The Rise of Multiple-Use Management in the Intermountain West: A History of Region 4 of the Forest Service

Between 1950 and 1959, the administration in Region 4 built upon the patterns established earlier to try to gain better control over the resources under its stewardship. Perhaps Floyd Iverson best stated the goal in his commentary on the 1958 General Integrating Inspection of the Teton National Forest when he wrote that the program of the forest over the next few years "will be extremely important. It will set the stage for the transition of administration from a custodial status to planned integrated use of the forest's many resources . . . [through] multiple-use management planning." [1]

Figure 69—Chester J. Olsen, Regional Forester, 1950-57.

Personnel Changes and Management

With the death of William B. Rice in January 1950, Chester J. Olsen became Regional Forester. Born in Mayfield, UT, "Chet" Olsen graduated from Utah State Agricultural College. He served as a ranger and supervisor on forests in Nevada and Utah from 1919 to 1936, when he moved to the regional office to become assistant regional forester in operation, recreation and lands, and information and education (I and E). Known as an "able, persuasive conservationist," he concerned himself with such problems as destructive timber practices and grazing abuses. While maintaining a close friendship with nationally prominent conservationists like Bernard DeVoto, Olsen also ingratiated himself with many of the region's prominent civic and business leaders. An associate called him the "best I and E man in the Forest Service." In 1956, a panel of prominent citizens named him Utah's outstanding Federal employee. [2]

Olsen continued to serve until retirement in 1957 when Floyd Iverson replaced him. Born at Bieber, CA, Iverson grew up on a ranch. His father held a prior use grazing permit on the Modoc National Forest, and he had long been acquainted with the Forest Service. Iverson received a degree in forestry and plant ecology from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving as a ranger and forest supervisor in California, he moved to Region 6 as assistant regional forester in charge of range and wildlife activities. In 1952, he became assistant regional forester covering the same activities in Region 1. He came to Region 4 in 1955 as assistant regional forester in charge of range and wildlife management. [3] Iverson continued as regional forester until his retirement in 1970, earning a reputation as a quiet, resolute, and capable resource manager.

The selection of Floyd Iverson is consistent with a pattern in major Forest Service administrative appointments that has continued to the present time. Since the late 1950's, experience in more than one region and often in the Washington Office has generally been requisite to appointment as regional forester, and, in some cases, to major staff positions. Region 4 regional foresters before the late 1930's had all worked outside the region; thus, in a sense, Woods, Rice, and Olsen constituted a temporary anomaly. Both their predecessors and their successors spent large portions of their careers elsewhere. [4]

Figure 70—Floyd Iverson, Regional Forester, 1957-70.

Moreover, employees could cut themselves off from advancement in the Service by refusing to accept transfers, either because they preferred to live in a particular area or because they did not believe the transfers would help their careers. Ivan Sack, for instance, refused a transfer to become supervisor of the Boise National Forest because he wanted to live in Nevada. [5] Kenneth Maughan declined a transfer from a ranger's position to become assistant regional landscape architect, because he believed there would be little chance of advancement in the position. He was not offered another position and completed his career as a ranger. [6]

During the 1950's the operations of the Forest Service elicited some interest among outside observers. A good example is Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger, [7] a study of the grass roots of national forest management. Kaufman identified the diversity of the rangers' management responsibilities that made them "executives, planners, and woodsmen." [8] With considerable insight, he argued that from the point of view of the ranger, Forest Service organization appeared "as an inverse pyramid with himself at the apex." [9] The ranger had to be a generalist who devised plans on the basis of prescriptions and instructions from line and staff officers in the regional and forest supervisors' offices and mediated the implementation of these plans with forest users. This position often led to conflicting demands on the ranger's time and abilities, particularly when forest users abused the lands or resources under permit. [10]

A number of conditions also militated against a uniform resource management policy. Each ranger carried a particular cultural baggage containing his individual beliefs and notions about resource protection, management, and use. Many rangers had considerable empathy with the problems of ranchers and loggers, among whom they often had spent their early years. The deliberate decentralization of Forest Service administration, which made the rangers "kings of their own domains," reinforced these attitudes. [11]

At the same time, other forces operating within the Service pressed for considerable uniformity of management practices. These forces included the statutes governing policy, the Forest Service Manual, which by 1960 consisted of seven looseleaf volumes, budgetary control by superiors, management plans which required their approval, and supervisor resolution of differences of opinion between his staff and the line officers. [12]

In addition, the Forest Service had means of detecting and discouraging deviation. These included reporting in various forms, keeping and analyzing official diaries, reprimands and sanctions, transfers, and, most important, inspections. Inspectors—ordinarily staff officers from one level above—were instructed not to "waste time on details already being accomplished to a satisfactory standard." Although inspectors were encouraged "to be alert to outstanding accomplishments," the reports were to be "frank and unvarnished." Forest officers were expected to respond to and correct deficiencies detected in these inspections. [13]

Most important, the Forest Service spent considerable time and energy in creating an atmosphere designed to help its personnel accomplish the Service mission. Like the Marine Corps, the Forest Service sought "a few good men," and it advertised for and selected those who could commit themselves to its ideals. Following entry into the Service, training programs helped in the initiation of employees and the building of an identification with the organization. Training included practical lessons in commitment to the interests of the agency, including a willingness to accept transfers for the good of the organization. The rewards of loyalty and hard work appeared in the respect shown employees at all levels: forest supervisors and regional foresters sought and seriously considered the advice of rangers and staffs in making policy decisions. [14]

Moreover, dedication to the agency was voluntary. During the 1950's, professional forestry schools produced many more foresters than the Forest Service could absorb. Since many positions were available at higher salaries in industry, the Service did not hire or keep a majority of the graduates. The evidence seems to indicate that ordinarily only the most dedicated joined and stayed in the Service. [15]

Although Kaufman does not say so, many of his generalizations about rangers could as well apply to other line officers, particularly forest supervisors and regional foresters. They, too, were subjected to the contradictory demands of public relations and resource management, their offices were inspected, and they participated in periodic meetings and training. If anything, their positions were even more difficult than the rangers'—they stood as if at the neck of an hourglass, with sand flowing first in one direction, then the other, as the glass was turned. In their positions they had to work to maintain equilibrium between the competing demands of Washington Office staffs, rangers, and the public.

Inspection

Inspections, especially General Integrating Inspections (GII's), provided an important means of checking on performance and conformity. This is evident from the GII of Region 4 in July 1955, the third GII for Region 4, succeeding those of 1939 and 1948. From July 13 through 30, Howard Hopkins and Lloyd Swift of the Washington Office inspected three of the region's forests in detail and eight others in a more cursory way. They also spent 3 days in the Regional Office and 2 days at the Intermountain Station. [16]

Most important, the Region 4 GII was a process rather than an event. The regional forester responded to and undertook correction of deficiencies noted in the report and provided information on the solution to problems. Correspondence specifically addressing the means of correcting problems noted in the 1955 report continued through the remainder of Chet Olsen's term and into that of Floyd Iverson, at least through 1961. [17]

Extremely thorough, the report covered all functions. Emphasizing what the inspectors perceived to be the major functions—watershed, range, wildlife, timber, and recreation—it included substantial sections on public relations, research, and inspection procedures. The report spent less time on protection, administration, safety, land management and ownership, engineering, quarters, the youth rehabilitation program, fiscal control, and mining. [18] Comments were both general and specific, addressing those areas in which the region was doing exceptionally well and those where improvement was needed.

Region 4 inspections, at 7- to 9-year intervals, came less frequently than the regional GII's of national forests, which were generally every 3 or 4 years. As in the regional GII's, followup was expected, and supervisors were required to report periodically on their success in solving problems noted in the inspections. [19]

Superior officers also conducted inspections of their specific areas of responsibility. Called "functional inspections," these provided thorough inspections of one function such as timber or fiscal management.

Planning

In addition to inspection, the Service gave considerable attention to adequate planning of work. The motivation for careful planning had at least two roots. Forest Service ideals had always emphasized careful planning based on scientific research. In addition, a congressional investigation in 1950 that faulted the Agriculture Department for poor planning on a number of projects led to instructions from Chief Lyle F. Watts calling specifically for preparation of careful forest management plans and for followup to see that the plans were implemented. [20]

This emphasis on planning led to the development of an annual regional program of work begun in 1953. A committee on the program of work consisting of selected regional staff officers and forest supervisors was appointed. Committee members assisted in establishing annual and long-range goals, planning, and reporting. [21] The program of work included sections dealing with each major division, in addition to a general statement from the regional forester. [22] Each forest was to cooperate by developing its own program of work and reporting progress at the end of the year. [23]

In line with instructions from the Washington Office, the annual report also emphasized cost-saving measures taken at the regional level and on the various national forests. In 1953, for instance, one forest saved $9.50 per cubic yard by having premixed concrete delivered to jobs rather than purchasing the materials and mixing it at the site. Another forest saved $175 by "rehabilitating" 25 used paint brushes. [24]

Multiple-Use Management and Increased Personnel Complexity

At the same time, Region 4 began to emphasize the need for multiple-use planning. Region 5 had moved ahead with multiple-use planning more rapidly than Region 4, and while Ivan Sack was supervisor of the Toiyabe in the early 1950's, he was invited to participate with Region 5 in the development of a Sierra Nevada subregional multiple-use plan. After that experience, Chet Olsen asked Sack to present the concept of subregional multiple-use plans to the forest supervisors at a meeting in Ogden in 1956. Some expressed skepticism about such plans, but, after Floyd Iverson became regional forester in 1957, the region moved ahead vigorously in preparing them. [25] In addition, following an approach adopted in Region 2, some of the Region 4 forest supervisors appointed multiple-use advisory boards representing a variety of interests, such as education, water, recreation, timber, livestock, business and industry, labor, the general public, women's organizations, and wildlife. [26]

By late 1959, the region had begun to publish multiple-use management guides for each of the major subregions. The guides provided essentially a context within which each forest was expected to prepare its multiple-use management plan. The guides outlined the general Forest Service missions, such as timber, grazing, water, and recreation management, as they related to each subregion. General comments were then provided on various altitude and influence zones. Zones defined were: crest, middle slope, lower slope, travel influence, and water influence. The subregional guides also provided for the inclusion of special zones, such as a wilderness area or research site peculiar to a particular forest. The basic objective of the guides was "to assist in correlating use and production of national forests for maximum over-all benefit to the public," and to provide direction which would result in "consistency in policy between units and successive administrators where similar situations exist." [27]

Reversing the trend apparent in World War II and afterward, the Service came under more pressure in the 1950's to pursue its work by contract with private businesses rather than force account. In 1951, Olsen indicated that they had been "getting considerable criticism, especially in connection with our reseeding, range fences, and other work, to the effect it is costing us more to do the job by force account than it could be done by contract." He suggested that various divisions might have overlooked the use of competitive bidding on insect control, slash disposal, forest rehabilitation, and road construction, and asked for the opinion of various staffs on that possibility. In general, the assistant regional foresters responding indicated that on most jobs force account seemed most desirable. The exceptions were large construction projects and other large undertakings where adequate information on appropriations was available to allow advertising for the 90 days required by regulations. [28]

In attempting to deal with budgetary problems, the region faced a number of conflicting pressures. At the same time that demand intensified to increase the sustained-yield cut, gain control of overgrazing on forest rangelands, and meet demands for recreation facilities, budgetary constraints and manpower limitations were putting enormous pressure on the service. The region stood in essentially a no-win situation. If it did not meet the demands for resource use, it came under censure, and if it spent too much money or tried to utilize current employees through overtime, it was in danger of exceeding its budget. [29]

The problem of meeting these conflicting demands and maintaining employee morale at the same time was the subject of considerable discussion in the region. The focus of the supervisors' and division chiefs' conference in 1951, for instance, was on human relations. In his cover letter sent with the preliminary material, Olsen wrote that "in our whole job of National Forest administration we are dependent for success on our abilities in human relations and the degree of our success is measured by the amount of those abilities we possess." [30] Some of the other conferences during the decade emphasized similar themes. The 1954 conference focused on "Executive Development," and the 1958 conference was entitled "Progress through Cooperation and Teamwork." [31]

Measures taken to deal with employee management included a continuation of the emphasis on work-load analysis begun during the late 1940's. On the Targhee National Forest in 1957, for instance, Supervisor Gordon L. Watts launched an investigation into correlated work-load standards of all ranger districts after the regional office raised questions about the load of three districts. Each district was intended to have a minimum 2,700-hour load; the review showed all at or above the standard. [32] Moreover, Watts recommended upgrading the Ashton district to a GS-11 position because, while the work loads in timber management and fire control were below the national average, those in range management, wildlife management, soil and water management, and recreation were above average, with range management and recreation 63 percent and 50 percent above the average. [33]

With the increasing demand for multiple-use management came concurrent pressure to provide a more professional approach to solving problems on the national forests. Robert Safran dates the change to 1957. Before that time the relatively large staffs on Boise and Payette had been exceptions. In 1953, when Safran went to the Teton, the forest had a supervisor, assistant supervisor, a roving forester, four rangers, an administrative officer, a typist, and a maintenance foreman. After 1957, however, the forest created staff positions for hydrologists, soil scientists, wildlife specialists, and others. [34] In 1959, when Don Braegger moved to the Cache National Forest, that forest had recreation, timber, and wildlife staff as well. [35] Other national forests expanded similarly.

