The Rise of Multiple-Use Management in the Intermountain West: A History of Region 4 of the Forest Service

During the period from 1970 to the present, both the Forest Service in general and Region 4 in particular have survived extremely difficult times. Following the passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act in 1960 the Service was involved in increasingly more complex planning in the attempt to manage the public resources under its jurisdiction so as to satisfy the public demand for commodities and services while protecting the land and resources for future generations.

Legislation passed during the 1970's radically changed the Service's relationship to the resources it manages. The laws passed between the enactment of the Organic Act of 1897 and the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act in 1960 were essentially permissive. Generally, these acts provided statutory authorization to do what the Service wanted to do or was already doing. Legislation like the Wilderness Act of 1964, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, together with a number of court decisions, subjected the Service to a series of prescriptions that reduced its discretion in making resource management decisions. Such legislation, in addition, forced the Service to spend considerable time and energy in doing things it probably would not otherwise have done and doing them in ways that were inordinately disruptive of normal management practices.

These demands placed Forest Service employees in extremely difficult situations. As Reid Jackson, supervisor of the Bridger-Teton National Forest, said, it "is not as much fun as it used to be and I guess you can say that of about almost any Federal Agency position. I really think the Federal Agencies are becoming or have become 'whipping boys' for the politicians and for the environmentalists . . . . Still, there is a lot of pride in the outfit, . . . the outfit is pretty highly thought of. That is worth a lot to me and . . . to the others who work for the outfit." [1]

Administrative Problems and Budgetary Shortfalls

While the Service was subjected to increasingly disruptive demands, the pressure to carry on normal functions related to range, watershed, timber, minerals, recreation, wildlife, special uses, and wilderness intensified. This pressure led both line and staff officers—but most particularly line officers—to practice what Manti-LaSal Supervisor Reed Christensen called "selective neglect." That is, since they could not do everything to an equally high standard, they "tried to put [our] licks where they bought [us] the most." [2]

This meant that rangers would spend increasingly less time in the field and in contact with forest patrons and increasingly more time in the office. As Foyer Olsen put it in 1984, "the district ranger's job had changed to the point where he is primarily an administrative officer . . . . I've heard a lot of [people] . . . comment, 'We never see a ranger any more.'" [3] A recent study by the Forest Service's National Communications Task Force found a perception among commodity groups, environmentalists, and the general public that line officers should be involved more in "informal day-to-day contacts." [4]

In order to try to deal with cost-effective management, in 1984 Chief Forester R. Max Peterson appointed the National Business Management Study team. Caribou Forest Supervisor Charles Hendricks, a member of the team, said that the buildup necessitated by the increasing demands on forest officers' time had created substantial unnecessary costs. Consequently, the Service had to figure ways of doing "business cheaper than we have in the past," which would "probably" mean "some sacrifice of quality," and "taking a few risks that we have said we aren't willing to take," especially in internal management programs such as writing manuals and coordinating personnel relations. [5]

The Forest Service used other strategies to try to deal with the problems of increasing demands. One was through the use of the budgetary process to control the types of activities carried on. Each forest was given a foundation-level budget, which was not enough to operate on. Each forest then bid on additional funding for projects it wanted to do. The regional office and Washington Office made decisions on allocating increments of funding for various projects, to the degree congressional legislation gave them the discretion. [6] Contrary to previous Forest Service tradition, decision-making authority was considerably more centralized. Unfortunately, Congress was generally quite willing to provide funding for projects with tangible results, such as timber and grazing, but reluctant to fund adequately the intangibles such as recreation and watershed protection.

In addition, the region faced periodic budgetary reductions that resulted in staff shortages. The two most serious reductions were in the early 1970's during the latter part of the Nixon administration and in the period after the inauguration of the Reagan administration in 1981. During both periods, the crunch was accompanied by personnel reductions. [7]

The Reagan cutbacks had essentially three results. First, Forest Service officers were forced to learn "to do things a lot more efficiently." [8] Second, as one respondent indicated, "When you start playing with people's lives and money and livelihood, it does cause morale problems." For example, managers, reluctant to force employees with critical family responsibilities out of the Service, often applied subtle pressure on older employees to take early retirement. [9]

Figure 97—Targhee National Forest management team studies ways of improving efficiency.

Third, forest users were forced to accept lower levels of service or provide their own services. Between 1979 and 1984, for instance, the Fishlake National Forest's budget was reduced by 60 percent. This resulted in a 20-percent reduction in employees, and more significantly, on a forest with a large range work load like the Fishlake, the permittees were forced increasingly to pay a larger part of range improvement costs through cooperative projects. [10] Similar reductions took place on other forests, for example, the Targhee. [11] In the regional office, various functions were reduced as well. Sterling J. Wilcox, engineering staff director, indicated that the major problem was the reluctance to fund "programs that have long range returns," in preference to those with immediately visible outcomes. [12]

One response of the region to this budgetary pressure was to create zone positions and shared services. [13] The Uinta, Manti-LaSal, and Fishlake, for instance, shared a specialist to install the Data General MV/Series computer system that was designed to tie the forests and the regional office together in a computer network. [14] The Dixie, Manti-LaSal, and Fishlake shared contracting services. [15] The Uinta had several zone offices that provided service to other forests on such functions as watershed, timber inventory, and threatened and endangered plants. [16]

Another tactic for reducing costs was the even more extensive use of contracts rather than force account labor. Although the region tried to avoid contracting for jobs involving direct dealings with the public, it often did so for services for internal operations. Thus, since a district ranger had to represent the Forest Service and to interact with the public, the forests did not ordinarily contract for those responsibilities. [17] Instead, the forest would contract for construction, food services, reforestation, electrical work, and aircraft. [18]

Under these conditions, the region reemphasized the need both for training and for cooperative interaction to help personnel understand how to do their jobs more effectively and efficiently. In November 1979, Regional Forester Vern Hamre inaugurated a "Management Effectiveness for the 80's" (ME 80's) program designed to train rangers in such things as handling conflicts, using computers, and dealing with environmental pressures. "Based on the concept that changing the culture of an organization rather than concentrating on technological or structural change is the best way to encourage efficiency and effectiveness," ME 80's began at a workshop held for district rangers at Snowbird UT, and continued with two other regional workshops. [19]

When the region introduced new or particularly sensitive technology such as prescribed burning or the Data General system it mandated extensive training and certification of personnel. [20] The pressure for change also brought about the introduction of a management-by-objectives program that coordinated individuals' work and performance with the region's goals and objectives. [21]

One of the most creative methods of coping with change was the introduction in the early 1980's of the Delta Team. The term "Delta" derived from the three sides of the Greek letter Delta and represented: Anticipate, Excellence, and Action. Under the system, the region established special ad hoc teams consisting of regional office and national forest personnel to analyze and propose solutions to problems such as information management, education, civil rights, budgetary reduction, and future direction. A report by Deputy Regional Forester Tom Roederer in March 1986 indicated the effectiveness of the teams in dealing with change. [22]

Unit Consolidation

The budgetary pressure accelerated the consolidation of forests and ranger districts into units of optimum size that had begun during the 1960's. In Region 4, this ordinarily meant larger sizes. After his appointment as regional forester in 1970, Vern Hamre continued the studies of ranger district and national forest size and made changes both in number and boundaries of ranger districts in the various forests and in the number and boundaries of forests in the region. [23]

Though ranger district consolidations continued into the 1980's, most of the consolidations were undertaken between 1970 and 1973. Some ranger districts were combined as in the Dubois and Spencer and the Ashton and Porcupine on the Targhee. [24] In some cases, as in the Vernon unit on the Wasatch, portions of ranger districts were administratively reassigned to other national forests. [25] The number of ranger districts in the region was reduced from 120 in 1971 to 94 in 1973 and to 77 by 1983. [26] At the 1986 Ranger's Conference Regional Forester J.S. "Stan" Tixier announced that the region had been "advised we have gone as far as we should go in Ranger District consolidation." [27]

Most significant, perhaps, were the forest consolidations, also undertaken because of budgetary constraints and in the interest of efficiency. Following a study of conditions, the regional office consolidated the Cache and Wasatch National Forests early in 1973, assigning the former Cache districts north of the Idaho-Utah border to the Caribou. Headquarters for the Wasatch-Cache were located at Salt Lake City, and the former Cache headquarters at Logan became a ranger district office. At the same time the region assigned the Palisades Reservoir portion of the Caribou to the Targhee, perhaps to compensate for the expanded responsibilities at Pocatello. [28]

The region studied the possible consolidations of the Toiyabe and Humboldt and of the Bridger and Teton. [29] The first was not undertaken. In 1973, however, the Bridger and Teton were combined, with the supervisor's office at Jackson. The Kemmerer headquarters of the Bridger became a ranger district office. [30] Consolidation of the Bridger and Teton created a 3.4 million acre national forest—by far the largest in the lower 48 States, exceeded only by the Tongass and Chugach in Alaska. Although its budget of $6 million in 1983 exceeded that of the nearby Grand Teton National Park, some Forest Service officers believed that the demands created by its much larger size and more diverse resources left it shortchanged. [31]

Portions of some forests not affected by such consolidations were transferred for administrative purposes to adjacent forests or regions. In central Idaho, for instance, creation of the Sawtooth National Recreation Area placed parts of three national forests under Sawtooth administration. The Middle Fork of the Salmon River, because of its unified recreational program, was transferred for administrative purposes to the Challis. The Region 4 portions of the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area and the Tahoe Basin were administered respectively by Regions 6 and 5. [32]

Proposed Regional Changes

A number of proposals surfaced after 1970 that would have altered significantly the configuration of Region 4 or abolished it entirely. In 1972 the Nixon administration's Office of Management and Budget proposed a concept that would have abolished the regional office in Ogden, transferring Nevada to the San Francisco region, Idaho to Portland, and Utah and Wyoming to Denver. In addition, contrary to Forest Service tradition, the administrator in each standard region would have been a political appointee rather than a career professional. The proposal would have reduced services to forest users in the region by cutting down the number of employees. Although he could not officially oppose the transfer, Regional Forester Vern Hamre worked with the Utah congressional delegation, especially Congressman Gunn McKay and Senator Frank Moss. Former Regional Forester Floyd Iverson took an active role in opposing the change and was sent to Washington to work against the proposal. McKay and Moss together with Senators Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf of Montana and Joseph Montoya of New Mexico succeeded in attaching an amendment to an appropriation bill prohibiting the use of any Federal money to close the regional offices in Ogden, Missoula, and Albuquerque. [33]

The most recent proposal to try to save money by consolidating land management services involved a nationwide interchange of various national forest and Bureau of Land Management lands. Revealed first on January 30, 1985, and elaborated in public meetings during the summer, the interchange proposal would have left virtually the same number of acres in Region 4 in Utah, increased Forest Service acreage by about 2 million in Idaho, decreased the acreage by about 175,000 acres in Wyoming, and completely eliminated Region 4 from Nevada. [34] Lobbying by the Nevada congressional delegation and others succeeded in modifying the proposal to keep the Forest Service in the Silver State.

In its present form the interchange proposal would actually add more land to the national forests in Region 4. Advantages touted for the proposal include the transfer of control of the mineral estate under national forest lands to Forest Service administration and the transfer to the Forest Service of the heavily timbered Oregon and California Railroad Lands that reverted to the Federal Government after the railroad failed to fulfill its land grant agreement. The main selling point, however, was the approximately $12 million to $15 million savings expected, largely by reduction in personnel and other administrative costs. The interchange proposal received administrative approval and was transmitted to Congress for consideration early in 1986. [35]

If the 1985 hearings in Salt Lake City are any indication the proposal will undoubtedly have rough sledding in Congress. Utah Congressman James V. Hansen's office manager testified that the congressman had reservations about the proposal. Representatives of the Utah Farm Bureau Federation took a somewhat equivocal stand. Virtually everyone else in Utah opposed the proposal, including those from the environmental community, commodity interests, and former Forest Service officers. Provo interests expressed considerable opposition because the Uinta National Forest headquarters would be closed and the lands consolidated with the Wasatch, Manti-LaSal, and Ashley. [36]

A 1985 study conducted by Region 5 showed considerable opposition throughout the Intermountain Region and elsewhere in the West. In Idaho, opposition had grown to the transfer of portions of the Caribou and Sawtooth to the Bureau of Land Management; Nevada respondents indicated heavy opposition to transfer of Forest Service land. Former Nevada Governor Mike O'Callaghan writing in the Las Vegas Sun charged Chief Peterson with "selling out his agency and every outdoors lover" to BLM Director Robert Burford. In Utah, considerable opposition arose over the proposed transfer of Pine Valley to the Bureau of Land Management and the proposed closing of the Dixie supervisor's office. In Wyoming, opposition surfaced to the proposed transfer of parts of the Bridger. [37]

Another controversial proposal closely tied to the interchange was the creation of a department of natural resources, reminiscent of Harold Ickes's abortive proposal for a conservation department in the 1930's. The Forest Service and its constituents opposed the concept, which surfaced anew during the Carter administration and as an option in the Grace Commission Report. In general, the opposition came because of a fear that the philosophy of the new department might mirror the more centralized operation of the Department of the Interior rather than the decentralization of the Forest Service as supported by the Department of Agriculture. [38] In part, Chief Peterson's support for the interchange proposal came because of his concern that such a reorganization might be forthcoming if interchange failed, as a result of the administration's heavy pressure to save money. [39]

Organizational Changes

One major organizational change took place in 1973 that significantly altered the makeup of the regional office staff. For many years, the regional forester had functioned with a single deputy sharing his responsibilities, along with a number of assistant regional foresters carrying both line and staff responsibility. The new organization better differentiated between line and staff. Under the new setup, the regional forester appointed three deputy regional foresters. One had line responsibility for administration, one for resources, and one for State and private forestry. Each had concurrent staff responsibilities to the regional forester. [40] Under the deputies' jurisdictions, directors headed the various staffs such as timber, range management, and personnel. [41] Vern Hamre indicated that this change facilitated a great deal more cooperation in the allocation of resources than the previous assistant regional forester system. [42] Some former regional foresters, for example, William Hurst, disagreed. Hurst believed that the assistant regional forester system was more efficient and cost-effective because it had fewer officers between the regional forester and the principal staffs. [43]

Employment Patterns and Regional Administration

Major organizational changes in recent years continued to refine the use of the interdisciplinary team. After 1980, members of the teams tended to work together to produce compromises much more effectively than before. After a decision was made, specialists became more prone than in the past to say, in effect, "I do not like the decision but my job is to do the best I can to help them implement it." Under these conditions, specialists tended to recognize themselves as team members working within a multiple-use management system rather than diehard devotees of a particular professional interest. [44] Some specialists, however, have resigned in protest over decisions with which they did not agree. [45]

