The Rise of Multiple-Use Management in the Intermountain West: A History of Region 4 of the Forest Service

By 1941, following CCC construction of new facilities and attempts at proper management based on grazing and timber surveys, Region 4 had laid the basis for initiating the intensive management of national forest resources. However, a number of things stood in the way of achieving this goal. The major requisites were staffs large enough to manage the extensive areas covered by the forests, management plans adequate for each ranger district, concepts and accurate data for successful management prescriptions, sufficiently good relationships with forest users, and a means of achieving sustained-yield timber management. During the 1940's, Region 4 developed adequate concepts, staffs increased considerably, and forest officers drafted good management plans. Still, range management data were defective or inadequate, the demand for timber was too low to secure sustained-yield use, and the relationships with stockmen were often tense. In spite of this, the accomplishments of the period provided a basis for better management in the decades to follow.

The Impact of World War II

The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the subsequent declaration of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy plunged the United States into the second major war in a generation. Nearly 2,000 Forest Service personnel joined the armed forces, significantly reducing the number of qualified employees. Although the Forest Service had learned from its experience in World War I that it could not play fast and loose with grazing policy, wartime conditions created other problems for the agency. [1] The Federal Government estimated that it required products from three trees to equip and maintain each soldier, and the War Production Board classified softwood as critical material and froze its use by civilians. [2] Still, excessive timber demand was not a problem in Region 4. While the region's total timber cut reached levels higher than the 1930's, the absence of adequate markets along with labor shortages continued to leave the region overstocked with overmature and deteriorating stands.

The situation on the Boise National Forest seems to have been typical. During 1942, the forest lost clerks, typists, and stenographers, which it tried with great difficulty to replace by transfers and new appointments. The forest was short 40 to 50 guards during much of the hazardous fire season. [3] Moreover, after the CCC was abolished, enrollees were not available to fight fires or to construct or repair facilities as during the 1930's. Conscientious objectors from Civilian Public Service Camps, such as Camp 37 on the Toiyabe National Forest, were available for such service, but these camps were fewer in number than the CCC camps. [4]

The Service also had to spend some time guarding against possible sabotage. Very little took place on the forests of Region 4, but during the spring of 1945 in an apparent desperation move, the Japanese launched rice-paper balloons carrying incendiary bombs on the prevailing westerly winds. Most of the balloons landed in the Northwest, and 288 floated into the Boise area, They did little damage because they landed early in the wet spring season. [5] A major problem in dealing with the balloons was the unwillingness of civil defense authorities to share details of the potential threat with Forest Service and National Park Service employees until some time after the bombs had started to land. [6]

Of necessity, the region undertook a number of cost-saving measures during the war. Office employees were admonished to reuse carbon paper from interleaved forms 7 to 10 times. [7] The regional administration promoted a share-the-ride program, and the Ogden City Defense Transportation Committee got the regional forester to change regional office hours to 8:30 to 5:30 from the normal 8 to 5 to remedy traffic congestion. [8] To promote efficiency, employees were asked to review programs and procedures, particularly for the more effective use of scarce labor resources. [9] Reports late in 1944 indicated that these programs had succeeded on a number of national forests. [10]

During the war, the Service began to plan for the postwar period. Expecting that general unemployment would increase following the war, the Service began planning for large-scale public works projects, on the CCC model, for returning veterans. [11] In general, the plans were not needed and did not materialize.

Postwar Administration

In the period following World War II, in part as a result of the need to deal with increasingly large staffs, the style of administration began to change. In the regional and supervisor's offices, the change consisted principally in a shift from a personal to a more formal form of management. Under these conditions, management and employees adhered more closely to fixed rules for promotions and pay. In general, the organization became more bureaucratic. [12]

A number of indications of this trend are evident, Perhaps the best evidence is found in a series of letters from the Washington Office in 1948 and 1949. Questions discussed included the size of the work load needed to justify hiring district rangers at particular salary levels (then called P-3 and P-4). It was expected that a P-3 district would be small enough that a ranger with a qualified alternate could manage it. It was anticipated, however, that the ranger would himself be involved in much of the actual hands-on operation rather than functioning solely as an administrator. Salary levels P-5, P-6, and P-7 were designated for forest supervisors assistant regional foresters, and regional foresters. [13]

The Service also wrestled with the problem of the status and pay of professional staff. The Washington Office recognized staff positions on the national forest level as roughly equivalent in responsibility to rangers, but carrying fewer perquisites, since the staffer was seldom furnished government quarters and thus usually paid higher rent, had less opportunity to cut living costs, and had to spend more time away from home. There was some feeling in the regions that a P-4 staff position should be an assistant supervisor. Earl Loveridge argued for promoting national forest staffers to P-4 as a matter of status. An office with a large work load, he believed, should warrant higher salaries. [14]

In addition, a definite separation in status was evident between clerical and fiscal positions on the one hand and professional positions on the other. Pay grades for professional positions fell in the "P" category, whereas those in the clerical ranks were labeled "CAF," CAF grades ranged from CAF-11 for a fiscal agent down to CAF-6 for a chief clerk. [15]

With increasing decentralization, the size of staffs in supervisors' offices and on ranger districts increased. The supervisor's office would generally have several clerks, an administrative assistant, a receptionist, a road foreman, and a couple of junior foresters. [16] The one-person district became the exception rather than the rule. Kenneth Maughan remembers that when he arrived on a Wasatch National Forest district in 1940, he was allowed to hire a secretary. Shortly thereafter, he had a staff of two stenographers, which was unusual. In the mid-1940's, he was able to hire a full-time maintenance man, and by 1950, some of the district timber staff were full-time employees. [17]

Even with staff expansion, by 1947 the demographic composition of the professional officers had changed little from the time the Forest Service had been organized. The major change was in education—most were now college educated. Most still came from the farms and ranches of the West. During the congressional hearings of the 1940's, there was a tendency for stockmen to accuse rangers and supervisors of being impractical college men with no livestock experience. However, this was decidedly not the case (table 10.)

Table 10—Demographic composition of Region 4 in 1947: rangers, supervisors & staffs, regional forester, and range managers

Some attempts on the part of Federal officials to promote efficiency failed to meet Forest Service needs. The Federal Government created a procurement division to purchase supplies for all its agencies. Because the regional office had already established contacts with suppliers and since Ogden lay on a major transcontinental rail route, the regional administration found that procurement division "prices as a rule are no better than prices we can obtain, their services are slower than we must obtain from manufacturers or distributors, and their packaging is frequently inefficient." In a letter to Chief Lyle F. Watts, Regional Forester William B. "Ben" Rice pointed out that Region 4 could purchase paper at the same or lower base price, and since they had to pay freight charges from the warehouse in Denver, the procurement division product actually cost more. The region had experienced similar higher prices for first-aid supplies, fire extinguishers, pencils, brooms, and brushes. A number of items, such as paint, hardware, and radio tubes, provided by the procurement division were often either out of stock or of inferior quality. Packaging of fragile items such as inks, glues, and typewriters was found to be inferior, and such items often arrived damaged. [18]

Since the construction of the Forest Service vehicle repair shops in Salt Lake, Boise, and Reno during the 1930's, the region had begun centralizing other functions as well. By 1947, for instance, the number of vehicles in the region's motor pool had created a parking problem at the regional office. This was solved by regulations requiring that vehicles be parked in the driveways on the south and east of the building. [19] In 1948, as an economy move, the region's central warehouse facilities were moved from Ogden to Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City. [20]

During the 1940's, most of the region's employees who had entered the Forest Service before the creation of regions had left active employment. In 1943, for instance, after a lifetime career in Region 4 and 6 years of service as regional forester, Clarence N. Woods retired. He was replaced in January 1944 by Ben Rice, a Yale forestry school graduate, who, though he started his career in 1912 in Region 2, had served since 1914 in Region 4. His experience included work as a supervisor on the Weiser and Payette National Forests in staff positions, and as associate regional forester. He continued as regional forester until his sudden death in January 1950 at age 61. [21]

National Forest Reorganization

With the exception of some lands purchased in critical watershed areas, by the 1940's the general outlines of forests in Region 4 remained unchanged. Major changes in the 1940's consisted of national forest consolidations and interforest land transfers.

Typical of the smaller changes was the transfer of the Malad Division of the Cache to the Caribou in 1942. In this case, the regional administration and the forest supervisors contacted forest users and other interested parties to poll them about their views on the proposal. About 75 percent of the users—those living in the Malad Downey-Swan Lake area of Idaho—tended to favor transfer. The 25 percent in the area from Preston, Idaho, south into Utah tended to oppose the transfer. Under those conditions, the change was made for administrative convenience, since Pocatello tended to be the regional trade center for the Malad area. [22]

In spite of wartime conditions and pressure on budgets, the Service did not reduce its commitment to decentralization. Shortly after his appointment as Chief of the Forest Service in 1943, Lyle F. Watts appointed a regional office study committee to investigate the relationship between the Washington Office, the regional office staffs, and the forest supervisors' staffs. Based on the philosophy that "the practical limits of decentralization expand as experience and training increase the ability of administrators," the committee was designed in part to see that too much centralization of functions did not take place in the regional offices to the detriment of the forest supervisors. [23]

In the spirit of Watt's view, an important change in 1943 further decentralized administration, placing more authority and greater responsibility with the supervisors. In that year, for the first time, grazing authorizations no longer needed regional office approval. Supervisors, however, were cautioned to base their stocking on "good grazing capacity estimates and adjusted thereto as quickly as possible in the public interest." [24]

The most dramatic changes came about as a result of Watt's desire to create larger, more cost-effective forest units. In trying to accomplish this, Watts appointed Ben Rice and two other regional foresters to study the job loads of forest officers to determine what consolidations could be made of the "operating units to obtain greater efficiency and promote more economical use of Government funds." In making the study, they concluded that a ranger district ought to have a minimum load of 2,000 hours per year, and a national forest should have 18,000 to 25,000 hours of ranger work. [25]

In Region 4, the changes suggested by this study that were later implemented included the consolidation of the Powell and Dixie under the name Dixie, the Manti and La Sal under the name Manti-LaSal, and the division of the Mono into the Toiyabe and Inyo as previously discussed. Also included was an unusual experiment with two large forests, the Boise and the "old Payette," which were combined under the name Boise, and the Idaho and Weiser, which were joined to create the "new" Payette.

These decisions were often wrenching since the removal of a supervisor's headquarters from a city often created considerable opposition there. In the case of the removal of the Powell headquarters in 1944, for instance, Panguitch and the surrounding towns on the east side of the high plateaus were home to more livestock, but more of the stockmen and other forest users lived on the west side near Cedar City. [26] In addition, Iron County, of which Cedar City was county seat, had a larger population (8,331) than Garfield County (5,253) with its county seat at Panguitch. [27] The headquarters was located in Cedar City.

In 1944 the Forest Service began an experiment with the two "superforests," the Boise and Payette with headquarters at Boise and McCall. [28] These forests had much larger and more specialized staffs than other Region 4 forests. By mid-1946, the Service evaluated the experiment and found some advantages and some disadvantages. The major disadvantages were in reporting—a single office had more difficulty in collecting reports from a larger number of units, in direct contact between the forest headquarters and forest users, and in the tendency for supervisor's office staffs to undercut the authority and assume the responsibilities of line officers, particularly rangers. The major advantages came in the division of labor. The larger and more specialized staffs could concentrate on particular areas of expertise. Also, some salary savings also were realized by the elimination of duplicated positions. [29]

Figure 59—William B. Rice, Regional Forester, 1944-50.

