MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

Despite the intervening years since World War II and the opening of previously sealed government records, it is little known that evacuees in all ten relocation centers persistently resisted the conditions in the camps. Evacuees regularly repudiated the government's Americanization program and experienced a resurgence in Japanese cultural values. They rejected WRA-imposed political and economic bureaucracy, while rejuvenating prewar Japanese patterns of community leadership. They redeployed themselves from labor projects selected by camp administrators to those regarded valuable by evacuees. Because this type of resistance was daily and incremental, rather than occasional and dramatic, it has gone largely unnoticed.

More visible, both during the war and in later studies of the period, were displays by evacuees of open resistance such as strikes and violent confrontation with WRA authorities and the military police who provided the external security for the centers. One of the most renowned examples of evacuee resistance during the evacuation and relocation center period was the violent event, variously termed or described as an "incident" "riot," or "revolt" that occurred at Manzanar on December 6, 1942. [1]

HISTORY

Events of December 5-6, 1942 [2]

Assault on Fred Tayama. On Saturday evening, December 5, 1942, at about 8:00 P.M., Fred Tayama, a Nisei evacuee at Manzanar, was assaulted in his apartment (Block 28, Building 11, Apartment 3) by six masked men. He was taken to the camp hospital and, when questioned there by Ralph P. Merritt, who had become Project Director at Manzanar on November 24, gave the following account:

He had just finished a shower and was in his apartment alone, lying face down on his bed with the light on, using a Japanese-American dictionary for the preparation of a speech he was to make, reporting on the happenings of the recent JACL conference in Salt Lake City. There was a knock on the door. Thinking it was a friend, Tayama said "Come in" without looking up. Six masked men entered, at least one of them carrying a club. The masks were black cloths drawn tightly across the face just below the eyes and tied behind the head. Caps pulled low over the eyes completed the disguise. Three men went on each side of the bed. Tayama was struck on the head and arms with the club. He rolled out of bed and engaged three of the men. A young girl passing outside heard the noise, screamed, and the men ran away. A neighbor called the hospital and an ambulance was sent. [3]

Although Tayama was severely beaten, his injuries, including a badly cut scalp, were painful but not serious.

Tayama, a 37-year-old Nisei who had moved with his family from Hawaii to a fruit farm in the Sacramento Valley before settling in Los Angeles before the war, [4] had returned the previous day from Salt Lake City where he had served as the center's representative at the national convention of the Japanese American Citizens League. At the convention, Tayama had supported a proposal urging the War Department to draft Nisei for the American armed forces. Dillon Myer, the WRA director, was a guest at the convention, and many of the residents of Manzanar assumed that the director had allowed himself to become a spokesman for the JACL. [5] Having worked closely with WRA administrators at Manzanar, Tayama was suspected by many camp evacuees as being an "inu" or informer ("dog" in Japanese) to federal investigative agencies regarding camp activities.

According to a WRA memorandum, Tayama was a former owner of a chain of restaurants in Los Angeles and the head of the Southern District of the Japanese American Citizens League prior to the war. The report noted that it appeared "that he is regarded by a large number of evacuees" as "an FBI informer" and was "disliked for that reason." [6]

Arrest of Harry Y. Ueno. [7] Tayama could not positively identify his attackers, but he told police that he was sure that one was Harry Y. Ueno (Block 22, Building 3, Apartment 4), an outspoken Kibei who had been employed in marketing and fruit stand operations in Los Angeles prior to the evacuation. Later, one of the suspects that was questioned in the case identified Ueno as one of the assailants. [8] In September 1942, Ueno had organized the Kitchen Workers' Union at Manzanar to represent Manzanar's 1,500-Kibei-dominated mess hall workers more effectively than did the Japanese American Citizens League-inspired Manzanar Work Corps chaired by Tayama. Thus, Ueno's group was composed largely of anti-JACL, anti-administration Kibei and Issei, [9] and Ueno had become an avowed enemy of Tayama. At Merritt's request, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell had requested that the Manzanar police assist in rounding up a number of possible participants in the assault. Accordingly, Ueno was taken into custody and questioned. Unable to give a clear account of his activities that evening, Ueno was handcuffed and taken to the county Jail in Independence by Campbell, [10] thus becoming the first Manzanar evacuee to be jailed outside the camp. Two other Kibei suspects were taken into custody and questioned at the Manzanar jail during the night. The two men were questioned until about 5:00 A.M. on Sunday, December 6, when they were released.

Shortly before his arrest, Ueno had gained a measure of popularity at Manzanar as a result of reporting allegations to the FBI that Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph ^^ Winchester were stealing meat and sugar intended for the evacuees in order to sell them for profit outside the camp. Thus, Ueno's arrest aroused widespread hostility and resistance among the evacuees. Contrary to the purported WRA rationale for this action — that Ueno had been identified positively by Tayama as one of his assailants — many evacuees charged that Ueno was innocent and was being victimized due to his recent allegations against Campbell. Many of the members of the Kitchen Workers' Union were Terminal Islanders who were notoriously anti-WRA in sentiment, convinced that the agency's staff members were grafters and caustic in their denunciation of individuals suspected of being informers or collaborators. Many were convinced that unionist Ueno's brazen exposure of corrupt practices, and the investigation he was promoting, were at the root of his being punitively confined in the county jail "outside" the camp. Thus, they reached the conclusion that Ueno was imprisoned not because he had beaten Tayama, but, rather, because Campbell, who had transported him to the Independence jail, wished him removed from the camp as a result of Ueno's accusations. [11]

Sunday Morning Meeting. At 10:00 A.M. on Sunday December 6, about 200 evacuees assembled in the mess hall of Block 22 (Ueno's block) to discuss his arrest and consider ways of effecting his return to the camp. This meeting, comprised primarily of Block 22 residents and a sprinkling of Kitchen Workers' Union members, entertained several plans of action, including the imposition of a center-wide mess hall strike. After about 20 minutes, the meeting was adjourned, and a second meeting to consist of block managers, mess hall workers, and various Kibei evacuees was arranged for 1:00 P.M. in Block 22. [12]

Sunday 1:00 p.m. Mass Meeting. News of the noon 1:00 P.M. meeting apparently spread throughout the center, for the crowd that subsequently arrived at Block 22 was so large (estimated to be about 2,000) that the gathering had to be moved outside the mess hall to the adjacent firebreak area. Shigetoshi Tateishi, a Kibei born in San Francisco and educated in Japan who was the block leader for Block 23, led the meeting. Some fiery speeches were delivered over a hastily-installed public address system, devoted to accusations against "dogs" among the Japanese as well as the Caucasians at the camp. A Committee of Five was selected to negotiate Ueno's reinstatement with Merritt. This committee included: Gengi Yamaguchi, a 40-year-old Issei educated at the University of Southern California and employed as a landscape gardening contractor and proprietor of a retail produce business in Los Angeles before evacuation who was block manager for Block 13; the aforementioned Shigetoshi Tateishi; Sakichi Hashimoto, a 42-year-old Issei who lived in Block 19 and was a member of the Kitchen Workers' Union executive committee; and Kazuo Suzukawa, a 38-year-old Issei who served as chef for the mess hall in Block 8. The principal spokesman for the Committee of Five, however, was Joseph Y. Kurihara, a Hawaiian-born Nisei, wounded World War I veteran, and outspoken American patriot who, while a friend of Ueno's was unaffiliated with the union. After Pearl Harbor, Kurihara had attempted to volunteer for the U.S. armed forces, but had been rejected because of his Japanese ancestry. Embittered by his rejection and the humiliation of evacuation, he had become one of the most prominent dissidents at Manzanar.

A detail of evacuee policemen was sent to the meeting by John M. Gilkey, the Caucasian Acting Chief of Internal Security at Manzanar. The police detail returned to the police station and reported that they were not wanted and had been asked to leave. Alarmed by the huge assemblage, Merritt, in company with Gilkey decided to go to the meeting. At the same time, he ordered Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director, to request Captain Martyn L. Hall, Commanding Officer of the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company that had been assigned to Manzanar, to form a contingent of his men outside the center's gate in the event of trouble. When Merritt and Gilkey arrived at the mass meeting, the evacuees were breaking up. Merritt and Gilkey were told that the purpose of the meeting had been to (a) protest the arrest of Ueno and demand his unconditional release, and (b) denounce and threaten physical violence to Tayama and other camp residents on a "blacklist" of evacuees regarded as "stool pigeons" and "traitors to our people" who were cooperating with federal investigative agencies. The list included Togo Tanaka and Joe Grant Masaoka, brother of Mike Masaoka, national executive secretary of the JACL, who had been serving as the camp's documentary historians. They were also told that a Committee of Five had been appointed by the evacuees to discuss their grievances with Merritt. [13]

Merritt's Interaction with Evacuee Crowd. Merritt and Gilkey returned to the Administration Building to await the arrival of the Committee of Five. The committee, marching at the head of a large crowd, many of its participants "yelling and marching in an irregular manner," arrived at the Administration Building about 1:30 P.M. [14] Captain Hall and about 12 soldiers arrived through the main gate of the camp at the same time, forming a line between the police station and the Administration Building with mounted machine guns.

Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall walked out to meet the unruly crowd. The Committee of Five demanded the immediate release of Ueno. Merritt walked among the crowd and talked to them for approximately 45 minutes. He refused to negotiate with the crowd, indicating that he would talk with a representative group and demanding that the crowd disperse. As Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall attempted to reason with the leaders of the throng, they were surrounded by four evacuee men whose actions indicated they were attempting to protect him. The crowd, for the most part, was respectful to Merritt, and as he walked among the men several of them laughed and joked with him. Generally, however, the crowd remained unruly and surly, led by agitators who were attempting to keep sentiment stirred up. Campbell was struck by an evacuee, and Merritt immediately ordered him into the police station when Campbell attempted to retaliate. At Merritt's urging, the leaders finally agreed that they would attempt to convince the crowd to disperse. They climbed on a car and talked to the crowd in Japanese for some time. As a result, the crowd became more menacing, some individuals making obscene gestures toward the soldiers and shouting obscene words in Japanese and English. On the verge of getting out of control, the crowd surged forward at times until it was close to the line of soldiers whose ranks had swelled to approximately 30 men in response to Captain Hall's request. [15]

Merritt's Agreement with the Committee of Five. When it became apparent that the crowd would not disperse, Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall discussed the course of action that should be taken. Merritt decided the "fanaticism" of some members of the crowd indicated there was imminent danger of bloodshed. The soldiers continued to be taunted and insulted, some stones and sticks being thrown at them by persons in the crowd. Many of the Caucasian school teachers and project appointed personnel were scattered around the fringes of the crowd, raising concern that some of them might be injured if force were used to disperse the mob. Sensing that it was no longer in control of the crowd, the committee urged Merritt to concede before matters got completely out of hand. Although the project director publicly reiterated his earlier refusal to this demand, a private conference with the police chief and the commander of the military police convinced him that this concession was necessary in order to avoid bloodshed. Merritt thus decided to compromise in an effort to forestall violence. Since Ueno's arrest, Merritt's men had investigated Tayama's beating and had been unable to discover any conclusive evidence that Ueno had attacked Tayama. Thus, Merritt directed the Committee of Five to the side of Block I, Building I, Apartment I, directly across the road from the police station, and after some discussion out of the crowd's earshot, the committee, after first rejecting his terms, agreed to the following:

a. Ueno would be returned to the jail at Manzanar within an hour after the crowd dispersed, and he would be tried in such manner (i.e., before the camp's Judicial Committee) as Merritt and WRA officials determined.

b. The crowd would disperse immediately.

c. There would be no more mass meetings without Merritt's consent until the Ueno case was settled.

d. There would be no attempts to free Ueno from the Manzanar jail.

e. All future grievances would be discussed and negotiated with Merritt through recognized committees.

f. The Committee of Five would help to find the assailants of Tayama and aid in maintaining law and order in the center. [16]

Merritt also announced that a subsequent statement pertinent to Ueno's return would be issued at 6:00 P.M. that evening at the Block 22 mess hall. [17]

After the terms of this agreement were reached, Kurihara reportedly burst into "a fanatical tirade, disclaimed loyalty to the United States, expressed the hope that Japan would win the war, and threatened death to all informers." He expressed the apparent sentiments of many in the crowd when he said "that no one should be punished for beating such informers as Tayama." [18] After being reminded of the agreement that had been reached, Kurihara apparently quieted down. Merritt shook hands with the Committee of Five, and Kurihara addressed the crowd, apparently explaining the agreement and urging the evacuees to return to their quarters.

Dispersal of Crowd. Kurihara spoke to the crowd in Japanese, and the evacuees responded with applause. Merritt turned to Higashi, the Japanese chief of internal security who was standing nearby, and asked whether Kurihara had explained the agreement. Merritt was assured that "the speech was all right." [19] Merritt later learned that Kurihara had not explained the agreement but had renounced his American citizenship and had reminded each evacuee that he should remember he was a Japanese. He reportedly told the crowd that a victory had been won in obtaining an agreement to return Ueno to Manzanar and that the crowd should disperse temporarily and reassemble at 6:00 P.M. at the police station to secure Ueno's release. The Japanese chief of internal security may have been intimidated, but it is possible that he did not fully understand all of Kurihara's speech to the crowd. Later, it would be learned that this man knew little Japanese and did not understand all of what Kurihara said. [20]

The crowd refused to disperse until the soldiers left the camp. At Merritt's request, Captain Hall moved the soldiers back to the entry gate at the center's periphery "in the face of humiliating catcalls." [21] The crowd was not satisfied by this pullback, and the soldiers were ordered back to the highway where they remained until the crowd broke up. By 3:00 P.M., the crowd had dispersed and the soldiers had returned to their quarters. [22]

That afternoon, Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall toured the camp by automobile and found it quiet. Football games were underway, and children were playing in the streets. They returned to the police station, where the Committee of Five was waiting, and arrangements were undertaken to return Ueno to Manzanar.

