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BURNSIDE'S PLAN APPROVED, THEN FOILED
When he returned to his comfortable office in Washington, Halleck did
present Burnside's plan to Lincoln, who approved it
with the caveat that Burnside would have to act quickly. Halleck did not
attend so conscientiously to the pontoon question, however, and Sumner's
troops stepped off toward Fredericksburg before the pontoons even
started down from the upper Potomac. The first Federal infantry tramped
into Falmouth on the evening of November 17, and General Sumner asked
permission to cross some cavalry over a precarious ford to take
Fredericksburg, which was lightly defended. Burnside declined, lest the
horse soldiers find themselves trapped by rising water, and indeed rain
began to fall as though on cue. Burnside ached to cross while the city
was lightly defended, too, and when he rode into Falmouth on November 19
he wrote Halleck that he would do so as soon as the pontoons
arrived.
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ALFRED WAUD SKETCHED THIS VIEW OF FREDERICKSBURG AS SEEN FROM FALMOUTH
JUST DAYS BEFORE THE BATTLE. (LC)
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The first of the pontoons did not even leave Washington until that day,
and (because General Halleck had not apprised his engineer officer how
badly Burnside needed them) they rolled out on ponderous wagons. The
same storm that lifted the Rappahannock turned Virginia roads into muck,
and the pontoon train slowed to a crawl, stopping altogether at the washed-out
bridges over the Occoquan River. Only then did the engineer in
charge of the work divert some of the pontoons to a steamboat, which
delivered them at Belle Plains landing on November 22. Even these few,
enough for a full bridge or two, did not reach the army until November
24. The bulk of the pontoon wagons finally pulled up at Falmouth, ready
for use, on the afternoon of November 27—some ten days after
Burnside expected them.
By then it was too late for the Army of the Potomac to waltz
unchallenged into Fredericksburg. As early as November 15 Lee suspected
that Burnside might be headed for Fredericksburg, and he sent a regiment
of infantry and a battery of artillery to bolster the city's garrison.
Lee thought, incorrectly, that Burnside favored shipping his army back to
the James River. Consequently the Confederate commander supposed for a
time that the Fredericksburg movement merely served as the screen for a
general withdrawal back to the wharves at Alexandria. By the morning of
November 18, however, he started two divisions of Longstreet's corps on
the road to Fredericksburg, following it with the balance November 19.
The next day Lee himself telegraphed Jefferson Davis from Fredericksburg
to say he believed the Yankees were concentrating for a strike at that
place. The last of Longstreet's corps filed into the city on November
23, and on that day Lee directed Stonewall Jackson to bring his corps
east of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
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A TRAIN OF PONTOONS LIKE THOSE USED BY BURNSIDE TO SPAN THE RAPPAHANNOCK
RIVER. THE TARDY ARRIVAL OF THE PONTOONS UPSET BURNSIDE'S PLANS FOR AN
EASY CROSSING AND ULTIMATELY DOOMED HIS CAMPAIGN TO FAILURE (NA)
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(click on image for a PDF version)
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THE ARMIES MOVE TO FREDERICKSBURG, NOVEMBER 15—DECEMBER 4
When the Fredericksburg Campaign opens, the Army of the Potomac is
centered near Warrenton Junction, north of the Rappahannock River. On
November 15th, Sumner's grand division marches toward Fredericksburg,
followed by Franklin and Hooker. Burnside plans to cross the
Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg, but is prevented from doing so by
the tardy arrival of his pontoon train. By the time the pontoons arrive,
Longstreet's Confederate corps occupies the heights behind the town. In
early December, Jackson's corps arrives from the Shenandoah Valley and
takes position south of Fredericksburg, toward Port Royal. With
Jackson's arrival, the Confederate army is reunited and ready for
battle.
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AT THE TIME OF THE WAR, FREDERICKSBURG WAS A COMMERCIAL TOWN OF 5,000
INHABITANTS. WHEN CONFEDERATE FORCES ABANDONED THE TOWN IN APRIL, 1862,
THEY DESTROYED THE BRIDGES ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER.
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In one of his messages to Jackson, Lee intimated that he did not intend
to resist Burnside on the Rappahannock. The geography favored the
Federals there, he felt, because of the heights that towered on
Burnside's bank of the river. Lee preferred the North Anna River, where
the high ground would have loomed on his side, but he probably guessed
that his president would frown on retreating so much nearer to Richmond.
Employing his renowned tact, he therefore tried to persuade Davis of the
wisdom of a Fabian withdrawal, destroying the railroad and otherwise
impeding Burnside's progress until winter; he posed the notion in such a
fashion that Davis might feel it had been his own idea. Lee's diplomacy
did not succeed, but neither did the Yankees offer to cross the
Rappahannock immediately, so Longstreet's corps remained in camp on a
long ridge a mile southwest of the river.
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