MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Initial Relocation Program Plans of the War Relocation Authority

On March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was established by Executive Order 9102 to "formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from [designated areas] of the persons or classes of persons designated. . . and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision." To carry out this function, the director of the WRA was "to provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, supervise their activities. . . . provide. . . . for employment. . . . prescribe the terms and conditions of such employment." [1]

That same day President Roosevelt appointed as the WRA's first director Milton S. Eisenhower, a brother of the general who had previously served as an official in the Department of Agriculture. By his own admission, Eisenhower knew little about the west coast ethnic Japanese, the deliberations that had preceded the decision to evacuate them, or future government plans for the evacuees. [2] He faced a herculean task — hurriedly building an agency to direct and supervise the lives of more than 100,000 people in an atmosphere of racial animosity and suspicion, and, at the same time, deciding what to do with them. He quickly concluded that the evacuation would eventually be viewed as "avoidable injustice," but later he would state that it was an "inhuman mistake." [3]

Eisenhower faced an initial decision that would shape the rest of the WRA program — would the evacuees be resettled and placed in new homes and jobs, or would they be detained, confined, and supervised for the duration of the War? He had been given little or no guidance on this crucial issue. Beyond the fact that the military would deliver the evacuees to the relocation centers operated by the WRA and thereafter wished no further part in the "Japanese problem," nothing had been decided.

The Tolan Committee (discussed in Chapter Three of this study) had reported this major deficiency in planning in March 1942, observing that to "date the committee has been unable to secure from anyone charged with responsibility a clear-cut statement of the status of the Japanese evacuees, alien or citizen, after they pass through the reception." Notably, the committee offered some guidance in the matter, although firmly opposing incarceration of the evacuees for reasons that proved remarkably prophetic:

The incarceration of the Japanese for the duration of the war can only end in wholesale deportation. The maintenance of all Japanese, alien and citizen, in enforced idleness will prove not only a costly waste of the taxpayers' money, but it automatically implies deportation, since we cannot expect this group to be loyal to our Government or sympathetic to our way of life thereafter.

Serious constitutional questions are raised by the forced detention of citizens against whom no individual charges are lodged. Instead the committee favored a loyalty review at the assembly centers as a precursor for resettlement or relocation. After the "loyalty and dependability of all Japanese, alien and citizen alike" was examined at the reception centers, 'arrangements" should be implemented "for job placement outside of the prohibited areas of all persons certified." [4]

Only when this process failed to resolve all questions did the committee envision the establishment of resettlement communities.

Eisenhower and other top-level WRA officials started from premises similar to those of the Tolan Committee. They believe that the vast majority of evacuees were law-abiding and loyal and that, once removed from the restricted zone, they should be returned quickly to conditions approximating normal American life. Believing WRA's goal should be to achieve this rehabilitation, they immediately devised plans to move evacuees to the intermountain states. [5] The government would operate "reception centers," and some evacuees would work within them, developing the land and undertaking agricultural development. Many more, however, would work outside the centers, in private employment — manufacturing, farming, or establishing new self-supporting communities. [6]

Mike Masaoka, National Secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, soon approached Eisenhower with a lengthy letter containing recommendations for policies the WRA should follow regarding relocation. This effort was grounded on the basic position the JACL had taken on exclusion and evacuation:

We have not contested the right of the military to order this movement, even though it meant leaving all that we hold dear and sacred, because we believe that cooperation on our part will mean a reciprocal cooperation on the part of the government.

Among the specific recommendations in the letter was the plea that the government permit Japanese Americans to have as much contact as possible with white Americans to avoid isolation and segregation. [7]

The WRA's plans were in sympathy with such an approach, but the government's experience with voluntary relocation suggested that the WRA would only be successful if it could enlist the help of the interior state governors. [8] Thus, the WRA arranged a meeting for officials representing the ten western states on April 7 in Salt Lake City, the day after Masaoka had sent Eisenhower his appeal for a cooperative relationship with the government. From the federal side, the three principal representatives were Thomas C. Clark, chief of the civilian staff of the WCCA (on temporary detail from the Department of Justice), Karl Bendetsen, director of the WCCA, and Eisenhower. The states were represented by five governors and a host of other officials, including several attorneys general and directors of State Agricultural Extension Services. Also in attendance was a small contingent of large-scale agricultural producers in the interior western states — particularly sugar beet companies with holdings in eastern Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Colorado — who were anxious to employ evacuees for harvesting their crops amid the wartime labor shortages. [9] After Clark opened the meeting and discussed its intent, Bendetsen made the first presentation, describing the government's evacuation program and the Western Defense Command's rationale for procedures used to implement it. He described and defended the War Department's evacuations and procedures, arguing that, although some evacuees might be disloyal, once they were removed from the west coast, their danger to American society and the war effort would be minimal. He stated that the United States was faced with two "real" problems, both of which were peculiar to the west coast: (1) possible fifth column activity in the event of an invasion, and (2) the possibility of confusing the Japanese Americans with the enemy He also pointed out the impracticability of furnishing troops for scattered small contingents of evacuee agricultural workers. [10]

Eisenhower then described the WRA program. He emphasized his concern about the civil liberties of the evacuated people and the problem of making effective use of the manpower they represented. He indicated five types of work plans that he had in mind for the evacuees: (1) public works, including such things as the development of raw lands for agricultural production; (2) production of food, both for evacuee subsistence and for sale, on federally owned project lands; (3) manufacture of goods, such as camouflage nets and cartridge belts, which were needed by the military; (4) private employment; and (5) establishment of self-supporting communities that would be managed by the evacuees themselves rather than by the federal government. Playing down the portions of his plan that concerned private employment, he assured the state participants that security precautions would be taken, evacuees would not be permitted to own land against the wishes of the states, and the WRA would insure that evacuees did not become permanent residents. [11] The governors of the intermountain states quickly grasped the politics of the situation, and indicated their disagreement with Bendetsen's rationale and Eisenhower's social engineering. They opposed any evacuee land purchase or settlement in their states, and demanded guarantees that the government would forbid evacuees to buy land and that it would remove them at the end of the war. They objected to California using the interior states as a "dumping ground" for its Japanese "problem." People in their states were so bitter over the voluntary evacuation that had been initially encouraged by DeWitt (but was terminated by Public Proclamation No. 4, issued on March 27 and made effective at midnight two days later) that unguarded evacuees would undoubtedly face physical danger. Governor Herbert Maw of Utah proposed a plan whereby the states would run the relocation program with federal financing, while the governor of Idaho advocated rounding up and supervising all those who had already entered his state. The governor of Wyoming wanted evacuees placed in "concentration camps." With few exceptions, the other officials present echoed these sentiments. Only Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado took a moderate position. The voices of those hoping to use the evacuees for agricultural labor were drowned out amid the stormy proceedings. [12]

Bendetsen and Eisenhower, with little or no support from higher federal officials, were unable to face down this united political opposition. Eisenhower closed the meeting: the consensus was that the plan for assembly and relocation/reception centers was acceptable, as long as the evacuees remained under guard within the centers. As he left Salt Lake City, Eisenhower believed that the much of his proposed program as well as the "plan to move the evacuees into private employment had to be abandoned —at least temporarily." [13] Bendetsen came to a similar conclusion, remarking several weeks later: "You can't move people across the street! The premise is that who you consider to be so dangerous, that you can't permit him to stay at point 'A' — point 'B' will not accept." [14]

Before it had begun, Eisenhower and the WRA had thus abandoned its resettlement plans and adopted confinement policies. West coast politicians had achieved their long sought program of exclusion; politicians of the interior states had achieved their goal of detention. Without giving up its belief that evacuees should be brought back to normal productive life in American society as quickly as possible, the WRA had, in effect, become their jailer, contending that confinement was for the benefit of the evacuees and that the controls on their departure were designed to prevent mistreatment by other Americans. Accordingly, the agency immediately stepped up its search for suitable relocation center sites, in cooperation with the military and the WCCA, and concentrated the balance of its attention on the twin problems of building an organization and preparing for the reception of the evacuated people. [15]

Commencement of College Student Relocation

Throughout the balance of April and early May, the issue of relocation was largely submerged in WRA thinking by the more pressing problems of evacuee reception and establishment of the relocation centers. The issue remained alive, however, and eventually it was brought to a head by two simultaneous and parallel developments: (1) the early beginnings of what came to be known as college student relocation; and (2) the continuously mounting demand from western sugar producers for evacuee labor to help harvest their extensive sugar beet crops.

The special problem represented by the Nisei college students was noted as early as March 8 by a small group of educators and YMCA and YWCA officials in the San Francisco Bay area and was brought more sharply into focus on March 19 by the preliminary report of the Tolan Committee. In late March, a Student Relocation Committee was formed on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley, and general plans were developed for facilitation of the transfer of Nisei students to midwestern and eastern educational institutions. On April 7, the day of the Salt Lake City conference, President Robert G. Sproul of the University of California informed Tolan of the problem and indicated that he planned to submit proposals for its solution.

At a conference on April 11, WCCA and WRA representatives met in San Francisco to discuss the student problem. Both agencies agreed that permits should be given in a few especially deserving cases to students and others to leave the evacuated areas for immediate travel eastward to pursue their education.

On May 29, at the urging of Director Eisenhower and through the efforts of the American Friends Service Committee, the National Student Relocation Council (later the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council with headquarters in Philadelphia) was established at a meeting in Chicago, attended by college and university officials representing institutions throughout the country. Under the direction of its chairman, Dr. John W. Nason, president of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, the council spent the summer focusing on the problem of facilitating a Nisei student transfer program for the opening of the academic term in autumn. Throughout April and early May, however, its predecessor organization, the West Coast Student Relocation Committee, had already helped about 75 Nisei students to move out and resume their studies, almost without a break, at schools and colleges lying east of the exclusion zone. [16] By September 30, 1942, a total of 143 junior colleges, colleges, and universities, had been approved for student relocation by both the War and Navy departments. Included were liberal arts colleges, such as Swarthmore in Pennsylvania, state universities, such as Nebraska and Texas, women's colleges such as Smith and Radcliffe, Catholic institutions, such as Gonzaga, teachers' colleges such as Colorado State College of Education, theological seminaries such as Union in New York City, technical institutions, such as Milwaukee College of Engineering, and specialized schools, such as Northern College of Optometry and the Oberlin Conservatory of Music.

Under the tentative leave policy adopted by the WRA on July 20, 1942, some 250 students were granted education leaves from assembly and relocation centers prior to September 30. Some of these students left during late July and August to attend summer sessions at various institutions, but the majority went on leave in September, thus resuming their education with the opening of the fall term. [17]

By December 31, 1943, the number of Japanese American students enrolled in American colleges and universities had increased to 2,263. During the last six months of 1943, an estimated 636 evacuees left relocation centers to attend institutions of higher learning. The group included recent graduates of the relocation center high schools, as well as students whose education had been interrupted by evacuation. Included in the number were approximately 200 girls who began nurse's training, the majority of whom enlisted under the U.S. Cadet Nurse's Corps program. In November, relocation officers in the centers began efforts to supplement the work of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council by exploring opportunities for evacuees to study nursing in nearby approved hospitals and nursing schools. On October 14, the War Department dropped a ban that had prevented admission of students of Japanese ancestry to educational institutions conducting classified activities for the armed services, pending individual investigations similar to those required for work in war plants and approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General. [18]

Seasonal Agricultural Work in Western Sugar Beet Fields

On May 13, 1942, the WRA and the WCCA acceded to the repeated demands of the western sugar beet producers, following a suggestion directly from the White House. The two agencies agreed on a joint plan for permitting immediate recruitment of seasonal farm workers at the assembly and reception/relocation centers. Under the plan the WRA undertook to handle negotiations with the employers, while the WCCA assumed a nominal responsibility for keeping track of the evacuee workers and assuring their ultimate return to government centers. This latter objective was accomplished without the use of troops by issuance of civilian restrictive orders by the Western Defense Command, establishing each county or group of counties where the evacuees were to work as a restricted area under the terms of Executive Order 9066 and forbidding any person of Japanese ancestry to leave the designated area without specific permission from the WRA. These orders were enforceable under the provisions of Public Law 503. In addition, the WRA-WCCA agreement set forth five requirements that had to be met before any employer's application for permission to recruit evacuee workers would be accepted: (1) payment of prevailing wages; (2) provision of adequate living quarters (without cost to the evacuee) at or near the place of employment; (3) assurances from state and local officials that law and order would be maintained; (4) provision of transportation for the workers from the centers to the places of employment and back to the appropriate center; and (5) assurances that employment of evacuees would not result in displacement of local labor.

Movement of evacuees into the sugar beet fields started on May 20, 1942, when a small contingent of 15 recruits from the Portland Assembly Center arrived on farm lands controlled by the Amalgamated Sugar Company near Nyssa, Oregon. The movement of evacuees to the beet fields continued during May and June, slacked off slightly in midsummer, and then was resumed in preparation for the fall harvest. Altogether, approximately 10,000 evacuees left WCCA and WRA centers during 1942 for seasonal agricultural work, principally in Idaho, Utah, Montana, Colorado, and eastern Oregon. By conservative estimates the evacuees probably saved enough beets to make nearly 250,000,000 pounds of sugar. [19]

Adoption of Basic Leave Regulations

Because the procedures to cover seasonal agricultural work did not address the problem of leaves from the centers for year-round employment, the first step toward solution of this issue was taken on July 20, 1942, when the WRA adopted a tentative policy permitting indefinite leaves. Under this policy., only American-born evacuees who had never lived or studied in Japan were permitted to apply for indefinite leave. Such leaves were granted only to applicants who had definite offers of employment somewhere outside the eight western states under the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command. Before an indefinite leave permit was granted by the WRA director, the applicant was investigated by the relocation center staff and a record check was made with the FBI.

On September 26, the WRA issued a more comprehensive and liberal set of leave regulations which were published in the Federal Register on September 29 and became effective on October 1. Under the new regulations, any evacuee — citizen or alien — could apply for leave to visit or reside in any locality outside the evacuated area. Three types of leave from relocation centers were covered by the regulations: short-term, work-group, and indefinite. The three types of permits could be revoked by the WRA director in any case where the war effort or the public peace and security appeared to be endangered.

Short-term leave was intended for the evacuee who wished to leave a relocation center for a period of several weeks in order to consult with a medical specialist, negotiate a property arrangement, or transact other personal business. The leave was granted by the individual relocation center project directors for a definite period after investigation by the WRA staff at the centers. If a project director denied an application for short-term leave, the evacuee could appeal the decision to the WRA director in Washington.

Work-group leave was designed for evacuees to leave the centers as a group for seasonal agricultural work. Like short-term leave, it was granted by a relocation center project director for a definite period (which could be extended) and was subject to investigation at the center. Whenever possible, a record check was made with the FBI and other federal intelligence services for such permits. If the circumstances warranted, however, a project director could grant the permit without the record check.

Indefinite leave was granted to evacuees only by the WRA director in Washington and only if four specific requirements were met. The applicant for such leave must have a definite offer of a job or some other means of support. He must agree to keep the WRA informed of any changes in his job or address. His record at the relocation center and with the FBI and other intelligence services must contain no evidence of disloyalty to the United States. There must be reasonable evidence that his presence will be acceptable in the community where he proposed to make his new home.