Ueno's Return to Manzanar. Ueno was returned to the Manzanar jail about 3:30 P.M. The Committee of Five remained until he arrived. Merritt repeated the terms of his agreement with the committee and Ueno and shook hands with them.

Sunday Evening Mass Meeting. When the Committee of Five appeared at the Block 22 mess hall at 6:00 P.M. to affirm the return of Ueno, it encountered a crowd of some 2,000-4,000 evacuees. Again the meeting was transferred outside to the adjacent firebreak. As the crowd milled about the dusty firebreak, various grievances were aired, including charges that Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester had been stealing sugar from a camp warehouse for sale outside the center and that the evacuees' clothing allowance had not only been delayed by administrative bungling but was also inadequate. On the grounds that it had accomplished its objective, the Committee of Five attempted to resign. This suggestion was shouted down by the crowd which apparently felt that the administration had not gone far enough by merely returning Ueno to the Manzanar jail. According to some of the more militant elements in the crowd, Ueno should be unconditionally released, even if release required his enforced removal. Moreover, the crowd demanded that evacuees like Fred Tayama, whom they accused of collaborating with the WRA administration and informing the FBI about pro-Japanese activities in camp, should be killed as "inu" or traitors. A list of 50 female "dogs" was also read. Having degenerated into an uncontrolled demonstration, the meeting broke up when its leaders announced a hurried plan of action. The crowd divided into two main groups, one to ferret Tayama out of the camp hospital and finish the job begun the previous night, and the second to liberate Ueno from jail. Members of the crowd armed themselves with knives, hatchets, hammers, screw drivers, stones, and any other weapons they could secure. [23]

About 6:30 P.M., Dr. James M. Goto, the chief evacuee medical physician at Manzanar, telephoned Merritt at his apartment and Arthur L. Williams, Assistant Chief of Internal Security in the camp, at the police station, reporting that a group was advancing toward the hospital, demanding that Tayama be turned over. Dr. Morse Little, Chief Medical Officer at the hospital, also called the police station as he saw the crowd approaching the hospital, requesting military police protection. Williams telephoned Merritt and was told to request the military police to escort an ambulance to the hospital for the purpose of removing Tayama. Following a request by Merritt, the military police agreed to take a circuitous route to the rear of the hospital, thus avoiding Block 22.

About the same time, one of the Japanese policemen (Jack Shimatsu, Block 14, Building 6, Apartment, 2) informed Williams that, according to his father, approximately 2,000 people attended the meeting at Block 22, and it was agreed that two groups would be formed, one of which would go to the hospital to get Tayama, while the other would go to the police station to release Ueno and kill all evacuee policemen because they were "stooges" of the WRA administration. Evacuee members of the police force were blamed for the arrests which had been made, and the mob intended to injure or kill them. Williams immediately notified Merritt by telephone that the crowd was marching toward the police station. When Merritt heard this, he told Williams to ask Hall to place a military guard at the station. [24]

Hospital Incident. The crowd that converged on the hospital consisted of some 50-75 persons. The crowd was prevented from entering the hospital building by three evacuee women employees. Nevertheless, the group clambered around the hospital grounds, insistent in its determination to get Tayama. Believing that Tayama had been spirited away by the military police before the crowd arrived. Dr. Little agreed to permit a group of five evacuees from the crowd to accompany him in searching the hospital wards. The search was conducted, but Tayama, hidden by evacuee personnel on the lower shelf of an orthopedic bed, concealed by blankets, was not found.

The ambulance and military escort arrived during the search, but the soldiers were told that Tayama was not there. However, the soldiers removed Fred Tayama's mother, a tuberculosis patient who had entered the hospital suffering from anxiety neurosis after her son's beating, in the ambulance. The milling crowd jeered and threw stones at the ambulance, believing that Tayama was in the vehicle. The hospital building was also pelted with stones, and a window was broken. [25]

At the suggestion of a leader in the crowd, the frustrated evacuees then divided into groups for the purpose of locating Togo Tanaka, Tokataru (Tokie) Slocum, John Sinoda, George Hayakawa, Tom Imai, and other former JACL leaders who had supported evacuation and were suspected of collaborating with federal investigative agencies. Small bands went to the apartments of these persons, but these men, having been warned, had retreated or been taken to various hiding places, including the military police compound south of the camp, and could not be found. In some cases, the apartments were ransacked by the increasingly angry evacuees. [26]

Thereafter, the hospital would remain quiet until about 9:30 P.M., when those who were wounded in the skirmish at the police station would be brought for treatment. At this time, WRA authorities discovered that Tayama had not been moved from the hospital as Dr. Little had presumed, but instead had crawled under a bed with the assistance of evacuee personnel when he heard the crowd approaching. The military police were again called, removing Tayama from the hospital to the military police compound. [27]

Police Station Incident. The crowd heading for the police station arrived about 6:50 P.M., surging into the building and completely surrounding it. Headed by the Committee of Five, this crowd consisted of approximately 500 men and boys. The jail was opened, but Ueno refused to leave the cell until Merritt arrived to release him. Meanwhile, Williams talked to the Committee of Five and others who were in the police station, reminding them of the agreement reached earlier in the day. The committee insisted that he call Merritt. Williams telephoned Merritt, advising him, however, not to attempt to come to the police station because the crowd was "completely out of hand." [28] Merritt realized that the agreement reached at noon had been broken and that the evacuee police force was either unable or unwilling to cope with the situation, most of its members having disappeared into the approaching darkness. Fearing that life and property in the center were in danger, he concluded that order could not be maintained without the assistance of the military police. Accordingly, Merritt instructed Williams to telephone Captain Hall and request him to take command of the situation and "if necessary declare martial law." [29]

Meanwhile, however. Private Ruggiero, the sentry at the gate, fired two volleys of three shots in the air as a warning for the purpose of summoning the military police. [30] In response to this signal from the sentry, rather than as a result of Williams' request made a few minutes later. Captain Hall dispatched to the center all of his men (approximately 135) who had been on alert since the afternoon meeting. [31]

The first detachment of military police arrived at the camp under the command of Second Lieutenant Stanley N. Zwaik. By 7:15 P.M., the detachment was "deployed in a line of skirmishers in the roadway immediately west of the Relocation Center jail." [32] When the remainder of the soldiers arrived, they cleared the dimly-lit street in front of the police station with some difficulty and forced the crowd back from the sides of the building.

At the request of Williams, the soldiers allowed the Committee of Five to remain in the front office of the police station with five of his evacuee police, three of whom had fled there for safety while only two had remained on duty. [33]

Merritt attempted to join Captain Hall, but was not allowed to pass through the sentry line. He returned to Campbell's apartment where he, in company with Robert Brown and Campbell, watched the crowd through the window and communicated with Williams via telephone. Thus, Williams was the only member of the WRA staff present at the police station.

After the military deployment, the crowd grew quiet. Captain Hall talked to the Committee of Five in the police station for about 30 minutes, listening again to a list of their demands. He reminded them of the agreement reached earlier that day and then went out to urge the crowd to disperse. Apparently, the committee, fearing that violence would soon erupt, offered to have themselves jailed if Ueno would be released. When Hall rejected this overture and his further efforts to disperse the crowd were met by "several Japanese throwing large stones," he returned to his soldiers to await developments. [34] A line was drawn in front of the soldiers, and the crowd was ordered not to cross it. Meanwhile, the milling crowd surged back and forth, coming as close as ten feet to the line of military police.

The temper of the crowd became increasingly threatening, some observers noting that the attitude of the crowd was "insulting, ugly, jeering, and menacing." [35] Some soldiers later stated that they were called "boy scouts" and were told to say "please" when ordering the crowd to move back. Stones, sand, and lighted cigarettes were thrown [36], and a door in the jail was broken open to release Ueno. Some members of the crowd sang Japanese patriotic songs and spit on the soldiers, while others attempted to disarm several soldiers and reportedly taunted the soldiers "to shoot." Some shouted "Banzai," a traditional "greeting to the Japanese armed forces." [37]

After waiting for a short period. Captain Hall and Lieutenant Zwaik addressed the crowd between 8:00 and 8:45 PM, urging its participants to disperse once more. When they were rebuffed. Hall determined that the crowd would not disperse without force. Thus, he decided to use tear gas grenades (CN-DM type) to disperse the crowd. The soldiers threw four or five grenades into the crowd, causing its participants to scatter rapidly amid the resulting smoke, chaos, and confusion. The wind was blowing from the north to the south, and since most of the crowd were assembled north of the point where the grenades fell, the majority did not suffer ill effects. However, most of the crowd scattered to the west or north, some elements apparently reforming and starting back for the jail while others advanced toward the soldiers. At about the same time, although no order to fire was given, shotgun and sub-machine gun blasts by two soldiers. Privates Ramon Cherubini and Tobe Moore, were fired into the crowd. Moore fired three 12-gauge shotgun blasts, while Cherubini fired two bursts (about 14-15 shots) with a .45 caliber Thompson sub-machine gun. The soldiers who fired did so on their own initiative, believing that their lives were in danger. Earlier, when rocks were being thrown, one of the soldiers had asked one of Captain Hall's assistants under what conditions he could fire. He had been told not to fire unless ordered to do so or unless rushed by the crowd. This direction was consistent with the policies of the military police who had been "trained and ordered to fire upon an unarmed mob only when commanded to do so, or when rushed by the mob." [38]

During the melee, a driverless automobile used by the camp's fire chief, was released by the crowd and headed for the police station. The vehicle struck the northeast corner of the station, gained speed, and traveled the length of the building's east side, before crashing into an Army truck loaned to the WRA that was parked on the southeast side of the structure. As it careened toward the soldiers. Lieutenant Zwaik, who could not see that it was driverless, opened fire on the vehicle under direct orders from Hall with a Thompson sub-machine gun, firing six or eight times. [39]

Amid the shooting, the crowd dispersed in panic. When the smoke and dust cleared, injured and dying evacuees lay on the ground near the police station. Some were immediately carried into the police station by the evacuees, and an ambulance quickly removed them to the camp hospital. The time was about 9:30 P.M.

During the night, the camp remained in a turbulent state. Meetings were held in many of the mess halls throughout the camp, and mess hall bells tolled continuously. Beatings of alleged informers ensued, and the military police patrolled the camp, breaking up numerous evacuee gatherings.

Casualties. As a result of the altercation, one youth (James Ito) was killed instantly, and eleven others were injured. One of those injured died in the Manzanar hospital on December 11 as a result of his wounds and complications. Four of the casualties were Nisei, two were Issei, and five were Kibei. All wounds were "from the side or behind," except for those of James Ito who was shot from the front at a distance of no more than 25 feet. [40] The casualties included:

James Ito — 17 years old; born in Los Angeles; unmarried; had a brother serving in the U.S. Army and another brother working in the sugar beet fields; reportedly "a quiet boy who seldom went out at night;" shot through the heart and abdomen from a distance of no more than 25 feet; pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.

Jim Kanagawa — 21 years old; born in Tacoma, Washington; educated in Japan; unmarried; bullet wounds in stomach and lung causing perforation of pancreas and stomach, requiring operative repair; died of complications related to bronchial pneumonia December 11.

Tom Hatanaka — 26 years old; born in Sacramento; unmarried; a produce broker prior to evacuation; assistant manager of one of the cooperative stores at Manzanar; bullet wound in abdomen and rupture of small bowel; 14 inches of small bowel excised.

Charles Sakihara — 18 years old; born in Sacramento; unmarried; worked in Manzanar motor pool; bullet wound in left hip.

George Kano — 25 years old; born in Los Angeles; unmarried; employed as a night watchman in the public works office; had worked in the Idaho sugar beet fields; bullet wound in left forearm.

Kenjiro Nagamini — 50 years old; born in Japan; came to United States in 1919; bullet wound in left femur and compound fracture.

Harry Nukada — 28 years old; educated in Japan; bullet wound in right shoulder.

Jingo Nakamura — 40 years old, born in Japan; came to the United States in 1919 married; father of two sons; employed as a carpenter; bullet wound in right shoulder.

Frank Takahashi — 22 years old; born in Los Angeles; educated in Japan; married; one child; a kitchen worker; bullet wound in left thigh and fractured femur.

Henry Mukado — 20 years old; born in Los Angeles; educated in Japan; employed as the timekeeper in a mess hall; bullet wound in back.

Henry Inouye — 24 years old; Kibei; bullet wound in left thigh.

