivered by the Post Office to the center, and the responsibility for its distribution to individuals was the responsibility of the center's management.

The U.S. Post Office Department established the Manzanar Post Office within the center, making it a substation of the Los Angeles Post Office. The acting postmaster at Manzanar and his first assistant were postal employees of the Los Angeles Post Office assigned to the center. When additional help was needed, the Manzanar Post Office employed residents of the surrounding communities as substitute clerks.

All incoming evacuee parcel post, freight, and express were opened and inspected for contraband by the military police. When a package arrived, the evacuee, was sent a notice. When he called for his package, a member of the military police inspected it in his presence.

The post office maintained a main office and five substations in the offices of the Information Service. Before carrier service was begun, residents of the center frequently waited for four or five hours in line to obtain their mail, and those on work detail often did not receive their mail. After numerous complaints, carrier service was initiated, and three carriers were assigned to every six blocks for daily mail delivery.

The postal unit installed drop boxes throughout the center. Before closing time at the Manzanar Post Office, mail clerks collected this mail and delivered it to the Post Office.

The initial organization of the postal unit was carried out by an evacuee who had many years of experience as a postal clerk with the Los Angeles Post Office prior to evacuation. Thus, the organization was made along the lines used in the various post offices in the U.S. Post Office Department. This system was continued by the WRA when it took over administration of the camp. [34]

The Manzanar Post Office provided the residents with all regular postal services such as money order, mail registry, C.O.D., and sales of United States war bonds. Evacuees handling mail were employed by the WRA under the regular employment program at Manzanar. These employees consequently were not bonded and were not permitted to sell money orders, register mail, or handle sales of war bonds or stamps. All such postal services were available at the main postal unit where non-Japanese civil service employees of the Post Office Department were on duty. [35]

Community Government

Under the WCCA. Within ten days after the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar on March 21, the first of a number of temporary "Block Leaders" were appointed by WCCA administrators. [36] The Block Leader was envisioned as a "combined boarding-house manager and liaison officer." It was intended that "he would represent the people [of his block] on a community council, that he would see that the tenants got along peacefully together, that the plumber and electrician were called when needed and that toilet paper and mops were provided as required." He would explain and interpret to the residents the policies and regulations of the administration and bring to the administration "a knowledge of the problems of the people."

Duties and responsibilities of Block Leaders, as well as a definition of their place in the community, were to be more fully defined in a "constitution." A draft document was prepared by evacuee committees and was sent to evacuees in another assembly center for comment. However, the document was never finalized "due to a change in policy after the WRA took over."

On April 13 qualified residents of each occupied block were called into meetings to nominate, by secret ballot, three candidates for the position of Block Leader. From these nominations a staff committee selected the Block Leader and an alternate for six-month terms. The selections were announced to the camp on April 22. Other blocks, as they filled with evacuees, had nominee elections. Suffrage was allowed both aliens and citizens who had attained the age of 21.

Representatives of the WCCA administration "bowed to the Japanese respect for age and in the majority of cases" selected as Block Leaders "older people, who were, by that fact, aliens and in many cases non-English speaking people." The Final Report, Manzanar observed that although "most of the previously acknowledged alien leaders in Japanese communities had been interned by the Justice Department at the outbreak of the war, these first Block Leaders appear to have been capable persons."

During the first two months of Manzanar's existence, the Block Leaders operated "without formal organization." Nevertheless, as a group they established a $45 loan fund through contributions, recommended that the police give protection to children playing ball in living areas, considered the problem of whether the Japanese custom of presenting monetary gifts to bereaved families should be maintained in an assembly or reception center, and brought pressure upon the administration for a Japanese-language edition of the Manzanar Free Press and for the immediate payment of wages to employed evacuees. The administration asked the Block Leaders for help in easing the growing tensions between Nisei and Kibei and deferred several other problems until the constitution could be completed.

During the early days of Manzanar's history, the Information Office had been established to aid the new evacuees in making adjustments to camp life. After the arrival of the first large group of evacuees at Manzanar on March 23, the administration building had been swamped by evacuees, seeking answers to questions concerning their new life. Two evacuees, Roy Takeno and Dave Itami, saw the need for facilities to provide the information sought by the evacuees. Their plan for such an organization was accepted by Camp Manager C. E. Triggs, and on March 25 the first Information Office was opened in Block I, Building 9, Apartment I. Under the WCCA, the Information Service was attached to the Service Division under the direction of J. M. Kidwell, who planned to organize one Information Office for every 1,500 residents. Six offices were ultimately established. [37]

The principal function of the Information Service during its early days was to act as an intermediary between camp management and the residents "by relaying information and instructions on behalf of the management to the residents, and by relaying complaints and suggestions on behalf of the residents to the management so that the latter may be able to improve facilities or remedy any shortcomings, if they had merits for consideration." This included handling complaints and taking applications for employment; issuance and posting of bulletins in both English and Japanese; writing letters in English for elderly Japanese who spoke little or no English; conducting a lost and found department; and operating a Voluntary Service Corps to aid evacuees in getting settled.

As arrival of large groups of evacuees occurred during the early period, the Voluntary Service Corps was organized by the Information Service. This corps consisted of young men who aided newly-arrived evacuees in carrying their baggage, and guided them to their assigned quarters. By the end of May, this Corps had reached an enrollment of 450. [38]

With the emergence of the Block Leaders, the similar and sometimes overlapping functions of the Block Leaders and the Information Office, began to create problems for WCCA administrators. The Information Office, staffed primarily with Nisei young people many of whom were early volunteers, had organized more quickly and at first provided better service than did the older people, most of whom were Issei, in the Block Leaders offices. As a result of their efforts, many of the information clerks and leaders were viewed as community leaders by the evacuees. Nevertheless, when the Block Leaders and other sections of the center administration were able to assume the functions of the Information Office, the WCCA began steps to dissolve its organization. Many of its personnel, however, which reached a peak of 50 in six offices, went to the Block Leaders' organizations where they served as assistants.

Under the WRA. When the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, it found that "individual and group insecurity had grown rather than lessened," thus undermining support for community self-government. The rising insecurity, according to Merritt, was due to "growing apprehensions of residents for their status as detainees, and accentuated by the construction of a barbed-wire fence to enclose the living quarters and watch towers with search lights constantly flashing over the Center at night" "failure of the Administration to settle on a wage policy and to provide furnishings for apartments that had been promised," and the "loss of status" felt by each "authoritative family head" when his wife and children were no longer dependent on him for their living. The change of center personnel and management policy brought by the WRA on June 1 heightened "the feeling of insecurity of the evacuees and brought into focus the difference in status of citizen children and alien parents which lead [sic] to the subsequent struggle for power and control."

When the WRA took over administration or Manzanar, the Block Leaders did not have the general respect of many evacuees. Many evacuees felt that the Block Leaders were mere "stooges" or "messenger boys for the administration," because they were appointed by the administrative staff. Residents failed to understand the limitations of the Community Council which then consisted of 36 individuals. Although it was understood that the council was to have a say in the government of the community, its position was "purely advisory." Yet the evacuee population of the camp tended to blame the council for the failure of the administration to immediately satisfy the demands and meet the pressing needs of the camp residents. Thus, it became the aim of the WRA to raise the prestige of the Block Leader.

In a June 5 memorandum addressed to all Project Directors, the Director of the WRA outlined in detail the plans for temporary self-government to be established as soon as possible in each relocation center. This temporary government was intended to be a laboratory for testing of evacuee ability and of WRA social ideals, and it was felt that this form of government would not only serve to educate evacuees in the workings of government but would also demonstrate the degree of ability of evacuees in self-government. [39] Each center would have a "Community Council" composed of American citizens elected by American citizens. The council would have no power to enact ordinances; rather it would make recommendations to the Project Director on matters relating to health, welfare, recreation, education, and other matters relating to center operations. Within the council, an executive committee of from five to seven members would consult with the Project Director on resolutions and recommendations of the council. A judicial committee was prescribed, but the executive committee might also serve in this capacity. This committee would cooperate with the Project Director in dealing with disturbances of the peace and law and order issues. Other committees, as deemed necessary, could be established by the council.

The prohibition of aliens from elective positions did not appear realistic to many evacuees or to staff members, because "the oldest people among the evacuee group had always carried the greatest responsibility." Merritt later elaborated on this issue in the Final Report, Manzanar:

.... Among the Japanese, all authority reposes in the family head and on his death, in the oldest son. With this in mind, it is easy to understand the respect for age that has grown up among the Japanese people. Very few of the citizens had reached an age which demanded respect- in a Japanese community. At Manzanar, no Nisei male was over 54 years of age and only eight were over 50. Forty-four more were between 39 and 50. While it is frequently mentioned that two-thirds of the Japanese group are American citizens, it is seldom noted that at Manzanar, at least, only 14 percent of the group were citizens of 25 years or older.

Accordingly, Project Director Nash "made no general announcement of this temporary policy excluding aliens from participation in community government because he feared the effect it might have and because he hoped for a change in the rulings of the Washington Office." Meanwhile, elections for Block Leaders at Manzanar continued to include alien voters and office holders.

Ignoring the directives from WRA headquarters, Nash convened in mid-June 1942 the existing Block Leaders at Manzanar, many of whom were Issei, "as a temporary Community Council." Representing Nash, the Assistant Project Director led the meeting, pointing "out the aims and the problems of the Project as a whole" and discussing "the significance of the contributions which the Block Leaders could make to a successful self-government program." The Assistant Director outlined the duties of the Block Leaders, which included responsibility for looking after the welfare of each individual in the block, seeing that all block facilities, such as kitchens, mess halls, wash rooms, and latrines, operated satisfactorily, distributing supplies and mail, supervising night checkers who were responsible for government property, and taking a nightly population count The Block Leaders voted unanimously to accept their responsibilities. In turn, they were to be placed on a full-time work basis as of June 15. At their first meeting, the Block Leaders agreed with the Assistant Project Director that, for the time being, at least, the administration would continue to appoint Block Leaders. Later, in the same meeting, however, they reconsidered and directed the chairman to ask the Project Director that "elections be democratically conducted and the persons receiving the largest number of votes be named Block Leaders without selection by the management." The request was approved, and after June 19, Block Leaders were selected following that procedure. Suffrage was continued for men and women of 21 years of age and over. Several weeks later, however, in response to pressure from younger Nisei, the age limit was lowered to 18, although Nisei had asked that it be dropped to 16.

Direct election of Block Leaders by the evacuees increased the prestige of the office. Greater interest was shown in the elections, and average voting participation increased from 44 to 87 percent during the summer of 1942.

The final democratization of the Block Leader selection process took place in mid-August, when direct elections were held to fill these positions in Blocks 1-6 and 9-12. Prior to the elections, these blocks had been represented by leaders chosen under the system of appointment by the camp administration. New leaders were also chosen in four other blocks. [40] The election results showed a great deal of volatility among the evacuees. With 1,935 out of 2,422 eligible voters going to the polls, eleven new block leaders were elected, while only three of the ten incumbents being reelected. [41]

Regardless of continuing criticism, the Block Leaders had sufficient support to consolidate their position, assume duties formerly conducted by the Information Office, and increase the personnel of their offices. While they did not receive approval from all residents, their leadership was accepted by most evacuees.

On June 26 the Assistant Project Director informed the Block Leaders that he was planning a trip to the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco "to do everything he could to obtain a review of the proposed policy that aliens could not hold elective office." This was the first semi-public announcement of the WRA policy, and the Block Leaders were led to believe that the provision would be changed. The constitutional committee, in fact, was proceeding under the belief that the provision would be altered.

By July 20, however, the WRA policy remained unchanged, prompting Project Director Nash to write the Regional Director that the Issei had not been permitted to become citizens. Among the aliens at Manzanar were "strong characters of conservative, sober judgment, who have been of untold help to the administration in every crisis where cool heads were in demand." To disenfranchise this group or prevent them from holding office "would cause more dissension in Manzanar than almost any one decision that could be made."

The Block Leaders, under the direction of the camp administration, continued to meet as a representative council. The council consisted of "17 aliens" and "10 citizens." Not until September 4, however, would the evacuee population be aware of the limitations placed upon the franchise of aliens by WRA headquarters in Washington. When the evacuees became aware of this WRA policy, a storm of protest was triggered which will be detailed in Chapter 11 of this study.

Meanwhile the temporary council (although beset by a variety of divisive issues that will be examined in Chapter 11 of this study) continued to hold weekly meetings during the summer of 1942, dealing with issues related to day-to-day living problems in the camp. These issues included concerns over the selection of men to staff the police department, recruitment of labor for the camouflage net factory project, failure of the administration to provide furniture for evacuee quarters, the wage scale, and the desirability and need for a clothing allowance.

Late in June, the council elected a chairman and an executive board from among its members. The board was to meet with and advise the Project Director on significant problems facing the evacuees, but these meetings never took place.

The council prepared, and the administration approved, a proposal to establish a judicial committee to be comprised of three appointed staff members and three evacuee members. The evacuees were to be elected from the center at large by the residents. The committee would be advisory in nature and final action was the responsibility of the Project Director. The committee was to study traffic regulations and rules governing the behavior of evacuees within the center and to hear minor cases of disturbance of the peace. All offenses against state and federal government statutes would be referred to the appropriate outside authorities.

Administrative Instruction No. 34, dated August 24, 1942, instructed each of the relocation center project directors to immediately establish community councils of citizen representatives in accordance with the director's memorandum of June 5, until regular community government could be established. The project directors were instructed to appoint commissions to prepare a plan for community evacuee government for each center "in accordance with the controlling provisions of this instruction." The instruction outlined the duties of a council of representatives to be elected by persons 18 years of age and over. Elected representatives had to be 21 years of age and citizens of the United States. Only American citizens could hold office, but aliens could vote and serve in appointive positions. Actions of the council would be subject to veto by the project directors. The plan of government included a judicial committee or commission to hear cases and apply penalties for violation of laws and regulations prescribed by the council, but its decisions were subject to review by the project directors. Although private enterprise had been forbidden within the centers, the plan provided for licensing evacuee businesses by a newly-created charter commission. Aliens were eligible for membership only on the judicial committee and other appointive boards and commissions established by the council.

In accordance with the administrative instruction, Project Director Nash, on September 30, appointed a 17-man commission to draw up a charter of community government for Manzanar. His appointments were made after consultation with staff members and evacuees. The commission immediately drew up a charter, although its work was limited to describing the electoral districts, provisions for recall, definition of a quorum, naming of time and place of meetings, provisions for filling vacancies, and voting procedures. Duties and responsibilities of the council, as well as eligibility for office holding, were denned in accordance with the WRA's administrative instruction.

Meanwhile, the Block Leaders were called into special meeting on September 30. Looking forward to establishment of the new community government, it was suggested that the temporary council be dissolved and they resign as Block Leaders and accept assignment as Block Managers. The new assignment would carry no representative or legislative authority or responsibility. The Block Leaders approved these recommendations unanimously.

The Block Managers, with the knowledge of the administration continued to meet and discuss center problems during October and November. Responding to mounting tensions in the center, they called for and obtained an explanation of the distribution of sugar; recommended that the charter include a provision for removal of inefficient and dishonest appointed personnel; requested evacuee representation at administrative staff meetings; and adopted a proposal that evacuee representatives should review the financial records of the center administration. By late November the camp administration had largely ignored the demands of the Block Managers, thus contributing to declining morale of the evacuee population and deteriorating relationships between the evacuees and the administration.

During the course of these events, the charter commission approved the charter in early October and designated November 9 as the date on which the charter would be voted upon by the evacuee population at Manzanar. The charter, with introductory notes, was mimeographed in English and Japanese and released as an "instrument of self-government." Early reaction to the charter was not favorable, and it appeared likely that it would be rejected. As a result, the commission resigned, and the election was postponed by the camp administration. Instead, an election for a committee consisting of two men from each block was held on November 22 to undertake further work on the charter in the hope that this would gain additional support before a final community government charter was submitted to the people. Any person over 18 years of age was eligible to vote in this election and to serve on the committee. Among the reasons given for the postponement of the voting on the charter were questions relating to licensing of private business, restrictions against the Issei, and fears that Japan might object if Japanese subjects contributed to their own government under the circumstances, as well as to allow time for the return of the 1/000 residents on seasonal farmwork furlough. [42]

The results of the election on November 22 were announced in the Manzanar Free Press on November 28. It was noted that a wide-ranging series of reactions to the election had occurred. Of the 35 blocks voting, two recorded no votes, and two recorded sentiments of outright disapproval of the charter. A fifth block postponed the election. Blocks showing fairly good response were Blocks 9, 23, 1, 17, and 19. [43]

In late November the representatives elected on November 22 met with the new Manzanar director, Ralph P. Merritt to discuss a community government plan. Of the 60 representatives elected, only 33 attended. The tone of their general attitude toward the proposed charter was exhibited when a vote was taken on the charter. Of the 33 delegates, one voted in favor of the charter. In the ensuing discussions, the lone supporter, Fred Tayama, a prominent pro-American Nisei who had been an active JACL member before evacuation, was subjected to vigorous questioning. When the meeting broke up, a unanimous vote against the charter was recorded. [44]

The final meeting of block representatives was held on December 3, 1942, with Merritt, to discuss the formation of a charter for community government. In this meeting Merritt proposed three recommendations for consideration by the evacuee representatives: (1) that the charter as it stood be accepted by them and be voted upon by the residents of the center; (2) that with minor changes within the limits of WRA policies, the charter be determined acceptable; and (3) that, even with revisions and additions, the charter be deemed unacceptable and not be submitted to the residents. Merritt stated that should the third view prevail, ". . . it is up to me as Project Director to state the terms on how we should live together." The meeting produced no action other than a statement that, following further study of the charter and WRA instructions, the representatives would meet with Merritt on December 10. [45]

Internal Security

The Western Defense Command issued a proclamation on May 19 that designated all relocation centers, either established or projected, in any of the eight far western states as military areas subject to external military control. Under this proclamation, protective services around the exterior boundaries of each operating center were provided by a company of military police (See Chapter 13 of this study). Maintenance of security and order within reach center, however, was left largely in the hands of the evacuee residents working under the direction of WCCA and WRA internal security offices. [46]

Under the WCCA. The Internal Security Section, or camp police force, at Manzanar was originally organized under the WCCA. [47] Three Caucasian police officers were appointed who organized evacuee police into patrol units. For this work, volunteers were called for and more than 100 men and boys were recruited. Their only training was in routine patrol work, to which duties they were assigned under the supervision of the three Caucasian officers. Patrols were conducted over a 24-hour schedule, the men working on foot, while extra patrols were conducted by car and truck. By June 1, there were 14 Caucasian officers on the Manzanar police force, and the WCCA had plans to expand that number to some 40 men. The trucks used by the police were half-ton vehicles once used by the Civilian Conservation Corps. In addition, the police inspected all baggage of the newly arriving evacuees, and rechecked all persons and cars that entered or left the camp, duplicating the work of the military police. A jail was built at the rear of the main office in the police station, consisting of a room 20 feet square in which was installed a double tank rented from the sheriff of Inyo County.

Under the WRA.