Thus, by late September 1942, the WRA was "making definite plans" for resettlement of evacuees outside the relocation centers. Although the WRA had made resettlement "the primary aim of the relocation program," it did not mean that the agency "was contemplating an immediate and wholesale exodus from the centers." To the contrary, the WRA stated:

. . . . The somewhat elaborate machinery of checks and clearances involved in applications for indefinite leave, the difficulties encountered by evacuees in arranging for jobs without the opportunity to deal with prospective employers in person, the still-evident anxieties felt by many communities toward all people of Japanese ancestry, the reluctance of many evacuees themselves to leave the sanctuary of relocation centers in time of war — all these things suggested that individual resettlement would doubtless be a slow and gradual process. Within the limits prescribed by national security and administrative expedience, however, the Authority had determined to work toward a steady depopulation of the relocation centers and a widespread dispersal of evacuees throughout the interior sections of the country. . . . [20]

Problems Associated with Implementation of Relocation Program

According to the WRA's Story of Human Conservation, the implementation of the agency's relocation program was beset by numerous problems. As a result, the "actual movement of evacuees out of the centers to take up residence in normal communities did not take on significant proportions until the spring of 1943." Throughout the fall of 1942, the relocation program was, in the words of the chief of the Employment Division, on a "retail" basis. The publication continued:

. . . . Each application for indefinite leave was processed individually both at the relocation center and in the Washington office. In many cases, weeks and even months went by between the time an evacuee first submitted his application and the time he was finally able to depart from the center. The Authority's efforts to find employment opportunities for the evacuated people were handled mainly by the chief of the Employment Division himself and a few members of his immediate staff. Contacts were made on a somewhat informal basis and letters were sent to the various relocation centers advising them that an employer had been located who would be willing to consider employment of evacuees. From that point on, the negotiations were between any evacuee who might be interested and the employer. Inevitably, under these procedures the tempo of relocation movement from the centers was extremely slow and effected only a minor reduction in the center populations. By the end of 1942 less than 700 evacuees had left the centers on indefinite leave. [21]

Establishment of Relocation Field Offices

In late November 1942 WRA Director Myer, impatient with the slow pace of relocation, recommended that field area offices be established in cities throughout the nation where WRA expected substantial numbers of evacuees to be relocated. The offices, according to Myer, could handle much more closely and systematically the kind of contact work with employers that the Employment Division in the Washington office had been conducting somewhat informally. The offices could provide a check on public attitudes toward the evacuated people in their areas and work toward improving the "climate of social acceptance. The offices could also furnish a variety of services that the incoming evacuees would need as they settled in their new homes.

The first field area office was established in Chicago on January 4, 1943, to supervise relocation activities throughout the midwestern states. Within weeks, additional offices were opened in Cleveland, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, and Denver. During the spring, an office was established in New York City to supervise relocation in the eastern states and another was opened in Little Rock, Arkansas, to cover the southern portion of the nation. By June 30, an additional area office had been established in Boston to handle relocation efforts in the northeastern United States. In addition to the eight area offices, the WRA opened approximately 35 subordinate or 'district" field offices during the spring to perform similar types of functions in specific localities. Each of the district offices was under the supervision of one of the area offices, and all of the area offices, which also functioned as local relocation offices for the cities where they were located, were responsible to the chief of the Employment Division in Washington As the network of field offices 'was gradually geared up to an operating peak in the late spring of 1943," the WRA was finally "in a position, for the first time, to move directly towards its major goal of restoring a substantial number of the evacuated people to private life outside the west coast exclusion zone." [22]

Changes in Leave Procedures

During the early months of 1943, the WRA made changes in its basic leave regulations. The changes were made primarily to speed up and simplify the leave procedures by transferring to the field offices and the relocation centers functions which had previously been conducted by the Washington office.

The first significant change in the basic leave procedures was made in tentative form on March 3, 1943, and clarified in greater detail on March 20. The change provided for decentralization in the handling of applications for indefinite leave. The function of issuing leave permits — in cases where clearance had been granted — was transferred to the relocation centers. The function of checking on community attitudes was placed in the hands of the relocation field offices. The "net effect" of this change was "to accelerate the handling of indefinite leave applications and to give the field offices an effective control over the influx of evacuees into the communities of their respective areas.

A second significant change in the basic leave procedures was adopted on March 24. Designed to fill a "long-felt need in the relocation program," it established a system of providing, final assistance for evacuees going out of the centers on indefinite leave. Such assistance was limited, however, to cases of "genuine need" and was provided only to evacuees who were leaving the centers for the purpose of taking jobs — "not to those going out on student leave or those with independent means of support." The assistance grants amounted to $50 for evacuees leaving the centers without dependents; $75 for those leaving with one dependent; and $100 for those leaving with two or more dependents. Later policy modifications adopted in April and May provided that grants would be made to the families of men in the armed services regardless of the purpose for which they were leaving the centers and that evacuees going out to live temporarily in hostels for the purpose of seeking employment after arrival would also be eligible. Later in October 1943, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made to stimulate family relocation. The $100 ceiling per family had proved to be an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from $50 to $25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families consisting of five or more persons. [23]

The third significant change to the basic leave regulations was adopted on April 2, 1943. Since the registration program conducted in February and March placed the WRA in a position to eliminate clearance as a separate step in the leave procedures, the amendment of April 2 "authorized the Project Directors to grant indefinite leave permits without referral to the Washington Office and in advance of leave clearance provided basic requirements were met." These included: (1) the applicant must have answered Question 28 during registration with an unqualified affirmative; and (2) the Project Director must be satisfied, on the basis of evidence available at the center, that the applicant would not endanger the national security or interfere with the war effort. Issuance of permits in advance of clearance, however, was prohibited in the case of: (1) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan; (2) those whose applications for leave clearance had previously been denied; (3) Shinto priests; (4) aliens released on parole from internment camps by the Department of Justice; and (5) those who were planning to relocate to one of the eastern seaboard states under jurisdiction of the Eastern Defense Command. [24] Later, on December 14, 1943, the WRA notified the War Department that it had decided to lift all special restrictions on relocation in the Eastern Defense Command (except for those cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of leave clearance) and would thereafter grant leave permits for resettlement in that area on the same basis as for other sections of the country. [25]

Relocation in 1943

As a result of the changes in the basic leave procedures, the volume of relocation mounted steadily during the first three months of 1943, soared sharply upward in April and May, and dropped off slightly in June. By the half-year mark, more than 9,000 evacuees had left the centers to establish residence outside, and by the end of 1943 this figure had risen to more than 17,000.

The majority of those who left the centers in 1943 were Nisei between the ages of 18 and 30. This movement tended to alter the composition of the relocation center populations gradually yet nevertheless distinctly. By the summer, the oldest and the youngest evacuees were beginning to comprise the majority of the population in the centers. "The more vigorous, more alert, more thoroughly Americanized members of the community were beginning to thin out; the more cautious, the more timid, and the least well adjusted to American life, who had previously occupied a kind of background role at the centers, began to move steadily into the foreground." Thus, the WRA became increasingly aware that the "winnowing effects of the relocation program were going to make the relocation centers somewhat harder places to manage and that the relocation effort itself would become increasingly difficult as time went on."

The relocation movement of 1943 found its primary geographical focus to be the north central states and the intermountain region. Chicago, with its numerous employment opportunities and relative lack of anti-Asian bias, "soon proved to be the favorite relocation spot and remained so throughout the history of the program.' Denver and Salt Lake City also attracted large numbers of resettlers, because they had small but reasonably well established Japanese populations during the prewar period which provided a nucleus for further settlement. In addition, the two cities had both received several hundred additional people of Japanese descent during the period of voluntary migration, and many of the evacuees who went out on seasonal agricultural leave during 1942 and 1943 eventually gravitated to them and found year-round jobs. Aside from Chicago, Denver, and Salt Lake City, the resettling evacuees were widely distributed throughout the midwestern and intermountain states. Relocation in the southern states was limited, partially because the WRA did little to encourage it and few of the evacuees looked upon the South with its reputation of racial discrimination and limited economic opportunity as a favorable region for resettlement. During the summer of 1943, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration (NHA) to assist the relocation officers to meet one of their most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the relocation supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA regional representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In return, the NHA would assist the WRA in determining the acceptability of evacuees for housing in localities and recommend communities where the housing shortage was less serious and opportunities for housing were most promising. [26]

One development that stimulated the increased tempo of relocation during the fall of 1943 was the initiation of a "community invitation' plan in August. By this time it had become clear that there were many cities throughout the country where employment opportunities were plentiful and varied where the original WRA requirement of a specific job prospect for the resettler was virtually "academic." Consequently the WRA authorized its field offices on August 5 to designate certain communities as open to the evacuees on an "invitation" basis and the centers to grant leave permits for relocation in such communities regardless of whether or not the applicant had a specific job prospect, provided that they had leave clearance and met other procedural requirements. This plan enabled the resettler an opportunity to meet with potential employers face to face and to "shop around" in search for employment. A large share of the relocation in late 1943 and throughout 1944 was carried out on a "community invitation" basis. [27]

Seasonal Leave, 1943-44

With the arrival of spring in 1943, American farm interests again requested the services of evacuees in the relocation centers for seasonal agricultural work. By the end of June, more than 5,000 evacuees had been employed. The majority of these seasonal workers went to jobs in the sugar beet sections of the intermountain states, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, and Montana receiving the heaviest contingents. A considerable number, however, took jobs in the Great Plains states, and some even entered seasonal farm work as far east as Michigan. In addition, several dozen went into railway maintenance jobs in several western states.

On March 16, 1943, the regulations governing seasonal leave were significantly modified for the first time since their adoption in May 1942. Under the new policy, the WRA assumed full responsibility for handling the seasonal leave program. The amended regulations provided that seasonal leave was to be issued only for work in areas approved by the relocation field offices and that seasonal workers would be restricted in movement to the county or counties which the field offices designated. Provision was made to exclude grants for seasonal permits from those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, those who had been denied leave clearance, and those who had failed to answer Question 28 with an unqualified affirmative. [28]

Because a large number of potential seasonal workers left the centers in 1943 for relocation purposes and several hundred others left to join the armed forces, the number of evacuees employed in seasonal agricultural work was lower than in 1942. It reached a peak in late November when slightly less than 8,000 were reported absent from the centers on seasonal leave. Of this number, probably as many as 50 to 60 percent, elected to remain outside the centers and converted their permits to an indefinite leave basis without returning. According to the WRA:

. . . . To an even greater extent than in 1942, the seasonal leave program, by removing the evacuees from the secluded environment of the centers and giving them an opportunity to see that life 'on the outside' was not nearly so bad as many of them had imagined, proved to be a definite aid to the relocation program. [29] In February 1944, the seasonal agricultural leave program was modified to provide for issuance of seasonal leave only to persons recruited for agricultural work through the War Food Administration, and employment was authorized only in counties approved by War Relocation Authority relocation officers. This modification of the program improved controls and the systematic granting of leaves to meet critical manpower shortages. Although 5,029 seasonal work leaves were granted by the WRA to evacuees in the slowly dwindling populations of the relocation centers during the first six months of 1944, it remained impossible, however, for the WRA to supply enough workers to satisfy all of the calls that were made for evacuee farm labor. [30]

Local Resettlement Committees

From the beginning of the relocation program, the WRA realized that it would need the assistance of citizen groups in various localities to gain public acceptance and assist the evacuees in making adjustments in their new communities. Accordingly, the first resettlement committee was organized in Minneapolis in the fall of 1942. After establishment of field offices in a large number of midwestern communities in early 1943, expansion of these local committees proceeded rapidly. By the end of 1943, 26 committees had been established from Salt Lake City to Washington, D.C.

In most cases, the organizing impetus for local resettlement committees was provided by active church-related people, particularly the Society of Friends (Quakers) and interdenominational workers whose efforts were stimulated and guided by George Rundquist, a traveling representative for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America assigned specifically to Japanese American resettlement work. As a result of his efforts, the Committee for Japanese American Resettlement provided an umbrella organization for the local committees. The committees, although usually formed around a nucleus of active social-minded church members, generally included civic leaders, representatives of organizations such as the YMCA and YWCA, and a variety of community-oriented people without organizational affiliations.

The first job of most resettlement committees was to foster favorable public sentiment toward the relocating evacuees. This was frequently done by personal contact with key officials and important citizens of the communities, sponsoring meetings at which WRA officials explained the nature and purpose of the program, and a variety of public information devices.

The second phase of the work of the local committees was to help the relocating evacuees in making necessary adjustments in their new homes. Initially, this sometimes involved contact work with potential employers. After establishment of field offices in early 1943, however, the principal problem became location of adequate housing. In some communities, the committees established boarding houses, known as "hostels," where arriving evacuees could find room and board at nominal rates for limited periods while they looked for permanent quarters. Hostels operated by church-related organizations were established in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Des Moines. In many cities, the local committees conducted contact work with local housing authorities and with property owners to gain entry for evacuees and to advise the resettlers where vacancies could be found. A few committees established comprehensive housing registries and undertook efforts to keep them current. In the majority of cases, however, this type of work was conducted by the WRA field offices with advice and assistance from the cooperating groups.

The committees were helpful in assisting evacuee families to enroll their children in school, facilitating the efforts of breadwinners to become members of local labor unions, and aiding the evacuees to become adjusted in the social life of their new communities. While the effectiveness of the committees varied, they "provided assistance in the relocation program at a time when it was desperately needed, especially during the early days when a large part of the public harbored feelings of hostility or suspicion towards all people of Japanese descent." [31]

Relocation Work at the Centers

Because of the slow pace of relocation, the WRA initiated efforts at the ten relocation centers to stimulate relocation in early 1943. Virtually every "device was used to build up confidence among the evacuees and create in their minds a desire to take up residence outside the centers." Pamphlets and releases were prepared in the field offices describing the particular localities involved and outlining the general relocation prospects for evacuees. Periodic newsletters were prepared to keep evacuees at the centers informed of specific job opportunities and other changing features in the relocation picture in each major community. Special teams made up of employees from the Washington office and field offices were sent to centers to describe relocation prospects and interview individual evacuees who might be interested. Photographs and motion pictures giving evacuees the visual impression of living conditions in some of the outside communities were sent to the centers for exhibition. The WRA director and other principal staff members, during their visits to the centers, used these opportunities to emphasize the importance of relocation before evacuee groups. The camp newspapers carried numerous articles concerning persons who had relocated and opportunities for resettlement.

On November 9, 1943, the Washington office sent letters to each relocation center describing steps the WRA was taking to assist group relocation agricultural ventures . These included: (1) stimulation of credit unions to provide resettlement loans; (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from federal and private financing agencies; (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by relocation officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities; and (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits. [32] These endeavors, however, did not seem to be enough, as a "deep-seated core of resistance to relocation at the WRA centers" continued. This problem "became increasingly difficult as the more readily 'relocatable' people gradually moved out." By early 1944, the WRA decided that "the main key to a breakdown of this resistance lay in throwing a greater degree of responsibility for stimulating relocation on the evacuees themselves." The ten project directors were authorized to foster organization of relocation committees composed of WRA staff employees and evacuee leaders, and efforts were initiated to bring the community governments into the relocation process as actively as possible.

Family counseling programs were commenced in the relocation centers during the late spring of 1944. At each center, trained WRA case workers were assigned to interview evacuee families, analyzing their specific problems and attempting to work out a family relocation plan, including financial assistance if needed, which would meet their particular circumstances. This counseling program was conducted on a systematic basis with the eventual goal of covering every family and unattached individual in each center.

Under legislative authority granted in 1942, the Social Security Board was authorized to provide special welfare assistance to persons displaced by restrictive governmental action who might require assistance. This program was administered by county welfare boards throughout the country, but the funds were provided through the Social Security Board. Since the program applied to relocating evacuees who developed need for emergency assistance after resettlement, the WRA worked out a system under which it could allocate part of its funds to the Social Security Board for this purpose with the understanding that the necessary arrangements would be made for handling cases at the local level. In cases where the relocated evacuee was only in need of emergency aid, he was referred to the appropriate welfare agency by the nearest WRA field office and provided necessary assistance in presenting his case. In cases where the evacuee family or unattached individual required continuing assistance, an inquiry was made to the community of destination before the person or family left the relocation center. This action was initiated at the relocation center and forwarded with essential details to the nearest field office from which further contact was then directed toward the appropriate welfare agency. Throughout 1943 and 1944 several hundred evacuees received emergency welfare assistance under the welfare assistance program. [33]

Progress of Relocation in 1944

During the first six months of 1944 the volume of relocation out of the centers continued at about the same level as during the comparable period of the preceding year. The totals for January, February, and March were significantly higher, while those for April, May and June were somewhat lower.