Yoshio Yoshihiro — 31 years old; born in the United States; educated in Japan; married; one child; employed as a junior cook; suffered from exposure to tear gas; no wounds. [41]

Aftermath

Arrests. Neither charged nor given a hearing, Ueno was again removed from Manzanar after midnight following the riot and taken to the jail at Bishop. A few days later, he was transferred to the jail in Lone Pine, along with a number of other suspected evacuee troublemakers who had been rounded up by WRA and military authorities. The members of the Committee of Five were arrested Sunday night, December 6, and transported to the Bishop jail. Five other evacuees were arrested Sunday night or Monday morning on the basis of a list supplied by Ned Campbell and the camp internal security staff. Eleven additional evacuees were arrested on Thursday, December 10, at the request of Merritt. By December 15, the jails at Lone Pine and Independence had been turned over to the WRA, and 15 of those arrested were incarcerated in Lone Pine and seven in Independence. Military police guarded the jails, and the WRA furnished food and blankets for the prisoners. Of those arrested by December 15, ten were Issei, ten were Kibei, and two were Nisei. One of those arrested attempted to commit suicide by consuming rat poison in the Independence jail, but, after being returned to the Manzanar hospital to have his stomach pumped out, he was returned to jail. [42]

All arrests made on Sunday night, December 6, were conducted by the military police. Thereafter, the military authorities requested that further arrests be made by camp internal security officers accompanied by soldiers. The purpose of this request was "to avoid any question of military law that might be raised as a result of the arrest of civilians by military officers." [43]

All those arrested were held pending determination as to whether they should be prosecuted in the local or federal courts, and whether they should be sent to an isolation center, a different relocation center, or be returned to Manzanar. A partial list of evacuees that were arrested included:

Ted Akahosi — Issei
Koiji Arataka — Issei
Harry Hashimoto — Issei
Raymond Hirai — Issei
Ben Kishi, — Kibei
Tamotsu Kono — Kibei
Joseph Kurihara — Nisei
Tadao Nakagawa — Issei
Fred Ogura — Issei
Kazuo Suzukawa — Kibei
Shigetosh Tateishi — Kibei
Harry Ueno — Kibei
Ernest Wakayama — Kibei
Gengi Yamaguchi — Issei
Toshimoro Asashi — Kibei
Yenuchi Fugisawa — Issei
Yoshiro Kaku — Kibei
William Kuga — Kibei
Bob Matsuda — Nisei
Kiyoji Nakamura — Kibei
Bill Tanabe — Issei [44]

Altogether, 26 evacuees, presumed to be the ringleaders of the altercation on December 5-6 or who were "believed to be trouble makers," were arrested and transferred to jails in Lone Pine and Independence. [45] Ten of these persons were later returned to Manzanar. The remaining 16, including Kurihara and Ueno (with the exception of Kurihara, all were Kibei) were sent to a temporary isolation center in an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Moab, Utah, via a two-day journey by bus and train on January 9, 1943. The isolation center had been established in the mountains outside of Moab by WRA authorities for dissidents and "troublemakers" from all ten relocation centers. Meanwhile, the WRA, having concluded that some more formal arrangements were needed for removing persistent and chronic "troublemakers" from relocation centers, moved ahead with plans for establishment of an isolation center on the grounds of an inactive Indian boarding school near Leupp, Arizona.

On February 16, 1943, the WRA issued a confidential policy statement governing removal of "aggravated and incorrigible troublemakers" from relocation centers. Under the procedure established, relocation center project directors were instructed to prepare dockets on each candidate for isolation for submission to the Washington office. If the candidate was an alien, the project director could recommend his transfer to an internment camp; otherwise, the transfer would be either to another relocation center or to an isolation center. [46]

Accordingly, the group of Manzanar agitators was transferred from Moab to Leupp on April 27, 1943. The Leupp center, replete with guard towers, a high fence, and 150 military police assigned to guard about 45 prisoners, received small contingents of agitators from the relocation centers until December 1943, when it was closed, and its remaining inmates, including Ueno, were removed to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. [47]

Ueno's own odyssey during this period was noteworthy. During the weeks he was jailed with other dissidents in Lone Pine, the military police guarding the jail sometimes reportedly became drunk during the night and peppered their cell doors with rifle shots. His last two weeks at Moab were passed in the county jail after disagreement with the authoritarian edicts of Francis Frederick, Moab's chief of internal security and acting project director in the absence of Project Director Raymond Best. Ueno was trucked, along with five or six other men, in a 4-foot x 6-foot box to Leupp. Upon arrival there, he was jailed in nearby Winslow for several days where he was served "adulterated" food, housed in cramped quarters, and left inadequately protected from the weather. When finally taken to Leupp, he was Jailed for about two weeks before being granted housing in a barrack. In spite of repeated WRA promises and his persistent demands for their fulfillment, Ueno never received a trial or hearing to determine his guilt or innocence to any charge that led to his removal from Manzanar.

When Ueno was transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center in December 1943, almost a year to the day after the altercation at Manzanar, he spent an initial week in an Army-supervised stockade before being permitted to live in the residential compound. At last reunited with his wife and children, he promised camp authorities that he would remain apart from all camp politics. Although a distressed Ueno had renounced his citizenship while at Moab, he was ultimately persuaded in late December 1945 by his knowledge of the devastated condition of postwar Japan to remain in the United States and thus spare his family further hardship. Three months later, he was released from Tule Lake, one of the last to leave. After working for a railroad in several small central California towns, Ueno turned to farming in the Santa Clara Valley, and in 1954 his American citizenship was restored. [48]

Protective Custody for Evacuees Whose Lives Were Threatened. On Sunday night and Monday, December 6 and 7, threats were made against many evacuees at Manzanar who were outspoken pro-American advocates or who were perceived to have pro-WRA administration sentiments. Those threatened included staff members of the Manzanar Free Press, members of the internal security police force, and evacuees who had supervisory jobs in the center. Many of these evacuees, including Tayama, Tanaka, and Slocum, had been active members of the Japanese American Citizens League prior to evacuation, and many had encouraged evacuee cooperation with the government's relocation policies. John Sinoda, a 25-year-old Kibei who held a key position in the camp's employment office, was severely beaten by a gang with clubs at the outdoor theater, receiving scalp lacerations. Others were assaulted, including George Kurata, the camp housing coordinator, who managed to escape from his attackers. [49] By Monday noon, approximately 40 evacuees had entered the camp Administration Building, asking for protection and indicating that they were afraid to remain in their barracks. The administration also aided removal from the barracks those evacuees whose names appeared on the dissidents' blacklists and deathlists. Thus, the number of evacuees taken into protective custody by the camp administration subsequently increased to 65 individuals.

The evacuees in protective custody slept on cots in the Administration Building at night and were crowded into a room in one of the military barracks in the military police compound south of the camp during the day. There was insufficient room for all of them, however, and they were forced to take turns "in getting warm." They were fed in the kitchen in the military police compound. [50]

Faced with the dilemma of protecting the 65 people, Merritt and his staff immediately began a search for a place outside of Manzanar to house them on a temporary basis. Merritt and Brown had been associated with T. R. Goodwin, Superintendent of Death Valley National Monument, during their days with the Inyo-Mono Associates as well as the Citizens Committee established by the military to ease public relations for the camp with the Owens Valley residents following evacuation. Thus, Merritt sent Brown to Death Valley to inquire as to whether the national monument had any place to house the people. Goodwin offered the abandoned Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Camp, comprised of 16 deteriorating buildings adjacent to the monument's headquarters. After considerable discussion and clearance was received from WRA Director Myer and General DeWitt, the 65 evacuees, who became known as "refugees," were sent to Cow Creek on December 10. They were transported via "a military convoy of jeeps and weapons carriers," accompanied by ten WRA staff members led by Assistant Director Campbell and about 12 soldiers armed with rifles. The cavalcade included a truckload of hay, one of furniture, and one of food.

The Cow Creek camp was administered by Camp Director Albert Chamberlain, a WRA employee, and Fred Tayama was elected unofficial "mayor" by the refugees. The WRA staff, evacuees, and soldiers shared the same latrines and showers and ate at the same times in the mess hall which was supplied from Manzanar. After improving their quarters and the grounds of the camp, the evacuee men, needing something to do with their time and appreciative of the hospitality shown by the National Park Service, painted signs, cleaned out springs, built dams, dug ditches, mixed cement, installed radio antennas, and conducted other odd jobs in the national monument without pay. The evacuee women spent their days, caring for their children, assisting in the mess hall, and housekeeping. During their stay. Park Service personnel, as well as the soldiers, took groups of evacuees sightseeing in the national monument and on trips to pick up supplies and mail. The camp had a swimming pool that was enjoyed by the older children. The 65 evacuees remained at the Cow Creek camp under military guard, primarily for their protection, until arrangements could be made for their release through indefinite leave and assistance could be provided for relocation. The American Friends Service Committee played a major role in obtaining jobs and homes for the evacuees, sending representatives to Cow Creek to interview and assist them in planning for relocation. As a result of this organization's efforts, many of the evacuees relocated to Chicago where the Friends had established a hostel to help those relocating from the relocation centers. As jobs and housing became available, departing evacuees were taken to Las Vegas, the nearest railhead, via military escort. By mid-February the "refugee" camp at Cow Creek was vacated. [51]

Following the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, Merritt blamed the FBI, in part, as a cause of the riot, stating that FBI use of informants in the camp had been the special targets or the rioters. According to an FBI investigation, however, only six of the 65 persons removed to Death Valley had ever been interviewed by agents. Of the 65, two had been prominently associated with the Japanese American Citizens League, were outspoken in their loyalty to the United States, and had served as informants for the FBI. These two individuals were Fred Tayama and Togo Tanaka, the latter having been employed as a documentary historian for the center's administration. Several other evacuees had been interviewed by the FBI in connection with investigations by the bureau, but, according to bureau officials, "could in no sense be considered as confidential informants." These evacuees included Tom Imai, Assistant Chief of Police at Manzanar, and Joseph Blarney and Ted Uyeno, both editors of the Manzanar Free Press. In addition, Tomoasa Yamazaki had been interviewed by FBI agents on two occasions. [52]

Additional Military Assistance. In the aftermath of the altercation at Manzanar, Captain Hall believed that it was necessary to secure additional military assistance to reinforce his military police at the camp. The District Attorney of Inyo County and Major Henderson, Commanding Officer of a detachment of the California State National Guard stationed at Bishop, 50 miles away, informed Hall that Henderson had men available. At Hall's request, some 50 officers and men immediately traveled to Manzanar on the night of December 6 to aid in guarding the camp under Hall's direction. [53]

During a meeting on Monday morning, December 7, Merritt and Captain Hall agreed upon a plan to govern administration of the camp. Merritt would resume full control of the internal administration of the center, while the military would maintain armed patrols within the camp and would be responsible for law and order. Mail, telephone, and telegraph services would be censored by the military. Although mail delivery was restored within the camp on December 9, mail from the center to the outside world remained restricted.

On Monday morning, December 7, Colonel Harrie S. Mueller, accompanied by Major Green, arrived from the Ninth Service Command at Fort Douglas to take general charge of the military police at Manzanar. Despite their presence at the camp, however. Captain Hall remained on duty.

Additional military police units were sent to Manzanar on Monday. At 2:00 P.M., Company A, 753rd Military Police Battalion, from Reno, Nevada, arrived at Manzanar with three officers and 93 men, and at 7:00 P.M., Company D, 751st Military Police Battalion, arrived at Manzanar from Camp Williston with three officers and 104 men. These military police units, which were housed in "pyramidal tents" in the military police area, reinforced and cooperated with the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company in maintaining law and order at the troubled camp. After these units arrived, the members of the California National Guard returned to their headquarters at Bishop. [54]

As an uneasy calm settled over the camp, the censorship restrictions were gradually relaxed. Church services (but no other mass meetings) were permitted on December 13, and by December 16, most censorship restrictions had been removed.

On December 11, Project Director Merritt informed the "Commanding Officer, Military Headquarters, Camp Manzanar" that he wanted the military police to maintain 24-hour guard duty at five locations in the camp "until further mutual adjustment or agreement." These points included the (1) switchboard; (2) post office; (3) warehouse area; (4) power switch; and (5) water line through the upper part of the camp. According to Merritt, this arrangement would "justify the release of one company at this time, with the understanding that two companies remain for the duties outlined above and such emergency duties as may from time to time become necessary, and that these companies be maintained at least at full company strength." [55]

The military was willing to keep soldiers in the center until the WRA could establish an internal police force capable of maintaining order at Manzanar. As calm returned to the camp during the Christmas holiday season, it was determined that one company of military police could return to their headquarters. On December 23, Company D, 751st Military Police Battalion was released, leaving the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company and Company A, 753d Military Police Battalion to patrol the camp. Because of continuing calm in the center, the latter company returned to Reno several days after Christmas. [56]

Maintenance of Essential Center Services. WRA and military authorities determined that essential center services, such as heat, water, light, food, garbage disposal, and supply deliveries, would be maintained during the emergency period following the violence. These services were maintained Sunday night, December 6, by the WRA administrative staff with the help of a few selected evacuees. On Monday, scattered groups of evacuees reported for work. Some were sent home, however, either because they were too few to function effectively, their supervisors felt their safety required such action, or because their work duties were located outside the fenced perimeter of the residential area. Sufficient numbers of evacuees (with the exception of Saturday, December 12, when the plumbers and electricians failed to report for duty) reported for work throughout the week, however, to keep the essential services operating during the daytime. Operation of such services during night hours was maintained by WRA appointed personnel. [57]

Schools. The Manzanar schools convened classes on Monday, December 7, but demonstrations and disturbances, particularly by high school boys who locked several teachers in classrooms and wrote obscene, threatening, and pro-Axis statements on blackboards, as well as a shortage of oil for heating, caused officials to send the students to their quarters about 11:00 A.M. on December 8. [58] Because the Caucasian teachers lived in barracks throughout the center, they were sent to local towns on December 8 to live temporarily for their protection. They were returned to the camp on Friday, December 11, because the crowded and expensive living conditions in the towns were unsatisfactory. Upon their return to Manzanar, they were assigned to live in the administration offices in Block I. [59] The schools, however, did not reopen until January 10, 1943.