Previously, when the agency hired a married ranger it actually got the services of two for the price of one as the ranger's wife generally did various jobs around the district. Ed Noble remembered his service in the late 1940's and early 1950's as a ranger on the Salmon and Minidoka: "If you couldn't type and your wife couldn't type, you were in trouble," Wives were "classed as collaborators, which entitled them to no pay," but since they "did have regular appointment papers" they could get a "driver's license so they could drive the government equipment." Noble's wife "would run the district, answer the phone and the radio," while he was out on week-long pack trips. If a fire broke out, she would "get some people to go fight the fire." Because he could not type very well, he would "go in and babysit while she did" his typing. [36]

By the mid-1950's, this situation had begun to change on ranger districts on some of the larger forests. Noble transferred to the Boise and felt he was "kind of in seventh heaven." Because of the large timber sales, clerks would be hired for the summer on ranger districts, to answer the phone and radio and do needed typing. The press of business, however, eventually necessitated hiring full-time clerks for the rangers. [37]

In the regional office the number and diversity of staff specialists increased materially as well. In 1956, Ollie C. Olsen came to the regional office as a soil scientist in the division of engineering. The following year A. Russell "Bus" Croft, who had transferred from the Davis County Experimental Watershed to the Regional Office in administration in 1951, was asked to head a new group in soil and water management; Olsen came into this group. [38] Before long, hydrologists joined the staff as well. The regional landscape architect's office expanded, and its duties were increased. [39]

Moreover, the emphasis in the supervisors' conferences shifted from personnel to resource management. With the increased concern over various functions, the 1956 conference emphasized "Making Multiple-Use Management Work!" While the 1958 meeting focused on cooperation and teamwork, considerable time was spent on range management, timber management, recreation, and relations with State and Federal agencies whose work affected the Forest Service. [40]

Interagency Cooperation and Public Relations

Successful resource management included inter-regional cooperation. By the 1950's, for instance, a number of people had become concerned about the protection of Lake Tahoe, which lay in Regions 4 and 5. As a result of the work of newspaperman Joe McDonald for the Fleischmann Foundation and the cooperation of people such as Supervisor Ivan Sack of the Toiyabe National Forest, casino owner Bill Harrah, and Barney Lowe of Sierra-Pacific Power and Nevada National Bank, the Lake Tahoe Area Council was organized. The council concerned itself with water quality, land use planning, and multiple-use management. With the creation of the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, in the 1960's, both Nevada and California appointed representatives, and Nevada Governor Paul Laxalt appointed Sack his representative on the agency. [41]

An important part of any successful program was the public relations aspect. Called I and E within the Service during the 1950's, this aspect of the program included working with local civic and business groups and concerned local, state, regional, and national political figures, finding and keeping friends in conservation organizations, and developing and maintaining good relations with various user groups. As the functions of the Service became more complex, interaction with various State and Federal agencies became increasingly important.

Chet Olsen was a master at public relations. During the 1950 election campaign he made it a point to meet with Wallace F. Bennett, Republican candidate for the Senate, who had been quite critical of Federal programs. Bennett admitted "a keen interest but lack of knowledge of many" of the Forest Service's problems. "He stated he would be very pleased to make a trip over some of the forests during the ensuing year." Bennett admitted "that he might have made some statements that were in error concerning the administration of the national forests, and that he was willing to learn more about them." [42] By July 1951, correspondence passing between the two, who had not known each other before October 1950, was addressed "Dear Wallace," and "Dear Chet," and Senator Bennett presented testimony supporting additional appropriations for the Forest Service, calling the forest "the poor man's playground." [43]

Forest Boundary Alteration and Consolidation

During the 1950's, alterations in national forest boundaries continued for essentially the same reasons as during the previous decade. That is, the work load on some of the forests simply was not great enough to justify national forest status and consolidations resulted. [44] Major forest dissolutions included the 1957 division of the Nevada in which southern Nevada went to the Toiyabe and central Nevada to the Humboldt. [45] In 1953, the Minidoka and Sawtooth National Forests were combined, with headquarters at Twin Falls. [46]

The major problems in such divisions and combinations were the public relations difficulties associated with the elimination of a supervisor's office. In the cases of the Sawtooth-Minidoka consolidation and the Nevada division, supervisors' offices at Halley and Burley, ID, and Ely, NV, were made into ranger district headquarters. In general, the regional and forest officers succeeded in preparing the public to such a degree that they accepted the changes with little difficulty. [47]

Other changes included several interforest transfers. These came about to adjust the work load between forests or for administrative rationalization. In 1952, for instance, the Santa Rosa division of the Toiyabe was transferred to the Humboldt. [48] In this case, the Toiyabe had a much larger work load than the Humboldt. [49]

Several other forest boundaries also were altered, including that between the Teton and Targhee, [50] and those separating the Uinta, Wasatch, and Ashley. At the time, Mount Timpanogos, which was within eyesight of the Uinta National Forest Headquarters at Provo, was in the Pleasant Grove district of the Wasatch. Moreover, the ranger district headquarters at Duchesne was much closer to the Vernal headquarters of the Ashley than to Provo, but was a division of the Uinta National Forest. James Jacobs, then Uinta National Forest supervisor, pushed for a boundary change, and the regional office adjusted the boundaries between the three forests, transferring the Pleasant Grove ranger district to the Uinta and the Duchesne district to the Ashley. [51] Other important land status actions included the completion of the land-for-timber exchanges with the Boise-Payette Lumber Company between 1956 and 1960, [52] the receipts act purchases of watershed lands, especially in the Wasatch and Sierra Fronts of Utah and Nevada, and the retention of the southern Idaho resettlement administration project.

Grazing Issues

The broadly based sentiment against single use that was evident in the derailing of Congressman Barrett's Wild West Show in 1947 continued during the 1950's. An early example was the passage of the Granger-Thye Act in 1950. The original bill was drafted by the Forest Service and sponsored by Congressman Walter K. Granger of Utah and Senator Edward Thye of Minnesota, at the request of Assistant Chief Forester Raymond Marsh. [53] During the Barrett and McCarran hearings considerable misinformation had surfaced about Forest Service policy, particularly the charges that the Service did not consult with permittees, that it was not interested in revegetating overgrazed lands, and that it wanted to eliminate grazing from the public lands.

The Granger-Thye Act basically contradicted such charges by codifying existing Forest Service policy. It specifically authorized cooperation between the Service and stockmen in improvements on grazing lands, the expenditure of portions of the receipts from grazing fees for range improvements, the issuance of 10-year grazing permits and the establishment of grazing advisory boards. [54]

The Forest Service had done all these things for years. A portion of the receipts from grazing fees had been used for range improvements as early as 1924. [55] The Anderson-Mansfield Act of 1949 had reinforced this practice by authorizing the reseeding of 4 million acres of range. Even though advisory boards had been in existence for decades, if the perception of the Humboldt supervisor in 1950 is any indication, the permittees were less than enthusiastic about the Granger-Thye authorization because it simply acknowledged the status quo. What they wanted, he said, was "authority to sue in court where the managing agency does not happen to see eye to eye with them." [56]

Through certain western congressmen, stockmen continued to press for legislation that would give them greater control over grazing permits. As before, principal opposition centered in those who favored Forest Service regulations to protect watersheds and manage big game. [57] At the time, the livestock interests seemed to have considerable power; but, in retrospect, it is clear that the combined opposition from cities and towns anxious to preserve their watersheds, from sportsmen's groups and their allies in the business community, and from conservation organizations was powerful enough to sidetrack such legislation.

The inability to assure their tenure as a right on the public lands did not set well with livestock interests, and they continued to press for increased stability by opposing reductions in numbers. In 1950, as a gesture of conciliation, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan ordered the Service to abolish its policy statement allowing reductions for distribution to new settlers. In practice, this change was more cosmetic than substantive since reductions for distribution had been largely nonexistent since the 1930's. The policy had, however, remained on the books as a vestige of the economic democracy of the Progressive Era and had served to irritate permittees. [58]

Figure 71—Forage utilization basket on allotment in Upper Big Creek, 1958.

More serious were stockmen's complaints about transfer reductions and reductions for range protection. After hearings in 1950, the Washington Office's National Forest Advisory Council, which had been reconstituted from the National Forest Review Board established in 1948, recommended retention of transfer adjustments, but suggested clarification of procedures. [59] This recommendation did not satisfy stockmen. After the inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, Montana Congressman Wesley D'Ewart introduced the Uniform Federal Grazing Bill, designed to provide continuity of grazing privileges, which would have effectively eliminated transfer reductions. Various conservation and business groups opposed the D'Ewart bill, and Congress killed it. Nevertheless, stockmen threatened to have the Forest Service budget slashed if transfer reductions continued. Chief Richard E. McArdle, who had replaced Lyle F. Watts in 1952, recognized that although Congress had not agreed to the D'Ewart bill, it might indeed reduce the budget, and agreed to eliminate transfer reductions, except when they were needed for range protection. [60]

With the elimination of transfer reductions for distribution, it seemed reasonable to adopt the policy of giving permittees the full benefit of improvements on their allotments. In 1953, the Service ruled that where carrying capacity improved through permittee cooperation in range improvement, the permittee was to be given the benefit of the increases. [61]

In 1953 the Service also recodified its appeals procedure. Appeals were taken from the ranger to the forest supervisor, through the regional forester to the Chief of the Forest Service, and finally to the Secretary of Agriculture. In lieu of the supervisor, the appeal might go to the grazing advisory board. If not satisfied with the board's recommendation, the appellant might continue through Forest Service channels. At the Agriculture Department level, a National Forest Advisory Board of Appeals was established of qualified Federal employees from outside the Forest Service to advise the Secretary on appeals from the Chief's decisions. From the Secretary, dissatisfied apellants could take their cases to the Federal courts. [62]

These changes were procedural, not substantive. They did not address such problems as numbers of livestock and seasons of use, grazing fees, and competition between big game and livestock. The grazing fees were not a source of general complaint during the 1950's. As we have seen, such fees were derived from a base put into effect in 1931 and determined by fluctuations in the market price of cattle and lambs. In 1953, the national forest grazing fee was substantially below that paid for comparable private range, but higher than BLM rangeland and most State-leased land. [63]

The oversupply of big game continued to rankle stockmen, but they were most concerned about reductions in numbers of livestock and in length of grazing season. [64] The basis of the dispute was the stockmen's demands that the Forest Service determine the condition of the range by the condition of the animals leaving it rather than by the condition and trend of the soil and the plants growing on it. Most important from the Service's point of view was the introduction of the Parker three-step method, which Region 4 had adopted by 1949. The three steps consisted of: (1) periodic collection of data at permanent benchmarks on representative sections of the range (the transects); (2) classification of, condition of, and estimation of trend on range units (analysis of data); and (3) establishment of permanent photopoints. [65]

Such systematic estimates of trend were necessary because of the conflicting perceptions of changing conditions of the ranges obvious in interviews collected to document trend. Memory tends to be highly subjective, and the Forest Service sought an objective measurement of trend under the assumption that condition of the soil and plants provided the best measurement of the quality of grazing lands. [66]

By the 1950's the Service had data that suggested changes over time in the composition of vegetation. On the Grantsville Division of the Wasatch, for instance, maps made in 1921 revealed a particular configuration of pinyon-juniper type. In 1941, aerial photographs showed that the pinyon-juniper had expanded. Aerial photographs in 1959 and 1960 showed continued pinyon-juniper encroachment on grass and brush lands. [67]

Involved in the process of allotment analysis were a number of systems for trend measurement. These included the 250-foot photoplots introduced in 1943 by Lincoln Ellison and Walter Cottam, with photopoints identified by iron pegs. The region stopped installing new photoplot transects in 1951, but asked rangers to continue to make followup measurements, since they were perceived as "effective in showing visible proof of trend in vegetation or soil." [68] Other earlier measures to determine trend included enclosures (called exclosures by the 1950's), quadrats, species plots, and browse study plots. The establishment of all of these methods had been discontinued by 1940, and line intercept transects were laid out as an experiment on the Teton and old LaSal between 1940 and 1943. [69]

The Parker transects were 100 feet in length. They were placed in key range areas to measure average range condition by charting the progress of key plant species over time. In measuring, the range conservationist would drop a 1-inch or 3/4-inch hoop every foot along the transect, and the plants hit were identified and recorded. A point near the beginning of the transect, at which photographs were taken, was marked with iron stakes. In addition, the conservationist would clip and weigh the vegetation at points along the transect and estimate forage production and the amount of grazed land. During the 1950's, another system of analysis was used in which similar transects were established and a hoop 13.27 inches in diameter was dropped at intervals with the hits on plants recorded. [70]

Results of such analyses were recorded, analyzed, and filed. The documents produced for each allotment included a "Range Condition and Trend Map," a "Range Allotment Record and Analysis" (which superseded in 1954 the "Grazing Allotment Analysis" (summary sheet)), and an "Allotment Action Plan" dated and signed by the forest supervisor and the district ranger. [71]

In implementing this program, the regional office conducted periodic range management inspections. In inspecting analytical procedures, range conservationists from the regional office went to the ranger districts and reviewed the transects and records to determine the validity of the studies and to provide further advice and training where necessary. [72]

After the inauguration of the Parker three-step method, the attitude of forest officers might best be summed up by a comment of Toiyabe Forest Supervisor Ivan Sack. In his 1951 annual report he said that "stocking to proper grazing capacity on each range is our objective, but material accomplishment will require several years and depends upon sufficient basic data." [73]

While the measurement of trend by charting the condition of the land and vegetation might have seemed threatening to stockmen, the service also offered those cooperating a portion of the income from grazing fees for range improvements. These improvements included projects such as fences, corrals, water developments, rodent control, weed eradication, and range reseeding.