During the period after 1970, the emphasis on employee rights increased. In 1970, the Washington Office appointed a civil rights coordinator to oversee efforts to improve programs for minority groups, conduct civil rights compliance reviews, and promote the awarding of contracts to minority businesses. [46] Forests wrote and implemented affirmative action plans. [47] In his monthly message in August 1984, Regional Forester Tixier emphasized his commitment to civil rights and urged an emphasis on representing all the people and making services available "to the entire population." [48]

The region also has expended considerable effort in hiring and training women employees. In 1979, for instance, the Sawtooth National Forest set its goal to hire females as 33 percent of its seasonal workforce, a 7-percent increase over 1978. [49] By 1984, most women were in clerical, secretarial, intermediate, and specialist positions. In 1984, a visitor to the forest supervisor's and ranger district offices would most likely find women who were not in secretarial or clerical appointments either in specialist or support services positions rather than staff director or line officer positions. [50]

It is clear, however, that the region's commitment to equal employment opportunities for women and minorities continued under Tixier. At the district rangers conference in Boise in March 1986, one of the sessions focused on women and minorities in the Forest Service. The panel was made up of women who were currently serving as district rangers in other regions. At the same conference, the moderator for one of the sessions was Carol Lyle, Region 4's sole woman ranger. [51]

A major factor militating against the employment of women and minority employees has been the reduction in budgets after 1980. This reduction has meant that few new jobs have opened and the region has been hard pressed to replace existing employees who retire or resign. [52] During the Carter administration from 1977 through 1980, the region could retain employees and plan for new hires. Under the Reagan administration, however, the size of the staffs has decreased. [53] Between 1980 and 1982, the number of employees in the region declined from 2,467 to 2,307. As the average age of employees increased, the average GS grade rose from 8.17 to 8.46. [54]

The result was a void of younger employees with new skills. [55] This created a particularly serious problem in engineering. [56] By 1984, the region had very few engineers in GS grades 7 and 8—those in their late 20's and early 30's. The average age of engineers in Region 4 was 40 to 45 years. After the 1970's, the need to recruit specialists such as hydrologists, archeologists, and wildlife biologists placed most of the younger employees in those categories, not in the ranks of the engineers. Increasingly, also, the engineering staff experienced difficulty in finding desirable people. Generally the engineering division sought the broadly trained student who liked the outdoors and could integrate information from a large number of specialties in designing roads and structures to meet the demands of resource protection, rather than the narrowly trained graduate who might have a particular research specialty.

Another problem was finding employees willing to meet the demands for mobility the Forest Service expected of those who planned to advance. Continued emphasis on multiregion and Washington Office experience for promotions within the Service placed a burden on families and on budgets. In some cases, for instance, engineering was unable to hire desired employees because of the region's inability to pay enough to get the potential employee to make a move. As a result, in some cases, they hired engineers with promise, but with less training than preferred. [57]

Some employees still believed the frequent moves to be an advantage rather than a drawback to a family. David Blackner, director of the regional personnel management staff, said that the system of reimbursement for moving expenses and subsistence while relocating has helped. In addition, he argued that moving around could be an advantage to children, broadening their experiences. Some employees disagree, believing it is important for their children to experience continuity in their schooling and peer relations. [58]

In a presentation to rangers in March 1986, Blackner announced that a program to be implemented in mid-summer 1986 would allow General Services Administration to purchase the homes of transferred employees. This program was not expected to be a panacea, however, as the housing market had been depressed in recent years in some areas and the homes are to be purchased at fair market value. Since employees might have purchased the homes when prices were high, they may not recover their outlay in the sale.

With increased emphasis on fairness in employment, the Forest Service adopted a new vacancy filling and promotion system in the mid-1970's. [59] Before that time, vacancies were filled and promotions given based on evaluations and recommendations by supervisors rather than on employee initiative. On the basis of such recommendations, a review committee recommended to the line officer the nominee they thought best qualified. This system left a great deal of administrative discretion in the promotion process.

The new system differed by advertising vacant positions to all employees. All interested employees were encouraged to apply, though they had to submit an evaluation from their immediate supervisors. All applicants were then screened and evaluated by a committee in the regional personnel office, and, from that screening, the person was hired who seemed best qualified for the job. A superior could direct an employee to apply if it appeared the person needed the job for development or was qualified for it.

Although fairer, since it allowed employees to select themselves for consideration for vacancies and promotions rather than forcing them to wait for a manager to choose them, the system had some drawbacks for supervisors. Some employees, particularly those with scarce skills such as hydrologists, "job-hopped" from region to region and forest to forest. Some employees moved from one position to another without the forest supervisor even knowing they had applied for a transfer. These quick changes created problems as the consequently vacant positions often had to be filled on short notice.

Law Enforcement

Along with those problems, the region was faced with increasingly complex circumstances. Largely because of urban development in the areas adjacent to many of the forests in the region and the increased recreational interest in all forests, law enforcement problems intensified. Forest Service law enforcement officers linked their communications into local and State law enforcement nets. On an urban forest such as the Uinta, forest officers discovered marijuana plantations, faced cult practices, and dealt with motorcycle gangs. [60] A theft ring operated to cut and sell Christmas trees from the Fishlake National Forest. [61] Increasingly, the region sent employees who had to deal with such problems to the National Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco Beach, GA, for a 9-week course used to train Border Patrol and Drug Enforcement agents. [62] By 1984, the region had six special agents with the full range of authority held by officers such as FBI agents except that the Forest Service agents helped to enforce the Secretary's regulations dealing with such matters as timber theft, arson, and illegal occupancy. [63]

The Problem of Conflict Resolution

After 1970, Congress forced the national forests to draw further away from some formal contacts with forest users. Even though (as indicated before) advisory committees had generally been used to support decisions already made by the Forest Service, such committees also had served to coordinate the interests of the Service with local communities. In December 1972, however, Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which restricted the use of such advisory committees. Following the act's passage, an executive order required the abolition of the forest advisory committees. [64]

In practice, the abolition of these advisory committees had some disadvantages. The older constituencies of the Forest Service—city, county, and State officials; community, business, and professional leaders; and commodity interests—no longer represented even a sizable minority of forest users. [65] The growth of the environmental movement and the tendency for the environmentalists to represent constituencies at a considerable distance from the forests as well as nearby recreationists left a gap in conflict resolution procedures that a somewhat modified advisory committee structure might have filled. [66]

As a case in point, the National Task Force on Public Communications/Awareness (often called the Tixier Committee) headed by Regional Forester Tixier, identified a significant division in the attitudes of environmental and commodity interests. In general, non-commodity interests believed that the Service had placed a "growing emphasis on timber and other commodity resource production without a commensurate emphasis on noncommodity resources," and that this imbalance in emphasis was an extremely serious problem. Commodity interests did not agree. The noncommodity interests placed little emphasis on the philosophy of multiple use and sustained yield, whereas the commodity interests tended to think these concepts were important. [67] Some commodity interests and their allies tended to use the phrase "multiple use" as a code word for opposition to wilderness areas, arguing unfairly that environmentalists sought to eliminate everything but wilderness from national forests. [68]

Unfortunately, an erroneous perception of many environmentalists that Forest Service officials principally favor commodity production resulted in a number of confrontations between the environmental community and the Service. A good indication of this type of confrontation was an exchange in 1984 between Ed Marsden, editor of the High Country News, and Vern Hamre, former regional forester. In March, Marsden published an editorial entitled "Can the Forest Service Be Reformed?" arguing that the Forest Service refused to listen to environmentalists, that it had increased its office staff at the expense of field staff who really managed the land, and that it had accomplished very little of consequence. [69] Hamre's reply outlined a number of the Service's significant accomplishments, pointed out that the increase in the Service's bureaucracy had come largely because of the time demanded for responses to appeals, and asked for help from environmentalists rather than confrontation. Marsden had written that he would "reserve space for [discussion of these charges] . . . in the next couple of issues." He did so, but not until October 1984, some 7 months after the editorial. [70]

In 1984, James Lyons, resource policy director of the Society of American Foresters, expressed considerable opposition to what he perceived to be the Reagan administration's overemphasis on commodity management and production at the expense of recreation, wildlife, and watershed conservation values. [71]

Attitudes like those of Marsden and Lyons caused deep divisions within the Service and between the Service and its constituencies. This dissatisfaction both among constituents and within the Service created some anxiety for Regional Forester Tixier. He indicated particular frustration with the expressed perception of some environmentalists that coming in to talk with Forest Service officials "would be futile." [72]

This concern led in part to Tixier's appointment as chairman of the National Communications/Awareness Task Force, designed to determine the public perception of the Forest Service and to propose means of dealing with problems of negative perception. Regional foresters and directors discussed the Tixier Committee report at their annual meeting in Fort Collins, CO. in August 1985. The Service took the unprecedented step of holding a conference to discuss the same issues with forest supervisors from throughout the Nation at Utah's Snowbird resort in November 1985. The result of these deliberations was a decision to prepare a "vision statement" redefining the purposes of the Forest Service. [73]

Most significant, it was believed that the recommendations of the Tixier Committee could help in solving both problems of internal dissatisfaction and public opposition. Among the recommendations that seemed most critical were those calling for reduced paper work and increased time in the field for district rangers to get them back in touch with the public. Another suggestion that seemed likely to produce significant results consisted of enlisting "the service of a neutral third party conservation organization," such as the American Forestry Association or Resources for the Future, "to focus debate on the 'balanced program' issue" with a goal of "involving commodity and noncommodity interests, as well as other interested publics, in a meaningful dialog aimed at consensus." In addition, the Tixier Committee recommended strengthening "working relationships with conservation organizations, interpretive associations, and other public service oriented groups who have an interest in National Forest programs." [74]

Information Office

The abolition of advisory committees, the deep divisions within the region's constituencies, and the inability of line officers to spend adequate time in contact with the public placed a great deal more pressure on the regional information office than ever before. In 1972, in recognition of the increasing importance of the function, the information offices at both the regional and Washington levels were assigned directly to the regional foresters and the Chief. [75]

The information office had a number of functions, of which four seem most significant. First, it dealt with the news media in channeling information to the public. Second, it conducted an environmental education program in which it worked with educators on the community and State levels to encourage them to include environmental programs in their classes. Third, it coordinated with legislatures in the region on both State and Federal matters. Fourth, the office conducted an extensive interpretive services program, servicing visitor centers and providing displays and audiovisual information. [76]

In view of the legislative mandate to involve the public in decisionmaking, the region and the forests developed an "Inform and Involve" (I and I) program in the early 1970's. Under this program, information officers functioned at the regional level and either an information officer or an I and I coordinator operated on each forest. The Wasatch, Toiyabe, Boise, and Bridger-Teton forests each had a public information officer. [77]

The approach to the dissemination of information changed considerably during the early 1980's. In the early 1970's, the information office worked principally with key community leaders—congressmen, governors, and business and industrial leaders. By the late 1970's, because of the changing nature of the publics with which the Service had to deal and because of the emergence of groups that did not respond to the traditional political structure, it became necessary to open the information office to a larger public. [78] The HOST program initiated by the information office tried to involve all Service employees in public awareness. [79]

Legislative Mandates and Planning

Confrontations resulted, in part, from the application of various pieces of congressional legislation. In practice, such legislation required the Service to meet certain minimum procedural standards before it could undertake any substantial activity. Since its beginning, the Forest Service had written plans for its various operations, and even before the passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, forest officers had been producing multiple-use surveys and management plans. By the early 1970's, the forests were writing unit plans, under regional guidelines, that divided planning units into blocks extending downward from the ranger district. [80] The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) imposed a further procedural requirement on the Service. After 1970, the Service was obliged to write environmental impact statements on all projects that required serious changes in the environment or might be controversial. On less controversial or minor projects, the line manager had to document the basis of the decision. [81]

Over time, the way in which the Service used the environmental assessment changed. According to Richard K. "Mike" Griswold, former director of the regional planning staff, the Service changed slowly, like a crew trying to turn a battleship with a canoe paddle. In his view, it took 3 or 4 years to "get around to the point" where forest officers complied with the NEPA process. The basic reason for the timelag was the extensive decentralization within the Service.

After the forest officers learned the NEPA system, until about 1980, the process seemed to work quite well. Then, around 1980, the Service found it had come to let NEPA dominate planning to such a degree that, when various interests challenged procedures, the courts ceased to recognize Forest Service employees as expert witnesses. The courts insisted, instead, that representatives of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appear as experts.

In order to achieve more control in such situations, the Service separated its NEPA environmental assessment (which documented the thought process) from its management plans (which indicated intended actions). Under those conditions, CEQ or EPA representatives might be the expert witnesses in court on the environmental assessment—the analysis that led to a decision—but Forest Service personnel were the expert witnesses on the management plans. [82]

Nevertheless, by 1984, the region had not done well in defending itself against appeals under NEPA. In general, the reason was that the region had not followed carefully the steps outlined by the act. In one case, the region decided to build a timber access road on one of the forests. In preparing the environmental assessment, the Service officers considered only the impact of the roadbed itself, not the effect of the road and timber harvest on the entire basin. It was, said Griswold, not malicious or preconceived, but "just a process goof." Fortunately that case did not go to court, a procedure the Service disliked because it was very expensive and could result in a decision extending far beyond the point at issue. The region would then be stuck with "new [judge-made] law," that could tie its hands. [83]

In practice, while forest officers griped about the NEPA, they generally supported it. The process often added additional costs because of the care with which plans had to be made, but resulted in a better product. [84] It was nevertheless extremely frustrating for Forest Service officers to face frequent challenges to their plans. Many believed that "for a twenty-cent stamp, [critics] . . . could stop just about anything." The level of frustration often rose because the various interests did not agree with one another and what pleased one side might well generate an appeal from an opposing faction. [85]

In 1974, Congress followed the NEPA with the passage of the National Resources Planning Act. This act required a nationwide assessment of all forest and range land each 10 years and development of a Forest Service management program each 5 years. As of early 1985, the region had been through two assessment and two program cycles. It made assessments in 1975 and 1980, since it wanted to put the assessments on decade anniversaries. In practice, Griswold argued the procedure was good for the Forest Service. In his view the unit plans were too fragmented, because they were based on ranger districts. [86]

This legislative action took place against the background of national appeals concerning forest management in West Virginia and Montana in the Monongahela and Bitterroot National Forests. Both cases involved timber management policy and especially clearcutting. The decision in the Monongahela case particularly invalidated the prevailing interpretation of harvesting provisions of the Organic Act of 1897. This decision forced Congress both to redefine the Forest Service's mandate and to require more detailed planning. The Bitterroot case raised serious questions about harvesting practices. [87] The resulting National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 placed major emphasis on the development of land management plans for each national forest detailing alternatives and proposals for the management of each type of resource under multiple-use management principles. It also provided for a committee of scientists to provide policy direction. In addition, the NFMA specifically overturned the Monongahela decision by allowing carefully controlled clearcutting. [88]

The process under the NFMA presented two basic problems to the Service, one concrete and one potential. On the concrete level, NFMA planning "really put pressure on the forest" since employees had to expend considerable time, labor, and resources in writing plans. Consequently, forest officers also found it considerably more difficult "to do a quality job of our routine work out on the ground." [89] Ed Marsden's complaint that employees were pulled from the field into the office was exactly right. A major reason for this shift was the demand for planning and for meeting procedural requirements in carrying out mandated activities.

