GEORGE ROGERS CLARK Selected Papers From The 1983 And 1984 George Rogers Clark Trans-Appalachian Frontier History Conferences

In the spring of 1777, Lord George Germain directed Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit "to assemble as many of the Indians of his district as he conveniently can." [1] It was Germain's intention "to divide the attention of the Rebels and oblige them to collect a considerable force" to defend their western settlements. Germain assumed that attacks on the frontier "cannot fail of weakening their main army," [2] and might even roll the Westerners back onto the already limited resources of the East. After two years of hesitation, the British and their Indian allies were going on the offensive in the West.

As Arthur Bowler states, "in none of these intended roles was the northern force notably successful." [3] The West would not be depopulated nor would refugee frontiersmen become a serious drain on the eastern war effort. In fact just the reverse would take place. American frontier population actually increased during the war, and it was Imperial resources which were strained virtually to the breaking point. Indian warriors, who formed the bulk of fighting strength in the interior, created seemingly endless demands on the British commissary. The government would never be able to overcome either the extreme difficulty or the enormous cost of fulfilling these demands.

A natural antipathy to the American agricultural frontier and the steady flow of manufactured goods from England assured that most of the western tribes would support the Crown. Utilization of Indian allies, however, was a mixed blessing. Military commanders in North America and political leaders in England deplored the moral implications of 'unleashing' these "Hell Hounds of War," as Pitt called them. Little organized fighting had occurred in the West for two years largely because Canadian Governor Guy Carleton and many of his officers were reluctant to employ Indian raiders. Henry Hamilton was a more vocal advocate of using the Indians but, despite his reputation as the "Hair Buyer General," he continually encouraged them to spare civilians and prisoners by offering substantial rewards for "live meat." There was also common agreement among British officials everywhere that war parties should be led by "proper persons" (e.g. white officers) to help curb "barbarities." [4]

Eighteenth century European concepts of restrained and humane warfare were jarred in the wilderness. The very presence of whites with Indian war parties, whatever their justification, was sufficient to condemn the participants and those who sanctioned them. So too was Hamilton's practice of accepting scalps as evidence of the Indians' successes, and then supplying them with provisions and war material. Nor could the more pragmatic factors of cost be ignored. For a decade Whitehall had struggled to curtail expenses for frontier defense, and had finally done so in the early 1770's only by evacuating much of the interior. Expenditures still remained higher than desired, but on the eve of the Revolution annual costs for Indian supplies at Detroit were reduced to an average £150. [5] Before the fighting ended both the financial and the moral costs of the western war would increase dramatically.

Immense quantities of ammunition, weapons, clothing, food and assorted "sundries" (the accepted euphemism for liquor) were essential if the Indians were to participate actively in the fighting. The abundance of these items in turn served as a magnet drawing ever larger numbers of warriors to the British posts. At Detroit, Hamilton was cautioned to keep a close eye on expenses; but this was "not intended to limit you with regard to such as are absolutely necessary for putting your post in a proper state of defense, and for keeping the Indians in readiness." [6] Such latitude released a veritable flood of expenditures which soon reached epidemic proportions.

The very nature of wilderness warfare dictated that its objectives must be limited. British forts at Oswego, Niagara, Detroit and Mackinack were intended primarily to protect the western flank of Canada. Unable or unwilling to commit significant forces of Regulars to this struggle, British strategy was restricted to harrassing raids which burnt crops and attacked isolated settlements. Large scale assaults against the admittedly vulnerable American frontier would only create additional expense and accumulate more prisoners to feed, with little result in return. As an estimated 5,000 persons (including Indian warriors and their dependents, prisoners, refugees, soldiers, Indian Department officers, and other government officials) were aleady being supplied at Detroit alone, the government insisted that every effort must be made to "lesson it as much as possible." [7]

Mounting costs and the increasing difficulty of supplying their military forces would plague the British throughout the war. Despite optimistic hopes that provisions could be acquired in North America, this "proved from the beginning to be impossible." [8] A hostile or at best apathetic populace, inadequate transportation, and the prevailing acceptance of limited war meant that the army would neither purchase sufficient supplies nor confiscate them by force. It consequently became impossible to avoid the "enormous expense of shipping food from Europe."

