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TO GETTYSBURG
Immediately after his victory at Chancellorsville, General Lee
prepared the Army of Northern Virginia for campaigns soon to come. He
reorganized its infantry into three corps of three divisions each and
placed them under command of Lieutenant Generals James Longstreet,
Richard S. Ewell, and A. Powell Hill. (A Confederate corps numbered
about 20,000 infantrymen, 2,000 artillerymen; a division 6,000 infantry
men, and a brigade 1,500.) His cavalry division remained under the
command of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, and he allotted supporting
artillery battalions to each. The Army of Northern Virginia numbered
about 75,000 officers and men, nearly 10,000 of whom were cavalry.
After his defeat at Chancellorsville, General Hooker's Army of the
Potomac returned to its positions near Fredericksburg and prepared for
a new thrust toward Richmond. Lee retained the initiative gained at
Chancellorsville, however, and on June 6 launched an ambitious campaign
of his own. Because he could see nothing to be gained from another
battle in the Fredericksburg area, he decided on a bold move that would
transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac River. If this
could be done, it might disrupt Federal campaign plans for the season,
remove Federal forces from the Shenandoah Valley, and give him a chance
to win a decisive victory for the Confederacy.
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"A CAVALRY CHARGE," ILLUSTRATION BY EDWIN FORBES (BL)
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Leaving Hill's Corps to guard the Rappahannock River's crossings at
Fredericksburg, Lee moved Ewell's and Longstreet's Corps west and north
to the Culpeper area where much of Stuart's cavalry had assembled for
the march north. There on June 9, in obedience to Hooker's order to
"disperse and destroy" the Confederate force in that area, the Cavalry
Corpus of the Army of the Potomac surprised and nearly defeated the
Confederate horsemen in the battle of Brandy Station, the largest
cavalry battle of the war. The
battle was a draw; the Federals rode from the field, leaving Stuart
to nurse his wounded pride. Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, commander of
the Union cavalry, however, had confirmed that the Confederates were in
force in the Culpeper area, and the Union horsemen had learned that they
could "dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to the
Confederate cavalry."
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MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, COMMANDER, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
RELIEVED ON JUNE 28, 1863 (GNMP)
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On June 10 Ewell's Corps left Culpeper for the Shenandoah Valley.
Four days later it captured the Union garrison at Winchester and a large
amount of supplies there and at Martinsburg. Ewell's Corps reached the
Potomac near Hagerstown on June 15. As Ewell neared the Potomac,
Longstreet's Corps moved northeast of the Blue Ridge to the mountain
gaps west of Washington. There it and Stuart's cavalrymen guarded the
Confederate right and rear as the remainder of Lee's army moved north.
In mid-June also Hill's Corps marched from Fredericksburg toward Front
Royal and the Shenandoah Valley beyond. Lee's plan to remove the theater
of operations from Virginia was well under way.
General Hooker knew that Lee's army was moving north but could not
divine Lee's intentions or objectives. When it became apparent that only
Hill's Corps remained at Fredericksburg, Hooker suggested that he be
allowed to strike it and advance toward Richmond. Although this
suggestion had some merit at that time, Lincoln denied it, observing
that Lee's army was his "sure objective point." Therefore, Hooker
shifted the Army of the Potomac to the area west of Washington and south
of the Potomac, whence it could face Lee's main force and cover
Washington. Hooker's efforts to learn of Lee's army's locations west of
Washington by sending cavalry and infantry probes through the mountain
gaps there resulted in lively fights with Stuart's men at Aldie,
Middleburg, and Upperville, but they provided little information and did
not seriously disrupt Lee's movements.
Ewell's Corps and Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins's brigade of
cavalry crossed the Potomac on June 15 and headed north up the
Cumberland Valley to Hagerstown and Chambersburg in a giant raid,
sweeping the country for supplies. At Chambersburg, the one-legged Ewell
divided his force, sending Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's division east to
Gettysburg, York, and the Susquehanna River beyond. In the meantime,
Ewell continued north to Carlisle and toward Harrisburg with the
divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Edward Johnson. On June 29
Early's troops reached the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, and
Rodes's division threatened Harrisburg. By this time the corps of Hill
and Longstreet had crossed the Potomac on June 24th and 25th and reached
the Chambersburg area on the 27th. They occupied Chambersburg and
Cashtown Pass over South Mountain to the east.
On June 25, on learning that Lee's forces had crossed the Potomac,
Hooker ordered the Army of the Potomac from Virginia into that part of
Maryland between Frederick and the river. In the meantime other Federal
commands in the threatened area girded to meet the Confederate menace,
and Governor Andrew Curtin of Pennsylvania worked to organize the
Pennsylvania militia to defend Harrisburg and other important points
within the Keystone State.
(click on image for a PDF version)
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LEE INVADES PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 3-JUNE 30, 1863
On June 3, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia begins moving west to
cross the Blue Ridge Mountains and gain the Shenandoah Valley. By the
time General Hooker discerns Lee's purpose the Confederate army has
entered the valley and is moving north to cross the Potomac and invade
Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Union Army of the Potomac withdraws from
the line of the Rappahannock River and starts marching north to
intercept Lee's army.
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After crossing the Potomac, Lee lost contact with Stuart and much of
the Confederate cavalry. He had instructed that general to guard the
mountain passes with part of his horsemen so long as the enemy was south
of the Potomac and to cross that river with the remainder in order to
screen Ewell's right. Stuart saw that his troopers guarded the passes,
but he attempted to reach Ewell's right, not by a direct route near the
mountains, but by leading his three best brigades between the Union army
and Washington. Stuart hoped that such a move would create havoc among
the enemy and remove the stain of Brandy Station from his reputation.