By early spring 1944 a sufficient number of evacuees had relocated so that the WRA could begin plans for closing one of the centers. The Jerome relocation center in Arkansas, which had been the last center to be opened, was closed on June 30, 1944, after approximately 5,700 unrelocated residents were transferred to several other centers, primarily Rohwer and Gila River. Throughout the fall of 1944 relocation continued at a level similar to that during the preceding year. By December 17, when the War Department announced the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, about 35,000 evacuees, including approximately 2,300 who had entered the armed forces, had left the centers on indefinite leave. [34]

Liquidation Program

With the revocation of the mass exclusion orders on December 17, 1944, the justification for maintaining the centers as a place of refuge for the evacuated people was eliminated. Accordingly on December 18, the WRA announced that all relocation centers would be closed within six months to one year after January 2, 1945 — the date the revocation became effective.

The actual time of closing at each center was left on a flexible basis for two principal reasons. First, the WRA realized that it would take a minimum of six months for the remaining evacuees at each center to overcome their "fears and misgivings,' complete their "relocation plans," and "make the physical movement." Second, the WRA believed that unless it established an outside limit of one year for the duration of any center, there would be "a strong tendency among the residents to procrastinate," and thus there would be "a real danger of a large and unwieldy residue of people" that needed "to be relocated in the last few weeks before actual closing."

At the same time that it announced the eventual closing of the relocation centers, the WRA also announced the termination of all seasonal leave, liquidation of farming operations at all centers except Colorado River and Gila River — where winter vegetables were still in the ground, and closure of relocation center schools at the end of the spring term in June 1945. While these announcements were made to stimulate relocation, their primary purpose was based on "practical operating necessity." Operations in the centers, according to the WRA, should be gradually liquidated over a period of several months rather than closed out in a hectic, last-minute operation. All liquidation announcements applied to the relocation centers, but were not applicable to the Tule Lake Segregation Center "which was regarded as a specialized problem."

At the time of the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, slightly under 80,000 evacuees still resided in the nine WRA centers, including Tule Lake. The WRA estimated that about 5,000 to 6,000 evacuees would be declared ineligible for relocation and that these detainees would be accompanied in detention by enough family members to comprise approximately 20,000 people. Thus, the WRA projected that it would need to assist in the relocation of approximately 60,000 people within a one-year period — almost twice as many as had resettled in the preceding two and one-half years.

To accomplish this task, and because the majority of the evacuees wished to relocate in their pre-evacuation communities, the WRA established field relocation offices in the west coast evacuated area. During the early weeks of 1945, area offices were established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, and district offices were established in some 25 other communities, including Fresno, Santa Barbara, Sacramento, and Portland. For about three months these offices functioned under the general supervision of the assistant director stationed in San Francisco, but in April they were placed on the same basis as other field offices throughout the country and made responsible to the Washington office.

While undertaking efforts to facilitate relocation in the evacuated area, these offices also took steps to gain public acceptance for the returning evacuees. In many communities throughout California, Washington, and Oregon, hostility toward the evacuated people and opposition to their return assumed significant proportions following the revocation of the exclusion ban, especially in the interior agricultural valleys of all three states as well as some rural sections along the California coast.

After revocation of the exclusion ban, anti-evacuee feelings, which had been simmering throughout the fall of 1944, erupted into violence in several communities in the coastal states. At first, the hostility took the form of well-publicized mass meetings, resolutions adopted by various organizations opposing return "at least until after the war," discriminatory signs posted in shop windows, formation of citizens' leagues whose stated purpose was to oppose the return, and unfriendly editorials and paid advertisements in local newspapers. In several California communities, however, the "hoodlum" element among the groups opposing resettlement resorted to violence and open intimidation. By the end of June 1945, authorities recorded 34 such incidents — attempted arson or dynamiting, shots fired into the homes of returned Japanese, and threats of bodily harm. The worst incidents occurred in Merced and Fresno counties, with seven shootings each; Orange County which had six cases of intimidation; and Placer County, which had an attempted arson and dynamiting coupled with a shooting.

Although no evacuees were injured during these incidents, property damage was extensive, and the "terrorism" "undoubtedly contributed to the relatively slow rate of return to that State during the first 6 months after revocation of exclusion." [35] Fearing that excessive visiting at relocation centers by evacuees who had already relocated would jeopardize the agency's intense relocation efforts and harm relationships with employers generally, the WRA adopted regulations, immediately after the revocation announcement, placing temporary controls on visits to the relocation centers. Project directors were instructed not to admit any visiting evacuees unless they had obtained prior approval from the appropriate WRA field office. The field offices, in turn, were assigned the responsibility of investigating the request of any relocated evacuee for a permit to visit a center in order to make certain that the visit was necessary and contributed toward the development of relocation plans for the family members still in residence. Thus, the control system, which would be operative until April 16, 1945, kept visiting at the centers within "reasonable bounds during a period when the Nation's transportation facilities were badly overloaded, when the center staffs were extremely overworked, and when all attention needed to be focused on the primary business of relocation." A significant feature of the WRA liquidation program policy concerned provision of resettlement assistance to people who had relocated outside the evacuated area before the revocation announcement and who now wished to exercise their option of returning to their former homes. Assistance was made available to such persons in the form of rail fare and transportation of personal property. Grants to cover subsistence while traveling and to assist resettlers during the first 30-day period in their new localities, however, were made available only to those leaving directly from the relocation centers. During 1945, about 5,000 of the approximately 35,000 people who relocated prior to revocation took advantage of this provision and received WRA transportation grants for travel back to their former homes in the evacuated area. [36]

Final Relocation Drive

To its surprise, announcement of the WRA's post-revocation program to liquidate the centers was received by many the remaining evacuees in the centers 'with a marked amount of apathy." The predominant feeling, as reported by community analysts at the centers, was one of 'disbelief." "Every possible pretext was eagerly seized upon to justify the rationalization that WRA did not actually intend to close the centers and that its announcement was merely a 'bluff' to stimulate further relocation." Some residents "attempted to build an elaborate case that WRA had made definite commitments to keep the centers open for the duration of the war and that it was guilty of bad faith in the adoption of its liquidation policy" [37]

To counteract the evacuee reaction and stem wide-ranging rumors that were sweeping the camps, the WRA concentrated its attention on convincing the remaining evacuees in the centers that the liquidation announcement was not a bluff and that the centers would close. Director Myer visited each of the eight remaining relocation centers during the early months of 1945, speaking before community mass gatherings, meeting with members of the community governments and other evacuee leaders, and attempting to answer all questions. This tour accomplished its principal objective, and, according to the WRA, "the great majority [of evacuees] began gradually to concede this point in their own minds and soon shifted their resistance to other grounds."

The new focal point for evacuee discussion became the difficulties associated with relocating — the nationwide housing shortage, losses the evacuees had suffered during evacuation, public hostility against them, and the fact that many of evacuees still in the centers were older and had passed their prime years of earning power. These arguments were addressed at what came to be called the "all-center conference" held in Salt Lake City in February 1945. Initiated largely by members of the community council at the Central Utah center, the conference was attended by community government representatives from all centers except Manzanar and Tule Lake. After lengthy debate, the conference issued a document requesting more extensive and far-reaching relocation assistance and questioning the "fundamental wisdom of closing the relocation centers." Although the WRA reply to the conference "was generally conciliatory in tone and did make a few minor concessions," its only "feasible course was to stand firm and insist quietly that the centers would be closed."

Throughout the early months of 1945, the relocation totals from the centers mounted steadily despite continuing evacuee resistance. During the week ending May 5, for example, a total of 788 people left the centers — the highest number for any single week up to that time. The WRA's goal was relocation of some 16,000 people between January 1 and June 30 — an objective that it almost reached.

After the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, the WRA became increasingly concerned about the transportation problems associated with its relocation efforts. The WRA determined that a "comparatively spaced-out, regular flow of relocation movement, with specific dates for center closures, was clearly essential in the interest of both the evacuees and the Nation at large." On June 22, the WRA announced that the Canal Camp at the Gila River relocation center and Units II and III at the Colorado River center would close by October 1. Four weeks later, on July 13, the agency issued a comprehensive schedule for the closing of all centers, except Tule Lake, between October 15 and December 15. But these two steps, which were taken to hasten relocation and curtail further evacuee procrastination, were not sufficient. In consequence of persistent talk by many evacuees about "staying until the last minute" and threatening that they were "going to see what happened" if they remained in the centers when the deadlines arrived, the WRA announced a mandatory "scheduling" of relocation at all centers, first for the individuals and families requiring special welfare assistance outside the centers and then for all remaining center residents.

On August 1, 1945, the project directors received official notification of Administrative Notice No. 289, the controversial policy statement covering the scheduled relocation of all remaining center residents. It provided that each project director, starting six weeks before the scheduled closing date of his center, should establish weekly quotas for relocation in order to meet the goal of depopulation by the deadline date. The order, however, could become operative two weeks earlier at the discretion of the project director. The quotas were to be filled, insofar as possible, by people who stepped forward and volunteered to develop relocation plans. If the quota for any particular week could not be met by volunteering, however, the project director was authorized to assign a departure date for individuals in sufficient number to make up the quota. Those assigned a departure date were given the option of selecting the place where they wished to relocate. In case they refused to make a selection, they were given a rail ticket to the community from which they were originally evacuated. If an evacuee refused to pack his belongings, they would be packed for him, and he would be escorted to the train, if necessary, by the camp's internal security force. All centers were urged to avoid the use of force except as a last resort, and they were instructed not to schedule any evacuee for relocation to a community unless the appropriate field office had indicated that temporary housing was available.

Administrative Notice No. 289 was issued two weeks before Japan surrendered to the United States on August 14, 1945, and was "disseminated among the evacuees only a few days before that event." According to the WRA, the two developments "finally convinced even most of the 'die-hards' that a return to private life was inevitable and would have to be accepted." The occurrence of V-J day was important, "superficially because it completely eliminated the protracted argument about 'war-duration communities,' and more significantly because it convinced some of the most relocation-resistant Issei that they would spend the rest of their lives in the United States and that they could no longer count on official intercessions from Japan on their behalf." Thus, the WRA was able to carry out its relocation program and center closing schedule "without resorting to compulsion in more than a half dozen cases." All centers, except for Granada, were closed between two and fifteen days before their scheduled dates, and the "evacuees at all centers ~ except Tule Lake were restored to normal communities before December 1." [38]

Resettlement Patterns

Throughout early 1945, the majority of evacuees leaving the relocation centers were bound for destinations outside the evacuated area. Many of these people had developed their relocation plans before revocation of the exclusion order and were only then carrying them into effect. Moreover, the somewhat precarious state of public opinion on the west coast during the early part of the year meant that "only the bolder-spirited evacuees and those with properties which could readily be reoccupied were inclined to go back to their former homes." By late spring, however, sufficient numbers of resettlers had established themselves in the former evacuated area so that the movement back to the coast began to increase. By the end of June, approximately half of those leaving the centers were going eastward, while the other half were headed "back home." From that point on, the balance swung increasingly in favor of 'westward' relocation. By the end of October, the proportion of people moving back to the evacuated area was as high as 85 to 90 percent of the total leaving the relocation centers. During December 1945 and January- February 1946, after the relocation centers had closed, the overwhelming majority of the people who left the Tule Lake Segregation Center, following clearance by the Department of Justice, found their relocation destinations in the evacuated area. After closure of Tule Lake on March 20, 1946, the net results of the WRA relocation program showed that approximately 57,000 evacuees had returned to the former exclusion zone, nearly 52,000 had settled in other sections of the country. In addition, 1,108 went to Hawaii, and 82 to Alaska. Evacuees resettled in every state on the mainland except for South Carolina. Illinois received the most resettlers with a total of approximately 11,200. Colorado and Utah were next with about 5,000 each, and Ohio, Idaho, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, and Minnesota had totals ranging between 4,000 and 1,700. Approximately 3,000 evacuees still remained, either voluntarily or involuntarily in the custody of the Department of Justice. A group of 450 evacuees were transferred from Tule Lake to Department of Justice internment camps on the day the segregation center closed. Following closure of Tule Lake, the WRA closed most of its district offices in the west coast evacuation area by May 1, and its last field offices were closed on May 15. The agency was liquidated by executive order on June 30, 1946. [39]

During 1945 and the early spring of 1946 the principal unresolved problem confronting WRA officials in the former exclusion area as they sought to speed their relocation program was adequate housing. To meet this need, the WRA, in cooperation with the Army and the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA), developed a program under which a number of surplus Army facilities in the vicinity of Los Angeles and San Francisco were made available for evacuee occupancy on a temporary basis under FPHA management. By March 20, 1946, some 2,100 evacuee resettlers were living in such facilities in Los Angeles County and about 1,000 in the San Francisco Bay area.

Gradually the population of these "special projects" was reduced during the spring of 1946. Many of the occupants moved into "normal" quarters, while several large groups, including a significant number of Terminal Island evacuees from Manzanar, found employment with canneries and other concerns that provided trailer housing. In early May 1946, a trailer project at Burbank in Los Angeles County was opened for the approximately 800 evacuees still remaining in the "special projects" who were classified as 'hardship cases.' The last of the "special projects" was officially closed on May 18.

Aside from housing problems, resettling evacuees faced other obstacles in late 1945 and early 1946. In some sections of California local licensing boards refused to grant permits to evacuees to engage in professional practice or commercial enterprises. Under the so-called "escheat law" enacted by the California state legislature in 1943, many evacuees were deprived of rural homes on the grounds that the property had been purchased or leased by alien parents in the name of citizen children in violation of the statute. In the Seattle area, the local members of an International Teamsters Union undertook a drive to boycott the handling of evacuee farm produce and thus force the returned evacuee farmers off the land. In the Stockton, California, area, some members of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union attempted to foment a strike to protest against the employment of three returned evacuees. This action, however, was promptly repudiated as contrary to the union's policy both by the international president and by the head of the San Francisco local which had jurisdiction over the Stockton unit. The protesting members were quickly suspended from membership, a strike was averted, and the evacuees retained their jobs. [40] Throughout the spring of 1946 the field offices in the former exclusion area cooperated with various groups that were supporting the rights of the evacuees to soften or eliminate the "last vestiges of discrimination" and help create "a more secure future for the evacuated people.' At each of the field offices the objective of the WRA was to make as much progress as possible on the solution of these problems before the date of the agency's liquidation and to foster activation of local resettlement committees which would carry on the work after the agency was terminated. Such committees were eventually organized in all west coast communities where WRA had field offices and where significant numbers of evacuees had relocated. However, the progress made in solving these problems was, according to the WRA, "admittedly somewhat uneven."

In concluding its examination of the relocation program, the WRA observed in its Story of Human Conservation that it had adequately discharged its obligations to the evacuees. This "self congratulation" would be questioned by many, especially when compared with what was later done for refugees in the Cold War era. Whether it would have been politically possible for a government agency to do more in 1945, however, is another matter. Recognizing the limitations of the political climate at the end of the war, the WRA concluded:

Although there can never be full or adequate recompense for the experiences which the evacuated people went through, it is best, we feel, to set these down among the civilian casualties of war and to build on the present base toward a better and more secure future for the people of Japanese descent in this country. The building of that future lies largely in the hands of the still-active groups which have supported the evacuated people throughout the war and, even more importantly, in the hands of the evacuees themselves. [41]

MANZANAR PERSPECTIVE

Early Phase of Relocation Program (September 1942 — May 1943)

Commencement of Relocation Program. On September 7, 1942, the Manzanar Free Press featured a headline "Relocation Starts Rolling." The article noted:

Nisei hopes for permanent relocation in areas outside the Western Defense Command brightened considerably with the arrival last Saturday of Thomas W. Holland, WRA chief of employment, who began interviewing applicants for permanent outside jobs. This is not to be confused with temporary agricultural furlough employment.