The potential problem was that associated with any planning. Since the planners had to project from what they knew about the current situation, none could anticipate every contingency. "The law says that when you have an approved forest plan, all licenses, permits, practices, and activities that occur on that national forest henceforth will be in accordance with that plan." [90] Some specialists in environmental policy such as Sally Fairfax of the University of California at Berkeley reportedly said that no land management agency could possibly accomplish what the law demanded of the Forest Service. [91] Though the Service wanted to prove her wrong, part of the possibility of doing that was in fact out of its hands, since virtually anyone could demonstrate legal standing in order to file an appeal.

The entire planning process was strewn with roadblocks. A major obstacle appeared during the second review of roadless areas (RARE II). In the case of California vs. Block, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the RARE II final environmental assessment was insufficient to base a decision for non-wilderness designation of roadless areas. As a result, the roadless area review was incorporated into the land management planning process and the forests were forced to go back to the drawing boards. [92] By then, the Targhee and Uinta had circulated draft forest plans to the public. The Caribou had sent its plan to the Washington Office for review and had been given approval to circulate the plan to the public. Under the circumstances, the three forests did not have to junk everything they had done, but they were forced to redo much of the previous work. [93] The Toiyabe estimated that the cost of including the reassessment of roadless areas in the land management plan added an additional $150,000 to $200,000 to the already staggering cost. [94]

Though it allowed discretion in management within multiple-use principles, the NFMA created what former regional forester Vern Hamre called "a real nightmare." By late 1984, although the region's forests had completed the drafting of a number of plans, none had been approved. Hamre believed that it would be "almost impossible to complete a forest management plan on a forest which has any significant environmental controversies." [95] The region drafted a plan—later called a "regional guide"—designed as a directive to the forests in the planning process. [96]

As might be expected, the supervisors most sanguine about planning were those who had completed or nearly completed their plans. Don Nebeker, supervisor of the Uinta National Forest, spoke with some justifiable pride about the fact that his forest was the first in the region to complete its plan. [97] The regional office placed the Fishlake National Forest's plan on a fast track, but it faced considerable difficulty because of reductions in staff between 1981 and 1984. Nevertheless Supervisor Kent Taylor expected to complete his plan on schedule. [98] Supervisor Jack Lavin on the Boise believed that his planner would make few drastic recommendations from the previously completed unit plans and RARE II proposals, but by early 1984 he thought it was still too soon to tell for sure. [99] Supervisor Art Carroll of the Wasatch-Cache recognized that the public might find his plan controversial and expressed concern that virtually anyone might qualify for the administrative appeal process. [100]

Diversity within the region created both problems and advantages for planning. Few forests in the system are as heavily used for recreation as those along the Wasatch Front; the region has mineral and range management loads second to none; concerns about scenic attractions and wildlife are particularly sensitive in western Wyoming and eastern Idaho. [101] But because the forests of the Intermountain Region are not as heavily timbered as those in Region 1 or Region 6, the region did not have as much money for planning. [102]

Because of the larger recreation load, however, the environmental interests have been easier to work with. Utah's wilderness bill, for instance, was the first in Region 4 to pass Congress. In addition, the region's national forests were very careful to involve the public in the decision process by holding public meetings with various groups and private meetings with particular interested parties. [103]

In spite of the obvious technical aspects, planning became in the final analysis a political process. The administration in Washington set policy for the Service, and changes in political philosophy made changes in planning and implementation of plans both imperative and disruptive. In the view of John Burns, the Reagan administration turned "almost a hundred and eighty degrees" from the direction of the Carter years. The situation was complicated since political pressure cut in a number of directions. Congress decided how much money the forests got for the various activities. Decisions on the amount of wilderness and timber harvesting were by their very nature political, as various interest groups inevitably wanted different mixes of these activities. [104] Hence, Forest Service officers were not free to implement all the proposals they might have preferred.

Basically, the forests tried to respond to the political realities through the four phases of each plan. Phase 1 consisted of issue identification, phase 2 was an analysis of the management situation, phase 3 involved the development and assessment of alternatives, and in phase 4 the forest officers selected the final plan. Extensive opportunities were provided in each phase for input through public meetings and comment. [105] In connection with the planning, the forests wrote draft environmental impact statements indicating the potential consequences of the various planning alternatives together with the preferred choices. [106] The final product was a draft forest plan that reviewed the various mixes of resource uses and proposed the preferred alternative. [107]

The public response to the plans has varied from support to virtually no comment to adverse comment. Joseph Bauman, Deseret News environmental specialist, commenting on the 11-pound Wasatch-Cache National Forest plan that emphasized recreation, reviewed the proposed alternative favorably. He pointed out, however, that "all the plan's activities will be controlled by budgetary considerations. If budgets are cut, some projects may be rescheduled." [108] Idaho Governor John Evans, however, in responding to the Challis National Forest plan, urged that the forest emphasize recreation rather than commodity use to a greater degree. [109]

By March 1986, the region had reason to be more optimistic than Vern Hamre was in 1984. Four of its plans were in final form, and ten had been issued in draft. Of seven appeals, four had been resolved. Both the Uinta and Wasatch-Cache plans had been cleared. In commenting on the land management planning process, Chief Peterson said that he would give the region an A+ for effort, a D for speed, and a B for overall quality. [110]

Recreation

After 1970, recreation within the entire national forest system took on greater importance. Traditionally, the national forests have experienced far more recreation visitor-days than the national parks. In 1970, recreation stood third behind timber and grazing as a principal revenue producer in Region 4. By 1983 it had moved into first place, eclipsing all other functions, a position it retained through 1985. [111] (See table 19.)

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of recreation to the forests of Region 4. Recreation encompassed a great range of activities including water sports, camping, picnicking, sightseeing, hiking, skiing, hunting, fishing, rockhounding, and snowmobiling. Management of cultural resources also fell under recreation's domain. In 1984, the region had 783 campgrounds and picnic sites capable of accommodating 79,000 people at a time. The region supported 8.6 million to 9 million visitor-days per year during the early 1980's. [112]

The Wasatch Front in Utah and the Sierra Front in Nevada and California experienced the greatest recreation pressure. Pressure on the Wasatch was much the more intense because of the larger population in the Logan-Provo corridor than the Reno-Carson City area. [113] Until the early 1980's, the Wasatch National Forest was the number one recreation forest (based on visitor-days) in the entire system. By 1984, it had dropped to fourth or fifth behind several forests in California. [114] Some forests such as the Uinta were essentially backyard resorts for people living nearby. [115]

Outside the Wasatch Front area, recreationists tended to come from greater distances. On the Fishlake, for instance, approximately 50 percent of the visitors came from Nevada and California. [116] In spite of an accelerated timber harvest caused by an extensive pine beetle infestation, the Ashley considered recreation its biggest single responsibility, in large part because of the Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area. [117] In Teton County, WY, 80 percent of the economy was geared to tourism, and local citizens demanded that the Teton and Targhee maintain those values attractive to tourists. [118]

A major problem in meeting the public demand for recreation was caused by the unwillingness of the administration and Congress to provide needed funding. During the 1970's, even the creation of the Sawtooth and Flaming Gorge National Recreation Areas provided little additional money. The region took funds from other forests and relied, to a limited extent, on private funding sources. Congressman Gunn McKay of Utah did succeed in getting some campground development money. [119] Supervisor Lavin of the Boise indicated that the main problem was to keep the campgrounds and picnic areas in good shape with increased use and declining funding. [120] Supervisor Richard Hauff of the Salmon said that budgetary shortages created a major problem for recreation on his forest, as well. [121]

Moreover, Congress was unwilling to approve funding for recreation improvements and administration through the collection of additional fees for recreational activities. It was suggested that Congress impose recreation user fees beyond the funds going to the Land and Water Conservation Fund, but Congress refused to authorize such charges. [122] The demand for a forest camping experience was so great that some forests had to limit stays to 16 days, though none used advance scheduling except for group areas. [123] Demand on some national forests became so great for group camping experiences that Uinta Supervisor Don Nebeker wondered whether they would be able to provide for the apparent demand. [124]

Under these conditions, some Forest Service officials rethought the purpose of forest camping facilities. Most wilderness advocates and forest officers favored solitude in camping facilities, and the Service built most campgrounds in an attempt to provide it. Many people with urban backgrounds, however, seemed to prefer their sylvan experience at closer quarters. During hunting season, the national forests sites filled with "camper cities," containing as many as 50 recreational vehicles parked close together. [125]

Figure 98—Checking the tape at Avalanche Forecast Center, Old Salt Lake Airport, 1981.

While camping was important, two types of experiences—dispersed recreation and skiing—increased most rapidly after 1970. The dispersed recreation, particularly by off-road vehicles, caused some difficulty because of the tendency of people to perceive the public lands as their own and to believe that they could do anything they wanted on the forests. [126] In an attempt to deal with problems caused by excessive noise and indiscriminate killing of wildlife, the forests wrote off-road vehicle travel plans for the use of motorcycles, trail bikes, snowmobiles, and similar vehicles. The Boise, for instance, completed its off-road travel plan in 1976 which restricted such vehicles to roads and trails on 70 percent of the forest. [127] In 1979, the region conducted a sample off-road vehicle management review on the Uinta and Fishlake in order to gauge the impact on an urban and a rural forest. The data were used in planning off-road vehicle management for the region. [128] The Wasatch found it necessary to ban off-road vehicles in the canyons east of Salt Lake City. The Humboldt banned such vehicles in the Ruby Mountain Scenic Area. [129]

As urban forests, the Toiyabe and Uinta put considerable effort into trail and road maintenance. Uinta supervisor Don Nebeker indicated that one reason for this effort was that dispersed recreation (hiking and driving) was less costly. In addition, since the Uinta was so close to an urban area, he recognized that the forest approached the condition where people will "saturate almost every opportunity that we've got to put facilities in without destroying the environment itself." [130]

As with other functions, there was little extra money for construction of new facilities on the forests. [131] Even rural forests like the Salmon emphasized dispersed recreation in part because of budgetary problems and also because many visitors "do not require conventional Forest Service campgrounds," with picnic tables, since they come in recreational vehicles. [132]

Region 4 retained its position as "the leader in winter sports management in the Forest Service." [133] By 1984, 26 ski areas operated with permits on the region's national forests. The most active areas tended to be concentrated along the Wasatch Front, near Jackson Hole, and at Sun Valley. Other ski resorts were located in areas ranging in geographical dispersion from Charleston Mountain near Las Vegas on the southern end of the region to Heavenly Valley near South Lake Tahoe in the Sierra on the west, and to Brundage Mountain near McCall on the northwest.

During the early years, the Forest Service and volunteers provided many of the safety services for ski areas. By the early 1980's, the Service had turned much of the responsibility over to the ski area operators. The operators then provided most of the workers for avalanche control. This change was facilitated by gas-charged tubes called avalaunchers replacing the more dangerous 105 mm howitzers in many areas. In some cases, to meet technical requirements, ski area personnel received temporary appointments in the Forest Service. [134] Professional ski patrol personnel tended to replace volunteers. Responsibility for lift inspection was turned over to many of the ski areas. This was possible particularly in States like Utah which provided Passenger Tramway Safety Board certification of private engineers to do the inspections. In many areas where qualified private inspectors were not available, the Forest Service continued to provide inspectors. [135] In perhaps no activity more than skiing was cooperation with other Federal and State agencies and with private industry so important.

Figure 99—Loading a 75mm pack howitzer used to control avalanches, Little Cottonwood Canyon.