A major anomaly continued to be the extremely small La Sal National Forest with headquarters at Moab. Some consideration was given to transferring it to Region 2 or consolidating it with the Uinta National Forest, headquartered at Provo, to which it had been attached for administrative purposes in the late 1940's. [30] Conditions, however, seemed to favor its consolidation with the Manti, then headquartered at Ephraim, and moving the combined headquarters to Price, which lay between Moab and Ephraim and was then the largest town in Utah (7,000) that did not have supervisor's headquarters. After some consideration and negotiation (because of the opposition to moving the headquarters from Ephraim) the consolidation was consummated in 1949, under the name Manti. In 1950, in deference to southeastern Utah sentiment, the name was changed to Manti-La Sal. [31]

Watershed Purchases

Beyond the acquisition of portions of the Mono National Forest by the Toiyabe, most of the expansion of the forests of Nevada took place according to provisions of the Weeks Act and other lands acquisition acts, with the consent of the State. Acts passed by the Nevada legislature in 1937, 1939, and 1947 authorized the Federal purchase of lands or water rights within the boundaries of national forests, with the consent of the State tax commission and the stipulation that the Federal Government would make payments to the State in lieu of taxes and that private parties occupying the lands would pay regular State taxes. [32]

Perhaps the most critical watersheds along the Sierra Front were those above Reno, Verdi, Carson City, and Minden. The lands had been cut over, overgrazed, and otherwise abused, and the Toiyabe-Nevada Receipts Act passed in the 1930's authorized purchase of such lands. [33]

In general, the people of Nevada favored such purchases, but there was some opposition. The principal opponent was Senator George W. Malone, who was against any extension of the Forest Service into areas not capable of growing merchantable timber. Senator Pat McCarran also opposed Federal acquisition of private lands, but seems not to have been as strident as Malone. Congressman Walter Baring agreed to sponsor a bill extending the boundaries of the Toiyabe when he learned that local people supported the acquisition. Those favoring the change included the county commissioners of the counties affected, the Reno Chamber of Commerce, the Nevada Farm Bureau, and other interested organizations. Both Howard Hopkins, assistant chief, and Chester J. "Chet" Olsen, assistant regional forester, testified in favor of the bill, which was approved on June 6, 1950. [34]

One of McCarran's principal objections was the potential loss of land from the tax base of Washoe County. The chairman of the board of county commissioners, however, pointed out that the county got approximately $3,635 in taxes from the lands in the proposed extension but that they spent between $3,500 and $4,000 for fire protection alone. Thus, as private lands, these areas were a liability rather than an asset to the county. [35]

Typical of the work that followed was the project in Dog Valley, a 30,000-acre area west of Reno. The Forest Service purchased the valley in 1939, and a number of rehabilitation projects were undertaken beginning in 1941. Projects conducted between 1941 and 1949 included gulley plugs, contour trenching, fencing for stock exclusion, and tree planting. [36]

In general, watershed protection was the principal motive for the acquisition of land in the national forests. During 1947, resolutions from the Idaho state legislature, chambers of commerce, farm organizations, irrigation associations, ranchers and waters users, labor organizations, dude ranchers, and sports and conservation groups supported watershed land acquisition in Idaho. [37]

Watershed deterioration had become a problem in Utah according to Walter P. Cottam of the University of Utah in his book Is Utah Sahara Bound?, the 1947 Reynolds lecture. [38] Outlining watershed deterioration, which he attributed principally to overgrazing, he presented evidence of vegetational change as less desirable plants such as pinyon-juniper, sagebrush, rabbitbrush, and greasewood took over on overgrazed lands. The results, he said, following the Bailey-Forsling Craddock analysis of the 1930's, were devastating floods descending on the towns and cities of Utah's populated valleys. The only solution, he opined, was public education and watershed protection and rehabilitation.

Utah people had already experienced the floods Cottam detailed, and local groups had already begun work to protect and restore the lands. Perhaps the major support came from those living on the Wasatch Front. Techniques already begun in the 1930's included the passage of receipts acts which authorized the use of a percentage of the income from fees on the Uinta, Wasatch, and Cache National Forests to acquire critical watershed lands, the extension of forest boundaries to include critical lands, and the collection of private and public funds to purchase private lands within the national forest boundaries. The Service reduced livestock numbers and lengths of season or completely removed animals from critical watersheds and undertook watershed rehabilitation of the newly acquired lands. [39]

Efforts to acquire land in Willard Basin began in 1933. There, a group of citizens from Box Elder and Cache counties, led by Robert H. Stewart of Brigham, John O. Hughes of Mendon, and William Lathum of Wellsville, organized the Wellsville Mountain Watershed Protective Association in 1936, to acquire lands on Wellsville mountain. Successfully lobbying to secure the extension of the Cache National Forest boundary, they collected money to purchase private lands for watershed rehabilitation. [40]

The Weber County Commission organized the Weber County Watershed Protective Corporation to receive donations from municipal and private corporations to purchase lands along the Ogden-North Ogden portion of the Wasatch Front and in the North Fork of the Ogden River drainage and transfer them to the Forest Service. [41] The corporation was headed by Julian Heppler of the Ogden Kiwanis Club and included such Ogden citizens as businessmen Lorenzo Williamson and W.R. White and Ezra J. Fjeldsted of the chamber of commerce. [42]

In his biography of Bernard DeVoto, Wallace Stegner considers it "surprising" that the Ogden Kiwanis Club rather than some conservation organization should have stood at the forefront of the conservation movement in Utah. [43] From the first flash floods, however, it had been the western townspeople who had suffered most from the overgrazing and deterioration of mountain watersheds. It was their homes and property that paid the ultimate price for this watershed abuse, and it was they who had the most to gain from the conservation movement.

In each case, the various groups worked closely with forest officers. These included forest supervisors such as James O. Stewart and Arthur G. Nord on the Cache and Felix C. Koziol on the Wasatch and concerned district rangers. [44] Similar watershed programs were inaugurated throughout the region. Sore spots on the Manti, Fishlake, Wasatch, Dixie, Boise, and Bridger also received attention. [45]

The Great Land Grab Proposal

At the same time that those groups interested in watershed rehabilitation pressed the Service to acquire critical watersheds, a contradictory movement grew in the livestock industry, aimed at selling national forest lands or giving the ranchers control over the range allotments. During World War II, stockmen centered their lobbying efforts on hearings by the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys. The 76th Congress had passed Resolution 241 authorizing the committee to investigate "the purchase, withdrawal, and allocation of land and the administration and use thereof by or on behalf of the Federal Government or any agency thereof." These hearings continued intermittently from June 1941 through November 1945, as subsequent congresses renewed the resolution. [46]

Generally referred to as the McCarran Committee hearings since Senator Pat McCarran chaired them at first, the hearings at first focused mainly on the Interior Department's Grazing Service. [47] Nevertheless, the testimony on Forest Service policy opened questions that were to continue to plague the Service well into the 1960's, The hearings tended to pit the stockmen against both the Forest Service and State wildlife authorities. [48]

Though legislation based on the McCarran hearings failed to pass, the Service actually had little disagreement with most of its proposals. The legislation proposed to codify existing practice on the role of advisory boards and to require publication of commensurability standards. The major change the Service strongly opposed would have recognized a legal tenure in the grazing permits by prohibiting reductions for distribution to new owners. It would, however, have allowed continued reductions for multiple use management or range improvement. [49]

No hearings were held in 1944, but they resumed again in 1945. As they proceeded, particularly those held in Ely and Salt Lake City in May 1945, it was apparent that McCarran had developed a friendly relationship with Regional Forester Rice, and although the Forest Service anticipated some opposition, particularly at the Salt Lake City meeting, a crisis did not materialize. [50] Instead, many local community leaders who had benefited from watershed rehabilitation testified in favor of the Service. [51]

The major dispute in the 1945 hearings was the reopening of the question of reductions for redistribution. In his testimony, Washington Office range management director Walt Dutton indicated that the Service was contemplating a provision in the new 10-year term permits, which would begin in 1946, allowing reductions for redistribution of up to 25 percent annually for livestock in excess of the protective limit. Although he promised that the question would be submitted to the livestock industry before a final decision ranchers greeted the proposal with a storm of protest. [52]

The source of this opposition is quite understandable. Some ranchers had paid a premium for the permits at the time they purchased their ranch property. While in theory the permits had no market value since they carried no legal tenure, in practice they were quite valuable. Because they sold with the base property, lending institutions recognized their value when making loans to ranchers, and the Internal Revenue Service subjected the permits to inheritance taxes. In practice, a reduction in the number of permitted animals meant also a reduction in the value of the rancher's base property both for his livestock and for operating loans. [53]

Figure 60—Branding cattle at Baker Ranch, Baker, NE, August 1943.

In most cases, however, the permits were valuable property for which the ranchers had not paid. A study made in Region 4 in the late 1950's and early 1960's, while William Hurst served as assistant regional forester in range management, showed that a large number of the original permittees were still active and that more than 50 percent of the stockmen had acquired their permits either directly from the Forest Service or by inheritance. [54]

In addition, some witnesses argued that the reductions for protection were based on invalid data. Regional Forester Rice and Clarence E. Favre, assistant regional forester for range management, fairly well demolished that argument with specific factual information on the indicators of range condition. [55] McCarran himself seems to have been persuaded by their data; when it appeared that one permittee was spending too much time detailing reductions on the Pine Valley allotment on the Dixie, the senator cut him off and invited Rice to present rebuttal testimony. [56]

However, when the hearings moved to Casper, WY, the climate changed, and the Forest Service bore the brunt of the attacks. McCarran surrendered the chair to Wyoming Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, and the only other senators in attendance were McCarran, Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, and Edward V. Robertson of Wyoming. O'Mahoney and Robertson dominated the questioning, and Congressman Frank Barrett chimed in regularly. The tenor of the hearings was much less conciliatory. O'Mahoney began to badger range management director Walt Dutton. Wyoming Governor Lester C. Hunt's attitude was quite different from that of Utah Governor Herbert B. Maw, who had praised the Forest Service administration. Hunt called for a law guaranteeing basic permitted numbers and disposing of the surface rights on the public domain to the States for eventual sale to private interests. [57]

Edwin V. Magagna, a Bridger National Forest permittee and secretary of the Bridger-Washakie Forest Association, followed Hunt, Magagna made a number of allegations in regard to Forest Service administration. Obviously upset with proposals for reductions, he charged the Service with dictatorial methods in writing regulations beneficial to itself and detrimental to the forest users and stated that it was "the apparent policy of the Forest Service to eliminate all livestock grazing on the forest ranges." While accepting the position of the Service that reductions for range improvements were legitimate, he opposed their intention to reduce for range protection "at any time," instead of "prior to the beginning of any grazing season."

Dutton attempted to answer the allegations, but he had a number of things going against him. Perhaps because the Salt Lake City hearings had ended on such a positive note, the transcript of his replies indicates that he was quite poorly prepared for the negative questions and comments. He lacked specific information, and, although western Wyoming was situated in Region 4 and Magagna was a permittee on the Bridger, no one from the Region 4 administration had been invited to attend. This omission may be attributable to the fact the Forest Service had been informed that the Wyoming hearings would consider only Region 2 and that "the Region 4 part of the program could be carried out without too much difficulty." [58] Unlike Rice and Favre, Earl D. Sandvig, Region 2's assistant regional forester for range management, seems to have been unprepared for questions on conditions in Wyoming. A number of the allegations made by Magagna and others either went unchallenged or were only partially answered, On a number of occasions, Dutton was forced to have material inserted into the record after the hearings were completed because he did not have it at hand. In contrast, at the Salt Lake City hearings, the Region 4 officers had the exhibits with them and could refer with some confidence to the data while giving their testimony. [59]

Under these circumstances, the livestock interests had an advantage in Casper. McCarran was much less conciliatory. [60] The permittees particularly called upon their congressional representatives to help in creating stability through legal tenure. Most important, the permittees and the Service differed on their interpretation of deterioration of the range resource. Permittees tended to look only at the condition of animals as they came from the land. The Forest Service considered the condition of the animals but emphasized most the condition of the land as indicated in measurements.

Undaunted by the failure of the legislation proposed by the McCarran committee and violently opposed to reductions for redistribution and what they perceived as excessive reductions for protection, the livestock industry began lobbying more vigorously for laws that would grant the desired tenure. In 1946, they organized the Joint National Livestock Committee on Public Lands and drafted legislation to transfer ownership of grazing lands to the stockmen. [61]

Perhaps in response to these hearings, the Forest Service changed its policy on reductions for distribution. The Service had placed a moratorium on these reductions for the 10-year permits from 1936 to 1945 and agreed to extend that moratorium for all except a small handful of large permittees. The livestock industry accepted this compromise. [62]

Nevertheless, the livestock associations wanted the Service to recognize grazing as the predominant interest on portions of the public land. In a speech to the Idaho Cattlemen's Association in 1946, Rice recognized this tendency and emphasized his profound concern. In a forthright, if cautious, statement, he called upon the stockmen to recognize the multiple interests of the public lands, and "to adjust their interests with those of others through friendly and far-sighted cooperation." [63]

Conservationists perceived the efforts of the stockmen as an attempted land grab, and Bernard DeVoto, Lester Viele, William Voigt, and others prepared articles critical of both the ranchers and the Forest Service, charging that the stockmen aimed at nothing less than transfer of ownership of the public lands to themselves. They challenged the makeup of the grazing advisory boards, saying they gave undue representation to grazing interests at the expense of other multiple-use concerns, and called upon the Federal Government to broaden the membership of these boards.