By 1956, the region had been involved in reseeding projects for 15 years, and revegetation policy took the results of those years of experience into consideration. Reseeding was to be allowed only on allotments devoted to single use: common use allotments (those with sheep and cattle grazing together) were not eligible. Preference was given to those allotments with the best cooperation from permittees and where there was a "guarantee of . . . [permittees] resuming use not to exceed the carrying capacity of the treated unit or allotment." Large areas were to be treated first. Permittees were encouraged to participate financially if possible. Proper measures were required to prevent destruction of seedlings by rodents and big game. Spraying of herbicides was strictly controlled and allowed only where desirable species could not reestablish themselves through natural protection. Preference in reseeding was given to accidentally burned areas. [74]

With the passage of the Anderson-Mansfield Act in 1949 and the codification of the customary policy of using money from grazing fees for reseeding in the Granger-Thye Act in 1950, the Washington Office launched a projected 15-year range improvement program. Within that time, the Service expected the bulk of the work to have been completed. [75]

Service employees found the permittees and livestock associations generally cooperative. The Santaquin Association, for instance, "held all their cattle off the range for three years" while the reseeded area established itself. The largest project was under Supervisor Albert Albertson on the Dixie National Forest in John's Valley near Widtsoe, UT. A number of areas were seeded by airplane. Recent observers have indicated that the reseeding projects "materially increased forage production on many areas throughout the region." [76]

Success of the reseeding program depended upon research information available by the 1950's, which had demonstrated those species better suited to particular geographic and climatic conditions. As Ed Noble pointed out, in canyon bottoms they could use brome, orchard-grass, timothy, and bluegrass. Crested wheatgrass did well in dry areas. Although crested wheat was not the most desirable grass, since it grew in bunches and robbed the soil of moisture to such a degree that little could grow between the clumps, it was exceptionally hardy, its seed was readily available, and it produced palatable forage. [77]

Results of these efforts are evident from the annual range revegetation report for 1955, which seems to have been typical for the decade. During 1955, the region spent a total of $262,609, allocated in amounts ranging from $42,360 on the Dixie to $200 on the Wasatch. The appropriation allowed the region to rehabilitate 30,175 acres, bringing to nearly 396,000 acres the total treated to that time. Of the acres treated in 1955, 19,000 were reseeded. Competing plants were removed on 11,000 acres. This was only a drop in the bucket, however, since forest officers estimated that a total of 1.9 million acres needed to be rehabilitated. Between 1950 and 1955, the region had rehabilitated an average of 24,554 acres per year. To complete the work in the 15 years projected would have required treatment of 131,905 acres per year. The region would have needed an estimated $1.5 million per year. Clearly, at the 1955 rate of appropriation, it would have taken far more than 15 years to complete the projects. [78]

With the data gathered from systematic range allotment analysis, the region moved ahead on reductions in livestock numbers and grazing seasons to improve the condition of the ranges. In general, the procedure followed was for the ranger, supervisor, and their staffs to analyze the data, then arrive at a course of action. The ranger would then invite members of the stockmen's association to ride the allotment. At that time, he would point out the problems, listen to their point of view, tell them of the forest's proposal for dealing with the difficulties, and consider any counter proposals. Ordinarily, he would follow this meeting with a letter indicating his decision. [79]

Figure 72—Return of sagebrush to overgrazed North Ephraim common-use allotment, where fenced, 1958. Enclosure established in 1951.

While the appeals from these decisions have gained considerable publicity, it should be understood that appeals were the exceptions rather than the rule. In perhaps 90 percent of the cases, the permittees accepted, however reluctantly, the decision of the district ranger. Ordinarily, the permittees did not like to have to reduce the numbers of stock, but they usually gave in. [80] Rangers on the Fishlake National Forest, for instance, made reductions as high as 70 percent without appeals. The success came in part because of the range improvements the Service was able to use as an incentive. [81] On the Ashley, Richard Leicht said that the program to eliminate common use initially appeared to be "like throwing Bengal tigers and elephants . . . in a big box," but that the Forest Service succeeded both in eliminating common use and reducing numbers. [82] By the mid-1950s, the Service had gotten "a good handle" on the range on the Humboldt. [83] The Payette had no appeals, and Foyer Olsen remembered none on the Dixie. [84] On the Manti-LaSal, between 1946 and 1956, the number of animal units of cattle and of sheep and goats combined were reduced, respectively, by 35,280 and 144,530. [85]

In some cases, dissatisfied stockmen would try to apply pressure on the Forest Service through their congressmen. Ordinarily, when a permittee wrote to a congressman, the letter would be sent through Forest Service channels, eventually reaching the forest supervisor, who was expected to respond with dispatch. [86]

The Payette provides a good example of a forest where appeals were the exception. In 1950, for instance, Supervisor J.G. Kooch reported that progress had been made on allotment analysis. On the basis of the analysis, a number of allotments—two, particularly, on the South Fork of the Salmon with steep slopes and loose granitic soils—were scheduled for retirement in 1951. [87]

As might be expected, the Payette received considerable flack from stockmen because of the intention to reduce the number of livestock. At a hearing held at Boise in January 1951, stockmen complained, saying that the best evidence of good range conditions was the 80- to 100-pound lambs coming off the ranges. Many were upset because they had paid a per head premium for the permits they held and consequently felt they were losing part of their investments, Some argued that the reductions would cut their herds below economically viable units. [88]

Despite these complaints, the forest reduced the number of livestock allowed. A General Functional Inspection (GFI) of Payette range management made by Oliver Cliff in 1959 pointed out that there were some deficiencies in proper training of personnel conducting the allotment analysis work, but that in general, the forest had proceeded, in spite of serious opposition from permittees, and had been generally successful. [89]

These efforts on the Payette were extremely difficult. In the 1940's, members of the Idaho congressional delegation had thwarted efforts to obtain corrective action on the Mann Creek allotment. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, forest and regional officers worked on the problem. As late as 1963, a difficult appeal case seemed in the offing. By then Edward Cliff was Chief of the Forest Service, and he told the regional officials that he would not back up any formal appeal if the region proceeded with a forced reduction program before making a large expenditure for range improvements. Through persistent efforts and successful negotiation, a formal appeal was avoided. Considerable progress was made on Mann Creek, but in many cases, progress was not rapid enough to stop deterioration, especially in the granitic soils of western and central Idaho. [90]

The GFI's helped by providing a stamp of approval on the allotment analysis and by monitoring progress on the forests. The Sawtooth National Forest Range Management GFI conducted by Oliver Cliff in 1957, for instance, recognized the progress the forest had made, but emphasized particularly the need to eliminate grazing from a number of steep, high-elevation areas, to correct problems caused by damage on stock driveways, and to improve planning of range rehabilitation projects. [91] A GFI of range management on the Boise by Floyd Iverson in 1956 indicated some deficiencies in allotment inspections and in installation of three-step transects. By 1960, some progress had been made, but the situation was far from ideal. [92] A major problem on the Boise continued to be the ability of well-placed stockmen to reach political leaders for support.

On some of the forests, grazing trespass continued to be a problem. On the Toiyabe, for instance, Ivan Sack reported in 1956 that the Austin and Tonopah districts had about 800 miles of unfenced boundary adjacent to BLM lands. Fencing could have controlled the trespass, but the cost of installation was prohibitive. Funds for boundary posting were not available either. [93] Forests often dealt with these problems by tagging regulations and impoundment procedures, as on the Minidoka. When range managers impounded trespassing livestock, the owners had to pay the impoundment costs to redeem them. [94]

At times, disputes between stockmen and Forest Service employees almost came to open warfare, Richard Leicht remembered going out with a ranger on the Payette to meet a permittee, George Speropulous, who planned to drive his sheep through a campground. The ranger told Speropulous, "You cannot go through the campground." Speropulous told the ranger he was going to drive his sheep through because it was the easiest way. "Okay," said the ranger, "only after the fight." Speropulous said, "What fight?" The ranger took off his coat and handed it to Leicht and said, "Now George, if you whip me, you can take them through the campground; if you cannot whip me, you go around." Finally Speropulous "just broke out in a big smile and said, I will go around." [95]

In some cases, several years after reductions had taken place, permittees would change their views. Some found that their calf crops increased as the grazing lands improved. One Minidoka permittee who had originally objected told Ed Noble, "You know, we thought you were a dirty guy, but you did us the biggest favor of any man we ever had in the country. You made us get control of the trespass and made us get down to managing that range. We developed a lot of forage of our own, and we are getting a lot better calf crops now, and fatter cattle. You made us money in the long run, by doing that." [96]

Whereas in Idaho most of the serious cases were dealt with in the political realm, the most serious disagreements in northern Utah forests led to appeals. On the Cache, the Logan Canyon Association appeal of a forest supervisor's decision that the regional forester, the Chief, and the Secretary of Agriculture had all upheld, denied the permittees' tenure by right on the grazing land and affirmed the adequacy of grazing allotment analysis. [97] Several appeals involved permittees in the Heber and Kamas areas, in part because of the aggressive attitudes of Don Clyde, president of the Utah Wool Growers Association, and Levi Montgomery, president of the Utah Cattlemen's Association, both of whom lived there. [98]

Most national publicity came from the Grantsville cattle permittees' appeal on the Wasatch National Forest because of the prominent figures involved and because the issues in the case addressed directly the rights to tenure of permittees and the question of the stewardship of the Forest Service for the land involved. The prevalent attitude among livestock interests, but probably not in the Grantsville community in general, seemed to be that by right of history, right of conquest, or right of continuous use, the Federal grazing lands really belonged to the permittees rather than to the Federal Government. This attitude found expression in the thoughts and actions of a number of members of the leading councils of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Strikingly, the opposite attitude—that the Federal Government had responsibility to exercise stewardship over the lands under its jurisdiction—also found expression among other members of the same governing bodies.

Incidents prior to the Grantsville appeal had made the Forest Service aware of the attitudes of some of the Mormon hierarchy. In January 1947, representatives of the Forest Service met with members of the LDS Church's First Presidency in Salt Lake City to discuss Forest Service policy. Then on February 12, 1950, at a stake conference in Mount Pleasant, UT, Elder Henry D. Moyle of the Council of the Twelve Apostles opened an attack on Forest Service management of grazing allotments and on proposed grazing reductions. He argued that the lands belonged to the permittees by right of prior settlement and that if they surrendered to Federal officials the right to make their own management decisions, they lost their freedom. [99]

Two days after the conference, Ivan L. Dyreng, ranger on the Ephraim District of the Manti-LaSal National Forest, wrote the First Presidency asking to meet with Elder Moyle. He requested also that Neil Frischknecht, a specialist in watershed management, Julian Thomas, assistant forest ranger from Monticello, and several others be allowed to attend. [100]

The meeting took place on February 21 in Moyle's office at the church office building in Salt Lake City. Dyreng and Thomas came as did Leslie L. Shelley, President of the Mount Pleasant Cattle Association and counselor in a local LDS bishopric, and D.A. Shelley, a permittee in the association and bishop who attended at Moyle's request. Dyreng and Thomas tried to explain the deteriorating condition of the watershed and invited Moyle or other church officials to come down and ride over the range. Moyle again called Forest Service management dictatorial, arguing that the people who lived near the lands ought to decide how to use them. Though he said he opposed destruction of the watersheds, he indicated that he would not trade the people's freedom for watershed protection, and he declined to ride the range. [101]

Following the meeting, Dyreng and Thomas submitted reports and the regional I and E office worked out a plan to deal with the problem. It was agreed that Thomas would maintain a contact with Moyle and that the region would initiate "an aggressive I&E program" with other church leaders to acquaint them with local problems. Officers were to contact more of the church leaders, especially Elder Ezra Taft Benson and President J. Reuben Clark, and to arrange show-me trips for members of the church welfare committee. [102]

As early as 1945, Elder Benson had shown considerable concern about the condition of the public lands. He declared in a conference address that Mormons should use information from the Forest Service and other sources to improve the range. [103] In 1953, Elder Benson became Secretary of Agriculture in the Eisenhower administration, and he continued the proconservationist policy. [104] In the mid-1950's, a committee in the Washington Office, including William D. Hurst, formerly with Region 4, recommended that the Service return the southern Idaho resettlement project to private ownership. Benson, who had grown up in the area near the project, wanted to keep the area in public ownership to demonstrate the benefits of sound grassland management. As a result, he overrode the committee recommendation and placed the project under Forest Service administration as the Curlew Grasslands. [105] While he generally opposed governmental interference in agricultural businesses, he felt quite strongly about the concept of stewardship over publicly owned resources.

Until about 1957, J. Reuben Clark, at the time second counselor in the First Presidency of the LDS Church, seems to have been concerned about good range management. When the Forest Service began to press for extensive grazing reductions among Grantsville permittees, however, he changed his position and began attacking the Service. [106] He laid out his views in a speech before the Utah Cattlemen's Association in December 1957. [107] For him, as for Moyle, the stockmen of Utah had "a moral right [to the federal grazing lands] by all considerations recognized in territorial acquisition," through exploration, conquest, and use. The contribution of Federal tax revenues to their management and improvement were, in his view, insignificant in comparison with the prior right. He argued, further, that it was the intention of some "fanatics" to transform the grazing lands into wilderness areas and eliminate grazing.

Although he admitted that the Forest Service gave lipservice to multiple use, Clark implied that the Service really favored an exclusively wilderness and recreational approach as embodied in a bill sponsored by Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, which he misinterpreted as applying to all Federal grazing lands. Agreeing that some problems of overgrazing had existed in the past, he argued that these were the result of long-term moisture patterns that were currently shifting toward greater annual precipitation. For him, as for most stockmen, the measure of condition of the land was the condition of the animals leaving it.

He seems to have been unfamiliar with current Forest Service appeals procedure, because he proposed a system essentially similar to the one in use except that the initial decision on each allotment would have been made jointly by the ranger and two permittees, rather than by the ranger in consultation with the permittees. In any case, appeal could be taken by either the ranger or the permittees to the supervisor and higher officials as in the Service's system.