The Service participated in land exchanges with some ski areas. [136] A proposal for the interconnection of ski areas on both sides of the Wasatch Mountains, between Big and Little Cottonwood Canyons and the Park City area, involved the Forest Service in considerable discussion with local governments, the State of Utah, and private industry. [137]

In the early 1980's public involvement in controversies over proposed ski area expansions and new developments became particularly significant. The ongoing development of the Snowbird ski area in Little Cottonwood Canyon on the Wasatch raised considerable public controversy. Conservationists opposed its proposed expansion into the White Pine drainage adjacent to its present runs. [138] The proposed Heritage Mountain Resort east of Provo generated considerable opposition because of the potential use of Forest Service land, the impact on the local community, and problems of financing. [139] By April 1986, it appeared that the special use permit for the resort would be canceled because of its inability to secure financing. [140]

River-running generated steadily increasing interest. Until a new program was instituted in 1984, the Forest Service received very little revenue for managing river operations. On the Middle Fork and Main Salmon River, for instance, outfitters generally charged between $100 and $200 per day for their services on a trip lasting 3 days, from which the Service got a modest $1.25. In 1984, however, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management instituted a new fee schedule that was designed to reach 3 percent of the customer charges after 3 years. In Salmon Supervisor Richard Hauff's view, the "new permit fees should produce a fair return and help us to manage that use." [141]

The Salmon allowed both unguided float trips and professionally guided groups on a fifty-fifty basis. The outfitter permits for such trips, even after 1984, were closely held monopolies. [142] In about 1982, potential outfitters who had no access to float the rivers secured approval from the Service for a program that would have advertised and granted these permits on a competitive basis. Established outfitters complained to their congressmen who applied pressure on the Chief to change the policy. The revised policy continued essentially the status quo. Thus, if outfitters holding a current permit perform satisfactorily they can continue to renew the permit annually. [143]

The South Fork of the Snake River in the Bridger-Teton also was particularly popular for float trips. In fact, the Snake experienced more day use than the Salmon, perhaps because of its relatively easy accessibility to major highways and to visitors to Grand Teton and Yellowstone National Parks. In 1979, the Bridger-Teton proposed designation of 50 miles of the upper Snake as a wild and scenic river. Considerable opposition emerged from private landowners in Jackson Hole to the designation of the upper 25 miles. The Bridger-Teton continued to press for the lower 25 miles, which is entirely within the forest. By 1984, the proposal rested in limbo because of opposition from the Office of Management and Budget, which feared that the Bridger-Teton would ask for funds to manage the river if the special status were approved. In 1984, Supervisor Reid Jackson of the Bridger-Teton said the Service would settle for designation of the lower 13 miles as a scenic river, to protect it from potential hydroelectric development. [144]

After the creation of the Sawtooth National Recreation Area in 1972, the region experienced some difficulty in its management. Under the enabling act, the Sawtooth was to maintain a western outdoors atmosphere with continued rural community life, ranching and grazing, and limited logging and mining. Sawtooth officials proceeded to purchase scenic easements on private lands, sharply regulating future use. [145] If an owner refused to sell the easement, the Service could acquire it under condemnation proceedings. The attempt to condemn such easements led to a suit that the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Forest Service in 1977. [146] In some cases where developers proposed subdivisions containing incompatible uses like A-frame houses and trailer courts within the recreation area, the Forest Service purchased the land. Regulations allowed some mining as long as it did not substantially impair the scenic beauty or damage fisheries and if the claim had been located prior to August 22, 1982. [147]

The Service encountered some difficulty in eliminating nonconforming uses. Some landowners, backed by Senator James McClure, wanted the Service to interpret the legislation as requiring an exchange for property within the Sawtooth at the option of the landowner. Regional Forester Vern Hamre disagreed, since he thought the legislative history did not support that view. He invited McClure to obtain a declaration from the Interior Committee chairman, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, or to secure language in an appropriation bill, supporting his view. McClure could secure neither, and the region went ahead as before. [148]

Problems at the Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area were less severe but similar to those at the Sawtooth. Owners of private land within the Flaming Gorge proposed to subdivide into one-tenth of an acre lots suitable for trailers. County commission chairman Albert Neff, who favored the subdivisions, became quite indignant when the Service suggested the county regulate such incompatible use through zoning. Neff carried enough political clout to get a congressional hearing on the matter. Vern Hamre went fishing with Senators Frank Moss and Alan Bible, who told him that they would stay out of the dispute. Later the commission denied the subdivision proposal, and the Forest Service purchased the land. [149]

In commenting on the proposed management plan for the Flaming Gorge, Joel Frykman, formerly assistant regional forester for timber management, thought the forest had been unduly strict in dealing with timber values and might have exceeded its authority in regulating private and State lands, but that it was insufficiently strict in wildlife management. Such views did not receive broad public support. [150]

Like the Sawtooth, the Flaming Gorge's management plan emphasized recreation and scenic values. The road layout conformed with these values. The Ashley recommended the designation of a section of the Green River as a wild and scenic river. The proposal was not acted upon. To enhance wildlife values, the Ashley transplanted a number of bighorn sheep to the Flaming Gorge. In cooperation with private developers, the forest encouraged conforming private development, including that of major resorts. The Flaming Gorge had two visitor information centers staffed full time by Ashley employees during the summer. [151]

In 1984, the Uinta National Forest accepted responsibility for recreation management at Strawberry Reservoir. Constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation, the reservoir is part of the Central Utah Project. On June 1, 1984, regional and forest officials joined State and Bureau of Reclamation representatives in dedicating a recreation complex at the site. Camping, boating, and fishing are the main activities at the reservoir. [152]

Forest Service management of archeological, historical, and geological functions—especially archeological—expanded considerably in Region 4 after the early 1970's. [153] As a result of a number of executive orders, all Federal Government agencies were required to conduct inventories of any land-disturbing activities to determine archeological values involved. If such values existed, the Service and region were committed to protecting them or taking mitigating action such as excavating and documenting the findings. The program was quite expensive, since each national forest had to have access to an archeologist and the sites were often quite isolated.

The region experienced a major problem when, as soon as the archeologists began work, the sites became public knowledge and often attracted opportunists who tried to profit from finding and selling artifacts, amateur collectors who disturbed the sites, and vandals who destroyed ancient artifacts. Robert Safran indicated that sites at Joes Valley on the Manti-LaSal and Wheeler Peak on the Humboldt were particularly difficult to manage because of such vandalism.

In some cases, the forests conducted cultural management programs themselves or secured the help of interested local historical associations. The Challis National Forest, for instance, managed a dredge and museum on the Yankee Fork at Custer. Through creative thinking, the forest succeeded in getting considerable private involvement by organizing a dredge society. The Sawtooth Interpretive Association, a private group organized in 1972, cooperated with the Sawtooth NRA in providing interpretive services at the Redfish Lake Visitor Center and at the Stanley Ranger Station. [154] At Johnny Sacks Cabin in Island Park, the Targhee succeeded in making an arrangement for the local historical society to manage the site. The Bridger-Teton operated a display cabin adjacent to their headquarters showing an early ranger station and its furnishings.

One important program was the development of archeological studies along Clear Creek on the Fishlake. Mitigation became necessary owing to archeological damage resulting from the construction of Interstate 70 through the area. The Fishlake cooperated with the State of Utah, Brigham Young University, and the Federal Highway Administration in conducting digs at the site. By early 1986, mitigation had proceeded well, and the State of Utah had planned a visitor center to explain the prehistoric Fremont culture. [155]

Wilderness

The Wilderness Act directed the Forest Service to consider the suitability of primitive areas for wilderness designation. In addition, in August 1971 the Service undertook the evaluation (called RARE I for the first Roadless Area Review and Evaluation) of all undeveloped areas of more than 5,000 acres. Completed by June 1972, findings were announced in January 1973. For the entire National Forest System, the report recommended 12.3 million acres for wilderness protection from the 56 million studied. In response to the review, the Sierra Club and other conservation organizations filed a suit in Federal court to force the Service to protect the entire 56 million acres. In August 1973, Federal Judge Samuel Conti granted a preliminary injunction supporting the appellants. The injunction led to a promise that the Service would prepare an environmental impact statement consistent with NEPA and reconsider wilderness preservation, before authorizing any development. [156]

As far as Region 4 was concerned, the Sierra Club suit seemed unnecessary. The Washington Office directive had forced the region to conduct the review in an impossibly short 11 months. Recognizing that development did not threaten most of the roadless area, the region passed over those tracts low in mineral and timber values. In the process, they disregarded a number of locations because they were not threatened. These included Wellsville Mountain, Mt. Olympus, Mt. Nebo, and Lone Peak on the Wasatch Front and Mt. Borah in Idaho. [157] In addition, some forest officers believed that the designation of wilderness had the effect of calling attention to an area and that the impact might be less with no designation. [158]

Some Region 4 officers such as Oliver Cliff resented the implication that any areas without roads ought to be designated as wilderness. For them, certain qualities of solitude and beauty were necessary to wilderness, and the absence of roads did not automatically invest an area with a wilderness character. [159]

In spite of the problems with RARE I, the Nixon and Ford administrations were reluctant to undertake a second review of roadless areas. With the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977 and particularly with the appointment of M. Rupert Cutler as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the climate changed. Between 1977 and 1979, the Service undertook the study called "RARE II" in which it evaluated 67 million acres of roadless tracts. The Forest Service expected that any lands not recommended for wilderness under RARE II would be released for multiple-use management at the same time Congress designated the new wildernesses. Under RARE II, 36 million acres nationally were to have been opened for multiple-use management, 15.4 million were recommended for wilderness and 10.6 million acres were reserved for future action. [160]

The whole process ground to a halt, however, with the California v. Block ruling in 1979 that the Service had failed to comply with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirements of NEPA. This ruling prevented the release of roadless areas for multiple-use management and threw them into consideration with the forest plans. Under the Wilderness Act the ruling tossed them into the lap of Congress, since the Service no longer had the authority to designate wilderness by presidential proclamation.

In general, Region 4 officers believed that RARE II was quite well done. Vern Hamre pointed out that a number of areas were included that had not been included in RARE I. [161] Pat Sheehan of the regional information office argued that the public interaction generated by RARE II was "one of the most intensive public involvement efforts that . . . [Region 4] has undertaken." The RARE II recommendations of 1979 formed the basis for the wilderness bills considered from 1984 through 1986.

Until 1984, however, the only tangible result was the Central Idaho Wilderness Act that redesignated the Idaho Wilderness Area as the River of No Return Wilderness and had come about because of Idaho sentiment and the close cooperation between the Service and Senators McClure and Church. [162]

Some former employees were bitter about the results of the process. George Lafferty, for instance, said that while he "generally supported a Wilderness System throughout" his career, he was concerned to see "the Forest Service being hamstrung" in its attempt to manage national forest lands. He thought the court rulings had brought the Service "to a point where" it could not properly "manage the study area lands—and they are extensive." [163]

After the California ruling sidetracked RARE II, the Service began working with Congress in drafting wilderness legislation on a State-by-State basis. Working with political leaders, environmentalists, commodity interests, and the general public, the Service tried to shape each bill to fit the wilderness needs of each State. The bills under consideration for states in Region 4 were based essentially on the RARE II evaluations, but initially some of them contained either redundant or offensive features. The Utah bill, for instance, emphasized a right to graze on the forests. Regional Forester Tixier was concerned about this provision because he wanted to maintain the traditional status of grazing as a privilege as confirmed in the Wilderness Act rather than as a vested right. The original bill also contained what was called "hard release" language—essentially redundant, but potentially contentious provisions—ordering the Service not to reconsider the released areas for wilderness until the year 2000. [164]

Consideration of the wilderness bills for each of the States in Region 4 was extremely difficult and at times acrimonious. A compromise between House Public Lands Committee Chairman John Siberling and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman James McClure revised the "hard release" language in the Idaho bill to allow consideration of released areas during development of the next forest plan, or roughly in 10 years. [165] Similar language was included in the Utah bill, passed in September 1984—the first from Region 4. The Utah bill, also the result of compromise, set aside 750,000 acres as wilderness, some parts without controversy, others after considerable, and at times heated, discussion. [166] By spring 1986, the Utah and Wyoming bills had passed, Congress was not actively considering the Idaho bill, and differences among members of the Nevada delegation, particularly over the potential Great Basin National Park in what is now the Wheeler Peak Scenic Area, had stalled that bill. [167]

Wildlife and Feral Animals

Several considerations dominated the disputes over wildlife and feral animals after 1970. These considerations included protection of threatened and endangered species: what to do with wild horses and burros, perceived by many as a nuisance but with fondness by others: the reintroduction of game species into areas they had formerly occupied; and the impact of change and development on wildlife habitat.

The management of wildlife habitat continued much as before, with stream improvement for various kinds of fish, prescribed burning, and planting of various browse species for larger wildlife. [168] Wildlife considerations assumed considerable importance, because, as Regional Forester Tixier put it, "hunting is almost a religion" in Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming and the fishing in the region is among the best in the United States. [169] Although a considerable misperception existed, because of the occasional shooting of elk in hayfields and refuges, the Teton Wilderness was one of the best places to hunt in the world. [170]

The best example of the region's problem with threatened and endangered species is undoubtedly the grizzly bear, which is on the threatened list. Within Region 4, the focus of this problem was the greater Yellowstone Park ecosystem, which included the Bridger-Teton and Targhee National Forests, forests in two other regions, and two national parks. [171] Representatives of the forests and parks together with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the State fish and game departments of Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana formed an Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee (IGBC) and several subcommittees to investigate and recommend action for dealing with problems caused by the bears' threatened status. The committee received research support from the Fish and Wildlife Service.

After reviewing conditions, the IGBC designated Management Situation Zones, specifying grizzly treatment for various areas. [172] Situation 1 zone was primary grizzly habitat where the bears were given priority over other uses in the area, though commodity production was still allowed. In Situation 2 habitat, the bear was not perceived as the primary inhabitant and other use prevailed where conflicts occurred. Situation 3 included developed and inhabited areas with high human use. Bears were generally removed from those areas. Situation 4 zones were areas suitable for bears in which they did not live and in which they could be established. Situation 5 zones were habitats in which grizzly bears did not live and which were generally unsuitable for them.

The major difficulty in dealing with the grizzly was not the resolve of the Forest Service and other agencies to solve the problem, but rather the unwillingness of some in the public to support the regulations. In one case where an outfitter shot a bear in the Teton Wilderness, the Fish and Wildlife Service secured a grand jury indictment. During the trial, however, the judge allowed the offender to plead guilty to cruelty to animals, which allowed him to retain his outfitter's license. Then the judge suspended both the fine and the jail sentence.

In another case, however, Forest Service personnel, especially Supervisor John Burns of the Targhee, resolved a potentially explosive situation. In 1983 a grizzly sow designated number 38 moved with her cubs from the Gallatin National Forest to Two Top Mountain on the Targhee. Two Top had been designated as Situation 1 habitat, and under the guidelines sheep grazing had been allowed. Since bear had primary consideration in the area, after it started attacking the sheep, the rancher had to move them from the grazing allotment to private land. The bear followed the sheep, however, and began spending the day on the forest and the nights marauding in the herds on private land. After a week of consideration, the committee agreed to trap the bear and the cubs and relocate them in a remote area of Yellowstone Park.