These articles rankled a number of congressmen, particularly Barrett and Robertson. [64] Both they and representatives of the livestock industry denied that they wanted private ownership of all western public lands, asserting that they merely sought stability for livestock operations. In counterattacking, the congressmen and industry representatives charged the Forest Service with collaborating in writing and publishing the critical articles. [65]

The stockmen and congressmen asserted that Chief Forester Watts had fed information to DeVoto and the others, but apparently this was not true. DeVoto, a native of Ogden, had developed a longstanding friendship with Chet Olsen, then assistant regional forester. When the transplanted westerner traveled through the West in 1946, he met with Olsen, who talked with him about the proposals for land control and gave him copies of the stockmen's resolutions. As Wallace Stegner put it, "DeVoto went West in 1946 a historian and tourist. He came back an embattled conservationist," who wrote more than 40 articles about the West after January 1947, most of them about conservation. [66]

By 1947, things had changed. The livestock interests tended to favor policies of the recently created Bureau of Land Management (BLM) over those of the Forest Service. At the time, the very features of the BLM's grazing administration that had ingratiated it with the stockmen struck fear into those with interests other than grazing. [67] The BLM safeguarded tenure by recognizing the primary right of present graziers and did not reduce permits for redistribution whereas the Forest Service denied any tenure right. [68] The BLM had no maximum limits; the Forest Service did. Grazing fees under the BLM were set at the cost of administration; Forest Service fees were based on a modified market-value basis. [69]

Recent large reductions by the Service for watershed and range protection had antagonized stockmen, but met with the hearty approval of other interests. In contrast, the BLM and its predecessor, the Grazing Service, moved much more slowly to make reductions for protection. In fact, in 1943, BLM Director R.H. Rutledge announced a 10-percent increase in numbers of stock allowed, to the dismay of Forest Service officials who understood the actual depleted condition of Grazing Service lands. [70]

Stung by the conservationists' attacks on the livestock interests and the Forest Service's proposals for reductions for range protection and wanting tenure for stockmen, the House appointed a subcommittee headed by Barrett to investigate. The hearings ran from April through October 1947. Dubbed "Barrett's Wild West Show" by the Denver Post, these hearings took up where the McCarran hearings of 1945 had ended. Governor Lester Hunt of Wyoming led off as he had earlier and called on Congress for legislation transferring surface rights to the States, for sale to the livestock interests. Differentiating between lands necessary for "forest growth, watershed protection, national parks and monuments," F.E. Mollin, executive secretary of the American National Livestock Association, said that his organization and the Joint Livestock Committee on Public Lands wanted reclassification of the lands and sale to the users of land principally valuable for stock raising. [71]

At the same time, the Service was subjected to considerable abuse from some conservationists. In a retrospective interpretation, Voigt charged that the Service capitulated to the stockmen by failing to reduce livestock for protection. He rightly charged that the Forest Service had transferred some officers who favored land protection, for example Earl Sandvig, if they tended to rankle the stockmen. He went on, however, to make the absurd charge, citing Walt Dutton, that the Service never had undertaken reductions for protection. [72] In fact, in the period between 1920 and 1946, the Service had reduced animal-months by amounts averaging 35 to 49 percent on the ranges of Region 4 in addition to reductions in periods of use. [73] (See table 11.)

Table 11——Livestock permitted on the National Forests of Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, 1920-46 (in thousands of animal-units, 5 sheep = 1 cow)

At the hearings, the Region 4 administration was well prepared to answer the charges. As each permittee testified on what he perceived as Forest Service abuses, the regional officers and forest supervisors presented rebuttal testimony. For instance, in the case of the testimony of L.K. Olson on the removal of his stock from the Afton, WY, watershed, Edward P. Cliff, I.M. Varner, and Carl B. Arentson all testified citing allotment analysis done by Irwin "Hap" Johnson and others, specific information on conditions on various portions of the range, and information gathered in collaboration with the permittees as they rode over the range. [74]

Following complaints by permittees on proposed reductions, Teton Supervisor Arthur Buckingham was there with specific information on the condition of allotments. Congressman Barrett would not allow him the time to testify, but his testimony was entered into the record. [75]

In view of Barrett's opposition in Wyoming and Colorado, the regional office prepared itself for the worst in Salt Lake City. All supervisors were called and told to bring in their files so they would be prepared for any questions that might come up. Ivan Sack, Uinta supervisor, was particularly concerned since the presidents of both of the Utah grazing associations were permittees on this forest. Supervisor A.E. Briggs of the Minidoka responded to Rice's request by outlining his experiences in dealing with livestock associations. [76] In addition, the regional office prepared a briefing book with statistics on virtually all aspects of range administration, including related questions concerning wildlife, rainfall, and age and experience of administrators. It also contained sample answers to possible questions. [77]

In Salt Lake City, in addition to the prepared and rebuttal testimony, the Service had a number of ready allies. Representatives of cities, chambers of commerce, watershed improvement committees, and water users associations—such as Earl J. Glade and Gus P. Backman of Salt Lake City, Ezra J. Fjeldsted of Ogden, Mark Anderson, and Vasco Tanner of Provo, and T.M. DeCoursey of Canyon County, Idaho—appeared to praise the Service for reducing numbers of livestock and acquiring and improving watersheds. [78]

By October 4, 1947, when the committee held its last hearing in Ely, NV, both Nevada Congressman Charles Russell and Congressman Barrett himself went to some length to repudiate publicly the idea of selling forest lands or turning the public lands over the the States. [79]

Vernon Metcalf led off the hearing, spending more than an hour arguing for the transfer of national forest lands principally valuable for grazing to the BLM. [80] While several stockmen supported his views, the majority of the witnesses appeared to support the Forest Service. As witness after witness representing city and county governments, mining interests, chambers of commerce, sportsmen's associations, the Boy Scouts, and labor organizations praised the Forest Service and condemned the proposed transfer, stockmen began to charge that the Service orchestrated the hearings. Representative Norris Poulson of California asked one of the witnesses about the charge, and he denied that he came at the request of the Forest Service. [81] Most importantly, although the Service had sent Dutton from Washington and Regional Forester Rice and two staff members as well as the director of the Intermountain Station and all three Nevada supervisors, none of them had to testify except Rice, who replied briefly to one question. [82] Beyond this, the Nevada Democratic Party organization, represented by chairman Roy Cassidy, interceded with Senator McCarran to express opposition to the movement for private ownership. [83]

In a sense, the recommendations of the Barrett committee issued in 1948 indicated how far the committee had moved from its original intentions. Its principal recommendations, like those of the McCarran committee, simply called for codification of existing Forest Service multiple-use policy. Recommending that the Forest Service's organic act be amended to include grazing, recreation, and wildlife among the basic uses of forest lands, it also called for providing legal status for advisory boards. The major change proposed by the report was the end of transfer reductions on grazing permits. [84]

Range Management

In part, the disputes addressed by the McCarran and Barrett hearings were attributable to previous overly optimistic Forest Service projections of range improvement based on range surveys, palatability tables, and cropping estimates. Permittees had come to expect certain improved outcomes, but while cattle and sheep came off the range fatter than before, the vegetation did not regenerate itself as rapidly as expected, and watershed deterioration continued.

By the 1940's, it was clear that at least two things were wrong. First, the grazing surveys made earlier were based on faulty principles, and second, the amount of vegetation that had to be left to produce a new crop was underestimated. Additional research had shown that livestock needed to leave 50 percent or more of the vegetation for dry western ranges to improve. [85] Merle Varner, then supervisor on the Caribou, began to question the effectiveness of the older surveys since "he could see a lot of the areas . . . were overused where grazing survey figures showed there was ample forage." [86] The existence of records dating from Clarence Favre's grazing surveys in 1914 and Dean Phinney's 1928 rechecking showed that, far from improving, "range conditions had deteriorated." [87]

In trying to deal with this problem, Region 4 turned to research to propose new systems of analysis to help them understand where they had fallen short. In 1943, Lincoln Ellison of the Intermountain Station and Walter P. Cottam of the University of Utah introduced photo-plot transects as a means of analyzing trends of plant growth and watershed condition. These transects were 250 feet long with photo-plots 1 yard square spaced at about 25-foot intervals along the transect. Plots were identified with iron pegs and were to be rephotographed at 5-year intervals to measure trend. [88] In addition, the region began to use aerial photography to determine change over time in large areas. [89]

In 1949, the region issued instruction for a "grazing allotment analysis" that included classification as to condition and trend, usability, and grazing capacity. These instructions constituted the inauguration of "a reanalysis of all grazing allotments for the purpose of developing a more realistic basis for range and watershed management." [90]

In undertaking these measures and dealing with other problems as well, the region worked closely with the Intermountain Station. Research at the Desert Experimental Range, for instance, indicated that a moderately stocked sheep range could produce more wool and higher financial returns per ewe than a heavily stocked one. [91] In 1945, the region published and disseminated a book titled Book of Grazing Facts in which is summarized the conclusions from research for various problems faced by range managers. [92]

Largely because of experiments begun during the 1920's by the Intermountain Station, the region by the late 1930's learned how to replant overgrazed ranges. [93] A major problem was in determining which sorts of plants did well. Trial and error showed that crested wheatgrass, slender wheatgrass, several types of brome and several types of ryegrass produced the best results. [94]

The region at first had tried to adapt farm practices to range reseeding. However, these techniques worked only in the areas with favorable moisture conditions and were extremely expensive. [95] Experiments with other methods were undertaken on a large scale in reseeding open range on the Uinta in 1933 and 1934 in Payson Canyon and Diamond Fork. The region did similar work on the Davis County watershed on the Wasatch and at Arrowrock Dam on the Boise. By 1938, the experiments had worked so well that they were tried on a large number of national forest ranges in Utah, Idaho, and Nevada. By 1940, experiments with the single-disk drill and heavy seeding proved satisfactory. Regional officers "felt we had gotten far enough along in the experimental stage" so they could undertake a program of range rehabilitation. Some experiments were attempted with airplane reseeding, but these proved generally unsuccessful. [96]

Beginning in 1945, largely through the efforts of Congressman Walter K. Granger of Utah, the Forest Service started receiving direct appropriations for reseeding. About two-thirds of the money went to Region 4. By 1947 when Regional Forester Rice testified at the Barrett Committee hearings, he could confidently reply to the charge that the only way the Service knew to rehabilitate land was through permit reductions with the information that the Service had reseeded "117,000 acres, of which 56,000 was reseeded in Utah." [97]

Appropriations went to finance other range improvements such as fence construction, stock driveway rehabilitation, and water developments as well. By 1947, contrary to the stockmen's charges that the Forest Service was doing nothing, the region was spending about $150,000 annually on such improvements. [98] A 1948 Range Improvement Handbook outlined policy and methods for a wide range of improvements including fences and cattle guards, corrals and chutes, water developments, driveways, bridges, pest control, and revegetation. [99]

A notable, if largely unsatisfactory, effort in cooperative range rehabilitation was undertaken in Ruby Valley on the Humboldt from 1944 through 1949. Agreements were negotiated with a number of permittees, allowing fence repair, sagebrush removal, and reseeding on BLM, private, and county lands. In return, the Service reserved the right to use the resulting increased grazing on these lands for a period of 10 years in place of grazing on the national forests. Crested wheatgrass was used for reseeding, and forage conditions were monitored closely through clipping on sample plots to determine capacity. Unfortunately, by the end of 1949, the project had achieved only limited success. [100]

It is not true, as alleged by William Voigt, that the Service used reseeding and range improvements as a substitute for needed grazing reductions. [101] Reseeding and range improvements were part of a two-pronged range rehabilitation program, the other prong of which consisted of reductions for protection. Comments like this one in the 1949 Caribou grazing report—"due to voluntary reductions [those agreed to by permittees on the recommendation of forest officers] and transfer reductions, total numbers of livestock permitted on the Caribou in 1950 will be less than during the 1949 season"—are common. [102]

In 1943, shortly before his retirement, Regional Forester Woods issued instructions to reduce all grazing allotments to carrying capacity within 5 years. In 1945, Ben Rice, Woods' replacement, reaffirmed the goal of reducing all allotments to capacity within 5 years. This evoked resistance both from permittees and from some personnel. Nevertheless, many employees moved toward the goal with only limited success, largely because of the short timeframe. [103]

In spite of these efforts, many ranges continued to decline. In 1949, for instance, Edward Cliff, assistant regional forester for range management, inspected the ranges on the Boise. He recommended that the supervisor move slowly to fill permits for the ranges that had improved, because they were going to need some slack to deal with other very serious problems. [104]

By early 1947, even before the Barrett hearings had begun, Forest Service officials recognized that they faced problems in dealing with many ranchers. Several appeals from reductions had been forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture, and he gave "his wholehearted support to . . . efforts to bring stocking into line with carrying capacity and abate the continued deterioration of some of our ranges and watersheds." He said, nevertheless, that the forest supervisors could handle ranchers with more finesse. In dealing with this situation, Rice asked for examples of problems from each of the supervisors and recommended that they improve their public relations skills, particularly by working closely with advisory boards and consulting in advance with stockmen whose interests might be affected by planned administrative decisions. [105]

Figure 61—Stripped sagebrush and highlined juniper on overused winter range, Powell Ranger District, March 1949.

