A History of Forest Conservation in the Pacific Northwest, 1891-1913

The act of 1891 was taken advantage of promptly in Colorado, New Mexico, California, and Wyoming. Groups in these states, such as the Sierra Club and the Colorado Forestry Association, had long desired such a law, which made possible the creation of those reserves the West had agitated for during the last decade. Within two years of the passage of the enabling law, 16 reserves in the western states, plus one in Alaska, were established with an area of over 17 million acres. As Fernow wrote:

The reservations were established usually on the petition of citizens residing in the respective states and after a due examination, the forestry association acting as an intermediary. [1]

The mechanics of the act were simple. Memorials or petitions by interested persons or groups were sent in, to the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of the General Lend Office, or the President; all of these eventually came into the hands of the Commissioner. The area under question was examined by Special Agents of the Land Office, who collected information not only on the desirability of reserving the area, but also of public sentiment in reference to the proposed withdrawal. If the reports were favorable, notice of the impending withdrawal would be published in a newspaper printed in the area for a period of six weeks, to allow full expression of public opinion on the matter. Then, if in the opinion of the Commissioner and the Secretary, the withdrawal seemed justified, they would make their recommendation to the President, and the withdrawal would be made. [2]

In the Pacific Northwest there were no such groups as existed in Colorado and in California, working closely with the eastern forestry associations. The Oregon Alpine Club, which might well have become the prime mover in such matters, had no eastern connection, and what James High has called an "obscure rider" to another bill passed without notice. [3] Nevertheless, there existed forces, in city needs and in recreational desires, which led to use of the bill within a short time.

I

Ashland, Oregon, was at this time the largest town in southwestern Oregon. Located in a fertile intermontane valley near Bear Creek, the largest tributary of Rogue River, her physical assets were considerable. The town was on the line of the Oregon and California railroad, and had therefore direct connection with both Portland and California. The climate was mild and adapted to fruit growing; peach growing had been tried with such success that a packing and canning plant had located there. A woolen mill, a saw mill, a grist mill and a five-stamp quartz mill were located in the city; and cultural life was enriched by the presence there of one of the state normal schools. Stock raisers in the foothills, and prospectors in the mountains, made this their supply center. Ashland's proximity to Crater Lake, and the presence near the city of soda springs and hot springs, were gaining her some repute as a tourist center. An ample supply of pure water was available from Bear Creek, which headed in the mountains to the south, in the basins around Ashland Butte, a snow-covered peak of 8,000 feet elevation, some twelve miles to the south. The population of the city had doubled in a period of ten years, from 842 in 1880 to 1,784 in 1890. [4]

In 1889, the water works were enlarged and relocated at a higher elevation, to take care of the increased city needs. But there was need to protect the water supply. With this in mind, at a joint meeting of the mayor and City Council and the Board of Trade in 1892, a petition was drafted and sent to Senator J. N. Dolph of Oregon. The petition requested that a forest reserve be created in Township 40 and part of Township 39 S, R 1E, W.M., to the south of the city, from which area they obtained their water. The area to be reserved, they wrote, was timber land, and they needed it to protect their water supply from "timber land speculators and other types of vandals." Dolph forwarded the letter to the President, who sent it to the Land Office for consideration.

The petition languished for some time; as will be seen, the question of the type and number of reserves to be created in the Cascades became a tangled one. About a year later Max Pracht, an employee of the Treasury Department, investor in suburban development called Peachblow Paradise Orchards, and perpetual writer of letters to the editor, wrote again, asking for a reserve, lest timber land speculators locate in the area and "mulct" the people of Ashland. No protests to the reserve were filed, and the reserve was proclaimed on September 28, 1893, the same day that the Cascade Reserve was created. [5]

II

Portland, also, began to take action at this time. As the largest and most rapidly growing city in the state, she, too, was concerned about her water supply. The water supply had been from springs, wet weather creeks, and the Willamette River, all of which were unsatisfactory. By a legislative act of 1885, the city was authorized to purchase or construct a more suitable system and a Water Committee was formed to consider the matter.