This was even more true for the interior. Long and tenuous communications which stretched through the Great Lakes and along the St. Lawrence were closed from November to April. Bottlenecks at the St. Lawrence rapids and Niagara, and poorly constructed storage depots at Carleton Island, Niagara and at the posts themselves caused inordinate delays and considerable damage to merchandise. Even when shipments could get through, provisions from Quebec alone were of inadequate quantity and quality to provide for both the Canadian and western military establishments. Nor could the small settlements of subsistence farmers clustered around the western forts provide immediate support. Every difficulty encountered in supplying the armies in the East was compounded by the particular circumstances of a wilderness environment. [9]

One obvious method to cut costs and increase available food-stuffs would be to stimulate local production. But the western outposts were ill-prepared for the increased demands of a rapidly escalating military effort. For a century observers had noted the advantageous climate and fertile soil of the lower Lakes region. Following the British occupation in 1760, western farmers and merchants provided corn, locally milled flour and other home-grown necessities for the fur brigades travelling further west. During Pontiac's siege in 1763 provisions from Niagara kept Detroit well stocked, while shipments from the Straits on more than one occasion saved the settlement at Mackinack from virtual starvation. But any potential for agricultural expansion in the West was nullified by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and by prohibitions on private purchase of Indian lands. [10] Throughout the period of British control, Detroit and the other posts in the Lakes country remained populated by Canadian Habitants and a thin veneer of British merchants wedded to the fur trade.

Western productivity was also limited by the government's decision to avoid local purchases whenever possible. This attitude dated from the Indian uprising of 1763 when the British suspected (but never proved) widespread complicity by the Canadian population. Reluctant to trust the supply of vital foodstuffs to a potentially hostile populace, and unwilling to overwhelm the resident Canadians with an influx of British settlers, the military government simply ignored western farmers. For a decade prior to 1775, provisions for the West were imported from Canada, New York, or England. Merchants continued to buy the small surpluses accumulated by individual farmers to supply the fur brigades or in time of crisis provide emergency rations for the garrison. These purchases, however, were always ad hoc arrangements and post commandants invariably were criticized by commanding officers for making them.

Local purchases continued to be discouraged even after fighting began, but demand was such that the erratic supply system simply could not cope. Commandants never knew when a war party might suddenly appear. When they did come the Indians demanded instant gratification, otherwise, as Haldimand was warned, "we must give them up to the enemy." [11] Indian warriors could either hunt game or raid American settlements, but not both. If they were to fight they must be supplied with virtually every necessity from arms and ammunition, to clothing and food; and the British must find some way to stockpile these and many other items at the western forts.

Contracts for provisions were made in England on the basis of a stipulated number of rations for a specific cost. These estimates were made a full year in advance to allow for acquisition and transport to North America. Along with normal requirements for the garrison, commandants must predict the potential number of Indians to be supplied and anticipate unexpected calamities (as when Detroit's storehouse collapsed). The potential for miscalculation of such estimates, added to allowances for spoilage, loss and delay (a flat 25% was considered normal for wastage) ensured occasional shortages would almost certainly occur. In fact, both Bowler and Curtis suggest that even in the Eastern command conditions of adequate supply were unusual, and each notes numerous campaigns which were frustrated by logistical failure. [12] In the West, shortages were less noticeable only because of the nature of wilderness warfare. When supplies were not available the Indians merely returned to their villages and no raids were launched.

Although local herds were small, mills for grinding grain scarce, yields poor and farming techniques lax, the government had no recourse but to rely on whatever sources might be available. The same was true for needed services and skills. Carpentry work, blacksmithing, a supply of firewood or picketing for stockades, and a multitude of other small items were required, particularly when it was decided to construct new forts at Mackinack and Detroit. Officials might lament the enormous expense of local materials, but nonetheless some means must be found to marshal whatever resources might be available.