Following a general survey of employment opportunities in the midwest, Holland is interviewing individuals at 1-5-2 to clear their records and open the way for their eventual relocation. . .

Especially requested to appear are those with definite employment offers, but others desiring permanent relocation are also asked to file applications.

The 900 applicants for temporary harvest work will not be interviewed at this time but it was expected that company representatives would arrive within a week to conduct recruiting for furlough work. . . . Outlining the procedure followed in relocating Japanese, Holland stressed that at the present time existing regulations limiting relocation to citizens must be followed. 'But these regulations are temporary in nature and it may be possible in the future to include other classifications,' he said.

After an individual files application, his record is checked with his project head here and sent to the FBI for further clearance. A pass to leave for the job is issued after assurances from the prospective employer and other citizens in the new community are received. If conditions do not prove satisfactory a person may return to the relocation center, it was announced.

Planning to remain the greater part of the week, Holland has established his headquarters at 1-5-2. Although many employment opportunities are agricultural, other types of work including secretarial, hotel, teaching, [and] domestic fields are offered. [42] While at Manzanar, Holland filled out newly-devised forms, titled "Application for Permit to Leave a Relocation Center for Private Employment" (Form 71), for each applicant that he interviewed. Walter A. Heath, an employment officer, was detailed to Manzanar from San Francisco to sit in on the interviews. Although Heath subsequently held various titles, such as senior administrative assistant, leave officer, assistant relocation officer, relocation program officer, and relocation officer, he was generally referred to as the camp's relocation representative and headed the relocation office and division throughout its entire program.

Form 71 was designed to disclose background information which would serve as a basis for judging loyalty It covered relatives, residence, education, references, activities, and hobbies, as well as a direct question on loyalty Additional longhand notes were added to indicate the degree of Americanization, the interviewer's impression of the applicant, and the applicant's choice of relocation locality and type of work. Along with the original Form 71s, Holland also obtained copies of the applicant's "Individual Record" (Form 26) and information and recommendations from WRA appointed personnel in the camp for submission to Washington.

Applicants were told that they might expect an offer of a job in two or three months "if everything turns out all right." Approximately 350 persons completed interviews during the days that Holland was at Manzanar and the weeks following his departure when Heath took over the interviews. Virtually all applicants were between the ages of 20 and 28, and men outnumbered women by a three to one ratio. Later, about 50 additional persons applied before the Manzanar relocation representative's efforts were focused on recruiting seasonal agricultural labor. [43] Because of the interest shown in relocation by the camp residents, Heath warned the evacuees "against over-optimism" in a camp newspaper article on September 17. He noted that relocation was "a slow and laborious process. Much "time may elapse before the records of the job-seekers can be cleared, and before he can leave the gates of Manzanar behind him." Heath also stressed "the difficult task of public relationship being conducted by the WRA to influence the employers and communities to accept the Japanese Americans." [44]

Early "Leave" Efforts.

Seasonal Agriculture Furlough Work — Because of wartime labor shortages, the western sugar beet growers were anxious to use relocation center evacuees to help harvest their crops. Before mid-September 1942, several representatives of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company arrived at Manzanar to recruit seasonal agricultural labor under the WRA's newly-established 'group work leave' program. Later, a representative of the Amalgamated Sugar Company recruited workers at the camp. In both instances, several days' delay elapsed because contract approval from the San Francisco regional office was late in arriving.

By the time that active agricultural recruiting finally started at Manzanar, interest had developed to such an extent that waiting evacuees completely filled the space between the two barracks used for recruiting. The evacuees formed themselves into crews ranging in size from two to ten persons, and the crews chose a leader to act as their spokesman. The crews were interviewed by recruiters who selected a farmer's contract requiring a group of suitable size. Work to be accomplished, location, living quarters, and wages were discussed briefly with the crew leader. In almost every instance, the crew agreed to accept the contract offered to it and signed the agreement. Both Issei and Nisei were eligible for agricultural work furloughs.

After the contract was signed, the workers filled out applications for group work furloughs and leave permits. Departure rosters were prepared for each county of destination. The rosters, together with copies of the "Individual Record" (Form 26) for each person, were sent to San Francisco and to the employment investigator, later known as the relocation officer, responsible for the destination area. Sign-ups ranged as high as 150 per day. After the first few days of recruiting, groups of about 100 left Manzanar simultaneously on chartered busses under civilian escort provided by the sugar companies.

For each movement of agricultural furlough workers, a military travel permit had to be obtained by wire from the Western Defense Command. Permits named the destinations and the number of workers authorized to go to each destination. Every movement included workers for a number of localities.

In less than two weeks, 1,018 evacuees left Manzanar for the western beet fields, and during the entire year 1,148 labored under the program. There were no eligibility requirements other than freedom from application for repatriation or expatriation and parental permission for school-age youths. Unattached women were not granted leave by the project director to insure that the "morals" of the evacuees and community sentiment were respected. In several instances, however, the Welfare Section at Manzanar arranged for seasonal agricultural work for the third party in marital triangles, thus contributing to "peace and harmony" within the center.

"Relocation rumors" began to spread soon after the sugar beet workers left Manzanar. Many of the rumors were found to be exaggerated by WRA officials, but they took on credence as they were retold and spread. The rumors included scores of bus accidents, beatings, unsatisfactory housing, little or no work, poor earnings, discriminatory treatment, and racial prejudice. By the end of the season, such rumors had established a pattern that was to continue throughout the entire relocation program. When the seasonal agricultural workers returned to Manzanar in late November, WRA officials established that there had been no beatings, reception had been good almost everywhere except for several localities in Montana where open discrimination was experienced, and housing facilities, while not modern, had been good compared with those encountered by Mexican beet workers as well as housing owned by many Caucasian farmhands. Earnings had averaged $3.00 per day. This low figure had not met expectations, both because of the inexperience of many of the evacuee workers and the crop yield was poor in many areas. [45]

FBI Clearance — In October-November 1942, Manzanar administrators received several letters from the WRA's Washington Employment Office listing names of persons who had received final clearance by the FBI for "permanent relocation." These names included those who had applied in early September when Holland had been at the center. One such letter listing 74 names was announced in the Manzanar Free Press on November 30. The article noted:

. . . . A few have definite offers for jobs, but the majority do not. Many others have definite offers and have been cleared, but have not been listed as yet. . . .

If these cleared persons do receive offers for work, they should be submitted at the project, as leave is expected to be authorized in a few days. [46]

Early Relocation Trends — During November and December 1942, Manzanar officials received a few offers of employment from private firms or persons. Most of these came as a result of efforts by the chief of employment in the Washington office. Most offers were for domestic service, and many were "poorly paid positions offered by persons with big hearts and small pocketbooks who wanted to do something tangible to help the evacuees.

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, Heath reported that a "psychological reaction appeared" soon after the relocation program began — a development that would continue "throughout the program. Evacuees who, at the time of application, expressed a willingness to do "anything" became hard to please when release seemed assured and positions began to open up. "Waiting for something better," became a popular response. Few wanted to accept a poor job today when a better one might be available tomorrow. Thus, many persons accepted positions but refused departure privilege after the completion of the lengthy Washington procedure that was necessary for final release. This "very human, but exasperating trait of changing one's mind continued until the end."

Nevertheless, the relocation program at Manzanar began to be implemented, although long delays developed during which Washington checked community acceptance for final approval. In some cases, however, evacuees arranged for their personal relocation with little or no assistance. [47]

First Relocations. WRA officials received word on November 7, 1942, that the first release from Manzanar under Holland's program of "permanent relocation" was granted to Esther Naito, a young Nisei who had been attracted by an offer for a clerk-switchboard operator position from Presbyterian College of Christian Education in Chicago. Since she had no experience with a switchboard, immediate arrangements were made for her apprenticeship at Manzanar. The job was made possible through the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee. She left the relocation center on November 15 after receiving "a military pass from the regional office in San Francisco." [48] During November and December 1942, additional Washington approvals were received, and 39 relocations or "releases" were authorized. Some of the "releases" were arranged through the Welfare Section and authorized by the Western Defense Command for persons who were parties of racially-mixed marriages and for children of such marriages. Applicants were required to show evidence of community acceptance from their prospective new communities in the form of a letter from law-enforcement officials as well as an ability to earn a livelihood. A few of the "releases" were for students who obtained college or university acceptance and Army release as a result of church committees working through the camp's Welfare Section. [49]

After the sugar beet workers departed, applications increased for what was to become known as "leave clearance." In an article on December 3, 1942, the Manzanar Free Press reported that "relocation fever" in the camp was "rising." The article noted:

With 312 applicants for private relocation in November, making a total of 644, relocation fever is really becoming an epidemic. Last Monday saw 38 persons crowd the little office where applications are filed, while Tuesday, following the publication of the FBI clearance list, a greater number of applicants swamped the staff.

Mondays may be 'blue' for other departments but it is a banner day for the relocation department. A week ago last Monday, 39 persons rushed in to file their applications after attending the relocation rally at which Thomas M. Temple [chief of the Community Services Division] and Henry Tsurutani [chief of the Legal Aid department] spoke.

To take care of the rush of relocation applications, the relocation office had hired four additional evacuee secretaries, thus increasing its staff to nine. [50] Complications in relocation procedures were the "greatest stumbling block" for the overworked relocation office staff at Manzanar. For each individual relocating, the following documentation was required:

1. For Submission to Washington — (a) Several copies of the Individual Record, Form 26, to permit FBI clearance; and (b) several copies of the 4-page application, Form 71;

2. For Local Approval — (a) letters of reference from three pre-evacuation Caucasian friends and one Project supervisor; (b) certificate of clearance with the Project Internal Security Section and the Project official handling applications for repatriation and expatriation; (c) the Project Director's recommendation; (d) proof of guarantee of employment or other means of livelihood on the outside; and (e) transportation and escort to some point outside the restricted area.

3. Approval from Washington — (a) leave clearance by the Director; (b) favorable sentiment in the community of choice.

4. Military Approval — travel through the restricted area. [51]

Leave Office Established. Administered by Ruth Cushion, the Leave Office was established on December 1, 1942, and charged with the responsibility for arrangement of evacuee travel, passing judgment on applications for assistance grants, and conducting necessary clerical work for the departure of evacuees after their relocation plans were completed.

Since Manzanar was located inside the restricted military area, all evacuees leaving or arriving at the camp were required to be escorted to the boundary of the restricted area by a Caucasian WRA employee. As a result, an escort position under the supervision of the Leave Office was filled on December 1, 1942.

Because Manzanar was not directly connected with railroad service, the only means of public transportation directly to the camp was provided by a small bus lie that operated between Los Angeles and Reno. The nearest railroad station with regular passenger traffic service was at Mohave, 140 miles distant. From there a local Santa Fe rail line extended to Barstow where it joined the main Southern Pacific Railroad line. The Southern Pacific placed a representative in Lone Pine to sell tickets and take care of travel details, and a railway agent from Mojave went to the center once a week to handle reservations with the Leave Officer. A seven-hour delay between bus and train connections was encountered at Mojave and Barstow. Since both communities were "very unfriendly toward the Japanese," travel through those towns was soon diverted from those communities to Reno, Nevada, a town "more friendly" to evacuees some 265 miles north of Manzanar. As travel from Manzanar became heavier, racial "resentment" also increased in Reno. The situation soon became untenable, and on April 26, 1943, Project Director Merritt determined that WRA equipment" would henceforth be used to transport evacuees.

All evacuees who left or entered the restricted military area had to have military passes. These passes were issued by the Western Defense Command through the WRA's regional office in San Francisco until the spring of 1944. (After that time, the commanding officer of the military police company at Manzanar was allowed to issue outgoing passes, and, at a later date, passes for those arriving at the camp.) As a result, evacuees waiting to leave on scheduled dates, as well as on emergencies, were held up because their passes were delayed. Prior to the spring of 1944, It was not uncommon for persons of Japanese ancestry coming into Manzanar to wait three days for a travel permit which had been applied for a week in advance of their anticipated arrival. There were no overnight accommodations in Reno, and the evacuees often had to sit in depots until their permits came through from San Francisco. [52]

Impact of "Manzanar Incident" on Relocation. Following the outbreak of violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, administrative offices in the camp were used as dormitories for evacuees taken into protective custody, and evacuee laborers stopped work. The necessity of hurriedly preparing documentation for relocation of the 65 persons taken to the Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps camp in Death Valley brought "total confusion" to the relocation process. Although camp school teachers were used in the emergency, they were not familiar "with procedures" and had little "clerical experience."

In the wake of the violence, WRA officials reported that for "the first time, pro-Japanese elements began to work against relocation" as evacuees "commonly understood that a trip to the Relocation Office would place them in danger of physical harm." In spite of this development, however, "a newly hired escort quietly left the Center with 15 relocaters while the work stoppage was under way" The people leaving the camp were "picked up unobtrusively and without fanfare."

The relocation representative at Manzanar was instructed to relocate immediately the 65 evacuees who were taken into protective custody and transferred to Death Valley. Their applications were airmailed to Washington with an appeal for quick action, but little progress was made for several months.

The American Friends Service Committee, in the process of opening a hostel in Chicago in cooperation with the Church of the Brethren, found employment possibilities for many of these evacuees, but clearance "remained discouragingly slow." The Washington office rejected a suggestion that Project Director Merritt be granted authority to approve indefinite leave for the evacuees, but promised to give 48-hour service on applications for each individual. In spite of this promise, however, clearance for most was delayed for several months, and three persons still remained in Death Valley when the camp was closed in mid-February 1943. The three individuals were transferred to the Granada War Relocation Center pending final clearance. [53]

Later on October 19, 1944, Morris Opler, the community analyst at Manzanar, submitted a report on the relocation program in which he commented on the "serious" impact of the "December disturbance" on relocation efforts at the camp. He noted:

Relocation was off to an early and a good start at Manzanar with the visit and special assistance of Mr. Holland in September, 1942. . . . The bloodshed and tension of that period and of the period that followed made it difficult for evacuees to cooperate with a WRA sponsored program. The fact that those who left the Center in December of 1942 were taken out because they were suspected of participation in the riot or for their own safety caused many who contemplated speedy relocation to abandon the idea for the time being. This was particularly true of those who had been critized [sic] for friendliness toward the Administration or toward individual members of the appointed personnel. Since they had been labeled 'dogs' and had been accused of one thing and another through the channels of gossip, they felt that it would be an admission of guilt or an indication of cowardice to leave until such talk and attitudes had subsided. [54]

Establishment of First Hostel. WRA officials working with the relocation program concluded that the procedures for release were "too involved" and that employment could be found "with greater ease and better individual adjustment" if evacuees were permitted to locate employment after rather than before release from the camps. Former Manzanar staff members joined others in solving these problems through the establishment and use of hostels, low-cost hotel-boarding houses operated for relocating evacuees. Through the efforts of two former teachers and a former Director of the Community Management Division at Manzanar, the Church of the Brethren accepted sponsorship of a group of evacuees from Manzanar and provided temporary living quarters at a hostel it had established in Chicago in cooperation with the American Friends Service Committee. The former Community Management Director accompanied the group of evacuees to Chicago in late December 1942, and the two teachers left the camp shortly thereafter to assume management of "this first hostel." [55]

Reorganization of the Relocation Office, December 1942 — February 1943. In late December 1942, the relocation office at Manzanar was separated from the employment office and placed under the supervision of Assistant Project Director Robert Brown. On February 1,1943, it was placed under the newly-named Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, where it remained organizationally until some time after a Washington reorganization effort provided for an enlarged Relocation Division under the direct supervision of Project Director Merritt. The early change at Manzanar was made because Merritt, a strong supporter of the camp's relocation program efforts, believed that relocation and project employment were competing activities and that relocation should be the principal, as well as an independent, function of the WRA organizational structure.