Various sources were considered; but, finally, on the recommendation of C. B. Talbot, a civil engineer, it was decided to get water from the Bull Run River, thirty miles east of the city. Talbot, to insure getting the water, filed a claim on the stream for water rights, but there was the need to safeguard it further. [6]

Probably as a result of discussion of the problem at their monthly meeting, Henry Failing, Chairman of the Water Commission, wrote to the Commissioner of the Land Office in January, 1892, asking that a reserve be created. A pipeline, he said, was under construction from Portland to the head works, where a flow of 7,000 gallons per minute, ample for the city's needs, could be obtained. Cutting of timber in the area, he feared, would destroy the purity and diminish the flow of the water; consequently a reserve should be established. The communication was apparently forwarded through Senator Dolph. At a meeting of the Water Committee on March 2, 1892, Chairman Failing reported that Senator Dolph had recommended the withdrawal of the area by Presidential order, by which action it could only be restored to entry through act of Congress. Dolph also reported that he had endorsed the request and sent it to Senator Mitchell and Representative Herman for their signatures. [7]

On March 12, Thomas H. Carter, Commissioner of the General Land Office, wrote to the Secretary of the Interior, citing the communication from the Water Committee, and asking that the area be reserved under the act of March 3, 1891. Meantime the Water Committee received support from the Oregon Alpine Club, which had just awakened to the fact that they had a golden opportunity to reserve the Mt. Hood area. (Their activities will be described in detail in connection with formation of the Cascade Reserve.) On April 30 Frank Dodge wrote to C. E. Loomis, Special Agent of the Land Office in charge of investigating the area, describing the area and urging the withdrawal of it to protect it from invasion by sheepmen, whose habits of "light-burning" would endanger the water supply. Loomis made his examination some time between April 30 and May 21. He found the area suitable for reserve purposes; no objections to the withdrawal were filed at that time, and on June 17, 1892, the area was withdrawn from entry as the Bull Run Timberland Reserve. [8]

III

Meantime another reserve had been created to the north. Some time in 1891, Cyrus A. Mosier, a Special Agent of the General Land Office stationed in Seattle, received orders to examine the area around Mt. Rainier, and to sound out how the people felt about such a withdrawal. [9] On a trip to the Puget Sound cities, to sample public opinion, he found the time opportune, since there had been heavy floods. In meetings, he used the following points as arguments for creating the reserve: (1) that the reserve would not be noticed, since abundant timber was available; (2) that privately owned timber would become enhanced in value by the withdrawal; (3) that denuding the land toward the headwaters would cause floods and soil erosion; (4) and that by reserving the land at the foot of the mountain, the mountain would remain unsullied in her setting. [10]

Mosier made some preliminary trips to the mountain in 1891, and followed them up in 1892. On July 21-30 of that year, he traveled by way of Eatonville to Longmeier; in August to the headwaters of the Puyallup River; in September to Cowlitz Pass, and in late September over Naches Pass to Yakima. His report, accompanied by photographs, gives a good account of the topography, flora and fauna of the area, of the progress of irrigation in Yakima and of the light-burning habits of sheepmen; but its chief theme is the beauty of the mountain. [11]

In his official report he proposed withdrawal of some 967,680 acres, lying between the meridians 121 and 122. His recommendation includes statements to the effect that the withdrawal would prevent floods, and that no agricultural lands were involved; but his main point was the unique scenic beauty of the area. Botanists, zoologists, and geologists, he pointed out, would benefit by the withdrawal. There would no objections to it by the people of the state, because "it is the wish of the people of Washington that these and other such lands be set aside for national park purposes." They felt "the patriotic pride and desire to protect unique natural beauty manifested by the people in the establishment of Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks." [12]