In most instances it was the local mercantile community which accumulated material and expertise, coordinated the allocation of supplies, or imported manufactured goods for the Indians. Much of this was accomplished by adapting the practices already established with the fur trade. For a decade and a half, western merchants had relied on firms in Montreal, Quebec and England to handle the packaging, shipping, insurance, storage, sale of furs and purchase of manufactured goods on a commission basis. As this procedure was almost entirely a credit operation, it was essential for merchants to maintain a secure business reputation. [13] Long standing accounts of substantial amounts were often secured by little more than the individual contacts and friendship of the debtor. This was a difficult enterprise for newcomers to penetrate once such a pattern of personal relationships was established.

A switch from the fur trade to requirements of the war time government proved to be a simple transition. In fact, much of the merchandise utilized in each instance was identical as it was meant for the same purpose: to supply the Indians with the material benefits of the Industrial Revolution. Steel knives and hatchets, rifles and shot, wampum, clothing, food and trinkets were highly adaptable. They could be provided to the Indians for the acquisition of furs or for hunting Americans.

For the merchants, the only difference after 1775 was that payment was received in the form of drafts drawn on the government rather than in furs to be sold on the international market. To some extent this proved to be a safer and more secure trade. At least the value of the government's drafts did not vary from one season to another as did the highly volatile fur markets. But the hazards of trade with the government were also quite real. Political disputes or changes in official policy could mean a delay of months or even years before drafts would be honored. In particular dispute during the early years of the war were the "enormous" expenditures of Lieutenent Governors Edward Abbott at Vincennes and Patrick Sinclair at Mackinack, [14] and the merchants were caught in the middle.

In May 1777, insiders in Montreal were advising "our upper country friends that no future drafts of the Governor's (Abbott) will be paid." [15] Several years later, Sinclair's decision to construct a new fort, at a cost in excess of §100,000 was disputed. Many of the drafts he drew on the local community were also disallowed. Eventually both Abbott and Sinclair were recalled for an investigation of their accounts, many of which were never paid, and a number of merchants were ruined. Fortunately for those engaged in the trade at Detroit, such was not the case there. While some of Henry Hamilton's accounts were questioned, his capture by George Rogers Clark and the apparent danger this posed to Detroit outweighed any hesitation to honor bills presented by subsequent commanding officers.

In an effort to regularize the method of financing the wilderness war, in 1778 Governor Haldimand printed bills of exchange to be used in payment for supplies and services at the western posts. Drawn at 60 days and payable in New York Currency (the prevailing medium in the interior), bills were to be sent by commandants to Paymaster Dunn at Quebec for approval and payment. Although administrative departments and even individual officers could contract with local merchants, farmers and workmen when required, final responsibility for all expenses remained with post commanders. [16]

It was impractical for subsistence farmers, workmen or traders with few financial contacts outside the community to exchange government drafts. Bills of exchange might act as a type of local currency, but more often small-scale producers preferred to sell directly to the larger mercantile houses at the posts which acted as the government's agents. These firms, in turn, sent bills honored by the paymaster to London. These were applied against further purchases in much the same way as furs were sent and trade goods ordered.

Despite a constant irritation with the merchant's desire for profits, it was more efficient for the military to deal with a few middlemen than with a multitude of individual suppliers. This tendency invariably led to charges of favoritism and collusion between officers and favored merchants. Certainly some fraud did exist, but the domination of a few finns was endemic to the system of procurement. The decision to utilize bills of exchange in lieu of specie, and continued reluctance to encourage local purchases (which would bring more producers and middlemen into service) contributed directly to the concentration of public accounts with a select number of merchants at each post. Just as the fur trade became focused on those with close personal contacts in North America and England, so too did the government supply business tend to flow in the same direction.

Western merchants were caught in a classic dilemma. Criticized by their neighbors and competitors for gaining special favors from the government, they were in turn condemned by the military for greed and avarice in raising prices and monopolizing trade. The war already had disrupted normal economic activity to the point where "the (Indian) trade of the country in its present bounded state is scarce worth continuing." [17] Yet anyone who abandoned his wilderness commerce endangered losing his contacts, employees and above all the sums owed by his current customers. With capital tied up in the form of debts owed by the Indians, or sunk into the purchase of more trade goods in England, the fur merchants were trapped in a spiralling pattern of debt.

