The Land We Cared For...
A History of the Forest Service's Eastern Region
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CHAPTER XVII
THE FOREST PLANS

A massive planning effort took place in the Eastern Region during the 1980's. It was mandated by an act of Congress, but the scope and complexity of it were dictated by a number of other factors. There was the need to better integrate clearcutting into the overall scheme of forest management in the East and to have public involvement in the process. These were the lessons learned in the Monongahela Controversy. Another factor was the decision of the leaders of the Forest Service to use National Forest planning as the vehicle to replace RARE II in the wilderness selection and recommendation process. Still another factor was the growing emphasis on multiple uses of National Forests stimulated by greater environmental awareness. Along with this, there was now a wide variety of specialists within the Forest Service with expertise which needed to be better utilized. One final factor was the advent of computer technology. This allowed a more comprehensive management of great masses of data than had ever been possible before.

Federal Legislation

The Forest Service was directed to prepare a land and resource management plan, known as a forest plan, for each National Forest by the Resource Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 as amended by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976. These acts required the Forest Service to investigate management alternatives involving many combinations of activities and levels of production of goods, services, and uses. The environmental impact of every possible combination was also to be determined. Environmental impact was to be assessed under guidelines laid down by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Taken together, these laws provided for a nationwide assessment every ten years of forest and rangeland resources. These findings, called the RPA Assessment, would dictate future Forest Service programs. [1]

The end result of the entire forest planning process was to be the Final Statement of Policy and Program which would become the guide for Forest Service budget proposals. The budgets as finally passed would determine the actual implementation of the program. [2]

In the Eastern Region, the schedule for completion of individual forest plans called for all National Forests to have their plans done by December 1985. However, the task was so monumental and complex that some were not ready until well into 1986. [3]

New Approaches

In the past there had been timber management plans, and recreation plans and many others. These were separate plans for only one resource. There had also been forest plans but in these, timber production was invariably the dominant use. In the new forest plans, each resource was "codominant" and all are integrated into the master plan.

The guidance for forest planning in the Eastern Region was contained in what later became known as Integrated Resource Management (IRM). Strictly speaking, IRM was a procedure for implementing the forest plans. It was not really formalized until after some of the forest plans were written. But the basic principles of IRM came into play from the beginning. (Parenthetically, IRM is now being emulated by other Regions and is likely to become the paradigm for the entire Forest Service.) IRM has been defined as "putting our heads together, combining all of our collective knowledge, skills and talents—integrating all of our resources—to do the best job we possibly can." [4]

IRM was based on the hallowed principle of multiple use, but Regional Forester Larry Henson and his staff recognized that in the past the natural inclination of the Forest Service had been to emphasize those uses which produced income and to make other uses ancillary. When past forest plans were made it was often a process of writing the timber management plan and little more. Such matters as wildlife management and scenic quality were pushed to the back burner.

Henson and his staff did not want a repeat of the old style forest plans. Nor did they want an unintegrated collection of separate plans. The problem with separate plans for single resources was that they were indeed separate. Henson sought planning which would lead toward collective goals in an integrated manner and which would achieve a "balance in multiple uses." It would take more teamwork than in the past and more personal initiative from those involved to make it work. What was wanted was "a uniform, region wide understanding of our roles and our mission . . . of managing the land and resources." [5]

To attain a Regionwide understanding of IRM the Regional Office published an attractive 28 page booklet, complete with photographs, charts, and art work, aimed primarily at forest planners, and managers. Titled "Working Together for Multiple Use," the booklet, called for less parochialism in the Region—"We can and must trust the integrity of our associates," treat them as "good neighbors," and "work together as a team." [6] With new open mindedness and respect for the opinions of others, the forest planning process and its execution would help the Region evaluate its work, learn from mistakes, make changes where needed, and recognize successes.

While "Working Together for Multiple Use" may have sounded like a standard pep talk to outsiders, to perceptive people in the Eastern Region it had deeper meaning. Management was saying that the days of forester rule were over. Now wildlife, recreation, wilderness, environmental protection, scenic quality, human resources, public interest, and many other factors would take their places along with forestry in forest management. The booklet was probably received with silent rejoicing in many "shops" throughout the Region, other than the timber management professionals.