Clarke's address was prompted, in part, by his association with the Utah Cattlemens' Association and by the announcement of proposed reductions on the Grantsville allotment. [108] A permittee on the division, Clark opposed the reductions, even though range allotment analysis showed the range seriously overstocked. Ranger Mike Wright laid out the proposed reductions, which the association, represented by attorney Art Woolley, a relative of Clark's, appealed to Forest Supervisor Felix C. Koziol, Regional Forester Floyd Iverson, and Chief Richard E. McArdle. In line with Clark's views, Woolley argued that grazing was a right, not a privilege: that the reductions were not based on a realistic assessment of range condition; that any problems resulted from Forest Service management, not overgrazing; that deer, not cattle, were responsible for any range damage; and that the range could be improved without livestock reductions. After the permittees received adverse decisions at every stage of the appeal, they decided not to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture. [109]

In dealing with the problems caused by such a prominent leader opposing its action, the Forest Service and Agriculture Department worked very carefully. President Clark traveled to Washington to meet with Secretary Benson to try to enlist his support. William D. Hurst, assistant regional forester for range management, and James L. Jacobs, assistant regional forester for information and education, met with Clark to try to explain the Forest Service policy. [110] In addition, the two assisted Secretary Benson in drafting a letter to Clark outlining the necessity for multiple-use management of the public lands and questioning the concept of their use by graziers as a right rather than a privilege. The letter emphasized that the lands belonged to all the people of the United States and that the Service ought to manage them in the public interest. [111] Clark and Benson exchanged similar views, in talks before the April 1958 Latter-day Saints' general welfare meeting. [112]

In spite of Clark's insistence on the doctrine of preemptive occupation, in view of Bean A. Gardner, general counsel for Region 4, the Grantsville case was hardly precedent setting. There was, he said, obviously "nothing legally at stake." Clark cited no legal precedents, but merely gave his own opinions, and Woolley's briefs showed no legal grounds for the permittees' views. Gardner thought that the Service's proper course of action was merely "to show that the Forest Service was the professional manager of this land" rather than to deal with the legal issues. [113] At the time, Gardner issued a legal opinion on the question of rights of the permittees in which he cited precedent showing that the permittees had no "rights" to the land, and that contrary to what J. Reuben Clark had insisted, both statutory and constitutional law supported the Service's position. [114]

Figure 73—Rangers compare ungrazed check plot with moderately grazed area outside fence, Benmore Experimental Range, Utah.

After the case had been settled, the Service began to reduce livestock numbers and improve the land. Supervisor Koziol indicated that positive results had begun to show up by 1965. [115]

During these negotiations, the regional office worked with the media and the stockmen to try to disarm criticisms. In December 1957, Regional Forester Iverson, assistant regional forester Jacobs, and Howard Foulger from the division of range management, met with officers of the Utah Cattlemen's Association and reporters for the Deseret News and Salt Lake Tribune. They had a frank exchange of views, and the meeting was quite peaceful; nevertheless, opinions remained unchanged. [116] Throughout the period, the presses fairly hummed with blast and counterblast on the question, but while the stories provided details of the dispute, little in the way of new interpretations appeared. [117]

Meanwhile, the stockmen tried to apply political pressure to get the grazing reductions rescinded. In mid-December 1957, Utah Senator Arthur V. Watkins called for a moratorium on all reductions. [118] The stockmen also pressed Governor George D. Clyde to back them. Clyde, however, who was an irrigation engineer by profession, agreed with Secretary Benson and supported the Forest Service. [119] While the Deseret News tended to favor conciliation, the Salt Lake Tribune editors, to the consternation of the stockmen, made it clear that in their view, "Watershed Stability Is Still [the] Main Issue." [120]

Although the Grantsville case engendered a great deal of controversy and raised again the question of the rights of the permittees and the Forest Service to the degree that Gardner felt it necessary to issue a legal opinion, it settled no new questions of law. The Hobble Creek Cattle Allotment case on the Uinta National Forest settled basic questions on Forest Service procedures. Instead of basing their appeal on dubious legal theories, the permittees raised a direct legal challenge to the adequacy of the Forest Service's grazing allotment analysis procedures and to the ways in which the concept of multiple use was interpreted. In addition, the permittees mounted a persuasive campaign emphasizing the adverse impact of the reductions on the local economy. [121]

The case followed a long train of events in which cooperative efforts eventually reached an impasse. When James Jacobs came to the Uinta as forest supervisor in 1950, many cattle allotments were nominally 6 months long, though the cattle actually entered the range when joint inspections determined they were ready. Since problems with overgrazing persisted, the Forest Service cut a month from the season to begin with. [122] Between 1955 and 1958, allotments with common use were divided, and some permittees took reductions of more than 20 percent. [123] The Forest Service had tried to work with the Springville Cattlemen's Association to rehabilitate the Hobble Creek allotment, but in 1955 the permittees refused to divide the allotment and refrain from use during range reseeding, and the Service refused to put any more money into what it perceived as a futile effort. [124]

By 1958 allotment analysis showed the need for drastic reductions. An analysis of the data led Merrill Nielson, ranger on the Spanish Fork District, to prescribe a stocking reduction of 84 percent—from 12,475 to 2,000 cow-months—by 20-percent increments over 4 years beginning in 1960, coupled with a $200,000 rehabilitation program. [125] By 1957, Clarence Thornock had replaced Jacobs as supervisor, so the job of implementing the prescription fell to him and Nielson. The permittees refused to accept Nielson's decision and appealed to Thornock who sustained it. [126]

Members of the association appealed immediately to Regional Forester Iverson. In a news release, Arthur W. Finley, president of the Springville Cattlemen's Association, charged that the Service had discounted the effectiveness of the rehabilitation work the cattlemen had done after the Service withdrew its assistance. Finley said that the transects misrepresented the condition of the range, arguing "that dropping the hoop a foot in either direction would completely change the picture." [127]

Unlike Woolley in the Grantsville appeal, Clair M. Aldrich from Provo, attorney for the Hobble Creek permittees, presented his appeals very effectively. [128] The regional hearing, conducted by Dean Gardner, was held in July 1959, but at the request of the permittees, Iverson did not render his decision until November 10. In making their appeal, the permittees called a number of experts in range management including John F. Valentine of the Extension Service, G. Wayne Cook, research professor in range management at Utah State, and L.A. Stoddard, head of the department of range management at Utah State in addition to local officials from Springville. [129]

Even though the appeal was well drafted, the permittees stood little chance of overturning Forest Service range management criteria. For the Service, "suitable range is defined by the Intermountain Region's livestock-game Range Allotment Analysis Instructions as forage-producing land which can be grazed on a sustained-yield basis under an attainable management system without damage to the basic soil resource of the area itself, or of adjacent areas." Under this definition, cattle could not graze on steep slopes like those on portions of the Hobble Creek allotment, because, unlike sheep, cattle tended to drift into the bottoms instead of remaining on the hillsides. Successive studies had shown significant increases in bare ground and soil disturbance. Iverson addressed the problem of the economic impact by pointing out that half the permittees were "only partially dependent upon the national forest grazing permits for their annual income," and that other economic values, including recreation and watershed destruction, had to be considered as well.

Permittees offered the animal weight improvement argument. In response, Iverson cited research of Lincoln Ellison that demonstrated that range could produce improving animals and still decline, because the animals would shift from preferred species to less palatable plants and even browse on twigs and branches to remain healthy. Under those conditions, however, soil erosion would occur. Ellison concluded that condition of the land rather than of the animals must be taken as the measure of proper stocking.

Following Iverson's adverse decision, the permittees appealed to Chief McArdle who rendered his decision in 1962. The appeal focused basically on two points: (1) the adequacy of range allotment analysis as a means of determining suitable stocking, and (2) the adverse economic impact of the reductions. In reviewing the chief's decision, it is clear that while the permittees' expert witnesses raised a number of questions about the analysis procedures, they could not demonstrate to his satisfaction that the methods used by the Service were unsound or that alternative criteria for measuring suitability of the range were superior. In the Forest Service's view, based on research by the Intermountain Station, about two-thirds of the vegetation should remain after grazing in order to protect the watershed from excessive erosion. In simple terms, the analysis in the Hobble Creek case showed that sufficient vegetation did not remain and that erosion had occurred at an excessive rate. [130]

By 1962, when the appeal went from McArdle to the Secretary of Agriculture, John F. Kennedy had replaced Dwight D. Eisenhower as President and Orville Freeman had supplanted Ezra Taft Benson as Secretary of Agriculture. In sustaining McArdle's decision, Freeman rejected the permittees "sacrifice area" doctrine (that some low-lying areas had to be overgrazed in order to provide adequate use of all range within the allotment) and their allegation that the forest officers had been arbitrary and capricious in their application of allotment procedures. [131]

In retrospect, it seems clear that the policies and practices of the Forest Service contributed to the difficulties on Wasatch Front allotments. [132] For some time after the inauguration of range management under the General Land Office then under the Forest Service, the optimistic attitudes of range managers and permittees led both to believe that prescribed reductions and range rehabilitation would improve the grazing allotments to an acceptable level.

Some improvement in animal forage production did occur, and weights of animals improved. However, in cattle allotments particularly, the livestock would tend to move into the improving range in the bottoms, and improvement would then be noted on the higher slopes. Cattlemen would cite the unused forage on the steep hillsides as evidence that the ranges were underutilized.

The level of improvement that produced such weight gains, however, did not restore the land to a satisfactory condition. In practice, forage could remain on the slopes, and excessive erosion still occur in the bottoms. Research at the Intermountain Station and the introduction of more precise measures of condition and trend through the Parker three-step method provided the data the Service needed to inaugurate the tougher corrective measures required. Ranger Merrill Nielson, for instance, found that only 13 percent of the forage on the steep Hobble Creek allotment could be utilized without excessive erosion.

These management prescriptions violated the expectations of the permittees, and they resisted. In most cases, the Service was able to work out accommodations and get the permittees to accept, however reluctantly, the prescribed reductions and range rehabilitation. Why specifically, then, did the allotments in northern Utah serve as the focus for permittee intransigence? To say that the permittees were independent is no answer as stockmen throughout the region shared that sense of independence. That they were predominantly Mormons does not explain the situation either; the majority of the other permittees in Utah and southeastern Idaho were Mormons as well. In addition, the permittees throughout the region shared the same attitudes about the allotments. In all portions of the region the Forest Service found both permittees who were cooperative and those who were not.

Two reasons seem most important for understanding the exceptionally high rate of appeals from northern Utah. First was the fact that the reductions on the northern Utah forests were announced ahead of many of the others in the region. In William Hurst's view, had substantial reductions on other forests of the region been announced ahead of those in northern Utah, the appeals would have come from the other areas instead. In fact, in Idaho, there was concerted, if less extensive, resistance on the Mann Creek allotment on the Payette and the Sixteen-to-One Allotment on the Boise.

A second factor was the rapidly changing conditions under which the northern Utah stockmen lived. They were predominantly residents of towns and cities, and although the same was true of permittees on the Manti-LaSal, Dixie, and Fishlake, northern Utah was different. Permittees in northern Utah lived not only in the oldest settlements in the region, but also in the most rapidly urbanizing area. They were keenly aware that the way of life they had known was under attack. These had been their allotments. Now recreationists, hunters, wilderness enthusiasts, and other townspeople who feared watershed deterioration more than loss of grazing land seemed to threaten not only the control of lands the stockmen perceived to be theirs, but their livelihood and their way of life. What besides this sort of fear would lead distinguished men like J. Reuben Clark, former solicitor of the State Department and legal advisor to national and international bodies, and Henry D. Moyle, with law degrees from Chicago and Harvard, to assert that land that was clearly the property of the entire United States belonged to and ought to be managed as a matter of right solely by the permittees who used it?

In retrospect, then, it may be most useful to see these northern Utah appeals as the last gasp of a dying way of life as well as the efforts of a group of powerful community leaders to promote their interests. However, the appellants lacked political support. The only major Utah political leader who backed them was Senator Arthur V. Watkins, and significantly, he came from a Wasatch Front city not far from Springville where most of the Hobble Creek permittees lived. Even Governor George D. Clyde, with family connections in Springville, failed to provide support. Secretary of Agriculture and Utah native Ezra Taft Benson insisted on the priority of Forest Service stewardship and multiple-use management (Table 16).

Table 16—Animal-months of livestock grazed in Region 4, 1950-69

Research

It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of research at the Intermountain Station on the development of range allotment analysis and grazing management prescriptions. Perhaps as part of the movement for consolidation, in 1953, the Forest Service extended jurisdiction over what had been the Northern Rocky Mountain Station in Region 1. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration created the Agricultural Research Service in the Department of Agriculture. [133]

Of particular importance was research on range revegetation. Lincoln Ellison, who joined the staff of the Intermountain Station in 1938, led the station in important studies of range ecology and influenced the discipline long after his untimely death in an avalanche near Snow Basin in 1958. [134] Work at the Davis County Experimental Watershed particularly aided in the management of ranges and watersheds throughout the region. Research at the Desert Experimental Range, which had been established near Milford in 1933, showed that proper management could improve forage production and double net income from sheep grazing on salt desert shrub ranges. [135]

Research on timber management centered particularly at the Boise Basin Experimental Forest established in 1933 near Idaho City. Particularly concerned with the regeneration and management of ponderosa pine, its scientists also worked at other locations in the Boise, Payette, and Salmon National Forests. [136] The Town Creek Plantation on the Boise, for instance, was a pilot project in planting ponderosa pine. [137] Other studies published by the Intermountain Station included methods of managing lodgepole pine. [138]

In addition, the region cooperated with the California research station in studies on ponderosa pine. In 1955, Chet Olsen instructed supervisors at various Idaho and Utah forests where ponderosa pine grew to cooperate in collecting seeds for a genetic study to determine conditions under which the seed from various locations would generate and grow. [139]

Besides authorizing funds for range rehabilitation, the Anderson-Mansfield and Granger-Thye Acts authorized expenditures for tree seed, nursery stock, and forest rehabilitation. [140] In the 1950's, all tree seedlings for southwestern Idaho and western Nevada were furnished from outside the region. [141] In 1959, the region established the Lucky Peak Nursery on 296 acres near Lucky Peak Reservoir about 15 miles east of Boise. In 1960, Lucky Peak began receiving seeds for 10 tree species from throughout the region and producing seedlings that were returned to the place of origin for transplanting. By 1965 the nursery had become the chief supplier of seedlings for the region. [142]

Timber Operations

In managing timber operations in Region 4 during the 1950's, there were several conflicting pressures. First was the need to provide timber to maintain economic stability in the lumbering towns of southwestern Idaho. Second was the problem of erosion and ecological destruction from the construction of timber roads. Third was the need to rehabilitate and replant cutover areas.