Relations with the St. John Forest Users Association on the Caribou indicated the ideal means of approaching needed range reductions. At the annual meeting in 1943, for instance, Edward Cliff talked about the need for tagging, the carrying capacity of the range, and the length of the grazing season. After explaining the situation to the ranchers, he found it unnecessary to force the reductions on them, as they proposed and approved the necessary changes themselves, including a reduction in the length of the season and the abolition of temporary permits. [106]

It was not as easy to deal with permittees on all forests as it was on the Caribou. On the Fishlake, Carl Haycock remembered the 8 years after 1940 as extremely difficult. Concerned "with their bread and butter," stockmen vigorously opposed any reductions. Progress required years of tough bargaining, range rides, meetings, and work with advisory boards. Stockmen insisted they knew range needs better than anyone else, because they were the ones who used the ranges. Haycock had the respect of the permittees since he had grown up operating a ranch, but even he experienced almost unbearable difficulty. [107] Some of the Fishlake problems probably stemmed from the reputation Supervisor Blaine Bettenson had for being hardnosed and unyielding. [108]

In some cases, attempts to create better relations with the permittees where range problems existed resulted in transfers for Forest Service employees. The evidence currently available indicates that such transfers were ordinarily done for public relations purposes, not merely because the forest officer had insisted on grazing reductions or observance of regulations. [109] The transfers usually either came because the ranger or supervisor was unable to get along with the permittees or because the permittees believed they could not get along. Ordinarily, the regional officers agreed with and supported the substance of the actions that the local officers proposed.

An example of this approach was James Jacobs' experience on the Boise. Both the old Payette and old Boise were headquartered in Boise in 1944 when they were merged to form the Boise "superforest." Thomas H. Van Meter, supervisor of the old Payette, was named supervisor of the Boise and most of the supervisory positions were filled by men who had worked under Van Meter on the Payette. About a month after the merger, permittees who thought Van Meter too aggressive complained at what they interpreted as his attempt to stack the administration with his men. Chet Olsen came from Ogden to assess the situation. He switched Jacobs, whom Van Meter had appointed to the range staff position, to timber staff and replaced him with Louie Dremolski. Dremolski had been handling range work on the old Boise and was slated for transfer to the Targhee. This change placated the permittees, and the forest then operated with little conflict. In order to placate the permittees, however, Jacobs had been assigned to a timber staff position for which he had little background. [110]

Forests continued to have problems with cattle trespass. The most common means of trespass control was by feedlot counts conducted by forest officers prior to the grazing season. After the counts, permittees were told to enter the forest with the permitted numbers and to leave surplus cattle on the ranches where the rangers could recount them. In some cases, rangers would brush the tails of surplus cattle for easy identification. Cattle with brushed tails found on the forest were cited for trespass. Where cattle were not kept in feedlots but were wintered on outside ranges, arrangements were made to count permitted cattle as they were driven onto the forest. In practice, all of the methods were unsatisfactory, and rangers recognized that dishonest permittees could graze surplus cattle on the forest with little chance of detection. [111]

Forest Officers found tagging of permitted cattle with numbered tags to be the most effective method of trespass control, and this practice was adopted on most of the heavily stocked forests, especially on the forests in Utah where there were many stockmen with small permits. Each spring, old tags were removed, and new tags of a different shape were put on. Often, rangers tagged the opposite ear each year to aid in identification. [112]

Even though tagging was the most effective method, permittees still found ways to circumvent it. On the Fishlake, for instance, Carl Haycock found evidence of a permittee stealing tags from the ears of other ranchers' cattle. When he did the tagging one spring, Haycock saved all the tags he took from the suspected permittee's cattle and compared the serial numbers with his list. He found more than 20 tags belonging to other permittees. The regional office refused to prosecute on the basis of the evidence, however, because Haycock had not found the cows on National Forest land. [113]

In most cases, though, tagging programs proved successful. In 1947, the Minidoka advertised its intention to impound all untagged stock. The supervisor subsequently reported that the ranchers had sold large numbers of stock, apparently to avoid impoundment. [114] Ranger Allen Folster on the Ferron District of the Manti reported that when he started tagging, owners sold about the same number of cattle as they had been permitted, which indicated to him that the ranchers had been running about twice as many cattle as their allotted numbers. [115] The Dixie supervisor also reported a successful tagging program. [116]

In some cases, supervisors had to deal with chronic trespassers. Ivan Sack on the Uinta, for instance, suspended one permittee's term permit and issued a temporary permit until he stopped trespassing. The permittee appealed what he perceived to be a "malicious, arbitrary action," and Regional Forester Rice came to Provo for a hearing. After Rice sustained Sack's decision, the permittee was so angry that he threw his hat on the floor and began to stomp on it to the accompaniment of vigorous claps of thunder! [117]

Forest officers found problems also stemming from common use of allotments by sheep and cattle. The Salmon National Forest, for instance, worked to eliminate common use as a means of improving range management. Problems had been created because unattended cattle would often graze over the same areas as sheep had grazed, causing range deterioration. [118] Similarly, rangers on the Ashley faced considerable difficulty with common use, especially on extremely overstocked and fragile land at high elevations. [119] The Humboldt achieved some success in eliminating common use, and Ed Cliff recommended in a 1948 report that reseeding efforts be tied to agreements eliminating common use. [120]

All of this work was accompanied by management plans drafted for each ranger district. On the Fishlake, for instance, the 1945 management plan for the Scipio Ranger District indicated that grazing was the principal use of the district, but recognized the interrelationship of other uses such as watershed protection, recreation, wildlife, and timber. The plan outlined commensurability standards and allotment use and indicated whether allotments were properly grazed or overstocked. Plans for needed improvements in herding and salting and in education were detailed. [121]

Wildlife Management

Closely related to difficulties with watershed and range were the continuing problems with big game. In both the McCarran and Barrett hearings, stockmen complained about the inordinate increase in deer, which they blamed for the overgrazed condition of the national forest watersheds. J.A. Hooper, secretary of the Utah Woolgrowers Association, charged in 1941 "when the permittee comes to graze the areas which he has paid for, . . . he finds that it is almost denuded of feed by big game." [122]

Considering these circumstances, Regional Forester C.N. Woods told the Utah State Cattle and Horse Association in the spring of 1940 that it would be his policy not "to reduce livestock on deer-congested areas till the deer were reduced . . . fairly close to what we [the Service] thought the ranges should carry." [123]

In part, this management problem resulted from policy decisions in which the Forest Service had some options. Since the Supreme Court decision in the Kaibab case, the Service undoubtedly had had the authority to remove excess wildlife. In practice, however, the Washington Office issued regulations that required regional and forest authorities to work with State game officials and prohibited extraordinary measures. During the 1930's and early 1940's, although the States did authorize the removal of some does, they were reluctant to move as rapidly as necessary to protect either the welfare of the deer or the land because of pressure to save the does. Since deer are polygamous, the population could not be kept under control through buck hunting alone.

The Service's unwillingness to initiate measures adequate to reduce herd size was probably the result of an accurate belief that the State officials resented Federal intrusion into what they perceived as their domain. Even Congressman Barrett, who was so critical of Forest Service wildlife management, opposed the idea of the Service reducing game in the absence of State approval. But the States resisted such action and the stockmen blamed the Service for the large deer herds, putting the Forest Service in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation.

Some State officials and sportsmen had an inordinately optimistic assessment of their success in dealing with such problems. [124] Many also were unwilling even to acknowledge the severe pressure deer populations exerted on overgrazed and disappearing winter feeding grounds. [125] In a meeting in Beaver County, UT, a game warden attacked the Service for its concern about the high-lining of junipers (stripping the trunks clean as high as the deer could reach). "To hear them [Forest Service people] talk," he said, "you would think Juniper is one of the prettiest plants that mother could grow in her garden. Do you folks know what it is? It is nothing but a Cedar tree. Give it to them [the deer]. There are worlds of it." What he did not realize was that when the deer population had reached the point where the deer had to high-line unpalatable juniper for feed, the normal browse plants such as bitterbrush, cliffrose, and even sagebrush "would be severely damaged or outright killed," [126]

In the early 1940's, a number of agencies tried to gather the information necessary to educate the public on the seriousness of the big-game problem in Utah. An interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Forest Service, BLM, and State Fish and Game Department coordinated efforts. The committee studied deer herds, determined browse utilization, checked on numbers, assessed damage to private property, and furnished information to the State Board of Big Game Control. The control board also held meetings throughout Utah to collect evidence on these matters. [127]

On the basis of this information the Forest Service and other agencies began a public relations program to try to convince people of the need to reduce deer numbers. Brochures, pictures, and show-me trips were used. [128]

As enlightened officials changed their positions and the wildlife authorities tried to attack the deer overpopulation, public opinion often lagged. In Utah, for instance, when herd censuses revealed an excessive population of deer and the Board of Big Game Control opened hunts for does, sportsmen's organizations lobbied to abolish the board and in some cases actually bought up and destroyed doe permits. The board continued to authorize the antlerless hunts, but such opposition undoubtedly reduced its effectiveness. [129] In 1948 and 1949, the excess deer population necessitated 95 special hunts in the region's four States. [130]

By the late 1940's, both the State wildlife authorities and some sportsmen's groups had come to recognize the extent of the problem. After the Barrett committee hearings, the Weber County Wildlife Federation issued a critique pointing out the seriousness of excess deer population and urging authorities to handle the situation. [131]

At the same time, some groups emphasized the economic importance of wildlife and urged Congress to recognize wildlife maintenance as an important aspect of forest management. In testimony before both the McCarran and Barrett committees, sports enthusiasts emphasized the economic contribution of hunting and urged a more tolerant attitude toward sportsmen. Stockmen, while indicating their interest in hunting, perceived it as of decidedly secondary importance. They argued that hunting only passed money around within the local population, rather than bringing in outside revenue. [132]

Although elk overpopulation was also severe, it was not as severe during the 1940's as that of deer. [133] The most critical area was undoubtedly in Wyoming, where the Jackson Hole and Grey's River elk herds required drastic control measures. [134]

Although big game was undoubtedly the most prominent concern, Forest Service personnel managed other wildlife as well. Upland game birds, particularly chukar partridge, lived on some national forest ranges. In addition, the rangers assisted in planting fish and maintaining fish habitat. [135]

Another serious problem that emerged during the 1940's was a large number of wild horses ranging over the region's forests, especially those in Utah, Nevada, and Idaho. Some had run away from ranches, others had belonged to the army remount service, and some ranchers had simply turned loose to go wild on the range. [136] The Service rounded up many of the horses for redemption by owners or for sale to others, but that practice generally proved unsuccessful. Where the situation became unusually severe, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a closing order that authorized officers to shoot the horses and thus stop their overgrazing of the range. [137]

Timber Management

As we have seen, in Region 4, unlike in the East and Midwest, the bulk of timbered land was in the public domain. A 1945 estimate suggested that 71 percent of the Intermountain Region's forest land lay within the national forests, an additional 11 percent was under other Federal administration, and the States owned 9 percent. Thus, about 91 percent of the timber was under public ownership. Timber companies owned only 5 percent of the timber, private farm woodlands encompassed 4 percent, and Native Americans owned about 1 percent. [138]

Moreover, the timber on private lands was being cut more rapidly than public timber, and with the reduction of private timber supplies, logging companies' interest in national forest timber increased. This development led to two important trends. First, the exchanges of timber on public lands in return for cutover private lands continued, especially on the Boise, Caribou, Payette, and Weiser. [139] Second, large companies began to press the Forest Service to open new national forest areas for cutting.