FORPLAN: A Computer Model

What processes were used in selecting the areas to be studied and the factors to be considered in making the forest plans? As one might imagine, the decisions were made by qualified experts but the actual sorting and sifting through all of the data was done by a giant computer. To do the job, a computer model called FORPLAN was programmed and maintained for all of the Regions at the Forest Service Computer Center at Fort Collins, Colorado.

FORPLAN is a series of computer programs which utilizes linear programming. It can evaluate a large number of management options for specific units of land. It selects the combination of prescriptions which optimizes a chosen objective. Prescriptions are assigned by FORPLAN to land areas, and FORPLAN also schedules practices to achieve resource outputs. The work of FORPLAN begins by putting into the model the existing and potential condition of each analysis area. The analysis areas are relatively homogeneous in respect to productivity, cost of treatment, and response to treatment within each area. The practices and activities which can take place are also modeled to the use of management prescriptions.

Prescriptions and Restraints

Management prescriptions, the practices and activities necessary to achieve desired future conditions on selected planning areas, were all included in the computer model. Also put into the program were quantitative effects of applying the prescriptions to the analysis areas considering resource yields and economic conditions.

To illustrate the interplay of the different types of factors, a management prescription might be a nondeclining hardwood and pine yield, a FORPLAN prescription might be a level of harvesting which will maintain a nondeclining yield, and a quantitative effect might be the dollar value of the timber left unharvested. FORPLAN, of course, is able to process many different combinations of prescriptions and effects at once and to determine the mix which will optimize the desired objectives. One final aspect of analysis is to identify the constraints needed to achieve recognized goals. As the word indicates, constraints are those limiting prescriptions which will bring about the desired effect, for instance scheduling practices. [7]

Before the FORPLAN model was constructed, there were numerous assumptions, analyses, and decisions which had to be made in order to define analysis areas, prescriptions, standards, and guidelines. Without such management input, the computer program would have been of little value. The following are some examples of the kind of decisions which were made on one National Forest in the Eastern Region: the size of analysis areas was set at no less than 500 acres in most cases, 104 analysis areas were selected, and the number of prescriptions was kept small by deleting those which were obviously unworkable or absurd. In the end, there were 1,500 FORPLAN prescriptions and 56 regenerated prescriptions. This was a relatively small model, which allowed many benchmark and alternative runs through the program at moderate cost and in a form simpler to understand. [8]

Regional Guidance

The role of the Regional Forester and his staff in forest planning was to provide the goals for planning. Like other Regions, Region 9 published a Regional Guide for the planning process, but unlike all the other Regions, Region 9 listed specific management goals toward which the National Forests were to work. There were nine of these goals, including management primarily for timber and wildlife, research areas, wild and scenic rivers, recreation, wilderness, and semi-primitive non-motorized areas. Each Forest could construct its own alternatives for managing each of its areas using any of the management goals. The numbers 1 through 9 were used uniformly throughout the Region so each forest plan could be easily understood by others. There were also sub-goals. For instance, Goal 6 provided for semi-primitive, non-motorized recreational experience. Under 6.1 there would also be reduced potential for life threatening and property damaging fire. Sub-goal 6.2 would emphasize wildlife diversity, and sub-goal would support a wide variety of fish and wildlife species by improving habitats. The sub-goals were not standard throughout the Region and could vary considerably from Forest to Forest, depending on local situations.

A unique aspect to Region 9's planning process lay in its generation of the "problem statement." Each National Forest had to make one. It was a determination of what issues and concerns were present and how the Forest should be managed. The public had to be consulted in this. Next came the Analysis of the Management Situation, which consisted of looking at the potential of the Forest to produce timber, wildlife, recreation, and other factors. In effect, it was a determination of the decision space within which the Forest had to operate. In other words, could they really accomplish the goals they had set for themselves in their plan?

Making the Plans

The heaviest burden of National Forest planning fell on the Forest Supervisors and their staffs. To begin with, the directions were appallingly complex. The original legislation had set up a committee of scientists to develop the regulations governing forest planning. There were 2,200 lines of directions in those regulations—directions on how to handle timber, wildlife, recreation, minerals, and many others factors. For most planners it was an extremely difficult task to try to consider so many regulations at one time. In past planning, things were done separately, but in this round it was all to be done at once and integrated. Moreover, economic impact on the Forest and the local economy had to be considered in the process. Plans had to be kept simple but detailed enough to guarantee that specific interests were adequately analyzed.