The Police — As soon as the WRA took over Manzanar on June 1, 1942, efforts were undertaken to reorganize the camp police force on a more professional basis and active recruitment efforts were initiated to attract trained appointed personnel. Although a policy covering internal security at the centers was not issued by the WRA until August 24, the police department at Manzanar was "well on the road to organization prior to that date." By September the three Caucasian officers hired by the WCCA had either resigned or been terminated, and two new men were recruited by the WRA to replace them. On September 7, a Chief Internal Security Officer was appointed. At the time of his appointment, he was the "head instructor in the police school at Sacramento Junior College." Less than one week later, an officer from the Palo Alto Police Department took over duties as assistant to the chief. On October 20, a second assistant to the chief was appointed. He had served as an officer at Manzanar under the WCCA, and prior to that he had been a traffic officer in Santa Monica. On November 27, the Chief Internal Security Officer left the camp to become Acting National Director of Internal Security in Washington, D.C. The assistant chief at Manzanar was made Acting Chief of Internal Security. No more appointed personnel were employed on the Manzanar police force until after the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6.

The duties of the appointed internal security officers at Manzanar were based on Administrative Instruction No. 30, a WRA directive to all relocation centers issued on August 24, 1942. The instruction stated that internal security was the "responsibility of the Project Director." Each project was to have one or more "Caucasian internal security officers," but it was the intention of the WRA "to make as great a use of evacuee personnel as possible in providing internal security." The Chief Internal Security Officer under the direction of the Project Director, was to be responsible for "organizing, recruiting, training, and supervising an adequate internal police force." The force was responsible for enforcement "of regulations adopted by the Community Council and provisions of the federal, state and local laws or regulations specifically applicable to the relocation center." Under the policy statement, the internal security force at Manzanar was responsible for handling misdemeanor cases, while felonies were to be turned over to outside authorities. [48]

In September 1942, when the newly-hired WRA Caucasians officers took over, there were more than 100 evacuee men on the camp's internal security payroll. These men remained on duty during the "changeover," when the section was reorganized as a "regular police department." In keeping with the policy of self-government which the WRA was introducing, a chief of police with two assistant chiefs, a captain, a desk sergeant, and a patrol sergeant for each shift were elected. The entire department cast votes for the chief and his assistants, and each shift voted for its own captain and sergeant. All orders to the evacuee policemen were issued through the evacuee chief or his assistants who were responsible to the Chief Internal Security Officer.

To aid in the selection of "suitable candidates" for the police force, the WRA administered observation tests to the evacuee policemen. Those failing to pass the tests were terminated. By December 6, the number of evacuee police had declined to 81.

Under the WRA, patrols of the center were conducted on foot, with "check-ups by the patrol sergeant in a car." Constant patrol was maintained "in sections" of the camp "that had the most trouble and violations."

A training program for the evacuee police was organized, and a school was started on November 1, 1942. Among the first training classes provided were sessions on criminal investigation, description of persons and property, report writing, traffic procedure, and patrol work. The classes, presented on a periodic basis, averaged 15 to 20 minutes in length, and followed "the common practice used in police schools." First, there would be a lecture, followed by a hypothetical case based on material covered in the lecture. This was followed up by discussion and correction. Where possible, an attempt was made to appeal to the students' interest by combining actual field work with the subject covered. A beneficial, but unscheduled, test of the training program resulted from a murder and a suicide committed in the center during the fall.

An evacuee officer assisted in giving the lectures. As many of the men could not follow lectures in English, an evacuee officer, selected as an interpreter, repeated them in Japanese. Examinations were set periodically, and many of the papers were written in Japanese. These papers were translated into English by an evacuee and graded by the instructor.

Arrests were made by both appointed personnel and evacuee policemen. No arrest was made unless a person was "caught in the act" or unless a warrant had been issued. Warrants were not issued without a complete investigation, and "a high degree of certainty that the person named in the warrant was the true offender." As a result, the person charged "generally pleaded guilty" and was ready "for punishment." There are no records of persons charged being found "not guilty."

Written reports were prepared by the officers making the case investigation. Evacuee police were allowed to write their own reports, with the appointed personnel assigned to follow up on the cases to see that they had been handled properly.

The first means of identification used by police in Manzanar was an armband with the word "Police" painted on it. While this served as a temporary means of identification, it "was not adequate when the officer had to work in crowds or in the dark." Accordingly, police uniforms were ordered from the Manzanar sewing factory in November 1942. The uniforms consisted of "a wine-colored shirt and green pants." Caps were ordered from "a mail-order house," and badges were purchased from a Los Angeles company. Because the workers in the sewing factory "lacked experience," many of the police uniforms "fitted poorly, but bad as they were the men were glad to get them."

The Program: Evacuee Attitudes Toward Cooperation with Police — At the start of the internal security program under the WRA, the evacuee population was reluctant to make reports to the police. At times, reports would leak back to the police department after incidents occurred. This meant that fights could take place or gangs could create disturbances without fear of their activities reaching the police until well after the incident. The evacuees' refusal to report "arose, at least in part, out of an inborn fear of the law," as well as "fear of retaliation from fellow evacuees."

Throughout 1942 the police department fought "a losing battle." Arrests were made, fights broken up, and disturbances quieted, but these incidents were "mostly cases the police had 'run across.'" A number of persons were brought before the Judicial Committee for trial and punishment, and long jail sentences were imposed, but the disturbances and thefts continued. Thirty days in the Manzanar jail for minor disturbances and as high as six months in the county jail for theft was "the rule."

Manzanar's original jail, located inside the police station with windows opening on a road, was "an easy place for prisoners' friends to visit and to pass articles through its windows." Instead of being a location for punishment and detention, it became "a spot in which to rest and have fun."

Nevertheless, because of the long sentences imposed by the "Project court," a feeling of "resentment against the police and the judicial Council" mounted among the residents. Policemen were looked down upon and were referred to as "dogs" and "stool pigeons." Several police were "beaten up" when off duty. Cooperation from the residents was lacking, and when the police worked with the FBI and other outside law enforcement agencies, "popular feeling ran especially high," thus preventing law enforcement from being "an effective reality."

The Program: Gangs — Several gangs of boys operated continuously in Manzanar during "1942. One of these was the "Terminal Island" group, made up of boys and young men who had come from the working class neighborhoods of that island community. "If an insult, real or fancied, was leveled against any member of this gang, immediate action was taken by the rest of them." The Terminal Island boys. as they came to be called, "lacked the polish of polite society having been schooled in fishing boats and fish canneries." As a result, they were not "ordinarily invited to the social gatherings that were held in the Center." Consequently, a group of the Terminal Island boys "would often crash the gate at dances and parties given by more select groups." Disturbances and fights "arose when the attempt was made to stop their gate-crashing." While no fights occurred between the police and the Terminal Islanders "as a group, most of the evacuee police feared them."

To improve relationships, a series of meetings was held during 1942 between the police department and the leaders of the Terminal Island families "through the medium of some Terminal Island men who were on the police force." A clubroom was established for the Terminal Island boys, where "entertainments" were planned for them. Although the clubhouse helped matters, the Terminal Island boys continued to resent other groups for not giving them invitations to their "regular entertainments." When the gate-crashing continued, sponsors of other dances were urged to invite the Terminal Islanders. The "suggestion was acted upon at a school dance, with results to be expected — the boys attended, stood around a while, and left without further disturbance." Upon the recommendation of the police department, an educational program was initiated for the Terminal Island boys in which they were "taught to dance and to conduct themselves acceptably at social gatherings" with beneficial results,

Older members of the police department held meetings with "the old men of the Terminal Island group and placed on them the responsibility for maintaining peace among their people." After these meetings were completed, "very little trouble emerged." The boys gradually accepted their responsibility and assisted in maintaining peace among other gangs. As a result of these efforts, during the December riot, the Terminal Island boys were "one of the most cooperative groups" with law enforcement authorities. Instead, "in the interval that followed the "incident and until peace was declared in the Center, the Terminal Islanders maintained picket lines around their block and prevented others from passing through except on essential business."

The so-called "Dunbar Gang," a well-organized group of boys and young men primarily from West Los Angeles, posed more serious problems for the police. This gang had been operating in the Los Angeles area for some years prior to evacuation. Many of its members, which ranged in age from 15 to 24, had Los Angeles police records ranging from petty theft to burglary. Many gang members were at Manzanar "without a family or family training." The gang managed "to get room assignments together in one of the barracks."

As early as May 1942, members of this gang were brought before the WCCA's Judicial Committee for crimes ranging from petty theft to burglary and malicious mischief. In June some were convicted of petty theft and placed on probation by the committee. In November, three were sentenced to six months in the Manzanar jail for breaking windows and "other malicious mischief." The boys were noisy in their quarters, and when fights occurred in the center, some of "their number were sure to be around." When some of Dunbar Gang left on furlough to work on farms in Montana during the summer of 1942, one was caught and convicted of burglary while away from the center.

After the police failed to obtain cooperation from this group, they requested the assistance of the Project Director. The strength of the gang was broken by depriving it of its leadership. Several of the ringleaders were sent to Boys' Town, while others were sent to jobs in the Middle West. After removal of the leaders, the remaining members were called to the police station and placed on probation under the direct supervision of families in the camp. After these events, "very little subsequent action against them became necessary."

The Program: Juvenile Delinquency — Most cases of juvenile delinquency, which "remained at a minimum throughout the operation of the Center," were handled by the Welfare Section at Manzanar. Police notified the Welfare Section of problems and turned cases over to for handling. If it became necessary for a juvenile to appear before the Judicial Committee for a hearing, the session was closed with the parents present to assist in development of "corrective plans."

The Program: Recreational Groups — In their crime prevention efforts at Manzanar, the police assisted community activities directed toward "guiding the young people of the Center." During 1942, the police, under the guidance of the WRA, began taking "a long-range view of the situation" and "gaining the cooperation of the residents as a whole and the young people in particular." Recreational programs designed for youth will be described later in this chapter.

Community Welfare

Under the WCCA.

Organization — According to the Final Report, Manzanar, community welfare at Manzanar "was organized to give attention primarily to the family life in the Center." [49] The "basic conditions of life in individual families had been disrupted" with evacuation. The report stated further:

.... Some families had been separated in the evacuation. Heads of many families, often those who had been community leaders, were interned. Related family groups which had not before been living together had elected to evacuate together because of feelings of insecurity, and were even living in the same apartments. Young married couples were housed for the first time with their parents. Because of inadequate housing space, the Center was over crowded.

Normal family life seemed almost impossible. In the beginning there were no partitions in the apartments, and no privacy was possible. In contrast meals were in mess halls, and families could not easily arrange to eat together as families. Normal family discipline was difficult. Previous patterns of work, school, and church life were broken.

Although the evacuees had before lived in somewhat segregated districts, they had been part of American communities. In coming to Manzanar on the basis of their Japanese ancestry, they were forced to live with others of similar ancestry in an artificial community whose members had not come together by choice, either economic or social. There was a wide range of background, habits, and social status.

On April 6,1942, slightly over two weeks after the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar, the first consultation was arranged with the Chief of Community Services regarding the creation of a Family Relations Section to function under the Community Services Division. The work of the Family Relations Section was tentatively outlined as the task of looking after the "sociological needs and problems of Manzanar families."

The Family Relations Section was established on April 22. Staff, including one evacuee supervisor, Mrs. Miya Kikuchi, and field and office workers, were selected. The duties of the section were noted as "responsibility for Information Centers, notices, and bulletins, consideration of family relations, care of lost and found department, and voluntary helpers' corps."

By May 26, the Supervisor of the Family Relations Section reported a staff of 21 — five social workers, one stationed at each of the five information offices in the camp, four field workers, and two stenographers. The staff was approximately one-half Issei and one-half Nisei, all of whom had been college students.

The section's organization outlined six information officers, each to cover six blocks. In each Information Office, one social worker and three field workers would be placed. A central office would be established for the supervisor, her assistant, and two stenographers.

Early Duties — Soon after organization of the Family Relations Section, the unit determined that the unit would focus on six principal divisions of work. These were juvenile problems, family problems, inter-family problems, aged persons and invalids, personal service, and assistance to needy families. In addition, the section had to deal with many other problems related to stabilization of family life and establishment of minimum normal conditions of housing, food, clothing, work, and health.

Assistance to needy families concerned the section employees immediately. They began to study family budgets, and since no funds for grants were as yet available, they received voluntary contributions, which they dispensed as loans. They established an advisory committee to aid in selecting loan recipients.

By May 1942, the section estimated that about 200 families were in need of public assistance. Many of these were families in which the father was interned after Pearl Harbor. Of these cases, 30 were considered to be major cases — one morals case, 12 family quarrels, and two divorce cases. In addition to these families, it was reported that 700-800 single persons who had come to Manzanar as volunteers to help establish the center in March, and who had as yet received no wages, were without money for daily personal expenditures. The need for clothing, especially children's clothes, shoes, babies' diapers, layettes for expectant mothers, and work clothes for men was already apparent. To help care for the blind, infirm, and convalescent cases, the section worked with the hospital and public health staff to develop a housekeeping aide system.

The Family Relations Section met daily for discussion, consultation, and training. The section worked with the camp administration and the evacuees and block leaders to cope with the crowded housing conditions. Other daily problems that affected daily family life, and that the section was expected to resolve, included questions relating to mess hall procedures, lack of sweets for children, lack of food appropriate for invalids and babies, permits for milk, teaching young girls to cook, issuance of four bars of soap per half month to each apartment, need for clothes, sewing machines, and clothes lines, lack of partitions in latrines, and high prices at the camp canteen.

Although there was no provision for schools under the WCCA, the Family Relations Section made a preliminary educational survey in May 1942 that indicated that there were 3,123 persons from infants to college age in the camp. The section enrolled voluntary teachers, corresponded with schools about textbooks, and started some voluntary classes.

Under the WRA.

Establishment of Community Welfare Section — On June 5, Thomas Temple arrived at Manzanar to become Chief of Community Services, a WRA organizational unit that would provide supervision for the WCCA's former Family Relations Section. Two weeks later, Dr. Genevieve Carter became the new Superintendent of Education at Manzanar, and the Family Relations Section relinquished its responsibility for a voluntary school program to her organization.

As the WRA took over Manzanar, one of the principal problems facing the Family Relations Section concerned the need of many evacuee families for clothing and public assistance. When these needs were publicized, the San Francisco YMCA, Christian Church Federation, various womens' groups, American Friends Service Committee, and interested individuals sent new and used clothing, blankets, and comforters to Manzanar. In addition, out-dated army uniforms were sent to the camp in late June.

During late June, the centers former information offices were disbanded, and the social workers in these offices was discontinued. On June 26, the Family Relations Section staff was consolidated in one office with their duties "concentrated on strictly welfare matters."

On July 6, Mrs. Margaret D'Ille arrived to become Supervisor of the Family Relations Section, Mrs. Miya Kikuchi having resigned because of family responsibilities. Two days later, on July 8, the name of the section was changed to the Community Welfare Section, and placed under the Chief of Community Services.

The central office of the Community Welfare Section was established in Block 1, Building 10, Apartment 1. This small office, which served as the central office for four months, was equipped with "one cupboard, two long tables, and benches, with a corner for private interviews behind two screens." There were no desks, chairs, files, or telephone, and only one typewriter.

During 1942 the Community Welfare staff usually met each day to discuss its work and policies. A training course with lectures and discussion about social work philosophy and policy was conducted by Harry and Lillian Matsumoto, superintendents of the Children's Village, which was opened at Manzanar in June to house Japanese American orphans and abandoned children. [50]

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the staff meetings and training programs of the Community Welfare Section were hampered by "the language handicap." In "a community where the older persons spoke or read for the most part only Japanese, while many of the younger persons spoke and read only English, a bi-lingual Welfare staff would have been desirable." Since this was "not possible," the "nearest approach to this was a combination of Issei and Nisei staff, and the use of translation where it was especially important." "Even so, perfect understanding was tardy, open and free discussions hard, and much time had to be allowed to accomplish results."

Language and cultural questions, according to the Community Welfare Section's portion of the Final Report, Manzanar, was "a constant consideration for staff and for residents." The report stated further:

.... How far Japanese language, culture, ideals, and manners should be recognized in a community whose background was Japanese but which should increasingly be a part of American life, came up for repeated consideration. The Welfare Section had to attempt to unite both cultural patterns but had constantly to work toward future American understanding.

In the early days of Center life, the Nisei took a very active part in community leadership. Many Issei leaders were still interned when the Center started. Many were paroled to Manzanar during 1942. To get a combination of Issei and Nisei leadership was extremely difficult. At meetings where Issei were present. Nisei felt loath to speak, since their Japanese was inadequate. Issei found it hard to accept any Nisei advice or opinion on its merits. At the same time many Issei were fearful of their future and unwilling to express their ideas or take responsibility.

The Welfare Section encountered great difficulty in the realm of the conflict in families between old Japanese cultural ideas and those of modern young Japanese Americans. The close life under crowded housing conditions aggravated this clash of ideas. Grandparents wished to control their grandchildren in discipline, manners, food, and sleeping habits. Parents' control of selection of their children's mates was accentuated in the Center. Young peoples' social life was constantly under the eye of older persons, their parents and others. Children had difficulty about space, time, and quiet for homework for school. There were strong differences of opinion between the older and younger groups in churches.

In some cases conflicts between old cultural patterns and new ideas resulted in family separations and tragedy. In certain cases wives used the opportunity of economic freedom to insist upon actual separation from their husbands. There were disagreements about questions such as repatriation and relocation. In difficult triangle cases, in cases of the future of illegitimate children, in questions of divorce, it was very difficult to get families to discuss and decide questions on the basis of what seemed right or best. It was even hard to get a recognition of American codes of law. The tendency always was to discuss what had been the old Japanese way or what was understood to be the American or modern way, and to contrast these two ideas. . . .

The Welfare staff had to stand between the old Japanese thinking and extremes of modern ideas, with an effort to unite family life and development. They tried to urge preservation of the best in both ways, and the need for preparation for the future on the basis of reality and not prejudice. . . .

Activities During 1942: Clothing — The work of the Community Welfare Section during the summer and autumn of 1942 emphasized family visiting and counseling, with daily staff meetings for reports and training. As a result of daily visitation, two principal programs developed — one was concerned with clothing while the other focused on grants in aid. Other functions that normally would have fallen under welfare were directly administered by the head of Community Services and not turned over to welfare until early 1943.

To meet the pressing clothing needs at Manzanar during 1942, the Community Welfare Section first developed a system to distribute new and used clothing privately contributed to the center. A small amount of clothing was purchased and distributed, and donated surplus out-dated army clothing was distributed. Since virtually all military clothing was too large, a sewing room was established for the alteration of garments as well as for making new garments. Although all army clothing was for men, women of the center were as needy as the men, especially as the autumn cold approached. Thus, "pea-coats" that required alteration were also issued to women.

A warehouse and distributing center was assigned to the Community Welfare Section. An ironing room was equipped as a sewing room with electric machines. Two sewing machines were assigned to each block for family use.

In November 1942, the WRA announced a new program for clothing allowances and grants. This program provided for an automatic monthly clothing allowance for workers and their dependents, supplemented by a clothing grant for unemployable families based on a monthly determination of need. Thus, the surplus stock in the Community Welfare Section's warehouse was offered to the Cooperative Enterprises at cost. What they did not take was later turned over to Property Control for purchase by workers in the camp. Later, the Welfare sewing room workers were transferred to the Industrial Section where they worked and received training as power machine operatives.