As the Boise-Payette Lumber Company became more interested in national forest timber, its relationship to the Forest Service began to change from an "independent if not arrogant attitude" to a much more cooperative stance. [140] The company loggers had cut over their lands with little regard for the future and by 1944 were "within easy sight of the end of their operation" on lands subsidiary to the Emmett mill. Under the circumstances, the company increasingly secured national forest timber through purchase or through the exchange of cutover land. [141] The exchanges began in 1935 and by 1950, six cutting blocks had been approved, largely on the Payette and the Boise. [142]

During the 1940's project logging by large companies increased in importance in southwestern Idaho, southwestern Wyoming, and northeastern Utah, but small operators continued to carry on most logging on the region's national forest lands. [143] Often these small mills lacked the expertise, equipment, and capital to produce high-grade products, so lumber dealers and customers were understandably prejudiced against native lumber. The inefficiency of these small operations contributed to the prejudice. "The output of most of the [small] mills . . . [was] poorly manufactured," particularly as to uniform thickness and end finish. Surfacing was poor, and lumber was often sold unseasoned. [144] Gordon Watts saw one small mill with a sign reading: "The Thick and Thin Lumber Company—Our Best is None Too Good." [145]

In addition, builders were often unfamiliar with species that have since proved to be excellent construction lumber. Favored species were western white pine (generally found in northern Idaho and virtually absent from Region 4) and ponderosa pine, which together constituted only about 38 percent of all timber in Idaho and a much smaller percentage in Utah and Nevada. Douglas-fir, which was actually stronger than ponderosa pine, was not popular and lumber yards were reluctant to handle it. [146]

Because of the prejudice against Douglas-fir, the Service virtually gave it away. At the large Hallack and Howard sale on the South Fork of the Payette River in the mid-1940's, for instance, it was sold at 50 cents per MFBM, and even after the war, as prices soared, sales at $1.00 per MFBM were not uncommon. [147] (See table 12.)

Table 12—Timber cut under regular and cost sales, Region 4, 1940-48

For the time being, Region 4 faced two contradictory goals. Even though the administration recognized the shortcomings of the small mills, particularly in developing a sustained-yield system, regional officials also understood their importance. The small mills helped to create stability in small towns, which Forest Service officials perceived as an important objective. At the same time, the administration wanted to create a good relationship with large companies like Boise-Payette because only these large operations were capable of cutting overmature and deteriorating stands. The two goals conflicted. In trying to resolve the conflict, the Service seemed reluctant, at least during World War II, to consider a large sustained-yield unit in southwestern Idaho and instead urged Boise-Payette to open small mills. [148]

Figure 62—Boise-Payette Lumber Company loading logs near New Meadows, ID, April 1942.

As might be expected, Boise-Payette, searching for economies of scale, sought opportunities for large-project sales on the Boise and Payette superforests—not places for small mills. [149] Of the 10 areas the Boise-Payette Lumber Company examined for potential large sales in 1943, the North Fork of the Boise River and the South Fork of the Salmon River seemed most promising. The North Fork seemed best, because of the relatively large stand of 240,000 MFBM and the relatively favorable trucking grades. Although the South Fork held the largest virgin timber stand in southwestern Idaho, the company was concerned because, though the trucking distance would not be excessive (30 to 80 miles), the hauling grades were adverse both to McCall and to Cascade, where their nearest mills were located.

Immediately after the war the region came under pressure to make more timber available to the Boise-Payette Company. In October 1946, Regional Forester Rice met with Harry Shellworth of Boise-Payette, who argued that the Service should build timber access roads and open the Middle Fork of the Weiser River as soon as possible. Rice indicated that they would probably not sell timber there, since he feared that if the area were opened to the company it would have to be on the basis of "having the company take off the cream," as they had in the 1930's, and he was dubious about such an arrangement. For Rice, the goal of achieving a sustained-yield operation by cutting the overmature timber was more important. [150]

Even with these problems the cut did increase, and by 1947, the region began making plans for stabilizing operations at a somewhat higher sustained-yield level. W.L. Robb, assistant regional forester for timber management, argued the need for stability. He thought that the region could "support a cut of around 200,000 MFBM to 210,000 MFBM annually." In order to achieve this, he said, it would be necessary to stabilize the cuts on forests such as the Boise, Payette, Dixie, and Uinta, which had tended to have relatively large but often fluctuating production. In addition, the cut on national forests such as the Ashley, Bridger, Teton, and Targhee that had relatively large commercial stands of lodgepole pine, would have to be increased. [151] (See tables 13 and 14.)

Table 13—Total timber cut in Region 4, 1939-45 (ranked by cut in 1943) (thousand board feet)

Table 14—Total timber cut and average lumber selling price for Region 4, 1946-48 (thousand board feet and organized in order of volume cut in 1948)

Robb recognized a number of obstacles in achieving these goals. First, companies like Boise-Payette and Hallack and Howard had built large mills at Emmett, Council, and Cascade to cut private timber and were pressing the region to allow them to cut national forest "timber at a faster rate than could be sustained." Some of these mills would undoubtedly have to close. Second, management plans on the national forests were out of date and had generally been drafted in anticipation of a much "larger cut than can be maintained." Third, the region would have to move aggressively to promote alternative timber uses. [152]

Immediately after the war, the Service ordered "over-cutting," cutting beyond the sustained-yield capacity, in order to facilitate reconversion from wartime to peace time. A report in late 1946 indicated overcutting on the Boise, Dixie and Uinta totaling about 10,200 MFBM for the year. [153] Competition for timber on some forests was quite vigorous, and some small local operators disliked the increasing tendency for lumbermen from some distance to move into what they perceived to be their territories. [154] The Washington Office made it abundantly clear, however, that there was no legal basis for any provision in timber sale contracts giving preference to local needs. [155]

Achieving the maximum possible sustained-yield cut seemed absolutely necessary to diminish loss by fire, insects, and disease. By the late 1930's, the supply of timber in all of Idaho was actually declining more rapidly than the estimated annual growth by 410,600 MFBM. Rice estimated that the annual average cut between 1935 and 1938 was 788,300 MFBM, while disease, insects and fire took an estimated 653,300 MFBM. Thus, the annual sawtimber drain was approximately 1,441,600 MFBM, whereas an estimated 1,031,000 MFBM grew each year. [156]

Only by cutting the old growth, the foresters reasoned, could they remove the deteriorating trees, reduce loss by fire, disease, and insects, and stabilize the resource at the level of the annual sustained-yield cut. Thus, regional officers worked closely with the timber industry to promote such uses as pulp plants, the harvesting of fence posts and power poles, the manufacture of excelsior, and the utilization of mill waste products. [157]

In achieving this goal of stepped-up cutting, Region 4 faced problems that regions with large widespread timber stands, such as Region 6, did not. Since the Region 4 stands were relatively small and most cutting was done by small local operators, the region tended to have a large number of small sales. In 1946, for instance, the region had more than 3,000 sales under contract. Under the circumstances, the region spent a great deal of time and money for sale administration, and the average cost per unit sale was higher than the Forest Service average. Rice estimated the cost per MFBM for administering an S-22 sale in Region 4 at $1.90, the Service allowed an administrative base of $0.40 per MFBM. This high cost made administration extremely difficult, especially right after the war, when the region did not have adequate funds to prepare sales to meet demands. [158]

Forest Improvement

A major goal in timber operations was the development of a more productive forest. In order to facilitate the rehabilitation of cutover forest areas, the Congress passed the Knutson-Vandenberg Act in 1930, which authorized the creation of a revolving fund for reforestation and timber stand improvement. Each sale included a charge to the operators for improvement ranging from $0.05 per MFBM to as much as $1.20 per MFBM depending on the time and the condition of the stand. [159] The region also collected additional money from operators for slash disposal and erosion control. [160] Timber purchases also were expected to make the necessary improvements on roads and stands or pay the Service to do it. [161]

Prior to 1944, Forest Service policy generally required piling and burning of virtually all slash. A modified policy issued in 1944 required that contractors pile and burn all slash along roads and 30 to 60 percent in other areas depending upon the terrain and silvicultural prescription. [162] During World War II, lumber companies had difficulty in securing labor to dispose of the slash. In 1943, the Boise-Payette Lumber Company tried unsuccessfully to get the Service to take over the work or alternatively to secure prisoner-of-war or Japanese-American internee labor to do it. [163] In general, slash disposal had been done by hand, but in 1943 the Service undertook some experiments on the Idaho, Payette, Boise, and Weiser in the use of horses, tractors, bulldozers, and loaders to speed up the work and do it more economically. Experimentation with a Caterpillar tractor showed that the work could be done for $0.30 per MFBM rather than the $1.00 previously paid for hand labor. [164]

Figure 63—Sawmill on Green River.

Improved Logging Technology

New technology seemed to bring the goal of achieving sustained-yield cuts closer. By 1944, the development of truck logging, for instance, brought "into the market timber that as recently as 12 or 15 years [ago]. . . was economically unmerchantable and seemed destined to remain so." [165]

During the 1940's, operators introduced other technological improvements to make their businesses more efficient. Perhaps the most important was the general introduction of tractor skidding to replace the single-horse skidding that small operators had generally used before. [166] Some operators also began experimenting with gasoline-driven power saws for felling trees. The power saws used in the early 1940's were relatively heavy (between 127 and 137 pounds) compared with the present-day chain saw, and they were not used for bucking. In an experiment in Wyoming it was found that a 4-man crew, consisting of 2 men with a power saw (perhaps a gasoline-powered chain saw), one doing undercutting, and the fourth assisting in clearing debris, could keep 30 men busy trimming and bucking. [167]

A few small mills began to introduce drying kilns as part of the lumber operation. Ward W. Blazzard was the first to introduce one in the Kamas area on the Wasatch. [168] Small milling operations also tended to shift from steam to internal-combustion engines. The Bartlett mill on the Ashley, for instance, used steam power until about 1940 when it converted to an old diesel engine. The operators used this engine through 1948 when they purchased a newer Caterpillar diesel engine. [169]

Figure 64—Brown Tie & Lumber Company unloading logs into Payette Lake at McCall, ID, April 1942.

Another innovation was the introduction of the Idaho jammer. This was a mixed blessing at best. The jammer consisted of a crane mechanism with skidding cables. The crane would operate from a series of parallel roads constructed horizontally around the mountains. From those roads, operators would use the crane to hurl the cables down and to snake the logs up the hillside.

During the 1940's, some forest officers became concerned about the potential for environmental damage from this type of skidding. Jim Jacobs, then head of timber staff on the Boise, feared that the loose granitic soil of the Idaho batholith could not stand such treatment. He reported that on a 56-million board foot sale on the Garden Valley Ranger District on the South Fork of the Payette River, there were some real problems with erosion during World War I. [170] In a 1948 report W.L. Robb said that the greatest environmental damage "has to do with the skidding and hauling of timber which has been cut" rather than cutting itself. Robb recognized, particularly, the excessive danger to the granitic soils of the Boise and Payette forests. Eventually, in order to mitigate such impacts, the region had slash or grass seed broadcast on the skid trails, and required cross-ditching or outsloping of logging roads. [171]

Timber Stand Improvement

The region continued to seek ways to improve timber stands. The Intermountain Station continued research and experimentation begun on the Boise Basin Experimental Forest in the 1930's. Various studies included stand improvements, factors of natural reproduction, and planting and seeding techniques. [172]

The region resumed tree planting. Previously, such efforts had proved largely unsuccessful. In his annual planting report in 1942, John N. Kinney reviewed a rather sorry picture. In the period from 1909 until 1917, the region had spent $128,000 for tree planting and $40,000 for direct seeding. The results of the direct seeding were "nil," and planting had produced only a 17-percent success rate. In 1917, the efforts were broken off until 1937, when planting was resumed. The region tried no direct seeding, but began planting seedlings furnished from the Tony Grove nursery. Some of these seedlings were transplanted in the McCall nursery for replanting in southwestern Idaho. The efforts during the 5 years between 1937 and 1942 were not particularly satisfactory; after 1942 the wartime economy required the closing of the nurseries. The region sold as much of the remaining stock as possible and plowed up the remainder.

Research had shown that May rainfall was critical to tree generation. In general, if the newly planted seedlings received 2 inches of rainfall in that month, they would survive; if not, they generally died. Unfortunately in the period from 1910 to 1941 the region had adequate May rainfall in only 6 years. [173]

In the virgin forest other forces removed and regenerated the trees. Insects, disease, and fire destroyed one crop, and fire prepared the seedbed for the new growth. "When man became the harvester, these old relationships were disturbed. The immediate effect [of man's intervention] was to greatly increase the occurrence and effect of fire." Man's attempts to regulate and harvest the crop of trees broke the chain in the natural cycle at crucial points. As a corollary, once the forester had placed his foot on the path of forest management, he could no longer rely upon the natural process. [174] Consequently, an important aspect of the attempt to manage forest lands was the protection of timber stands against fires, diseases, and insects.