The linear model for the analysis, FORPLAN, was one of the most complex ever put together, but the Forest Service was convinced that only with such a thorough programming model could the planning requirements be met. The whole process took great amounts of budgeted money, but the hidden costs were probably even greater. The planning process preoccupied District and Forest personnel for six years, requiring much of their time and taking them away from other work. Endless meetings, countless days spent compiling data, thousands of miles of travel, nearly full utilization of secretarial staff plus the necessary use of computers and office machines all contributed to the hidden costs. But the Forest Service and particularly the Regional planning staff believed that the money and effort were not wasted. They reasoned that having made their forest plans, the District and all the National Forest people would know where they were headed.

There was a perceptible change in attitudes by field people toward the planning process during the six years of intensive planning activity. Personnel progressed past the point of saying "this too will pass." District and Forest employees realized that it would not pass, that it was the direction of the future, and that they were the ones who had to make it work. It was the goal of the Regional Forester and his staff to use the Integrated Resource Management approach to involve everyone in the planning process. According to one key planner, Don Meyer, "there are still skeptics out there, [but] it's the best direction we've ever had, and that's gotten people on the bandwagon." [9]

Regional Review of Plans

After the National Forests had developed their individual Analysis of the Management Situation, these were sent for review to the Regional Office. The purpose of looking at them at an early stage was for the Region to see how the plan was going and to have some influence on how the draft forest plans were put together.

When the draft management plans and environmental impact statements were finished, these too came to the Regional Office where they were reviewed by the Technical Review Team. The Team provided quality control and saw to it that the plans met the standards set by the Regional Guide with some uniformity.

One of the first draft plans to arrive in the Regional Office was that of the Nicolet National Forest. It was accompanied by relatively few public comments. Months later the Chequamegon Plan arrived with many more public comments. Part of the reason for this was that people in Wisconsin were becoming more aware of the forest planning process. When the Ottawa Plan came to the RO there were literally thousands of public comments. The Ottawa had solicited public reaction in local newspapers. There was also another factor involved in the outpourings of public comments. The Wilderness Society had selected two Forests in the Eastern Region for in-depth reviews of their forest plans—the Ottawa and the White Mountain. This, in turn provoked more comments from what might be called the commodity side, that is timber and mineral interests. In addition, many people in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan who resented outside interference in the management of "their" National Forest also made comments. Much of the same sort of public reaction occurred concerning the White Mountain Plan. The reasons were much the same—special attention from the Wilderness Society and resentment of outside interference.

The National Forest Plan with the least public reaction and with the least number of appeals was the Allegheny Plan. The people of northwestern Pennsylvania are also interested in their National Forest, but they do not seem to have the extremes of viewpoint that other areas have. Additionally, the staff of the Allegheny did an admirable job of soliciting input from local publics when writing the Forest Plan. Apparently, most interest groups and individuals believed they had already had their say when the draft Plan was completed.

The Allegheny had the potential for real controversy in its Plan. The Plan generated some serious questions and comments from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a respected group of environmental law attorneys. People from the Allegheny met with representatives of the NRDC for two days and listened to their concerns. The final version of the Plan contained some provisions which still bothered the NRDC. Cognizance of this encouraged the Supervisor and some of the planners to travel to Washington, D.C. to confer again. Finally, they were able to satisfy the NRDC concerns and there was no appeal. A NRDC spokesman commented that no other National Forest had come to them for clarification of their position as the Allegheny had done.

The Shawnee National Forest Plan offered an example of the necessity to balance economic considerations with environmental concerns. The Shawnee draft Plan contained heavy emphasis on converting the Forest to the production of pine. However, pine forests are not native to southern Illinois, where the Shawnee is located. There was an immediate adverse reaction to the draft Plan from local people who did not want to see the appearance of their area changed. The comments on the draft Plan reflected this reaction, so the Forest made substantive changes, in the final draft, removing the emphasis on pine. This did not satisfy everyone, and there were appeals on the Shawnee Plan, but what happened illustrates the willingness of Forest planners to defer to strong public reaction. Similar drastic changes took place between the draft and final versions of the Monongahela and White Mountain National Forest Plans.