A number of letters came to the office of the Commissioner supporting the proposed withdrawal. These included T. R. Kemp of Seattle; J. Hampton, Land Commissioner of the Kirkland Land and Lumber Company; Byron Phelps, County Treasurer of King County; and F. A. Twichell, County Auditor. The Board of Trustees of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce also wrote favoring it, stressing the fact that denuding the land would cause floods. No opposition to the reserve was received, with the possible exception of the Commercial Club of Tacoma. In a letter to President Harrison, they wrote that they were for the reserve, but against having the name "Rainier" appear in it. The area was withdrawn February 20, 1893—under the name of the Pacific Forest Reserve. [13]

IV

There had been little protest against proclamation of the Pacific, the Bull Run and the Ashland reserves; the reserves were comparatively small, their purpose was obvious, they had been created at the wish of the people living in the vicinity, and sentiment, so far as can be judged, was well-nigh universally for them. The case was different with the Cascade reserve. The very magnitude of the reserve, an area 234 miles long and covering an area of 4,492,800 acres, made it inevitable that some protest should arise from users of the area. More important was the fact that an element of fraud entered in; that a land ring, taking advantage of the genuine desire for forest reserves, was able, through manipulation of the land laws, to enrich itself at the public expense.

There had long been a desire in Oregon that Mt. Hood, like Crater Lake, be withdrawn as a park. Creating reserves before 1891 had taken congressional action, which was slow, and apparently Oregonians had missed the significance of the act of March 3, 1891. People were awakened to its significance by an article in the Morning Oregonian for March 25, 1892. R. G. Savery, a Special Agent for the General Land Office, was interviewed, and said that the land could be easily reserved. The text of the law was published. Savery stated that he had sufficient data to make recommendations on Mt. Hood, and would be in Washington, D. C., in May and June to present the recommendations in person. He asked for communications from people living in the vicinity in order that local sentiment on the proposal might be evaluated, and suggested that the Alpine Club, the Chamber of Commerce, and other groups collect such information. Above all, there was need to do it at once, before settlers took up the land. [14]

By April 14, the Alpine Club had taken up the idea. Two Land Office agents were working on the reservation project, R. G. Savery on the Mt. Hood area and C. E. Loomis on the Bull Run Reserve, petitioned for by the Portland Water Commission. The plans were for the Water Commission and the Alpine Club to meet and ask for a reserve to include both Mt. Hood and the Bull Run water site. They also got aid from the town of Hood River, where S. F. Blythe of that city headed a committee to get the headwaters of Hood River reserved. The lumbermen, Blythe reported, were working toward the headwaters of the river, and these should be protected as a source of irrigation water for the valley. The Hood River group asked the assistance of the Alpine Club, and stated that they were circulating a petition among the people of that valley. [15]

Meantime, another group came on the scene. A group of land speculators, led by Stephen A. D. Puter, saw their chance to profit by loopholes in the land laws. Under the Oregon state laws, state school land could be sold at $1.25 per acre and the language of the law made it mandatory that it be so sold on demand by a purchaser. The law called for one fourth the payment down. Also under federal law, the state was entitled to indemnity for all unsurveyed school sections within a reserve or reservation of any kind. Hence, by buying school land at $1.25 per acre, in advance of creation of a reserve, speculators could use this as base to exchange for valuable timber land worth $2.50 per acre. Reviving the idea expressed in Waldo's Memorial, that a reserve be created to include the whole crest of the Cascade Mountains in Oregon, they took the proposal, and a linen map with the suggested boundary on it, to W. G. Steel, who was already busy promoting the Mt. Hood Reserve, and suggested that he ask for the whole range, rather than a part of it. Steel swallowed the bait, and in his usual energetic fashion began rounding up petitions for the larger reserve. [16]

By mid-April the organized campaign was under way. On April 13, a petition was mailed to the General Land Office from the people of Klamath County, asking that the office create further reserves around Crater Lake "for the double purpose of protecting the scenery and to protect the timber and underbrush of said lands."