About November 15 the Community Welfare Section began preparation of Basic Family Fact sheets to provide the necessary information to implement the new clothing program. A "new physical house-to-house check" was conducted "by blocks, barracks and apartments." Before the completion of the cards, the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6 interrupted the life of the center. The cards were taken over and completed by the Fiscal Section, thus delaying authorization of the first clothing allowances until December 31, 1942.

Activities During 1942: Public Assistance Grants and Unemployment Compensation — The first public assistance grants were authorized at Manzanar in July 1942, but they were not paid until September. The grants were issued to each of the children in the Children's Village and to center families on the basis of need (e.g., illness, father interned, insufficient income, separated from husband, six minor children, etc.). Under a policy adopted on August 24, the WRA provided for grants to deserving evacuees who were not in a position to benefit either from the center's employment program or from unemployment compensation. These evacuees included: (1) persons who were unable to work because of illness or incapacity; (2) dependents of physically incapacitated evacuees; (3) orphans and other children under 18 without means of support; and (4) heads of families with a total income from all sources inadequate to meet their needs. By the end of 1942, public assistance cases at Manzanar numbered 162, in addition to 63 children at the Children's Village. [51]

Under WRA employment and compensation policies adopted on September 1, 1942, provision was made for unemployment compensation. Any evacuee who applied for work and was assigned a job or who was laid off through no fault of his own could apply to the WRA for unemployment compensation covering himself and his dependents. Rates of unemployment compensation were established at $4.75 per month for men age 18 and older; $4.25 for women 18 and older; $2.50 for dependent children between 13 and 17, inclusive; and $1.50 for dependent children under 13. [52]

Administration of the public assistance program at Manzanar was affected by traditional Japanese attitudes toward public assistance and their acceptance of conditions for granting aid. Prior to the war, Japanese communities in the United States had generally taken care of their own needy cases. As a result, almost no Japanese were on public relief rolls before evacuation except for chronic patients in hospitals and mental institutions and children in orphanages.

After evacuation to Manzanar, when it was discovered that some evacuee families and some aged persons without relatives and widows with children were in need, the welfare staff "followed the traditional Japanese method to relieve them temporarily." A small fund was privately collected and dispensed as loans. Throughout the operation of Manzanar there would be a small fund at the disposal of the welfare staff made up of voluntary contributions by people in the center. This fund was used in cases of need that did not come under rules of eligibility for public assistance grants.

At the beginning of the authorization of grants in aid, it was necessary, through careful work of the family visitors with evacuees, to explain that the acceptance of public assistance did not carry a stigma, and that it was "essentially an extension of the old idea, familiar to them all, of the responsibility of family members for their own relatives, of friends for each other and community members jointly." Despite these efforts, however, some needy families refused to apply or to accept grants.

Activities During 1942: Handicapped Children — In October 1942, family visitors from the Community Welfare Section met with personnel of the Health Section and school officials to consider the question of what should be done with deaf, handicapped, and crippled children. As a result, a crippled children's diagnostic clinic was established on November 16. Appointments were scheduled for 38 children, the oldest being 20 years of age. The types of conditions to be evaluated included orthopedic, heart, eye, hearing, spastic, and orthodontic. Attempts to have deaf children sent out of the center for instruction were unsuccessful. Later a school for handicapped children was developed by Miss Eleanor Thomas of the Education Section in one ward of the hospital.

Activities During 1942: Churches — Soon after the first evacuees reached Manzanar, outside churches assisted the residents in both material and spiritual ways. As soon as the camp was established, key persons from many religious groups visited Manzanar to find out what could be done and later assisted the evacuees in the centers as well as with relocation outside. In late March 1942 the Federal Council of Churches of Los Angeles and the Maryknoll fathers, sent church equipment, money, and other items to assist the evacuees in establishment of church life.

It was realized by many religious groups that public sentiment for the evacuees throughout the nation should be improved. It was important that the outside church become expert in public relations. Prominent clergymen went on record as deploring attacks on the Japanese population on the basis of ancestry. An early movement sponsored by outside churches consisted of programs, such as scholarships, housing, and employment, to relocate college students from the relocation centers.

The first religious group to hold services in the center were the Methodists. They met on March 29 with Rev. Frank Herron Smith of the Methodist Board of Home Missions preaching in Japanese and Rev. Hideo Hashimoto translating in English. Later the Catholic and Protestant groups began holding services and organizing activities often under lay leadership. Under the WCCA, the only religious services permitted at Manzanar were those "of the Catholic faith and under the direction of such Protestant ministers as were certified by the Federated Church Council." No Buddhist worship was permitted, and all services were required to be conducted in the English language. Religious services were held in the recreation halls. [53]

The WRA issued a policy statement regarding religious worship at the relocation centers on May 29, just prior to assuming administrative control of Manzanar, and again on August 24. The policy stated that "the right or freedom of religious worship in WRA centers is recognized and shall be respected." Under this policy, evacuees of all religious groups, including Buddhists, were permitted to hold services in the centers and to invite outside pastors in for temporary visits with the approval of the Project Director and the community council. Despite the policy permitting religious freedom. State Shinto was barred on the grounds that it involved worship of the Japanese Emperor. Restrictions against the use of the Japanese language in religious services were removed by the WRA. [54]

Early provisions for religious worship at Manzanar were hardly adequate for a community of 10,000 people. Administrative Instruction No. 32 stated WRA policy for church facilities:

At each relocation project the WRA will provide material for the construction of one building to be used as a general center of worship by the several denominations represented in the community. Suitable altar furnishings will have to be provided by each denomination and a schedule or periods of worship will have to be arranged.

In compliance with this directive, WRA camp administrators planned to construct one church building at Manzanar, but because of the difficulty of procuring building materials and a lack of agreement regarding the joint use of the building when it would be constructed, it was decided temporarily to continue allotment of recreation buildings for church use. Later the plans for building a joint church were abandoned, and block recreation buildings and mess halls became permanent churches.

The connection between church groups and the camp administration was effected at Manzanar through the Community Welfare Section, because many functions of welfare were closely connected with church life. On September 30, 1942, the Community Welfare Section made several decisions regarding the establishment and operation of churches at Manzanar. It was agreed that facilities for Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant churches would be provided, and it was determined that the various sects of the Buddhist faith would function jointly and the various Protestant denominations would meet as a Community Protestant Church.

Until January 1944 ministers, priests, and sisters were listed on the Community Welfare Section payroll as family counselors, thus entitling them to compensation for their services. As professionals, they were paid 19 dollars a month. These religious leaders met frequently with the rest of the welfare staff, and they were called upon particularly when special cases indicated that advice from an appropriate church leader would be helpful.

A religious affiliation census was conducted at Manzanar in August 1942. The results were: Buddhist, 4,048; Catholic, 454; Protestant, 2,684; Shinto, 21; Other, 21; No religion, 2,321. Several months later, weekly attendance statistics showed that 1,800-1,900 persons were attending Buddhist services, while approximately 500 and 1,550 were attending Catholic and Protestant services, respectively. Appointed personnel attended and took part in services.

The Buddhist Church was at first under suspicion regarding allegiance to the United States because Caucasians knew little about its religious beliefs and values. Over time the community-conscious Buddhists participated in many events in the life of the camp, interpreting their church programs and thus disproving suspicions of special allegiance to Japan.

On June 21, the Buddhists held their first services. The congregation consisted of Buddhist followers, principally from Southern California, the Sacramento area, and Bainbridge Island, Washington. Mr. L. Mihara acted as chairman on the opening day and sermons were delivered by Mr. Junzo Izmuida and Mr. Sangoro Mayeda, while Mr. Eizo Masuyama participated as the ceremonial speaker. In August, the Rev. Shinjo Nagatomi arrived from the Tanforan Assembly Center in response to an invitation from the Manzanar Buddhists, accepting pastoral responsibility of the Buddhist Church activities and duties at Manzanar. The Nyubutsu ceremony, or the dedication of the church shrine, was held on September 13, 1942, with Rev. Nagatomi as the dedication speaker.

The Buddhist Church was divided into four sects. The Shinshu sect, for which the Rev. Nagatomi officiated as head and was assisted by Mr. Mayeda, held its services at the head church. The Nichiren Shu held its services in Block 27, Building 15. The other sects, Daishi Ko and Kannon Ko, held their services in Block 13, Building 15.

The regular services of the church represented a combination of American and Japanese influences. Two regular Sunday services were held morning and evening. The morning service was for the young people and the evening service for adults. Sunday school classes were held regularly for children and young persons. Besides the regular services, memorial services, funerals, and weddings were conducted as necessary.

Three organizations were affiliated with the Buddhist Church. These included the Buddhists Block Representatives Council with 150 members, the Young Buddhist Association with 900 members, and the Buddhists Women's organization with 1,000 members. The Buddhists were community-conscious and contributed to many social, cultural, and ceremonial events in the life of the camp.

Father Clement arrived with the first large contingent of volunteers at Manzanar in late March 1942 and conducted the first Catholic mass before the end of the month. Although Father Clement returned to the camp periodically to hold masses, the Manzanar Catholic Church did not receive a regular pastor until July 1942 when Father Steinback returned from internment in Japan. He remained at the center until it cloyed in November 1945.

Father Steinback was assisted by Sisters Bernadette and Suzanne, Japanese nuns. They held study clubs, taught classes for all ages, organized a choir, and counseled families and individuals. They established two membership clubs — the Senior Sodality and the Holy Name Society.

The Catholic Church was the smallest religious group at Manzanar, but it was reportedly "the one most closely knit." During the three-year internment period, more than 230 persons in the camp were converted to Catholicism.

As there were many followers of various Protestant denominations at Manzanar, the Community Welfare Section determined that all would be united under one organization called the Manzanar Christian Church. The stated purpose of the church was "to make God a reality in daily living."

With the arrival of the evacuated pastors from the West Coast and the WRA's lifting of restrictions against the use of the Japanese language in preaching, organized Protestant church work began to take shape. The first official body formed was the Christian Council. At the opening meeting in June 1942 more than 70 members were assigned as representatives of the adult council. In August, the church was dedicated in Block 15, Building 15. Later three additional worship centers were located conveniently in the center. The program included services in English and Japanese on Sunday morning and evening. During week days, the program included prayer meetings, club meetings, Bible study, and choir practice. A church school was established, the upper division open to children of elementary and high school age and the lower division to children of preschool age. Church-related social clubs included the Young People's Fellowship, the Young Adult Forum, and the Adult Council.

Activities During 1942: YWCA and YMCA — As early as April 1942 correspondence was carried on between the Business and Professional Girls Club of Los Angeles and some older girls at Manzanar, former members of the club, regarding establishment of a "Y" in the center. As a result of the efforts of interested individuals, a group of women concerned with the formation of Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) chapter at Manzanar met in the center with two secretaries from the National YWCA and one from Los Angeles on August 5. Mrs. Miya Kikuchi was chosen as the first president of the YWCA board and Miss Alice Asaka the first general secretary. Additional officers included an office secretary, a Girl Reserve secretary, older girls' secretary, and a house mother for the organization's dormitory. At first, all personnel of the organization were paid through the Community Welfare Section at the regular camp wages of $19 and $16. The administrative board was composed of evacuee and appointed personnel.

To encourage the membership of Buddhists and Catholic girls in the "Y", it was decided that the matter of religion would be left to the church and its officials. Thus, this organization was at first known in Manzanar at the Young Women's Association (YWA). The WRA allotted one barrack, Block 19, Building 15, for the office and club rooms of the YWA. Furnishings were contributed by the Japanese branch YWCA in Los Angeles, the national office, and individual YWCA branches throughout the country.

By October 1942, the YWA had established seven older girls' clubs and nine Girl Reserve clubs at Manzanar. A dormitory for single girls had also been started. The clubs began playing an active role in various community programs at the camp, including assistance to school committees and PTA groups, as well as the adult education program, Community Activities Section, and churches. That month a national secretary led a conference at the camp under the theme "To Give and Find the Best." In November the YWA played a significant role in World Fellowship Week activities at Manzanar with Miss Ruth Woodsmall, World YWCA general secretary, and Mrs. Edna Moore of the national staff present.

The Manzanar Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) was organized in the early autumn of 1942 at the request of men and boys who had been members of the YMCA before coming to Manzanar. The first meetings on organization were held in the apartment of the Chief of Community Services, and the formation of the groups was sponsored by him and aided by the girls interested in a sister organization for the YWA. A clubhouse and dormitory were assigned to the YMCA. A board, consisting of Issei and Nisei and appointed personnel, was established. Clubs were organized, and two secretaries were employed. These staff members, like those of the YWA, were at first carried on the payroll of the Community Welfare Section.

The YMCA activities at Manzanar never became as extensive as those of the YWA, primarily because young men were generally the first to leave the center on seasonal leave, trial leave, and final relocation. Thus, the YMCA leadership and membership at the camp were constantly changing.

Activities During 1942: Red Cross Unit — The first meeting to organize a Red Cross unit at Manzanar was held in April 1942. It was decided to request assistance from the Los Angeles Red Cross in establishment of the unit. Many of the evacuees in the camp had been members of various Red Cross chapters in Los Angeles before evacuation. However, Los Angeles would take no responsibility for Red Cross work in the camp. Thus, authority to organize a Red Cross unit was provided by the San Francisco area office.

By early autumn of 1942, interest in Red Cross activities at Manzanar had decreased except for request for first-aid and home-nursing classes. Home nursing was taught by a Red Cross itinerant nurse from the San Francisco area office. Camp administrators encouraged the home nursing course because women who passed the course could serve in the Manzanar hospital as nurses' aides as well as provide home nursing services for patients dismissed from the hospital. Of the 200 persons who attended these classes, several continued as nurses' aides until the hospital closed in October 1945. Several home nursing classes were taught by public health nurses at the camp. These classes were registered with the San Francisco area office, and students who passed were issued certificates.

First aid courses were encouraged by the camp administration, because there were few telephones at Manzanar and medical services were hampered by limited staff. During the fall of 1942, the center's schools required that one teacher in each block have a first aid certificate. All nursery and kindergarten teachers were required to have certificates, while firemen and policemen were encouraged to have them. Although the Red Cross unit experienced difficulty in finding teachers who were fluent in both Japanese and English or translators who could understand the subject to make teaching practical, more than 100 persons completed the first aid course. First aid and home nursing text books were sold to those taking the courses by the local Red Cross unit.

Statistics

When the WRA took over administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, the organizational unit that would later become known as the Statistics Section existed as two separate units. A group of clerks in the Housing and Employment Division formed one unit, while the other, the Census Office, was an independent unit that had just been established by Washington.

Registration and Records Unit. At first, no special subdivision of the Housing and Employment Division was in charge of record keeping, but on June 18 a memorandum from the Employment Officer to an evacuee on his staff placed her in charge of a unit to be responsible for this work. During the summer of 1942, this unit was known by various names (chiefly as Personnel), but in August it became known as the Registration and Records Unit. No standards were set up for the guidance of this work either by the WRA offices in Washington or San Francisco. Thus, methods and procedures were adapted from the former office experience of the local staff.

The first records kept were family folders, family record cards, and individual cards with work classification information for the use of the Employment Section. The family folders contained documents pertaining to the family or individuals within the family group, papers concerning the release of a parolee from an internment center, travel permits, and correspondence. As each family arrived in Manzanar, it was assigned an identification number, and data regarding the group was entered by hand on a family record card (824-M). Besides the family name, head, identification number, Manzanar residence, and previous address, these cards noted family relationship, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, schooling, and health data for each member. On the reverse side of the card was space for pre-evacuation work history and names of those required to continue at school. This information was later typed on WCCA Form R-l, a card "practically identical with 824-M except rearranged with a space for remarks." These cards contained the notation, "Old Id. #— These were numbers given groups when they-registered preparatory to evacuation, which had become known as Social Data Registration numbers.

From the beginning, the Registration and Records Unit functioned as a depository and disbursing center for information concerning evacuees to other units at Manzanar as well as various WRA offices. While a part of Housing and Employment, the unit occupied desk space in the office of the division, "a 20- by 24-foot apartment designated as 1-2-1" (Block 1, Building 2, Apartment 1). About September 1, the second-hand desks and files were moved to Block 1, Building 5, Apartment 2, where the unit became the sole occupant or a 20-foot x 20-foot apartment. The work was under the general supervision of the Employment Officer and more directly under the junior placement officer. About the time the office was moved to 1-5-2, it was placed, together with the Census, under the direction of an Employment Officer from the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco.

Census. The Census was a temporary project initiated by the WRA's Washington office to gather information about the evacuees. A mimeographed pamphlet of instructions for interviewers was prepared on May 30, and the work began in June. Appointed personnel from the Regional Office selected and trained the evacuee interviewers, and one remained for some time to supervise the work. After her departure, an evacuee was placed in charge. As of July 9, the Census employed a staff of 67 evacuees.

While the interviewing was in progress, the Census moved from block to block for the convenience of the residents. Master housing lists were compiled and maintained as a means of obtaining complete coverage of the blocks. Interviews were scheduled for all family members 14 years of age or older.

After all 36 blocks had been visited by the Census, the office was established at 1-5-1 about September 1. A selected corps of interviewers translated the occupational histories into the terms and codes used by the U.S. Employment Service and filled out an Employee Record Card for the use of the Employment Section. This service to Employment, later known as Personnel, was continued by the interviewers as long as interviewing was underway. The work was not completed until January 1943. [55]

Evacuee Employment

Under the WCCA. During the early weeks of Manzanar's operations, recruitment of incoming evacuees for employment in the center was conducted in "a more or less haphazard manner." Various functions had to be performed, such as operation of mess halls and organization of community facilities and services. Amid the chaos of the evacuation process during the spring of 1942, efforts to place each person in the position for which he "was best fitted was at first almost an impossibility.

Nevertheless, the WCCA embarked on a program to employ the Manzanar evacuees until such time as they were relocated. The assignment of jobs to evacuees was delegated to the Personnel Section of the Finance Division. Under the supervision of this section, all employable persons at Manzanar were registered and classified beginning in April 1942. [56] The registration and classification were used to find and recruit qualified persons to fill the numerous jobs needed to operate the center as well as to serve as an aid to relocation. [57] As this registration and classification process neared its final stages, regulations and directives were issued in regard to employment. No evacuee was given a job without a "work order" authorizing employment issued by the Personnel Section, and no evacuee could quit one job and apply for another without a release from the Personnel Section. Five consecutive absences would result in dismissal of the evacuee from his assigned job. [58]

Evacuee employment at Manzanar advanced rapidly under this system. By the first week of May 1942, the population of Manzanar had increased to some 7,200 persons, of which some 2,300 were assigned jobs. Approximately 150 work orders were issued each day. Many of the early job assignments were of a temporary nature, and adjustments accounted for a sizable portion of the daily work orders. [59]

A census of evacuee employment at Manzanar taken in mid-May demonstrated the number and diversity of jobs in which evacuees were employed. The employment list showed the following breakdown: executive office, 11; finance division, 24; timekeeping and payroll, 59; personnel section, 32; heating and plumbing maintenance, 83; fuel oil detail, 30; electrical maintenance, 45; machinist crew, 8; carpentry detail, 36; sewage plant, 15; water works, 15; garbage and rubbish disposal, 49; ground and street improvement and maintenance, 140; office personnel, 28; fire department, 95; police department, 128; stenographers, 4; bedding, moving, and checkers, 36; housing, 45; hospital, health, and sanitation, 263; laundry staff, 33; ambulance drivers, 5; night watchmen, 12; janitors, 15; gardeners, 10; kitchen staff, mess, and food warehouses, 1,562.