After the draft plans were made public there was a 90-day public reaction period. When that was over, the key people from the Forest were asked to come to Milwaukee and go over the public reaction and other critical issues with the Regional Forester and his planning staff. These meetings sought to resolve problem areas while simultaneously generating a final plan. At this point the Regional Forester made the final decisions since he was the deciding officer for forest plans. [10]

Wilderness in Forest Planning

For years there have been certain areas in most National Forests which have been what might be called "wilderness in waiting." These are areas which are managed in much the same way as wilderness with no harvesting, few existing roads and no new ones, and no developments. Wilderness advocates are aware of such areas but their existence does not satisfy them because they do not trust the Forest Service to continue such pseudo-wilderness management. They know that the administrative direction of the Forest Service can change—a new Chief or a new Regional Forester could set things in a new direction. What the wilderness advocates want is Congressional designation of wilderness areas which can only be undone by act of Congress.

In the last round of forest planning, the administrative direction from the Regional Forester and his staff was to provide in each forest plan opportunity areas called "semi-private, non-motorized recreation areas" which were suitable for study as wilderness at some future date. If managed in this manner, no further damage would be done to the wilderness qualities and over a period of years the areas might well come closer to being real wilderness than they were at the beginning. [11]

From a practical standpoint, wilderness in the Eastern Region has to be small in area and is rarely genuinely pristine. In fact, Congress can designate anything it wants to be wilderness. The National Forest managers will manage any designated area as wilderness if that is what the public wants. Luckily, wilderness recovers more quickly in the forests of the East rather than in the drier climates and higher altitudes of the West. [12]

But few people in the Eastern Region wanted to see Congress take over the whole process of wilderness designation. Fortunately, a reasonable alternative was available in the semi-primitive, non-motorized management prescription available in the forest plans. The considerable expertise of the Forest Service could be applied to the selection of SPNM areas which could be managed like wilderness and might someday be recommended to Congress for wilderness designation.

Under pressure from the Regional Office, most National Forests of the Eastern Region included some SPNM areas in their forest plans. This has, in effect, kept the Forest Service in the wilderness designation process and opened the way for significant additions to the National Wilderness System in the future. It is also what the leadership of the Forest Service directed be done when they decided to abandon RARE II. If the wilderness selection process stays in the hands of the Forest Service the expertise of the Forest Service is applied, the public has input, and an appeal process is available. In the meantime, semiprimitive, non-motorized areas can be managed without substantial Congressionally imposed restraints so as to benefit a wide variety of publics and to continue providing such benefits for generations to come.

Clearcutting in Forest Planning

Since the Monongahela Controversy, the Region had been concerned about clearcutting. From the standpoint of efficient forest management, clearcutting could not be abandoned, even though environmentalist groups strongly advocated just that. The solution sought by the Region was to allow clearcutting to be written into forest planning only where it makes good sense, not only from the economics standpoint but in terms of good silviculture and wildlife management. An example might be the clearcutting of areas in the Chippewa, Ottawa, Chequamegon, Nicolet, Superior, and Hiawatha National Forests where aspen will regenerate. The benefits are many: the aspen will come in voluntarily, habitat conditions for several desirable species of wildlife will be improved, and there are new and growing markets for aspen.

In the past the Region has stood fast on the values of clearcutting, even in the face of strong criticism. However, in more recent times, there has been an initiative emphasizing uneven-aged management. This could change things on many National Forests and could mean that the policy is shifting away from clearcutting. [13]

Handling Appeals

Appeals of forest plans were handled by filing with the Regional Office a Statement of Reasons which explained why the plan was being appealed. The Regional staff then put together a Responsive Statement, to which the appellants were given an opportunity to respond. Then the appeal went to the Chief of the Forest Service for a final decision. Since the Regional Forester was the deciding officer, the Chief's role was to review his decision and uphold it or remand it to the Region for something to be done. Naturally, the federal courts were open to appeals, but ordinarily federal judges would not accept appeal cases until all review procedures had been exhausted within the Forest Service. In the event of an appeal to federal court, the Regional Office handled the case, preparing the record of appeal and all of the other phases of the administrative process in preparation for the court procedures. [14]

Revising the Forest Plans

The forest plans project management practices from 50 to 150 years into the future. Some of the more sanguine critics have charged that this is little more than a long term commitment to the planned destruction of the forests. The original Forest Service regulations concerning forest plans anticipated this criticism and provided that the forest plans be revised every 10 to 15 years. When such reviews take place, the whole process will be repeated, including determining public sentiment and incorporating all new information to determine the best management direction.