Funerals/Memorial Services. On Monday, December 21, a funeral was held for the two young men who died as a result of the wounds they suffered during the altercation on December 6. The evacuees requested special permission to conduct memorial services in the camp's outdoor theater. They also asked that mass meeting restrictions be lifted so that 1,000 persons could attend. Ninth Service Command authorities rejected these requests, suggesting instead a service in Bishop with only family members present. When the evacuees rejected this proposal, it was mutually agreed that 150 mourners would be permitted to attend a service in the woods outside the sentry line with Rev. Nagatomi, the Buddhist pastor, officiating. According to Merritt, only those evacuees authorized "to attend the funeral in cars provided with Caucasian drivers, and such Caucasian members of the staff as have been requested to attend" were to "be permitted through the Center limits." Despite these restrictions, the entire evacuee population in the camp expressed its collective sentiments on the day of the funeral with a two-minute prayer and time of silence at 1:00 P.M. [60]

On Christmas Day, Project Director Merritt described the funeral in a letter written to his Aunt Luella, a daughter of John Shepherd who had grown up on her father's ranch where the relocation center now stood. He observed:

Last Monday we buried our dead. At the Buddhist funeral held in the woods, beyond the Lacey Ranch, we mourned with their families the death of the two boys, innocent of wrong doing, the victims of the riot. The only soldier present stood at the head of one of the coffins — the brother of the dead boy. This soldier of Japanese ancestry was on active duty at a distant point, but the Army granted my request to bring him home to his family. The Buddhist Priest prayed that the lives of these young men would be a sacrifice for the sins of all the camp. . . . [61]

Negotiations Between Evacuee Committees and WRA Administrators. As an uneasy calm settled over the troubled camp, efforts were quickly initiated to begin dialogue between the evacuee population and WRA administrators. On Monday, December 7, the block managers and two representatives from each block met at the Block 22 mess hall under the chairmanship of George Murakami. A committee of six evacuees, calling themselves the "Negotiating Committee," was selected. The members of the committee were Murakami, Fred Ogura, Koichi Masunaka, Thomas Ozamoto, Shunichi Ikkanda, and Bill Tanabe. Purporting to represent the block managers, this committee attempted to meet with Merritt, but the project director referred them to Captain Hall. Robert Brown, the camp's WRA Reports Officer and newly-appointed Acting Assistant Project Director, attended the meeting with Hall and the committee. The evacuee committee demanded release of all prisoners who had been arrested and demanded that F. D'Amat, the Spanish Consul from San Francisco (Spain, a neutral country, was looking after the interests of Japanese citizens in the United States on behalf of the Japanese government), be called to the camp. Captain Hall refused to comply with both demands. That evening, Fred Ogura, one of the spokesmen for the committee, was arrested as part of the continuing WRA campaign to rid the camp of suspected troublemakers.

On Tuesday, December 8, the committee, led by Ozamoto, the block manager of Block 24, called on Merritt and repeated its demands concerning release of all prisoners and calling the Spanish Consul. The committee made veiled threats of stopping essential services for WRA appointed personnel if evacuee demands were not met. Merritt again refused cooperation with the committee, responding that stoppage of essential services for his staff would be met by curtailment of all essential services for the entire evacuee population, including food and heat. He also stated that the Spanish Consul would have no interest in any of the evacuees except those who were aliens, but he indicated that the committee could write the Spanish Consul if it desired. During the ensuing days, the Spanish Consul visited Manzanar on December 17 with a representative of the U. S. Department of State. After interviewing a number of Issei in the center, the consul informed Merritt that the Issei had advised him they would return to work only if the Spanish Ambassador so directed — a step taken to protect themselves from recriminations should Japan win the war. At Merritt's suggestion, the consul telephoned the Marquis de Fontana, a diplomat in the Spanish Embassy in Washington, advising him that Manzanar was "a good place" and that the Issei wanted to know if they should go back to work. According to Merritt, de Fontana stated that the ambassador said, "Tell the damn fools to go back to work." Accordingly D'Amat met with the Block Managers Assembly and advised the Issei to return to work. [62] The evacuees did not immediately return to work, however, because when the Nisei were advised of the Spanish Consul's advice, many of them felt that if they returned to work immediately, it would appear that they were obeying the orders of the Spanish Consul. Finally, however, both Issei and Nisei returned to work on December 19. [63] While the negotiations continued with the Spanish Consul, Ozamoto, spokesman for the evacuee committee, called on Merritt each day during the week following the violence, his attitude reportedly becoming "increasingly conciliatory." [64] On several occasions, he requested permission for the block managers to hold a mass meeting in the camp, but all requests were referred to Captain Hall and denied. On Thursday, December 10, Hall stated that he would grant permission to hold such a meeting if a Caucasian interpreter and an Army officer were present. Since no Caucasian interpreter was available, the meeting was not held.

Reports from many evacuees indicated that they were threatened or intimidated by evacuees they did not know and told not to go to work for the administration. The reports, together with the fact that only essential services were continued by evacuees until December 19, convinced WRA authorities that "some kind of informal organization was controlling the action of the evacuees, and there was reason to believe that it operated through threats of physical violence." [65] By Tuesday, two days after the violence, all evacuees who reported for work were wearing black arm bands as "a sign of mourning for those who were shot." WRA authorities also believed that the arm bands represented "permission by an evacuee committee to work." Failure to wear the arm bands while working "resulted in threats of violence." According to WRA authorities, the committee headed by Ozamoto was believed to be close enough to the controlling group "to be useful when the time to negotiate arrived."

On Sunday, December 13, one week after the altercation occurred, Merritt and Hall determined "the time was ripe to permit a mass meeting composed of representatives selected from each block for the purpose of selecting a committee to negotiate" with Merritt. Thomas Ozamoto was notified that such a meeting could be held the next morning at 9:00 A.M. The plans were for Hall to address the group, explain the bad faith of the Committee of Five on the preceding Sunday, and indicate that the group could elect a committee to negotiate with Merritt. Although Merritt did not plan to attend the meeting, he posted a mimeographed notice in each mess hall on December 13, informing the camp residents as to "the facts concerning last Sunday's events." Because the Committee of Five had broken its agreement with him, he had been forced to call in the military to "maintain law and order." He had called in the military "as a last resort to protect life and property from the rule of mobs." "Law and order must be preserved in any community at any cost," and if "it cannot be preserved through the police it must be preserved through the military." Soon after this notice was posted, the committee cancelled the meeting scheduled for the next morning, believing that Merritt's announcement had been "too brutal." [66]

On Monday, December 14, the evacuee committee and block representatives, after cancelling their morning meeting with the project director, asked to meet with Merritt that afternoon. The meeting was attended by three representatives from each of the 36 blocks in the camp, one of whom was the block manager. The representatives purported to have been chosen fairly by the residents of each block. The method of selection varied from block to block, however, some holding elections while others circulated petitions naming the three representatives that were signed by a majority of the residents of the block.

Merritt addressed the afternoon meeting, accompanied by Brown and two interpreters, John McLaughlin and Father Leo Steinbach, the Catholic priest at Manzanar. Merritt informed the gathering that he was not there to negotiate or discuss the "incident." His purpose in speaking was to report that the results of the prior week were "due directly to the bad faith of the committee of five in breaking its agreement reached on Sunday, December 6, and to advise them that he would receive any committee that was fairly selected and truly representative of the people of Manzanar." The meeting was given one and one-half hours to select such a committee to negotiate evacuee grievances with Merritt with the goal of returning the camp to "normalcy." [67]

During the meeting, four members of the original evacuee "Negotiating Committee" were selected to negotiate with Merritt. Led by Thomas Ozamoto as chairman, other members of the new committee included Koichi Masunaka, Block 19; George Murakami, Block 34; and Shunichi Ikkanda, Block 16. [68] The new committee met with Merritt on Tuesday and Wednesday, December 15 and 16, recounting the "general background of unrest and dissatisfaction of the evacuees at Manzanar" and requesting that Merritt "return to Manzanar all those who had been arrested, for the purpose of a fair hearing." The committee was told that the future of the men who had been arrested was no longer within the control of the project director, and that some of them would not be returned to Manzanar but would be treated fairly by the government. The representative character of the committee was also discussed. Merritt proposed to continue meeting with the committee, helping to determine whether its membership needed to be supplemented by other evacuees to represent various minority group viewpoints in the camp, and to work out a solution for returning the project "to normalcy." [69]

Christmas Day. As the Christmas holiday season approached, Merritt determined to relieve tensions at Manzanar. Just before Christmas, truckloads of Christmas trees, cut from the nearby mountains by WRA staff members at Merritt's suggestion, were taken to the camp and distributed to each mess hall. Presents sent by religious and other philanthropic organizations to the children at Manzanar, which had been stored in warehouses, were used to decorate the trees. In response, about 100 young people gathered to sing Christmas carols in front of Merritt's barracks on Christmas Eve. A special festive Christmas edition of the Manzanar Free Press, which had not been printed since the violence occurred, was printed for distribution throughout the center. [70]

In his aforementioned letter to his Aunt Luella on Christmas Day, Merritt attempted to place the recent violence in historical perspective. Describing the peace that had returned to the camp, he noted:

. . . . Today Manzanar has again become the scene of a test of racial tolerance — the greatest test a democracy has ever met. We are face to face with the question of whether we can live in peace and security with American citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese who by virtue of our laws are non-citizens. To all of them we have pointed to American democracy as a better way of living. These people, ten thousand of them, are now held inside a barbed wire fence as a measure of national protection in this time of war.

The reality of this great drama is on my mind this Christmas morning because only thirty days ago the War Relocation Authority sent me here to Manzanar as Project Director with full administrative authority. It was like coming home to be back on the desert of Inyo that I have loved and once again to see the seven-mile shadow of Mt. Williamson. But Manzanar was a volcano about to erupt. I knew that too when I came. Evil work had been done by the slow boiling of many bitternesses. Some are old; some are as new as yesterday. These ten thousand people had no grudge in common. Many people were filled with many hates about many things — race hates, war hates, political hates, class hates such as those between Japanese born in America to whom Japan is a foreign country and Japanese born in America but educated in Japan who have become pro-Japanese, and just the common kind of hates we all know too well.

After describing the pleasant events surrounding the Christmas celebrations at the center, Merritt completed the letter by describing his goals and hopes for the restoration of peace in the camp:

So we greet this Christmas morning. Shall the problems of keeping this peace and good will be solved by the military, or by being overtrustful of this show of goodness, or is there some safe middle course through which the ideals of peace and good will can mingle with the realities of race tolerance? If there is an answer, it will be the corner-stone upon which a future peace of the world will rest. [71]

With the removal of the additional military police unit from the center several days after Christmas, a semblance of normal operations returned to Manzanar. In early January 1943, the camp's operations fully resumed with the block managers reconvening on January 6 and the opening of schools on January 10.

CAUSES

WRA Investigations

Following the violence at Manzanar on December 5 and 6, WRA administrators, shaken by the seething tensions in the camp, launched several investigations in an attempt to determine the principal causes of the unrest. In a document, entitled "The Manzanar 'Incident': December 5 to December 19, 1942," WRA investigators concluded:

From the preceding sketchy picture of what happened for two weeks at Manzanar it can be seen that an extremely complex situation developed. To list briefly some of the contributing factors to the general condition: self-government charter controversy, personal grudges, Japanese-American Citizen's League, camouflage, housing, dissatisfaction with certain administrators. The two most important factors were: first, the inherent conflict between those culturally Japanese and those culturally Americans, and secondly, the close confinement within the area. The latter is a strong force that tends to aggravate any preexisting conflicts.

The clean sweep that would eliminate a goodly portion of these problems naturally would be relocation. . . . [72]

Although many factors contributed to the tensions that led to violence at Manzanar, WRA authorities nevertheless concluded that the confinement within barbed wire fences of various divergent groupings of persons of Japanese descent was a major underlying cause of the unrest. These groupings ranged from traditional, and hence conservative, rural agricultural communities such as Florin near Sacramento, where members of the burakumin, a class of Japanese "untouchables," had settled, to "Japanesy" working class communities such as Terminal Island and San Pedro near Los Angeles Harbor, to middle class neighborhoods in West Los Angeles and Los Angeles suburban communities such as Pasadena and Glendale. Evacuees from agricultural areas, such as Bainbridge Island, Washington, Florin, French Camp near Stockton, Venice, and the San Fernando Valley, and college-educated professionals from Los Angeles had little in common. Furthermore, stresses and strains had developed between the younger largely-Americanized Nisei and the older, more Japanese-oriented Issei who had dominated prewar Japanese American communities. [73]

In the aforementioned WRA report on the events of December 5 and 6 submitted to Director Myer on December 22, 1942, a section entitled "Probable Causes" elaborated further on the underlying factors leading to the violence. The report noted in part:

Ueno was very popular at Manzanar. Tayama was despised as an informer and a stool pigeon. The spark that set off the incident was the arrest of Ueno on suspicion of participating in the assault on Tayama, and his removal to a local jail. Few of the evacuees believed that Ueno was guilty, most of them thought that he was arrested because of the personal animosity of Mr. Campbell; that, even if he were guilty, he ought not to be punished for assaulting an informer of Tayama's character; and that his guilt should be determined by a hearing at Manzanar rather than in the local courts.

It is the consensus of the administrative staff at Manzanar and many of the evacuees who were interviewed that, while the arrest of Ueno was only an immediate cause of the incident, the real causes lay in a long series of deep-seated grievances which culminated in the event on Sunday, December 6. Tom Ozamoto detailed most of these grievances when his committee met with Mr. Merritt on December 14. Dr. Goto listed many of the same grievances. Togo Tanaka and other representatives of the Manzanar Free Press confirmed this analysis. . . .