Of the 9,671 evacuees at Manzanar on June 1, nearly one-third (3,165) were employed in "operations, services and functions within the project." Of this number, about 125 were employed in agriculture. [60]

While evacuee employment was increasing at Manzanar, the issue of wages continued to be a significant matter of concern to the workers. When the first evacuee volunteers arrived to work at Manzanar, many were under the impression that prevailing American wage scales would be applied to them. As time passed, however, the WCCA failed to make any statement concerning wages as a result of internal agency debates over the issue. Official announcements were periodically made, however, that a wage policy was being formulated. [61] The announcements, however, created confusion as contradictory announcements regarding policies were forthcoming from the Army, the WCCA, and the WRA. From a public relations standpoint, it seemed unwise to pay evacuees at the centers a higher wage than the minimum wage of the American soldier, which was $21 a month. On the other hand, in fairness to the evacuees, the scale had to be set sufficiently high to provide some incentive for productive work, and to enable the workers to purchase needed items not furnished in the camp. Finally, on May 14, nearly two months after work programs started at Manzanar, the WCCA unexpectedly announced the wage scale that was to apply to operating assembly and reception/relocation centers. The policies were continued by the WRA and formalized in WRA policy adopted on September 11. Monthly wages ranged from $12 for unskilled or semi-skilled labor, to $16 for skilled labor, to $19 for professional work or supervisory responsibilities. The wages would be paid to all employees, and in addition they would receive food, shelter, and medical and dental care. Clothing would be issued to those in need, and a gratuitous issue of money would be made to all persons for the purchase of personal necessities. [62]

The low wage scale was not well received by the evacuee population at Manzanar, many residents charging the WCCA with "broken promises" when it was learned that the workers would not be paid wages prevailing on the outside. [63] Similar charges were leveled when the evacuee employees were forced to wait to be paid the sum due them for their work to date. It was not until the last week in June, nearly one month after the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar, that payment was begun for work done in the month of March. Two weeks later payment was started for work performed in April. [64]

Under the WRA. In its First Quarterly Report, the War Relocation Authority outlined its policies that governed evacuee employment in the relocation centers. In order to provide employment at the centers and hold down the costs of program administration, the WRA early determined that each relocation center "should be as nearly self-sufficient as possible." One step in that direction was selection of areas with agricultural potential so that evacuees with farm experience might produce "a maximum of the foods needed for their own community kitchens." Another was the planning of government-sponsored manufacturing projects to produce articles needed by evacuees (such as clothing) and goods required by the camps as a whole (such as school furniture). A third step was employment of evacuees in: (1) construction of buildings other than basic housing, (2) a range of community service occupations at the centers; and (3) various clerical and other phases of project administration and maintenance. [65]

Under the WRA, an Employment Office was organized at Manzanar with a staff of evacuee interviewers and occupational analysts. Evacuees were required to register with the office, and an Employment Record Card was developed for each evacuee. When the employment record cards were completed, the Employment Office established a file of occupational classifications, including those persons too aged, feeble, or young to work; housewives; and those physically handicapped or in poor health. From the file of those available for employment, an effort was made to place in useful employment as many people as could fit into a specific job classification. The purpose of this process was to maximize the utilization of individual evacuee skills wherever possible.

Although section heads sometimes recruited prospective employees that were then processed through the Employment Office, the most satisfactory method of recruitment, and the one eventually adopted by the Personnel Office, was known as the "referral method." The placement unit of the Personnel Office maintained a list of people who had inquired about employment. If no particular type of job was available at the moment, the person was told that he would be notified. His employment record card was taken from the file and checked for occupational classification, and as soon as a job was available, a referral card was immediately sent to his quarters, usually by personal delivery to facilitate the contact. The employing officer interviewed the referred person, and action was taken was taken on his suitability for the job.

By September 30, the number of evacuees employed in full-time jobs at Manzanar had risen to 4,159 (approximately 80 percent of the employables). The largest number (1,503) were working in the mess halls, while more than 1,000 men and 30 women evacuees were engaged in the sugar beet fields of Montana and Idaho. [66]

Opportunities for private employment outside the centers developed on a significant scale during late May and early June 1942. The growing wartime-related manpower shortage in agricultural sections of the West was beginning to be acutely felt, and the need for labor in the sugar beet fields was especially urgent. At the suggestion of public officials in some of the principal sugar beet producing states, plans were developed by the WCCA and WRA and the U.S. Employment Service to recruit groups of evacuees in assembly and relocation centers for agricultural work. Under the plans, recruitment during May and June was handled on a voluntary basis by the Employment Service in cooperation with representatives of the sugar companies.

To protect the interests of both the evacuees and the general public, the WRA and the WCCA established definite requirements that had to be met before evacuees could be employed in an agricultural area outside the centers. These stipulations included: (1) written assurance from the state governor and local law enforcement officials that law and order would be maintained; (2) provision by the employer for transportation from the assembly or relocation center to the place of employment and return; (3) payment of prevailing wages; (4) provision that local labor would not be displaced; and (5) certification by the U.S. Employment Service that satisfactory housing would be provided to the evacuees without cost in the area of employment. Although these conditions were established jointly by the WRA and the WCCA (because much of the recruiting took place in assembly centers), the actual operation compliance phase of the program was handled by the WRA. As a result of the program, large acreages of a vitally need crop were saved. According to the WRA, this work was probably the most direct and positive contribution to the war effort made by the evacuees during the early months of the evacuation process. [67]

The WRA policy on employment and compensation adopted on September 1,1942, provided for automatic enrollment in the War Relocation Work Corps of all evacuees assigned to jobs in the relocation centers. Under this policy the WRA administrators at Manzanar initiated efforts to enroll employed evacuees in the center's Work Corps. The Work Corps was designed to have a Representative Assembly elected by all of the various work groups on the basis of one representative for every fifty workers or fraction thereof.

In addition to the Representative Assembly, the WRA policy directive called for a Fair Practices Committee and a Merit Rating Board to aid in the solution of the center's labor problems. This committee would be composed of three members from the professional or executive staff, and one each from the Industrial, Agricultural, and Mess sections, as well as one member selected by various other projects acting together. [68]

Election of representatives took place late in September, but the results showed only a mediocre interest in the Work Corps. Nevertheless, organization continued and the nomination committee advanced names for election to the Fair Practices Committee. [69] The election of the Fair Practices Committee took place on October 23, but the Mess Section failed to take part in the election. This group, led by Harry Ueno who would play a vital role in the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6, distrusted the Work Corps, believing that it was a tool of the administration. Led by Ueno, the mess workers formed their own Kitchen Workers Union, the stated purpose of which was to wring concessions from the administration rather than have the administration wring more work out of the evacuees as they believed would happen under the Work Corps. Nevertheless, the Fair Practices Committee chose candidates for the organization and prepared a tentative constitution and by-laws. The organization, composed of candidates elected from chose selected by the organizing committee, met and approved a constitution and by-laws and elected a chairman as well as other officers.

As stated in the constitution, the purpose of the Manzanar Fair Practices Committee was "to afford Manzanar with a democratic representative organization within the work corps in order to maintain fair employment practice." All persons on "acceptance of employment automatically" became a member of the Manzanar Work Corps. The membership consisted of the executive staff, or those with direct supervisory responsibility to an administrative official, and all others defined as "project employees." The immediate aim of the organization was "to settle employment grievances and problems through proper channels to establish coordination between the administration and the members of the Work Corps, and to assist in relocating the evacuees." The ultimate purpose of the organization was "to provide for successful rehabilitation of evacuees." [70]

Despite the lofty goals of the Manzanar Work Corps, distrust of its program was not limited to the Kitchen Workers Union but was widespread throughout the center. Many of the evacuees were wary of the Work Corps because those associated with its formation and leadership were primarily Nisei who were labor conscious and active politically within the center. The organization attempted to function at Manzanar, but soon after the "Manzanar Incident" it resigned as a body, citing "as the primary reason the fact that it did not have the support of the people of Manzanar." [71]

Manufacturing/Industry

Development of industrial projects to provide employment to large numbers of evacuees held "a prominent place in the early discussions of WCCA officials on the organization and administration of the Centers." When it became apparent in May 1942 that the WRA would take over the administration of the program, however, the WCCA took little further action. To provide work opportunities for evacuees with manual skills, the WRA explored a wide range of comparatively simple industries that might be established at relocation centers. The primary objective of these projects was to meet the needs of the evacuee population and the requirements of the centers, while a secondary goal was to produce items that were needed in the war effort and which were not being turned out in sufficient quantity by the private industry in the nation. [72]

Camouflage Net Factory. With the assistance of the Corps of Engineers, however, one industrial project was initiated by the WCCA — the manufacture or "garnishing" of camouflage nets. [73] When the WRA assumed administration of Manzanar, the Army engineers were completing four large open-faced structures designed to house the camouflage net project To meet the Army's request that this industrial activity be commenced, and also to foster its goal of industrial development in the relocation centers, the WRA established an Industrial Division in its regional office in San Francisco. At the same time, the WRA established Industrial sections in the various relocation centers, the first of which began to operate at Manzanar in June 1942 with a senior manufacturing superintendent and one assistant in charge. The camouflage net project operation at Manzanar on June 10, 1942, under the supervision two individuals with technical assistance and advice of the Corps of Engineers, who also provided guidance for similar projects at the Santa Anita Assembly Center and the Gila War Relocation Center.

The camouflage net project at Manzanar operated until early December 1942, employing "at a peak some 500 evacuees, and producing nets at the rate of from 2,000 to 10,000 a month in direct proportion to the number of persons employed." The project involved the manufacture of simple camouflage nets with colored pieces of fabric in summer, winter, and desert patterns. [74]

Since provisions in the Geneva Convention of 1929 prevented aliens from being conscripted for war work or working on projects involving production of goods for the nation's armed services, WRA administrators ruled that Japanese nationals or aliens were ineligible to work on the Manzanar camouflage net project, because it was considered direct "war work." Although the Geneva Convention applied specifically only to prisoners of war and was not ratified by the Japanese government, both the United States and Japan had recently agreed through neutral diplomatic channels to extend its applicable provisions to cover alien civilians who were interned in either country as well as Japanese subjects in the United States who were quartered in relocation centers. This ruling excluded Issei but not the American-born Nisei and Kibei from being eligible as camouflage net workers. Some Issei, who wished "to do their part" for the nation's war effort were irritated by this decision. Other Issei, including some of the Terminal Island fishermen, were more capable than the Nisei at producing nets because of their experience with netting. [75]

The Final Report, Manzanar detailed some of the problems that resulted from the camouflage net project. It noted that there was

a constant focus of contention between certain factions of the evacuees and the management of the Center. Indeed, it was through studying the cause of this contention that the management first began to understand the existence of what was later popularly known as the 'pro-Japanese' element among the evacuees. . . . With this ruling, and actual work on the nets, a first "cause" was provided for the various groups within the evacuee population to work 'for' or 'against.' Here, for the first time, the management became aware of the degree of domination which parents held over their children of all ages, many well past their 18-to-2l birthdays. Differences between Kibei and Nisei also came into focus. 'Patriotic' American families began to disassociate themselves from 'Japanese' families.

The standard wage scale . . . was applied to the camouflage net work. This brought out the first labor agitation and labor agitators who, under the pretext that the Army was getting 'slave' labor or 'prisoner' labor to do a war emergency job, urged slowdowns, strikes, poor work, and other standard ideas of protest. . . .

On August 12, the WRA announced that the net factory would close pending a reorganization. The cause of this announcement was trouble that had arisen over the eight-hour day regulation of the WRA. When the factory opened, the Army had set a quota of five nets for each crew per day. The evacuee crews found that as time passed, they became more efficient and could complete their quota before the day was through. Thus, they began going home when they had finished their quota for the day. This resulted in complaints from other evacuees, and also embarrassed the administration, which had been ordered to maintain an eight-hour day. The administration met considerable resistance when an effort was made to enforce the eight-hour day, finally closing the factory on August 12. [76]

The net factory reopened on August 17 under a reorganized method of operation. The reorganization involved initiation of training classes in some of the more detailed work connected with the project, as well as classes in first aid. Thus, the eight-hour day was maintained by having the crews report for instruction classes when they finished their daily quota. [77]

Less than one month later, the net factory closed again. On September 11, it was announced that the factory would close, ostensibly because of the loss of workers, many of whom were going on furlough or seasonal leave to work in the sugar beet fields in the western states. With the beginning of the school term it was anticipated that many workers would also leave. On September 14 the net factory registered new workers under new regulations which included an eight-hour day and a forty-four hour week. The following day the plant resumed production with a much-reduced workforce of 370 workers. [78]

Despite resumption of the operations, factory production fell from 15,354 nets in August to 7,512 in September. The reduced workforce, resulting from the fact that many workers were leaving to take other jobs in the center that had been vacated by the seasonal leave workers, was an indication of the growth of unpopularity of the net project. One reason for the increasing unpopularity, according to one historian, was that the net factory "was very zealously supported by Nisei who were well known politicians, and who were quickly becoming unpopular throughout the camp." The struggle over hours placed a stigma on the work. In addition, the unfavorable conditions of work in the lint-filled air of the factory were increasingly blamed for respiratory problems experienced by the workers. Many who worked in factory believed they should receive war industry wages rather than the $16 per month they were receiving. [79]

In November 1942, the Corps of Engineers announced plans for turning the camouflage net project over to a private contractor who would operate the factory at Manzanar and pay the evacuees "standard wage rates." Because the Nisei and Kibei were the only ones who would benefit by this arrangement, the Issei charged that they were victims of discrimination, and they immediately exerted pressure on workers "to keep them from participating in the new project." As a result of this labor dissension, the WRA center management announced that net workers would receive a $10 dollar bonus over their pay if 1,000 square feet of netting were produced per day by each worker. Any amount over 1,000 square feet produced by a worker would provide him an additional bonus of one-tenth of a cent a square foot. Before this wage decision could be implemented, however, the "Manzanar Incident" occurred on December 6, and the WRA suspended operation of the net project, a decision concurred in by the WRA's central office in Washington. [80]

Clothing and Furniture Factories. Besides operation of the camouflage net project in 1942, the Industrial Section at Manzanar planned future operations and surveyed "industrial possibilities which could use the skills known to exist in a Japanese community." While various plans were rejected, it was determined to commence clothing and furniture factories.

In August 1942, the clothing factory began operation in the ironing room of Block 2. [81] At first, six "domestic electric sewing machines" were used, "at which women operators made "dust masks and arm protectors for the workers on the camouflage net project." They also made uniforms for nurses in the hospital and for operators in "Manzanar's first 'beauty parlor.'"

In November, the domestic sewing machines were replaced by power machines, and the factory was reconditioned. Thereafter, the clothing factory operations expanded rapidly. A canvas of skills among the evacuees disclosed that only one person had ever operated a "power machine on a production line." This female evacuee was employed as the first "chief operator" in the reconditioned clothing factory to aid in teaching the trade to others. The superintendent of manufacturing, having supervised garment factories for years, took personal charge of the operation and helped to train new operators as they were recruited. Inexperienced workers were trained to be designers, pattern makers, cutters, machine operators, floorladies, and machinists, all of whom were reportedly "skilled workers capable of handling any type of power machine on any type of production line in the garment industry."

A variety of garments, ranging from baby layettes to tailored suits, were produced during 1942. Items manufactured included camouflage masks, beauty shop smocks and uniforms, kitchen aprons, waitresses' uniforms, towels, denim coats, and policemen's shirts. The largest orders, however, were for overalls, coveralls, hospital uniforms, children's dresses, and shirts and blouses. The clothes were produced for the camp administration and furnished to laborers as work clothes, or they were produced for the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises which paid the WRA wholesale prices and then sold the articles to the evacuees in the camp's general store. The factory, which would employ an average of 65 persons, made a profit throughout its history, "even in the early stages when much time was spent in training operators." [82]

Machinery for the furniture factory or shop, consisting of saws, planers. Joiners, drills, and lathes, was obtained from the National Youth Authority. Because numerous articles were needed immediately for development of the center, the shop was placed under the supervision of the Engineering Section. Later in February 1943, the shop would be turned over to the Industrial Section.

Community Alterations Shop. Soon after the opening of Manzanar, several hundred bales of clothing were obtained from "federal surpluses." Some of the clothing consisted of "Army outer garments left over from World War I, some were woolen jackets, some were Navy 'P' coats." The original intention of the WCCA had been to furnish clothing free of charge to the evacuees, but that idea was changed during discussions between the WCCA and the WRA concerning evacuee wage policy. However, a number of persons at Manzanar were "welfare cases and could qualify for free clothing." In later months, some of the clothing was offered for sale to the evacuees through the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises store.

Most of the clothing was too large for the evacuees, and "for a few months the evacuees tried to alter the clothes themselves." This proved impractical, however, and the Welfare Section started a unit for the alteration of clothes to be given to needy cases. This alteration unit, which employed 17 persons, would later be turned over to the Industrial Section in 1943. [83]

Typewriter Repair Shop. Typewriters were scarce at Manzanar during its early months of operation. An evacuee, who had operated a typewriter rental service in Los Angeles, rented his typewriters to the WRA and was employed at evacuee wages to keep the typewriters in repair. As the center developed, this operation "grew to a sizeable service." Later, the evacuee requested his typewriters back, and transferred to other work in the center. [84]

Sign Shop. Among the early arrivals at Manzanar were several young evacuees who had been employed as commercial artists in motion picture studios. One was employed by the Engineering Section of the WCCA to paint emergency signs for the center. After moving into one of the engineering warehouses, he developed "a worthwhile service in sign work." [85]

Food Processing Units. During the first six months operation of the Manzanar center, evacuees asked for and received permission to develop food-processing projects to make foods they were used to eating. As a result, shoyu, bean-sprout, and tofu plants were started. These units were largely directed by evacuees with little administrative supervision.

Shoyu, a "highly appreciated condiment among the Japanese," was a sauce made from soya beans. Employing three employees, this factory, which began operation in November 1942, produced some 1,500 gallons per month at a cost lower than the Mess Section could procure in the outside market.

A bean sprout plant was commenced in October 1942. Employing four men, it produced an average of 7,000 pounds of bean sprouts per month.

Tofu, a small cake made from soya bean meal, was produced in a factory opened at Manzanar in August 1942. By early 1943 it would employ eight persons and produce an average of 10,000 one and one-fourth pound cakes per month. [86]

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises

Army Canteen under the WCCA. During late March 1942, as the population of Manzanar was rapidly increasing, a canteen/general store, offering necessities to the evacuees not furnished by the Army, was established under the auspices of the WCCA Service Division. [87] The original canteen and general store located in Block 8 carried a limited supply of items that had a quick turnover and which were in immediate and constant demand. These items included newspapers and periodicals, smoking supplies, confections, soft drinks, ice cream, wash basins and tubs, laundry boards, soaps, limited clothing, canned goods, fruits, and sunglasses. Purchase of supplies were made through the procurement officer of the Supply and Accounting Section of the San Francisco office, and receipts were placed to the credit of the United States Treasury.