"Sensible, Balanced and Responsive"

As described earlier, major emphasis on pine was eliminated from the Forest Plan of the Shawnee National Forest partly in response to criticism from the Sierra Club and others. The changes were made in part because of economic realities. A local sawmill had closed and the foreseeable market for pine had lessened. The changes were made also because of comments received from the Regional Technical Review Team. The whole process epitomized what the Region was trying to do with the planning process.

The responsiveness of the Forest Service in changing the Shawnee Plan was recognized in a highly laudatory editorial which appeared in the Southern Illinoisan, a regional newspaper published in Carbondale in the heart of the Shawnee National Forest. The editorial praised the way the entire forest plan process had been conducted. In a piece titled "Shawnee Plan OK," the newspaper wished that the government could address such problems as poverty, hazardous wastes, or nuclear arms as sensibly as the Forest Service had planned the future of the Shawnee National Forest. The editorial writer found something "almost calmly rational" about the way the plan was written, submitted to the public, modified by 22 major changes resulting from public input, and then finalized in a form which carefully balanced competing interests so that strong objections were minimized.

The Southern Illinoisan noted that where the original Shawnee Plan had called for greater emphasis on pine planting and timber harvesting, it now provided for planting more hardwoods and reduced cutting. The newspaper used words such as "sensible," "balanced," and "responsive," frequently in describing the Shawnee Plan, and it congratulated the Forest Service (heartily) for its effort.

The hottest local issue in southern Illinois concerning the Shawnee Plan had been off-road vehicles. The editorial described how on this matter, the Shawnee Plan went down the middle of the road. ORV's would be permitted on about 55% of the Forest, but only on designated trails and roads. There had been objections from tourism-oriented groups to designating Bald Knob area, a popular religious site, and six other areas for wilderness study, but the editorial agreed that such unique areas needed to be protected and added "If the motels and restaurants are a few miles away, that's all right." [15]

The Southern Illinoisan editorial recognized what every forest planner and manager hoped the public would see—that the best that could be hoped for with a forest plan was to reasonably balance the interests of environmentalists, recreationists, timber companies, local communities, the general public, and many others.

The revised Shawnee Plan came very close to achieving the kind of balance the Regional planners wanted. Part of the credit for this must go to the Regional Forester and his planning staff because the Shawnee Plan was one of several which underwent significant changes urged by the Region.

The success story which the Shawnee Plan represents has been a source of pride throughout the Forest Service. The Southern Illinoisan editorial which praised the "sensible and balanced" attributes of the Shawnee Plan was circulated to all of the National Forests of the country at a time when many people were becoming disheartened at the seemingly endless planning process. According to Regional Planner Don Meyer, the editorial was such an encouragement to forest planners that it was "important in lifting morale" and took on "national implications." [16]

The Monogahela Plan

If there was one National Forest which would indicate whether the lessons of the past had been learned and applied in making the Forest Plan, it was the Monongahela. This was true not only because of the Monongahela Controversy, but because the Forest is a fairly typical eastern Forest. Timber production was once the main focus of the Monongahela. It began with "cut and run" lumbering around the turn of the century. In the 1930's after the Forest Service acquired it, the emphasis was on protection and rehabilitation of the forests. This continued even into the 1950's because the Forest had little timber to sell. Then, in the 1960's, the Forest became productive again. The managers of the Forest were primarily concerned with marketing the crop they had been growing for 30 or more years. They gave little thought to the implications of clearcutting. It had been used on the Monongahela before. In the year before the Monongahela Controversy began, timber sales reached 60 million board feet, 150% of what the recent Forest Plan would allow.

As reflected by its Forest Plan, the Monongahela has changed greatly. Part of the change is the result of the controversy over clearcutting, but an important part is also the product of the public reaction to its Forest Plan. The managers of that National Forest are clearly determined to give the public what it wants within reasonable limits.

Determining What the Public Wants

The managers of the Monongahela, with little training in evaluating such things, decided to use their common sense and years of experience in taking the meaning from the public response to the Forest Plan. They reasoned that they could not simply count votes. Polls and surveys are too easy for interest groups to manipulate. Nor could they take written reactions at face value. They had to try to take into account the people who were not organized and who did not write letters but who were nevertheless quite concerned. They were aware that very few letter responses came from rural residents who hunted and used the National Forest frequently. "We know he [the rural resident] is there and we know he uses the National Forest; we have to take him into the consideration."