But his gamble failed; the Union forces moved and prevented his reaching
Ewell's right. Thus, the three errant brigades crossed the Potomac at
Rowser's Ford and rode north via Rockville, Westminster, and Hanover to
Carlisle, completely out of touch with General Lee and the main army and
not providing the intelligence and screening important to its success.
Stuart's failure to cover the the right of Lee's army and provide him
with information on the enemy was one of the major Confederate blunders
of the Gettysburg Campaign.
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MAJOR GENERAL JAMES. E. B. STUART,
COMMANDER, CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. (GNMP)
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MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE
(SEATED, CENTER), COMMANDER, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, & STAFF. (LC)
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Early on June 28, when the Army of the Potomac was concentrated near
Frederick, Maryland, a messenger from the War Department arrived with an
order relieving General Hooker from command of that army and replacing
him with Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Union Fifth Corps.
Hooker had rashly offered his resignation on the 27th, and President
Lincoln accepted it with alacrity. Meade was thoroughly surprised at
his appointment and was reluctant to accept it. Few if any Americans
have had so much responsibility thrust upon them at such a critical
time. Yet, Meade, a thoroughly capable professional soldier who had a
strong sense of duty, shouldered the burden and took immediate
measures to move his army north on a broad front to the relief of
Harrisburg while covering Washington and Baltimore.
On the evening of June 28 General Lee, who was at Chambersburg,
learned from a spy that the Army of the Potomac, now under General
Meade, had crossed the Potomac and was in the Frederick area. He
decided immediately to concentrate his army east of the mountains to
hold the Union army there and sent riders to General Ewell at Carlisle
with orders to return his corps at once to the Gettysburg-Cashtown
area. Ewell, who was about to attempt the capture of Harrisburg, called
off that operation and ordered General Early at York, Pennsylvania, to
return his division to the assembly area without delay. In the
meantime, Ewell sent Johnson's division and his wagon train back toward
Chambersburg and started with Rodes's division on a direct route toward
Gettysburg.
(click on image for a PDF version)
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SITUATION JUNE 30, 1863, THE EVE OF BATTLE
The Army of Northern Virginia is attempting to concentrate near
Cashtown to prepare for battle. Only four of the army's nine divisions
are on the eastern side of the mountains. The Army of the Potomac is
moving north from Frederick along nearly a thirty-mile front. Buford's
Union cavalry division occupies Gettysburg during the afternoon, and
Reynolds's 1st Army Corps camps five miles south of the town. The
remainder of the army is gradually moving in the direction of
Gettysburg.
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On June 29 Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division of Hill's Corps crossed
South Mountain through Cashtown Pass to the hamlet of Cashtown at the
east base of the mountain. On June 30 Heth sent a brigade east eight
miles to Gettysburg in search of supplies, shoes especially, that he
heard were in the town. When near Gettysburg, the Confederates saw a
sizable force of Union cavalry and returned to Cashtown without having a
fight. On July 1 General Hill sent Heth's division, followed by that of
Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender, to Gettysburg in a reconnaissance-in-force.
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MAJOR GENERAL HENRY HETH (GNMP)
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The troops seen near Gettysburg on June 30 were cavalrymen of Maj.
Gen. John Buford's division of the Army of the Potomac. As that army had
moved north from the Frederick area, Buford's troopers screened its left
front, collecting information on Lee's army for General Meade and for
Maj. Gen. John E. Reynolds, commander of the Union First Corps. Buford,
an excellent cavalry officer, had reached Gettysburg with two of his
three brigades. He posted them in an arc west and north of the town
covering the roads over which the Confederates might approach.
Gettysburg in 1863 was a town of about 2,400 people. It sat amid
gently rolling farmland—a bucolic quilt of orchards, grain fields,
pastures, and wood lots. Its landscape undulated between low north-south
ridges sometimes connected to lone granite hills, and Rock Creek
bordered the town on the east. Gettysburg was the county seat of Adams
County, and it could boast having Pennsylvania College and a Lutheran
seminary. In addition, it was the hub of a road network with turnpikes
leading west to Chambersburg, east to York, and southeast to Baltimore.
Eight other roads led to Harrisburg, Carlisle, Emmitsburg, Taneytown,
Hagerstown, Hanover, and lesser places nearby. A railroad stretched
east to Hanover Junction and to Baltimore beyond. A railroad bed had
been constructed near the Chambersburg Pike
west of the town, but it had no tracks.
The Army of
the Potomac numbered about 95,000 officers and enlisted
personnel, all volunteers. It had seven corps of infantry and
artillery, a corps of cavalry and artillery, and an artillery reserve of
twenty-one batteries. Its corps were significantly smaller than
Confederate corps and averaged 14,000 officers and enlisted men each but
ranged in size from 9,800 to 17,000. There were twenty-two divisions,
two or three per corps, divided into fifty-nine brigades. The infantry
brigades were comparable in size to Confederate brigades, having an
average strength of about 1,500 officers and men. Union divisions,
however, were usually smaller than those of the Army of Northern
Virginia.
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL AMBROSE P. HILL, COMMANDER, 3RD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF
NORTHERN VIRGINIA (GNMP)
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Meade's army had marched north from Frederick on a broad front,
searching for the Confederates and covering Baltimore and Washington. On
June 30 the left of Meade's army was near Emmitsburg,
Maryland, and its right about 25 miles to the east near Manchester.
As Lee ordered a concentration near Gettysburg, Meade prepared to set
up a defensive position along Pipe Creek just south of the Mason-Dixon
line. The events of July 1 were to change each commander's plans.
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