During April there were suggestions that a "swap shop" be established to supplement the services of the canteen/general store and that solicitors be allowed to sell merchandise and services for pay at Manzanar. However, the WCCA determined that Manzanar was an Army camp and refused to allow private enterprise to operate in the center. All business in the camp was to be transacted through the canteen/general store, and any person found soliciting private business would be stopped.

On April 15 it was announced that plans for a new commissary building for community enterprises "to house a soda fountain and clothing department" had been developed and would be under construction in the center of the camp that week. Among the items that the commissary planned to have in stock were "basins, tubs, seasonal sports clothes, stationary, toilet supplies, hardware, goggles, washboards, hats, and small household items." Plans were also announced to establish small soft drink counters throughout the camp. "Due to the shortage caused by the supplying towns of Lone Pine, Los Angeles, and Fort Ord," however, articles "such as washboards, tubs, pans, and buckets" were not available. It was anticipated, however, that the "shortage problem" would be "relieved soon."

While no structures were built specifically for stores, canteens, or private enterprise, there was considerable discussion of undertaking such efforts during the early months of the center's operation. A plan, however, was approved by those managing the business enterprises and by the project management either to erect a group of buildings in one of the firebreaks or to move some of the standing buildings to such a location and convert them into a community shopping and service center. The plan never materialized, however, because of labor and building materials shortages.

Manzanar Community Enterprises under the WCCA. The Army canteen/general store operation was replaced on May 24 by a new business organization named Manzanar Community Enterprises, organized by the Community Enterprises Section under the authority of the WCCA procurement officer. Under this new organization, the canteen/store was managed by an appointed staff manager who selected his evacuee assistants. The profits from the new canteen were to be used for welfare needs and improvements in the camp. Six evacuees, experienced in merchandising, were selected to serve as an oversight board in the operation of the business. Because of their prior business connections, and with the backing of the camp administration, the trustees were able to purchase goods on an open book account basis for sale at the canteen. The trustees and other evacuees at Manzanar had stocks of goods in storage in the communities from which they had been evacuated, and they were "more than willing to have these brought to Manzanar to stock the shelves in the canteen." "Through the prompt payment of invoices they were able to enhance their credit and enlarge the business by building up larger stocks and offering for sale a greater variety of goods."

On May 24, the first day of business for Manzanar Community Enterprises, the new canteen had 8,182 customers. Sixteen clerks rang up total sales of $1,847.18. On the first two days of business, the canteen sold 4,200 bottles of soda pop daily. [88]

As part of this new enterprise, the fish market which had originally been located in the canteen was moved to a nearby ironing room in Block 8. The odor of the fish, its affinity for flies, and the general messiness associated with its operation prompted management to transfer the fish market. Prices in the fish market were comparatively high contrasted with those to which the evacuees had been accustomed in Terminal Island and Los Angeles. The markup was high, about 50 percent, to counterbalance spoilage and shrinkage. However, there was no other way in which the evacuees could purchase fish, and the market continued to be well patronized on the two days per week that it was open. Some fish was served in the mess halls, but this was insufficient in quantity and inferior in quality.

In May the general dry goods section of the canteen/store was transferred to Block 21, and those commodities belonging to a general store were removed from Block 8. This move enabled the canteen/store to expand its services to include the sale of more clothing, yard goods, toys, rationed shoes, and drugs. After this date, the canteen/store in Block 8 confined its sales to food items, confections, smoking supplies, newspapers and periodicals, stationary, and drugs. The general crowded housing conditions in camp made it impossible to secure additional space. There was "a dire need for other types of service besides those provided in the canteen and store," such as a barber shop, shoe repair shop, and watch repair shop. However, the question of who should provide these services — the government at no cost for service to residents, or the business enterprises at nominal charges for services — was debated without resolution while Manzanar was under the WCCA. The government was reluctant to undertake such services, but the most evacuees felt that it was the duty of the government to do so since they had been removed unwillingly from their former communities and many had suffered considerable financial hardship. In addition, no wages were paid to any of the evacuee workers until the first payroll allowance arrived on June 19 in the form of printed script to be used or cashed at the canteen/store. Thus, many evacuees complained about their inability to keep "shod," get their hair cut, and have their glasses changed. Some evacuees terminated their employment in the center, because they did not receive the personal services they felt they needed and deserved.

To alleviate these difficulties, the canteen/store tried several plans. It attempted to send shoes to Los Angeles for repair, but this service proved to be slow and costly. The facilities in the neighboring towns were already overtaxed and unable or unwilling to provide much relief for the Manzanar evacuees. As a result, evacuee barbers began to flourish under unsanitary conditions in the camp as early as mid-April, but largely because of the wrangle over whose responsibility it was to provide such services, no community-wide business projects were established.

Manzanar Community Enterprises under the WRA. When the WRA took over administration of Manzanar on June 1, management of Manzanar Community Enterprises passed into WRA hands. The business operation continued to expand. By August 31, some 39 evacuees were employed in the canteen and 41 in the general store. On October 1, Manzanar Community Enterprises employed 110 evacuees in the canteen, general store, warehousing, and administration.

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises under the WRA. The WRA considered Manzanar Community Enterprises as "an interregnum period" preceding establishment of center cooperatives by evacuees to carry on private enterprise initiatives. The WRA believed that it was necessary in a temporary community with an unlimited labor supply to find an outlet for the ambition and resourcefulness of the people. Having their own businesses in the form of a cooperative, according to the WRA, created a feeling of self-reliance and independence. Knowing they were working for themselves added to the self-respect which the WRA hoped to inculcate in the evacuees. Thus, an associate Superintendent of Community Enterprises, who was an appointed WRA staff member, arrived at Manzanar on June 14, 1942, to supervise the existing enterprises (canteen and store), enlarge the services offered, and promote the organization of other business enterprises into a cooperative.

Under his leadership, a cooperative, based on Rochdale cooperative principles, was encouraged and educational programs were inaugurated. On June 16, study groups examining consumer cooperatives were organized. Establishment of the Japanese-language section of the Manzanar Free Press on June 20 provided a medium for reaching the non-English reading evacuees in the camp. Sponsored by a 14-member Education Committee, a series of articles on the operation of consumer cooperatives and future plans for the canteen was begun in the newspaper in July. Literature was distributed, and meetings were held in the mess halls under the direction of the associate superintendent of Consumer Enterprises to discuss the proposed cooperative for Manzanar. The stated purpose of the cooperative was to supply the evacuee community with goods and services which the government did not provide at the lowest possible price.

Some evacuees opposed establishment of the cooperative. Some people were skeptical about the liability imposed on members if the proposed cooperative should fail. Others distrusted the management of the canteen under Consumer Enterprises and was concerned that the same management would remain in control. Some charged that even the Block Leaders' chairman had profited financially from the operation of the canteen. Still others maintained that it was the duty of the government through the WRA to supply, at no charge, many of the services that the proposed cooperative was planning to provide.

Once the opposition was quieted, plans for the cooperative moved quickly. On July 30, a cooperative congress was elected, each block electing three delegates to represent the voice of the people of the community in the establishment of the cooperative enterprise. A WRA-appointed Superintendent of Consumer Enterprises began duty at Manzanar on August 1, and he convened the first meeting of the cooperative congress on August 8.

Articles of Incorporation were adopted by the congress on August 18, and four days later a board of directors was elected, consisting of eight Nisei and 7 Issei evacuees. The newly-elected board held its first meeting on August 25 during which the papers of incorporation were signed.

On September 5, a charter was granted to Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., by the Secretary of State of California. The charter stipulated the power to engage in the sale of goods and services, to borrow money, provide memberships, engage in manufacture of commodities as it deemed desirable, and to carry any other authority necessary for the transaction of its business. Furthermore, the charter granted authority to issue not more than 15,000 memberships at $5.00 each. It stipulated a capital of at least $20,000 with which to begin business. The members of the board of directors would serve six-month terms. The directors had the power to distribute earnings, provided ten percent was set aside for a reserve fund and until a 30 percent reserve would be reached, after which further reserves might be accumulated. Each member would have one vote, and no proxies would be allowed. Later on September 21, by-laws that were drawn up by the board of directors were approved by the cooperative congress.

The organization, finances, and personnel of Manzanar Community Enterprises were transferred to Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., on October 1, 1942. The assets that were transferred consisted of: (1) $38,865 in earned income since May 24 after the Army canteen was discontinued, subject to various taxes and claims by the WRA for rent, utilities, and clothing allowances; (2) $46,244 in inventories; (3) $8,123 in fixed assets, and (4) 110 personnel on the payroll. A financial statement for Manzanar Consumer Enterprises between May 24 and September 30,1942, indicated that gross sales of the canteen had been $142,609.00, while those of the general store had been $93,446.00. The inventory of the canteen on September 30 amounted to $16,624, while that of the general store amounted to $29,620. The net income amounted to 19.31 percent of sales.

As of October 1, when the cooperative took over the business of its predecessor, several services were being offered. The canteen was selling newspapers, periodicals, tobacco products, candy and other confections, nuts, school supplies, canned goods, and various food items not on the ration list, such as coffee, honey, dried and fresh fruits, eggs, fish, ice cream, paper goods, soda drinks, punch, and a variety of other edible items. The general store was selling clothing, shoes, yard goods, toys, and notions.

In addition to the operation these two enterprises, the cooperative was to assume the obligation of subsidizing the Manzanar Free Press in its printed form, as had been done by its predecessor since July 15. This expenditure was later limited to $300 monthly to cover the cost of printing — less advertising revenue — at the shop of the Chalfant Press in Bishop.

The commencement of the printed issues of the newspaper made it possible for the publication to accept advertising from both persons and enterprises in Manzanar and from the "outside." Such revenues helped defray a large part of the cost of printing. For example, the cost of printing the newspaper in November 1942 was $795, the revenue from advertising was $509, and the net charge to the cooperative was $286.

As the business of the cooperative expanded, more facilities were needed. It was not possible, however, for the cooperative to have the amount of floor space required during 1942 because of crowded conditions in the camp. The management of the cooperative, as well as many residents, continued to hope that a shopping center would be provided by the erection of special buildings in one of the firebreaks.

In addition to continuing the services of Manzanar Consumer Enterprises which it took over on October 1, the cooperative initiated new services in response to evacuee demands. These new services, including such conveniences as check cashing and mail order services and establishment of barber and beauty shops, were commenced by the cooperative during October 1942 in various locations wherever space could be found throughout the center. The dispersal of its operating units throughout the center required relatively more supervision, travel, and trucking, and some duplication of equipment and personnel. For the evacuees it meant more traveling, some confusion as to where each service was located, and loss of time by not being able to perform several errands in one shopping trip.

Check cashing services were opened in the Administration Building in Block 1. At first, the Bank of America sent a representative from its Lone Pine branch to Manzanar to enable residents to open new accounts, make deposits and withdrawals, and cash checks. Eventually this service was discontinued and the cooperative took over the task of cashing checks.

A barber shop was established in Block 21 to supplant the private barbers that were operating in private barracks. Only hair cutting and shaving services were offered. The fee was 15 cents for hair cuts, and 10 cents for shaves. Caucasians paid 35 cents for haircuts and 25 cents for shaves.

A beauty parlor was established in Block 15 . A complete line of services was offered at prices below those charged on the outside. The evacuee price was in turn lower than that for the appointed personnel.

Mail order service was established in Block 10. The department was opened and operated under an agreement with Montgomery Ward. Those using this service were given a ten percent discount on their purchases.

In addition to these four services, the cooperative began showing motion pictures in November 1942. Because there was a demand for motion pictures by the evacuees, a few films, provided by evacuees or through interested welfare, charitable, or educational institutions, were shown in the camp prior to this time using a borrowed projector. After it was found that an evacuee had projection equipment stored in Los Angeles, he was permitted to have his equipment transported to Manzanar. He began showing a variety of films that were borrowed free of charge. When the cooperative took over the sponsorship of all public motion picture shows in November, it paid the evacuee at the project rate of pay and kept his machines in repair. Later, when the cooperative decided to purchase equipment, some of that belonging to the evacuee was purchased and another projection staff was hired at the project rate of pay. The complete cost of building, equipping, and operating the outdoor theater in the firebreak between Blocks 20 and 21 was paid for by the cooperative. No admission fee was charged; the sums needed were taken from the cooperative's general fund.

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises became a member institution in the Association of California Cooperatives and later joined in establishing the Federation of Center Enterprises, both actions enhancing its credit rating and purchasing contacts. The cooperative's management was able to secure some goods hitherto unobtainable by the camp through these two channels.

The mark-up on goods sold by the cooperative varied with the nature of the item and the frequency of its turnover. The general mark-up for most items was between 15 and 25 percent, the average being 20 percent.

The basic objectives of Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises were synonymous with those of the Rochdale principles. These included open membership, one member, one vote, limited interest on capital loans, patronage dividends on purchases, cash sales at market prices, neutrality in race, religion, and politics, continuing education, and constant expansion.

All of these principles, with the exception of two, were fully applied at Manzanar. Open membership was not fully attained. Early in 1943 every evacuee resident in the camp over 16 years of age was declared a member, but appointed personnel and their family members were denied membership. Some prices charged were in excess of the prevailing market in the stores in neighboring towns.

Agriculture/Food Production

The arid climate and sandy soil conditions at Manzanar posed problems for agricultural production. At an elevation of approximately 4,000 feet, temperatures at the center ranged from 10 degrees below zero during some winters to highs of more than 100 degrees above zero nearly every summer. Desert winds of high velocity blew much of the time from early March until late June. Average yearly precipitation amounted to only about 4 1/2 inches of rain and snow.

Soil at Manzanar was "of a light sandy type, lacking in sufficient nitrogen, potash, arid phosphoric acid" to produce good vegetable crops. Supplemental fertilizers and irrigation were necessary to produce crops.

Farm field acreages were established on wastelands that had not been farmed for about 15 years. Having stood idle for such a lengthy period, the fields were "covered with brush and badly hummocked with dunes caused by hard winds."

As the Western Defense Command went forward with its plans to establish the Manzanar camp in March 1942, the City of Los Angeles registered its opposition, and actively fought the establishment of the center on its land. With the city in the lead, various groups in Los Angeles started a newspaper campaign to sway public opinion to their side. In order to frighten the public into opposing the project at Manzanar, they used the Los Angeles Aqueduct as a weapon. Emphasizing that the aqueduct ran parallel with and adjacent to the center, opponents of the project led the residents of Los Angeles to believe that the evacuees might poison or contaminate the city's water supply or sabotage the aqueduct.

This quarrel impacted agricultural development at Manzanar in a variety of ways. Difficulties were encountered concerning the manner in which the city wanted irrigation water utilized at Manzanar. This water was drawn from streams flowing down from the mountains and from two wells located in the camp. The city lodged complaints concerning the use of commercial fertilizers used on Manzanar's farm fields. During 1942 the city refused to approve a hog project, even though the WRA agreed to locate it at least one mile from the aqueduct. The city's rate for irrigation water on the project was based on the price for domestic water in Los Angeles, thus forcing the WRA to pay higher prices for water than other farm and ranch owners in Owens Valley.

Under the WCCA, approximately 100 acres of land at Manzanar were cleared and partially leveled for agricultural use (primarily for vegetables) with evacuee hand labor during the spring of 1942. Because planting was late and there was a shortage of heavy farm equipment, four volunteer evacuee crews worked six-hour shifts around the clock to prepare the ground and plant the crops in May.

From March until August the only powered equipment available for agricultural use at the camp was a rented Ford tractor, plow, and cultivator. After the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, ten mules were purchased to aid the agricultural efforts. The WRA immediately began purchase of farm equipment, but the machinery did not arrive at Manzanar until about August 1. The new equipment included four used 35-horsepower track tractors, four new small Case wheel tractors, and five new Ford wheel tractors. All pulled farm equipment obtained for the track tractors was secondhand, but that for the Case and Ford tractors was new but limited in amount.

In June 1942 the WRA placed six appointed personnel in charge of overseeing agricultural operations at Manzanar, including a farm superintendent and five senior foremen. Each foreman had charge of an evacuee crew that went outside the fenced enclosure of the camp to work the center's adjacent fields. The evacuee crews comprised some 300 workers.

In June about 100 evacuee farm laborers quit the Agriculture Section in protest against the use of Caucasian foremen as escorts for work crews traveling to and from the fenced enclosure around the camp's residential area to work the center's adjacent field areas. The senior foremen were not experienced in farm work, and served mainly as escorts and overseers. The evacuees resented the presence of the senior foremen. After several months of negotiations with the Army, the Western Defense Command approved a WRA request in the fall to allow farm workers to go to the center's outlying fields and return to the fenced residential area at evening without Caucasian escorts. Work relations and production improved as the senior foremen were replaced by evacuee foremen. Thereafter, the only Caucasian workers in the Agriculture Section were the farm superintendent and the assistant farm superintendent.

The Manzanar farm, consisting of 120 cultivated acres, produced 800 tons of vegetables by the fall of the first growing season in 1942. As the growing season lasted only from 120 to 180 days, it was necessary to dry store, dehydrate, and process vegetables to assure maximum tonnage for winter use. Nearly $25,000 worth of vegetables, melons, and tomatoes were produced, and three "carloads" of Swiss chard and two of watermelons were shipped to other relocation centers. The neglected orchard of "600 apple and 400 pear trees" at Manzanar was rehabilitated (pruning, spraying, irrigation) and produced nearly $2,000 worth of fruit.

While farm operations went forward in 1942, the WRA developed policies that would guide expansion of agricultural production during the remainder of the war. WRA agricultural goals at Manzanar were to produce food for the subsistence of evacuee residents of the center as economically as possible and at the same time to provide employment for some of them in a productive undertaking. Production of food for use of the center permitted the WRA to avoid the more costly course of purchasing food on the outside market. Such production obviated the necessity of drawing upon the Quartermaster Corps for supplies that were critically needed by the Army. Center farm production materially reduced overall project transportation costs and released the common carriers for more urgent war tasks — a matter or importance in view of the scarcity of trucks and the high cost of hauling to Manzanar's isolated location.

Farm production at Manzanar was confined primarily to the production of foodstuffs for center needs. The WRA did not wish to compete with private growers and producers. At times, small surpluses of vegetables were sold on the open market rather than allow them to go to waste, but such instances were rare and in some cases served to relieve current market shortages. More than 78 of the 800 tons of vegetables produced in 1942 were shipped out of the center for sale.

Evacuee participation and responsibility for farm production was encouraged by the WRA. Inasmuch as local production was locally consumed, evacuees were allowed to choose such crops "as best suited tastes so long as such vegetables could grow well in [the] Manzanar soil and climate." [89]

Guayule Experiment

During the spring of 1942, an experiment in guayule rubber culture was undertaken at Manzanar. Administrators at the camp, including both WCCA and WRA personnel, as well as interested evacuees promoted the project both as a chance to develop scientific work and educational opportunities for trained evacuee scientists and as a means of demonstrating that the evacuees were contributing to the war effort by attempting to meet the nation's rubber production shortage. The objectives of the experiment were to provide a "larger reservoir of growing guayule plants which can be drawn upon for experimental work; to devise a practical method for the rooting of cuttings; to study the dependence of growth and rubber production on watering; to produce, by breeding or selection, varieties of guayule which yields large amounts of rubber per acre, or which produce maximum yield in shorter time than the present varieties; and to produce varieties which are adapted to marginal or desert lands, and to be able to yield rubber in such land instead of rich valuable soil on which the present varieties appear to give the best yields."