In evaluating the written responses, the data was processed by "blind" evaluation so that the evaluators did not know the numbers of responses attached to each issue. Even so, a heavy preponderance of remarks favoring something was bound to influence their decisions. The evaluators took into account the entire range of public involvement. This included 61 public meetings, wide publicity in local news media, talk shows, responses from organized groups, and written responses. Decisions were made collectively by line and staff officers based on the public response and their own knowledge and experience. There was an attempt to systematize the process, but in the end it was judgment call.

If the public responses were fairly well balanced, deciding was easy and the position taken in the Forest Plan was confirmed. An example of this was the question of whether the Forest should buy more land to add to its National Recreation Area. There were about 100 responses; 50 or so wanted more land than the Forest Plan specified, and about 50 wanted less. The Plan was not changed in this regard. On the other hand, the Forest received more than 15,000 replies saying they wanted reduced cutting, and more wildlife habitat. Only about two hundred letters wanted less habitat and more cutting, so the decision was made to decrease cutting.

The Final Plan

The final Forest Plan provides that the Monongahela National Forest which once had no wilderness areas and apparently little concern about having them, now has 78,000 acres of designated wilderness, about 9% of the Forest. An additional 125,000 acres have been prescribed for recreation with no harvesting of trees. About 75% of the Forest contributes to remote habitat for wildlife because it is carefully controlled so as to cause minimum disturbance to the environment. There are also many new campgrounds, a new visitor's center, and increasing recreational use.

The new emphasis on wilderness, recreation, and wildlife habitat was not achieved without resistance. The West Virginia forest products industry believed that their interests had been hurt by the Monongahela Forest Plan because of the limitations it put on harvesting. In reality, their objections lay more in a conditioned response than in actual financial injury. The managers of the Monongahela studied the situation thoroughly and concluded that under the Forest Plan, both the short and long range needs of the industry can be easily met. The pivotal question was whether the timber would ever be offered for sale. In these considerations, the managers weighed heavily the overwhelmingly negative public reaction to proposals from the industry that harvest levels be set much higher than they were in the draft Forest Plan. They were convinced that the public would not tolerate such heavy cutting, especially clearcuts.

Deciding what to do about timber harvesting was not simply a matter of compromise between conflicting interests. The managers of the Monongahela now have a long range master plan for the Forest. They will provide what the public wants in recreation, wilderness, and wildlife habitat and at the same time they will build a hardwood forest that may someday be a valuable and rare resource for the nation. Planning and Information Officer Gil Churchill puts it this way:

"We'll be growing trees—good trees to a much larger size than is practical on private lands—and one day we may be producing a timber product that can be found nowhere else—very high quality hardwood. So we may play an important role yet (in timber production)." [17]

From this it is evident that the management of the Monongahela has not turned its back on the older Forest Service values. Even though there has been a shift toward recreation and preservation, timber and other resource utilization still play an important role. There remain five operating coal mines on the Forest plus 50 operating natural gas wells. The Forest continues to grant grazing allotments and, as indicated earlier, timber cutting continues. [18] But taken as a whole, the Forest Plan suggests that the managers of the Forest have come a long way in adjusting to the realities of the 1980's.

All of these concessions to public concerns raises the question of whether the Monongahela has over-reacted to the clearcutting controversy which lies buried in its past. The managers of the Forest recognize that it is possible. There are employees on the Forest who believe that there is now too much emphasis on recreation and scenery. They hope the pendulum will swing back toward timber cutting some day. It may. As far as the managers are concerned, it all depends on what the public wants. They have learned this lesson well. They now intend to manage the Forest so they do not "spend all of your time feuding and fighting and defending yourself . . . and not establishing credibility for the outfit." [19]