Fifty-two people from Klamath Falls and vicinity signed it, including the county judge, the sheriff and his deputies, the county attorney and the county surveyor. Another group got in touch with the American Forestry Association, which forwarded a petition for such a reserve to Senator Mitchell, who in turn endorsed it and sent it to the Secretary of the Interior on April 14. [17]

On April 27, another petition was prepared. Addressed to the President of the United States, it pointed out that the Cascade Range forms a continuous watershed from north to south in Oregon; that the mountains are covered with timber and underbrush, "because of which the snows of winter are carried into summer, and an enormous reservoir of moisture maintained, by means of which the climate of the state is so regulated that droughts on the Western slope are utterly unknown." The sources of the streams, the memorial continued, should be maintained; the region was valueless for agriculture, and but poorly mineralized. Protection was needed against sheepmen, who used this for summer range, and started fires to increase the area of range land, thereby endangering the water supply. They petitioned, therefore, for withdrawal of at least the Mt. Hood, Bull Run and Crater Lake areas, and if the President saw fit, for the remaining portions of the Cascade Range.

The petition, prepared by the Oregon Alpine Club, and signed by the Club's president, George Markle, a Portland banker, and its secretary, G. Perrot, had a long list of endorsers. It included such state officials as Sylvester Pennoyer, the Governor; the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer, State Printer, State Auditor, and Superintendent of Public Instruction; and other worthies, such as Harvey Scott, editor of the Oregonian; The Postmaster and the Mayor of Ashland; John B. Waldo; W. B. Gilbert, U. S. Circuit Court Justice; and W. L. Boise, Chairman of the Republican State Committee. W. G. Steel signed it on July 20, and G. W. Farnsworth and R. E. Baker of Klamath Falls on September 7. A second petition of the same tone was signed by H. W. Corbett, newly elected President of the Alpine Club, and George H. Himes, Secretary, and endorsed by William Ladd, Justice of the State Supreme Court; John Gates, Mayor of Portland; Daniel McCleary, President of the Portland Board of Trade; and J. T. Apperson, President of the Oregon City Board of Trade. Other signers included the mayors of Oregon City, The Dalles, and Salem; The Dalles Board of Trade; F. L. Mays, U. S. Attorney, and Binger Herman. In July R. G. Savery investigated the area and found sentiment overwhelmingly for the reserve. [18]

In November, two petitions were filed by homesteaders, one containing 85 names, the other well over 100. Stating that the reserve would interfere with their homesteading, they asserted that the desire for the reserve was solely on the part of "a few wealthy Residents of the City of Portland and its environments." They felt that ten statute miles from timber line on Mt. Hood was all that should be allowed for the reserve. About the same time, too, there apparently came in some protests from the Bohemian Mines, in the southern part of the state. [19]

Aware of these protests, and perhaps also aware that the full reserve would redound to the benefit of timber speculators, the Oregon Alpine Club filed a second petition, endorsed by the Portland Chamber of Commerce, in January, 1893. They had found that the entire requested reserve would interfere with mining in the Cascades, they said, and asked that the reserves be limited to Mt. Hood and Crater Lake. [20] Meantime, however, Senator J. N. Dolph, who had come out strongly for the reserves as early as June, 1892, [21] had communicated with the Oregon State Senate on January 25, 1893, asking their pleasure in the matter of reserves. The Senate produced, by unanimous consent, a Joint Resolution in favor of the reserve. Stating their full endorsement of the principle of establishing timber reservations under the act of March 3, 1891, they asked for the immediate establishment of the Crater Lake and Mt. Hood reserves, and asked:

the enlargement and extension of each said reservation so as to include the whole crest of the Cascade Mountains in Oregon, with a convenient space on each side thereof, just as soon as the same can be intelligently done after a proper but thorough investigation by the Interior Department of any vested interest as may be in such a territory. [22]

Meantime, Steel became aware that if the entire reserve was created there would be fraud. In a letter to E. A. Bowers of the General Land Office, on May 1, 1893, he asked for creation of the Mt. Hood and the Crater Lake reserve, stating:

The desire is universal in this state, except among a few timber sharks, who hope to benefit by the withdrawal of the entire Cascade Range, for the immediate establishment of both these reservations.