Under the guidance of Dr. Robert Emerson, a faculty member at the California Institute of Technology at Pasadena, waste cuttings and seeding culls of guayule plants were delivered to Manzanar from Salinas Valley nurseries in April. By June 1, four shipments of guayule plant seedlings had been sent to Manzanar, and 169,000 had been planted in sand beds and soils. Twenty-one nursery men and three evacuee chemists were employed at the project, having put in "approximately 6,000 man hours of work."

To provide facilities for the guayule experiment at Manzanar, a lath house and propagating beds were built at the southwest corner of the camp, a chemical laboratory was installed in the ironing room of Block 6, a cytogenetics laboratory was opened in the hospital, and field plots were located at various points around the camp. Experiments were conducted on the extraction of rubber from guayule cryptostegia and other less promising rubber bearing plants using a new and rapid method developed at Manzanar. Early samples of the tested rubber varieties were vulcanized in Los Angeles and proved to be of good quality. Scientists from Stanford University, the University of California, Los Angeles, and the California Institute of Technology, interested in monitoring the progress of the experiment, visited the guayule project at Manzanar in increasing numbers during the latter months of 1942. [90]

Recreation Recreation under the WCCA.

The Program — As the evacuees began arriving at Manzanar during the spring of 1942, the Final Report, Manzanar stated that the "desire and need for organized leisure-time activities" became "marked." The report described the lifestyle of the interned evacuees as of early April:

.... Even the few evacuees, employed by the administration, felt a strong need also for something to do in the evenings. The shock of sudden separation from the 'American way of life' to which they had become accustomed, whether 'loyal' or not, had made them restless and desperate for something to occupy their time. It may be hard for people who have always lived according to the American pattern to comprehend the full import of the term 'nothing to do,' but to 3,000 men, women, and children, confined within a quarter-square mile barbed-wire enclosure [by early April 1942 the 3,000 evacuees were confined to 12 blocks within a quarter-mile barbed-wire enclosure] it was only too real and full of meaning. ... No going anywhere to see or do anything! With the exception of the project canteen which 'specialized' in lukewarm pop, there were no stores and no attractions of any kind. True the high Sierras on the west and the Inyo range on the east beckoned, but they were out of reach for they were each eight miles away.

A typical day's program was made up of three meals in the block mess hall with the rest of the time given over to looking at family or neighbors, who, too often, lived in the one room. Yet it was not the dullness or the inconveniences that worried most of the evacuees. Rather it was the imposed idleness, the emptiness of the present and the hopelessness of the future which made them afraid. The evacuees were men and women who had led busy, industrious lives. What would this emptiness and idleness do to their hands and minds and those of their children?

Thus, the "introduction of a community recreation program found the evacuees receptive and ready to cooperate." Getting the evacuees to attend activities was never a problem, "for most of them were determined to use their time in as constructive and beneficial a manner as possible." The principal problem for the WCCA was to find leadership and facilities for the many who wished to participate in recreational program. On April 9, 1942, Aksel G. Nielsen entered on duty at Manzanar as Chief of the Recreation Section. Several evacuees who had prior experience in recreation supervision approached him, expressing a desire to be allowed to help set up a recreation organization.

Those interested in starting a recreational program inspected the availability of building facilities. Each block had 20 barracks, of which 14 were used as residences and one (Building 15 of each block) was designated as a recreation building. This building was left unpartitioned. No provisions as to material or labor were made for having it divided into small rooms. Thus, it quickly became apparent this building could not be reserved for exclusive recreational use by its block, such self-sufficiency resulting in "near chaos."

Inasmuch as the center did not provide school or other activities, the leaders of the fledgling recreation organization determined that it would be necessary to keep the recreation buildings open seven days a week from after breakfast to about nine or ten o'clock at night, thus necessitating several shifts of workers.

The recreation staff established an organization consisting of evacuee department directors and specialists — preschool activities, men's athletics, women's athletics, director of Boy Scouts, Music, Dramatics, Chief Librarian, handicrafts, director of gardening — who served in an advisory capacity and without actual authority over the workers in the block recreation halls. Authority was delegated to zone directors who supervised the workers within their zone which constituted four blocks. Three of the four buildings under the zone directors were staffed by a leader, two assistant leaders, and one attendant who was responsible for cleaning and keeping up the building. The fourth building, used as a branch library, had only one assistant leader instead of two.

The heads of two departments, music and gardening, had staffs directly under them.

Because of objections to the noise of musical instruments, the music program was concentrated in Building 15, Block 14. Thus, the whole staff could be supervised directly by the director of music who was present in the building for the entire day. The Japanese music program remained scattered throughout the center, since objections focused primarily on "occidental music." Gardening was also concentrated in one location and could be supervised directly by one person.

While Manzanar was fortunate in having several persons with some college training in recreational subjects, the center apparently was less fortunate than other centers in the number of college-trained people it received. In arts and crafts, however, trained leadership was more plentiful. Although these artists and craftsmen were proficient in their fields, their training and experience had not been provided from a recreational point of view. Rather, the emphasis of their experience had come through business, where they had made things for production rather than for teaching others how to enjoy the activities as an arts-and-crafts leisure-time activity.

While it was hoped that these department heads would be able to provide in-service training, most "proved too inexperienced or too immature for such an assignment." The need for in-service training of leaders became especially urgent as preschool centers were organized. Consequently, a WPA arts and crafts supervisor from the state office in Los Angeles was loaned to Manzanar for two weeks. The WPA supervisor showed preschool and arts-and-crafts leaders how to take advantage of scrap material "so plentiful on the Project." The in-service training, however, went beyond instruction in handicrafts alone. Techniques and methods were also discussed, with the result "that renewed hope and ambition were instilled in most of the people attending the training sessions."

Manzanar also received valuable help and in-service training from traveling instructors sent from Los Angeles by such commercial agencies as "Leisurecraft." Regular staff meetings with training and guidance as the keynote were held twice a week by the chief of the Recreation Section to discuss immediate as well as long-term plans.

To much of the staff, the objectives and ideals of recreation were new and needed clarification and emphasis.

It was also determined that a "satisfactory indoor program, to satisfy the varied interests of both sexes and all ages" should include "art, crafts, music, dancing, reading, and social activities at all levels from small children to grown adults." These demands made it apparent to the block managers that, much as they would like to have their blocks remain independent of one another, a plan should be agreed upon in which the use and purposes of all recreation buildings in the center would be centrally administered.

Each group of four blocks formed a natural unit or zone by virtue of its separation from others by firebreaks. Recognition of this grouping led to the decision to operate such four-block zones as independent units. The four recreation barracks in each zone were to be used as follows; one for arts and crafts; one for children's activities; one for adult activities; while the fourth was set aside as a branch library where reading and quiet table games could be enjoyed. Later it was found necessary to specialize further and to designate central buildings for music and an older girls' center, and under the WRA for the exclusive use of three church groups. When it was found that the ironing rooms were little used because evacuees preferred to do their ironing in their barracks, several of these rooms were devoted to recreational use.

Prior to the time when all 36 blocks were occupied as residences, it was possible to borrow an unused mess hall for a dance, party, show, or social activity. As the center became filled to capacity, however, all mess halls were needed for serving meals three times a day, thus curtailing this opportunity. Thereafter, block mess halls could be used for recreational purposes on special occasions only. In spite of his difficulty and the ever-present need for a large social hall, building space was fairly adequate during the summer of 1942. It was not until the autumn, when school opened and it became necessary to convert nearly half of the recreation barracks into schoolrooms that recreation "felt a real pinch."

Since the residents could not go outside the confines of the center "proper," the only outdoor areas available for sports activities were the firebreaks between the blocks. Two firebreaks ran north and south and three east and west. The firebreaks were 300 feet wide, with the exception of the central one, which was 600 feet wide. Camp management prevented the installation of permanent improvements in the central firebreak because of proposed plans for constructing two elementary school buildings and some business buildings. Except for a few spots, the soil in the firebreaks was loose sand, too poor to grow a surface covering of grass or alfalfa. Thus, athletic fields were laid out in the firebreaks which "became really and truly 'sand-lot' games."

Under the WCCA, no money was spent for recreational purposes except for evacuees' salaries and some equipment, such as manuals, rope, compasses, first-aid kits, pup tents, fire-making sets, bugles, pennants, a flag staff, flags, and wood-carving sets for the Boy Scouts. All other equipment and supplies, such as athletic equipment, games, toys, playground equipment, furniture, and pianos used during the early months of Manzanar's operation were secured through donations from private individuals, churches, and public and semi-public agencies in southern California or by personal purchase by instructors. A large proportion of these donations was hauled to Manzanar by two men, Rev. Fred Fertig and Rev. H. V. Nicholson.

The evacuees gathered scrap and waste materials and turned them to use. Scrap lumber from the barracks still under construction was collected by the truckload. Yet the number of articles that could be made from this salvaged material was limited since "2 x 4's over 3 feet long" were not allowed to be taken. Nails which had been dropped by the carpenters engaged in building construction were collected and filled several barrels.

Using these scrap materials, parents of preschool children made tables, benches, and chairs for the centers. Friends of the churches constructed benches and stools for the congregations. Goh and shogi players made benches for the halls where those games were played. Members of the music staff made stools from scrap lumber and music stands from sheets of plywood. When the music activities settled in Block 24, Building 15, the musicians built several small practice rooms with celotex purchased by the musicians and their friends.

Activities: Preschool Program — The first preschool centers to be opened at Manzanar in April 1942 were for children between the ages of three and six. Mothers were requested to bring their children to the centers for registration on April 11. Very young children were to be brought to the centers each morning and be picked up at lunch time. Two centers, each intended to serve a zone of four blocks, were organized in April. Each center had an average attendance of 50 children. As the camp rilled to capacity during 1942, the number of centers was gradually increased to eight. The preschool work was headed by an evacuee who received her training in kindergarten administration at the University of Hawaii. Assisting her was a young woman with an A.B. degree in kindergarten teaching. Difficulty was experienced in finding more trained leaders, but by May 9, fifteen evacuee teachers were working in the centers.

The success of the preschool program led to requests by evacuees that something similar be done for older children. Thus, during the afternoons and evenings the centers were opened to older children for free play. While a shortage of qualified leadership prevented establishment of an organized program, some zones did establish simple programs for children of elementary-school age.

Activities: Athletics — Of all the sports offered during the spring of 1942, softball proved to be the most popular. Starting with an exhibition game between two teams, made up of Nisei and Kibei, the softball program, although hampered by lack of equipment, expanded to include more than 100 teams by the end of the summer. The sport was popular not only with the players but also with the evacuee population in general, some contests attracting several thousand spectators on weekends to watch the better teams. The majority of the players were males, but by June 1 a girls' softball league that included 14 teams had been established.

Other sports included five boys' and five girls' volleyball teams. Five boys' teams held several track meets during late spring and the early part of the summer. Membership on these teams was determined by the evacuee's place of residence prior to coming to Manzanar, such as Bainbridge Island, Terminal Island, Los Angeles, and other localities. In the absence of a track, the running events were conducted around the blocks, while the field events took place in the firebreaks. Boxing was popular, with 75 men practicing this sport nightly in two of the recreation halls. Wrestling was carried on "intermittently on a 'catch as catch can' basis, and was participated in mostly by members of the police force."

Activities: Arts and Crafts — The first arts-and-crafts program enjoyed the benefit of assistance from several artists who were among the first evacuees to arrive at Manzanar. These evacuee painters began at once to give lessons in painting and sketching, the equipment and supplies for the classes being furnished by themselves. Soon the program was augmented by assistance from leaders of other activities. During 1942 several expert sewing teachers, who had operated a sewing school prior to evacuation, gave lessons to more than 1,100 individuals. Three recreation centers were devoted to sewing activities. Expert instructors in flower-making taught their popular art to hundreds of students. Because "real" flowers were absent from Manzanar, this activity was "the more appreciated." Expert performers set up classes in knitting and embroidery. A course was offered in puppetry to make puppets and to present entertaining puppet shows.

Several "Japanese-type" arts and crafts activities were also offered in 1942. An evacuee taught Japanese brush-lettering or artistic painting of Japanese letters and characters, while evacuee taught the "fine art of conducting a Japanese tea service in combination with flower arrangement."

Activities: Music — Manzanar's music department was first headed by an evacuee who entered Manzanar as a volunteer in March 1942. A graduate of the Cincinnati Conservatory of Music, he and his staff experienced much difficulty in trying to establish a music program. Facilities were "extremely unfavorable," and "sympathy and understanding on the part of most of the residents" was "lacking." Forced to move from one barracks to another during the early months of Manzanar's operation and faced with the fact that none of the recreation barracks had partitions, the music department was "compelled to produce all types of instrumental music in one room 20 x 100 feet."

Despite these difficulties, the music staff slowly acquired popularity. By the end of the summer several hundred interested students were attending lessons at the music hall. The students provided their own instruments or used whatever instruments the department was able to obtain.

Voice and glee clubs also proved to be popular. The Final Report, Manzanar stated: "Contrary to the general belief that oriental people are not psychologically suited to sing the occidental scale, Manzanar as a community produced an unusually large number of good singers."

Activities: Social Activities — Dances were held once or twice a week in the recreation halls, but sometimes as many as three dances were held on one Saturday night. As the center's population increased, public dances were generally held in the mess hall which were twice as wide as the recreation halls.

Classes in social dancing were offered to both men and women, the dancing being done to recorded music. Instruction was also offered by competent instructors in ballet, tap, and special dancing.

The Issei were little interested in ordinary American social activities, the majority "preferring to spend their time playing goh and shogi." These Japanese table games were somewhat similar to checkers and chess, respectively. Some Issei joined poetry clubs, where under the leadership of an experienced instructor, they learned "to express their thoughts in rhyme and blank verse."

Belonging to a club "soon became something of a fad" at Manzanar. Most clubs were social or athletic in nature, few being "mixed" or made up of members of both sexes. Some 40-50 such clubs were organized during the first few months of Manzanar's operation.

Activities: Gardening — The firebreak between Blocks 17 and 18 on the north and Blocks 11 and 12 on the south was one of the few to have "black soil suitable for gardening." The firebreak was subdivided into small plots varying in size from 10 feet x 50 feet to 30 feet x 50 feet, and each interested family was given a plot. A few larger tracts were set aside as community gardens for certain blocks. The work in the block gardens was done by volunteer labor recruited from the block residents.

Gardening was pursued by the Manzanar evacuees for various reasons. Some did it as a hobby, while others wanted fresh vegetables and flowers that they personally raised. Some wanted to experiment and perpetuate plants which they had brought with them to the center.

The firebreak chosen for the garden was covered at one end with thousands of wild rosebushes. During the summer, Kuichiro Nishi, an evacuee, volunteered to bud and cultivate the wild roses if the WRA would obtain some cultivated plants and buds. With the cooperation of the procurement office, four plants of 50 different varieties of roses were purchased. After receipt of these plants, Nishi budded approximately 15,000 wild shoots.

Activities: Libraries — Since no government funds were allotted to purchase books and magazines while Manzanar was administered by the WCCA, it was necessary for the evacuees to write to libraries and request surplus books for the center. The Manzanar library started in April 1942 with a gift of 17 books and 80 magazines made available in a part of one evacuee's living quarters. The first community library was opened on May 4 amid the Spartan conditions in Block 7, Building 15, when 1,000 discarded books were received from the Los Angeles Public Library. Several weeks later, an evacuee librarian who had studied library science at the University of California arrived to set the library in operation. Within two months, more than 15,000 volumes were received, most coming from libraries in Los Angeles City and County. Individual donors also provided books and magazines, although many of the latter were back copies which the evacuees had read prior to evacuation. Prospective donors were reminded that they could send subscriptions to current magazines, and many responded to this request.

Under the leadership of the evacuee librarian, the main camp library was later established in the recreation hall in Block 22 because of its central location in the camp. This building served as headquarters for the librarian and her assistant, and it was used as a training center for girls working in the branch libraries. All books were received, classified, and sorted in the main library, and selections were sent to the smaller branch libraries scattered throughout the center.

Activities: English Instruction — The adult English department, under the direction of Mrs. Elizabeth Nishikawa, was established on May 15 with a staff of five instructors teaching ten well-attended classes of Issei and Kibei men and women. Some of the classes were held regularly in the evening so that evacuees with daytime jobs could participate. Other classes met in the afternoon which was a more convenient time for men and women without regular jobs. By June 1, some six evacuee teachers were providing 18 classes in English instruction to approximately 300 Issei and Kibei men and women. Classes, which included an Americanization program, were held in mess halls between meal servings. There were no books or supplies except mimeographed material prepared by the evacuee teachers.

Special Events and Programs: Flag Pole Dedication — A flag pole was installed in front of the Administration Building located in Block I, Building 8, on April 17. Boy Scouts supplied a color guard, a color bearer, and four buglers. The dedication speech was given by the Assistant Project Director. After the flag-raising ceremony, the camp manager christened two burros as camp mascots.

Special Events and Programs: "I Am An American" Program — The "I Am An American" program was held on May 17 in the firebreak between Blocks 2 and 3. After several musical numbers were presented, speeches were given by the departing WCCA camp manager and by the new WRA project director, the latter being introduced to the evacuees for the first time.

Special Events and Programs: Memorial Day Service — Attended by several hundred people, the Memorial Day program on May 30 began with a parade, led by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, both of which had members among the evacuee population in camp. These groups were followed by the Manzanar police, firemen, and finally by more than 100 Boy Scouts. The ceremonies were held in front of the Administration Building with two trucks serving as a stage.

Special Events and Programs: Arts and Crafts Exhibits — Two exhibits of art and handicrafts prepared by evacuees in the camp were held at Manzanar during its first two months of operation. The first exhibit, held on May 3, was visited by 1,216 people, while a two-day exhibit in early June drew approximately 5,000 people.

Special Events and Programs: Variety Talent Shows — A variety talent show, using both Nisei and Issei talent, was held outdoors on May 10, for which a temporary wooden stage was constructed adjoining Block 8, Building 15. The show was attended by several hundred spectators.

Recreation under the WRA. The change in administration of Manzanar from the WCCA to the WRA on June 1 had considerable impact on recreational programs at the camp. Organizationally, the name of the Recreation Section was changed to Community Activities and the title of its appointed head was changed from Chief of the Recreation Section to Supervisor of Community Activities.

The WRA found that the original plan of having two specialists serve as recreational advisers, with actual supervision and authority resting in zone directors, was impractical. Thus, the recreation program was reorganized to reflect the evacuees' wishes. Under the new organization, the heads of departments were given direct authority over the people they hired to work with them and over whom they had jurisdiction. Ten departments — hobby garden, music, arts and crafts, amateur profession, librarian, children's activities, men's and boy's athletics, women's athletics, adult social activities, scout activities (four Boy Scout troops were organized) — were established, each with its own head. Activities were organized so that all employees, no matter where their barracks, came under the one department head. In some instances, it was necessary to have more than one activity in a recreation building. Generally, three different types of arts and handicrafts — painting, woodwork, or other crafts, and needlework or sewing — were offered in one recreation hall.