The White Mountain Forest Plan

Because of the limitations of time and space it will not be possible to analyze all of the forest plans of the Eastern Region. However, the White Mountain National Forest used such a different approach in writing its Plan that it is worthy of note here. The Forest has used a Working Group method in their planning processes since 1971 when the New England Area Guide was being developed. The same Working Groups were used extensively in formulating the White Mountain Forest Plan. The Groups were made up of volunteers who worked together for six to eight weeks to find a group consensus on the best management actions for the Forest. The volunteers represented a cross section of the users of the National Forest. After opposing views are discussed, a consensus based on a well thought out rationale was reached. The Forest Service provided the group with a situation statement, a list of management alternatives, analysis of environmental impacts, and maps. The expertise of management specialists could be called on when needed. In the end, the Working Group's response was presented to the Forest Service as a consolidated statement of the public's desire in the Forest's Plan for future management. [20]


Reactions to Forest Plans

Retirees' Association

The Eastern Region Retirees' Association is a group which includes former Regional Foresters and many people who have played key roles in the history of the Region. The Association reacted strongly in its "Newsletter" of November of 1986 to the large number of appeals to the forest plans and the prospect for a drawn out process of legal maneuvers and court cases.

Bob Prausa, President of the Association, urged the members of the Association to be involved in the forest plan process and above all to support the final approved plans. Prausa stated, "We believe the FS has been very responsive to the direction [of the RPA and NFMA], and . . . that Forest Supervisors have been very responsive to expression of concern." He pointed out that extensive revisions and basic changes had been made in plans as the result of public input. But, said Prausa, "Now it is time to get on with the job of putting these plans into action." He urged the members to support the forest plan process and the final product by contacting their Congressional delegations. [21]

Swanson's Appeals

Each and every forest plan when its draft went out for public involvement was appealed by John R. Swanson, whose address is a post office box in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The appeals are all hand written in a barely legible hand and invariably protest the fact that more land was not put into wilderness in the forest plans. Swanson usually advocates that as much as half the land of the National Forest be put into wilderness. However, the areas he selects are not exact and usually show no specific knowledge of the individual Forest. No Forest Service officer has ever met Swanson or consulted with him. Each Forest has a more-or-less standard answer to his appeals: They cannot make any of their land into wilderness on their own or through the forest planning process. Only Congress can designate wilderness. [22]

Sierra Club

Since late 1986, the Sierra Club has carried on a program called "Save Our National Forests." It is a slick, hard-sell mail campaign to raise money to fight the forest plans nation-wide. The literature claims that the forest products industry has unduly influenced the writing of the forest plans with the result that they are no more than plans for the ultimate destruction of the National Forests by intensive harvesting. Several areas in the National Forests of the Eastern Region are included in a list of those deemed threatened by excessive harvesting. [23]


Summary

The long range effects of the latest round of forest planning will not be known for years, perhaps decades. The immediate consequences, however are discernible. The Eastern Region has made a good faith effort to accomplish the task set before it by Congress and the Forest Service. In the process, two major developments have taken place. One has been the far greater participation in the planning process by the public and by organized interest groups. The other has been increased consideration of resources and uses other than timber. Along with the latter has come a holistic approach to forest planning which did not exist before.

The forest plans have forced the Eastern Region to make public its intentions for management of the National Forests. In the process, the underlying philosophy has been re-evaluated and modified. It has been a healthy experience for the Eastern Region, but the published forest plans have also provided clearly defined targets for a wide range of critics. The Region showed considerable flexibility in reaction to public criticism during the planning process but its position on protests after the forest plans have been finalized and approved has tended toward the defensive. At the time of this writing, it was too early to conclude anything about the eventual outcome of the appeals process.

Reference Notes

1. Forest Plan, Shawnee National Forest, Environmental Impact Statement Appendices B-11.

2. Regional Guide, pp. 1-3.

3. Larry Henson, Interview, Aug. 12, 1985.

4. Eastern Region, USDA Forest Service, "Working Together for Multiple Use" (Eastern Region, n.d.), p. 2; John Pager, Interview, August 12, 1985.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. EIS, Forest Plan, Shawnee National Forest, B-12.

8. Ibid., B-13.

9. Don Meyer, Interview, December 16, 1986.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Don Meyer, Editorial Comments.

14. Don Meyer, Interview.

15. The Southern Illinoisan, September 13, 1986, 8.

16. Don Meyer, Interview.

17. Gilbert Churchill, Interview.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. White Mountain, Interviews.

21. Eastern Forest Service, Retirees' Newsletter III, Issue 3, pp. 3-4.

22. Gilbert Churchill, Interview.

23. Mailed materials of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, November 1986.

Young stand of pine trees Hiawatha National Forest, Michigan, 1936.


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