Thus, the WRA report listed 25 reasons as the underlying causes for the unrest that led to violence at Manzanar. The grievances were listed "without attempting to indicate the particular persons who assigned them as basic reasons for the unrest." The list included:

1. Discrimination against the Issei and their exclusion from positions of importance in project administration.

2. Reliance by the project administration upon JACL leaders who were not regarded as representative of the evacuees and upon other purported leaders who aided in the evacuation.

3. Pre-evacuation quarrels and differences between various factions of the Japanese.

4. The presence of informers within their relocation center.

5. Rumors of misappropriation of sugar.

6. Frequent changes in the Project Director.

7. Frequent changes in administrative policies.

8. Indecision and vacillation in the determination of administrative policies.

9. Delays in the payment of clothing allowances.

10. Delays in making wage payments.

11. The wage differential between chefs and cooks.

12. Variation in food between the kitchens in different blocks.

13. The pro-government policy of the Manzanar Free Press.

14. The inadequacy of literal translations of English into Japanese.

15. The presence of objectionable flag-waving groups within the center.

16. The assumption by the JACL of the right to speak for the evacuees without consulting them, on such subjects as the application of the selective service system to the Japanese Americans.

17. The separation of Japanese aliens held in internment camps from their families, many of whom reside in Manzanar.

18. The labor policy for the camouflage net project.

19. The arrest of evacuees and their trial outside the relocation area.

20. The administration's effort to organize an evacuee council without consulting representative Issei groups.

21. Dissatisfaction with some members of the administrative staff.

22. The attitude of some members of the administrative staff toward the evacuees; unnecessary familiarity, fraternalism.

23. Uncertainty about the future in this country.

24. Loss of income and property as a result of the evacuation.

25. The unfavorable national press. [74]

Togo Tanaka, January 25, 1943

Togo Tanaka, an active JACL leader during pre-evacuation days and one of the documentary historians employed at Manzanar, prepared a lengthy analytic report, entitled "An Analysis of the Manzanar Riot and Its Aftermath: Its Causes, Principal Participants, Occasion, Consequences," on January 15, 1943. This report, the last of the documentary reports to be prepared, was written during his stay at the Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps Camp in Death Valley. He prefaced the report with a statement that placed his work as a relocation center documentary historian in perspective:

The Documentary Historian, compelled by circumstances to be an unwilling Principal in the Manzanar disturbance of December 6, concludes his duties with this report. Because, like it or not, he was a Principal in the event, he runs the risk of submitting a paper lacking in the objectivity expected of such an assignment. This report has been purposefully delayed. A detached perspective has been better afforded by the lapse of time. Moreover, the time has been spent by the Documentary Historian in solid manual labor with congenial Park Service Rangers here in Death Valley. He cannot help but feel that this atmosphere, freeing him from fear of assault and violence and uncertainty, has cleared up mental processes clogged by seven months in bewildering situations of which he was more often than not, unprepared. . . . In a very real sense, the documentary work has been, to him, a continuing search for the truth. The cost in personal defamation of character and slander sustained partially as a result of the work has not been light. . . . If time sustains the truth, accuracy, and historical value of the work, he will feel that the cost will not have been too heavy.

Tanaka observed that the "Manzanar Riot" was the "logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by war, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentments within the limited area of the Center." Pre-evacuation conflicts "centered chiefly around two fairly distinct and identifiable groups." The conflicts were "a curious mixture of pre-war personal feuds, political, business and social rivalries of long standing." Evacuees "from Southern California, particularly Los Angeles, carried these conflicts into Manzanar in March, April and May, 1942."

During the "early stages of Manzanar's development," Tanaka noted that there was "little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs:" Continuing, he observed:

. . . .In a very real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population. It was generally felt by members of both groups in the beginning that 'we're all in the same boat now, so let's pull together.' But old incompatibilities and jealousies flared anew in short order, individuals within each group resorted to torpedoing one another. It is significant that these two factions represented the only articulate citizen element within the Center having a semblence [sic] of organization.

In the light of what has already happened, it is quite safe to record here that this situation of a feuding citizen element helped pave the way for the formation of a third group which came much closer to achieving the goal that the pre-evacuation groups failed to reach — the ostensible leadership of Manzanar's population.

Tanaka identified and described the three groups or factions at Manzanar. These were: Group I, the Japanese American Citizens League, an organization of which he was a member; Group II, the Anti-JACL group; and Group III, the Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL group.

Regarding Group I, Tanaka noted that there were over 350 clubs and organizations in the pre-war Japanese communities throughout southern California. Of the dozen that survived war and evacuation, the JACL was "undoubtedly the largest from the standpoint of membership, organization staff, finances, prestige, and enemies." For many years in Los Angeles, the "most persistent criticism of, and opposition to, the J.A.C.L. was furnished by a numerically small but articulate group" which he termed the Anti-JACL group.

Group II (the Anti-JACL group in pre-war days), according to Tanaka, had "held a reputation among the Japanese population generally as being 'Aka' (Red) meaning 'Communist.'" In the communities "where economic control or dominance was held largely by a Japanese-speaking non-citizen element, to be labelled 'Aka' was synonymous with ostracism." Tanaka observed that "individual political thinking among the Japanese was neither characteristic nor conspicuous." Among the "so-called Anti-J.A.C.L. group, however, it was." Some individuals, "who shied away from this group for personal economic or social reasons, considered it more as a 'left wing,' 'liberal,' or 'progressive' group rather than the 'Aka' label more generally recognized."

Tanaka noted that, unlike Groups I and II, the Group III faction was "primarily Japanese-speaking" and had "no pre-evacuation history as an organize, body." Unlike Groups I and II, its "war idealogy was openly and admittedly anti-American pro-Axis." According to Tanaka, "Group III's principal appeals for evacuee support and sympathy, however, were bolstered more by the general unpopularity of Groups I and II rather than by any wholesale adherence to the war ideology its more fanatic obvious leaders preached."

Tanaka observed that any "discussion where 'groups' are involved compel certain general statements," and that generalizations "at best, are only approximately true." In the "Manzanar riot, there were individuals who figured as Principal Participants who considered themselves as belonging to no 'group.'" Other principals had "deliberately" attempted "to dissociate themselves from previous labels under which they had been known." Within "the small circle of the groups themselves were frictions tending against any 'group' unity." Nevertheless, "both in the developments leading to the disturbance, and in the riot itself, Groups I, II, and III crystallized as definite associations or factions."

Tanaka listed some of the relationships among the three factions. Group I individuals were on the "Death List of Group III." Individuals in Group II were on the "Death List" of Group III. Groups I and II, numbering less than 40 principals, were evacuated for reasons of personal protection to Death Valley. Group III leaders were jailed for their efforts. "Differences of opinion, personal dislikes, harbored grudges of long standing, and old rivalries separated Groups I and II." In their "positions and attitudes on the war, however, they were united — ideologically." Their "community of interests and willingness to cooperate with each other, however, ended there."

During the pre-evacuation period, individuals associated with Group I "were, among the Japanese population, more affluent; in business they were undoubtedly the more financially successful; they were generally described as the entrepreneurs or employers; socially they carried greater prestige." Individuals in Group I "through positions of office in the Japanese Citizens League, regularly receipted for a heavy bill in accusations, rumors, public charges." There were numerous charges that "Group I members were grafters, or frauds cheating the J.A.C.L. treasury" or "they were disreputable would-be capitalists exploiting Japanese American labor or obstructing legitimate unionism." "That Group II members were parties to these public and private efforts to discredit Group I" was "acknowledged by the former."

Tanaka observed that Group II "came in for the same type of abuse and slander in pre-evacuation days." This "torpedoing was admittedly aided and abetted by Group I." More than the other factions. Group II "was characterized in its composition as intellectual intelligentsia among the Japanese." Rumors and "vicious backyard talk about Group II invariably centered around the alleged loose morals and unconventional behavior of its members."

Group III leaders "exploited this relationship of bad feeling and malicious personal slander between Groups I and II, to good advantage in winning evacuee support and in neutralizing potential sympathy for the obvious representatives of 'pro-Administration' and 'pro-American' thought." Tanaka noted that it was "now apparent" that Group III held "both Groups I and II in contempt for the latters' position on the war which was regarded by Group III more often than not as 'dreamy idealism" or "wishful thinking contrary to real facts." Group III held Groups 1 and II in "disgust for the latter's evident desire to cooperate with the Caucasian administration, a desire that was interpreted by Group III as 'licking the white man's boots.'" Group III also viewed Groups I and II "with fear, distrust, and suspicion because of the latter's alleged willingness to cooperate with the federal investigative agencies within the center." This "latter relationship played an important part" in the "outbreak of violence" on December 6.

On the "night of the riot," Tanaka noted that "it can be recorded" that no love was apparently lost between Groups 1 and II, despite the fact both were refugees from the same disturbance." "Mutual distrust, suspicion, and dislike" were "only temporarily stifled."

Tanaka recalled "that members of Group II arrived at Manzanar as evacuees before Group I," thus enabling Group II members to establish "themselves at the relocation center first." When Group I members "arrived a month or so later, they generally discovered that Group II "had laid the mines and torpedoes in advance of our coming." They "prepared the Administration — and volunteer evacuees for a hostile reception for us; they kept up the vicious rumors to perpetuate themselves in their petty little jobs, continuing jealousies and frictions of pre-war and pre-evacuation days." On the other hand. Group II "members felt justified in their attitude toward the latecomers," characterizing the JACL members as "troublemakers and would-be big shots" who were "used to grabbing selfish control of everything."

Tanaka reported that approximately 95 percent of the Manzanar evacuees "were neither active nor passive participants in the incident." Rather, "they were interested, curious, fearful, somewhat bewildered spectators." None of the three groups "commanded any substantial loyal following." Groups I and II "certainly did not," as individuals "associated with either have been completely vilified, hung in effigy." In Tanaka's opinion. Group II "represented a spontaneous outburst of pent-up emotion growing out of fears and uncertainties which continually made for a neurotic state of mind among a large section of the population." The "incentive to resist the kind of talk espoused by Group III (Harry Ueno-Joe Kurihara-Genji Yamaguchi) did not (and still does not) exist within the limiting confines of barbed wire fences and watchtowers."

Tanaka observed that the "impression given in most newspaper accounts of the Manzanar disturbance" was that the "instigators were all 'pro-Japan' or 'pro-Axis' (and the same was applied to their alleged followers) and that the intended victims of violence were 'pro-American.'" This, however, was not "necessarily an accurate picture." "If it implies that all the outstanding 'pro-American' individuals have been driven out of the Center and only 'pro-Axis' or 'pro-Japan' elements are left, it is entirely erroneous and misleading." Undoubtedly, "differences in ideology and position on the war played an important part," but these were "incidental to clashes of personality and organizational friction in leading to the riot itself."

One of the most difficult problems facing WRA administrators, according to Tanaka, was "that of securing or getting evacuees sympathetic, or at least cooperative, in their attitude toward the W.R.A. administration." "If even partial success is attained, the vicious circles of rumors which make for so much unrest and fear would be cut down considerably." The evacuees were "a disbelieving, distrustful, suspicious populace," because of "the long and unbroken series of 'broken promises,' about the true nature of which there is little understanding." Added to this unconscious "source of resentment and grievance," was the disillusionment and "bitterness of a frustrated citizen element which can be satisfied completely only by a return to the normalcy of outside life." This "underlying situation" provided "a setting for disturbance, an occasional outbreak of violence."

Thus, on December 6 Manzanar "was not unlike a powder barrel." "Groups I, II, and III constituted exceedingly short fuses." One single incident — the attack on Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Ueno — "ignited the whole barrel."

Elimination "of the apparent and most active members of these Groups has reduced the hazard of another blow-off of major proportions in any predictable immediate future." However, Tanaka warned that this did not "necessarily mean that the underlying situation has been corrected." [75]

Evacuee Perspectives as Documented by the Community Analysis Section

Several reports prepared by Morris E. Opler, the WRA-appointed Community Analyst at Manzanar who had served on the faculty of Cornell University, included the perspectives of evacuees concerning the causes and background of the violence at the camp on December 5-6, 1942. One revealing description of the events that led to the violence was provided by an anonymous evacuee in a report dated November 19, 1943. This evacuee, who was an eyewitness to some of the events leading up to the violence as well as a confidant of some evacuees who were involved in the controversies swirling throughout the center, stated:

I don't know the date of this kibei meeting. It was held in Kitchen 15. There the chairman opened the meeting by announcing that all loyal American citizens should get the heck out of the kitchen. Kurihara and Slocum had a clash in words. Slocum was pro-American and Kurihara was anti-American and they bitterly hated each other. At that meeting Uyeno [sic] agitated very much. Karl Yoneda was the secretary and it seemed that he put in the wrong memorandum as to the procedure of the meeting, which aroused the kibei boys to threaten him at one time. At that time the kibei boys were against the forming of the fair practice committee for the Center simply because of the fact that they thought that all JACL members would become the ones in charge. They said the JACL leaders were trying to get a hold of it, and it did look like those JACL leaders were trying to get a hold of it, and it did look like those JACL fellows were putting themselves on everything.

So Uyeno [sic] and Tsuji (both have been pulled in since), with the help of kibei agitators, formed a kitchen work corps, which was non-cooperative and agitated against the Administration. It seemed that at that time the kitchens weren't getting their allotment of sugar and Uyeno [sic] went to complain to Campbell and asked, "Where does the sugar go to. It comes into the camp but it doesn't come into the kitchens?"