Insect Control

The general policy of the Service, stated clearly in a memo in 1945, was to "suppress epidemic insect attacks where there appears to be a sound entomological basis to anticipate that the control measures will be successful." The application of this policy was limited by the availability of funds. [175]

In Region 4, the major problem continued to be various pine beetles. In general, policy dictated that when the beetles attacked a particular stand, foresters tried to eradicate them in the entire area infested. By 1941, the region had become convinced that spraying with oil and burning the live tree was not effective, and it had adopted felling and decking, then burning or spraying with orthodichlorobenzene. [176]

Epidemics ran in cycles. Reports in 1942 indicate that the situation was worst in the lodgepole and ponderosa pine, particularly on the Wasatch, Ashley, Powell, and Dixie. In 1945 the Caribou, Targhee, and Teton seemed most infested. [177] Treatment was expensive, ranging as high as $5.00 per tree in 1942, but was done to the extent of the money available. [178] (See table 15.)

Table 15—Number of trees treated for insect infestations, Region 4, 1940-48

The 1945 infestation on the Caribou led entomologist James G. Evenden of Coeur d'Alene and others to wonder whether the Service ought not consider the relative value of the stand and the potential for insect infestation of other more valuable trees as compared with the cost of treatment. Since the Caribou infestation was widespread and the stand was of marginal value, both the Washington Office and the regional administration began to question whether conditions warranted expensive treatment. Some 40,000 trees were affected, and the region had not undertaken an adequate survey before beginning control measures. The Caribou tried some salvage sales but, because of the wartime scarcity of labor, the operator cut fewer trees than expected. [179] Most important, Congress had been appropriating only $100,000 annually for Forest Service treatment of insect infestations, and more than that would have been required to treat the infected trees on the Caribou alone. [180]

By the late 1940's, Evenden's reservations were largely forgotten as Congress began appropriating substantially more money for insect treatment. In 1947, Public Law 104 recognized the Federal concern and responsibility for control of insects and diseases and paved the way for increased efforts at detection and suppression. [181] In 1948, the region received $490,000 to treat an estimated 95,000 trees on the Teton, Targhee, Caribou, and Bridger; officials anticipated a large appropriation in 1949 for followup work and for treatment on the Wasatch, Ashley, and Payette. [182]

Fire Control

As before, wildfire constituted the other major hazard to forest management. During World War II, the call to arms and the elimination of the CCC significantly reduced fire control forces. Getting a fire crew together became a major undertaking. In some cases a Forest Service employee would drive through the streets of town with a bullhorn recruiting firefighters. Crews were often composed largely of relatively able Mexican nationals together with older men, young boys, and bar habitues. [183] The Office of Civilian Defense helped somewhat by establishing a volunteer force of noncombatants and the Civil Air Patrol assisted in spotting. The regional office provided a list of available personnel and equipment in Ogden, at various national forests, and in military installations in Region 4. Regional Forester Rice said he expected "a free exchange of forces between forests" and unstinting "help to your neighbor." [184] Preseason arrangements were made with housewives, ranchers, and others to assist in detection and reporting. [185]

Figure 65—Contractors at work with Caterpillar tractor on the Ball's Canyon Fire, 1949.

The National Advertising Council, state foresters, and others assisted in carrying on a campaign against fires. [186] The ad council originated the Smokey Bear idea in 1944 and issued the first poster in 1945. In 1947, the council added the slogan "Remember, Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires." [187]

Clearly the situation was not ideal. Ranger Basil Crane found himself on a fire on the Toiyabe with a crew of men picked up on the streets of Reno and 25 convicts from Folsom Prison. Trees began burning like giant torches in the intense fire; the Reno crew proved so incompetent that Crane fired all of them.

Wartime labor shortages sped up the utilization of smokejumpers, since foresters believed that if fighters could reach the fire quickly fewer men would be needed. In 1943 a five-man squad trained at Missoula, MT, was sent to McCall, ID, for duty on the Payette. Dropping from a Curtis Travelaire owned by Johnson Flying Service, John Ferguson and Lester Gohler made the first jumps for the unit on August 14, 1943. The Forest Service moved CCC buildings to McCall for the jumping operations. By 1947 the unit consisted of 50 men, and training facilities were established at McCall. In 1948, the region established a 10-man unit, under James "Smokey" Stover, in Idaho City. [188] At first, they used a single-engine Noordyne to transport the jumpers to fires. Later, the Service used Ford Trimotors because their high-lift airfoil enabled these planes to fly at low speeds and their strong landing gear allowed the use of rough backcountry airstrips. [189]

Labor shortages also necessitated the increased use of mechanical equipment in firefighting. Bulldozers became standard equipment as the Service tried to find quicker and more effective ways to dig firelines and move fuel away from the lines. [190]

Figure 66—Smokejumpers preparing to jump on a fire.

In late World War II and afterward, the Service began experimenting with other types of mechanical equipment in fire suppression. In 1945 the Wasatch tested a high-pressure water tank and pump mounted on a crawler tractor, which it found somewhat effective on grass and brush fires. [191] From 1947 through 1949, the Service experimented with such equipment as helicopters, improved radios, aerial-delivered fire retardants, power saws, mechanized trail builders, tank trucks, and wetting agents all of which were used operationally in later years. [192]

In 1945, Congress approved an amendment to the Clarke-McNary Act which authorized increased appropriations for cooperative protection on State and private land. In 1947 the Forest Service made an agreement with the Fibreboard Products Company for protection of private lands near the Toiyabe National Forest. [193]

During the war, the Service employed as firefighters some Mexican nationals who were working in the United States as agricultural laborers. In one case a crew of 20 Mexican nationals worked on slash disposal for the Halleck and Howard Company on the South Fork of the Payette River when they were not needed as fire fighters. [194] Following the war, the Service continued the use of Mexicans under arrangements made with their private employers and the Mexican Government. [195]

Seasonal employees fought fires as well. Students hired as trail construction and maintenance crews and maintenance workers understood that they were on call to fight fires. Lookouts were expected to survey the country for 20 minutes each daylight hour. [196]

Recreational Development

Increasingly, the national forests of Region 4 became less and less the preserve of the logger and stockman as many people sought recreation away from the towns and cities in which they lived. [197] While visits to the forests declined during the war, afterward they surpassed pre-war levels. [198]

There is perhaps no better evidence of the growing importance of recreation designed for urbanites than the development of winter sports areas. The expansion of skiing in Region 4 is most closely associated with the work of Felix C. Koziol. Koziol had been an avid skier since the opening of the first chair lifts in the United States at Sun Valley, ID, in 1936. At Sun Valley, Koziol came to know Averill Harriman, who had financed the resort. The financier invited the forester to work with some of his people. His company planned to expand its operations from the private land on which they were currently situated to the adjacent Sawtooth National Forest. Regional Forester R.H. Rutledge approved the proposal, and afterward he assigned Koziol as "sort of a winter sports specialist to look over and examine prospective . . . areas throughout the region." Alf Engen, an expert skier who was then working as a specialist in the CCC camps, was assigned as a collaborator. The two of them investigated and pioneered resorts such as Bogus Basin, McCall, and Magic Valley in Idaho, Snow Basin in Utah, and Jackson Hole in Wyoming. [199]

In the late 1930's, the regional office promoted the development of winter sports in other areas as well. Alf Engen went to explore eastern Idaho for possible locations, and a group of Idaho Falls skiers led by Charles Blazius and Targhee personnel together with James Jacobs made several trips to look over locations on the Targhee and Caribou. They selected the Bear Gulch areas on the Targhee, and a tow was installed. In 1940, Engen conducted a ski school for forest officers, and more than 20, from as far away as the Minidoka, attended. [200]

Figure 67—Orvil Winkler, Averill Harriman, and companion on Bald Mountain, Sun Valley.

The Alta development, by contrast, had its origin in a venture of George H. Watson and other businessmen. They cooperated with Wasatch Supervisor James E. Gurr in consolidating mining claims under forest jurisdiction and in securing a special use permit for the development of a lift in 1938 and 1939. [201]

After his appointment as supervisor on the Wasatch, Koziol supported the development of sophisticated means of studying avalanche conditions near Alta. Familiar with work done in Switzerland and other places in Europe, Koziol organized the Alta avalanche studies, which resulted by the late 1950's in the publication of a Forest Service avalanche handbook. [202] During the late 1930's and early 1940's, snow rangers had used hand-placed explosive charges to precipitate potential avalanches. Koziol worked out an agreement with the Army to use 75-mm pack howitzers and 75- and 105-mm recoilless rifles for shooting down avalanches, following the European model. [203]

Other important developments in the field of recreation took place during this period. The Humboldt National Forest, which surrounds much of the Lehman Cave National Monument, provided much of the scenic attraction in the area. Consequently, cooperation between the Forest Service and National Park Service was of prime importance. [204] In 1942, the Forest Service acquired more than 9,000 acres of land near Lake Tahoe, which it developed as Nevada Beach. [205] After World War II, white water float trips on the Middle Fork of the Salmon became increasingly important. [206]

Public use of recreational facilities increased a great deal after World War II. Campgrounds in some forests, particularly those near the Wasatch Front urban areas on the Uinta and Wasatch National Forests, came under exceptionally great pressure. [207] Unfortunately, funds were generally not available for new facilities during the 1940's. Most facilities had been constructed by the CCC during the 1930's. [208]

Engineering

Closely associated both with the development of recreational, logging, and other facilities the regional engineering division managed a holding operation during World War II and expanded greatly afterward. During the war when Henry M. Shank became regional engineer, he and his staff managed to keep two crews busy in constructing timber and mineral access roads. One of the roads led to a mine in the old Payette National Forest at Stibnite, ID, which produced 60 percent of the world's supply of tungsten. Shank found it extremely difficult to keep 100 miles of mountain road open in winter with 7 feet of snow and temperatures as low as 60 degrees below zero. [209]

Following the war, Shank and Ernie DeSilva were assigned to make a 2-year study of the national forest trail system, and Arval Anderson, who had previously served as regional engineer, returned from the military to that position. [210] The Forest Service building at 25th and Adams in Ogden was not large enough to hold the expanded staff, and Anderson moved his 90 engineering people to the Eccles Building on the corner of 24th Street and Washington Boulevard. Occupying nearly a floor of the building, they expanded their operations to include such techniques as photogrammetry and stereoplanigraphy. [211]

Late in the war, in anticipation of the need for post war economic development, the regional administration began to press for further funds for roads. In late 1944, Ben Rice and Chet Olsen began working, particularly with Congressman J. Will Robinson, to get such funding, arguing that new roads would promote economic development. [212]

After the war, anticipating increased timber cutting, the region constructed a number of new roads. In 1944, when the old Payette and Boise were consolidated, George Kreizenbeck was transferred to the Boise as forest engineer, the first in the Forest Service. [213] Prior to the war, roads had been constructed to such a low standard that they could not accommodate the heavy trucks removing timber from the forest. Thus, after the war, the Boise undertook a major construction program. [214]

Summary

By 1949, conditions in Region 4 had changed considerably. A progressive attitude seemed to pervade the Intermountain Region, the Forest Service, and, indeed, the United States as a whole. The introduction of mechanization into firefighting and logging and especially the introduction of truck logging had created the potential for much more extensive operations, as the demand for forest products increased during the 1950's. The increased appropriations for firefighting and insect control seemed to promise eventual successful management of the timber resources. The defeat of the effort to transfer control of the public lands to stockmen indicated more than anything the strength of the increasing diversity of public opinion as urbanites, conservationists, recreationists, and sportsmen significantly influenced resource decisions. The public was beginning to accept the need to control wildlife populations, in the interest of maintaining other resource values. The effects of these changes in attitude were to be increasingly apparent during the 1950's.

Figure 68—A just-completed fire trail.

Reference Notes

1. Forest Service Report, 1943, p. 19.

2. Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 247. For a general treatment see: Christopher M. Granger, "The National Forests at War," American Forests (1943): 112-15, 138.

3. Elizabeth M. Smith, History of the Boise National Forest 1905-1976 (Boise: Idaho State Historical Society, 1983, pp. 50-51.

4. "A Brief History of Civilian Public Service Camp #37," File: History of Toiyabe National Forest, Appendix Vol 5, Toiyabe.