Because of its location and resources, the Bridger-Teton was a particularly critical area in wildlife management. Wildlife values played a part in virtually everything that was done. When the forest conducted timber sales, for instance, officials coordinated their actions with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and various preservation groups. Twenty-six thousand head of elk summered on the forest in addition to large herds of mule deer, moose, and bighorn sheep. Endangered species such as the bald eagle and the trumpeter swan also inhabited the forest. [173] On a number of other forests as well, roads were often closed after a timber sale so that easy access did not threaten the elk population with excessive hunting pressure. [174]

It took considerable time for the region to come to the position where wildlife considerations were generally recognized as being as important as commodity production. That change came about largely through reeducation of employees to convince them to understand how to consider wildlife in their decisions. As Mike Gaufin indicated, wildlife biologists helped with the reeducation by explaining how such measures as leaving a little litter after a timber harvest benefited the wildlife. Gaufin told of a discussion with one of the region's engineers, just before both retired, who said to him, "Mike, I used to hate to see you come in my door because I knew every time you came in, you were going to be standing in the way of progress, but thank God you did it." [175]

After careful studies, the region authorized State fish and game departments to reintroduce wildlife in certain suitable areas. Examples included mountain goats in the Lone Peak Wilderness area and bighorn sheep in the Mount Nebo area. [176]

During the period, as changes overtook the region, other difficulties arose for various types of wildlife, in addition to those with anadromous fisheries already discussed. During the late 1960's and early 1970's deer populations dropped off considerably. No one knows why the mule deer populations in Utah, Nevada, and Idaho declined so drastically, but several explanations have been given. Because the region had been so successful in reducing forest fires, aspen habitat for large browsing animals like deer was replaced by less palatable conifers. [177] As urban expansion pushed farther and farther into the foothills and canyons, winter range for deer was lost. As a result, in the winter it was not unusual to see deer feeding in some residential areas. [178]

Minerals

The diversity of conditions in Region 4 was nowhere more evident than in minerals. During the 1970's and early 1980's, a combination of the Arabian oil embargo and subsequent rise in oil prices, the increase in the price of precious metals, and the exploitation of large phosphate deposits catapulted Region 4 into first place in the National Forest System with regard to both locatable and leasable minerals (table 19). According to William Johnson, former director of the regional minerals staff, within a 300-mile radius of Salt Lake City there "were probably more major ore discoveries made . . . than . . . any [other] area in the world." The resulting pressure led Region 4 to create the first mineral area staff group in the Forest Service system in 1975. [179]

Table 19—Collections for goods and services for the National Forest Fund in Region 4, 1960-85

Since the Department of the Interior had the major responsibility for both leasable and locatable minerals, the Forest Service acted as an agent in making recommendations to the Bureau of Land Management. On national forest lands acquired by purchase, the Forest Service had sole responsibility.

As part of its management responsibility, the region required mining operators to restore the surface of the land through adequate reclamation procedures. In order to protect other resource values, in 1972, the region began to require miners to secure permits to build access roads across national forest lands. Here again, Region 4 was the first in the system to require compliance. The Washington Office followed in 1974 with regulations requiring miners to submit an operating plan spelling out how they expected to search for or develop the deposits and how they planned to restore the surface to a natural looking state. [180]

Figure 100—Tenneco Oil Company pumping operation.

Most of Region 4's mineral problems were concerned with leasable minerals. The Manti-LaSal held approximately two-thirds of the coal available for lease in the region. The oil-rich Overthrust Belt runs through eastern Idaho, western Wyoming, and eastern Utah, and the interest in gas and oil there was extremely heavy. [181] By 1984, the entire Caribou National Forest, for instance, was blanketed by oil and gas leases, even though at the time there were no producing wells on the forest. Beginning in 1984, however, with the slackening of the oil crisis and the increase in lease fees, miners began to allow leases on obviously marginal land to lapse. [182] In the spring of 1986, oil prices began to decline rapidly, a situation that will probably promote a further drop in interest in leases.

Leasing had an enormous impact on the Caribou in other ways. J.R. Simplot; Monsanto; Food, Machinery, and Chemical; International Minerals and Chemicals; Stauffer; and Agricultural Products Companies held leases on various parts of a large body of phosphate deposits near Soda Springs, ID. In 1984 these deposits produced 35 percent of the Nation's phosphate supply. Not the least of the problems for the Caribou was the development of techniques for managing the rehabilitation of the surface following open-pit mining. One large waste dump reportedly contained more than enough material to fill the Panama Canal. The Intermountain Station worked with the forest particularly in finding and developing plants suitable for restoration of such areas. [183]

Because of the conflicting interests of commodity and environmental groups, it is not at all surprising that this increased mining activity generated considerable controversy. Much of the mining centered in areas adjacent to wilderness and scenic areas. Examples included the Phillips Petroleum leases on the North Slope of the Uinta, the abortive Utah Power and Light coal leases on the Kaparowits Plateau in southeastern Utah, American Smelting and Refining Company's molybdenum deposits at the foot of Castle Peak in the Sawtooth, and Getty Oil leases on the Bridger-Teton. [184] Complaints of environmentalists included destruction or threat to wilderness values, national parks, or threatened and endangered species. This sort of conflict seems quite likely to continue. [185]

Similar conflict plagued one of two major steam-producing geothermal fields in the region. After strong objections were raised to such developments, the Forest Service placed a moratorium on geothermal leases in the Island Park Geothermal Area west and south of Yellowstone Park. Under the final environmental impact statement issued in 1980, leasing was recommended in part of the area, but would be prohibited in a strip ranging from 1 to 5 miles wide bordering Yellowstone Park and in other sensitive areas. In addition, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior would need to agree that the leasing would not harm the geysers and other geothermal features in Yellowstone before development could take place. [186]

The other major geothermal area was on the Fishlake near Cove Fort. In October 1983, Mother Earth Industries tapped what appeared to be a major steam field. The company negotiated an agreement to supply electrical power to Provo City. Reports have indicated that delivery should start in 1986. [187] Environmentalists did not object to this development, but the city encountered some difficulty in securing agreements to transmit the power from Cove Fort to Provo over Utah Power and Light Company lines.

Timber Management

Primarily because of the conflict between commodity and recreational values, timber management proceeded on two fronts in Region 4 in the 1970's and early 1980's. On one side regional and forest officials promoted technological and managerial changes in an effort to sell mature and overaged timber. On the other side, environmental interests outside the regional administration and members of interdisciplinary teams within the region opposed timber sales that would damage esthetic values or cost the Forest Service money. This opposition existed even when bark beetle damage and deterioration threatened other values.

Numerous changes in timber sales took place. [188] During the late 1960's, the region began using computer programs to compile stand tables. During the early 1970's, the region began a system called "stand examination" to develop prescriptions for the treatment of particular forest areas. Stand examination was used in connection with a forestwide inventory, which the region tried to conduct every 10 years on heavy timber forests such as the Boise and Payette and every 15 to 20 years on timber-deficient forests such as the Humboldt. Between 1972 and 1979, in conjunction with the stand examination and the forest inventory, the timber management staff under the leadership of George Roether developed a computer-assisted database called "Timber Management Information System" (TMIS) that timber management officials used as the source for an ongoing program of management prescriptions. Using linear program models, TMIS provided much more sophisticated data than the acreage and volume-per-acre estimates associated with former timber management prescriptions. Timber management used TMIS to simulate models designed to optimize volume, present net worth, or consider other variables the staff thought important for a particular species under particular conditions. The Intermountain Station provided much of the expertise in understanding characteristics of differing species, which helped the region accomplish its timber stewardship.

The work of the Intermountain Station was just one aspect of the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of planning timber management prescriptions. Landscape architects, wildlife specialists, and others worked with timber management to factor in values other than the production of a specific volume of timber. Wildlife, recreation, watershed, and esthetics were all considered in designing management prescriptions. [189]

In part because of esthetic and watershed considerations, the region no longer relied on natural regeneration. Most prescriptions required revegetation within 5 years. Because some species like spruce required up to 20 years for regeneration, managers had to either seed or plant cutover areas. By selecting seed by elevation and type, development of the snow cache, and use of vermiculite slurry, the augur, and other techniques in planting, the region was enormously successful in its regeneration efforts. By 1984 an 88-percent survival rate placed it in the first rank of regions nationally. [190] In part, these successes came about because of work at the Intermountain Station and the Rocky Mountain Station at Fort Collins, CO. This work helped reinforce the recognition that total cleanup of an area did not produce optimum conditions for regeneration. Thus, felling techniques, design of the cutting areas, and other considerations all contributed to the prescriptions. [191]

In this interdisciplinary effort, the region's State and Private Forestry staff played an important part. They did this particularly by working with industry in designing improved lumber recovery methods through a sawmill improvement program, in conducting research and training on improved harvesting, and in evaluating and improving methods of felling and bucking timber. [192]

Beyond the introduction of interdisciplinary timber management, perhaps the most important change was the decentralization of responsibility for preparing management prescriptions. After 1970, while the regional office's staff of silvicultural specialists remained constant at three people, the budget increased 10 to 12 times. Instead of keeping the money in Ogden, however, the region sent it to the national forests. Consequently, by 1984, the forests boasted 60 trained and certified silviculturalists who provided quality control for cutting practices, reforestation, and timber stand improvement. In the process, an emphasis on "biologically sound alternatives that will work within the silvics of the species to maximize other outputs . . . [prepared through an] Interdisciplinary Team," replaced the 1960's emphasis on clearcutting and maximum timber production at theoretical sustained yield levels.

A major achievement in timber management was the development of effective yarding techniques to get the timber out with minimum damage to the land. In the words of George Roether, Region 4 "skipped a step in the evolution of logging systems." While loggers on the West Coast moved from the Idaho jammer to long-span ground-skidded or skyline cable systems, Region 4 jumped from the Idaho jammer to helicopter logging. Eventually, the region found insufficient regeneration with helicopter logging so in 1984 prescriptions began moving back to cable systems. Some areas in the region still used horse skidding, crawler tractor yarding, and rubber-tired skidders. On the Boise, for instance, yarding was done by tractor, skyline, or helicopter, depending upon the particular conditions. [193]

Under the constraints of multiple-use management, the regional timber staff wanted to achieve timber management on a sustained yield basis. In practice, this was quite impossible because of unsatisfactory market conditions and unavailable operators. Although the Boise and Payette "bumped up" against the maximum amount they were allowed to sell on an average annual basis—the allowable cut—most other forests came nowhere near that level.

After a superficial analysis, one might assume that the failure to achieve the allowable cut facilitated other considerations such as wildlife, watershed management, grazing, and wilderness. In practice that was not the case. Cutting old growth timber, for instance, sometimes actually improved elk and deer habitat and even water production, within certain tolerances for erosion. A professionally designed harvest added in some cases to the visual interest of an area by creating a greater variety within a specific vista.

All of this took place in a climate of severe outside criticism and internal examination. Partly in response to complaints from environmental organizations and Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming and partly because of the concerns of Floyd Iverson and others within the Service, in the late 1960's, Regions 4 and 2 appointed a study team to consider forest management, especially in lodgepole pine stands on four forests: Bighorn, Shoshone, Teton, and Bridger. [194] The team consisted of six specialists representing Region 4, three forest and range experiment stations, and Region 1. Carl M. Berntsen of the Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station headed the team. [195]

In general, the forest management study team's 1971 "Wyoming Report" revealed many problems in the management of forests of northern and western Wyoming. Clearcuts had often been too large, roads poorly designed, and attention to wildlife and esthetic values insufficient. The team recommended more attention to interdisciplinary and multiple-use values in the planning of timber management prescriptions.

Between the appointment of the team and the presentation of the report, Vern Hamre had replaced Floyd Iverson as regional forester. A forestry graduate of the University of Montana, Hamre had worked in Region, in the Washington Office in the Division of Watershed Management as General Inspector, as director of the WO Division of Manpower and Youth Programs in the Johnson administration, and as Deputy Regional Forester in Region 6, before moving to Ogden as regional forester in April 1970. [196]

After the team reported, the two regional foresters met in Denver, along with the supervisors of the four Wyoming forests and those from the Ashley and Targhee. At the meeting, the forest officers agreed upon measures to address the problems. In Hamre's view, though Region 4 had its problems, conditions were better than in Region 2. This had resulted, in part, from the work of supervisors like Bob Safran and the environmental concerns of Floyd Iverson and others during the 1960's. [197] Nevertheless, forests in Region 4 had many problems to correct. The measures mentioned earlier, in connection with timber management, were in part a response to these concerns.

Moreover, Hamre, his staffs, and the supervisors tried to devise solutions to problems mentioned in connection with the Wyoming report throughout the entire region. Projects promising potential environmental damage, such as a proposed pulp mill at Green River, WY, were abandoned. Allowable cuts were reduced to take multiple use and esthetic factors into consideration. [198] The region scheduled meetings and Forest Service officers traveled over the forests with large timber operators like Boise-Cascade to explain the reductions in allowable cut. [199] Clearcuts were reduced in size, and a moratorium was placed on cutting on the South Fork of the Salmon River. [200] (See table 20.)

Figure 101—Vern Hamre, Regional Forester, 1970-80.

Other factors helped the region meet its goal of reducing timber cuts to protect other values. Declines in the timber market during the recession of the early 1980's aided some forests like the Salmon. [201] On some forests, such as the Uinta and Fishlake, timber production was not particularly important. There, the allowable cut was not a major factor, though some of the timber produced, especially Engelmann spruce, was quite valuable. [202] Some forests, for example the Wasatch, concentrated on small products like posts, poles, and firewood. Others, despite a rather large timber sale load, still carried on a considerable firewood business. [203]

Table 20—Commercial timber transactions in (convertible products only) Region 4, 1965-85

Vern Hamre retired in 1980, and Jeff Sirmon, who had been deputy regional forester, served as regional forester until 1982. In 1982, before Sirmon moved to Portland as regional forester, Governor Ed Herschler of Wyoming asked the two regional foresters—Sirmon and Craig Rupp of Region 2—to review the progress under the Wyoming report. The original study team appointees agreed to conduct the review in cooperation with three new members representing the State of Wyoming. [204]

Before the team issued its report, J.S. "Stan" Tixier had replaced Sirmon as regional forester. A native of Albuquerque, Tixier developed an interest in range management at an early age. He studied range management at the University of Arizona, then joined the Forest Service as a range conservationist. After Service in Region 3, he moved to the Washington Office where he worked on the range staff. He transferred to Milwaukee as deputy regional forester and in June 1982 moved to Ogden as regional forester. [205]

On the whole, the report that Tixier received in 1983 indicated that all of the forests had made some progress but that forests in both regions needed improvement. [206] The regional officers produced a response to the report in which they concurred basically in the recommendations and resolved to continue with improvements. Some recommendations, such as the reestablishment of citizen advisory committees and the writing of a memorandum of agreement between the regions and the governor's office, either could not be implemented under current Federal regulations or were considered unnecessary. Other recommendations, such as the suggestion that wildlife specialists be maintained on every forest, were already in effect. The response pointed out that such specialists might be needed elsewhere temporarily since they were often used on interdisciplinary teams. [207]

Figure 102—Jeff Sirmon, Regional Forester, 1980-82.

Besides the controversy over clearcutting, a major dispute continued over salvage sales. [208] In various areas of the region, these sales resulted from fire and wind-throw, but most particularly from bark beetle, mistletoe, and other infestations. Often the two issues were combined, because clearcutting was often used, especially in lodgepole pine, to salvage dead or dying trees before they deteriorated in value.

The Bridger-Teton and especially the Targhee were the sites of large salvage sales. In 1984, the Bridger-Teton, for instance, cut about 30 million board feet of timber, of which 5 million was salvage. [209] Outfitters and guides were particularly vigorous in their opposition to these sales. State Senator John Turner, an outfitter, was one of the leaders in this opposition. These businessmen earned their living from providing quality service to hunters. In their view, a timber access road was a direct threat to the amount of big game in an area and to their businesses, since it opened the area to general hunting.