He had, it was true, at first circulated a petition for the withdrawal of the whole range, but subsequently his attention had been called to the fact that "we were being made the innocent tools of designing men to work an injury on the state." His objection to withdrawal of all was due first to the fact that it would interfere with the mines. [23]

There came other demands for the smaller reserves also, from John H. Cradlebaugh, publisher of the Hood River Glacier, and C. W. Kimball of Roseburg, who like Steel felt that the large reserves played in the hands of the "lieu" land sharks. [24] However, either the Land Office ignored these requests or felt that arguments for the entire reserve outweighed those for the smaller ones; at any rate, on September 28, 1893, the Cascade Range Reserve, reaching from the Columbia River nearly to the California border, was created. [25]

V

During the period 1891-97 no further important legislation was passed in regard to administration of the forest reserves. The forests remained reserved areas, not open to settlement, exploitation or speculation, but vulnerable as before to fire and theft save for such limited protection as the special agents of the Land Office could give them. It took six years to remedy this situation. In the absence of specific legislation, the Secretary of the Interior construed the reservations as withdrawn not only from sale and entry, but from any use whatsoever. The Department felt itself powerless to protect or to utilize the area.

After proclamation of the Cascade Range Reserve, it was tacitly agreed that no further reserves would be created until a modus operandi was established. Fernow, head of the Division of Forestry and of the American Forestry Association, had since 1887 brought up bills annually for passage but they had generally failed under the weight of political maneuvering. The problem of a system was not easy to settle; the relative merits of using the General Land Office to run the reserves, or of creating a new bureau; the type of permanent regulations to prevent fire, regulate timber cutting, and fashion general policies; whether the army could be used for protection of the forests in lieu of a protective force; all these matters were pondered. Above all, there was the usual apathy of Congress towards forest legislation.

In 1893 some action was taken toward getting a comprehensive forest bill. Through Representative McRae of Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, Fernow succeeded in getting a bill introduced that he had himself drafted. The McRae bill provided that new reserves should only be created to improve the forest within the reserved area, and to secure favorable conditions of water flow or a continuous supply of timber. The Secretary of the Interior would make provision for protection of the timber from depredation, and make rules and regulations regarding occupancy, timber cutting, and protection of the forest cover. Timber would be sold to the highest bidder, after appraisal, at not less than its appraised value, and notice of such sales would be published for thirty days in a newspaper of general circulation in the area. The sales would be for cash. Troops might be used to protect the reserves, and agricultural lands within the reserve might be restored to entry by the President, on recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior after sixty days public notice.

The bill was strongly supported by the American Forestry Association, the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture, and the General Land Office, and was reported from committee favorably. In debate, however, it met with opposition from various western groups. Binger Hermann of Oregon led the attack, and pointed out some justifiable weaknesses in the bill. He felt that grazing and mining lands should also be excluded from the reserves at the discretion of the Secretary, as well as agricultural land. Also, he felt the Secretary of the interior had too much power to sell timber. A supplementary amendment, added in committee at the suggestion of Edward Bowers, Assistant Commissioner of the Land Office, had provided that the Secretary could sell timber outside the reserves, as well as in, on the same terms; and this, Hermann thought, would lead to overcutting. Hermann favored permitting sale of only dead and mature timber, and limiting the area of timber sold to a single individual to 320 acres. He also felt that in a large state such as Oregon, publication of notices of timber sales and of removal of agricultural lands from the reserves should be printed in the newspaper nearest the area affected. His views on cutting were backed by Doolittle of Washington, who could find no redeeming feature in the bill except the use of the army as a guard. [26] No action was taken on the bill in 1893.