5. Smith, Boise, pp. 120-2 l.

6. Howard Ahlskog interview by Elizabeth Smith, October 1974, pp. 20-21, Historical Files, Boise.

7. J.W. Mattson to Forest Supervisors & Regional Office Divisions, September 17, 1942, File: O- Supervision, General, 1943, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

8. John N. Kinney to RO Personnel, December 11, 1942, and Kinney to idem., December 16, 1942, File: O- Supervision, General, 1943, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

9. John N. Kinney to Forest Officers, July 10, 1944, File: O- Supervision, General, 1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

10. John N. Kinney to Forest Officers, November 7, 1944, File: O- Supervision, General, 1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

11. Forest Service Report, 1944, pp. 3-4; "Toiyabe Work Program Notes," August 16, 1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

12. For a discussion of the bureaucratic form of organization from a theoretical point of view see: Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology trans. ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 196-244.

13. Lyle F. Watts to Regional Foresters, March 15, 1948, File: O- Organization, General, 1948-1949, Historical Files, Regional Office. The salary for P-4 ranged from $4,902 to $5,905 in 1948, The other salaries were not given.

14. Earl Loveridge to Regional Foresters, June 30, 1949, File: O- Organization, General, 1948-1949, Historical Files, Regional Office.

15. Richard E. McArdle to Regional Foresters, March 22, 1949, File: O- Organization, General, 1948-1949, Historical Files, Regional Office.

16. Don C. Braegger interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 2-6, Historical Files, Regional Office.

17. Kenneth O. Maughan, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 54-55, Historical Files, Regional Office. In commenting on an early draft of this manuscript, Gordon Watts indicated that few rangers had two stenographers; many didn't even have one.

18. Rice to Chief, December 9, 1946, File: O- Organization- Procurement Division Warehouses, 1945-1946, Historical Files, Regional Office.

19. John N. Kinney to Regional Office Divisions and Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, September 26, 1947, File: O- Supervision, General, 1947, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

20. John N. Kinney to Operation, Washington Office, December 21, 1948, File: O- Supervision, General, 1948, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

21. Ivan Sack, interview by Mary Ellen Glass, November 1974-March 1975, p. 104, Special Collections, University of Nevada-Reno Library. Sack erroneously dates the death in December 1949. It was actually January 13, 1950, on a train returning from Weiser, Idaho. Salt Lake Tribune, January 15, 1950.

22. Memorandum for Regional Forester, May 1, 1941, and Executive Order 1962 (1942), File: LP- Boundaries- Cache, General, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, Historical Files, Regional Office.

23. Lyle F. Watts to Regional Foresters, Directors, and W.O. Divisions, December 22, 1943, File: O- Organization, General, 1941-1947, Historical Files, Regional Office.

24. Charles DeMoisy to Weiser Forest Supervisor, January 9, 1943, File: G- Management Reports: Payette (Weiser), 1934-1944, Pierson Collection, Payette.

25. "Notes taken at a special meeting held July 29 [1944?] in the Panguitch North Ward L.D.S Chapel," File: Powell National Forest: General Information, Historical Files, Dixie.

26. "Notes taken at a special meeting held July 29 in the Panguitch North Ward L.D.S, Chapel."

27. Albert Albertson to Files, October 21, 1944, File: Powell National Forest General Information, Historical Files, Dixie.

28. Forest Service Report, 1944, p. 12; Statement of George E. Kreizenbeck, December 1975, MS, Historical Files, Boise, p. 19.

29. J.W. Farrell to Regional Forester, May 1, 1946, John T. Mathews to Regional Forester, May 13, 1946, File: O- Organization, General, 1941-1947, Historical Files, Regional Office Records.

30. Sack interview, p. 98.

31. Charles S. Peterson, Look to the Mountains: Southeastern Utah and the LaSal National Forest (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1974), pp. 240-42, W.B. Rice to Chief, April 2, 1946, File: O- Organization, Manti-LaSal Consolidation, Manti-LaSal.

32. George P. Annand to W.T. Holcomb, May 8, 1948, File: LP- Boundaries, Toiyabe- Boundary Extension (Correspondence) 1948-1951, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

33. A.G. Nord to Chief, Forest Service, August 27, 1948, File: LP- Boundaries, Toiyabe, Boundary Extension (Correspondence), 1948-1951, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

34. Howard Hopkins to The Record, February 8, 1949; Ted H. Baker to C.E. Favre, October 28, 1948; A.E. Holgate to George W. Malone, March 4, 1949; Howard Hopkins to George W. Malone, June 6, 1949; Howard Hopkins to The Record, June 6, 1949; Hopkins to The Record, August 24, 1949; File: LP- Boundaries- Toiyabe, Boundary Extension (Correspondence) 1948-1971, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC. 64 Statutes at Large 230 (June 6, 1950).

35. Carl B. Shelly to Patrick McCarran, January 16, 1950, File: LP- Boundaries, Toiyabe, Boundary Extension (Correspondence), 1948-1951, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

36. Gilbert B. Doll to John W. Torvinsen, October 18, 1949, File: Regional Office, 1925, Historical Records, Toiyabe.

37. Forest Service Report, 1947, p. 12.

38. Walter P. Cottam, Is Utah Sahara Bound? (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Extension Division, 1947).

39. Julian Heppler to Bernard DeVoto, December 23, 1947, File: 1680 History, Soil and Water Management (2500), Historical Files, Regional Office.

40. William D. Hurst, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 19-21, Historical Files, Regional Office. See also Robert Stewart's testimony in House Committee on Public Lands, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Public Lands House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session, Pursuant to H. Res 93, Committee Hearing 24 (Washington: GPO, 1948), pp. 188-90.

41. Forest Service Report, 1947, p. 12.

42. Hurst interview, pp. 19-21.

43. Wallace Stegner, The Uneasy Chair: A Biography of Bernard DeVoto (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 308.

44. Hurst interview; Maughan interview, pp. 52-53.

45. Forest Service Report, 1948, p. 28; Smith, Boise, p. 74; Maughan interview, pp. 52-53.

46. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, Hearings . . . Pursuant to S. Res. 241 76th Congress: A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys to Make a Full and Complete Investigation with Respect to the Administration and Use of Public Lands [Title Varies] 20 parts (Washington: GPO, 1941-46)1:1, It should be noted that the pagination through the various parts is continuous.

47. See Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, parts 1 through 13.

48. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 1:204-20; 3:943-46, 1032-37, 1046-47, 1073-91, 1102, 1104-05, 1110-11; 4:1451; 5:1924; 8:2505-13, 2543-54.

49. Ibid., 5:1923-26.

50. W.L. Dutton to Lyle F. Watts, June 6, 1945, File: D- Cooperation, Public Lands Committee, 1941-1947, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. See the other correspondence in this file as well for the preparations for the meeting. See also C.E. Rachford to W.B. Rice, October 20, 1941, ibid. It should be noted that Dutton's contemporary perception of the hearings is much different than the perception indicated by William Voigt who thought that Dutton "took the brunt of complaint from industry spokesmen." William Voigt, Jr., Public Grazing Lands: Use and Misuse by Industry and Government (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 79. In the letter to Watts, cited above, Dutton said: "The Senate Committee was at least neutral on most of the questions—definitely sympathetic with the efforts of the Forest Service to rehabilitate the range through reseeding . . . . To me the most outstanding feature of the Salt Lake hearing was the strong and straight forward position assumed by the Regional Forester and his assistants on the question of range adjustments, not only in Utah but for the Region as a whole. It was extremely encouraging."

51. Lyle F. Watts to Regional Foresters and Directors, August 20, 1947, and William B. Rice to Forest Supervisors, November 20, 1946, File: D- Supervision, General, 1946-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; and Mark Anderson to A.V. Watkins, January 14, 1947, File: 1658, Historical Data, 6, Watershed and Multiple Use Management, Uinta.

52. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 14:4004-9.

53. Ibid., 14:4610-22; 19:5685.

54. Based on comments of William Hurst on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

55. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 14:46 10-15.

56. Ibid., 14:4641-65.

57. Ibid., 19:5680-81.

58. William B. Rice to Lyle F. Watts, August 17, 1945, File: D- Supervision, General, 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

59. Cf. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 14:4646- with 19: 5803, 5714, 5716, 5718.

60. Ibid., 20:5920.

61. Voigt, Public Grazing Lands, pp. 91-93.

62. House Committee on Public Lands, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session, Pursuant to H. Res. 93 Committee Hearing No. 22 (Washington: GPO, 1948), p. 31, (Hereinafter cited as Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, Hearing Number: page(s).)

63. W.B. Rice, "Excerpts from W.B. Rice's talk at the 1946 annual meeting of the Idaho Cattlemen's Association," File: D- Cooperation, Public Lands Committee, 1941-1947, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

64. The following discussion is based on Subcommittee on Public Lands 1947, Hearings 10, 12, 21-24, 28, and 30.

65. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 22:22-26, 32-34.

66. Stegner, Biography of Bernard DeVoto, pp. 297, 301-4.

67. For the attitude of support on the part of ranchers see comments of Vernon Metcalf in C.E. Favre, "Memorandum of Meeting Held in Reno, Nevada, with representative Nevada Stockmen, August 11, 1945," File: D- Supervision, General, 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

68. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 30:10-11, 19.

69. Ibid., p. 9.

70. Ibid., p. 3. See also C.N. Woods confidential memo of March 30, 1943, File: D- Cooperation, Public Lands Committee, 1941-1947, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

71. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 33.

72. Voigt, Western Grazing Lands, chapters 10 through 14. The Dutton charge is made on pp. 109-10, See William Hurst to William Voigt, Jr., March 7, 1977, personal papers of William Hurst, in addition to material in this and preceding chapters for a refutation of Voigt's charges.

73. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 24:116-30, and passim. See Table 6-2.

74. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 22:147-73.

75. Ibid., pp. 192-98, 201-7.

76. W.B. Rice, Confidential memo to Forest Supervisors, February 11, 1947, and A.E. Briggs to Regional Forester, February 19, 1947, File: D- Supervision, General, Minidoka National Forest, Sawtooth.

77. File: Data Compiled for House Public Lands Committee, 1947, Regional Office Records, RF 95, Denver FRC.

78. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 24:passim.

79. Ibid., 30:1, 3.

80. Ibid., pp. 4-19.

81. Ibid., 30:45, 51.

82. Ibid., p. 42.

83. Edward Maw, untitled talk in the session, "Does History Repeat Itself?" presented at the Region 4 Ranger's Conference, March 17, 1986, Boise, Idaho.

84. Forest Service Report, 1948, p. 27.

85. W. B. Rice to E. P. Cliff, May 23, 1949, File: D- Supervision, General, 1946-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

86. James L. Jacobs, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, p. 17, Historical Files, Regional Office.

87. Jacobs interview, pp. 8-9.

88. Irwin H. (Hap) Johnson, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, p. 1, in the author's possession; Jacobs interview, p. 29.

89. Hurst interview, p. 7.

90. W.B. Rice to Forest Supervisors, April 18, 1949, loose papers, Historical Files, Regional Office.

91. Forest Service Report, 1945, p. 22.

92. Division of Range Management and Wildlife, Region Four, Book of Grazing Facts: Results and Conclusions from Research and Administrative Studies (San Francisco: Forest Service, 1945).

93. Forest Service Report, 1945, p. 22.

94. "Report on Progress in Range Reseeding, Region 4, U.S. Forest Service, " File: RG Grazing Research- General, Caribou, 1942, Caribou.

95. Forest Service Report, 1948, p. 13.

96. Ibid.

97. Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 24:27.

98. "Reseeding and Improvements," File: D- Cooperation, Public Lands Committee, 1941-1947

99. Range Improvement Handbook, 1948 ([Ogden, Utah]: Intermountain Region USDA Forest Service, 1948).

100. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Ruby Valley Reseeding Project Between Earl Wright and U.S. Forest Service, July 5 and July 12, 1944; John M. Fenley Office Memorandum, March 27, 1950, File: 2240, Improvements, Humboldt, Ruby Valley, Grazing Records, Humboldt.

101. Voigt, Public Grazing Lands, p. 140.

102. Annual Grazing Report, Caribou National Forest, 1949, File: G- Management Reports, 1943-1949, Caribou National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

103. S. Edwin Cazier, The Last Saddle Horse Ranger (Logan, Utah: Educational Printing Service, 1971), pp. 78-79; Comments of William D. Hurst on an early version of the manuscript.