Figure 74—Ranger with crested wheatgrass on Meadow Creek Project, 1950's.

The scope of the first problem was quite apparent in a meeting in July 1950 between Regional Forester Olsen and W.L. Robb, assistant regional forester for timber management, and the supervisors and timber staffs of the Boise and Payette. [143] Seventy-six mills then operated adjacent to the two forests. The annual sustained yield cut for both national forests and the nearby private and state land stood at 60 million board feet. The capacity of those mills was far in excess of that volume. Robb thought they ought to "strive for fewer mills," and to place fewer, but relatively "larger units of national forest stumpage on the market periodically, rather than attempt to split available cut into a larger number of small offerings for the possible benefit of a greater number of mills."

Though the report of the meeting does not indicate this, it is apparent that such a policy would place great economic pressure (to bid on national forest timber sales) on smaller marginal operators who could not find timber on private or State land. Olsen hoped to reduce the pressure by encouraging companies to take species other than ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, white fir, and Engelmann spruce. In addition, the regional administration urged the national forests to reoffer unpurchased offerings of stands of timber on a competitive basis instead of negotiating private sales. This would, it was thought, give all companies an equal opportunity. Regional officers suggested that the forests use oral bidding where possible.

Some foresters thought that community stabilization might result from the creation of Federal sustained-yield units at Idaho City, Cascade, and McCall. After study, the only unit actually proposed in Region 4 was at Idaho City. The proposal was killed, largely because of opposition from outside the Idaho City area. [144]

Between 1950 and 1954, Forest Service policy began to shift as the Washington Office pressed for the cutting of a substantially increased volume of timber on the national forests. [145] (For the impact of this pressure on Region 4, see tables 17 and 18.) In 1950 Ira J. Mason, chief of the division of timber management in the Washington Office, made a detailed inspection of the Boise and Payette National Forests. Mason concluded that the two forests were considerably more important for timber production than had been previously acknowledged and that their "sustained yield capabilities appeared much greater than other ponderosa pine areas such as the Black Hills or Coconino Plateau, which had received a great deal more attention." [146] Mason recommended a timber management planning analysis covering the two forests and adjacent areas in the ponderosa pine belt. Also in 1952, Chief McArdle inaugurated a general timber resources review of all national forests. [147]

Table 17—Comparison of quota and actual timber cut in Region 4, selected years 1949-69

Table 18—Commercial transactions of convertible forest products in Region 4, 1950-69

In 1950, on the basis of Mason's recommendation, assistant regional forester Robb assigned Joel L. Frykman, of the Boise National Forest timber staff, to head a study team and Mark M. Johannsen, an assistant ranger, to help. Several personnel changes took place over the 4 years of the study, and Johannsen eventually ended up heading the team and writing the report. The State of Idaho and the Boise-Payette Lumber Company cooperated on the study. The result of the analysis was to increase the estimated allowable cut on the forests of southwestern Idaho by "nearly three times." [148]

Even before completion of the study, pressure mounted to increase timber production there. This was evident in a meeting held between the regional office and personnel from the Boise and Payette forests in April 1953. The meeting was to consider "ways and means to expand the timber sale business on the Boise, Payette, and that part of the Sawtooth within the Boise River drainage." [149]

Several factors seem to have been important in the region's decision to increase the cut substantially. Most important perhaps were (1) the need of the region to follow policy set by the Washington Office and (2) extended pressure on the Forest Service to offer additional timber for sale. [150] In implementing its policy, Washington used a carrot-and-stick approach by offering the regions additional funding on the basis of the projected timber sales and by setting timber sale quotas. [151]

Figure 75—Aspen-log excelsior-bolt-cutting operation near Beaver, Utah, 1950's.

Sharp differences of opinion appeared on the region's ability to sustain this vastly increased timber harvest. These differences led to some personnel changes in 1953 as Lester Moncrief replaced W.L. Robb as assistant regional forester for timber management. [152]

In general, the increased funding went for additional staff to supervise the sales and for timber access road construction. In 1953, the Boise and Payette forests financed 13 assistant ranger positions from appropriations for increased timber sales.

Both the region and the Washington Office recognized that timber access road construction would use the bulk of the money. [153] The regional office estimated, for instance, that it would need to construct more than 200 miles of additional roads in 1954 alone on the Boise, Payette and northwestern Sawtooth to meet its timber quota. [154]

The Washington Office called upon the region to help in lobbying for the appropriations. In 1954, for instance, Ira Mason urged Region 4 to help get money for the road program from the Department and Congress by providing information on the role increased lumbering could play in saving from economic strangulation such single-industry towns as Horseshoe Bend and Emmett. Saving such communities, he said, would sell the road construction program. [155]

This was not, of course, simply propaganda. As George Lafferty put it, most foresters took "a commercial view of 'greatest good.'" Most had grown up in communities where the economy was totally dependent upon the use of national forests. Moreover, they had "grown up during a serious depression" and their "decisions were probably tempered by that experience." Most professional foresters coming into the Service at the time were "imbued with the idea that we would increase the productivity of the nation's forests and make the Nation a better place in which to live." [156]

Although the general public in most of the single-industry towns strongly shared such views, some of the communities greeted the prospect of new roads and additional logging with apprehension. In 1953, the Washington County, Idaho, Farm Bureau passed a resolution opposing increased timber sales because "large-scale operation" would necessitate "extensive road improvements." These farmers thought that while the Service would realize little actual money from sales, since the cost of the roads would have to come out of timber sales receipts, such operations "would injure our watershed and cause accelerated erosion on the area." [157]

Figure 76—Idaho jammer in operation on Sawtooth National Forest.

Moreover, several professional foresters began to question the pressure for additional logging, which they attributed to the "uncritical, almost slavish following of European patterns." In an article in the Journal of Forestry in 1951, Raphael Zon argued that German forestry theory which influenced the American pattern had emphasized monetary returns from lumber and hunting, "neglecting the indirect benefits of the forests such as amelioration of the climate, prevention of erosion, and effect upon agriculture." [158]

Clearly, at least at first, few foresters paid much attention to people with misgivings like the farmers or Zon, and lumbering on the Boise and Payette increased considerably during the 1950's. At the beginning of the decade, the national forests were still heavily immersed in the land-for-timber exchanges with the Boise-Payette Lumber Company. [159] The lumber company, wanting only the best timber in trade, engaged in selective cutting. Later, however, as economies of scale in timber cutting became more important, companies on the Payette began logging in strips, and there was a tendency "to skid right down the draw bottoms in a lot of the cases." This caused "a lot of silt." Still, on the Payette, loggers were not permitted to clearcut. As Dick Leicht reported, "it was all selective cutting." [160] The strip cutting, however, continued to produce erosion damage even though forest officers got good cooperation from the companies and gypos (contract logging companies). [161]

Large companies practicing economies of scale benefited most from these changes. In 1953, the Boise-Payette Lumber Company, after purchasing the Hallack and Howard mills at Cascade, changed its name to Boise Cascade Corporation. [162] (It has survived under that name as the largest lumber company headquartered in the Intermountain Region.)

To meet the demand for increased cuts, economies of scale, ease of slash disposal, and ease of replanting the area, the Boise began to alter its cutting prescriptions, eventually approving clearcutting in ponderosa pine and cutting spruce that could not be managed properly. [163] Johannsen's study had recommended a sustained-yield cut of 131 million board feet. The timber staff on the Boise recommended that the allowable cut be held to approximately 85 million as the basis of the requirements in the multiple-use management plan. In 1956, a timber management plan was drafted for the Boise Working Circle (which included the entire forest), increasing the allowable cut to 129.9 million, a 240-percent increase from the 38 million in 1952. [164] The supervisor, however, did not accept the staff recommendation and succeeded in getting the allowable cut revised again, exceeding even Johannsen's recommended level and eventually reaching 185 million. [165]

To achieve this allowable cut on the Boise, in 1955 the Forest Service implemented what was called "unit area control." This allowed the operator to take all trees on a given plot, i.e., to clearcut. The maximum size of the plots was restricted at first to 5 acres; but, as Ed Noble put it, "like Topsy, it grew." The loggers had to have roads; the contractors had to skid and load the logs. It was generally more economical to clearcut larger areas. In addition, there was a belief that ponderosa pine would regenerate itself properly on the clearcut areas. Initially, companies did most skidding with tractors, but, in the steeper country on the Salmon River, they used cables. [166] In the 1950's, loggers also introduced the Idaho jammer on the Boise. Such logging required a dense pattern of roads. [167]

These and other technological changes allowed considerably more cutting by fewer men in less time. Most important, perhaps, was the perfection of the chain saw, which had been adopted extensively by the 1950's. [168] The use of skid loaders, cranes, and other mechanical devices increased logging efficiency on the Targhee and facilitated the introduction of pulpwood operations in mistletoe-infested overmature lodgepole pine stands on that forest. [169]

The increased tempo of logging necessitated changes in the method of marking trees for cutting. Andy Finn on the Payette remembered that, as a young boy, he had helped his father blaze trees. They had marked every tree with the "U.S." brand and a keel mark. At the time, he was only 4-1/2 feet tall so he marked the trees at nose height rather than at breast height. [170]

Pressure for increased cutting during the 1950's made this method of marking too costly and time consuming. On the Payette, foresters adopted "sample" marking—generally measuring only every fifth tree. [171] Working 12 months of the year and walking on snowshoes during the winter, they marked almost full time. Dick Leicht remembered a practice that was common on all the forests. During the spring and summer, he left the office between six and seven in the morning and returned between six and seven at night. The Service paid nothing for overtime work. Since the Payette timber staff did not have its own transportation, marking crews would generally have to ride the buses transporting the company's saw crews. [172] In 1954, the Targhee and Ashley National Forests conducted a successful experiment using paint guns for marking lodgepole pine. This method became standard practice. [173]

In meeting the increased demand for timber harvest, the Service introduced new methods of scaling. Traditionally, scalers determined the values removed by measuring the cut logs in the woods or in decks at the landings. In 1958, under agreements with Boise Cascade and the Sawtooth Lumber Company of Mountain Home, the region agreed to provide 100 percent scaling at the company's mills, at company expense. With the success of this experiment, the region opened such scaling services at seven major mills. The companies undoubtedly saved money by using this service, since logs could be removed at their discretion rather than having to wait for the scaler in the woods. [174]

The increase in cut was not limited to southwestern Idaho. On the Toiyabe, for instance, the annual cut increased substantially. Before the forest surveys of the mid-1950's, the cut had been at 5 to 8 million board feet per year; afterward it was between 16 and 20 million. Forest Supervisor Ivan Sack felt that volume was too high. [175] On the Ashley, the allowable cut increased substantially as larger operations began replacing small family-owned mills. [176] Pulpwood logging operations on the Targhee increased the cut materially during the early 1950's as the logs were removed by railroad to a Wisconsin pulp mill. [177]

The increased annual allowable cut had less significant impact on the national forests of northern Utah and eastern Nevada. There, much of the timber went for mine props and in cost sales to small users for fences and poles. [178] The annual allowable cut on the Cache, for instance, remained at about 4.5 million board feet, which was less than during the 1940's. [179] On the Uinta most of the 4 million board feet of conifer timber was cut annually on the Heber District, in Strawberry Valley, and on the headwaters of the Provo River. The Uinta also cut about 3 million board feet of aspen annually, which was used for excelsior and moldings. [180]

Watershed Problems

By the late 1950's, it was quite evident that in some areas the rapidly increased volume of logging had produced disastrous effects on watersheds. In building roads rapidly, engineers had paid too little attention to road location and design. This neglect resulted in sluffing, landslides, and unstable roadbeds, with much material being washed into stream channels. On some forests, the dense pattern of roads, particularly those associated with the use of the Idaho jammer, produced excessive undergrowth destruction and consequently accelerated erosion. [181] In a number of cases, inadequate cleanup of the slash and poor selection of skid trail locations took place. This created a visual image that many forest visitors found difficult to accept in addition to the damaging erosion. [182] In addition, the relatively dry microclimatic conditions in southwestern Idaho were not conducive to proper regeneration after clearcutting except in shaded areas. [183] Moreover, the region found successful replanting of certain species, especially spruce, particularly difficult. [184]

By 1956, some forests, such as the Boise, had become greatly concerned with watershed damage and excessive erosion, Previously, the supervisor had pressed for an extensive road system in the belief that roads were necessary for proper forest management. [185] In 1956, however, Supervisor K.D. Flock commissioned a report by Edward L. Noble on methods of dealing with the serious problems that had appeared. Citing such problems, Noble recommended that each forest officer develop criteria for erosion control and that the forest administration place immediate responsibility for such control with the timber sale administrator. To accomplish erosion control, Noble also recommended particular measures such as prohibiting skidding in draws and improving road location and design. [186]

Figure 77—Making an undercut with power saw, Yale Creek drainage sale, 1951.