Figure 103—J.S. "Stan" Tixier, Regional Forester since 1982.

On the Targhee the situation was even more serious. By the late 1970's, beetles had killed 60 to 80 percent of the lodgepole pine in the forest. The Targhee faced the prospect of salvage operations on all the timber, because of the problem of windthrow in the remaining stands. Public opposition surfaced, in part because of the clearcuts and in part because of forest plans for logging roads in the vicinity of Yellowstone National Park. The forest conducted a major and relatively successful public relations effort in an attempt to secure support for these efforts. [210] Similar problems existed on other forests like the Ashley and the Wasatch. [211] In some cases, as in a cut planned on the North Slope of the Uinta, wildlife habitat was at issue.

Opponents of the salvage operations generally discounted and often questioned the sincerity of the Forest Service argument that cutting these infested stands, even at a loss, was a necessary component of proper timber stand management. Discounting the time needed to regenerate the timber and explaining away the potential damage to nearby timber by arguing that "the insect problem is actually worsened because of forest debris left after cutting and damage to trees that are not taken out," Joseph M. Bauman, environmental specialist for the Deseret News, for instance, pointed out that "forests will simply regenerate themselves after this natural attack, as they always have." [212]

In November 1985, the Idaho Natural Resources Legal Defense Foundation tried to stop a salvage sale of fire-damaged timber on the Payette National Forest. Here, the arguments against the sale were potential damage to the adjacent Carey Creek Roadless Area and the closure to public use of a forest road used by tourists. From the point of view of Edwin Stockly, representing the foundation, the potential damages outweighed the potential advantages. From his perspective, the Payette's arguments lacked balance. [213]

Figure 104—Firewood give-away program for handicapped and senior citizens, 1979.

In addition to these arguments, a third side of the dispute, that of the timber companies, was often apparent. In the late 1960's, Regional Forester Floyd Iverson ruled against the use of DDT spraying in certain areas, such as the Salmon National Forest, except under severely restricted conditions, because of potential damage to fish and birds. [214] This restriction was extended to other forests, and the region was subjected to contradictory lawsuits. On the one hand, environmentalists in Idaho sued to stop the limited spraying for spruce budworm. On the other, Boise-Cascade entered a suit asking for a judgment requiring the Service to spray in order to protect its adjacent private lands. [215]

The region also faced problems because of the policy of the Washington Office that allocated more money for production of timber than for other multiple-use values. In May 1975, William J. Bryan, responding for the timber management staff, argued against a proposed system of allocating dollars to the region based on favoring timber outputs over other values. The result, Bryan argued, would be "ever poorer management in such areas [with low timber values]." He expressed concern about the criticism that such policy would generate in local communities and among other groups, presumably those interested in other multiple-use concerns. [216]

Range Management

After 1970, range management tended to generate less controversy than timber management. The battles over reductions in numbers so characteristic of the 1950's and early 1960's had virtually ended. Relations between the Forest Service and the ranchers tended generally to be quite good. Most allotments throughout the region had been placed under good management. Range managers recognized the limitations of range improvement projects, because of the problems of environmental deterioration and difficulties in making permanent alterations in the character of plant communities. Some range conservationists raised questions about current methods of allotment analysis as a means of determining trend in range conditions. On several forests some problems of overgrazing continued, but these were much less severe than previously. In a replay of previous developments, stockmen continued to resist efforts by the Federal Government to change the basis for grazing fees. Some conflict persisted between demand for grazing on the one hand and the desire for recreational and wildlife use on the other.

When Vern Hamre came on as regional forester in 1970, he found range conditions relatively good. Range problems had been largely solved on the Cache, Wasatch, and Uinta and on the forests of eastern and central Idaho, northwestern Wyoming, and Nevada. Some rather serious problems continued to persist on the Manti-LaSal, Fishlake, and Dixie in Utah and on the Boise and Payette in Idaho, and a few local problems continued on the Bridger-Teton in Wyoming. Hamre moved to address the continuing difficulties, in part, by encouraging each State to form a range improvement committee made up of representatives of the livestock community, wildlife experts, and others interested in the range program. The committees in Utah and Idaho performed very well. The Wyoming committee "was never quite as successful." The Nevada Secretary of Agriculture was quite uncooperative, because of the developing sentiment that led to the Sagebrush Rebellion.

Beyond this, the region continued to work with the grazing advisory committees to help the permittees understand and address problems. By 1984, Supervisor Don Nebeker of the Uinta could say with confidence that "Hobble Creek is one of our most productive allotments [and] . . . it is probably one of the more cooperative groups." [217]

In general, by building on the work of the Iverson administration, Hamre and his associates succeeded in getting most ranges into satisfactory condition sometime between 1972 and 1974. [218] As late as 1984, however, some problems continued to persist, especially on the Manti-LaSal and Fishlake. On those two forests, problems existed principally because of difficulties in the cooperative management of forest system lands and adjacent and enclosed private lands. [219] The forest supervisors and rangers, however, were determined to address the problems by working with the permittees to bring about necessary reductions and range improvements. [220]

In the 1970's and 1980's depressed economic conditions reduced the pressure on many sheep allotments. By 1984, New Zealand and Australian imports had cut into the domestic market. A number of sheep allotments were vacant. In 1984, the Targhee could find no stockmen willing to use 19 sheep allotments. [221] The Wasatch ranges could probably have taken 90,000 to 92,000 animal-unit-months (AUM) without damage compared to the 77,000 or 78,000 used in 1984. [222] Farms and ranches adjacent to the Uinta passed into urban uses and Supervisor Nebeker wondered where they would get the animals to graze the ranges. [223] Former Wasatch Supervisor Chandler St. John pointed out that, with the depressed market, stockmen found it difficult to get skilled herders to work for them at the wages they could afford to pay. [224]

Nevertheless, range management continued to constitute a substantial work load in the region. By 1984, Region 4 still grazed the largest number of sheep of any region within the Forest Service system. [225] On the Fishlake, for instance, Supervisor Kent Taylor said that "grazing is still our number one resource problem, . . . even though we have reduced [numbers of] livestock." Even there, because of the pressure for better management, by 1984 sheep were down to about 20,000 AUM's compared with 75,000 AUM's during World War II. [226] Supervisor Chuck Hendricks said that the Caribou's range management program was particularly important. He and his staff were especially proud of the demonstration work being done on the Curlew National Grasslands. [227] The Humboldt in Nevada and the Bridger-Teton in Wyoming also carried very large range loads. [228]

Some of the forests had a very light grazing load. The Salmon, for instance, grazed only about 55,000 AUM's in 1984, mostly cattle. [229] Former Boise Supervisor Ed Maw counted the grazing load there as not very heavy. [230] The Ashley grazed only about 75,000 AUM's, which was not very heavy compared with its wildlife, energy, and recreation loads. [231]

Perhaps the major changes that took place in range management in the early 1980's resulted from a recognition by both livestock operators and forest officers that grazing could not be permitted on all national forest lands. Much of the land would not stand the impact of livestock use without experiencing unacceptable damage. Once both groups understood this concept, it was much easier to adjust livestock numbers to the capacity of the range. [232]

A second change of importance was the recognition of the limitations on range improvement projects. Range managers learned that although they could convert sagebrush and pinyon-juniper cover to grass temporarily, these large and deep-rooted plants tended to reinvade the arid lands within 12 to 20 years. Those areas most susceptible to such invasion were in the Great Basin—the Vernon unit of the Uinta and the Curlew National Grasslands, for example. [233]

In the early 1980's, the Forest Service experimented with a herbicide called "Grasslan" that could be broadcast from fixed-wing airplanes. Grasslan did not damage desirable grasses and forbs, but took out sagebrush. However, a Service-wide ban on the use of herbicides, generated in part by accidental damage to desirable species caused by spraying with other herbicides, made Grasslan unavailable. In the meantime, plowing and seeding in sagebrush and chaining in pinyon-juniper provided some relief if there were sufficient money and environmental conditions allowed the region to treat the land. [234] In this connection, potential damage to archeological sites, especially in southeastern Utah, and possible environmental damage throughout the region made the EPA less willing to approve such projects. [235]

During the Carter administration, money for range improvement was much easier to come by than recently. In 1978, under the Range Betterment Fund, the region got $1.7 million for range improvement. [236] Beginning in the early 1980's, however, money for range improvement become scarce. With the Reagan administration's budgetary philosophy, neither the supervisors nor regional staff officers saw much hope for improvement. In 1984, Don Hooper of the regional office expected that under current appropriation levels, they would "lose ground." In 1984, the region got only $1.6 million for range improvement, which was $100,000 less than in 1978, in spite of the rapid rate of inflation in the intervening 6 years. [237] Hallie Cox, formerly head of range management, indicated that budgetary considerations forced the reduction in the size of range staffs after 1981 as well. [238]

Stockmen also were concerned about the real or potential conflict between livestock and wildlife. On the Tonopa Ranger District of the Toiyabe and on some portions of the Fishlake, stockmen were particularly critical because of the increase in elk herds. [239] Supervisor Kent Taylor indicated in 1984 that Forest Service studies had never shown any problem attributable to elk grazing on the Fishlake, but the stockmen were unconvinced. [240] On the other hand, the Bridger-Teton removed livestock from the foothills east of the Jackson Hole Elk Refuge to protect it for wildlife. [241] Other conflicts developed because of depredations in hayfields caused by elk moving back into populated areas and finding alfalfa more to their liking than browse, forbs, and mountain grasses. [242]

In recent years, because of problems in the use of the Parker three-step transects, the region introduced other means of measuring trend and use. [243] In the late 1960's Kenneth R. Genz served on a team under Jack Reppert at the Rocky Mountain Experiment Station at Fort Collins that considered the problem. The major difficulty was in the "tremendous amount of human error in its application." In many cases, they found that the transects had not been put in representative plant communities or the range conservationists had tried to cover two communities with one transect cluster.

After Genz moved to the Toiyabe, he learned of work being done on plant frequency measurement by Paul Tueller at the University of Nevada. In 1972 or 1973, Genz began experimenting with similar frequency measures. After releasing his work for comment, he submitted his proposal to the regional office in April 1981. It was accepted and incorporated in the range analysis handbook.

With the ranges under generally good management, the region could experiment with programs that turned more responsibility to users. The Challis, for instance, undertook an experimental stewardship program. Working with a committee of representatives of the Idaho State Fish and Game Department and other interested groups, the permittees wrote management plans that they then implemented. [244] The Uinta inaugurated a similar program called "grazing agreements," which shifted a substantial portion of responsibility and control to the permittees. Under both these programs, range managers evaluated results rather than monitoring the livestock operation on the ranges. [245]

The perennial issue of grazing fees arose again in 1985. In 1978, Congress set grazing fees at $1.23 per AUM, based on a 1966 study. From that base, the Forest Service used the Economic Research Service's beef price index to determine the new fees. In 1985, the fee, which had declined with the drop in beef prices, was set at $1.35. [246]

In 1978, Congress also mandated a new appraisal study, by which it intended to base the fee on comparative land value rather than beef prices. By 1984, researchers had collected preliminary data on private lands, and the Forest Service released a proposed new fee schedule early in 1985. The study report, which went to Congress for approval in June 1985, proposed fees as high as $4.92 per AUM for the best grazing land. [247] Ranchers greeted the proposed fee hike with derision and sought political help to quash it, pointing to the non-fee costs they had to pay for using Federal lands. Senators Jake Garn and Orrin Hatch and Governor Norman H. Bangerter of Utah supported the ranchers' position. By the end of 1985 Congress had failed to act on a compromise. The Office of Management and Budget pressured for an increase while stockmen pressed the Reagan administration to keep the fees lower. [248]

The Sagebrush Rebellion

Like the conflict over grazing fees, the question of Federal versus State or private ownership of the public lands arose at various times since the Service's organization. The most recent revival of the problem occurred during the late 1970's and early 1980's under the title "Sagebrush Rebellion." In part, at least, the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 announcing the Federal Government's intention to stop disposing of public lands sparked this latest protest. In addition, the movement represented "the culmination of a growing sense of dissatisfaction with what many feel to be 'over-regulation' by the Federal Government," especially the restrictive provisions of the Federal acts discussed earlier. [249]

In response to this sentiment, all States in Region 4 considered legislation to assert State authority over the Federal lands. The State of Nevada passed a law in February 1979 claiming State ownership of 53 million acres of Bureau of Land Management lands. Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah introduced a bill to transfer most Federal lands, including national forests, to State ownership. The bill never passed. The Nevada law soon became a dead letter, but its sentiments persisted into the early 1980's.

Under the direction of Regional Forester Vern Hamre, with the support of the information office, the region undertook a number of measures to counter the State claims. Hamre spoke with the governors of Idaho and Utah. He pointed out in talks that the cost to the States of managing the lands at the same level as Federal management would mean a substantial increase in State taxes, since the Federal Government subsidized land management in all the States. [250]

Figure 105—Western Forest service regions, 1985. Note Intermountain Region in center of map. (click on image for a PDF version)

Summary

Perhaps the most useful way to view developments between 1970 and 1985 is to see them as an effort on the part of both Region 4 and the people it served to interpret the meaning of multiple-use management in the context of legislation designed to protect the environment and noncommodity uses of the national forest lands. This attempt at balance was difficult for both the public and the forest officers. Long inured to dealing with politicians and commodities groups together with local officials interested in the protection of watersheds above major urban and agricultural areas, the region was forced to enlarge its concept of what constituted the public to include various environmental and preservationist interests. Moreover, it was forced to do this while facing both declining budgets and increased demands caused by a greater volume and diversity of uses and by the extraordinary expenditure of time and money required in drafting forest plans. The result was a decrease in public contacts and in services at a time the public demanded more of the Forest Service.

Although the region experienced some successes, the many pressures resulted in increased public dissatisfaction. Among the greatest successes was the completion of the forest plans, the generally good management of range lands, and the successful passage of some of the State wilderness bills. The Tixier committee, however, uncovered considerable misunderstanding and dissatisfaction that the Service must address to continue successful management of public resources. Most stress in the future will probably still be caused by the conflicting demands for use of national forest resources, especially the conflict between environmental protection and commodity production.

Reference Notes

1. Reid Jackson interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 24-25, Historical Files, Regional Office.

2. Reed C. Christensen interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 57-59, Historical Files, Regional Office.