The bill came up again in 1894. Again it was attacked by Hermann, as favoring the large millmen at the expense of the smaller ones. [27] Amended in committee, it provided for the sale of dead and mature timber only; permission to prospectors in the reserve; and two newspapers to advertise timber sales or elimination of agricultural lands. These essentially met Hermann's objections; and he backed the bill, as did most of the western congressmen, as a fair compromise, and the bill passed the House.

In the Senate the bill was amended somewhat. Money from timber sales was to be put in a separate account. A provision was added that if a bona fide entryman should locate on land and obtain a patent he might relinquish it to the government, and in lieu thereof get a tract of the same size from the public domain. The bill passed the Senate in 1895, but through a fluke did not become law. It was sent back to the House to iron out the differences in the bills, but McRae had been called home due to the illness of his daughter and was unable to pilot it through committee. It was referred to the Public Lands Committee and from lack of time died there. [28]

Such was the situation in 1896. During this time, the reserves had been merely withdrawn areas, not subject to entry but not protected from trespass or depredation. In 1892 the Secretary of the Interior had suggested that federal troops be used to prevent trespass of sheep in the reserved areas, as was done in Yosemite and General Grant National Parks; but this use of troops was held to be unconstitutional. [29] Meantime, the problems caused by lack of any rules for governing the reserves multiplied. There were too few special agents available to carry on the work of surveying new reserves and preventing trespass on old. [30] Many recreational groups had petitions before the Secretary asking for new reserves; but without the laws to administer them he was unwilling to go ahead. [31]

The reserves had also evoked in some regions powerful hostility. Sheepmen in Oregon, for example, resented closing of the Cascade Mountains to grazing, and petitioned for the reopening of the area to pasturage. Counter memorials were presented by citizens with other interests, who called attention to the motives of the sheepmen and pointed out that maintenance of the forests was essential to the protection of city watersheds and of water for irrigation. One typical letter ran:

I wish to say . . . that I have lived in Oregon all my life and I have seen the government looted of its coal lands, its timber lands and swamp lands and pretty nearly everything of any value which it contained until now the only asset left is the land and timber contained in this reserve. The timber lands of the Cascade Reserve, Mr. President, should be held inviolate for all time to come. They are the common heritage of the people. These forests act as reservoirs to hold in storage the rains and snowfalls which go to make up our navigable streams and water courses, and are of vital importance to the people who inhabit this country. [32]

William Gladstone Steel, writing to Fernow, stated that there was need for passage of the McRae bill, which the bulk of the people were behind. He stated that the greatest need was for small sales, of 160 acres or less, to fill local needs of settlers. [33]

Moreover, at this time, there occurred a split in the forestry ranks themselves. Fernow, as head of the government Bureau of Forestry, desired to continue his program of gradualism, educating the public, and creating no further new reserves until Congress had completed plans for administering the existing ones. However, a number of men interested in forestry, including Robert Underwood Johnson, editor of Century Magazine and chief spokesman of John Muir in the east; Charles Sprague Sargent of Harvard; and Gifford Pinchot, forester at the Vanderbilt estate at Biltmore, North Carolina, wanted more action. They felt that Fernow's fabian policies were too slow. More could be accomplished, they thought, by having a commission of experts appointed to examine the reserves and make recommendations for governing them. Fernow opposed this plan on grounds that such action might well antagonize the public, that it would discover nothing new, and that it would put his own plans for getting a forestry bill through the next session of Congress in danger. The activists were aided, however, by petitions from the New York Chamber of Commerce, the New York Board of Trade, and the City Council of Los Angeles, asking for action to save the reserved areas. After some acrimonious discussion, a majority of the American Forestry Association voted in favor of such a commission, and Congress gave an appropriation of $25,000 to the National Academy of Sciences for carrying out such an investigation. [34]