The WRA continued most of the existing WCCA recreational programs and expanded many of them. The WRA hired additional evacuee personnel to operate the program. As of September 15, 1942, 151 evacuees were employed to administer recreation in the center. The largest categories of recreation workers were adult activities — 46; children's activities — 19; gardening and landscaping — 15; music — 14; men's and boy's athletics — 13; entertainment — 12; and sewing and needlework — 11.

During the months of July to September 1942, participation in the various recreational activities at the center remained high. The number attending sewing and needlework classes was more than 1,100. Some 1,600 men and boys were involved in 12 softball leagues, while three track teams involved 90 individuals. Three boys' hardball teams were formed, but the lack of proper equipment and facilities hindered development of that sport. Girl's and women's softball involved 250 individuals on 19 teams in three leagues. Weekend softball contests sometimes attracted 3,000 to 4,000 spectators. Some 180 girls and women were involved in 14 volleyball teams in two leagues, and 100 participated on seven basketball teams. An estimated 7,000 children attended children's activities, including eight preschool centers. Sunday evening recorded concerts (American music) attracted 700 to 2,000 persons, while approximately 3,000 persons attended Wednesday evening recorded concerts (Japanese music). These music programs, known as "Symphony Under the Stars," were made possible by the use of a public address system owned and operated by three of the evacuees at the center. Approximately 100 couples attended weekly dances, 8,000-9,000 people attended motion pictures (two showings), and 5,000 attended periodic variety shows.

Some 120 families worked plots in the "Victory" garden, and six larger tracts were worked on a community basis. Approximately 1,000 persons attended weekly music classes, including piano (300), saxophone and clarinet (200), voice (100), mandolin and guitar (200), trumpet (40), violin (60), and viola, cello, tuba, trombone, and oboe (100).

Upon taking administrative control of the camp on June 1, the WRA immediately purchased equipment and supplies, particularly for arts and crafts and athletics, to facilitate and expand the recreation programs at Manzanar. The purchased items included tempera paints and brushes, baseballs, bats, volleyballs, basketballs, footballs, tennis nets, and basketball hoops.

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, as the evacuees began to understand that the center would operate for the duration of the war, they began to show increasing interest in developing a sense of permanence in regard to their home. This interest included a growing desire to obtain as many recreational facilities as conditions would permit. Many residents gave their time and sometimes their money to develop facilities. Within several months, Manzanar "had practically all the recreational facilities which could be found in any other American city of 10,000 persons."

Recreational Facilities — During the early summer of 1942, the sentry line was moved back about 100 yards behind the last line of barracks to the south of the camp residential area, thus placing Bairs Creek within the center. After the WRA assured the evacuees that the creek could be used as a picnic spot both day and evening, evacuee volunteers started landscaping the area and constructing walks, bridges, and open-air fireplaces. The area became so popular as a picnic area that it became necessary to issue permits so that picnic parties would be assured an opportunity to use a fireplace.

Several evacuees who had brought their golf clubs to Manzanar formed a golf club which pledged its members to help construct a course. A 100-yard-wide area southwest of the center was selected as the site for the course. Sage brush and other growth were removed, and a 9-hole course was laid out. Because the course could not be watered, the greens "were of necessity made of sand."

Each block had a space within its borders east of the men's showers that was left vacant. These spaces were quickly converted into recreational areas for the block residents. Most blocks put up volleyball posts, and the majority of them constructed basketball courts with backboards, hoops, and other features. Playground equipment, including swings, teeter-totters, and slides, were installed. These facilities were constructed by volunteer labor from within the blocks and entirely at a block's own expense.

Tennis courts were laid out using clay soil located by the Owens River approximately four miles east of the center. More than 150 truckloads of claylike dirt were hauled to the center to construct four tennis courts in the eastern part of the firebreak between Blocks 8 and 14. Salt was mixed with the clay to improve its texture, but the soil proved unsatisfactory. Hence another 50 loads of clay, this time a reddish composition, was hauled to the center and resurfacing was continued. The wire around the courts, nets, and posts were purchased with WRA funds.

Judo contests could not operate in the low-ceilinged barracks. With WRA approval, judo enthusiasts determined to take up a collection and from the funds pay for construction of a floor. The floor was covered with sawdust, and canvas was stretched over the sawdust to keep it in place. During the autumn, voluntary subscriptions were taken to defray costs for the construction of a 40-foot x 60-foot building with additional shower-room space.

The firebreak between Blocks 8 and 14, where the tennis courts had been constructed, was designated as a sports field complex by the WRA. Several basketball and volleyball courts were built adjacent to the tennis courts. The volleyball courts consisted of little more than posts for the nets, with a ridge stretched on the ground to indicate boundary lines. The basketball courts were surfaced with the reddish claylike soil used to resurface the tennis courts.

Two football fields with goal posts were laid out, and nearly all the firebreaks were used as softball diamonds. Material for backstops was scarce, but some old wiring was found in the farm area and put to use for this purpose.

Landscaping and Parks — During the fall of 1942, the wild roses that Nishi budded were dug up and transferred to the firebreak between Blocks 23 and 33. About 100 different species of flowers were seeded and planted in this new garden area in addition to the roses. A Japanese tea house was constructed, and the beginnings of Rose Park were laid out.

One of the Manzanar evacuees was a former nursery owner and producer of Japanese cherry trees. He offered to donate several thousand trees to Manzanar, provided that all the trees would be planted in one location and that this location would be set aside as a Japanese Cherry Park. The WRA accepted his proposal, and the cherry trees, together with hundreds of Wisteria trees, were hauled to Manzanar and planted in the firebreak in front of the Children's Village. Volunteers dug wide shallow holes for pools, but as water was still at a premium in Manzanar, these pools would eventually be seeded with grass.

Outdoor Theater — Evacuees at Manzanar voiced the need for an outdoor amphitheater to accommodate various recreational programs during the early months of Manzanar's operation. Under the WRA, "a spot just outside the center beyond the southeast corner of the camp" was selected for an outdoor theater, because it had a natural slope required for such a facility. With the aid of a power blade, the natural slope was improved so that from 3,000 to 5,000 persons could witness performances. A concrete stage, 40 feet x 60 feet, was constructed using voluntary evacuee labor. Sand and gravel were secured from nearby Bair's Creek. Benches, with seating space for 2,000 persons, were constructed. The expense for most of the work and lumber was defrayed from profits derived by the early canteen/general store before its operations were taken over by Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises.

This theater was used for only two occasions during the fall of 1942. These events included an address by Dillon S. Myer, director of the WRA, to the opening high school assembly and a dedication ceremony for the theater about a week later. Because of the outdoor theater's distance from the camp's residential area, it was decided to hold outdoor shows on a temporary stage in the camp. Later a new permanent 20-foot x 30-foot stage would be built against the wall of the recreation hall in Block 16.

Relationship with Schools — When the schools opened in fall 1942, adjustments became necessary between the education and recreation programs. The Community Activities Section had been chief promoter of all activities for which there was a need. To fulfill its obligations, the section had taken over operation of all recreation halls (Building 15 in each block).

Some of these buildings, although designated as recreation buildings, were converted for use as schoolrooms during the later summer of 1942, because no school buildings had been constructed. Consequently, one-half of the Number 15 buildings were taken over by the Education Section for schoolrooms and education offices.

The Education Section budget allowed appointed personnel to administer and supervise some of the activities which had been conducted by the Community Activities Section. Thus, some activities were transferred to the Education Section in July. The activities that were transferred included adult English classes, the preschool program, and the camp library. It was also agreed that the adult education department would promote all adult English classes, as well as all commercial, vocational training, and other classes that were primarily educational. The Community Activities Section, on the other hand, would promote all programs that were primarily recreational, including sports, arts, crafts, music, dramatics, gardening, social activities, and special events.

During the fall of 1942, 18 units of nursery school and seven kindergartens were organized. Of the nursery school units, six were afternoon sleep sessions. All preschool units were housed in regular elementary school buildings scattered throughout the community. Almost 1,000 children between the ages of three and six had an opportunity to share experiences in an environment that emphasized health, safety, social and emotional adjustment, and mental development through selected play materials. This was accomplished by trained leadership, parent education, use of English in speech, and teaching socialization skills.

The parents of all children enrolled in the preschool automatically became members of a specific parent club that functioned in connection with a specific nursery or kindergarten unit. A central board, made up of the chairmen of the individual units, the preschool parent-coordinator, the preschool supervisor, and the president of the board selected at large, coordinated all phases of the preschool parent activities. All parents held membership in the national Parent Teachers Association. Parents shared in financing the preschool program, paying a monthly fee of ten cents per parent and holding fund raisers for specific projects. They also contributed many hours of service in maintaining playground equipment and beautifying the play environment.

In September 1942 the adult education department was transferred from the Education Section to the Community Services Division, with an office established in Block 35, Building 15. Charles K. Ferguson, an appointed WRA employee, became its first director.

The first general registration for the entire program of adult education courses was held on September 7, Class offerings included carpentry, English, and tailoring. Week by week new classes were added to the list. Approximately 3,000 students showed interest in attending classes in English, commerce, history, science, and sewing during the remainder of 1942. [91]

Education

Under the WCCA assembly and reception/relocation centers had no budget provisions for buildings, trained personnel, or supplies for establishment of schools. Educational efforts, which could be developed by the evacuee population, however, were encouraged. Thus, the only formal educational activities that were commenced at Manzanar under the WCCA were the preschool and adult English class programs.

During the spring of 1942 parents with children at Manzanar began to explore ways to continue the education of their children while in the center. The older parents began "by calling in the college Nisei to work out some type of school program to occupy and settle the children who were 'running wild' in their new surroundings." Many children had brought their school books with them. Plans for studying by mail were encouraged among the college group, and several evacuees began correspondence courses.

Thirteen seniors from Bainbridge Island completed the correspondence work outlined for them by their former high school. On May 25 they received their diplomas in a small graduation ceremony presided over by the Project Director.

Approximately 200 high school seniors had reached the closing weeks of their senior year at the time of evacuation. Most of them had been given their diplomas before they left for Manzanar, while others received theirs by mail when their classmates graduated in June.

On June 1, 1942, the date on which the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar, officials from the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco, accompanied by two consultants from the State Department of Public Instruction, arrived at the camp to select a site for school buildings. Conferences were held with the Superintendent of Schools of Inyo County, who was "politely cooperative but not at all in sympathy with the problems involved in educating Japanese-American children."

Summer Program of 1942. Because of continued pressure from parents for a summer school program, the WRA's Social Welfare Section soon began a block census to determine the number of school-aged children in the center. Since most of the children had missed the last two months of the school term, parents were worried about loss of academic credit resulting from evacuation. Willing evacuees offered to serve as teachers and to provide an academic program to children who wanted to attend classes during the summer months.

Genevieve W. Carter, who would become Superintendent of Schools at Manzanar, visited the camp on May 19 when she was sent as a staff member from the University of California to document the progress and impact of evacuation for its department of sociology. As Manzanar's superintendent of education, she reported to the project for work on June 15.

Before a survey could be made in preparation for the fall school term, a summer program, already developed, was thrust on Carter. Nearly 1,000 pupils were enrolled, and 50 evacuee tutors had volunteered to teach and were ready to meet their classes. An opening date had been announced for the following week, and the evacuees were prepared to enter immediately upon a summer school program which would cover 12 grades. Plans for the summer program had been developed without the guidance of an experienced school administrator.

Carter immediately began working "on the problem of setting up a program without supplies, buildings, or experienced teachers," while at the same time recruiting teachers for the fall term. As a result of Carter's efforts, three credentialed teachers were brought to the center within two weeks.

A form was prepared for children to use to send to the schools from which they had come, requesting that textbooks and assignments required to complete their semester's work be sent to them at Manzanar. At the beginning of the summer tutoring classes, nearly 800 high school students were enrolled, but of these only 484 had completed their courses and received credit from their "home" schools. Volunteer tutors were grouped into departments, and these were headed by subject supervisors. Final grades and evaluations were prepared during joint conferences involving tutors, subject supervisors, and the credentialed teachers.

The former schools from which the evacuee children had come cooperated "whole-heartedly" in lending books and furnishing study outlines, and in many cases prepared final examinations. Of the 65 high schools represented at Manzanar, all except one gave full high school credit to the students who satisfactorily completed their courses.

The summer high school classes were held in empty mess halls, day and evening, in temperatures ranging from 100 to 120 degrees. No partitions separated the classes from one another. Instead, students grouped around mess hall tables and "competed with one another in noisy recitations."

The elementary summer program or 1942 accommodated about 300 children who were grouped by grades and given instruction in the skill subjects, art, and group singing. On August 20, the elementary summer school held an "open house" for parents, and exhibited the work completed by the children.

Orientation for WRA Schools. On July 13 the WRA Regional Director of Education and Recreation called an Education Planning Conference in San Francisco. The purpose of the conference was to establish a "community school philosophy" to guide all relocation center education programs.

The education department at Stanford University offered its services in establishing proposed curriculum procedures for the relocation center education programs. Superintendents and principals who were not familiar, or in sympathy with, the "community school concept," were briefed with lectures, discussions, and reading materials. All WRA Education Sections were directed to gear their schools to this curriculum pattern.

School Organization for the Fall Term. The problems associated with organizing the embryonic school system at Manzanar during the hectic summer months of 1942 were described by Carter in the Final Report, Manzanar. The report stated:

Along with the problems of running a summer school for which no one was prepared, continuous adjustments had necessarily to be made within the Center between the Administration and evacuees, on the one hand and among incoming WRA personnel on the other. Sectional lines were not well denned at this time. Project personnel were limited in number to 105, and of these a large part were engaged in construction work. It was necessary at one and the same tune to expand in my directions to cover many needs of which buildings, personnel, supplies, and equipment were the most urgent. Requisitions for supplies were prepared, only to find that no established procedures existed for bringing the supplies into camp.

Frequently, too, questions were raised as to who had authority to recruit personnel. Since schools had not been planned for at the time the incoming evacuees had been assigned to their housing, it became a necessary step to move people into barracks already crowded, in other blocks, in order to make room for schools. These problems were desperate ones with no one apparently armed with the authority to open up avenues along which the school plans could proceed.

During the summer of 1942 a memorandum of understanding was drawn up between the WRA Regional Office and the California State Department of Education to govern the educational programs at the Manzanar and Tule Lake relocation centers. The memorandum anticipated legislation which would bring the Manzanar school area under state control by establishing a special school district for it. Only California-credentialed teachers would be employed, and all records were to conform to California standards.

Because of rising resentment of the WRA program by late summer of 1942, however, the legislation was never introduced, making teacher recruitment "doubly difficult."

Carter established a teacher ratio that allowed one teacher for each 35 high school students and one teacher for each 40 elementary school students. The teaching load was to be reduced by use of evacuee teachers who had already completed their training in education and who had partially completed practice teaching.

By mid-September 1942, 22 secondary school and 13 elementary school teachers had been hired and were housed at Manzanar. At the elementary level, the problem of recruitment was more serious because the $1,620 salary offered by the WRA could not meet the competition of public schools which were paying better salaries for a teaching year that ran only 9-10 months.

In addition, recruitment of teachers at Manzanar was hindered by the "mechanics of Civil Service employee" practices. Two or three weeks passed before an applicant could receive official notice of his teaching appointment. Frequently, the prospective teacher had accepted another offer by that time. As a result of the lengthy bureaucratic process of recruitment, it was found that for every 50 letters or notices that were sent out from Manzanar, "perhaps two [teachers] would actually arrive on the Project and be assigned a teaching load."

After it was determined that Manzanar schools would not come under the state program, it was possible to recruit teachers who held credentials from states other than California. Problems still existed with recruitment, however, as the Final Report, Manzanar noted:

Yet the manner of recruiting had to be continued after the list of the available applicants in California had become exhausted. Most the of the applicants came from states that paid lower salaries than California did. During the early months the procedure for recruiting personnel changed a number of times. Administrators of education could never be sure as to how much liberty they were allowed in recruiting teachers.

One of the principal handicaps to teacher recruitment during the summer of 1942 was the lack of housing. Throughout 1942 teachers were forced to live "four to a room, in the same type of barracks as those assigned to evacuees." The teachers' quarters were located in Block 7, which had been vacated for high school classes. This meant that the teachers had to use two latrines in common with 1,300 high school students. Furniture for the teachers' quarters was also lacking. When a portion of the Empire State Hotel furniture was sent from San Francisco to Manzanar, teachers unloaded the furniture from boxcars in Lone Pine and hauled it to Manzanar in Army trucks. There was not enough furniture to go around. At one time it was found that four teachers were sharing one dresser and one chair. If one teacher received a mattress, another would be assigned the matching box springs. Since there were no bedsteads, the box springs were placed on the floor. As a result, many resignations were submitted, because "no teacher had to endure such hardships, with so much wartime employment available from which he could choose a job."

One of the first problems in making space for schools at Manzanar was to win the cooperation of the evacuees living in Block 7 so that the block could be converted for school use. Negotiations with evacuee leaders, however, led to the move from Block 7 "without serious difficulties." The partitions which had divided each barrack into four family apartments were retained, and the apartments were converted into classrooms. These rooms, each only 25 x 20 feet, however, proved to be too small to accommodate high school classes that generally ranged from 25 to 45 students.

Securing classrooms for the elementary schools was less difficult, because the grades could be scattered throughout the camp. Twelve recreational halls were assigned to the Education Section for elementary school classroom use. These buildings housed nursery schools, kindergartens, and six elementary grades. The recreational barracks were "100 feet long, with bare rafters, floors, and walls, and no equipment." Three to four classes were grouped in each building. With each group having to compete with the next group to make itself heard, "concentrated study or quiet work, was almost impossible."

The Final Report, Manzanar described the feverish efforts undertaken to improve the designated buildings for school use. The report stated:

Requisitions, conferences, memorandums, telephone calls, threats of resignation — everything was used in an effort to secure physical improvements for the school buildings. The authority for direct purchase of essential school needs was so bogged own and buried in red tape that attempt after attempt ended only in a blind alley. Sufficient plasterboard was available to line and partition residential barracks but there were no materials for the number 15 barracks which made up the classrooms. Requisitions were prepared for textbooks commonly used in high schools and elementary schools in California. Delays, changes in procurement procedures, Regional Office approval, and other handicaps held up these orders.

Although the WRA had established the "community school curriculum" as the basis on which WRA schools should be operated, the Manzanar educators thought it "advisable for the education administration in the camp to follow a curriculum similar to that from which the school children had recently transferred." Since about 85 percent of Manzanar's students came from the Los Angeles area, the Manzanar educational program was based on that of the Los Angeles schools, thus simplifying "program-making in the high school" and making it easier "to evaluate credits for seniors about to graduate."

Sample textbooks, state bulletins, curriculum outlines, and units of work secured from several typical California schools in the Los Angeles area provided the basis for Manzanar's first school program. Committees, made up of teachers who arrived early, worked under the school principals and the superintendent, developing the camp's "first course of study."

A primary, as well as difficult, task was to obtain an accurate school census. The project records were "in a state of flux," and the formal records and statistics section had yet to be established. Family visitors from the Social Welfare Section made a block-to-block canvas of the camp, but with "so much shining and moving around" the school census did not "get accurately established until some time after school opened."