Private interest, however, might be of public benefit. A continuation of their fur trading would keep the Indians dependent on England, and private suppliers could help fulfill the warrior's demands which otherwise must come from the government. But Haldimand insisted that "great caution be observed as to what merchants' effects, particularly ammunition, be permitted to pass" into the Indian country. [18] Wilderness trade depots might invite American attack, and there was always the prospect of unscrupulous traders "sliding" goods to the Rebels for a tidy profit.

In anticipation of just such an eventuality, stringent restrictions were placed on wilderness travel. Passes were required, for which an oath of allegiance must be given; only boatmen were allowed to accompany traders westward; passes must be produced at each military post before the party could continue; all trade regulations (which covered weights and measures, prices and quantities of liquor and weapons) must be observed; a bond must be posted guaranteeing good behavior. Individual passes were limited to a six-month duration and traders were strictly forbidden to enter Indian councils or deliver belts. Goods sent into the wilderness without authorization were confiscated. [19]

Prospects of illicit trade also prompted a severe limitation of private shipping. As early as 1778, Haldimand remarked that,

at a time when the natural trade must necessarily diminish from the Indians being employed in war, it created suspicions that means were found to convey supplies wanted by the Rebels into their country. The inconsiderable number of troops . . . rendered it imprudent to risk the large quantities of goods which the clamor of the merchants obliged me to send up. [20]

Haldimand's response was to ban all private vessels from the Lakes "so that there might not be the smallest temptation to carry them into alien states"; as all transport was limited to the King's vessels or those appropriated from private owners, shipping available on the Lakes was reduced to 350 tons. [21] Military requirements naturally took precedence and the already weakened fur trade was further curtailed for lack of merchandise.

But for the moment the war could provide a temporary boost to the western economy. After 1779, Hamilton's capture by Clark, the recall of Abbott from Vincennes, and Carleton's departure as Governor helped relax political tensions. Within the year the appointment of Major Arent de Peyster at Detroit as de facto military commander west of Niagara, and the arrival of Frederick Haldimand as Governor of Canada helped revitalize British leadership.

It was imperative that the British act if they were to nullify the losses suffered by Sullivan's campaign against the Iroquois or by Clark's success along the lower Wabash and in Illinois. In response, Haldimand and de Peyster planned a two-pronged assault for 1780. One wing would operate from Mackinack against Illinois and Spanish St. Louis to cut Clark from his western supply lines, while a second attack launched from Detroit against the major settlements in Kentucky would isolate Clark from the east. Haldimand was optimistic that the new offensive would revive British prestige among the Indians, as "we are much dependent on their steadiness at this 'interesting period.'" [22]

He was to be greatly disappointed. The raid from Mackinack was halted outside St. Louis and degenerated in to an assault on the surrounding countryside. This was carried out with "most unheard of barbarity," intensified as the Spanish charged, by "the fury of these barbarians animated by the English." [23] Nor was the move against Kentucky much more successful. In an effort to compel the Indians to forage for supplies, the expedition was given no provisions. Almost 900 Indians and whites, armed with cannon and accompanied by Regulars, crossed the Ohio where they destroyed Ruddle's and Martin's Stations. At this point the Indians promptly killed all the cattle captured at the two stations, leaving the force without a food supply. Laden with booty and captives, the group buried its cannon and retreated to Detroit.

Haldimand was furious. Already the huge sums spent on the Indians were causing him to ponder "their fatal consequences to the nation," and he wondered how much longer Parliament would agree to sanction such expense. [24] It was time to return to "an alert defense," and he urged an "unremitting economy of provisions" which were so difficult to acquire and transport; "the frequency of these amazing demands is a matter of very serious concern to me knowing how ill they are received at home and how trifling the services that can be urged in support of them." [25] It was not only the public treasury which suffered. Troops stationed in the West were also caught in the price squeeze and could no longer afford the "little things of comfort they would otherwise enjoy." [26]

No matter how great the disillusionment, it would be diplomatically unwise and militarily dangerous to renounce Britain's alliance with the tribes, whose wrath might instead be turned against the British if supplies or assistance were curtailed too sharply. De Peyster agreed that "cruelties alone would be the result" of renewed attacks, and he accepted that any advantages gained from them probably cost more than they were worth. But some raiding was necessary, if only to keep the Indians occupied and the Americans on the defensive. He too was exasperated, however, with the Indians who so quickly forgot "past favors." [27] In an effort to limit the expense of provisions, de Peyster off-handedly noted that "the worst has mostly been reserved for them."