It would be far too easy to place all the blame for adverse road developments on the regional and national forest engineering staffs. These employees came under constant pressure to get the most roads for the dollar and to construct as many roads as possible for what was then perceived as proper forest management. A report in 1954, for instance, weighed various methods of road construction to prevent economic and social dislocations in southwestern Idaho communities dependent on the logging and lumber industries. [187] A 1956 hearing held by the Idaho State Highway Department, the Bureau of Public Roads, and the Forest Service considered the disposition of FY 1958 forest highway funds. At least half of the 1-day meeting "was devoted to hearing presentations by delegations from various parts of the state advance reasons for construction or improvement of Forest Highway Projects in which they were particularly concerned." [188] Congressional leaders lobbied for roads in their States. A 1959 study by Norman Nybroten and Wade Andrews indicated that more than a fifth of all public roads in Idaho were forest development roads or forest highways. These roads were important to the people of the State. [189]

Behind these developments is the inescapable conclusion that despite both the Forest Service and the public talking about multiple-use management, a considerable reorientation was required for many, inside and outside the Service, to actually think consistently in such terms. A careful reading of Mark Johannsen's report on timber management in southwestern Idaho, for instance, shows virtually no concern for values other than removing mature timber, Frykman and Johannsen seemed unconcerned with the geologic instability of the land or the fragility of the watersheds on which many of the trees grew. [190] Frykman produced a report in 1955 on a proposed boundary extension for the Hoover Wild Area in the Toiyabe National Forest. Although he commented on the nature of the area's geologic formation, he did so only from the standpoint of its influence on the cost of constructing roads and getting logs out, not in terms of potential erosion. [191]

The effort to get forest officers to think in true multiple-use management terms required a basic reorientation to emphasize interdisciplinary rather than single-disciplinary values. Noble indicated that on the Boise, he and others concerned with watershed destruction had a difficult time "trying to convince the engineers and the timber people to control the water from the roads so that . . . [they] didn't get a lot of erosion . . . after construction." Eventually, particularly after the disastrous effects of road construction on the South Fork of the Salmon River, Noble said that engineers "came to appreciate the need" for higher road standards. Their initial concern had been cost, in part at least because of outside pressure. In time they came to realize that the least expensive road might not be the least costly. [192]

In this context, it would be difficult to overestimate the leadership Floyd Iverson gave to the reorientation to multiple-use management. In the words of William Hurst, "Truly, he turned the region around in many respects and started on a course of workable multiple-use management. . . . Under Regional Forester Floyd Iverson's leadership, the application of multiple-use became a systematic procedure with a system for application placed in the hands of every forest officer. This thrust did more than anything else to achieve a uniformity of purpose in the management of the national forests in Region Four." [193]

By the mid-1950's, technological and policy changes in engineering management allowed better road design at lower cost. In 1954 and 1955, when I worked as an engineering aide on a number of national forests in Idaho and Utah, virtually all design was done by Forest Service employees using field data collected on the ground. By 1956, technological improvements such as photogrammetry and stereo planigraphy allowed the location of roads and the design of cuts and fills from aerial photographs. [194] In addition, a shortage of engineers in the Federal Government required considerable contracting for professional engineering services. This sometimes had the added advantage of saving money. [195]

In spite of early difficulties, once the engineers became convinced of the erosion problem, they worked closely with other Service employees to devise solutions. In 1954, for instance, engineers and foresters cooperated in gauging discharges and sediment yields from watersheds with different plant cover on the granitic soils of southwestern Idaho. [196]

In 1955, Forest Service officials, contractors' representatives, State highway officials from the 11 Western States, Park Service employees, and Bureau of Public Roads representatives met at Jackson Lake Lodge in Wyoming to discuss problems of road construction. Davis C. Toothman represented the Boise National Forest. His notes on the meeting emphasized particularly contractor-engineer relations, the effects of highway construction on fish survival, and the location and design of Forest Service roads by photogrammetric methods. [197]

By 1956, the region's engineers had begun distributing bulletins dealing with such topics as methods of erosion reduction on roads in timber sale areas and protection of trout streams during construction. [198] Paul E. Packer of the Intermountain Station, for instance, produced some particularly valuable recommendations for road construction on granitic soils. These recommendations were published and given broad distribution to Region 4 foresters and engineers who put them to use on the ground. [199]

As the Service came under continued pressure to construct roads and the necessarily higher standard roads cost more, it was necessary for Forest Service representatives to explain to public officials and community leaders the need for care in road construction. In October 1957, Regional Forester Floyd Iverson and Regional Engineer Arval L. Anderson took Idaho Senator Henry C. Dworshak and Roscoe C. Rich, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Idaho State Highway Department, on a show-me trip through the Payette and Boise National Forests. The regional officers emphasized particularly "problems incident to road construction along streams and rivers." Anderson pointed out, for instance, that the South Fork of the Payette River was "a particularly striking example of how highly erosive soil can contribute to sedimentation of a stream." [200]

In addition, engineering personnel continued to work with other employees on watershed rehabilitation projects. Congress helped the Service to deal with watershed problems, through the passage of the Flood Control Act of 1950 and the Hope-Aiken Small Watershed Act of 1954. [201] Support from the Eisenhower administration and especially from Secretary Benson facilitated such work in Region 4. [202] Watershed rehabilitation projects were inaugurated throughout the region. [203] The Uinta constructed contour trenches in Santaquin Canyon, and undertook rehabilitation of the watersheds on Provo Peak. [204] Fishlake employees worked on watersheds in various places, including the headwaters of the Glenwood drainage. [205] Restoration work was undertaken on the North Fork of Swift Creek on the Bridger. [206] The people of San Juan County cooperated with the Manti-LaSal in rehabilitating the watershed above Blanding. [207] The Caribou and Targhee cooperated with the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers in planning for watershed protection near Palisades Reservoir. [208] Reseeding was undertaken near Arrowrock Reservoir on the Boise. [209] The Toiyabe restored the Galena Creek watershed on through trenching and reseeding. [210]

Insect Control

In spite of problems with road construction and watershed damage, the Forest Service was still committed to logging the optimum volume of timber. In order to do this, however, it was important to continue to control both insects and fire. While the region continued the attack on insect infestations, perhaps the most important development was the recognition of the limitations of tree-by-tree treatment. In some cases, it was just too expensive or ecologically damaging to try to save every tree from insect destruction. In retrospect, it may be most useful to see this conclusion as consistent with the realization that not every area should be logged because the destructive consequences of road building made the cost too high.

At first, however, this change in perception came slowly, and it took the form of searching for less costly means to contain insect epidemics. On the Wasatch National Forest, for instance, Dick Anderson argued that timber remaining after the beetles got through with it was practically worthless. He proposed that, rather than trying to harvest the timber, a crew should knock it down, pile it in windrows, and burn it. This practice would, it was hoped, kill most of the remaining insects and militate against further epidemic destruction. [211]

In addition, the Service began more carefully to control the use of insecticides. Particular care was taken to minimize damage to fish and wildlife habitat by working closely with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and State fish and game agencies. [212] Although the Service continued to use powerful insecticides, it also paid more attention to the work of natural enemies such as woodpeckers and parasitic insects. [213]

Figure 78—Fire crew on the Corn Creek fireline.

Firefighting

While fire was used to eradicate pinyon-juniper and sagebrush in some areas, there was no tendency to allow wildfires to run unchecked. The major changes in fire-fighting in the 1950's were improvements in fire control technology. A major concern was to monitor expenses, as it cost three times as much to hire fire crews in 1951 as in 1940. [214] To determine the areas where fire control forces might be needed, the Service developed fire prediction indexes based on the degree of curing of cheatgrass and the relationship between temperature and humidity. [215] To provide faster response, the Service began using helicopters and airtankers in addition to the time-honored smokejumpers. At first the tankers dropped a slurry of sodium calcium borate that clung to vegetation and helped to cool the fire so ground crews could gain control of it. [216] In 1960, bentonite replaced borate, after it was discovered that the borate sterilized the soil. [217] Helicopters sped firefighters and equipment to the fire. The region made more extensive use of bulldozers, trenchers, tractors with plows, power brush cutters, and portable radios. [218] Monetary savings came also from the increased use of Mexican nationals and Native Americans on large project fires. Bringing these large crews from distant areas sometimes created considerable logistical problems. The Payette, for instance, worked out a system of feeding as many as 500 people at a time on a 24-hour basis. [219] In 1955 the Boise, together with eight forests in other regions, began to experiment with what was called the Increased Manning Experiment. The national forest hired special firefighting crews that worked on various projects around the national forests when not engaged in firefighting. [220] These experiments helped in cutting both costs and burned acreage. [221]

After each fire, fire control officers filed a report analyzing the reasons for success and failure and suggesting improvements for future reference. A report on the Wallace Canyon fire on the Toiyabe in July and August 1959 provides an example. On the negative side, the report revealed that the fire had burned unchecked for 6 hours before anyone reported it, and coordination of the fire crews had been unsatisfactory. On the other hand, coordination with agencies outside the Forest Service was excellent, particularly with the Air Force and the Clark County Sheriff's office. The critique session included personnel from all ranger districts on the forest. [222]

Figure 79—Esther and Hank Holverson with fire finder on Twin Peaks Lookout.

Recreation

In spite of the disdain in which some stockmen held recreationists, forest recreation had become a major component of multiple-use management by the 1950's. In a sense, stockmen had to learn the same lesson that timber management personnel and engineers did—multiple use had come to stay and all appropriate uses had to be considered in management prescriptions. In 1957, the Service reorganized its staff system in the forest supervisors' offices by authorizing needed branch chief positions, and those forests with large recreation loads appointed a recreation and lands branch chief. [223] In 1957, also, the region published a recreation handbook that provided instructions on resource plans, types of recreation areas, and various other matters. [224]

The explosion of recreation in the 1950's was nothing less than phenomenal. In the Forest Service as a whole, recreation visits increased by 213 percent from 26 million in 1949 to 81.5 million in 1959. [225] In order to meet the need for recreation services, the Washington Office inaugurated its Operation Outdoors program in 1957. Patterned after the National Park Service's Mission 66, this 10-year program was designed to improve existing recreation facilities and to construct new ones to meet expanding needs. [226]

In June 1958, Congress established the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, charged with reporting on future outdoor recreation and suggesting policies and programs to meet needs. [227] Although Region 4 did not play a central role in the work of the commission, it did help facilitate a change in attitude about the role of recreation on the national forests. [228] Many of the influential members of the commission had serious doubts about the role of the Forest Service in outdoor recreation. Many thought that the Service had neither the interest nor ability to properly manage recreation.

All meetings of the commission were held in Washington except one that Chairman Lawrence Rockefeller planned for Jackson Lake Lodge. The Park Service and Forest Service had the duty of organizing and conducting four field trips in connection with the Jackson meeting. Three of those trips were organized by Region 4 officers—commission and Washington Office officials were taken to the Targhee, to Palisades Reservoir on the Caribou, and to what would soon become the Bridger Wilderness. The precise role of Region 4 in convincing dubious commission members that the Service could provide excellent recreation management is not known; nevertheless, the commission's final report praised Forest Service recreational management, and few have seriously questioned the Service's role in recreation since that time.

Winter sports use, particularly downhill skiing, soared in the 1950's. On the Wasatch, Supervisor Koziol participated in a variety of organizations including the 1952 Olympic Ski Committee and the National Ski Association. [229] In the winter of 1949-50, the Wasatch held its first avalanche forecasting and control training school at Alta. [230] The Toiyabe approved development of the Slide Mountain winter sports area. [231] At Jackson Hole on the Teton, developers had started with a rope tow shortly after World War II: by 1965, an elaborate tramway was under construction. [232] The Beaver Mountain area opened on the Cache in 1951. [233] Snow Basin continued to be of particular importance on the Cache. [234] Developments continued at the Bald Mountain Ski Area at Sun Valley, which affected the Sawtooth National Forest. [235]

Other types of recreation grew in importance. On the Cache, camping and water sports facilities were developed around Pineview Reservoir. [236] Camping expanded in the Jarbidge Mountains on the Humboldt, and camp sites had to be improved. [237] Increased hiking on Mount Timpanogos on the Uinta, and especially the annual Timp Hike in which more than 1,500 people participated, necessitated the construction of a shelter at Emerald Lake and constant vigilance because of trail damage and pollution problems. [238] Of extreme importance to the Toiyabe was the development of recreation facilities at Nevada Beach. [239] The Targhee and Caribou developed and operated major picnicking, camping, and water sports facilities at Palisades Reservoir, using funds furnished by the Bureau of Reclamation. [240]

In connection with Operation Outdoors, each forest recommended various recreation, construction, and rehabilitation projects. In FY 1958, the second year in the cycle, the region allocated $925,035 to the various forests in amounts ranging from $4,747 for the Humboldt to $106,715 for the Toiyabe. [241]

In cooperating with the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, the region developed a means of providing needed statistics on recreation use. William O. Deshler, then on the Bridger, and Vern Kupfer of the Dixie designed a statistical system to convert the number of cars and camps into visitor-days for reporting purposes. [242]

Important also to recreation was the increased public interest in wilderness areas. It should be understood that substantial portions of these areas were not pristine. As Dick Leicht put it in discussing the High Uintas Primitive Area, "you could see man's hands all the way through it." One night, with his pack animals and saddle horse, he came to Five Points Lake. He expected to see sheep grazing in the area, but instead found 56 head of horses. Drawing closer, he came upon a troop of Boy Scouts. This, he said, was a good example of one of the wilderness area's major problems—grazing around lakes, not only by cattle or sheep, but also by recreation animals. [243] While Bill Hurst was supervisor on the Ashley, forest officers made a concerted effort to keep motorized vehicles out of the High Uintas Primitive Area. They had major problems with irrigation companies that wanted to use motorized vehicles in maintaining reservoirs constructed prior to the designation of the primitive area. In general, the forest officers were successful in getting the irrigators to use horse-drawn equipment for maintenance, arguing that the dams had been constructed without motorized vehicles. [244]

In some areas, a major control problem existed with packers or outfitter guides. As late as 1951, Idaho had no licensing for such services, and the special use permits issued by the Forest Service for a base camp did not adequately cover the cleanup of side camps. Neither did the permits ensure adequate quality for the services provided. [245]

By 1954, Idaho had inaugurated licensing, and the Idaho State Outfitters and Guides Association lobbied to secure the passage of national legislation to protect the interests of its members. Such a law would have allowed district rangers to "allot certain exclusive territory to each qualified outfitter or packer." The association also lobbied, with the Idaho legislature, to require that any license be issued only if approved by three licensed outfitters who resided within the same district as the applicant. [246]

Wildlife

Closely allied with other forms of recreation, hunting and associated wildlife management continued to be extremely important in Region 4. In recognition of this importance, Region 4, along with most other regions, added a full-time wildlife specialist to the staff in 1958, complementing the increased status given to recreation on the forests the year before. [247]

Perhaps the most important development in wildlife management was the establishment of close cooperation between Federal and State agencies in Idaho, Wyoming, and Nevada to help create the relatively amicable relationships already established through the Board of Big Game Control in Utah. [248] Cooperation in eastern Wyoming had existed since 1945, but was not extended to the western portion of the State until 1948. Interagency meetings were held on a trial basis in Idaho beginning in 1953 and made permanent in 1954, In 1955, Nevada became the last State in Region 4 to adopt interagency cooperation. [249]

Another important development was the extension of range allotment analysis to wildlife management. The forests set up three-step transects, along with browse utilization study plots and game enclosures, all of which were used to study the feeding habits of big game. [250] Studies undertaken cooperatively by the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Utah State Fish and Game department, and Utah State Agriculture College tried to determine the competition between cattle and deer on common summer range. They found that areas heavily grazed by cattle were also heavily used by deer. The only exceptions were on steep slopes and in oak and sagebrush types where the cattle preferred not to graze. Still, the results indicated a serious management problem on overgrazed ranges. [251]

Figure 80 —Construction of ski lift on Bald Mountain, Union Pacific special-use permit, 1957.