3. Foyer Olsen interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 20-21, Historical Files, Regional Office.

4. Stan Tixier, Roy Feuchter Don Girton, and George Leonard, Communications/Awareness Discussions: Important, Nationally Significant Information from Persons Interested in the Forest Service, Report prepared for the Regional Foresters and Directors Meeting, Fort Collins, CO, August 1985 (n.p.: 1985), p. 15. (Hereinafter cited as Tixier Committee Report.)

5. Charles Hendricks interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, pp. 28-31, 34, 39, Historical Files, Regional Office.

6. The information on budgetary matters is based on Richard K. Griswold interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, Historical Files, Regional Office.

7. On the earlier cuts see: "Moss Assails Forestry Office Cuts," Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1973, Clipping, File: 1658, Historical Data 4, Early Administration, Historical Files, Uinta.

8. John J. Lavin interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 25-26, Historical Files, Regional Office.

9. John F. Hooper, Lee A. Bennett, Water W. "Pete" Pierson, Rodman N. Barker, Frank Youngblood, James W. Camp, Earl F. Dodds, Kenneth W. Weyers, and Ralph A. "Andy" Finn interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 44-48, Historical Files, Regional Office. (Hereinafter cited as Weyers interview.)

10. J. Kent Taylor interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 16-18, Historical Files, Regional Office. Hale M. Hubbard interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 15-16, Historical Files, Regional Office. Hubbard questions the figures of Supervisor Taylor on the budget reduction.

11. John E. Burns interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, Historical Files, Regional Office.

12. Sterling J. Wilcox, Jack Arrowsmith, Lou Jean Findlay, Russ Rogler, Ron Hayden interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 13, 18, Historical Files, Regional Office. (Hereinafter cited as Sterling Wilcox interview.)

13. See: U.S. Department of Agriculture—Forest Service, Intermountain Region, Organization Study, Zone Positions, January 1976, File: 1680, History, Improvements (1340), Historical Files, Regional Office.

14. Note: The region has gone extensively to the use of computers. The first systems, introduced in about 1957, were rather crude and required the payroll information to be run through the computer six times in order to get needed information. William H. McCrum interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, p. 5, Historical Files, Regional Office. Initially, the designation Forest Level Information and Planning System (FLIPS) was used for the computer network, but the system is usually referred to simply as Data General today. See Jack Arthur, "Distributed Processing Implementation Systems - FY 1986/1987," in Proceedings of the 1986 District Rangers Conference, pagination irregular, copy in author's possession. (Hereinafter cited as: 1986 Rangers Conference Proceedings).

15. Hubbard interview, pp. 4-10, Jack Wilcox interview by Gary Schaffran, June 1984, p. 30, Historical Files, Humboldt.

16. Don J. Nebeker interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 30-31, Historical Files, Regional Office.

17. Hendricks interview, pp. 31-32.

18. See file 6320, Contracting CY 78, D89, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC: File 6320, Contracting Bids, Catering Service Bids BIFC, ibid.; File 6320, Contracting, D 89, Helicopter Services, Sawtooth Helicopters, Inc., ibid.

19. Vern O. Hamre interview by Thomas G. Alexander, July 1984, pp. 35-37, Historical Files, Regional Office. See also Jim Lawrence, "Management Effectiveness for the 80's," in 1986 District Rangers Conference Proceedings.

20. Douglas Bird, Warren "Hub" Harris, James Moore, Margie Peterson, and Roy Keck interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 68-70, Historical Files, Regional Office. (Hereinafter cited as Bird interview.)

21. McCrum interview, pp. 12-13.

22. Tom Roederer, "Delta Team Report," March 18, 1986, in 1986 District Rangers Conference Proceedings.

23. Hamre interview, p. 15. See particularly File: 1240, Standard Size of District Study, Cache-Caribou Consolidation, Historical Files, Caribou.

24. Press Release, June 4, 1970, File: Targhee NF History, File 2, Targhee.

25. Vern Hamre to Forest Supervisors, December 6, 1973, File: 1658, Historical Data, 4, Early Administration, Uinta.

26. Daily Herald (Provo), January 4, 1973, File: 1658, Historical Data, 4, Early Administration Uinta; Intermountain Region, Forest Service Organizational Directory, May 1983 Ogden, UT: Intermountain Region, 1983): Hamre interview, pp. 26-28.

27. J.S. Tixier, "Regional Forester Comments—Monday evening, 3/17/86," 1986 District Rangers Conference Proceedings.

28. John R. McGuire to Regional Forester, December 26, 1972, Historical Files, Wasatch-Cache. "Forester Announces Office Shift," undated clipping, ca. 1973, File: Newspaper Clippings, CY 1973, Historical Files, Boise. Frank G. Beitia interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, pp. 16-17, Historical Files, Regional Office.

29. "Forest Service Study Planned," Humboldt Hummer, February 1973, File: Information and Education, Historical Files, Humboldt.

30. "Foresters to Review Need to Shut Office," Salt Lake Tribune, January 5, 1973, File 1658, Historical Data, 4, Early Administration, Historical Files, Uinta; "Forest to Close Bridger Offices," clipping n.d., File: Newspaper Clippings, 1973, Boise.

31. Jackson interview, pp. 21-23. Its FY 1985 Budget was $8.1 million. Some question exists as to the equitability of this distribution since the B-T is considerably larger and its functions more varied than Grand Teton.

32. Lavin interview, pp. 24-25; Robert L. Safran interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, p. 26, Historical Files, Regional Office; Nebeker interview, p. 19.

33. Hamre interview, pp. 28-30; Robert S. McBride interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 37-38, Historical Files, Regional Office; Pat Sheehan, Bonnie Eldredge, and Vern Fridley interview by Thomas G. Alexander, pp. 15-16, Historical Files, Regional Office. (Hereinafter cited as Sheehan interview.)

34. "Forest Service/Bureau of Land Management Interchange: History in the Making . . . If Congress Approves," Intermountain Reporter (Special Edition), May 1985; News release, February 20, 1985, material furnished by Philip B. Johnson of the Regional Office.

35. R. Max Peterson, "The Ranger—Past, Present, and Future," in 1986 District Rangers Conference Proceedings.

36. "Land Swap Draws Fire: Mineral Proposal Hailed," Deseret News, June 21, 1985. Notes taken at the meeting by the author.

37. John Chaffin, "BLM/FS Interchange: Summary of Public Response and Analysis," MS, n.p., n.d., in the author's possession.

38. Sheehan interview, pp. 13-15.

39. This is based on my notes of comments made by R. Max Peterson at the 1986 District Rangers Conference, Boise, ID, March 18, 1986.

40. Hamre interview, pp. 30-31. See also McCrum interview, p. 1, and Sheehan interview, pp. 16-18.

41. "R-4, Organizational Structure Proposal Revealed," Humboldt Hummer, November 1973, p. 2, File: Information and Education, Historical Files, Humboldt.

42. Hamre interview, pp. 20-21.

43. William D. Hurst in a comment on a version of the manuscript.

44. Lee Bennett in Weyers interview, pp. 41-44.

45. Rusty Munn to Jimmy Carter, July 1, 1977, and James Nielson to Rusty Munn, August 5, 1977, File: 2400, Timber, FY 77, D-83, Salmon Notional Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

46. Forest Service Report, 1970-71, p. 34.

47. See E.A. Fournier to Staff, December 23, 1977, File: 1700, Civil Rights, Affirmative Action Plan for Civil Rights, October 1, 1977, September 30, 1978, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

48. J.S. Tixier, "Regional Forester's Message," Intermountain Reporter (August 1984), p. 8.

49. E.A. Fournier to Staff, February 23, 1979, File: 1700, Civil Rights, Civil Rights Affirmative Action Plan for FY 1979, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

50. Hubbard interview, pp. 16-17. Bonnie Eldredge in Sheehan interview, pp. 67-73; David E. Blackner interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 7-8, 12-13, Historical Files, Regional Office.

51. District Rangers Conference Proceedings, 1986.

52. Blackner interview, pp. 13-14.

53. Hamre interview, pp. 34-35; Taylor interview, p. 27.

54. Blackner interview, pp. 14-15.

55. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

56. The following is based on Sterling Wilcox interview, pp. 53-61.

57. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

58. Blackner interview, pp. 6-9: informal discussion with Payette National Forest staff; notes by the author of David Blackner's presentation to the 1986 District Rangers Conference in Boise, ID, March 18, 1986.

59. The following material on promotion procedures is based on Hamre interview, pp. 40-42.

60. Nebeker interview, pp. 37-38. On some less urban forests, offenses still range from the more traditional cutting timber illegally and livestock trespass to taking off-road vehicles into prohibited areas. Beitia interview, pp. 15-16. Ray H. Morrison interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 14-15, Historical Files, Regional Office.

61. Hubbard interview, pp. 12-14.

62. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

63. McCrum interview, pp. 2-3.

64. J.L. Emerson to Bob Banks, September 26, 1973, File: 1680, History, General Collection, Historical Atlas, Historical Files, Salmon; J.S. "Stan" Tixier interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, p. 17, Historical Files, Regional Office.

65. Tixier interview, pp. 17-18. See also Chandler P. St. John interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, Historical Files, Regional Office, pp. 4-5, 34-35; Sheehan interview, pp. 9-10; Nebeker interview, p. 48; Taylor interview, p. 14.

66. St. John interview, passim. Griswold interview, pp. 3-7.

67. Tixier Committee Report, pp. 3, 5.

68. Tom Robinson, "Guest Opinion: Forest Management Act: Wilderness Society Response," Mountain Express, May 17, 1984.

69. High Country News, March 19, 1984.

70. As might be expected, confrontation has characterized the relationship between the Service and the environmental community. On the national level by the mid-1970's, at least two dozen lawsuits were pending, most of which had been entered by the environmental community. Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 311; Lawrence W. Rakestraw, A History of the United States Forest Service in Alaska (Anchorage, AK: United States Forest Service, et al., 1981), p. 153.

71. "Foresters Deplore Forest Service Trends," High Country News, May 28, 1984

72. Tixier interview, pp. 15-19.

73. See Tixier Committee Report and The Friday Newsletter (Washington Office), November 22, 1985.

74. Tixier Committee Report, pp. 23-24.

75. Sheehan interview, p. 2.

76. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

77. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

78. Ibid., p. 57.

79. See: HOST: Intermountain Region Host Program, 1980-81 Action Plan, File: 1680, History, Host Program (1520), Historical Files, Regional Office. See for instance, Robert L. Safran to Forest Supervisors, December 2, 1977, File: 2330, Development Sites in Public Sector, FY 78, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

80. Hamre interview, pp. 42-44. In practice, only the Boise National Forest completed all its unit plans. Lavin interview, pp. 13-14. See for instance D.A. Schultz to District Forest Ranger, December 3, 1970, File: 2130, Ranger District Plans, FY 71, D75, Caribou National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC and Big Piney Land Use Plan, May 25, 1976, File: Final Environmental Statement and Land Use Plan, Big Piney Planning Unit, Bridger-Teton National Forest, Forest Service USDA, current files, Bridger-Teton.

81. Forest Service Report, 1970-71, p. 3. Griswold interview, pp. 7-8. For the procedure to be followed in conducting an environmental analysis see D.A. Schultz to Regional Forester, February 24, 1971, File: 2100, Multiple Use, FY 71, D75, Caribou National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

82. Griswold interview, pp. 3-7.

83. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

84. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

85. Weyers interview, pp. 33-38.

86. Griswold interview, pp. 11-14. For a general discussion of the background and impact of the act from the FS point of view see Forest Service Report, 1974, p. 1: 1975, p. 1.

87. George Cameron Coggins and Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources Law (Mineola, NY: The Foundation Press, 1981), pp. 494-502.

88. Forest Service Report, 1976, p. 2. Sheehan interview, pp. 11-13. Coggins and Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resource Law, pp. 529-33. In commenting on the guidelines set up by the committee of scientists, R. Max Peterson said that no set of guidelines anywhere in the world requires such extensive planning as that required of the Forest Service. Notes on Peterson's comments at the 1986 District Rangers Conference, Boise, ID, March 18, 1986.

89. Jackson interview, p. 1.

90. Griswold interview, p. 16.

91. Ibid., p. 17.

92. "National Forest Wilderness and Rare II Court Decision - State of California v. Berglund [the original name of the case]" MS, n.d., File: Roadless Area Review, Wilderness, 1978, Historical Files, Toiyabe.

93. Griswold interview, pp. 28-31. For the Targhee's original plan see: Proposed Land Management Plan for the Targhee National Forest ([St. Anthony, ID]: [Targhee National Forest], n.d. ca. 1979).

94. "Status of Forest Planning, MS, loose briefing papers, Historical Files, Toiyabe.

95. Hamre interview, pp. 42-44.

96. Griswold interview, p. 14. For an outline of the planning process for the region see: Regional Issues: A Determination of Significant Forest Service Issues in the Intermountain Region ([Ogden, UT]: Intermountain Region, 1979) and A Draft Regional Plan for the Intermountain Region ([Ogden, UT]: Intermountain Region, 1981) in File: 1680, History (Planning), 1900, Historical Files, Regional Office.

97. Nebeker interview, p. 46.

98. Taylor interview, pp. 26-27.

99. Lavin interview, p. 27.

100. Arthur J. Carroll interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 4-6, Historical Files, Regional Office.

101. See Griswold interview, p. 38.

102. Ibid., pp. 31-5.

103. See Carroll interview, pp. 7-8.

104. Burns interview, p. 28.

105. See, for instance, Briefing Guides for the Targhee National Forest, numbers 1, 2, and 4, Historical Files, Targhee.

106. See, for instance, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Land Management Plan for the Targhee National Forest ([St. Anthony, ID]: Targhee National Forest, ca. 1982. The Targhee statement included 8 alternative courses of action ranging from strong emphasis on commodity production through strong emphasis on recreation to a laissez faire management policy, see pp. ii and iii. See Analysis of the Management Situation: Summary ([Richfield, UT]: Fishlake National Forest, 1982,), File copy, Fishlake.

107. See The Proposed Uinta National Forest Plan ([Provo, UT]: Uinta National Forest, ca. 1984) and Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Proposed Management Plan for the Uinta National Forest ([Provo, UT]: Uinta National Forest, ca. 1984).

108. Deseret News, September 5, 1985.

109. Deseret News, November 18, 1985.

110. Peterson in 1986 District Rangers Conference Proceedings, and my notes on his comments.

111. Annual Collection Statements FY 1970 and 1985 furnished by Philip Johnson of the Regional Office. For the condition in the Nation as a whole see Forest Service Report, 1970-71, p. 109; 1982, p. 158.