104. W.B. Rice to Boise, November 17, 1949, File: General Functional Inspections Prior to 1955 (Grazing) Boise National Forest, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

105. W.B. Rice to Forest Supervisors, April 25, 1947, and file of examples from supervisors, most dated in February 1947, File: D- Supervision, General, 1946-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

106. Oliver Cliff to Merle Varner, April 10, 1943, File: G- Cooperation, St. John Forest Users Association, 1942, Caribou National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

107. Carl Haycock, interview by Marie Loosle, March 1974, pp. 25-27, 37-38, Historical Files, Fishlake.

108. Jacobs interview, pp. 47-48. One rancher told me he was the only Fishlake permittee to attend a former Supervisor's funeral. The others, he said, refused to attend because they disliked him so much.

109. See Voigt, Public Grazing Lands, chapters 13 and 14.

110. Jacobs interview, pp. 43-44; and comment of Jacobs on draft of the manuscript.

111. Jacobs comment on draft of the manuscript.

112. Jacobs comment on draft of the manuscript.

113. Jacobs interview, pp. 50-51.

114. Minidoka National Forest, Annual Grazing Report, December 17, 1947, File: G- Management Report, Sawtooth, 1942-1952, Grazing Records from Seattle FRC, Sawtooth.

115. Jacobs comment on draft of the manuscript.

116. Annual Grazing Report, Narrative Section, Dixie National Forest, 1947, File: Range, Historical Files, Dixie.

117. Sack interview, pp. 102-3.

118. J.G. Kooch to Regional Forester, December 15, 1948, File: 1680, Forest Service History, Salmon National Forest, Historical Data, 1938-1948, Salmon.

119. Hurst interview, p. 16; Annual Narrative Report, Ashley National Forest, 1948, File: G- Management, Reports Ashley, CY 1945-1948, Ashley.

120. Edward P. Cliff, Inspection, Humboldt, June 21-25, 1948, File: G- Inspection, Humboldt, 1948-1959, Grazing Records, Humboldt.

121. Scipio Ranger District Management Plan, Fishlake National Forest, 1945, Historical Files, Fishlake.

122. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 3:943.

123. C.N. Woods to Utah Forest Supervisors, May 6, 1942, File: Grazing, Historical Files, Dixie.

124. See testimony of Orange Olsen, Senate Committee on Public Land. and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 3:1033-34; 8:2505-10, 2545-48. C.N. Woods, "The Big Game Board," February 8, 1945, File: D- Supervision, General, 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, Denver FRC.

125. Haycock interview, pp. 25-27.

126. Hurst interview, pp. 13-14.

127. Ibid., p. 11.

128. Maughan interview, p. 51.

129. Woods, "The Big Game Board,"

130. Forest Service Report, 1948, p. 31; 1949, p. 51.

131. "To Hell with Tomorrow: A Review of Reports of the Barrett Committee Livestock Hearings," May 24, 1948, File: 1380, Reports, Valuable Records, 1917 through 1950, Uinta.

132. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Administration and Use of Public Lands, 3:1045; Subcommittee on Public Lands, 1947, 22:67-69, 24:56.

133. Sack interview, p. 104: H.H. (Rip) Van Winkle, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 2-3, Historical Files Regional Office.

134. For a general discussion of the elk situation see Orange A. Olsen, Elk Below (n.p.: Stevens and Wallis, 1945). W.L. Robb to Carl Jorgensen, October 7, 1948, File: 1650, Historical Library, Historical Items (General) Bridger, 1948-1970, Bridger-Teton.

135. Charles I. Daugherty to Regional Forester December 29, 1947, File: W- Management, Annual Reports, Targhee, 1947, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. 1942 Wildlife Report for Weiser National Forest, File: W- Management, Reports 1942, Idaho, Payette National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

136. Basil K. Crane, Dust from an Alkali Flat (Reno, Nevada: Toiyabe National Forest, 1981), pp. 107-11.

137. Hurst interview, pp. 16-18.

138. W.L. Robb to James D. Curtis, April 18, 1949, File: S- Supervision, General, 1947-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

139. Clark Miles to Timber Management, April 20, 1944, File: S- Supervision, General, 1943-1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

140. W.B. Rice to Lyle F. Watts, June 23, 1944, File: S- Sales, General, 1941-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

141. Ibid.

142. W.L. Robb to C.J. Olsen, October 31, 1950, File: S- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

143. See Tables 11, 12, and 13. The large project sales in 1943 were Brown's Tie and Lumber on the Idaho, Boise-Payette on the Boise and Weiser, Hallack & Howard on the Payette, Standard Timber on the Bridger, and Great Lakes Timber on the Wasatch, Clark Miles to Timber Management, April 20, 1944, File: S- Supervision, General, 1943-1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

144. W.L. Robb to Forest Officers, March 18, 1942, File: S- Supervision, General, 1938-1942, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

145. Gordon Watts in a comment on an early version of this manuscript.

146. W.L. Robb to Forest Officers, March 18, 1942, File: S- Supervision, General, 1938-1942, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

147. Jacobs interview, pp. 27, 44.

148. W.B. Rice to Lyle F. Watts, June 23, 1944, File: S- Sales, General, 1941-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

149. The following discussion is based on Gordon MacGregor (Boise-Payette), Memorandum on Possible Future Timber Resources on National Forest Lands, October 23, 1943, File: S- Supervision, General, 1943-1944, Regional Office Records, Denver FRC.

150. W.B. Rice to Timber Management and Engineering, October 17, 1946, File: S- Supervision, General, 1945-1946, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

151. W.L. Robb to Regional Forester, July 16, 1948, File: S- Supervision, General, 1947-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

152. W.L. Robb to Regional Forester, July 17, 1948, File: S- Supervision, General, 1947-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

153. W.B. Rice to Chief, September 12, 1946, File S- Sales- General, 1946, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

154. See L.F. Kneipp to J. Wilford Roe, July 11, 1946, and attached file, File: S- Sales- General, 1946, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

155. C.M. Granger to Regional Forester, May 6, 1946, File: S- Sales General, 1946, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

156. W.B. Rice to D.S. Jeffers, September 14, 1944, File: D- Supervision, General 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

157. W.B. Rice to D.S. Jeffers, September 14, 1944, File: D- Supervision, General 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

158. Ibid.

159. W.B. Rice to Timber Management, January 29, 1943, File: S- Sales- Disposal, 1930-1944; and list of sales on various forests, undated, in File: S- Sales- General, 1946; Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

160. See general statement of policy in W.L. Robb to Operation, May 20, 1947, File: S- Supervision, General, 1947-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

161. Maughan interview, p. 29.

162. J.W. Farrell to Regional Forester, October 30, 1943, File S- Sales, Disposal, 1930-1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; W.B. Rice to Forest Supervisors, June 19, 1944, ibid.

163. W.L. Robb to Files, August 11, 1943, File: S- Sales/Disposal, 1930-1944, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

164. Floyd W. Godden to Regional Forester, October 26, 1943, File: S- Sales, Disposal, 1930-1944, Regional Office Records, RG, Denver FRC.

165. W.B. Rice to Lyle F. Watts, June 23, 1944, File S- Sales, General, 1941-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

166. Maughan interview, p. 27.

167. Allen S. Peck to Regional Forester, October 12, 1942, File: S- Sales, General, 1941-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

168. Maughan interview, p. 30.

169. Floyd Bartlett, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, pp. 2-3, in the author's possession.

170. Jacobs interview, pp. 26, 46-47.

171. W.L. Robb to W.L. Hansen, March 12, 1948, File: S- General, 1947-1948, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

172. Reed W. Bailey to Dear Sir, March 15, 1942, File: Range Studies, Caribou, 1942, Caribou.

173. John N. Kinney to Chief, March 5, 1942, File: S- Planting, Annual Reports, 1933-1942, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. The closing down of planting was required Service-wide because of the wartime effort, Forest Service Report, 1942, p. 19.

174. A.A. Brown, "Fire Control in Resource Management," File: O- Organization- General, 1941-1947, Historical Files, Regional Office.

175. Ira J. Mason to Regional Forester, October 24, 1945, File: S- Control, Insect, General, 1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

176. W.B. Rice to Chief, March 9, 1942, File: S- Control- Insect, General, 1941-1942, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

177. James C. Evenden to Regional Forester, November 28, 1945, File: S- Control, Insect, Teton, 1940-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; and J.G. Kooch to Regional Forester December 5, 1945, File: S- Control, Insect, Targhee, 1930-1945, ibid. James C. Evenden to Regional Forester, September 21, 1945, File: S- Control- Insect- General, 1945, ibid.

178. Albert Albertson to Regional Forester, November 2, 1942, File: S- Control- Insect- Dixie, 1937-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

179. Ira J. Mason to Regional Forester, October 24, 1945, File: S- Control, Insect, General, 1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. Some question also arose about the treatment of white fir infested with needle miner on the Dixie, because the tree was not important commercially. Clark Miles to Timber Management, June 23, 1945, File: S- Control- Insect, Dixie, 1937-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

180. H.M. Shank to James C. Evenden, October 29, 1945, and Evenden to Regional Forester, November 13, 1945, File: S- Control, Insect, General, 1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

181. Forest Service Report, 1947, p. 21.

182. W.L. Robb to Regional Forester, July 16, 1948, File: S- Supervision, General, 1947-1949, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

183. Smith, Boise, p. 120.

184. W.B. Rice to Forest Officers, July 12, 1945, File: F- Plans, Presuppression, Forest Plans, Caribou.

185. Charles S. Peterson and Linda E. Speth, "A History of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest," (MS, Report for the Wasatch-Cache National Forest, 1980), p. 154-55.

186. Forest Service Report, 1942, p. 13.

187. Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 176.

188. "R-4—McCall, Idaho City and Boise," File: 1680- History of McCall Smoke Jumpers," Payette.

189. Smith, Boise, p. 120.

190. Charles A. Enlow, interview by Elizabeth Smith, September 1975, pp. 9-10, Historical Files, Boise; Crane, Dust from an Alkali Flat, p. 93.

191. J.W. West to Regional Forester, October 10, 1945, File: F- Control Equipment, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

192. Forest Service Report, 1947, pp. 33-34; 1948, p. 32; 1949, p. 54.

193. "Cooperative Agreement" August and September 1947, File: F-1-70, Fire Cooperation 1- Agreements, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

194. Information supplied by James Jacobs in his review of a draft of this manuscript.

195. Lyle F. Watts to Region 4, June 30, 1948, File: O— Supervision, General, 1948, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

196. Jean K. Beatty, Lookout Wife (New York: Random House, 1953), pp. 126-29.

197. On this trend see Lincoln Ellison, "Trends of Forest Recreation in the United States," Journal of Forestry 40 (1942): 630-38.

198. Forest Service Report, 1945, pp. 24-25.

199. F.C. Koziol, interview by A.R. Standing, May 1965, p. 5, Historical Files, Regional Office. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," p. 268, On the development of Bogus Basin see F.C. Koziol, Memorandum for the Files, April 22, 1938, File: U- Recreation, Boise Winter Sports, General, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; idem. Memorandum for Mr. Rutledge, April 11, 1938, ibid.; W.L. Hansen to Regional Forester, January 6, 1942, ibid; A.L. Moats to Regional Forester, September 6, 1941, ibid.; A.G. Nord to Regional Forester, September 24, 1945, ibid.; Smith, Boise, pp. 106-8.

200. Information supplied by James Jacobs in a review of the manuscript.

201. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," p. 268.

202. Koziol interview, pp. 12-14.

203. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," p. 270, Forest Service Report, 1949, p. 49.

204. See particularly the correspondence in File: L- Acquisition- Donation, Nevada- Lehman Caves (White Pine, Cty), Humboldt National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

205. Nevada State Journal, March 5, 1942, File: Press Clippings, Historical Files, Toiyabe.

206. Smith, Boise, p. 106.

207. Maughan interview, p. 39; Sack interview, p. 103.

208. Forest Service Report, 1948, p. 13.

209. Henry M. Shank, "Forty-Six Years Ago, and Later," in Engineering in the Forest Service: A of History and Memoirs, 1905-1969 (n.p., n.d.), p. 11-8.

210. Shank, "Forty-Six Years Ago," p. 11-9; Arval Anderson, interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1985, Historical Files, Regional Office.

211. Arval Anderson interview.

212. W.B. Rice to C.M. Granger, November 4, 1944, File: D- Supervision- General, 1943-1945, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

213. Kreizenbeck statement, p. 21.

214. Smith, Boise, p. 131.