Under the reorganization plan of February 1, 1943, the relocation office was headed by a WRA senior administrative assistant. The expanded office had two WRA appointed personnel — a senior escort who, with an evacuee typist and a WRA-appointed escort, handled travel arrangements, military passes, and leave credentials, and a senior clerk (school teacher on detail) who supervised six evacuee clerical typists who filled out forms

— and two evacuee interviewers who assisted the office head in interviewing applicants for leave clearance and outside jobs. Despite the organizational changes and additional personnel, the relocation office was often overworked, a problem complicated by the fact that Washington was "hopelessly behind' in clearing applications. [56]

Impact of Registration, Segregation, and Leave Clearance Programs on Relocation. The registration program at Manzanar during 1943 had a significant impact on relocation. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the registration program "created great mental and emotional turmoil at Manzanar, particularly among the alien group." Revision of the loyalty question "to permit aliens to respond to their intent in obeying the laws of the United States, rather than in being loyal to the United States" had made it possible for them "to become eligible for leave clearance." The report continued:

In all the confusion, approximately 50 percent of the citizens answered the 'loyalty' question in the negative. Although it is doubtful this answer represented the true feeling of more than half of those who had given it, no way was found to correct the situation easily and quickly. Persons who answered in the negative were not eligible for relocation.

After a number of weeks, Washington provided a procedure for reconsidering persons who had first answered 'no' and who later claimed loyalty to the United States. Leave clearance hearings were held for all 'no' persons. Transcripts of the hearings and recommendations by the boards and the Project Director were sent to Washington for review. . . .

On an average, several weeks were required at the Project for a given case in order to assemble pertinent information, have a hearing, transcribe and summarize the hearing, and get proper signatures. It was then not unusual to wait as long as six months for a decision from Washington, with the average wait being perhaps four months. No substantial number was cleared until one year after registration.

Throughout the following months, the Relocation staff spent a great deal of time serving as members of Leave Clearance Boards. Even more time was spent with individuals desirous of relocating and anxious about their status. Numerous letters and wires were written to Washington in an effort to expedite action on individual cases.

In addition to preventing or delaying relocation of large numbers of evacuees, the registration, segregation, and leave clearance programs "brought to Center residents a great fear of forced relocation and of split-ups in families." This development, according to Heath, "did much to crystalize feeling against relocation, and this fear persisted even when the reason for it had faded." [57]

In his aforementioned report on relocation, Opler reiterated many of Heath's themes concerning the impact of registration, segregation, and leave clearance on relocation. He observed:

Unfortunately registration came hard on the heels of the riot and the issues and divisions which had much to do with the December disturbance again came to the fore. In fact, many who had remained aloof from the events leading up to the trouble of December were, out of anger or because of intimidation and family pressure, caught up in the difficulties growing out of a qualified or negative answer to Question 28 and were denied leave clearance.

Persons to whom indefinite leave is closed can be expected to make some kind of a psychological adjustment to that fact and to rationalize their position. Thus the Center was filled with skeptics and opponents of relocation and with people who had a stake in the maintenance of Manzanar, with most of its population, and all of its facilities and services. [58]

Relocation Rates, 1943-44. The number of evacuees relocating from Manzanar during the early months of 1943 were 60 in January, 64 in February, and 78 in March. The figures, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, did "not indicate the popularity of the program but only the ability to complete detailed clerical work at Manzanar and in Washington."

In April 1943 the WRA established simplified procedures that allowed evacuees "with no adverse factors in their backgrounds" to be released for relocation subject the approval of the individual project directors. As a result, relocation rates increased to 192 in April and 182 in May. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, persons who relocated "during this time were those who had been clamoring at the gates to get out and who remained eligible even after registration" During the spring of 1943, most evacuees relocating continued to be Nisei with men outnumbering women. Gradually, Issei "began to go out in greater numbers but the program continued to be much more successful for those of the second generation." The number of evacuees relocating from Manzanar declined to 85 in June and 66 in July — a level that continued until the spring and summer of 1944, when it climbed above a monthly average of 100. The number of relocations remained at that monthly level until the fall and early winter months of 1944, when relocation rates underwent "a sharp incline upwards." [59]

Middle Phase of Relocation Program (June 1943 — January 1945)

Factors That Influenced Relocation Program.

General — In the Final Report, Manzanar Heath discussed the general feelings of the evacuee population at Manzanar toward relocation efforts during the late spring of 1943 as the center began its second year of full-scale operation. Among other things, he observed:

More than a year after evacuation, the war, which the evacuees had expected would end within three to six months, showed less promise than ever of early completion. The honeymoon vacation feeling at Manzanar had been lost in the dust and heat of the preceding summer, and that chapter of life at the Center finally closed with the 'incident' on December 6, 1942.

When a man is in jail, his every hope and plan centers on his re-entry into the free world. The days that he spends in confinement are considered wasted days and his dreams are of the time when the doors of his prison will clang behind him.

On the surface there seemed to be a great similarity between the man in jail and the man in the relocation center. Many of the evacuees who came to Manzanar showed resentment at being detained. Among them were many who had completed plans for evacuation to the East and who were caught by the 'freeze order' of March 27, 1942 which had prohibited further voluntary evacuation.

Also in the Center were many who pointed to their peaceful compliance with evacuation orders as proof of their loyalty. Here was injured innocence personified. . . .

Into this setting had come the relocation program. It would appear that relocation would have been accepted as an unexpected pardon by a prisoner, a cause for rejoicing, an opening of bars. It was all of these things for some of the Manzanar evacuees. Yet, strangely enough, the great majority of Center residents did not react in this way at all. There were but few at the gates clamoring to get out, or breaking into a run every time an additional bar was lowered with the easing of the restrictive measures.

The reasons for this reaction to relocation, according to Heath, were "many and varied; each contributed toward a cumulative effect that was a result of an unreasoning and unreasonable distaste for relocation." For example, Heath noted:

. . . . One man would hesitate to relocate because of fear of prejudice. A friend might tell him that his fear was silly, but not to relocate because in the open area the climate was bad. A second friend would argue that one need not worry about either of these points, but that damages could be recovered from the Government by staying in the Center. Many agreed that relocation was undesirable and stayed in the Center.

Heath listed six issues that in his opinion formed the background to explain the evacuees' reaction to the relocation program at Manzanar. These issues were: (1) fear; (2) pro-Japanese influence; (3) uncertainty about the future; (4) roots in California; (5) group loyalties; and (6) climate.

Fear — Heath observed that sometimes it seemed "that there was only one reason for evacuees not relocating, and that was fear; the others were only rationalizations." While fear was "one of the greatest deterrents" to relocation, "it was not always voiced." The "gripping fear of physical violence towards one's self and particularly one's family can not be imagined by those who have not experienced it." Fears of social discrimination, discrimination in employment and of being laid off, illness and necessary hospitalization "all did their share in discouraging relocation." Particularly among the older people, many of whom spoke little or no English, these fears were "paramount."

Pro-Japanese Influence — Heath observed that an "underground element of increasing importance — active or inactive sympathy for Japan — was fostered largely by some of the Issei and Kibei." Since America needed manpower, they reasoned, "it would be a disservice to Japan to go outside." These people believed that it "would be a service to Japan to discourage relocation." In addition, there was "a larger group who did not identify their own future with that of America, because it was individually necessary for them to return to Japan on account of family responsibilities or property matters."

When the segregants were transferred to Tule Lake in late 1943, this pro-Japanese influence that had been "a continual damper on the [relocation] program" was lessened. However, because "of illness or pregnancy within the family, and because no decision had yet been made on leave clearance, at least 250 segregants did not go to Tule Lake with the main movement." Later there was "no space for them there and they remained in Manzanar to the detriment of the relocation program.

Uncertainty about the Future — Encouraged by the pro-Japanese elements at Manzanar, some evacuees developed a "belief in the uncertainty" of "a future" in "the United States." This uncertainty was abetted by west coast newspaper stories calling for deportation of all persons of Japanese ancestry and legislation to strip Nisei of citizenship. There was widespread fear among the evacuees "that they would be deported or economically and socially forced to give up life in America." While many fought "all the harder to win a place in this country," others were resigned to "lose fight" and "determined to do nothing that would make them unacceptable in Japan."

Roots in California — According to Heath, many evacuees at Manzanar were "deeply rooted" in the California communities from which most of them had been evacuated. They would say with emotion that Santa Monica was their 'second home.' They had made no choice between Japan and the United States. Their choice had been between Japan and Santa Monica or between Japan and Glendale. Later, during the days of Center closure, they refused employment and housing in any but the exact locality of their pre-evacuation residence. Only in the final weeks. . . . did they accept housing an hour's distance from their old homes. It then became clearer as to why it had been so difficult to relocate the evacuees in the East.

Group Loyalties — According to Heath, ties "of friendship and mutual assistance among certain groups" at Manzanar often strengthened "a desire to resettle in a body." An "outstanding example"

of this occurred with the Terminal Island group. They came from the same locality in Japan, worked together and lived together on Terminal Island, lived in the same blocks in Manzanar, and, for the most part, returned in the same motor caravan to a block of housing near Terminal Island. Later they went to work as a group in the same fish canneries.

Climate — Heath observed that never "did climate mean so much to any group as to the Manzanar evacuees." The climate in any place east of California was viewed by many evacuees as "unhealthy" and "bad." The "factor of climate kept large numbers of Manzanar people from bettering themselves immeasurably." Such considerations as "community acceptance, broad vocational opportunity, and social equality were of no importance to them compared to climate." [60]

Morris Opler, the community analyst at Manzanar, prepared a series of studies regarding the evacuees' reaction to the WRA relocation program in the camp in which he reiterated, as well as elaborated, on many of Heath's aforementioned issues. On October 16, 1943, for instance, he issued a report entitled, "The Present Situation In Respect to Relocation at Manzanar. Based on a series of interviews and preliminary studies, Opler summarized the factors that he believed were influencing the slow tempo of relocation at Manzanar during the fall of 1943:

1. Age: Because Japanese immigration was a phenomenon of the two decades following the turn of the century and was cut off in 1924, the issei or family heads are now past their prime and have the misgivings that old people who have suffered serious financial reverses might be expected to show concerning a new start in unfamiliar surroundings.

2. Previous Departures: A large percentage of the young, unattached, better-trained individuals have already left Manzanar on relocation, and as the total of these eligibles has shrunk, the rate of relocation has dropped.

3. Occupational Specialization: The presence of large numbers of persons whose occupational background is intimately associated with the West Coast (Terminal Island fishermen) or who functioned in activities for which there is little call or in which it would be difficult to become established now (those who were engaged in professional or managerial activities) has been a check on relocation.

4. Status Considerations: The reluctance of many, especially older persons who had considered themselves established and independent, to accept employment where they will be under supervision, particularly under the supervision of Caucasians, where linguistic difficulties and prejudice are likely to be operative.

5. Immobility: The long term of residence of many of these people within a relatively circumscribed section of the country, their complete familiarity with the economic and climatic conditions of this particular region, their many misconceptions about other areas, and the consequent resistance to scattering, have likewise been of considerable moment.

6. Fear and Uncertainty: These worries, material and psychological, cover a great range. Some of them seem naive and unrealistic until it is realized that the evacuees have been removed from the normal stream of American life during a period when the nation has made dramatic transition to war conditions. The adjustments to travel conditions, rationing, taxation, housing conditions, etc. which have come to the

   average citizen gradually, seem impossible barriers to those who must face their cumulative weight the day after they leave a Center.

   A number of basic fears have been noted on the economic side, moreover. There is the fear that the wages offered relocatees will not be sufficient to pay expenses and taxes at present costs and rates. There is the objection that W.R.A. assistance does not provide for the 'extras' which evacuation and relocation entail, such as the obtaining of household goods (if they can be obtained at all) to replace those sacrificed or lost at the time of removal, the provision for clothes suitable to the new life of a markedly different climate, etc. There are the fears that housing will be inadequate, found only in undesirable locations, will be too expensive, or will not be obtainable at all. Important, too, is the fear that any economic or occupational adjustment, no matter at what cost they are made, will not be permanent; that post-war shifts and problems arising from the absorption [sic] of returning soldiers will leave large numbers of Japanese and Japanese Americans far from their original bases, jobless and with few assets.

   Fears relating to social security are effective too. There is the concern about unpleasant incidents, insults and discrimination. There are just a sufficient number of such instances reported in the public press and their occurrence is evenly enough spaced to constitute a deterrent to relocation. . . . There is the fear of going to a region to which many relocatees have gone, lest the charge of 'Japanese colonization' arise again, and there is the contrary anxiety concerning professional opportunity, professional care, marriage and recreational possibilities if the community chosen does not contain persons of Japanese ancestry There is nervousness over. . . . the chance that future regulations may prevent reunion with relatives in Centers at a time of crisis, etc. Some of these misgivings seem strained and absurd, unless one appreciates how many unexpected shocks this segment of our population has received in the year and three-quarters since Pearl Harbor.

7. Draft Status: The uncertain draft status of the male of military age has acted as a deterrent upon those in this category and all those who depend on them. If the young man has capital he fears to relocate and risk it, lest he be forced to liquidate his business hurriedly a second time if national policy on this issue changes. If he has dependents he dislikes to attempt to support them on the outside when he may be forced to leave them less well cared for than would be the case in a Center.

8. Property interests: There are those who still have substantial property interests on the west coast. They intend, if it is at all possible, to stay as near to their holdings as they can and to return to them at the earliest possible moment. The recent statement of the President, and the relaxation of dimout [blackout] regulations along the Pacific coast have encouraged them to think of eventual return to their homes rather than in terms of relocation.

While Opler believed that these eight issues explained the current evacuees' attitudes toward relocation, he noted that the "primary reason why the rate of relocation has lagged in recent months is simply that so many of the residents of Manzanar do not at present have the leave clearance which will permit them to resettle." Commenting further, he observed that the segregation program had resulted in tensions and restlessness "in the community which favors a contemplation of relocation for those for whom it is possible." Little advantage could be taken of these developments, however,

as long as 1000 members of the community are denied leave clearance, for a rough count indicates that 4500 persons, or well over half of those not bound for Tule Lake, are concerned in the fate of this block of 1000. It is unlikely that many of these 4500 will make any important move until they have a clear conception of what may be expected from the leave clearance hearings now in progress. It is important to realize that the family tie, always close in Japanese and Japanese-American communities, has been still more greatly solidified by evacuation. Even where it was weakening, it has now been reaffirmed. The financial losses suffered by the parents have given the children a still further sense of obligation to the old people. The humiliation and suffering brought by evacuation has made it a point of honor not to desert a close relative, particularly a parent or child. Property losses, rebuffs to status, uncertainties in nearly every other sphere, have made the personal and family tie more precious. As long as there remains the threat that one member of a family may be denied leave clearance and may ultimately be sent to Tule Lake, it may be accepted that the vast majority of other family members will take little initiate [sic] toward relocation. [61]

WRA and Evacuee Staff Interpretation — To convince evacuees at Manzanar of the desirability of relocating, the WRA appointed personnel in the camp's relocation office believed that their primary job "was one of promotion and selling." They believed that "this could be done best by a sales agency that protected the interests of its clients" and did not engage in "high-pressure methods."