As the wilderness war bogged down in stalemate, the Indians were told that the war had been long and the King had many children to support; they must therefore be content with only basic necessities in the future. Officers in the Indian Department were instructed to keep the warriors in the field, and away from the Storehouses at the forts. [28] Supplies would be forwarded to wilderness depots for distribution.

Already committed to sending provisions for the West from Canada or England to avoid local purchases, Haldimand now decided that "the exorbitant charges of the merchants at the posts have determined me to send up supplies for the Indians from hence." [29] This policy was to be all-inclusive: "I hope you will have no occassion or will be able to avoid purchasing any more goods, particularly rum . . . even if supply runs out." If that happened, officers should explain that the British merely were agreeing to the oft-requested prohibition of liquor made by the chiefs themselves. Western commandants were not told what to say when shipments of rum once more began arriving and the flow was suddenly turned on again.

If Haldimand assumed that his new program would eliminate charges from the West, he was sadly mistaken. Reacting to a sheaf of bills amounting to £17,000 sent from Detroit in May 1782, he dryly noted that his orders must not have reached de Peyster in time. It must be recognized, he lectured, that both the traders and the Indians "Will not fail to meet with every difficulty they can mutually throw" into the way of embargo's implementation. [30] Haldimand's irritation was not soothed by the subsequent arrival of bills amounting to £65,000 in July, nor by the £25,300 in drafts payable to Detroit merchants alone presented in mid-1783, a full two years after such expenditures presumably had been prohibited.

The Canadian Governor had taken the conventional way out by blaming the mercantile community for what was essentially a military and political decision to supply the Indians with whatever they demanded. But his view also reflected a persistent disdain held by officers for traders. [31] The military might agree in public that it was fighting to retain the interior for economic advantage (that is the fur trade), however much that argument was political rhetoric. Parliament had to be convinced that the tremendous expenses lavished on the Western Theatre were for some tangible benefit, and there was a general consensus that commerce should be protected. To the military government in North America, fear of Indian retaliation and a desire to keep the Americans away from Canada and the Great Lakes communications network were far more immediate considerations. Moreover, the long term economic advantage to the Mother Country of the wilderness trade conflicted with the daily necessity of having to deal with individual merchants — trade might be fine if it were not for the traders.

An end to the fighting in 1783 suggested a release from the government's financial burden and a return to normal economic activity in the interior. In fact neither occurred. The fur trade continued to be disrupted by British retention of the western posts in defiance of the peace treaty, and by renewed Indian warfare along the American frontier. Indian warriors were still supplied at British posts along the Lakes, while western farmers and merchants were still used, albeit reluctantly, to provide for the government's immediate needs. In short, little had changed: nor would it until yet another western war was concluded in 1815.

The war years were a curious blend of success, stalemate, and disappointment for the British in the Lakes Country. At the outbreak of hostilities, offers of land at the western posts were made to anyone supporting the Crown. Refugee loyalists and captives taken in raids against the American frontier readily accepted — but the offer was quickly rescinded. [32] Neither the military government in Canada nor the North Ministry were willing to risk alienating the Indians by promoting even such limited settlement; nor was anyone anxious to underwrite the considerable costs involved. Prisoners and Loyalists alike were shipped to Canada for repatriation or resettlement in the East.

Unwilling to trust either the loyalty of the Canadian Habitant or the honesty of the resident British merchants, the government also refused to encourage, or even utilize, local resources on a regular basis. As a result the western economy remained tied to the narrow-based fur trade and subsistence agriculture, and the military was never able to establish a reasonably priced or consistent source of supply.

At first reluctant to 'unleash' the unrestrained ferocity of their Indian allies, the British eventually became equally disenchanted with the military effectiveness of the warriors. By 1781, Haldimand was convinced that they were actually trying to prolong the war so they could "live in indolence " at British expense, an attitude he felt was encouraged by the "grasping traders." [33] Trapped in a wilderness war they hoped to avoid, the British allocated too few resources to achieve a decisive result and they expended too many to justify the meager advantages gained. The costs, in treasure and in spirit, had become excessive.