Because of rapidly disappearing winter range for big game, the region undertook a number of reseeding projects. On the Payette, for instance, a heavy starvation of deer in 1949 led to a cooperative project between the Idaho Fish and Game Department and the Intermountain Station to study the feasibility of planting browse species to restore the winter range. The study found that bitterbrush met the requirements needed for such feed, and experimental plantings were undertaken. The researchers found, however, that the still excessive game population made continued revegetation difficult. [252] Continued studies in Utah indicated that with adequate protection of young plants, range managers could successfully replant with fourwing saltbush, cliffrose, big sagebrush, rabbitbrush, and curlleaf mountain mahogany as well. [253]

In spite of the cooperation between the Forest Service and other State and Federal agencies, populations of certain big game animals continued to increase in some areas during the 1950's. William O. Deshler indicated that elk competed to an even greater extent with cattle on the Bridger. [254] In the four States covered by Region 4, the number of deer increased 16 percent from 556,000 in 1955 to 647,000 in 1958. Utah reinstituted an either-sex hunt in 1952, and Wyoming allowed a bag limit of two deer. In spite of these extremely serious problems, some hunters still opposed the efforts to reduce the number of deer. [255]

Range managers continued to experience serious problems with predators considered undesirable by various groups. Sheep herders insisted that the Fish and Wildlife Service continue to try to eradicate coyotes on national forest lands using poison formula 1080. [256] Because 1080 also kills other animals that eat the poisoned meat used as bait for the coyotes, numerous complaints were voiced on the use of the poison, but sheepmen considered these complaints unfounded. Hence, 1080 continued to be used through the 1950's. [257]

The other major area of concern was the large number of unclaimed mules, burros, and horses roaming the rangelands in portions of the region, particularly in Nevada. These animals competed with permitted livestock for range and in some areas damaged ranges and watersheds. Opinion was divided on the disposition of these animals. Ranchers and forest officers generally favored their roundup and removal. Some other people saw these "wild" animals as legitimate occupants of the public lands. On some ranges, roundup and removal proved to be unfeasible. In 1950, at Forest Service urging, Agriculture Secretary Charles Brannan issued a closure order from June through December for portions of Nye, Eureka, and Lander counties in the Toiyabe. The order authorized forest officers to shoot trespassing horses. Rangers killed approximately 400 horses under the order. Similar actions to remove lesser numbers of horses were undertaken on other national forests, including the Ashley and the Challis, during the early 1950's. Some difficulties occurred, such as one case where a ranger killed several horses belonging to a rancher from Austin that were grazing legitimately. [258]

Special uses continued to increase in Region 4. In Logan Canyon on the Cache, for instance, nine new homes were constructed in 1952—the largest number ever erected in a year. Seven other homes were erected between 1952 and 1962 when a moratorium was placed on home permits. [259] When the Charleston Mountain area was transferred to the Toiyabe, Supervisor Ivan Sack wondered about the number of summer homes in Kyle and Lee canyons that were located on sites highly desirable for public recreation. [260] Other uses, including microwave and television relays, became increasingly important. [261] Major new power transmission lines were constructed through the national forests especially in connection with the various Bureau of Reclamation dams. [262]

Figure 81—Artist painting view of Stanley Lake and McGowan Peak.

Mining

With the increasing complexity of multiple-use management for watershed, range, timber, wildlife, special uses, and recreation came also an added responsibility for mining. Increased prospecting for minerals, particularly petroleum and uranium, was coupled with additional Forest Service responsibilities under the Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955. Under the act, unless some question existed as to the validity of a claim located prior to 1955, the claimant was free to mine just as before. On claims located after July 1955, the claimant's right to locate and mine minerals, except certain common materials like sand, gravel, and pumice, was not impaired. The act, however, required the Forest Service to manage the surface values until the claim went to patent, at which time the private rights of the owner were obtained. [263]

The principal conflicts in administration of surface lands on mining claims came when other surface uses conflicted with mining uses or when the claims had been fraudulently filed in order to gain control of the surface rights. Usually, fraudulent filing occurred when people tried to get title to or use of the timber or of a summer home or hunting cabin site. [264] Forest officers undertook an active program to investigate related surface uses in order to gain the necessary information needed to substantiate the legitimacy of the claim and for management of surface areas. [265]

Uranium mining affected the Manti-LaSal more than any other forest. By August 1955, the development of mining claims in that national forest had gone forward at a rapid pace. Four-fifths of the commercial stands of timber in southeastern Utah, or roughly 50 to 60 million board feet, were covered by uranium claims. In general, however, the forest had little difficulty in securing cooperation of the miners in removing any timber that hampered mining operations. [266]

During the late 1950's, a number of forests were "plastered" with oil and gas leases. Inspections and paper work in such cases added additional burdens to forest officers. On the Uinta, most oil exploration took place in the Strawberry Valley, Duchesne, and Currant Creek areas. [267] Oil prospecting accompanied by considerable seismic geologic work also was common on the Ashley. [268]

The region's other principal leasable mineral claims were on the Caribou, and to a lesser extent on the Targhee. In these areas, extensive phosphate deposits played a major role in determining management as the forest set standards for permits allowing phosphate exploration and mining, with provisions to prevent needless damage and to provide for rehabilitation of watershed, range, and other values. [269]

Summary

By 1960, Region 4 had advanced fully into multiple-use management, but with a diverse pattern of movement. Although the region had been moving toward multiple-use management of grazing, recreation, watershed, minerals, wildlife, and most other activities since the earliest years, multiple-use principles lagged behind in timber management.

The major problem in most areas, particularly range management, wildlife management, mining, and watershed management, was in arriving at a complete understanding of all such multiple-use values on the part of forest users and their political allies. Forest officers already were convinced of the need for multiple-use management relating to such values.

In timber management, however, many foresters, especially those in the Washington Office, as well as timber users and politicians, had yet to accept the need to temper their desire to get the timber cut with recognition of the need for protection of the land's other values. Quite a number of forest officers, especially those in line positions such as William Hurst and Floyd Iverson, shared Ed Noble's concerns and recognized the problems involved in excessively ambitious timber production goals; many, however, did not. Hurst, who was serving as supervisor on the Ashley National Forest in 1954, admitted that instructions from the assistant regional forester for timber management disturbed him so much that he "deliberately failed" to distribute them to his rangers. [270]

For those who failed to follow the examples set by Noble, Hurst, and Iverson, three factors seem to have been most important. First was the desire to try to preserve single-industry lumber towns from the boom and bust development that had occurred in other timber areas. Second was the heavy pressure from the Washington Office to increase the region's sustained-yield cut quite substantially. Third, although perhaps less important by the 1950's, was the education of many foresters, including some in influential supervisory positions, in the German forestry model, which posited that harvesting overaged timber took priority over the need to recognize other values.

The lack of attention to geologic and climatic conditions in road construction and timber harvesting had particularly serious consequences for watershed, scenic, and wildlife values. Overcoming this problem required regionwide recognition that a truly interdisciplinary approach is essential in multiple-use management. The degree of success Floyd Iverson and the foresters of Region 4 had in achieving this goal will become apparent in Chapter 9.

Reference Notes

1. Floyd Iverson to Harry H. Van Winkle, December 11, 1958, File: General Integrating Inspection Report, Teton National Forest, July 28-August 19, 1958, Historical Files, Bridger-Teton.

2. Salt Lake Tribune, March 10, 11, 1957; Deseret News, March 10, 1957; Ogden Standard-Examiner, March 10, 1957, in Historical Files, Fishlake.

3. Salt Lake Tribune, March 10, 1957

4. It is true, of course, that W.B. Rice spent his early years outside Region 4, but virtually all his administrative experience was gained in the region.

5. Ivan Sack interview by Mary Ellen Glass, November 1974-March 1975, p. 107, Special Collections, University of Nevada at Reno Library.

6. Kenneth O. Maughan interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, p. 67, Historical Files, Regional Office.

7. Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1960).

8. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, pp. 47-64.

9. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, p. 67.

10. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, pp. 76-77.

11. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, pp. 80-86.

12. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, Chapter 4.

13. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, Chapter 5.

14. Kaufman, Forest Ranger, Chapter 6.

15. Forest Service Report, 1951, pp. 69-70; 1957, p. 18.

16. Howard Hopkins and Lloyd Swift, "Report on General Integrating Inspection, Intermountain Region and Forest and Range Experiment Station," July 1955, Regional Office Records, Record Group (RG) 95, Denver Federal Records Center (FRC).

17. Ibid and file: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, General Integrating Inspection Report, Region Four, "A Report on Forest Watershed Range and Related Resource Conditions and Management, Intermountain Region 1955," H. Hopkins and L. W. Swift, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

18. Hopkins and Swift, "General Integrating Inspection," 1955.

19. On this point see General Integrating Inspection Reports for Teton, 1955 and 1958, Historical Files, Bridger-Teton; Uinta, 1958, File: Inspection (GII- Uinta, Moncrief-Wright, 1958), Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; Humboldt 1953 GII, File: 1440, Inspection, Grazing Records, Humboldt.

20. Lyle F. Watts to Regional Foresters and Directors, May 25, 1950, File: D- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

21. See, for instance, C. J. Olsen to Forest Supervisors and Division Chiefs, February 23, 1954, File: D- Supervision, Boise, Annual Plan of Work, CY 1954, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

22. C. J. Olsen to Assistant Regional Foresters and Forest Supervisors, February 7, 1956, File: D- Supervision, Boise, Annual Plan of Work, CY 1956, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

23. K. D. Flock to Rangers 1 thru 10, n.d. [1954], File: D- Supervision, Boise, Annual Plan of Work, CY 1954, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

24. Olsen to Forest Supervisors and Division Chiefs, February 23, 1954, File: D- Supervision, Boise, Annual Plan of Work, CY 1954, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

25. Sack interview, pp. 122-23; Ivan Sack interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, pp. 37-39, Historical Files, Regional Office.

26. Clarence S. Thornock interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, Historical Files, Regional Office.

27. See "Snake River-Green River Subregion: Multiple-Use Management Guide" (Ogden, Utah: USDA, FS, 1959), passim, Historical Files, Wasatch-Cache.

28. C. J. Olsen to RM, TM, E, O, May 9, 1951, and attached responses, File: D- Supervision, General, April 1 to June 30, 1951, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. In 1952 a committee to review funds control and operating plan procedures also was appointed and made recommendations, See: Committee to Regional Forester, December 10, 1952, File: O- Supervision, General, July 1, 1952, to December 31, 1952, ibid.

29. The regional office records in RG 95 of the Denver FRC contain a great deal of correspondence during the early 1950's on this matter.

30. C. J. Olsen to Forest Supervisors, Division Chiefs, February 28, 1951, File: 1680, History, Personnel Management (6100), Historical Files, Regional Office.

31. Historical Files, Regional Office.

32. G. L. Watts to Regional Forester, March 25, 1957, File: Targhee NF History, File 2, Historical Files, Targhee.

33. Watts to Regional Forester, April 24, 1957, File: Targhee NF History, File 2, Historical Files, Targhee.

34. Robert L. Safran interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 67-70, Historical Files, Regional Office.

35. Don C. Braegger interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 13, 18, Historical Files, Regional Office.

36. Edward Noble interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1985, pp. 19-20, Historical Files, Regional Office.

37. Noble interview, p. 20.

38. Noble interview, pp. 54-55; A. Russell Croft, History of the Davis County Experimental Watershed (n.p., 1981), p. 42. Copy in the author's possession.

39. Maughan interview, p. 67.

40. "Making Multiple-Use Management Work!" (1956), File: 1680, Multiple-Use Management, Historical Files, Regional Office; "Progress Through Cooperation & Teamwork" (1958), Historical Files, Lands and Recreation Library, Regional Office.

41. Sack interview, pp. 126-28; Sack interview, (Alexander), pp. 33-34.

42. C. J. Olsen to the record, November 6, 1950, File: D- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

43. Wallace F. Bennett to C. J. Olsen, July 13, 1951, with attachments, and Olsen to Bennett, July 17, 1951, File: D- Supervision, General, July 1-September 30, 1951, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

44. Sack interview (Alexander), pp. 41-43.

45. Floyd Iverson to Chief, Forest Service, May 3, 1957, File: 1 Modoc Forest 1957, 2 Lehman Caves, 3 Great Basin National Park, Historical Files, Toiyabe. Press release, June 27, 1957, File: Information and Education, Historical Files, Humboldt.

46. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 52.