To promote relocation, the staff at Manzanar searched for a Japanese word that "would combine with relocation a feeling of hope and anticipation." The Japanese word tenju that was ordinarily used for "relocation" was commonly translated "emigration." After lengthy conferences, the evacuee counseling staff determined that the Japanese expression shin seikatsu — translated "new living" — was superior to use of the word tenju and thereafter it was used in Japanese translations. Thus, the relocation office became known in Japanese by the English equivalent of "place to talk about new living." In English, the words "resettlement" and "re-establishment" were frequently substituted for "relocation." [62]

Obstacles Posed by WRA Policies —

1. Induction Policy: The WRA policy prohibiting reinduction of relocated persons back into centers, unless residence on the outside was proven to be impossible, discouraged relocation. Manzanar residents generally had little confidence in the "government" and felt they themselves should be the final judge of whether or not they could live satisfactorily on the outside. According to Heath, the strict project interpretation and the disposition of the first reinduction request at Manzanar "did much to convince residents that relocation was a one-way proposition and that they would not be allowed to re-enter a center no matter what adversity faced them." "It took a long time," according to Heath, "to break down this attitude." The first applicant for reinduction made his request about two weeks after his relocation "without making an effort to get adjusted outside." Six months later he was still attempting to regain admission to Manzanar "without having made conscientious effort at adjustment." He was finally readmitted, and subsequently "more liberal reinduction interpretations were made." Heath noted that "this restrictive policy on reinduction prepared people to make a real effort on the outside and was undoubtedly a stabilizing influence on relocated persons." However, the policy was "a two-edged sword that cut both ways.

2. Age and Dependency: By December 31, 1944, only 364 males, between the ages of 20 and 40, remained at Manzanar. Of these men, a number had recently received leave clearance, but some were still not eligible to relocate. Others had property in California to which they wished to return. Some had such large families and so little money that it was difficult for them to relocate with the limited financial assistance available.According to Heath, many evacuees "had understandable reasons for not going out," and age and health were "handicaps for a considerable number." Manzanar, "in its scenic setting, with its grounds becoming more and more pleasant, was an ideal old men's home."

3. Feelings of Insecurity and Fear: Relocation centers, such as Manzanar, "did make good on their promises of security for those to whom they offered haven." Thus, according to Heath, the Manzanar resident "had only one insecurity — his future." He "would decide that issue when he saw 'how things come out." Until then he "would refuse to let himself think about it." [63]

WRA Organizational Relationships — Much of the relocation program at Manzanar depended upon the Washington office for policy formulation, technical advice and assistance, and leave clearance approval for individual evacuees. While the relationship between Washington and Manzanar was generally satisfactory, according to Heath, it left "something to be desired" and "coordination with the Central office was always lacking."

An active Washington liaison person served Manzanar for less than six months during the relocation program. At other times monthly reports and correspondence were the "sole means of communication." During the nearly four years of the center's operation, "only one conference was held for relocation program officers."

The leave clearance program, in particular, presented serious difficulties at Manzanar. As originally established, the program required "tremendous effort by Project personnel in order to meet deadlines." In Washington, however, the program was "never adequately implemented." It was customary "to wait an average of four months, and sometimes longer, for a decision on leave clearance applications which required perhaps an hour of actual work." These delays were "exceedingly harmful to the relocation program and to evacuees. Finally, personnel from the various relocation centers, including Heath, were detailed to Washington "to complete the job."

With few exceptions, the relationship between the Relocation Division at Manzanar and the WRA field offices "remained excellent." Considering the handicaps under which they worked, the relocation officers in the field offices, according to Heath, "remained dependable, patient, and tireless in their efforts for evacuees." [64]

Initiatives to Promote Relocation Program.

Influence of Relocated Evacuees —One of the most significant single aids to relocation at Manzanar, according to Heath, was the "comeback" from those who had relocated from the camp. Many of their first letters commented on the fine treatment they were receiving "even from servicemen." Eventually their letters were concerned "more and more on wartime problems of living and less on discriminations, real or fancied." According to Heath, the "fact remained that they were outside, had no thought of coming back, were making fair to good wages, and were gaining valuable experience." These "things could not go altogether unnoticed." Since "early relocatees were young people, their success was important to the Nisei group." The Issei, however, "saw in this but little indication for an 'enemy alien' to expect as much."

Occasionally, there "was a misfit who did not adjust himself well on the outside and who wrote discouraging letters." According to Heath, such instances, however, were "remarkably few" at Manzanar. At first their influence was felt, but it "came to be realized generally that some persons are doomed to failure wherever they are. During the entire operation of Manzanar, there were only 109 re-inductions, of which only 16 were readmitted because "of maladjustment." Other reasons included impending service in the Army pregnancy of a serviceman's wife, and ill health.

According to Heath, it was rarely possible to uncover "unfavorable relocation letters written to Manzanar residents." Favorable letters, however, were frequently published in the Manzanar Free Press, but residents "soon began to look on such letters with suspicion."

An effort was undertaken to get relocating people to write letters back to Manzanar. To encourage residents to write to resettlers, a large wall directory of relocated block residents was placed in each block office.

During the spring and summer of 1944 increased efforts were undertaken for solicitation of information from those who had resettled. WRA administrators felt that a better response would be gained from an invitation from Town Hall than from project appointed personnel and that center residents would place more credence in information gained and released by their own representatives. Accordingly, a list was prepared noting the names of older and more responsible people who had relocated. A letter and questionnaire was drawn up which attempted to solicit information regarding conditions and reception on the outside. Because the WRA refused to pay for mailing expenses and all efforts to obtain money for postage from Town Hall and other organizations ended in failure, the letter and questionnaire were sent out over the signature of Heath. As a result, only six blanks were completed and returned.

Visits of relocated persons to Manzanar were "extremely effective" in encouraging relocation. According to Heath, most returning persons "obtained satisfaction from telling of their own successes on the outside," and nearly all urged their friends to join them.

The WRA administration at Manzanar discouraged relocated persons from visiting the center until they had been outside the center for six months. This decision was implemented because of transportation difficulties as well as the belief that "early maladjustments were usually remedied within this prolonged period."

Considerable effort was expended by the project administration to get persons "conveniently in and out of the Center" after the six months' period. During the last six months of 1944, for example, the daily average number of visitors in the center was 34.

On several occasions, the Relocation Division attempted to make formal use of visitors, but usually without much success. Some visitors were asked to speak at high school assemblies, current event classes for adults, and Block Managers' meetings. Selected persons were used as part-time advisers in the relocation office, but they attracted little interest. Issei would not rely on these young people, and Nisei often wanted more information than these people were able to provide. [65]

Short-term, Trial and Seasonal Leaves — WRA administrators at Manzanar adopted seasonal and short term leave and ultimately indefinite leave (trial period) policies to permit evacuees "to taste of the pudding without committing himself to eat the entire dish." According to Heath, most evacuees liked "the sample," and some "stayed out" while many more relocated after returning to the Center and resting for a while.

Seasonal leave permitted departure from the center for several months to engage in seasonal work (usually agricultural or cannery factory employment). At the expiration of seasonal leave, either return to the center or conversion to indefinite leave was compulsory. Travel expenses were ordinarily paid by the companies contracting for evacuee labor or by the War Food Administration.

Indefinite leave for a trial period permitted return to the center during the fifth and sixth months of residence outside. At the end of the trial period persons who remained on the outside were eligible for reimbursement of train fare, meals en route, and, if necessary, a $25 stipend for subsistence expenses. Movement of persons on trial leave was subject to approval by Heath.

1. Seasonal Leave: According to Heath, many frustrated persons "were able to arrange family permission for seasonal leave, and on the strength of this experience, to convert later to indefinite leave at a later time." Some refused to take indefinite leave status because of high earnings possible on seasonal leave, but these cases were offset by those who were financially able to relocate because of their previous high earnings while on seasonal leave. During 1944, seasonal workers averaged $12 to $16 per day, sums that approximated the average monthly salary of an evacuee in the camp.

   All told, 2,654 seasonal and furlough leaves were issued before this type of leave was terminated during the center's closure program in 1945. Of this number, 1,589 were for agricultural work in Idaho, while 457 were for seasonal labor in Montana and 371 in Oregon. As aforementioned, 1,148 seasonal leaves were issued in 1942. In 1943 and 1944, leaves were issued to 282 and 529 workers, respectively, who had not been outside the center previously. During these years, 258 evacuees converted to indefinite leave without returning to the center. On May 1, 1945, only 518 individuals remained in the center who had received seasonal or furlough leave.

   A comparatively small group of "repeaters" took seasonal leave whenever the opportunity was offered. During Manzanar's operation, 1,322 evacuees took one seasonal leave, while 390 took two leaves, 137 took three, 24 took four, and one took five. Some of these evacuees were prevented by family influence from relocating, while others enjoyed the high wages while on leave and the "winter vacations" in the center. A few had always been casual workers prior to evacuation, and thus were simply following previous life patterns. According to Heath the evacuees "appeared to build good reputations for themselves as workers in the agricultural districts." Farmers "claimed to prefer them to workers of other national origins." As a result, many job offers came from agricultural areas, and a large number of relocations to those areas resulted.

2. Short-Term Leave: Because there were no relocation areas within easy travel distance of Manzanar, short-term leave was "not appreciably used until after relocation was possible within the State of California." Thus, prior to January 1945, short-term leave was used mainly by older and financially secure persons. During 1943 and 1944, 186 and 467 short-term leaves were issued, respectively. At one point, it was found that 80 percent of those who went on short-term leave (excluding visitors to other centers) soon took indefinite leave.

3. Indefinite Leave for Trial Period: As Implemented at Manzanar from May to December 1944, Indefinite leave for a trial period was a "forerunner and a guarantee of successful relocation." As with seasonal leave, it was also a "practical first step in obtaining parental consent." Unlike ordinary indefinite leave, trial leave did not provide assistance with travel and subsistence expense until the individual decided to remain outside the center. Thus, people with family responsibilities and in financial need profited little from this type of leave.

   During the period when indefinite leave (trial period) was afforded to evacuees at Manzanar, 270 such leaves were issued. Of this number, 93 returned to the center, but the rest relocated immediately. [66]

Use of the Manzanar Free Press — The Manzanar Free Press staff was cooperative in publishing news about relocation undertakings. Selected job offers were reported as direct news releases from the relocation office, and efforts were made to find additional stories that quoted resettled evacuees concerning living conditions outside the center. In addition, Heath was "on the alert constantly" for letters from resettlers to staff members and center residents, and he interviewed many of the resettlers who visited the camp. Efforts were undertaken to obtain many "short stories" rather than "a few long stories" so that "almost every reader would at least get a portion of the educational material even though many preferred to pass over easily recognized relocation stories" in the newspaper.

The camp newspaper was "a good approach to the younger people who read English easily." As time went on, however, most of those persons relocated, and the English language increasingly "had less and less value for educational work."

Although the mimeographed Japanese language section of the newspaper offered the only "real approach" to those who knew little or no English. this "avenue was never satisfactorily opened." According to Heath, the Japanese section, under its own evacuee editor, reprinted translations of some of the English newspaper's stories. In addition, it carried many other stories and a fairly good summary of war news. The editor, "a man of good Japanese education, but with little ability to speak English," had a "fine recognition of the type of news that the Japanese-reading public wanted, but this was not Relocation news." Heath never succeeded in gaining the cooperation of the Japanese editor to translate articles on relocation. [67]

Visual Advertising — The Relocation Division at Manzanar placed considerable emphasis on many types of visual advertising to promote relocation at Manzanar, including: (1) bulletin boards; (2) handbills, posters, and throw sheets; (3) displays and exhibits; (4) motion pictures; and (5) pamphlets and field bulletins.

1. Bulletin Boards: During the early period, a large bulletin board was placed outside the relocation office on which was posted a short summary of virtually every relocation offer received by the camp. As time went on, however, and relocation opportunities became more numerous, this posting became more selective. During the final months of the camp's operation, only outstanding offers were exhibited, but "another board inside the office displayed domestic offers in California." In time, the large bulletin board was supplemented by a small, three-faced, glass-covered display board in front of the office which contained war maps, pictures of evacuees and employing companies, and reprints of favorable stories about evacuees. The success of bulletin board advertising, however, was somewhat limited by a general lack of evacuee interest in reading the displays.

2. Handbills, Posters, and Throw Sheets: During the spring of 1943, a weekly or bi weekly sheet of job offer summaries was issued and posted in each block. The attractive sheets, featuring appropriate sketches and the use of two or more colors, were prepared by an artist in the Adult Education unit.

   Large individually-painted posters were used to promote "general ideas" rather than advertise specific jobs offered. For example, one poster aimed "at driving home the idea" of the futility of waiting for military permission to return to California consisted of a picture of two black boys playing dice under a street sign reading "Little Tokyo" in Los Angeles. This district, formerly occupied by evacuees at Manzanar, had been taken over by blacks who came to the city to participate in war-related industrial work after evacuation.

   Small posters ordinarily advertised specific relocation opportunities, frequently in both English and Japanese, were reproduced on the hectograph. The posters were widely displayed throughout the center's offices and living areas, and even in the latrines. Sometimes an entire series of posters was released for a single group opportunity that seemed to offer promise.

   Throw sheets, generally detailed, mimeographed write-ups of job and living opportunities, were sometimes used to promote group resettlement opportunities or new relocation areas or simply to encourage relocation. They were handed out in the relocation office and distributed to evacuees attending meetings, returning seasonal workers, and apartments in the barracks.

   One mimeographed throw sheet prepared by the relocation office on March 28, 1944, to promote relocation was entitled, "Relocation Made Easy." The sheet stated:

   Relocation is not hard. For almost everyone, relocation can be arranged within just a few weeks. Unless you are one of the few people who are not yet eligible to go out, you are remaining in Manzanar only because you yourself choose to do so.

   Concluding with the question, "Why do you choose to remain behind barbed wires?," the sheet stated:

   There is a job for you on the outside, and in most instances the job will pay you more than you made before evacuation. There is a community in which you can live and be well received. There is a community that will treat your children better than they were ever treated in California. There is a community that will give your children educational and occupational opportunities that previously were closed to persons of Japanese ancestry Those are the opportunities of today; perhaps before another spring, they will be considerably lesser, because the European war may end at any time, and jobs will immediately become harder to obtain. [68]

3. Displays and Exhibits: On two occasions, "Relocation" was the "subject of an exhibit at the Visual Education Museum operated by the Adult Education unit." Relocation and museum staff combined to display pictures, maps, pamphlets, and letters from relocated evacuees. Evacuee attendance, however, was "not large" at either event.

   On several other occasions, displays, featuring photographs and accompanying text, were developed around an idea, such as a desirable farming area or a favorable group relocation opportunity. The theme of one large display was "Family Security in America — Where Shall I find It?" This material, slightly expanded, was later incorporated in a pamphlet in both English and Japanese for general distribution in the center.Large captioned WRA photographs of relocated evacuees were mounted "in series" and used in similar fashion. Such exhibits were moved from mess hall to mess hall by the Reports Officer Robert Brown.

4. Motion Pictures: The Adult Education unit, and later the Reports Officer, obtained a number of short motion pictures and arranged to have them included as part of regular center motion picture shows in the camp. Such movie shorts were usually concerned with the attractions offered by specific sections of the United States in which there were relocation opportunities. The films, according to Heath, were "good crowd getters" when shown by recruiters.

5. Pamphlets and Field Bulletins: WRA field bulletins and pamphlets, issued by area relocation supervisors, provided details of job opportunities and living conditions in the cities, communities, and areas for which they were responsible. The field bulletins and informational pamphlets were distributed in various center and block offices, and occasionally block mangers were requested to pass such materials from apartment to apartment in their respective blocks. For a considerable period this literature was displayed under large titles with other visual types of relocation material on the walls of the block mess halls under the general heading "Resettlement News." According to Heath, however, it was never possible to get evacuees to "go one step out of their way to read these releases." [69]

The Relocation Committee — In April 1943 Heath and the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management called a meeting of selected WRA staff members to consider ways of stimulating relocation at Manzanar. Those attending the meeting included three Japanese-speaking people, a supervising teacher, the head welfare counselor, a missionary serving the center, and the head of adult education. The attendees concluded that the basic obstacle to relocation was fear, physical and emotional, and that these fears stemmed from a doubt that persons of Japanese ancestry were welcome in America.