Fred Tayama had just returned from Salt Lake City from a JACL convention and the following night he got beat up or rather mobbed. Uyeno [sic] was pulled in on suspicion of being one of Tayama's assailants. The agitating group got together outside the grounds of kitchen 22 and demonstrated. They had a loud speaker set up on top of the oil tank. The leading agitators wanted the administration to return Uyeno [sic] to the Center within 24 hours. He was in the Independence jail. There were 5 chosen to act as spokesmen for the group who were trying to get the Administration to release Uyeno [sic]. At that meeting the agitators openly threatened to kill or get Winchester [Chief Project Steward], Campbell especially, Tayama, who was already in the hospital, Slocum, and all known 'dogs.' Those 5 go-betweens did not succeed but they were arrested too.

On December 6 again they had a meeting at Kitchen 22. The agitators inside of the mob tried to forcefully get Uyeno [sic] and the 5 men out. Uyeno [sic] had been brought back to the Center at the time that they demanded his freedom, but he was being kept in the Manzanar jail. On December 6, the fateful day, another open meeting was held at Kitchen 22 outdoors. There the agitators incited the mob to take things into their own hands. Half of the group was to go to the hospital and was to finish off Tayama. The other half was to go toward the Administration and get Campbell and free those who had been taken into custody.

Well, by this time soldiers were in camp lined up on 'A' street. The mob was there. It seemed that the head persons were behind the front line bystanders. The agitators were not in the front line. Those agitators, it seemed, wanted to stay in the background and heckle rather than being in the front. The agitators threw rocks at the Manzanar jail and at the soldiers too. It seemed that the agitators wanted the soldiers to fire upon the crowd. So the soldiers started throwing tear gas at the crowd to disperse them. Most of the crowd tried to disperse but by this time a soldier was shooting with his tommy gun. Several were injured at the time. One died instantly. He was an innocent bystander.

This is straight from block 22 block manager who was in the thick of it all the time. All the while that the Kitchen Work Corps was complaining about the sugar, complaining to Campbell and Winchester, they didn't realize that the warehouse workers were taking the sugar. It seemed that there is definite proof that one kitchen, namely number 10 used 3000 lbs. of sugar in one month. The food delivery crew was composed mostly of Terminal Island kibeis. It was not Winchester or Campbell's fault that each kitchen did not get its share, because of the fact that the food distributors were mostly from blocks 9 and 10.

If Cambell had been ousted and if stricter control over the food distribution had been maintained, the incident would not have happened. Her[e] is another thing. Slocum was supposed to have said he would be the last Jap in camp if at all. He said this back in Los Angeles. He said that he would never be put in a camp like this. It looked funny when he came then, as though he came for no good purpose.

It seemed that the Blood Brothers, the B.B.'s, a kibei group [sic], were out to get anybody who was connected with camoflage [sic] or J.A.C.L.

The man who told me this said that Uyeno [sic] was pulled in on suspicion of beating up Tayama not because the police or administration had any evidence that he was one of the assailants but because he was a dangerous agitator. So they got him first.

It seemed that Uyeno [sic] tried to get a job at the warehouse but was unable to do so. He thought that by getting in on the ground floor he could get evidence as to where the sugar went to. Rumor was flying, thick and fast around that time as to having seen Campbell drive out of this center in a panel truck loaded with meat. It seems that Campbell is in the thick of it. They sure hated his guts. I never had contact with him but I heard plenty. This fellow said that Campbell was a s.o.b. and that if he had been dead and buried the whole thing wouldn't have happened. You see, Doc., Campbell tried to be a dictator in this camp, that's why. The whole thing came out of this sugar thing too.

I think the people in the center still don't know whether the sugar was actually stolen by Campbell or misappropriated by the food delivery crew.

This is what this fellow told me. It isn't the way I understood it up to now. I had understood that Campbell and Winchester were up to their necks in sugar. Not only sugar, but there was the meat problem too. But this fellow, though he didn't like Campbell, says that this wasn't it. He says that the food distributors were more to blame. He knew this but he couldn't tell. Those San Pedro boys are pretty tough and he didn't want to get his neck in a sling. He says that in the warehouse they would just take a knife and slit down a bag of sugar. I can believe it because I have heard that eggs are delivered to the kitchens with the top row there only. Underneath the eggs are gone. Then the kitchen workers blame each other. Same with meat. Those fellows take their own boxes along and cut off pieces and throw them in there and the kitchens get shorted. If the kitchen workers complain to the food distributors about unfair distribution, the distributors lessen their allotment to that kitchen all the more. It seems that the whole damn squabble in the center is always food.

Kurihara was a fellow 35 or 40. He was a Hawaiian. He was bitter. He was an American Legionnaire [sic] and being stuck in a place like this nearly killed him. 1 first heard him speak December 5 outside kitchen 22 where the loud speaker was installed. He was definitely an agitator and I knew from the way he said things that it was just no good. He mentioned names, saying, 'Let's go get so and so, and the crowd would respond, 'Let's go get him.' They didn't at that time, but they tried to later on.

They had a little misunderstanding that brought things to a head later on too. The spokesmen, those 5 men, thought that it was understood that Uyeno [sic] was to be freed within the Center, but the Administration only meant that he was to be brought back to the Manzanar jail from the Independence jail.

The fact that the incident happened on December 6 had nothing to do with it. Nobody thought of Pearl Harbor but the newspapers. That was just a coincidence. The fellow who told me this was on the kitchen crew at Block 22 when this happened so that he was in the thick of it. He was the foreman there or the one in charge, pretty much. Uyeno [sic] worked in that same kitchen crew. [76]

On September 13, 1943, Opler prepared a report based on an interview with a Nisei from Venice who had relocated as a college freshman to the University of Utah in Salt Lake City in January 1943. While the college student was visiting relatives at Manzanar, Opler took the opportunity to talk with him about his experiences in the camp prior to his relocation. The Nisei provided some poignant insights into the stresses and strains in the camp that led to violence:

The main cause of the riot on December 6 was the feeling of the people that they had been betrayed by members of the Los Angeles chapter of J. A. C. L. They don't blame the leaders of other chapters or those in the national office but they do have it in for this Los Angeles bunch. It is felt that these fellows, in order to show their patriotism and gain favors for themselves, had given information even before evacuation about what people had said or done. Therefore they were blamed for a great many of the internments and hardships. It was believed that they had not only done this on the outside but had continued it on the inside, in other words, they had been acting as stool pidgeons [sic]. They are also charged with misleading the people while they were still on the outside and with getting them to accept evacuation. Therefore those who had become bitter over the way evacuation has gone, or who had lost much in evacuation, had it in for them.

Tayama was the worst hated of them all. He was beaten up, and he hid in the hospital. A group were out looking for him. They searched his home. They didn't find him there but they came back with tales of the fine furniture he had there and the amount of food stored in his place. This made the people more sure than ever that he was getting special favors from the government for his 'work.' Ueno and some others were jailed for beating him up. I knew there was going to be trouble, for a mob formed in the afternoon. Then in the evening they heard that Tayama was at the hospital. The mob formed again. I knew that there was going to be plenty of trouble so I stayed home, right in block 16. And, sure enough, the shooting followed. The people blamed the M.P.'s. They say they were just itching to fire.

I was working up at the hospital during this period. I was driving a truck, picking up the wash for the hospital. ... I saw the body of the boy, James Ito, who was shot and killed. He was in the ice box when I saw him. His clothes were there too. They were a bloody mess. The other fellow who died following the shooting was up in the hospital too. I didn't get a good look at him; I just went through the ward once while he was there. He was shot in the stomach and they say he was in terrible agony till he died.

The riot was all mixed up in several ways with the mess halls. They have always been a focus of trouble. It was charged that Tayama was getting special favors and privileges that others were not getting. Even now if one thing appears at one mess hall and not at another, favoritism is charged. . . [77]

On January 24, 1944, Opler prepared a report, entitled "Evacuation, Events at Manzanar, and Relocation (From a Well-Educated Man of Professional Background)." Among the observations of this evacuee were the following:

A great deal of the trouble which led to the incident here can be traced back to hard feelings which began before evacuation and during evacuation. Take the position of the issei. They had been kicked around pretty much in this country. But they stuck it out, made a living, raised their families, and some did pretty well. Then came the crisis between the two countries and war. The issei were crowded into the background or interned. If anyone was called to see the mayor [of Los Angeles], it was T.[ayama] (an officer of the J.A.C.L.), if anyone went to see the F.B.I, or any other agency of official it was T.[ayama] and his friends. The J.A.C.L. didn't have more than 1,500 regular members up and down the coast. I was an officer of one district with 12 clubs in it and altogether we didn't have more than 500 members. While many of the nisei were too young to join this was not a good representation. It was just not a representative body and a good many were sore because it undertook to speak for all the Japanese. . . .

Later on the story grew up that T.[ayama] and the J.A.C.L. people had agreed right away to evacuation and had helped pick out the site for Manzanar. T.[ayama] had nothing to do with the selection of the place. It's true that he was brought up to see it before the people came but this was so there would be someone to assure the people that the place was inhabitable.

Also there was a great fear of informers and spies. There was some of this at Santa Anita, where a fellow who was supposed to be a Korean was beaten up. Here they suspected fellows like S.[locum] From what I heard him say more than once I really believe he turned people in before he came here. If he did help the government it was pretty stupid of them to put him in here where the families of his victims could get back at him. At any rate the families of many of those interned felt that there were informers in here who had turned the family heads in out of malice or for some trivial remark made during a time of peace. . . . There were a whole series of mistakes. The first was the embittering of the volunteers. They didn't get their union wages; in fact they didn't get paid for months. Many had come up without any resources for they expected to get paid regularly here. Some had promised to send money to relatives still on the coast. They were running around here without a nickel for months. [78]

On April 22, 1944, Opler prepared another report based on interviews with a Nisei from French Camp near Stockton, California. This young man, a neighbor of Fred Tayama, commented on the tensions in the camp that led to violence, stating that the "first tension I ever felt over the things which were to lead to the riot was when I heard that they [JACLers] formed an American Citizens Federation for niseis only." He noted further:

. . . . I believed that to leave out the kibei group who were citizens also would create bad feeling between the two groups. . . . Their point of view seemed so selfish. It looked like the JACL bunch wanted to start in again under another name. They put themselves up for everything that came along. The same little bunch wanted to be the officers and to run everything. . . . This riot really did not start directly within Manzanar because there was a tension between the people and the JACL on the outside before coming to camp. We were led to believe that the JACL was going to protect our rights. I suppose that they did their best but to some it wasn't good enough. We don't remember any attempt of the JACL to go to Washington, D.C. and protest for the American citizens of Japanese ancestry. But they told us to evacuate quietly and to prove our loyalty.

Another reason is that the members of the JACL were turning in isseis who had had anything to do with the Japanese government. Instead of doing that we thought they were supposed to help us out. After I got here in May I met a fellow who was a member of the JACL who admitted that the leaders had turned in issei that they had something against. . . .

The first I knew about the trouble was when my sister told me that T.[ayama] had been beaten up during the night. I was the only one in the family who didn't wake up when all the noise of the beating was going on. He lived in the barracks right across from us. This was the night of December 5.

I was not surprised. There had been threats against T. He had been away to a JACL meeting in Salt Lake City and while he was away there was talk against him. They said that he was getting special privileges and special food. He seldom ate at the mess hall and they always had plenty. They say that when they broke into his house that night there was plenty of sugar and all kinds of rationed items there. I believe it. His relative was head of all the distribution of food supplies in camp and I think they looked out for themselves.

After this man [Ueno] was arrested they tried to get him out and of course there was some shooting here at Manzanar by the U.S. soldiers, which I guess you can't blame them for. Still, perhaps, it could have been avoided, I wasn't there at the time of the shooting but from what I have heard, some of these Japanese here at camp threw rocks at the soldiers, started up a truck and tried to run a truck into the soldiers. The truck didn't hit the soldiers but ran into the police building.

After hearing all that I felt that the soldiers had to look out for themselves and they had the orders to shoot, so I believe that we can't blame them entirely. . . .

Two of my friends were shot in the leg and in the stomach that day. I think they were innocent bystanders because I know those boys pretty well. Both of them have relocated. [79]

Robert L. Brown and Ralph P. Merritt, Final Report, Manzanar, 1946

Prepared in February 1946 by Brown and Merritt, the "Project Director's Report," in the Final Report, Manzanar, provided a lengthy analysis of the factors that led to the "Manzanar Incident" thus expressing the views of its authors with the benefit of hindsight and reflection, an opportunity to discuss issues with evacuees, and access to WRA and relocation center records. According to this report, the operation of the center under WRA administration "began to develop in a more or less normal manner" after June 1, 1942. While the operation of the center was developing during the ensuing months, however, "the development of leadership within the Center became stranded upon the shoals of mismanagement and meddling."

The struggle for leadership at Manzanar, according to this report, "was the struggle between Nisei and Issei." While there were "many variations and off-shoots of this struggle given names such as "Pro-Japanism" and "Pro-Americanism," these titles, according to the authors, were "more nearly handy labels to be pasted over old feuds rather than a representation of any real source of the struggle."

Block representatives had been a part of the Manzanar picture since WCCA days. At first block managers were appointed by the management from three nominees selected by the residents in each block. Later, as the camp was filling to capacity, a new method was effected whereby a block could elect a leader once the population of that block reached 200.

Most of the potential leaders of Manzanar recognized that eventually the block manager position would be an important one, but the younger people (Nisei) also recognized that under existing social customs governing Japanese American communities, only the elders in the community would be elected leaders. To counteract this trend, the Nisei began to exert efforts to obtain important administrative jobs and dominate the political life of the center. After the center had been operating for four months, most of the important administrative positions which were available to evacuees were held by Nisei, while most of the block manager positions were held by Issei.