NOTES

¹Carleton to Germain, March 28, 1777, Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections (MHC), IX, 347; see R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America (Princeton, 1975), 29.

²Quoted in Bowler, Logistics, 230.

³Ibid., 231.

⁴Germain to Carleton, March 28, 1777, MHC, IX, 347; see also John D. Barnhard (ed.) Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark in the Revolution (Crawfordsville, 1951), 21, 27-28, 30; N.V. Russell, "Indian Policy of Henry Hamilton; A Reappraisal," Canadian Historical Review, XI, 20-37.

⁵Estimate of Expenses at the Western Posts, June 16, 1775, Otto Fisher Papers, Burton Historical Collections, Detroit Public Library (BHC); Hamilton to Carleton, September 4, 1776, Ibid. For concepts of eighteenth-century warfare see John Neff, War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization (New York, 1963): Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism; Civilian and Military (New York, 1967).

⁶Carleton to Hamilton, October 6, 1776, MHC, IX, 344; Hamilton to Carleton, September 4, 1776, Fisher Papers, BHC; Lieutenant Brehm to Haldimand, July 8, 1779, MHC, IX, 416; Haldimand to Captain Lernoult, July 23, 1779, MHC, X, 345. Supplies of rum issued at Detroit for 1778 totaled 17,500 gallons (60 gallons per day), compared to total issues of 10,000 gallons at Niagara. Curtis says rum was dispensed without "ration or reason," E.E. Curtis, Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution, (New Haven, 1926), 92.

⁷Niagara situation is covered by Bruce Wilson, "The Struggle for Wealth and Power at Fort Niagara, Ontario History," (Dec. 1976), 137-55.

⁸Bowler, Logistics, 231, 48, 92; Curtis refers to the "clumsy and antiquated machinery" of army administration, Organization, 50; see Ch. IV, "Provisioning the Army."

⁹Bowler, Logistics, 232; Memorial concerning the Inland Trade, nd, MHC, X, 272; see also James Andrew to William Edgar June 22, 1775, and James Bannerman to Edgar, May 20, 1777, William Edgar Papers, BHC.

¹⁰For British policy see Jack Sosin, Whitehall and Wilderness, (Lincoln, 1961) Hilda Neatby, Quebec, The Revolutionary Age, 1760-91 (Toronto, 1966).

¹¹Haldimand to Hamilton, October 7, 1778, MHC, IX, 405; Haldimand to Germain, September 25, 1779, Ibid. X, 361; De Peyster to Haldimand, November 3, 1781, Ibid., X, 536.

¹²Curtis, Organization, 85, 93, 103; Bowler, Logistics, 218; Haldimand to Upper Country Commandants, May 6, 1782, MHC, X, 573; Lt. Brehm to Haldimand, July 27, 1779, Ibid., X, 420.

¹³For general studies of the western fur trade see Murray Lawson Fur; A Study in Mercantiism (Toronto, 1942); Harold Innis, Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1930).

¹⁴Haldimand to De Peyster, February 12, 1780, MHC, X, 377: Following the Quebec Act of 1774, Lieutenant Governors were appointed for Detroit, Mackinack and Vincennes to establish civil government. These functions were negated by the declaration of martial law in 1775 and the role of these officials remained ambiguous. See Jack Sosin, Revolutionary Frontier (New York, 1967); N. V. Russell, "Governmental Organization in Michigan, 1760-1787," Michigan History, XXIII, 99-100.

¹⁵Todd and McGill to Edgar, May 15, 1777, Edgar Papers, BHC; see Hamilton to Edgar, September 5, 1777, and Edward Abbott to Edgar, August, 6, 1777, Ibid; For Sinclair see Haldimand to Sinclair, November 2, 1782, MHC, X, 672; N. V. Russell, British Regime in Michigan and the Northwest (Northfield, Minn., 1939).

¹⁶For charges of favoritism see Todd and McGill to Edgar, November 6, 1777, Edgar Papers, BHC; Hamilton's order to Macomb and Lyons, September 14, 1776, Fischer Papers, BHC; De Peyster to Haldimand, MHC, X, 375; Hamilton to Haldimand, April 26, 1777, Ibid., 467.