The commission consisted of Charles S. Sargent, professor of horticulture at Harvard University; Henry L. Abbot, Army engineer; Alexander Agassiz, curator of the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology; Arnold Hague, geologist; and Gifford Pinchot, at the time a consulting forester. They traveled through the west in the summer of 1896, accompanied through part of their tour by John Muir. [35] Their purposes, as expressed in their letter of authorization by Hoke Smith, Secretary of the Interior, was to determine:

(1) Is it desirable and practicable to preserve from fire and to maintain permanently as forest lands those portions of the public domain now bearing wood growth, for the supply of timber?

(2) How far does the influence of forest upon climate, soil and water conditions make desirable a policy of forest conservation in regions where the public domain is principally situated?

(3) What specific legislation should be enacted to remedy the evils now confessedly existing? [36]

The President desired an early report from the commission; but the commission had difficulty in arriving at a unanimous decision. The commission was in agreement as to the creation of a number of new reserves, and also creation of Mt. Rainier and Grand Canyon National Parks. Beyond that, there was wide differences of opinion. Hague and Pinchot were in favor of making a public statement at the time of creation of the new reserves, that a plan for administration was under way. The majority of the commission refused to make such a statement. Sargent favored use of the army to police the reserves, but this proposal was opposed by Pinchot and by Hague. The final report of the commission was largely the product of Sargent; Pinchot furnished the descriptions of the reserves, and discussion as to depredations by fire and sheep in the west was largely the product of John Muir. [37]

The recommendations of the commission were wide. The first part of the report discussed the role of forests in regulating stream flow, reducing floods and continuing the flow during the dry season. Here their conclusions, made without any background of information from this country, were based on European sources. They felt that the bounds of national forests should be extended, and that a forest administration should be formed as soon as possible to save the forests from illegal timber cutting, fire, and pasturage. Fires, they reported, were often started by "shepherds who make fires in the autumn to clear the ground and improve the growth of forage plants for the following year." In Oregon and in California, they reported "great bands of sheep, often owned by foreigners . . . driven in spring into the high Sierra and Cascade ranges," carrying desolation with them, eating "every blade of grass, the tender, growing shoots of shrubs and seedling trees," loosening the soil, producing conditions favorable to flood, and by destruction of sod and undergrowth hastening the evaporation of water and the melting of snow in the spring. On the east side of the Cascades, great flocks, wintering in the sheltered valleys of the Snake River, and seeking summer range in eastern Oregon, destroyed herbage and forests in the mountains; and sheep herds in eastern Washington and Oregon were driven every summer across Idaho and Wyoming, "eating bare as they go the pastures of ranchmen and carrying ruin in their path." Since the commercial value of the sheep was small—the figures given by the commission were 5,958,348 in Washington, Oregon and California, with an annual wool clip of five million dollars value—the commission felt that their value was minor as compared with the damage done to the forest. The forests, therefore, should be freed from their presence. [38]

The recommendations called for extension of the reserve system and protection of the reserves by armed forces until legislation for their protection was passed. They desired that the legislation enable the Secretary of the Interior to make rules for use of the forests, including mining, cutting timber, and rights of way for highways, irrigation ditches and flumes. Grazing was not mentioned. The commission recommended the creation of thirteen new reserves, three of them in the state of Washington; the Washington reserve, 3,594,240 acres in extent, consisting of the region from the Canadian border to a little below the forty-eighth degree of latitude, and from the 120th—122nd meridian; the Olympic reserve, an area of 2,188,800 acres on the Olympic Peninsula; and the Mt. Rainier reserve, enlarging the Pacific reserve to 2,234,880 acres by extension to the west and to the south as far as the Columbia River. [39]