Considerable discussion was conducted over the form of community self-government at Manzanar. The Washington office informed the relocation centers that a pattern of self-government would be forthcoming and requested the projects not to do anything of a permanent nature in formulating self-government procedures. The notice from Washington disturbed the Nisei who were not, in their estimation, adequately represented in any governing body in the centers. To offset this problem, they moved in two directions. At Manzanar, a group of young Nisei, led by Fred Tayama, organized the Manzanar Citizens' Federation on July 12. Simultaneously, the Japanese American Citizens League, with headquarters in Salt Lake City, organized an effective lobby to have the Washington office recognize the Nisei as the only persons capable under law to vote or hold office in the relocation center community governments.

The Manzanar Citizens' Federation was a coalition of pro-America and pro-Communist patriots whose concerns coalesced in the matter of military service, with volunteering for a "second front" the overriding concern. At Manzanar, those who organized the Manzanar Citizens' Federation claimed that the Issei were only representing one generational point of view. They claimed that cases of discrimination and infringement of civil liberties in the evacuation program could only be fought by a citizens' group — the Nisei. They also claimed that the Issei were not considerate of the Kibei group and that the Kibei were, in reality, American citizens who needed guidance from the new organization.

Four objectives were adopted as the focus of the new organization. These were to: (1) improve conditions in the camp; (2) educate citizens for leadership; (3) participate in the war effort; and (4) prepare a postwar program to meet the needs of all evacuees.

According to Brown and Merritt, the Nisei who established this organization around these goals were accused by other evacuees in the camp, comprised mainly of Issei and Kibei, of proposing such an organization merely for their personal gain. Opposition developed at the first meeting, coalescing around the general theme — "We do not need a Citizens' Federation or self-government. The government put us behind barbed wire, let it take care of us."

Personality clashes entered into the struggle for leadership of the camp's community government. At the first meeting of the federation, the arguments between individuals quickly became a clash "over records and past performances of these individuals."

In the aftermath of this meeting, Joseph Kurihara emerged as an emotional leader of the opposition to Nisei ideals, goals, and organizational framework. He quickly began efforts to establish a "counter organization called the Manzanar Relocation Center Federation." According to the proposed constitution for this federation, its purpose was to "act in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and strive with the united efforts for the preservation of the Real Democratic principles." The federation would "act in the capacity of intermediary in carrying out instructions of the authorities to avoid misunderstanding and complexity among the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei groups." Membership in the federation would be "open, without restriction upon recommendation by fellow residents" and approval by the "Membership Board." Membership fees would be 25 cents a year, the fund to be under the "sole jurisdiction and control of the officers," and the proceeds to be "used to defray administrative expenses of the federation."

On September 4, WRA Administrative Procedure No. 34 arrived at Manzanar from Washington, containing regulations for the establishment of community government in the relocation centers. The "bombshell" in the document was that "only citizens could hold elective offices in any center." The Japanese American Citizens' League had thus won its battle, since enforcement of the procedure would place Nisei in control of center community government.

Administrative Procedure No. 34 directed the individual project directors to appoint a commission to draw up a charter for community government, the items that the WRA required in the charter being enumerated in the document. The entire center population would then be asked to vote on the acceptance of the charter.

In accordance with the directive, Project Director Nash appointed a commission to draw up a charter for Manzanar. Essentially, the members of the commission were leaders of the Manzanar Citizens' Federation. After they drew up a preliminary charter as directed by the WRA, a struggle between Nisei and Issei erupted over voting on the charter. Dates for the election were set and postponed twice, as the evacuee population in the center came "to a fine pitch of excitement" over the issue.

According to Brown and Merritt, the state of confusion in the center began "catching in the ranks of the members" of the WRA appointed personnel. The chief of community services and the employment officer were the first to "break openly and denounce each other in a staff meeting." The chief engineer, never very sympathetic with the evacuees, was the subject of a number of attacks in written memoranda by key WRA staff. This discord between members of the staff was "immediately picked up by evacuees and used to point out in evacuee circles the ineffectiveness of federal management."

Two orders by center management during the late summer caused considerable unrest among the evacuee population. The first was an order for all persons to move out of Blocks 1 and 7, the first to be used exclusively for administrative offices and the latter to be used for schools. At first, the residents, led by a group of openly identified "anti-administration" evacuees, refused to move from their quarters, arguing that the government had sufficient money to build schools and office buildings. Because schools were important to many evacuees, the residents of Block 7 "eventually gave in to pressure and moved." However, the residents of Block 1, composed primarily of bachelors, staged "what amounted to a sit-down strike which occasioned several 'ultimatums' by the management, the last one of which was obeyed but not without a great deal of resentment."

The second instance "of bungling on the part of the administration was a hurriedly written bulletin by the Project Director" following a meeting held by the Kibei in the mess hall of Block 15 on August 8. At the meeting, anti-administration voices roundly denounced the WRA administrators and the federal government in Japanese. Incensed by the meeting, Project Director Nash issued Director's Bulletin No. 16 stating that "no more public meetings will be permitted where Japanese is spoken as the principal language."

Anti-administration forces were quick to point out that this order canceled the inherent right of free speech in America guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, they used the bulletin as evidence that the administration was not in sympathy with problems facing the evacuees, and that the tone of the notice clearly demonstrated that Manzanar "was a prison camp, not a Relocation Center."

During this period, tensions mounted among the block managers. In August, for instance, the first block manager resigned after having made a fiery speech against the administration in which he asked, among other things, who was to pocket a supposed $14,000 profit from the camp's canteen/general store and who authorized a printing bill of $2,000 which, it was rumored, was the price paid to print the script. He urged the people not to move from Block 7 for schools, and concluded by claiming that his American citizenship was meaningless and that he wanted nothing to do with America. This first open rift in the block managers touched off "a series of accusations, recriminations, and resignations the next month or two." Soon, the chairman of the block managers, who had at one time enjoyed considerable personal popularity in the camp, was attacked for immoral behavior. Although he scoffed at these charges at first, he later tendered his resignation, the grounds for his resignation never being "completely clarified in any of the meetings."

According to Brown and Merritt, the first signs of nationalistic sentiments at Manzanar began to be noticed during the summer months following an announcement by Washington on July 20 that Kibei would not be allowed to leave the camp on work furloughs. Many of the Kibei, their emotions "taut because of conflicts of language, ideologies, and living patterns," felt that the order keeping them in the center, even though they were American citizens, was "a great act of discrimination."

Led by "anti-administration" leaders, many Kibei openly denounced their American citizenship and pledged their allegiance to Japan at a public meeting in early August. Tokie Slocum also attended the meeting and openly boasted of being an FBI informant. After this declaration, Slocum found it necessary to hustle out of the meeting for his own protection. The meeting became so boisterous that WRA staff members intervened and asked for adjournment. Such pronouncements presented an opportunity for many Nisei, who had ambitions to control the community government of the center, to point out that there was a large element of "dangerous pro-Japanese forces" in the camp "whose avowed purpose was to smash any constructive program of the administration and make the camp a "prison camp for Japs." The "pro-Japanese" or "anti-administration" group, on the other hand, claimed that many Nisei were "dogs, stooges, and informers" because of their positions in offices and their close association with WRA staff members.

Evidence of a rising underground movement began to surface as bulletins appeared in the mess halls and latrines signed by the "Blood Brothers" and the "Black Dragon Society." The first attacks were leveled against the community government program, but soon they switched to tirades against the camouflage net project. Other targets included the Manzanar Cooperative ("an obvious plot to impoverish us Japanese"), the education program ("We don't need a useless American education"), and furlough work in the sugar beet fields of the western states ("the white man told us to get out of California; now they want to use us as economic serfs. Do not go on furlough.")

Amid the struggle for power in the camp, the Kitchen Workers' Union was established in late September under the leadership of Harry Ueno. As "his bargaining weapon," Brown and Merritt observed that Ueno "manufactured out of wholecloth, without any basis of fact, that the administration was stealing sugar which belonged to the evacuees and was selling it outside at black market prices." Ueno was "able to stir up a great deal of excitement among the evacuees, but was unable to use this to any advantage with the administration." Ueno managed, however, "to get himself thoroughly disliked by the then Assistant Project Manager [Ned Campbell] who, on several occasions, threatened to throw the organizer bodily from the room."

Failing "to gain a point in having his union recognized and also failing to have his union members go on strike because of the sugar," Ueno, according to Brown and Merritt, "joined forces with the "pro-Japanese" group," which had rallied around the leadership of Joseph Kurihara. The names of Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester were thus added "to the list of 'dogs, stooges, and informers, who, by this time, were going to be 'liquidated' by the people."

Harvey M. Coverley, the new Acting Project Director, sensed the seriousness of the charges posed by Ueno. Accordingly, he launched an investigation of the sugar controversy and presented his findings to the block managers. These men, for the most part, accepted the administration's findings that the charges were baseless and transmitted the information to the residents of their blocks. By this time, however, "it was too late to kill the old antagonism between the organization of the Kitchen Workers and the administration, particularly certain individuals in the administration."

In this state of turmoil, Roy Nash, who had served as project director of Manzanar since the WRA had assumed administrative control of the camp on June 1, resigned to "take up new duties in South America." For the next six weeks, the center was administered by two different acting project directors, Coverley and Solon T. Kimball, sent from the regional office in San Francisco.

On November 24, Ralph P. Merritt, who had been chairman of the Inyo-Mono Associates and of the initial Citizens Committee in the Owens Valley appointed by Thomas dark in March, arrived from his ranch in Nevada to serve as project director. Although associated with the establishment of the camp, he had been away from the area for more than six months and "was not aware of the manifold conflicts which had brought the management and evacuees to an exploding point." A number of staff members, however, sensed the "potential powder barrel, and, in a series of early conferences" with Merritt "attempted to outline the situation as it stood at that time."

On his first day on duty at Manzanar, Merritt wrote that he was "greeted by a staff meeting with all the courtesy and curiosity which usually attends such occasions." Beneath "the veneer of the pleasantries of those first greetings," however, he sensed a "tenseness that came from misunderstandings, lack of leadership, and frustrations." Because of insufficient housing at Manzanar, much of the staff lived in Independence and Lone Pine. Merritt observed that it "was obviously a problem of first importance to build sufficient housing on the Center so the staff members might develop a better understanding of their problems and better relationships with each other and the evacuees whom they served."

The next day, Merritt attended a meeting in Town Hall in which the charter for community government was discussed. The Nisei "tactfully explained that the basic principles of the charter were the result of the planning of the Washington staff of WRA." The Issei, on the other hand, "were solidly in opposition to the adoption of any form of government which would rob them of power and prestige, and the opportunity to participate in the government affairs of the community." Merritt's attention was caught by the statement of one impassioned speaker; "Look out the window and what do you see? There is barbed wire, there is a watch tower, and there is a soldier who guards us by day and night and shoots us if we break the law. Because it is called self-government and we have no self-government, I move that: the damned charter be thrown out the window." The motion was passed unanimously. Merritt observed that he vaguely "began to understand that the problem of first importance with the evacuees was the creation of a method of Center administration that would create, rather than destroy, mutual confidence." Less than two weeks later, these tensions would result in violence. [80]

Joseph Kurihara Statement in March 1944 and Merritt Interview with Kurihara, November 12, 1945

By March 1944, Joseph Kurihara, one of the principals in the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1944, had been transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. At the request of the Community Analysis Section in the WRA's Washington Office, Kurihara, still embittered by his experiences at Manzanar and subsequent treatment by the WRA, prepared a written statement concerning the issues that led to violence at Manzanar. Kurihara stated:

Camp Manzanar was sailing along very satisfactorily until the introduction of the J.A.C.L. around the beginning of August 1942. This was the dynamite which only needed a spark to touch it off. I started to blast them to Hell, but they were so well entrenched behind the Administrative wall with official backing, it took several blastings before they were completely routed.

Togo Tanaka, one of the leading sponsors had personally admitted to me that he saw the sign of defeat on the very first night of the meeting. He withdrew and did not appear at the second meeting. However the sneaky Fred Tayama and Kiyoshi Higashi persisted in trying to salvage the bursted pieces of J. A. C. L. and attended without authorization, the National Convention of the J.A.C.L. at Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the meantime the Kibeis were very active trying to form a group of their own to offset the J.A.C.L. Permission to organize was not only denied but even the usage of the Japanese tongue thereafter was definitely prohibited. My petition to form the Manzanar Welfare Organization likewise was denied before presentation by Assistant P.D. Ned Campbell. None other than the J.A.C.L. was recognized and permitted, a discrimination which roused the feelings of the interested and the impartials.

This political controversy would have remained dormant had the J.A.C.L. been kept out of the centers. It was natural that feelings against everything American would be keenly entertained through the sting of evacuation. In the midst of such treacherous atmosphere, the J.A.C.L. had been boldly introduced. Had we been respected and treated as American citizens, the reaction might have been a welcoming one, but when we were classed as Japs and treated as such, I cannot see where in we should further americanize the youngsters of the centers. Unjustly General DeWitt had denounced us as "Once a Jap, always a Jap." Why then must we keep our vows to uphold the constitution of the U.S.? We were not unloyal. We were made disloyal by the greatest saboteurs in the service of the country, General DeWitt. . . .

Concluding his remarks, Kurihara sounded a warning that represented the frustrations and bitterness of many evacuees:

In short, let's take the fences out, the towers should also be removed. If the Army must have them, have them erected miles away. Give the inductees the chance to scout the surrounding hills. Give them every privilege of humanity. Short wave news and free expression of their emotions. Cut out all the vicious lies and discrimination. It is Un-American. All the dirty things said and done will not help win the war. Otherwise do not criticize what they do over there if America can not practice Democracy and the Doctrine of the Four Freedoms.