112. Safran interview, pp. 29-32.

113. Tixier interview, p. 8.

114. Carroll interview, pp. 28-29.

115. Nebeker interview, p. 32.

116. Taylor interview, p. 23.

117. Terry D. Hopson interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 25-26, Historical Files, Regional Office.

118. Jackson interview, pp. 5-6.

119. Hamre interview, pp. 63-65.

120. Lavin interview, pp. 23-24.

121. Richard T. Hauff interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, p. 13, Historical Files, Regional Office.

122. Ibid., p. 17.

123. Nebeker interview, p. 39.

124. Ibid., pp. 39-42.

125. Ibid., pp. 40-43.

126. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

127. Elizabeth M. Smith, History of the Boise National Forest, 1905-1976 (Boise: Idaho State Historical Society, 1983), p. 108. "The Big Noise in the Out-of-Doors," Idaho Statesman, December 25, 1973, File: Newspaper Clippings, CY 1973, Historical Files, Boise.

128. Jeff M. Sirmon to Deputy Regional Forester, Forest Supervisors, and Directors, September 18, 1979, File: 1410, Management Reviews, FY 79, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

129. St. John interview, p. 6. Vern L. Thompson to District Rangers, August 7, 1974, File 2360, Special Management Areas, Current Files, Humboldt.

130. Lavin interview, p. 5; Nebeker interview, p. 44.

131. Carroll interview, pp. 26-27.

132. Hauff interview, pp. 15-18.

133. The following is based on Safran interview, pp. 40-48.

134. St. John interview, p. 3.

135. St. John interview, pp. 19-20. "Ski Lift Inspections—A Job for All Seasons," Intermountain Reporter, December 1981.

136. Nebeker interview, p. 34.

137. Carroll interview, pp. 32-33.

138. Joseph Bauman, "Possible Snowbird Expansion Opposed," Deseret News, November 5, 1985.

139. Vasco M. Tanner, G. Marion Hinckley, Stella H. Oaks, and Gordon Bullock to Vern Hamre, February 14, 1977, File: 1958, Historical Data, 12, Recreation, Historical Files, Uinta. Louis E. Crandall to Clarence Thornock, File: 2720, Special Uses, Four Seasons and Winter Sports, Historical Files, Uinta.

140. "Wasatch Officials Want Heritage Permit Revoked," Deseret News, April 2, 1986.

141. Hauff interview, pp. 16-17.

142. See R.F. Hoag to Regional Forester, October 15, 1976, File: 2720, Special Uses, FY 77, Sawtooth National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

143. Safran interview, pp. 6-7.

144. Jackson interview, pp. 15-17

145. See R. Hoag to Regional Forester, January 19, 1973, with attachments, File: Private Land Regulations, Sawtooth National Recreation Area Headquarters, Ketchum, ID (hereinafter SNRA). "Firm Develops Plans for Towns in Sawtooths," Idaho Statesman, November 11, 1974, File: Newspaper Clippings, CY 1974, Historical Files, Boise.

146. Dean A. Gardner interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 20-23, Historical Files, Regional Office. SNRA Revisited," MS, 1981, Historical Files, Sawtooth.

147. Robert Hoag interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, pp. 2-7, Historical Files, Regional Office. "Discussion of the Sawtooth NRA Minerals Program to Date," MS, 1976, Historical Files, SNRA.

148. Hamre interview, pp. 56-58.

149. Ibid., pp. 58-60.

150. Joel L. Frykman to Andrew R. McConkie, February 5, 1971, File: 2370, Other Areas, Flaming Gorge, 2 of 2, Recreation and Lands Files, Regional Office.

151. Hopson interview, pp. 6-16. In 1972, the region operated nine other visitor centers in addition to the two at Flaming Gorge. News Release, June 7, 1972, File: 1680, History, Interpretive Services (VIS), Historical Files, Regional Office.

152. Intermountain Reporter, July 1984.

153. The following is based on Safran interview, pp. 32-7.

154. Merle W. Wells, "Sawtooth Interpretive Association," MS 1983, Merle W. Wells papers, Idaho State Historical Society.

155. Information supplied the author by Supervisor J. Kent Taylor and Cultural Resource Specialist Robert Leonard of the Fishlake National Forest.

156. Craig W. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 160-61. Forest Service Report, 1972-73, p. 1.

157. Hamre interview, pp. 52-53. Clarence S. Thornock interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 38-39, Historical Files, Regional Office.

158. Hendricks interview, p. 27.

159. Oliver Cliff interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 24-25, Historical Files, Regional Office.

160. Allin, Wilderness, pp. 162-63.

161. Hamre interview, pp. 53-54

162. Sheehan interview, pp. 18-19; Hamre interview, pp. 52-56.

163. George Lafferty interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, p. 9, Historical Files, Regional Office.

164. Tixier interview, pp. 26-28; Sheehan interview, pp. 19-21. "Compromise Breaks Wilderness Log Jam," High Country News, May 14, 1984.

165. High Country News, May 14, 1984. "Wilderness Bill Compromise," Reno Gazette-Journal, May 3, 1984.

166. Joseph Bauman, "President Signs Utah Wilds Bill" Deseret News, September 28, 1984, Raymond Wheeler, "Gunfight in God's Country," Utah Holiday, May 1984, pp. 44-54, 73-76.

167. Peterson, "The Ranger—Past, Present, and Future," 1986 District Ranger Conference Proceedings; The author's notes on Peterson's comments at the conference.

168. Hamre interview, pp. 45-47.

169. Tixier interview, pp. 8-10.

170. Jackson interview, pp. 19-20.

171. For a list of the various threatened and endangered species in the Intermountain Region see: Threatened and Endangered Animal and Plant Species (Ogden, UT: Intermountain Region, 1980). Other important species include the whooping crane and anadromous fish like the salmon and steelhead. See Hendricks interview, pp. 34-35: Hauff interview, pp. 4, 8-9. The following discussion is based on Jackson interview, pp. 8-11 and Burns interview, pp. 10-14.

172. Bridger-Teton, Shoshone, Gallatin, and Targhee National Forests, and Grand Teton and Yellowstone National Parks, Guidelines for Management Involving Grizzly Bears in the Greater Yellowstone Area (n.p.: 1979), pp. 3-4.

173. Jackson interview, pp. 17-18.

174. Tixier interview, pp. 11-12.

175. D.M. "Mike" Gaufin interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 26-28, 34, Historical Files, Regional Office.

176. Thornock interview, pp. 25-26.

177. Beitia interview, pp. 7-10.

178. Nebeker interview, pp. 20-22.

179. William A. Johnson and Donald A. Schultz interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 38-43, 54, Historical Files, Regional Office.

180. Johnson and Schultz interview, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 8-9. Forest Service Report, 1972-73, p. 3.

181. Reed Christensen interview, pp. 35-42; Bill N. Savage interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 8-10, Historical Files, Regional Office; Burns interview, pp. 21-22; Carroll interview, pp. 22-24; Taylor interview, pp. 7-8; Johnson and Schultz interview, pp. 32-34.

182. Johnson and Schultz interview, pp. 22-25, 29-30.

183. Hendricks interview, pp. 9-11, 20-23, 67. Idaho Statesman, File: Newspaper Clippings, CY 1974, Historical Files, Boise.

184. Sheehan interview, pp. 45-49; St. John interview, pp. 5-6, 24; Hamre interview, pp. 67-68; Gardner interview, pp. 23-24.

185. Deseret News, October 27, December 25, 1985.

186. Burns interview, pp. 20-21. Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Island Park Geothermal Area, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming (n.p.: Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, 1980), see especially pp. i and 88-89.

187. Taylor interview, p. 10.

188. The following is based on George Roether, Edward Harvey, Robert Cottingham, and Orville Engleby interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, Historical Files, Regional Office. (Hereinafter cited as Roether interview.)

189. See for instance, John Oien to John Emerson, May 5, 1977, File: 2400, Timber, FY 77-D-83, Salmon National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC; Jeffrey P. Reiner to Fairfield District Ranger, July 18, 1978, Frank Gunnell et al. to Forest Supervisor, July 28, 1978, and Frank Gunnell to District Ranger, July 20, 1978, File: 2630, Habitat, FY 78, Sawtooth National Forest Records, ibid.

190. The average survival rate between 1979 and 1983 was 83 percent, and in 1983, the region reached a 92-percent survival rate. "R-4, First Year Planting Survival by Forests," table supplied by the Regional Timber Management Staff.

191. See, for instance, Who Says We Can't Grow Spruce ([Ogden, UT]: Intermountain Region, n.d.).

192. The Sawmill Improvement Program: A National Program to Help the Nation Meet Its Need for Timber (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975): Improved Harvesting Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); Felling and Bucking (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

193. Lavin interview, pp. 16-18, 20.

194. Michael Frome, The Forest Service, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 80-81: Hamre interview, p. 11.

195. The following discussion is based on Wyoming Forest Study Team, Forest Management in Wyoming: Timber Harvest and the Environment on the Teton, Bridger, Shoshone, and Bighorn National Forests (n.p.: Forest Service, 1971); and Hamre interview, pp. 11-14.

196. Hamre interview, pp. 1-4.

197. See Safran interview, pp. 48-59.

198. On the pulp mill situation see in addition, Roether interview, pp. 70-71; Gaufin interview pp. 32-22, 36-37; D.M. Gaufin to Floyd Iverson, January 14, 1969, Richard J. Auchter to Regional Forester, December 23, 1968, and Gordon Watts to Assistant Regional Foresters and Forest Supervisors, January 9, 1969, File: 1680, Timber Management (2400), Packet entitled "Pulp Study: Green River—Early 1960's," Historical Files, Regional Office.

199. See also Edward C. Maw interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, p. 16, Historical Files, Regional Office.

200. See, in addition, St. John interview, pp. 10-11; Maw interview, pp. 27-28.

201. Hauff interview, pp. 5-11. Hauff also mentioned the work with smaller companies which was an attempt to promote smaller business and to maintain employment in smaller communities.

202. Nebeker interview, pp. 27-28: Taylor interview, pp. 21-22.

203. Carroll interview, pp. 15-17; Burns interview, pp. 9-10.

204. The discussion is based on New Directions in Management on the Bighorn, Shoshone, & Bridger-Teton National Forests (n.p. Intermountain Region and Rocky Mountain Region, 1983). See also Sheehan interview, pp. 30-33 for background.

205. Tixier interview, pp. 2-4.

206. See 1983 report, pp. 76-85.

207. "New Directions in Management, A Forest Service Response to the 1983 Update of the Wyoming Report covering the Bridger-Teton, Shoshone, and Bighorn National Forests," (n.p., 1983).

208. For discussions of the dispute over clearcutting see Frome, Forest Service, pp. 117-18; and Steen, Forest Service, p. 315.

209. This discussion is based on Jackson interview, pp. 3-6; Hamre interview, pp. 11-14; and Burns interview, pp. 4-6.

210. See Targhee Lodgepole: A Pioneering Effort in Deadwood Salvage (St. Anthony, ID: Targhee National Forest, 1979). See also Bob Roos, "Beetle Forcing Targhee Forest to Clear Out Half of Trees," Deseret News, November 24-25, 1983.

211. For a discussion of these matters see Carroll interview, pp. 13-20, and Hopson interview, passim.

212. Joseph M. Bauman, "Is Pine Beetle Real Reason for Doubling Timber Harvest?" Deseret News, November 10, 1984.

213. Mark Warbis, "Idaho Tree Harvest Called a Contrived Emergency that Could Ravage Area," Deseret News, November 12, 1985, "Forest Service Says No Delaying Timber Sale," Deseret News, November 15, 1985.

214. Gaufin interview, pp. 42-43.

215. Gardner interview, pp. 18-20.

216. William J. Bryan to Chief, May 29, 1975, with attachment, File: 2400, Timber, FY 75, DP, May-June 1975, Regional Office Files, RG 95, Denver FRC.

217. Hamre interview, pp. 5-9; Cox interview, pp. 24-26; Nebeker interview, pp. 3-4.

218. Hooper interview, pp. 24-25; Cliff interview, pp. 16-21.

219. Hooper interview, pp. 29-31; Taylor interview, pp. 16-17; Christensen interview, p. 49.

220. See Ira W. Hatch interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 17-18, Historical Files, Regional Office; Kenneth R. Genz interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, p. 15, Historical Files, Regional Office.

221. Burns interview, p. 12; Beitia interview, p. 22-23.

222. Carroll interview, pp. 20-22.

223. Nebeker interview, pp. 16-17.

224. St. John interview, pp. 26-27.

225. Tixier interview, pp. 4-5.

226. Taylor interview, pp. 12-15.

227. Hendricks interview, pp. 11-12; Beitia interview, pp. 18-19.

228. Jackson interview, pp. 7-8.

229. Hauff interview, pp. 12-13.

230. Maw interview, p. 23.

231. Hopson interview, p. 26.

232. William D. Hurst in a comment on a draft of the manuscript.

233. Beitia interview, pp. 18-21; Nebeker interview, pp. 12-13.

234. Beitia interview, pp. 12-13.

235. Cliff interview, pp. 26-28; Hamre interview, pp. 22-23.

236. Hooper interview, pp. 25-26.

237. Taylor interview, pp. 16-19; Hooper interview, pp. 19-20.

238. Hallie L. Cox interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 33-36, Historical Files, Regional Office.

239. Tixier interview, pp. 10-11.

240. Taylor interview, pp. 20-21.

241. Hooper interview, pp. 34-35.

242. Reed Christensen interview, pp. 49-51.

243. The following is based on Genz interview, pp. 1-12.

244. Cox interview, p. 26.

245. Nebeker interview, p. 15.

246. Hooper interview, pp. 26-28; Deseret News, January 9, 1985.

247. Cox interview, p. 28; Gordon Eliot White, "Higher Fees for Grazing Proposed," Deseret News, March 31, 1985.

248. Deseret News, March 26, April 18, 1985, January 5, 1986; Daily Herald, June 11, 1985; Tom Wolf, "Grazing Fees: Making a Good Deal a Fair Deal," Northern Lights 1 (July-August 1985): 18,20.

249. See Vern Hamre, "Sagebrush Rebellion," Paper prepared for delivery to the Idaho Wildlife Federation Meeting, Coeur D'Alene, December 7, 1979, copy in personal papers of Vern Hamre, Gallatin Gateway, MT.

250. Hamre interview, pp. 47-50; Sheehan interview, pp. 22-26; transcripts of talks in Vern Hamre's private papers, Gallatin Gateway, MT.