The formal committee report was not printed until May 1, 1897, and had little effect on the formation and governing of the reserves. It was widely read, however, and created an ill impression on many of the people in the region who read it. The tone of the report was unfortunate; it was dogmatic, opinionated, undiplomatic, and pretentious. Local pride or prejudices were treated in a roughshod manner. The statement that Mt. Rainier "is no longer called Tacoma beyond the limits of that city" was hardly calculated to win friends among local patriots. Brushing off the wool industry as unimportant, when it was in fact the livelihood of a good number of people in Oregon and California, with powerful supporters in Congress, was unwise. No press conferences or public meetings had been held during the western trip to get public opinion behind them. To many, the report seemed to be the work of eastern theorists and crackpots—this despite the fact that two members of the commission, Brewer and Hague, had a wide and peculiar acquaintance with the west.

Moreover, to many the statements contained in the report were inaccurate or biased. The trip was not a thorough examination of the forests, but as Fernow accurately called it, a "junket"; it was a hit-and-miss affair, rather than a real examination. Of the thirteen new reserves they recommended be created, five—the Bighorn and Teton in Wyoming, the Black Hills of South Dakota, and the Olympic and Washington of Washington—were not visited by the commission; rather, they relied on other reports. Sheepmen disputed the statements on damage done by grazing in the forests. Finally, the statements on waterflow and snow melt, citing as authority European studies, seemed to some local scientists like John Minto unsound and pseudo-scientific. John Minto, himself, from local observation, had reached other conclusions. [40]

Even before the report was published, however, the President took action. On January 29 Sargent sent a report to Professor Wolcott Gibbs of the National Academy, describing and recommending creation of thirteen new reserves, the description of which Pinchot had worked out a few days before. Gibbs sent the report to the Secretary of the Interior, who sent it to Cleveland with the suggestion that he make Washington's birthday an occasion for proclaiming the reserves. Cleveland, fearful that his successor, McKinley, would reverse the reserve policy, proclaimed the reserves on February 22, 1897. [41]

The withdrawals raised a storm of protest in many parts of the west. The Forester analyzed the causes for the protests as being:

(a) Unnatural irritation at the idea that Eastern influences are presuming to assert themselves in regard to the Western states. (b) Natural irritation at the manner in which the reservations were made, without consultation with Western Representatives. (c) Reasonable objection to the inclusion of agricultural lands within the bounds of the reservation. (d) Unreasonable objection to the whole forest reservation idea as impeding licentious use of the public domain by everybody. [42]

In the Pacific Northwest, the protest centered around the Puget Sound region. The Seattle Chamber of Commerce likened the action of the government to the oppressions of George III on the colonists. [43] The State Legislature sent memorials asking for instant cancellation of the reserves. [44] Puget Sound newspapers editorially denounced the reserves as hindering development of the country. [45]

The largest and most articulate group protesting the reserves were the miners. At the time, Puget Sound thought that it would have a great future in producing precious metals. Prospecting had begun in the 1880's in the northern Cascade. near Monte Cristo. At first the prospecting was a local affair; but in 1887 the Rockefeller interests decided it was worth their attention, and bought out the local claimants. They poured a great amount of money into the prospect, building a smelter at Everett and constructing a railroad from Everett up to Monte Cristo, at a terrific cost in money, and displaying considerable engineering ability. Local people with money to spend staked claims in the vicinity; Milwaukee, Portland and Chicago capital was attracted to the region; and at Silverton a syndicate of English, Scottish, and Welsh capitalists set up operations as the Stilaguamish and Sultan Mining Company. By 1897, when the bubble was at its largest, no less than seventy-six concerns, incorporated for amounts varying from fifty thousand to five million dollars, were interested in these and other mines in the northern Cascades. Several million dollars worth of ore bad been shipped to Everett by the end of 1896 for processing; and more millions had been spent in exploration. The Washington reserve included this area. Though the report of the committee stated that the area was unsettled, actually forty thousand mineral claims were located in the reserve. [46]