Finally make no promise which cannot be kept, or threaten the Japanese. They will surely call your bluff. [81]

After the war's end, on November 12,1945, curiosity led Merritt to seek out "possible hidden reasons" behind the violence at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1942. At Tule Lake, he interviewed Joseph Kurihara, then making preparations to leave for Japan as a result of having renounced his American citizenship, Merritt prepared a memorandum, to WRA headquarters, dated January 7, 1946, based on his interview with Kurihara. During the 2 1/2-hour dialogue, Kurihara provided some significant insights regarding his personal involvement in the unrest at Manzanar that Merritt passed along to his superiors:

. . . . The substance of his statement was that at the time of the evacuation a number of the Nisei leaders of JACL sold out the Issei and the Japanese cause in general. When he met those same leaders in Manzanar he made up his mind to expose them and drive them out of the Center. These men were Tayama, Tokie Slocum, Tanaka, Higashi, and Kad Yoneda. . . .

He said that, in the summer of 1942, Slocum had gotten himself a job on the police force and was working on the graveyard shift for the purpose of taking records from the administration offices to copy them and return them before daylight in order to have complete knowledge of all that was going on in the Center. Slocum was in fear of Kurihara and told him what he was doing and agreed to give Kurihara copies of all of the material which he got. I asked Kurihara for evidence of this and he showed me documents copied from the Manzanar files, particularly certain documents which he said were written by Tayama which were transmitted to the FBI through the Manzanar Police Department.

On August 8, 1942 the Kibei meeting was held in which Kurihara spoke as a representative of the citizens' group who had been mistreated by the Government. Tayama sent a report of this to the FBI. Kurihara gave me a copy of that report at Tule Lake. Because of the statement made by Tayama about Kurihara's speech, Kurihara says he decided to kill Tayama and therefore he organized the group which beat up Tayama on December 5th. Kurihara was not a member of the group and pretended to be surprised next morning when he heard the news of the beating. In the attempt to find the culprits of the beating, I, as Project Director, arrested Harry Ueno, a mess-hall worker who had been the head of the Kitchen Workers' Union.

On the morning of December 6th, a meeting was held at Kitchen 22 to demand the release of Ueno and from this meeting the Manzanar 'riot' was precipitated. Kurihara was a speaker at the meeting held that: day and was one of five people who composed a committee to call on the Project Director demanding Ueno's release. Because he was the most talkative, he became the leader of the group. As Project Director, I made an agreement for settlement of the disturbance on the evening of December 6th. Kurihara went before the group and spoke in what was supposed to be Japanese, telling them of the settlement. He admits and it is now generally agreed that he spoke a Hawaiian dialect of Japanese which was not understood by the crowd except when he told them that a report would be made at 6 o'clock that evening at Kitchen 22. Such a meeting was in violation of the agreement. This meeting developed the mob which later created the riot. When the mob appeared and the situation got out of control, Kurihara says he tried to prevent violence and get them to go home but that he lost control and the crowd broke up to be led in various directions by those who had particular grievances against Tayama, who was in the hospital, Slocum who was supposed to be in his barrack, Tanaka in his barrack, and others.

Kurihara took full responsibility in his talk with me for this entire matter. He said that he had spent three years in praying for forgiveness and in studying Japanese so that he in future might speak understandably. He said he was returning to Japan with the feeling that he would probably be killed but he intended to speak for America and the democratic way of living. [82]

MILITARY AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

Following the violence at Manzanar, the Ninth Service Command ordered the Commanding Officer, Central Security District, Reno, Nevada, to convene a Board of Officers to investigate the conduct of the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company during the events of March 5 and 6 with particular reference to the use of weapons on the night of December 6. On January 3, 1943, Captain Hall testified that 2d Lieutenant Zwaik had fired at the driverless automobile on his direct order and that Privates Ramon Cherubini and Tobe Moore had fired their weapons under a standing order that in "dealing with an unarmed mob no shots will be fired, except on orders from an officer or unless men are in danger of physical attack." He believed that their actions were consistent with his orders, and he indicated that the men did not deserve disciplinary punishment." Each of the men also testified that they had fired their weapons, because they believed they were "being rushed by the Japanese" and were in "personal danger." On January 4, the board issued a statement of findings, exonerating the military police of any wrongdoing or violation of orders. The findings included the following statements:

1. Private Ruggiero had "fired two volleys in the air as a warning, in obedience to his eighth General Order; that he gave the warning because of the gathering of the Japanese mob at the Manzanar Police Station; that he was on sentry duty near the Police State, at Post #3."

2. The next shots were "fired by 2d. Lt. Stanley N. Zwaik shortly thereafter, at a driverless automobile released by the Japanese so that it would crash into the Police Station; that he fired from 6-8 shots from a Thompson sub-machine gun on orders from Capt. Hall, his commanding officer."

3. Shortly thereafter, "upon the surge of the mob toward the troops, other shots were fired by two soldiers of the 322d MPEG Company; that these were the shots that killed one man instantly and wounded nine [eleven] others; that these shots were fired by Pvt. Tobe Moore and Pvt. Roman Cherubini; that Pvt. Moore fired three shots with a shotgun; that Pvt. Cherubini fired approximately 14-15 shots with a Thompson sub-machine gun."

4. The "shots fired by Pvts. Moore and Cherubini were not fired on the direct order of any officer or non-commissioned officer, but were fired in accordance with instructions they had received in a standing order from the company commander, to the effect that in event of an engagement with a weaponless mob they were to fire only on orders from an officer or if they were in danger of a physical attack; that Pvts. Moore and Cherubini fired at the mob because members of the mob were closing in and surging toward them."

5. Pvts. Moore and Cherubini "fired the shots that killed one Japanese and wounded nine [eleven] others, one of whom died on December 11, 1942." [83]

Although the Board of Officers absolved the military police of any malpractice or violation of orders during the violence at Manzanar because the men believed they were in personal danger, a somewhat divergent interpretation of the events on the night of December 6 emerged during hearings conducted by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs during January-March 1943. Under questioning by Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky on March 7, Project Director Merritt testified that the "wind was blowing and blew the tear gas [fired by the military police] away from the crowd," while Hall claimed that his men were forced to shoot after the tear gas failed to disperse the gathered evacuees. After further questioning. Hall admitted that after the first tear gas canisters were fired, the evacuees "went back and gathered in little knots and crowds and in some of the kitchens. We gassed them again in those places and they broke up." Since the shots by Cherubini and Moore followed the second round of tear gas firing, this admission provided the basis for future questioning as to whether the military police were in actual physical danger, or whether they fired blindly at the unarmed evacuees at point-blank range amid the chaos and confusion of the "night-time" mob scene. Captain Hall raised further questions by informing the subcommittee of the overwhelming amount of "firepower" that the military police at Manzanar possessed to counter the demonstrations of the unarmed evacuees. Weapons issued to the military police company at Manzanar, according to Hall, included "four light machine guns," "two heavies," "eighty-nine shot guns," "twenty-one rifles (Enfield)," and "twenty-one tommie guns." [84]

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

WRA-JACL Perspective

In a periodical article, entitled "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," Arthur A. Hansen and David A. Hacker, two historians who have conducted considerable research on the topic, analyze the historical perspectives from which the violence in the camp has been interpreted. Until 1974, most accounts of the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1942, according to Hansen and Hacker, have been filtered through what might be labeled the "WRA-JACL" perspective. The appellation is appropriate because nearly all of the original documentation on the violence was prepared by WRA personnel or evacuees with JACL connections and because secondary compilers have virtually without exception simply buttressed this official version. This perspective has resulted in uniform meanings being drawn from disparate information.

The WRA-JACL perspective, according to Hansen and Hacker, has three principal features. First, as a general rule, the primary sources refer to the violence on December 5-6 as an "incident," thus scaling down the event to commonplace proportions, while the secondary works term it a "riot," thus inflating its significance to "melodramatic" levels. Second, this perspective has tended to view the "riot" episodically, thus militating against sustained, in-depth analyses of causation, causing it to be misconstrued as a denouement rather than as one development along a continuum of evacuee resistance, and reducing the riot to a purely local phenomenon instead of being related to a pattern of resistance activity within all the relocation centers. Third, this perspective has viewed the riot as a microcosm of World War II, dramatizing the riot as an ideological confrontation between pro-American and pro-Japanese factions, confusing the aggressively patriotic posture of the JACL — a small minority — with that of the Nisei as a whole, and displaying an incapacity to understand ethnic identity in terms other than subversive. [85]

Ethnic Perspective

In contrast to the WRA-JACL historical perspective on the violence at Manzanar, Hansen and Hacker posit an "ethnic" perspective. Whereas the WRA-JACL perspective interprets the riot in terms of its ideological meaning within American society, the ethnic one focuses upon the riot's cultural meaning within the Japanese American community, with particular reference to Manzanar's evacuee population. Although the two authors indicate that their "new" perspective toward the Manzanar Riot is new, they argue that it conforms closely to and draws sustenance from a number of general studies — mostly recent and unpublished — on evacuation. This perspective, according to the authors, promotes analysis and understanding rather than "ideological reification" as does that of the WRA-JACL. [86]

As a first step in this direction, Hansen and Hacker replaced the word "riot" with "revolt." According to them, terming the event the "Manzanar Revolt" forces "us to see it not as an uncaused and inconsequential aberration, but as one intense expression of a continuing resistance movement." This change also "credits the participants in the action with a greater degree of purposeful behavior." For "while a riot's members are momentarily conjoined because they do not like where they have been, those involved in a revolt have some sense of where they want to go." "Overall" this "redefinition of the collective manifestation encourages us to view it in relation to social change within a larger structural framework, thereby affording a more sociologically meaningful analysis." "Instead of dismissing the 'riot' as an isolated, spontaneous, and unstructured phenomenon," the causes of the riot could be found in the Japanese American social system. Because the "ethnic" perspective viewed the "revolt" as an "expressive moment within a process of cultural development," it looks "backward to the prewar West Coast Japanese American community in search of explanatory antecedents for the revolt." At the same time, it also looks "beyond the revolt to ascertain its connection to subsequent subcultural evolution."

According to Hansen and Hacker, the prewar West Coast Japanese American community was dominated by Issei who hung on tenaciously to Japanese traditional cultural values. From the time of their arrival in the United States at the end of the 19th century, the Issei had experienced a series of attacks — both legal and extra-legal — which necessitated the development of self-sufficient "Little Tokyos." Each anti-Japanese attack forced the Issei to retreat further from American cultural values and to depend increasingly on their traditional Japanese culture. This, in turn, reinforced group solidarity. Thus, by the outbreak of World War II, the two most significant characteristics of the Issei-dominated Japanese American community were group solidarity and the predominance of elements of Japanese culture.

These characteristics prevailed less among the children of the Issei. During the 1930s, the Nisei generation matured and represented a potential challenge to the group's solidarity as well as its cultural orientation. As citizens growing up in America, Nisei came into greater contact with American society and consequently underwent increased Americanization, thus serving to widen the social distance between Issei and Nisei.

On the other hand, the Nisei, according to Hansen and Hacker, were not as thoroughly Americanized as some observers have stated, for countervailing forces, such as parental influence and social and economic discriminatory practices in the larger American society, were diminishing the social distance and returning the Nisei to the Japanese American community. In addition, many Kibei were non-assimilationists, thus contributing to group solidarity. While the JACL elements penetrated American society through social, economic, and political activities, they, like other Nisei, were generally young, uninfluential, and almost wholly dependent upon the Issei-dominated Japanese community for their economic livelihood. The events of December 6, 1942, at Manzanar, according to Hansen and Hacker, "must not be seen in isolation or ascribed solely to ideological motivations." When "viewed within the ethnic (i.e., community) perspective, all of the occurrences of that day — the massive crowds, the membership of the Committee of Five, the composition of the death-lists and blacklists, the demands for the dismissal of specified members of the appointed staff, and the character of the internees' evening demonstration at the jail — assume a definite cultural logic." They observe that "the mounting discontent of the internee population, which heretofore found sporadic expression through grumbling about camp conditions, work slowdowns, strikes against war-related industries and profit-oriented camp enterprises, and pervasive gang activity and 'inu' beatings, became crystallized into concerted resistance action through the symbolic juxtaposition of Harry Ueno and Fred Tayama." To buttress this interpretation, the historians quoted a "perceptive" analysis of the situation provided by Morton Grodzins:

The situation was made to order for a popular anti-administration demonstration. The issue cut through political and cultural lines. The question could be put as one involving administrative integrity and fairness to the evacuees. Loyalty to America had nothing to do with it. . . . The demonstrations that followed, though in part engineered by the genuine pro-Japanese elements in the camp, were not pro-Japanese demonstrations. Rather, they were simply demonstrations against an administrative policy that according to the trend of thought in the camp, jailed on flimsy evidence one of the community's benefactors.

Thus, Hansen and Hacker concluded that the events surrounding the Manzanar Revolt "were but a logical culmination of developments originating with the administration's decision to bypass the community's natural Issei leadership to deal with its own artificially erected JACL hierarchy and to embark on a program of Americanization at the expense of Japanese ethnicity." When the WRA removed the JACLers from the camp after the revolt, the "Issei took a step toward restoring the dominance they had enjoyed before the evacuation, and the entire community served notice that their self-determination and ethnic identity would not be relinquished without a struggle." "Through the operation of continuing resistance activity, Manzanar would eventually be transformed into a Little Tokyo of the desert where, as in prewar days, the most salient community characteristics were group solidarity and the predominance of elements of Japanese culture." This transformation would be symbolized by the "Peace of Manzanar." [87]