The attendees determined to form a "relocation committee" and decided that the best approach for promoting relocation in the camp was through speakers qualified to address evacuee audiences in Japanese. A sub-committee prepared a skeleton outline for a speech to sell the idea that persons of Japanese ancestry were welcome in American society outside the center. Heath was directed to collect and supply fresh information for the effort, and the existence of a "speaker's pool" was widely publicized in the camp. Individual committee members endeavored to develop interest among the evacuee population to attend meetings featuring the selected speakers. The sentiment against relocation was sufficiently strong in the camp, however, so that "not a single speaking engagement was found." The "relocation committee," as it became known, was thus expanded to include other interested persons, such as the personnel officer, Superintendent of Education, and principals of the elementary and high schools. During the summer of 1943, the committee was expanded further to include a number of prominent evacuees, such as the head of the Visual Education Museum, chairman of the block managers, and director of the Parent-Teacher Association, as well as several influential block managers. Under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management, the total committee membership was about 30.

Despite considerable effort, the accomplishments of this committee, until its demise in December 1944, were few. It sponsored a relocation exhibit and prepared a number of recommendations for national WRA relocation policy formulation. Beyond that, the members, according to Heath, "only talked." In his opinion, the education of its individual members, "to a degree, was its greatest contribution."

Heath analyzed the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the "relocation committee." As established, the committee was given no voice in development of camp policies. Thus, evacuee members were expected to risk their community reputations in support of unpopular policies. While making attempts to bring about policy changes that would aid the relocation program and allow them as individuals to give public support to the committee, the policy recommendations were not accepted by the WRA administrators, and the evacuee members sometimes felt that the WRA "was closing its eyes to reality."

Occasionally, the project administration adopted, in principle, proposals made by the committee, and in the final analysis the new policies were similar to the committee's proposals. Trial leave, temporary financial assistance, and government housing to meet the immediate housing needs of resettlers were examples of committee proposals resulting in camp policy revision. In each of these cases, however, the project administration denied that the need existed at the time the proposal was made, and final action generally came months later with no credit given to the committee. [70]

Zadan Kai — In June 1944 Project Director Merritt and Heath met with a small group of evacuee leaders to interest them in a field trip that Heath intended to undertake. The evacuee leaders requested that Heath investigate agricultural resettlement opportunities in the nation's midwestern and southern states. After a six-week trip, which included routine work assistance in the St. Louis relocation area office and inspection of farm lands in Nebraska and Louisiana, Heath reported his findings to the evacuee leaders. After lengthy discussion, the evacuees decided to meet again to discuss relocation in general and resettlement in the two farming areas in particular. They suggested that they could conduct more productive discussions without WRA staff assistance or presence. Although they were interested in these opportunities, they feared that differences in climate and agricultural methods, when compared with their pre-evacuation situations, negated their positive aspects.

Despite their rejection of these group relocation opportunities, however, the evacuee leaders continued to meet under the guidance of the chairman of the block managers. They drew other evacuee leaders into their group, and on several occasions asked Heath and visiting relocation officers and recruiters to speak to them. Nevertheless, they resisted tentative efforts for a formal organization to promote relocation, and simply called themselves the Zadan Kai discussion group. The group consulted with returning evacuees about conditions on the outside, and at least one of the Issei on the relocation staff attended all meetings of this informal group. This "overlapping of membership," however, was the only direct connection with the Relocation Division Although no definite relocation moves resulted from the group's deliberations, the group, according to Heath, "made a worthwhile contribution to relocation" as a result of educating evacuee leadership to resettlement possibilities. [71]

Block Managers Involvement — Block managers met weekly at Town Hall. Heath or the evacuee relocation coordination assistant or both attended nearly every meeting and discussed relocation policy changes and resettlement opportunities. They also made numerous "personal" contacts with the ever-changing block managers to "win friends" for relocation. According to Heath, some block managers were "sincerely friendly," had "an intelligent desire to help," and made "a real contribution." Unfriendly block managers, however, went so far as "to fail to post relocation material and 'forget' to read notices in their mess halls." While some individual block managers and the chairman of the Block Managers' Assembly "gave important assistance," they "resisted continuous efforts to give formal organized aid through the Block Managers Assembly or in other organized ways.

Despite this lack of enthusiasm, an ambitious series of eight panel discussions was sponsored by the project administration and Town Hall during the spring of 1944. The subjects discussed by mixed panels of evacuee leaders and staff members were as follows: "Who are Americans?"; "What does America stand for?"; "American Citizenship"; "Some American Problems"; "Problems of Residents of Japanese Ancestry in America"; "Japanese Adjustment to America"; "Future of People of Japanese Ancestry in America"; and "America At War."

According to Heath, the panel discussions and other meetings arranged by the administration and Town Hall had "one thing in common." A speaker, visiting recruiter, or relocation officer, (with interpreter for non-English speaking evacuees) who commanded great respect could draw a fair crowd if no similar event had been offered in the camp for a "considerable time." When those conditions were not met, "not more than six or eight people attended." [72]

Relocation Counseling Program.

Staff Counseling — According to Heath, evacuees approached relocation "with great timidity, and were always ready to abandon their efforts at the slightest excuse." Thus, evacuee and appointive staff members engaged in counseling and advising "were called upon for the greatest of patience, understanding, and skill." "High pressure methods in relocation were definitely out of order." Obvious problems "of a social nature were referred to the Welfare Section." No actual case work was conducted in the relocation office, but relocation counselors were "in reality, discussing personal evacuee problems and finding solutions." The counselors conducted considerable correspondence "in locating suitable opportunities, in obtaining acceptance of Manzanar applicants, and in giving to Relocation Officers information about persons going to their areas." [73]

Promotion of Individual Employment Offers — Most successful promotion of relocation efforts at Manzanar, according to Heath, "appeared to be through the medium of specific job offers." Prospective relocating evacuees were interested in knowing "exactly what hobs and what wages they could expect in the community of their choice." Selected job offers were publicized in the center via numerous aforementioned ways. In addition, while discussing relocation with interested evacuees, the relocation advisers would "continuously consult job-offer files and field bulletins and give pertinent information during the interview."

When group offers were received they were analyzed by the camp's relocation staff. Those that seemed to have little appeal were given only routine publicity, but those that showed promise "were given a great deal of publicity" because the staff believed that "successful promotion of popular offers did much to increase the faith and confidence of Center residents." While numerous campaigns to relocate groups of evacuees from Manzanar failed for a variety of reasons, one effort was notably successful.

During the spring of 1944, a group offer to work in the cannery and dehydration plant at Seabrook Farms in northern New Jersey was given extensive circulation at Manzanar. Soon, however, a much publicized anti-Japanese incident took place near Seabrook, and reports reached Manzanar that the first arrivals at Seabrook were not properly housed. Thus, further publicity of the Seabrook relocation opportunity was temporarily suspended at Manzanar.

By August 1944, however, a considerable number of evacuees from other relocation centers had relocated to Seabrook, and most of them "appeared well satisfied" with their work and social acceptance as well as the community's public schools. English was not required for employment at Seabrook, thus enhancing its attractiveness for some Issei evacuees. Relocation officials at Manzanar thus contacted recruiters from Seabrook and developed a recruiting plan to promote the resettlement effort.

Before the recruiters arrived at Manzanar, the Free Press carried reports about Seabrook, A series of ten hectographed posters, extolling the advantages of work and residence at Seabrook written in both English and Japanese was prepared and posted one by one at intervals of two or three days. Two Caucasian and two Japanese recruiters arrived from Seabrook and told their stories to the Manzanar block managers. Friendly block managers invited the Japanese recruiters to various mess halls for meals and informal discussions about Seabrook, One entire issue of the camp newspaper was devoted almost exclusively to Seabrook, and a mass meeting was planned and widely publicized. As the day of the mass meeting approached, several of the more influential evacuees were "individually prevailed upon to sign up as lead-off people" for the relocation venture. Their names were announced at the mass meeting, and dates were set for the movement of special railroad cars to Seabrook. After a few evacuees subsequently signed up, other camp residents began to apply, and all names were prominently displayed outside the relocation office. As a result, more than 200 evacuees left for Seabrook within a month's time. Upon their arrival at Seabrook, they sent back detailed positive reports that were printed in the Manzanar Free Press. Subsequent promotional campaigns sent approximately 300 additional people to Seabrook in March 1945. [74]

Relocation Library — The first efforts to supply a reading room and relocation library at Manzanar were undertaken during the summer of 1943. A collection of informational material — much of it colorful Chamber of Commerce pamphlets — and a collection of WPA Writers' Project State Guides were displayed in the entrance to the main library at Manzanar. Later, when space permitted, literature was moved to the relocation office reception room and additional reference works were added. The relocation library included large numbers of Japanese language pamphlets, numerous WPA pamphlets containing information on states and localities, and current WRA field bulletins. Despite these efforts, however, Heath noted that the evacuees "depended more upon first-hand reports from friends for their information on relocation." [75]

Use of Evacuee Counselors — During the early days at Manzanar, "mature Nisei counselors or interviewers," particularly women, were employed in the relocation office. Such persons, however, were the "first to relocate." Qualified male counselors became particularly "difficult to replace." The feelings against relocation that developed following the "Manzanar incident" and the registration program "deterred many capable persons from associating themselves with relocation." In addition, an evacuee "who himself did not plan relocation was unsuitable" as counselor.

As relocation "moved through the younger generation and into the alien group," the need for an older male alien staff member became "acute." A knowledge of Japanese was essential if one was to talk with older evacuees. Older Japanese men traditionally looked only to other men for assistance and advice. Authority and decision-making in the Japanese family reposed in the father, and later in the eldest son.

During the late summer of 1943, Heath succeeded in convincing a 60-year-old Issei to join the relocation staff. He was respected in the community and his oral English was fairly good, but he could not write letters in English or fill out anything but the most simple forms. This man thus was used mostly as liaison between the relocation office and the camp Issei and Town Hall. He contributed much to the dialogue between the Issei and the relocation center staff before he relocated to Seabrook Farms in November 1944.

During the winter of 1943-44, a 35-year-old Kibei, who had been successful in the produce field in Los Angeles prior to evacuation, became a relocation counselor. Although relatively young and highly Americanized, he had been selected by Manzanar residents to be a block manager and later to be Executive Secretary of Town Hall. According to Heath, the "promotional ability and understanding of Japanese psychology" of this Kibei" were valuable.

During the spring of 1944, a "large part of the progressive alien group left the Project on seasonal leave" to obtain "a sample of outside living conditions." Upon their return in the fall, several of the men, who had previously been block managers, planned to relocate, and had an adequate knowledge of English, were hired as relocation counselors. One of these counselors, however, was threatened with physical harm if he continued to advocate relocation. Despite the continuing opposition, these men held periodic evening meetings in the camp, securing good results by "emphasizing good wages and personal security." [76]

Centerwide Relocation Counseling Program — In June 1944 a centerwide relocation counseling program was commenced at Manzanar to help stimulate resettlement. The program was conducted by the Welfare Section and was designed to interview every Manzanar family head in order "to learn his feeling toward relocation, to discover common obstacles to relocation, and to stimulate relocation through proposed family planning." In addition, purpose of the counseling program was "to locate and refer to proper sections for assistance, whatever problems of health, law, property and social adjustment appeared to be retarding relocation." The extensive interviewing program took nine months to complete. [77]

Evaluation — As a result of the relocation counseling program, evacuee attitudes toward relocation at Manzanar changed significantly during the fall of 1944. Although many were initially apprehensive or hostile to the program, evacuees generally became more positive toward WRA resettlement efforts. Some, however, would continue to remain embittered or fearful, and others would accuse the government of attempting to shift the burden of their maintenance entirely and unfairly upon their shoulders after uprooting them from their established communities following Pearl Harbor. [78] Manzanar had the lowest relocation rate of all the centers in proportion to total population during the months of February, March, June, and July, and its rate fell below average in January, April, May, and September. In October, November, and December, however, Manzanar's rate was higher than that of any other relocation center.

The increased rate of relocation during late 1944 showed the changing character of time resettlement program at Manzanar, On June 30, 1942, the camp had 9,744 residents, while on June 30, 1944, it had only 5,472. On June 30, 1942, the camp had 1,557 males from ages 21 to 39 and 1,263 males 50 years of age and older, On June 30, 1944, there were only 345 males in the lower age bracket, while 962 were in the upper bracket. Thus, in 1942 there had been approximately 1.2 "young men" for each "older man," while in 1944 there about 2.8 "older men" for each "young man." Thus, relocation had been for the young and unencumbered during the early days. By June 1944, however, a higher rate for relocation was maintained by the older and encumbered evacuees. [79]

Final Phase of Relocation Program (January to November 1945)

Reaction to Announcement of Impending Center Liquidation. The announcements terminating the exclusion ban and closure of the relocation centers, according to Heath, "brought into the relocation program an element of compulsion that had been absent." While many of the WRA appointed personnel were skeptical and took a "wait and see" attitude, the general reaction of the evacuees to the announcements was, according to Heath, one of "disbelief." Many residents at Manzanar did not see how it would be possible "for all persons in the Center to be relocated within so brief a span without more physical hardship than the Government was willing to countenance." They frequently voiced the statement "that the Government had once disrupted their lives and that it had no right to do so again." The announcements also resulted in new problems for the camp's relocation office, Generally, the "announcement that centers would be closed within a year's time appeared not to be taken seriously by evacuees in general." According to Heath, there "was a marked disinclination to do anything in haste" as "most evacuees preferred to let someone else lead the way."

In the wake of the announcements and the evacuee reaction to them, WRA administrators at Manzanar, as well as at other relocation centers, determined that one of the first problems to be addressed was to convince the evacuees that the centers were definitely going to close. Until the evacuees were convinced, they would make little effort to plan for the future. Accordingly, in late February 1945, WRA Director Myer arrived at Manzanar to conduct a variety of meetings with evacuees during which he outlined his plans for closing the centers and assisting the evacuees in relocation. He refused "to admit the possibility" that "evacuees could not solve their problems, if given minimum assistance from the WRA. He saw "no problem in employment and housing in the Los Angeles area." Despite his assurances that the WRA would proceed with its liquidation plans, however, many evacuees in the camp "still felt that it was impossible within the year to find places for them to work and live on the outside and that the Government of the United States would not be so inhumane as to force them to leave the Center." [80]

Character of Residual Population on December 31, 1944. On December 31, 1944, the evacuee population at Manzanar consisted of 5,549 persons, including a number absent on seasonal and short term leave. Of this number, 3,125 were citizens; 2,117 were 20 years and under; 2,020 were between 20 and 50; 733 were between 50 and 60; and 401 were over 60. The group had a disproportionate number of older people, and many of those in their prime were "burdened with children." The population included a considerable number of farmers and approximately the same number of small business men who had formerly engaged in the wholesale and retail produce trade. About 350 were fishermen or members of fishermen's families from Terminal Island. A few had been domestic servants prior to evacuation, but a large number had been gardeners, farm laborers, produce clerks, and semi-skilled laborers. Approximately one-half of those over age 40 spoke no English, and many of the rest spoke limited or broken English.

By January 1, 1945, the day before the exclusion ban was to be lifted, the relocation office at Manzanar had received only one application for terminal departure to return to the evacuated area. On the other hand, 46 applications for short term leaves had been received, but many of these did not involve departure until after January 8. [81]

Preference for California. At the beginning of 1945, administrators at Manzanar estimated that about "50 percent of the Center residents would wish to return to California," A majority had come from Los Angeles and "would normally desire to return to their former residence area.

At the beginning of the year, some newspapers and public officials in California raised loud cries, criticizing the Army for lifting the exclusion ban and permitting the Japanese to return to the west coast. Some predicted harm to returning evacuees, while others urged them to stay away until the war ended and the housing shortage was alleviated, arguing that this was the "fair and patriotic thing to do." At the same time, the Governor of California and some individuals and groups rose to publicly support the evacuees, asking the public to accept them in "the American spirit of justice and fair play."