During August and early September 1942, letters were sent for "about 2,300 boys and girls to their former schools, asking for verification of grade placement and high-school transcripts." Most schools responded promptly, but others waited until the fall before sending the information. It was necessary, therefore, in the case of many students to arrange programs "on their own accounting of grade placement and credits earned." As a consequence, many children enrolled in the first grade were later found by verified birth dates to belong in kindergarten.

Teacher Training Program — The memorandum of understanding between the State of California and the WRA permitted teachers who did not meet state requirements but who possessed preliminary certificates to serve as practice or cadet teachers at the camp under supervision. The WRA guaranteed that it would request universities approved by the State Board of Education to institute an accredited teacher training program at Manzanar and Tule Lake. Under the agreement, it was contemplated that approximately 80 percent of the teachers employed would be Caucasians and 20 percent would be of Japanese descent.

A supervisor of teacher-training was selected at the recommendation of the University of California, Berkeley. Plans were immediately set to conduct a teacher-training program and to recruit possible teaching candidates from among the Manzanar evacuees. About 60 college-trained evacuees responded to the recruiting call. During the last two weeks of August, a demonstration school, using three levels of classes, was conducted to allow evacuee teachers observation and practice.

The Chief of the Elementary Division, State Department of Education and the Supervisor of Teacher Training at UCLA were invited to conduct a short institute for appointed and evacuee teachers at Manzanar. Several sessions were held in various mess halls, and the visiting educators "made a fine contribution in initiating a progressive philosophy and in opening the way for a teacher-training program for the evacuee teachers."

After the teacher training program was laid out, the number of evacuees interested in continuing the training declined to 23. The program, which was offered through the extension division of the University of California, Berkeley, included the following courses to be offered during the 1942-43 school year: history of education, psychology 1A, educational psychology, American institutions, industrial arts, tests and measurements, music methods, zoology, and secondary education. The courses were taught by qualified appointed personnel, most of whom had previous experience teaching at the college or university level. In each case, the University of California approved the instructor and course outline so that it would match a corresponding class offered at the campus. The evacuee students were registered in these courses at reduced rates since the University of California did not have to carry the cost of instruction.

Evacuee Teachers — In order to start school in the fall of 1942, it was necessary to assign full responsibility for a classroom to some of the evacuee teachers. The original plan had been for the evacuee teacher to be in the same room with, and under the direct supervision of, a state-credentialed teacher. When school opened, however, only one-half of the required number of appointed teachers had arrived. Thus, it became necessary to use evacuee student teachers as regular classroom teachers. This practice would continue until the evacuees were relieved or assisted by credentialed teachers who continued to be recruited. A policy was established whereby one credentialed teacher was placed in each school barrack, where he/she could supervise two to three evacuee teachers. The elementary school principal and the student-teachers' supervisor cooperated in outlining all student-teaching work and in guiding and supervising instruction within the parameters of the general elementary program.

At the high school level, the evacuee teachers entered specialized fields, such as physics, chemistry, art, woodshop, agriculture, physical education, and farm mechanics. Such specialized evacuee teachers came under the supervision of the student teacher-training program, but, because of the nature of their specialized subjects, they did not required less counseling and oversight than did the elementary teachers.

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the evacuee teachers "seemed to fit rather easily into the secondary school program where skill in presenting subject matter is so highly important." The evacuee high school teachers were "well qualified young people who quickly won the respect of their students." Although needing some "assistance in methods, their accomplishments with the students reached a fairly high level."

During the early months of the school year, the Final Report, Manzanar noted that Manzanar school officials found it "necessary to educate the parents and the community to accept and cooperate with the evacuee teachers." In some instances, the evacuee teachers had a better educational background and were "stronger" teachers than the appointed teachers who worked in the same building. In spite of this, however, cases "frequently occurred in which parents requested that their children be transferred from an evacuee to a Caucasian teacher." Such requests grew so numerous that it became necessary "to freeze all transfers and to begin a program of interpreting the evacuee teacher to the parent." An excerpt from the Manzanar Free Press on October 10, 1942, printed less than one month after the elementary school opened and five days before the high school program would begin, noted:

Many heated words have been bandied back and forth about the inferiority and superiority complexes of the Japanese race. Psychologists have long contended that a Napoleonic ego and Casper Milquetoast manner are one and the same thing; that they are only different expressions of a basic lack of confidence.

This lack of confidence in their own leaders and people is again demonstrated in the discrimination of parents and students against teachers of their own race. Students unanimously prefer Caucasian teachers and show great reluctance in signing up for classes conducted by Japanese teachers; this, despite the fact that many of these Japanese teachers are admittedly superior to some in the Caucasian teaching personnel. Dr. Genevieve Carter, Superintendent of Education, expresses the full confidence in these trained Japanese pedagogues, even to the extent of entrusting her own youngster to a Japanese teacher. She points out that many of these Japanese teachers are highly qualified and some have had more actual teaching experience than the younger Caucasian teachers. Many Issei repeat that time-worn race superiority theory. Yet when the education and welfare of their children are involved they seem to prefer Caucasian teachers. This presents a strange conflict in practice and theory, which obviously refutes their contention of racial superiority.

Nevertheless, this works an unnecessary hardship on the Japanese teachers who are willing to face the petty criticisms that accompany the job, to do their share. [92]

School Opens — The elementary schools opened on September 14, 1942, with 1,001 registered students, and the high school began classes in Block 7 on October 15 with 1,376 registered students. Although teachers (36 appointed and 4 evacuee compared with 19 appointed and 12 evacuee for the elementary school) had been successfully recruited for the high school, nevertheless the process of scheduling classes and arranging programs on "a half-year promotional basis for pupils, who had come from 206 different high schools," presented an overwhelming problem to Leon C. High, principal of the Manzanar high school.

Elementary schoolrooms were scattered throughout the camp with classrooms in 12 different blocks. Manzanar's first elementary school principal met an untimely death in an airplane accident on October 9, and was quickly succeeded by Clyde L. Simpson. There were no playgrounds, no playground equipment, and no chairs, tables, books or supplies. Many of the children brought little benches which their parents had made from scrap lumber picked up while the Army was building the barracks. Children carried these stools back and forth to school, because at seats were needed in their quarters in the evenings. A few school buildings had mess hall tables, but since they were required for mess hall operations, it was not possible to obtain many of them for school purposes.

High school rooms were in much the same condition as the elementary schools except that classrooms were partitioned, thus making it possible to shut off most of the noise from adjoining classes. In regard to textbooks and supplies, the high school fared no better than did the elementary school. There were no stoves in the rooms and no linoleum to cover up holes and cracks in the warped floors. After school started, the windstorms, sandstorms, and cold spells sometimes made it impossible to conduct school. Stoves were not installed in schoolrooms until some time after the cold weather began.

In October the school libraries were organized. The high school library was established first. Books from the camp library were transferred to the mess hall in the high school block being used as a study hall, thus setting up the study hall library. The supervisor of student teaching organized a small professional library consisting of more than 200 books in her office. These volumes were classified and loaned to student teachers and to regular teaching staff in the elementary and secondary schools. In November, children's books were ordered for the elementary school library. When these books arrived, they were placed on shelves in the elementary teachers' study room, and teachers borrowed them for use in their classes.

In October two meetings were held to organize parents into a group to work closely with the school staff. Prior to evacuation few parents at Manzanar had experience with Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) groups. Thus, they were unprepared, under their own leadership, to carry on the responsibility of a PTA. The first PTA president elected at Manzanar was the wife of a WRA appointed personnel staff member.

At the two relocation centers in California — Manzanar and Tule Lake — plans made to obtain free textbooks by having the schools incorporated as special districts in the regular public school system of the state were frustrated through an adverse ruling by the state's Attorney General. Thousands of used textbooks, however, were obtained from schools in California, such as those in Los Angeles which formerly had heavy enrollments of Japanese American children. The first allotment of textbooks, supplies, and school equipment began to trickle into Manzanar around November 1. By that time, a central warehousing system had been established in the camp, but it was not operating efficiently. Thus, much needed school materials often arrived at the camp, only to be buried in central warehouses, resulting in delivery delays until later discovery. [93]

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the disorganization in the schools during their early weeks of operation in the fall of 1942 paralleled the "the general progressive disorganization within the [Manzanar] community." The chaos in the schools was avidly described in the report:

Teachers having been frustrated, were exhausted and irritable. An endless amount of time and energy had been required to get even the smallest things done. For example, families had moved from barrack to barrack, with children being correlatively reclassified as to grade and ability. School lists had continually to be revised as students changed their locations. Classrooms were cold, the only blackboards were home-made, and chairs were available for only two-thirds of the pupils. With only half the number of textbooks needed, instruction had been left largely to the ingenuity or the teachers who were already exhausted from their work load and the almost intolerable conditions of living in camp.

Neither had the attitude and conduct of pupils recompensed them for their teaching efforts. . . . Children had walked out of study hall without permission, with their supervisor unable to find out who they were or where they had gone. Hysterical outbursts of pupils had occurred at every grade level. A child in the fourth grade had burst into tears, screaming "I hate you. I hate all Caucasians." High-school students had kicked in doors and torn tar paper from off of buildings. To all reprimands for such conduct, the answers had been: "I hate this kind of school." " This isn't a real school." "I had a good school in Los Angeles, and now they put me in a place like this." [94]

College Education — Because the WRA provided educational programs only through the high school level at relocation centers, special arrangements were necessary to provide for continuance or commencement of college and university studies for interested persons. Since the early days of evacuation, non-governmental organizations, most notably the American Friends Service Committee, began working on the issue. With the formation of the National Student Relocation Council in late May 1942, the efforts of these groups were coordinated.

The National Student Relocation Council, established with the approval of the WRA and the WCCA, was composed of a number of college presidents and other prominent educators who rounded out a formal organizational framework during meetings held in Chicago on May 29. John W. Nason, president of Swarthmore College, was elected chairman, and the council's national headquarters were established in Philadelphia. During June, the activities of the council were carried forward by two cooperating groups. The West Coast Subcommittee, operating under the leadership of Joseph Conard, concentrated its efforts on registration of students wishing transfer out of relocation centers and examination of their academic fitness and financial status. An eastern group, headed by President Robbins W. Barstow of Hartford (Connecticut) Theological Seminary as executive secretary, directed its efforts toward determining which colleges or universities outside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many evacuees might thus be transferred. Clearance of colleges with the War and Navy Departments was handled by the WRA.

While the council was pursuing its goals, the WRA explored the possibility of establishing extension or correspondence courses in the relocation centers with various state college and university officials. Such a program would provide for the needs of students unwilling or unable, principally because of inadequate funds, to transfer to outside institutions. Although such talks continued, these programs were developed in 1942. [95]

Health

Under the WCCA. Under the WCCA, insufficient clinical facilities, personnel shortages, inadequate space, and procurement difficulties limited medical care at Manzanar. [96] Several days after the first evacuees entered Manzanar in March 1942, the first "hospital" was opened in a barrack in Block 7. The original medical personnel were evacuees, consisting of one doctor, one dentist, and one registered nurse, all of whom had volunteered to evacuate to Manzanar. Dr. James M. Goto, a graduate of the University of Southern California and a former physician at the Los Angeles County Hospital, was the chief medical officer in the camp. Later in March, another doctor, a registered nurse, and two student nurses joined the embryonic camp medical staff. No Caucasian doctors or nurses joined the staff until October 1.

Two rooms in the "hospital barrack" were equipped for use, one serving as a first-aid station and operating room and the other containing five cots for in-patients. One refrigerator, one operating table, several tables for instruments, and five cots comprised the hospital equipment. Running water and sterilization facilities were not available at the time.

The U.S. Public Health Service provided a limited supply of drugs, instruments, and needed equipment to Manzanar. A doctor representing that agency spent two days at Manzanar at the time of the hospital opening, providing valuable assistance to the medical staff.

During March 1942 nine in-patients were hospitalized, and 251 cases were examined in the out-patient department. Of the cases treated in the hospital, two were for gastro-intestinal upsets and the remainder for upper respiratory ailments. This low number of hospital cases was a remarkable development "considering the lack of sanitary measures" in the camp. Medical services were rendered despite extremely cold weather and inadequate heat. From the beginning, emphasis was placed on the idea that preventive care was synonymous with clinical care. Within weeks of the camp's opening, various types of public health clinics were held each morning. The medical staff initiated instructions for sanitary inspectors, and a regular schedule of camp inspection and reporting was developed. During the first month of the camp's operation, the medical staff administered 14,750 typhoid inoculations and 6,968 small pox vaccinations to the incoming evacuees. A dental clinic was established under the guidance of an evacuee dentist working solely with the equipment he had brought with him.

Ground was broken for a new 250-bed hospital during late April. During that month, the medical staff increased by one doctor, two registered nurses, and four student nurses.

Meanwhile, on April 13, the hospital moved from its temporary location into larger quarters in a 100-foot x 20-foot barrack in Block 7 which had been partitioned into a pharmacy, laboratory, kitchen, and operating. X-ray, sterilizing, linen, utility, record rooms, as well as space for a ten-bed hospital unit. This building was equipped with running water. The U. S. Public Health Service provided the equipment for the ten-bed unit, including instruments, X-ray equipment, and an autoclave sterilizer.

Four more standard barracks adjacent to this unit were acquired for hospital use in April to accommodate contagious disease patients. Running water was not available then, nor at a later date, in this new addition to the hospital.

As the medical staff increased, physicians and nurses were stationed at the entrance to the center to screen the new arrivals for communicable diseases. Those requiring hospitalization were admitted immediately in an effort to prevent epidemics from spreading through the camp population.

Through the month of April, the total out-patient load was 954. Numerous cases of acute simple conjunctivitis caused by dust storms were treated. The total in-patient load was 75, consisting mostly of communicable diseases and upper respiratory cases. The number of surgical patients totaled 11. One repair of a ruptured Achilles tendon and two appendectomies were performed before April 13, when the hospital was moved to its more adequate accommodations.

In May, the camp's medical staff increased with the arrival of two doctors, three dentists, and one registered nurse. With the exception of the lay hospital administrator, the entire hospital staff was composed of evacuee personnel.

During May, the medical staff administered 558 dental treatments, 16 surgical operations, and eight baby deliveries. There were 70 hospitalized cases for communicable diseases, including measles, chickenpox, whooping cough, and mumps. The out-patient department handled 2,300 cases that month. One case (hospitalized on March 22) ended in death from "hypertension with decompensation."

Other activities conducted by the medical staff during May included examination of 146 food handlers, 99 well-baby conferences, and 45 prenatal examinations. Nutrition aides were selected to develop instructions for those working in mess halls.

On June 1, when the WRA took over administrative control of Manzanar, the improvised and primitive hospital facilities in the camp were deplorable. [97] On some of the hospital beds there were no mattresses, "straw ticking being used." In the nursery which housed five babies, there was "one bassinet, a common cardboard box and three wooden cribs built by Japanese workmen in the center from discarded building materials from the new hospital construction." There were only 12 urinals for the hospital patients. There was a shortage of pitchers, and "tin cans were used in several instances to supply drinking water to the patients." Nurses were forced to go outside and use an open spigot to wash their hands between patients. Water from wash basins used in bathing or caring for hospital patients was disposed "of on the open ground around the barracks, creating a possible source for the spread of infection in Manzanar's blowing dust." No telephones had been installed in the hospital.

Although the supply of drugs and medicines was considered to be adequate, the operating table, lighting, and surgical equipment were unsatisfactory. Despite the inadequate equipment in the hospital, however, "operations of a delicate nature" had been "successfully performed, including fourteen appendectomies and the removal of a cancer of the cecum, all without a fatality." Sterilizing equipment was "new and wholly adequate, and one ward had an air conditioning unit donated by Manchester Boddy, the Los Angeles newspaper publisher. The floors of the hospital buildings "were of bare boards, uncovered, but clean by dint of constant scrubbing." Hospital laundry was sent to a private establishment in Bishop. Deliveries were made twice weekly, sometimes resulting "in a shortage of hospital linen." The hospital did not have its own kitchen facilities "for the preparation of special foods and diets for the patients."

Under the WRA. In June another nurse, and in July another doctor, joined the Manzanar medical staff, bringing the camp's total professional evacuee personnel to six physicians, four dentists, six registered nurses, and six student nurses. A large shipment of medical equipment and supplies was received in June from the Quartermaster Depot in St. Louis. By the end of June, the medical services rendered to the camp population since its opening in March, included the following list:

On July 22, the new 250-bed hospital, which had been under construction since late April, was officially opened. The hospital continued to be operated with an exclusively professional evacuee staff. The Hospital Administrator, a member of the appointed personnel, was nominally the head of the hospital, but he was neither medically trained nor experienced in hospital management. He also served as a liaison officer between the hospital staff and the camp administrators.

Under the WRA organization, the Health Section was placed in the Community Services Division and divided into public health and hospital units. Each of these units duplicated various efforts, services, and supplies. In addition, a rift occurred between the staffs of the two units. The organization failed to function smoothly because of personnel friction and lack of coordination. Thus, a newly-appointed Caucasian Chief Medical Officer and his staff, along with the head of the Medical Section from Washington, arrived at Manzanar in October to investigate the hospital and public health operations in the camp. Their examination was followed by a reorganization of the hospital personnel and their responsibilities. The Health Section became a single operating entity in which all personnel from physicians down were rotated through both the hospital and public health services. The greatest aid to unity came when the physicians, "who distrusted public health on the ground that it offered an entry for socialized medicine," began to realize that proper preventive measures reduced the number of emergency calls.

The new organization provided for general supervision of all medical services under a Principal Medical Officer who consulted with his unit heads before making important decisions regarding their units. He had general supervision of the health program and overall responsibility for application of WRA health policies. Most responsibility for medical services were delegated to the Chief Nurse, who supervised all nursing services and personnel, and the Hospital Administrator, who oversaw operation of the hospital and related services, such as warehouse, clerical, telephone, laundry, mess, janitorial, and ambulance. Physicians performed all medical services expected of a general practitioner, while dentists made examinations, cleaning, fillings, extractions, and dentures. The sanitarian was responsible for checking the purity of the water supply, sewage disposal, garbage and trash removal, and sanitary conditions in the mess halls, latrines, and camp in general. The pharmacist rilled prescriptions, and a dietician supervised the preparation of and serving of meals at the hospital and the diet mess hall. Laboratory and x-ray technicians performed their respective jobs. The health section also had a medical social worker who interviewed patients as to their social welfare needs, and assisted the Welfare Section in the adjustment of evacuees in relation to their health problems.

Photo 42: Sign on west boundary, Manzanar War Relocation Center;
Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 43: Camouflage net plant, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 44: Irrigation for Manzanar War Relocation Center farm; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 45: Clearing land to south of residential area, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 46: Guayule experiments, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 28, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 47: Police station and evacuee police, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942.

Photo 48: Mess hall interior at mealtime, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 49: Japanese checkers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942;
RG 2I0, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 50: Art school, artificial flowers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942;
RG 210, Stilt Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 51: Boy Scouts at Memorial Day service, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, May 30, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 52: Hospital latrines for patients between barracks, serving temporarily as hospital wards; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 3, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 53: Evacuee gardens, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 2, 1942;
RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 54: George S. Takemura, landscape artist, building and wishing well, Manzanar War Relocation Center;
photo by Francis Stewart, May 24, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 55: Block 19, Manzanar War Relocation Center;
Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection; Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.