¹⁷Macomb, Edgar and Macomb to A. Ellice, June 5, 1781, Macomb, Edgar and Macomb Letterbooks, BHC; for patterns of the western trade see Macomb, Edgar and Macomb to Ellice, September 6, 1781, Ibid.; A. F. Tyler, "British Fur Trade from Lake Michigan West Between 1775-1780," MSS in Minnesota Historical Society; I. Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade (Ann Arbor, 1919); Donald Creighton, Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto, 1956).

¹⁸Sinclair to Haldimand, February 15, 1779, Canadian Archives Report (1890), 142; De Peyster to Carleton, June 29, 1778, Wisconsin Historical Collections, XI, 3; Haldimand to General Clinton, January 31, 1780, MHC XXI, 496-99.

¹⁹Trade Regulations for 1782, MHC, X, 622; Haldimand to De Peyster May 6, 1774, Ibid., 357; Haldimand to De Peyster, June 14, 1779, Ibid., 360.

²⁰Quoted in Innis, Fur Trade, 181; see E. Foy to Hamilton, nd, MHC, IX, 395; Carleton to Haldimand, May 27, 1777 and July 2, 1777, Ibid., 348.

²¹Innis, Fur Trade, 183, 220; see Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, 75; Creighton, Empire, 71; Memorial Concerning In and Navigation, nd, MHC, X, 272.

²²Haldimand to De Peyster, February 12, 1780, MHC, X, 377; Haldimand to Secretary Robinson, July 28, 1776, Ibid., 290.

²³De Leyba to Governor de Cabe 3, June 8, 1780 and June 20, 1780 in George Hammond (ed.), New Spain and the Anglo-American West, (Los Angeles, 1932), 243, 252.

²⁴Haldimand to De Peyster, August 10, 1780, MHC, X, 416; Haldimand to De Peyster, May 8, 1780, Ibid., IX, 635.

²⁵Haldimand to De Peyster, April 10, 1781, MHC, X, 465; Sosin, Revolutionary Frontier, 105.

²⁶Haldimand to Germain, October 25, 1780, MHC, X, 440; Haldimand to De Peyster, July 3, 1779, Ibid., 261; Haldimand to De Peyster January 1, 1781, Ibid., 534.

²⁷De Peyster to Haldimand, June 14, 1779, Ibid., IX, 541; and January 26, 1782, Ibid., X, 546. See also Bernard Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General: Henry Hamilton, George Rogers Clark and the American Indian," Indiana Magazine of History, LXXIX, (March, 1983), 1-29.

²⁸Indian Council at Detroit, November 9, 1711, MHC, X, 541; De Peyster to McKee, October 4, 1781, Ibid., 522.

²⁹Haldimand to De Peyster, April 20, 1781, Ibid., X, 471; Haldimand to Upper Country Commandants, May 5, 1782, Ibid., X, 572; Haldimand to De Peyster, June 24, 1781, Ibid., 491.

³⁰Haldimand to De Peyster, May 19, 1782, Ibid., X, 578; De Peyster to Haldimand, September 12, 1781, Ibid., 508; see Macomb, Edgar and Macomb to Ellice, January 10, 1783, MEM Letterbook, BHC. De Peyster disagreed with Haldimand's decision to curtail all local purchases. He was an exception to the general hostility of the military toward commerce, noting that "I have ever made it my study to promote the trade of this post" (referring at that time to Mackinack), De Peyster, Miscellanies of an Officer, (Dumfries, 1813), 2-6.

³¹Bowler, Logistics, 27; see Charles Grant report on Trade, April 24, 1780, MHC, XIX, 508; Haldimand to Germain, October 25, 1780, Canadian Archives Relating to Detroit, BHC; Mr. Foy to Carleton, March 10, 1778, MHC, X, 281.

³²Germain to Carleton, March 28, 1777, MHC, IX, 347.

³³Haldimand to De Peyster, May 8, 1780, Ibid., 634; see also Jack Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the American Revolution: A Re-Assessment," Canadian Historical Review, XLIV (June, 1965), 101-21; S. F. Wise., "The American Revolution and Indian History., "in John Moir (ed), Character and Circumstance, (Toronto, 1970), 182-201.