As the year wore on and evacuees returned to the former exclusion zone despite threats and acts of arson and violence, the California public, according to Heath, "appeared to become resigned to the fact that persons of Japanese ancestry would again live in California." At first evacuees feared "to risk the danger of returning," but this fear "eventually abated since little or no physical violence occurred in Los Angeles where most of them would go."

Although opportunities for employment, housing, and occupational and social acceptance were "still superior in areas to the east," many Manzanar evacuees began to cancel earlier plans to relocate in the eastern states, replacing them with "the hope for any early chance to go 'back home." Because of "fear and limited employment and housing on the West Coast," greater numbers of evacuees went eastward during the first seven months of 1945. During the summer months, however, the "determination to go only to California seemed to crystallize in the minds of many more Manzanar residents." During August to November 1945, approximately 80 of those relocating went to California, while the percentage moving directly to California during the entire year was 64 percent. To handle the evacuees returning to southern California, buses were scheduled to Los Angeles three days a week during the closing months of the center's operations. [82]

Major Obstacles.

Housing — As the war neared an end, the shortage of housing Los Angeles became increasingly serious. While Manzanar residents relocating in the eastern states were able to find available public and private housing, those moving to the Los Angeles area in 1945 faced mounting difficulties in finding adequate shelter.

By the middle of the summer, some 200 to 300 evacuees were "habitually absent from the Center on short term leave in an effort to find living quarters in the Los Angeles area." As a result of the efforts of Project Director Merritt and other WRA officials with various public housing authorities, however, a few veterans' and servicemen's families were accommodated in federal housing projects in Los Angeles in August. The following month 100 trailer units were made available for allocation to former Terminal Island residents near their pre-evacuation homes. Additional servicemen's families were also accommodated with "stop-gap housing." During November 1945, temporary living quarters in barracks or trailers with community mess halls and sanitary facilities were provided for about 70 families in the Los Angeles area. These incremental housing measures were sufficient to take care of those evacuees who had not found "make-shift quarters." Although no Manzanar evacuees left the camp "without temporary housing being assured, "few Manzanar families who went to Los Angeles during the summer and fall of 1945 "were really satisfactorily housed." [83]

Employment — Throughout 1945, fair to good jobs in most occupational classifications were available in many eastern and midwestern states and cities. In Los Angeles, however, few employment opportunities were at first available to the returning evacuees. Produce operators in the city managed to keep the field closed to persons of Japanese ancestry until the end of the WRA program in 1946. Nursery work and employment in war-related factories were largely closed to returning evacuees, although a few Manzanar residents were employed in both before the close of the war. Evacuee farmers, who had difficulty in finding equipment and securing financial aid, were hesitant to grow produce that would have to be sold in the markets dominated by anti-Japanese operators. Wartime regulations closed the fishing industry to all Issei, and restrictions were not lifted sufficiently to permit Nisei to engage in commercial fishing until after the Japanese surrendered on August 14. Domestics and gardeners, however, continued to be in demand in the city, providing many employment opportunities for the returning evacuees. Thus, many returning Japanese evacuees reestablished small businesses in Los Angeles and its surrounding area. After the first few months following relocation, "most other relocators obtained employment of one kind or another without the assistance of the War Relocation Authority" Young people found low-paying jobs rather easily, but many trades and professions remained closed to them. Older people, however, "were not altogether successful in finding employment." [84]

Exclusion Lists —

1. Military: Army intelligence personnel entered Manzanar immediately after the announcement that persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from the coastal area after January 2, 1945, on an individual basis only Such officers remained at the camp until Public Proclamation No. 24 was issued by the Western Defense Command on September 4, 1945, withdrawing all restrictions which the military had placed on persons of Japanese ancestry and rescinding all exclusion orders.

   On January 1, 1945, Army officers delivered to Project Director Merritt a list of names of all evacuees in the camp deemed to be dangerous to the "internal security" of the United States. This list classified all evacuees in one of three categories: (1) cleared persons, or those free to travel and reside anywhere in the United States; (2) excluded persons, or those excluded from travel or residence within the evacuated area but otherwise unrestricted; (3) detained persons, or those who were temporarily restricted from leaving the relocation center and who were to be detained by the Department of Justice if military recommendations were implemented. Registration documents and reports of various federal intelligence agencies were used in making the classification. but apparently no attention had been paid to leave clearance granted by the WRA or to such matters as applications for repatriation or expatriation that had been filed subsequent to the registration program. The Army list included 259 Manzanar male citizens of the United States classified as detained persons, but no aliens were "so classified as excluded persons." No females were listed.

   Thus, the relocation plans of many Manzanar evacuees were delayed and confused "because many American citizens who had been previously cleared by the WRA as loyal were now classified by the Army as detainees." In 1944, 132 of these persons had been granted seasonal or short term leave. At the same time, many others who had applied for repatriation and who were expecting to be segregated to Tule Lake were found by the Army "to be entirely trustworthy, and therefore, were expected to relocate," The Army also issued exclusion orders to both detainees and excludees, and both groups were confused as to why some were prohibited from departing while others were free to leave for areas outside of the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command.

   Although the exclusion orders named only a relatively small group of evacuees, most of them had families, and an order limiting the movement of the wage earner (perhaps the only wage earner in the family) ordinarily limited the movement of an entire family. Detainees under the Army exclusion orders and their family members totaled 823 persons. Appeals and hearings relating to the exclusion orders continued until V-J Day (August 14), and the status of many remained unclear until all exclusion orders were voided on September 4. [85]

2. Department of Justice: Seven Manzanar evacuees who had renounced their American citizenship were prevented from relocating. These evacuees were eventually taken into custody by the Department of Justice. [86]

3. Immigration and Naturalization Service: About 75 evacuees at Manzanar were restricted in their movement as a result of Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations. Some had gained entry to the United States illegally, while others had entered on temporary permits that had expired or been abrogated during the war. None of these persons was free to travel for several months. Eventually, one of these persons was taken into custody, while the others were released either under bond or parole arrangements, or both. Special parole arrangements with the Department of Justice were necessary for aliens who had been interned at the outbreak of the war and who were later paroled. [87]

4. Promotional Methods: Throughout the closing phase of the relocation program at Manzanar, the WRA undertook efforts to divert evacuees to the eastern states where housing and employment opportunities were "superior" to those on the west coast. Although the majority of evacuees wished to return to their former homes in California, the camp staff emphasized that more "satisfactory opportunities and better social acceptance, particularly for evacuee young people and children, existed in the East." [88]

Personnel Representatives — In spite of the increased use of eastern recruiters and relocation officers on detail at Manzanar, these promotional efforts met with little success. A relocation officer from Philadelphia was in the center during April and May 1945, placing about 30 evacuees. Another from Salt Lake City, who was particularly interested in acquiring workers for the Toole Ordnance Depot, visited the camp in February and April 1945. A Connecticut businessman of Japanese nationality was at the camp in May, and an industrial recruiter came from Wisconsin for ten days in February, but left without obtaining any evacuees. A relocation officer from Newark, New Jersey, arrived in June and succeeded in obtaining about 30 evacuees for relocation to New England and the mid- Atlantic states, while a relocation officer from New York City served as an assistant to Heath from late July to November 1945. Recruiters from Seabrook Farms contracted with more than 200 evacuees to relocate to their expanded facilities in March 1945. A relocation officer representing the agricultural concerns in Nebraska interested 12 to 15 people in resettling in his area, [89]

Publicity — Despite the promotional and publicity efforts by Manzanar administrators to assist the eastern recruiters and relocation officers, it "remained impossible to influence any substantial number of evacuees to go to the East." Recruiters from Utah and Idaho, however, "were able to obtain farm laborers or share croppers."

During April to September 1945, a six to eight-page mimeographed weekly relocation supplement to the Manzanar Free Press was published. Although some west coast news was carried in the supplement, nearly all space was devoted to news and job offers in the eastern United States.

An extensive number of mounted photograph displays with English and Japanese captions were prepared by Reports Officer Robert Brown. The photographs, mostly of eastern and midwestern relocation opportunities, were moved from mess hall to mess hall and attracted considerable interest.

During 1945 "Japanese language positions" became more "popular," and recruiters, preceded by publicized campaign efforts, continued "to find a few applicants each time they came to the Center." During the year, Japanese language instructors were sent from Manzanar to Army schools at Stanford, Northwestern, and the University of Minnesota, and to Navy schools at the University of Colorado and the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mining College. Some evacuees accepted employment with the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. [90]

Procedural Changes. Changes in military regulations, coupled with the Supreme Court decision that loyal citizens could not be required to apply for indefinite leave, made procedural short-cuts possible during 1945. Until Public Proclamation No. 24 was issued on September 4, voiding all exclusion orders, all departures had to be cleared with military representatives guarding the gate at Manzanar. However, this procedure was far simpler than obtaining military travel permits as formerly required.

During this period, the actual procedure involved in getting an evacuee and his entire family through the gate was relatively easy It required preparation in triplicate of a form giving identifying dates, relocation destination, and notes as to special factors involved. One copy served as a gate pass, one copy was filed, and a third copy served as a cover sheet under which the relocation officer in the area of relocation was forwarded relocation summaries, welfare and medical information, and related material. In addition, arrangements had to be made for ration books, a relocation grant, and travel reservations, as well as referrals to the Welfare Section if special assistance was required. [91]

Social Welfare and Institutional Cases.

Permanent Dependency — The center's Welfare Section was responsible for all dependency cases, including unattached children that were being cared for in the Children's Village. The Welfare Section "made complete arrangements" for the outside care of such children, and the medical social workers at the hospital provided identical service for institutional cases, referring them to the relocation office after which arrangements were completed. [92]

Temporary Assistance — In addition to dependents, Manzanar included a large number people who did not have sufficient financial resources to re-establish themselves in a new community. In 1945, the Social Security Board, with additional War Relocation Authority grants, undertook a program to assist needy resettlers with original relocational expenses, such as rent, food, and where necessary, minimum essential furniture. Application for assistance was made in the center where it was processed by the Welfare Section and submitted to the community of proposed relocation for approval by its welfare agency. After June 1, however, such grants were paid at the camp before departure, thus further simplifying the process.

Many Manzanar evacuees objected "strenuously" to this procedure and "refrained from applying for what they termed charity." Some felt that acceptance of such funds might be used against them by an unfriendly Immigration and Naturalization Service. Should they visit Japan in the future, re-entry to the United States might be denied, they thought, on the basis of "pauperism."

Since a "considerable proportion of the total money allocated for this temporary assistance was in the budget for the fiscal year of 1945," Project Director Merritt recommended that every "effort be made to accomplish, prior to June 30, 1945, the relocation of families needing these funds."

Consequently, interviewers called on the largest families throughout the center to learn whether they had relocation plans that had been delayed because of lack of money In almost every instance, few families had made "mature relocation plans." [93]

Personnel Adjustments. To expedite the relocation program in 1945, three to four evacuee interviewers were employed in the relocation office until summer, and one remained until early autumn. Five to seven WRA appointed personnel from other sections were detailed as assistant advisers to augment the normal relocation staff. Among these were three persons who spoke Japanese, and another person with a background in social work and employment counseling. In January, the principal of the elementary school at Manzanar was transferred to the position of assistant relocation program officer, serving in that position until April when he left for a position with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. From May through July, the assistant personnel officer was detailed to the relocation office, and, on August 1, the relocation officer on detail from New York City assumed the position of acting relocation program officer. [94]

Relocation Trends in 1945. Although only 125 persons relocated to California from January through April 1945, the visit by WRA Director Myer in February and "a number of good relocation opportunities in the East were remarkable stimulants to relocation." In March 1945, for instance, the number of applications for "terminal departure" — a term that came into use instead of "indefinite leave" — totaled 52 for each of two days in succession, and for a considerable period it averaged 25 per day. The daily average dropped off to 16 in April, increased to 20 in May, but fell to 12 in June and July and 10 in August.

A series of events in late summer 1945 resulted in accelerated relocation levels, On July 13 Myer announced that Manzanar would be closed by November 30. The issuance by Myer of Administration Instruction No. 289 authorizing the project directors to use physical force in evicting evacuees (after due warning) who had failed or refused to arrange for their departures was announced in the Manzanar Free Press on August 18. A follow-up letter to all residents at Manzanar on August 29 from Merritt reinforced Myer's directives. On August 14, the Japanese government formally surrendered, ending the war. Between August 15 and September 15, ten blocks within the center were closed, and the remaining residents were consolidated with those living in partially-filled blocks, This consolidation caused considerable inconvenience to persons who had spent three years in making their apartments and surrounding grounds more habitable. Schools failed to open in September, and no other educational facilities were made available for children. Camps 2 and 3 at Poston and the Canal Camp at Gila River closed on October 1, as scheduled, and only a handful of residents were permitted to remain temporarily until difficult arrangements could be completed.

Thus, the daily average of applications for relocations increased to 38 in September. When commercial fishing was reopened to Nisei and Issei received promise of work in fish canneries in the Los Angeles Harbor area, Merritt worked with Los Angeles housing authorities to locate temporary housing facilities in a trailer park near the former homes of the Terminal Island evacuees. On September 15, a large contingent of Terminal Islanders left for their new homes in one caravan, thus removing the one group that might have proved difficult to relocate.

On September 25, approximately 1,000 single persons and family heads were still in Manzanar who had not yet named an exact departure date, Merritt sent a letter to each of these persons, informing them that on and after October 9, departure dates would be established for those who had not set one for themselves, and that this would be done at a rate sufficient to keep the busses moving as scheduled. Immediately, applications jumped to an all-time high, and thereafter few evacuees required further individual attention. The impact of Merritt's letter was strengthened by the fact that one neurotic woman, a notorious welfare case, and two families with women in late pregnancy were forced to leave according to schedules set by the camp administration.

Busses were obtained to transport from Manzanar 90 persons per day, five days per week, during the six weeks ending November 23. According to Heath, there was "somewhat of a rush for reservations for the last days, particularly by those who had no assured housing." As a result of a scheduling error, 125 persons had been permitted to set November 23 as their departure date, and more than 90 were accepted for the 21st and 22nd, Meanwhile, the relocation program was proceeding considerably faster than had been anticipated in early October. Many evacuees left in private automobiles and trucks during this period, and the three busses per day to transport 90 persons were not needed. Many residents who had set late departure dates continually advanced their departure times. As a result, by November 15, a total of 61 evacuees were scheduled to leave on the 21st, 22nd, and 23d. This number was slightly in excess of one bus load after discounting those who were to leave in private cars and trucks. Thus, camp administrators arranged for the remaining evacuees to leave the center on November 21.

At 11:00 A.M. on November 21, nine days ahead of schedule, the last remaining evacuee, a four-year-old boy accompanied by his mother, passed through the front gate of Manzanar. The occasion was marked by an informal gathering of WRA staff members and a short impromptu speech by Project Director Merritt. Heath commented, albeit somewhat inaccurately on the symbolism, as well as the irony, of the occasion:

. . . . But even this touch of ceremony did not succeed in placating the sorrows of the little fellow whose protest at leaving Manzanar was expressed in tearful, physical resistance. The only home this small American had ever known was the barrack he was being required to leave; the only place that spelled safety and security was Manzanar.

Caucasians who were gathered around tried to placate him with smiles and soothing words, but he hid his face as if ashamed at so un-Japanese a display of emotion. He squirmed and kicked and to the end resisted the War Relocation Authority.

Yet 18,358 other evacuees had preceded him through that same gate and had found their places in normal American communities. Some had gone willingly enough; indeed, many had been eager to go. An even greater number, however, like this four-year-old child, had stepped through the gate haltingly and in fear. Yet all had found security and companionship and peace in the world 'outside,' This was obvious from the many letters of appreciation which they had sent back to the Administration. . . . The challenge which had been set for the staff at Manzanar had been met. The evacuees, uprooted and resentful, had been cared for for three long years; then they had gone 'home.' In the 'going-home' — no matter where it was — the Relocation Division had taken a major hand. Now it was over. The task was finished. [95]