47. Floyd Iverson to Chief, May 3, 1957, Historical Files, Toiyabe.

48. Forest Service Report, 1952, p. 37.

49. Sack interview (Alexander), p. 42.

50. John T. Mathews to the Record, May 24, 1954, File: Targhee NF History, File 2, Targhee.

51. James Jacobs interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 56-58, Historical Files, Regional Office.

52. Richard Leicht interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 17-18, Historical Files, Regional Office.

53. Harold K. Steen, The U. S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 274.

54. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 35: William W. Rowley, U.S. Forest Service Grazing and Rangelands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1985), p. 210. The one change in the grazing advisory boards required that a wildlife representative be appointed. William D. Hurst interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, p. 49, Historical Files, Regional Office.

55. E. J. Fjeldsted to C. J. Olsen, March 20, 1950, plus attachments, File: D- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. This inquiry had resulted from charges by Senator Pat McCarran that the USFS was diverting money that ought to have gone to counties for schools and roads under the 25 percent fund.

56. Humboldt National Forest, Supervisor's Annual Narrative Report, December 28, 1950, File: 2270, Records and Reports, Current Files, Humboldt.

57. See particularly "Transcript of Hearing on National Forest Use, December 18, 1951, Salt Lake City, Utah, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, Conducting," Typescript, n.p., Historical Files, Fishlake (hereinafter cited as Watkins hearings); and I. M. Varner to Regional Forester, December 20, 1951, File: D- Supervision, General (October 1-December 31, 1951, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

58. Steen, Forest Service, p. 274.

59. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 42.

60. Steen, Forest Service, pp. 274-76; Forest Service Report, 1953, pp. 16-17. In addition, the service had considerable difficulty in administering transfer reductions, particularly on inter-family and inter-generational transfers. See Jacobs interview, pp. 64-65.

61. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 16.

62. Forest Service Report, 1953, pp. 12-13.

63. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 14.

64. Forest Service Report, 1953, pp. 8, 15.

65. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 8: Rowley, Grazing, p. 488.

66. Kenneth R. Genz interview by Thomas G. Alexander, May 1984, p. 13, Historical Files, Regional Office.

67. Hurst interview, p. 7.

68. Unbound typescript of chapters from 1958 range allotment analysis handbook, File: G-Management, Toiyabe, 1958-1959, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC. (Hereinafter cited as Range Allotment Analysis Handbook, 1958.)

69. Range Analysis Handbook, 1958, pp. 19-23.

70. Irwin H. "Hap" Johnson interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, in author's possession; Allotment Analysis Handbook, 1958, Chapter 4, pp. 1-6.

71. See: File: Bridger National Forest, No, 2, Grazing Allotment Analysis, Condition and Trend Map, Usability Map, Forms 12-R4, Summary Sheet, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. This is similar to records found for other forests.

72. See for instance Ernest H. Taylor to Regional Forester, November 26, 1951, with attachments, File: G-Management, Humboldt Grazing Allotment Analysis, Grazing Files, Humboldt; Evan P. Murray to Floyd Iverson, September 25, 1956, File: 6150, Historical Library, Historical Items (General) Bridger, 1900-1940, Historical Files, Bridger-Teton; Irwin H. Johnson to Floyd Iverson, October 25, 1955, File: G-Management, Sawtooth, Grazing Allotment Analysis, Grazing Records, Sawtooth; Mont E. Lewis to Floyd Iverson, November 18, 1955, File: G-Management, Payette, Grazing Allotment Analysis, Pierson Collection, Payette.

73. Ivan Sack to Regional Forester, December 20, 1951, File: G-Management, Toiyabe, Reports, 1951, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

74. C. J. Olsen to Forest Supervisors and Rangers, November 2, 1956, File: G-Revegetation, Boise, General, CY 1956, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

75. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 41. Before the passage of the Anderson-Mansfield Act, such projects had been minimal because of the shortage of funds. Sack interview, p. 144.

76. Jacobs interview, pp. 54, 63.

77. Noble interview, pp. 32-34.

78. S. L. Cuskelly, "Report of Range Reseeding Accomplishments, Region 4, Calendar Year 1955" (MS, March 1956), File: G- Revegetation, Boise, General, CY 1956, Boise National Forest Records, Seattle FRC.

79. This summary is based on the reading of a number of reports by rangers and the decisions in various cases.

80. Thornock interview, pp. 10-16.

81. Hanmer Christensen interview by Arnold R. Standing, April 1965, p. 7, Historical Files, Regional Office; Carl Haycock interview by Marie Loosle, March 1974, pp. 30-31, Historical Files, Fishlake.

82. Leicht interview, pp. 25-28.

83. Jack Wilcox interview by Gary Schaffran, June 1984, p. 3, Historical Files, Humboldt.

84. John F. Hooper, Lee A. Bennett, Walter W. "Pete" Pierson, Rodman N. Barker, Frank Youngblood, James W. Camp, Earl F. Dodds, Kenneth D. Weyers, and Ralph A. "Andy" Finn interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 10-12, Historical Files, Regional Office (hereinafter cited as Weyers interview): Foyer Olsen interview by Thomas Alexander, March 1984, pp. 6-8, Historical Files, Regional Office.

85. Howard R. Foulger to ranger districts, January 30, 1957, File: 1300, Management, Grazing: Fairview, Mount Pleasant, Manti-LaSal.

86. Noble interview, pp. 28-31.

87. J. G. Kooch to Regional Forester, December 28, 1950, File: G- Management Reports, Payette, 1944-1952, Pierson Collection, Payette.

88. "Transcription of Hearing Held at Boise, Idaho, January 30, 1951," File: G- Management, Adjustments: Payette, Pierson Collection, Payette.

89. Floyd Iverson to Payette, November 19, 1959, with attachments, File: General Functional Inspection Report, Payette National Forest, Pierson Collection, Payette.

90. This information was received with a promise of anonymity for the person who supplied it.

91. Oliver Cliff, "General Functional Inspection, Sawtooth National Forest, September 8 to 20, 1957," with attachments indicating follow-up, File: General Functional Inspection, Sawtooth National Forest, Grazing Records, Sawtooth.

92. Floyd Iverson, Inspection, Boise, December 21, 1956, File: 1440, Inspection, GFI, Boise National Forest, Boise National Forest Records, Seattle FRC.

93. Ivan Sack to Regional Forester, January 20, 1956, File: G-Management, Toiyabe Reports, 1955, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

94. Noble interview, pp. 28-31.

95. Leicht interview, p. 11.

96. Noble interview, p. 31.

97. Floyd Iverson to Charles P. Olson, September 5, 1958, with attachment, File: G- Management, Toiyabe, General, 1958-1959, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC. Charles S. Peterson and Linda E. Speth, "A History of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest" (MS, Report for the Wasatch-Cache National Forest, 1980), p. 216.

98. Jacobs interview, p. 61.

99. Ivan L. Dyreng, Memorandum for the Files, February 24, 1950, File: 1- Supervision, Church Affiliations, Manti- FD 15, Manti-LaSal.

100. Ivan L. Dyreng to First Presidency, February 14, 1950, File: 1- Supervision, Church Affiliations, Manti- FD 15, Manti-LaSal.

101. Ivan L. Dyreng, Memorandum for the Files, February 23, 1950, and Julian R. Thomas to Forest Supervisor, February 27, 1950, File: 1- Supervision, Church Affiliations, Manti- FD 15, Manti-LaSal.

102. Robert H. Park to Regional Forester, March 22, 1950, File: 1- Supervision, Church Affiliations, Manti- FD 15, Manti-LaSal.

103. Rowley, Forest Service Grazing and Rangelands, p. 201.

104. On Benson's career as Secretary of Agriculture see: Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Ezra Taft Benson and the Politics of Agriculture: The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961 (Danville, IL.: Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1975).

105. Hurst interview, pp. 22-23.

106. This interpretation of the change in Clark's views is based on comments by William Hurst on a draft of the manuscript.

107. The following is based on J. Reuben Clark, Jr., Grazing on the National Forests (Salt Lake City: Utah Cattlemen's Association, n.d.), Copy in the papers of James Jacobs, Ogden, UT.

108. This interpretation of his motivation is based on comments of William Hurst on a version of the manuscript.

109. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," pp. 215-16. See: In the Matter of the Reduction of the Permittees of the Grantsville Cattle Allotment, Appeal from Decision of Ranger to Advisory Board of the Wasatch National Forest, September 28, 1957, File: FD 4, Grazing Controversy, 1957-58, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

110. Jacobs interview, pp. 68-69.

111. Hurst interview, p. 40.

112. Transcripts of talks given by J. Reuben Clark, Jr., and Ezra Taft Benson, April 5, 1958, in the possession of James Jacobs, Ogden, UT.

113. Dean A. Gardner interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 8-14, Historical Files, Regional Office.

114. Dean A. Gardner to James L. Jacobs, December 9, 1957, File: FD 4, Grazing Controversy, 1957-58, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

115. Felix C. Koziol interview by A. R. Standing, May 1965, p. 8, Historical Files, Regional Office.

116. James L. Jacobs to the Record, December 6, 1957, File: FS 4, Grazing Controversy, 1957-58, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

117. I have gone through clipping files kept by James Jacobs, and while the controversy involved a great many people, the issues were essentially as I have indicated above.

118. Salt Lake Tribune, December 15, 1957, Clipping file, FD 4, Grazing Controversy, 1957-58, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

119. Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1958, and Ogden Standard-Examiner, January 3, 1958, Clipping file, FD 4, Grazing Controversy, 1957-1958, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

120. Salt Lake Tribune, January 9, 1958, Clipping file, FD 4, Grazing Controversy, 1958-59, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

121. Gardner interview, p. 12.

122. Jacobs interview, p. 41.

123. Victor K. Isbell, Historical Development of the Spanish Fork Ranger District ([Spanish Fork, Utah]: Spanish Fork Ranger District, 1972), p. 67. For a detailed description of the changes see Merrill Nielson, "My Forest Service Career," MS, July 26, 1960, especially pp. 13-16, Historical Files, Uinta.

124. Richard E. McArdle, "Decision on the Appeal of the Permittees of the Hobble Creek Cattle Allotment, Uinta National Forest, to the Chief, Forest Service, from a Decision of the Regional Forester, Ogden, Utah, F. S. Docket No. 22," February 28, 1962, Hobble Creek File, in possession of James Jacobs, Ogden, UT, (Hereinafter cited as Hobble Creek File.)

125. Nielson, "My Career," pp. 15-16.

126. C. S. Thornock to Permittees, February 11, 1959, File: Hobble Creek Cattle Allotment Grazing Appeal Case, 1959-1962, Hobble Creek File.

127. Sunday Herald (Provo) February 15, 1959, Hobble Creek File.

128. Jacobs interview, pp. 66-67.

129. The following is based on Floyd Iverson to Permittees, November 10, 1959, Hobble Creek File.

130. McArdle, "Decision on the Appeal of the Permittees of the Hobble Creek Cattle Allotment."

131. Orville L. Freeman, "Decision on Appeal of the Permittees of the Hobble Creek Allotment to the Secretary of Agriculture from a Decision of the Chief, Forest Service, Forest Service Docket No. 22," November 20, 1962, Hobble Creek File.

132. I am particularly grateful to William D. Hurst and James L. Jacobs for their comments on my analysis of the grazing situation in a draft of this study. Their comments have led me to rethink some of my conclusions.

133. Laurence E. Lassen, Joseph F. Pechanec, R. Duane Lloyd, Carter B. Gibbs, Louise Kingsbury interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 9-10, Historical Files, Regional Office.

134. Wendell M. Keck, Great Basin Station: Sixty Years of Progress in Range and Watershed Research (Ogden, UT: Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, 1972), pp. 20-21, 25, 27-29, 35.

135. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 47.

136. The Boise Basin Experimental Forest: For Better Forest Management (Ogden, UT: Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, 1956).

137. Elizabeth M. Smith, History of the Boise National Forest, 1905-1976 (Boise: Idaho State Historical Society, 1983), p. 88.

138. David Tackle, "Lodgepole Pine Management in the Intermountain Region" (Ogden, UT: Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, 1953).

139. C. J. Olsen to various forests, August 15, 1955, File: S— Studies, Genetics, etc., 1955, 1956, 1957, Forest Studies File, Non-current Files, Payette.

140. Forest Service Report, 1950, pp. 35, 40.

141. Annual Planting and Stand Improvement Report, FY 1951, Region Four, File: S- Planting- Annual Report, 1943-1952, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

142. Smith, Boise, pp. 66-67.

143. The following discussion is based on W. L. Robb, Memorandum for Files, July 6, 1950, File: S- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

144. News release, November 29, 1954, File: S- Plans, Federal Units 354, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

145. In 1949, the estimated allowable sustained yield cut was 169,150 M. The actual cut was 134,431 M. The Boise, however, exceeded its allowable cut by 11 percent (34,800 M. and 38,663 M.) and the Payette by 46 percent (24,400 M. and 35,534 M.). Division of Timber Management Data, September 7, 1950, File: S-Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

146. The following is based on: Mark M. Johannsen, "The Southwest Idaho Timber Management Study, 1950-1954," File 1680, History, Timber Management (2400), Historical Files, Regional Office.

147. Steen, Forest Service, p. 286.

148. The estimate for the Boise was 131,000 M., for the Payette 50,000 M., and for the northwestern Sawtooth 10,000 M.

149. W. L. Robb, Memorandum for Files, May 12, 1953, File: S- Sales, General, 1953, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

150. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 38.

151. Howar Hopkins to Regional Forester, April 28, 1952, File: S- Sales, 1952, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

152. Comment on a version of the manuscript by William D. Hurst.

153. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 38; 1953, p. 22.

154. W. L. Robb, Memorandum for Files, May 12, 1953, File: S- Sales- General, 1953, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

155. Ira J. Mason to Region 4, April 14, 1954, File: S- Sales- General, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

156. George Lafferty interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 7-8, Historical Files, Regional Office.

157. K. D. Flock to Regional Forester, December 7, 1953, File: S- Sales, General, 1953, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

158. Raphael Zon, "Forestry Mistakes and What They Have Taught Us," Journal of Forestry 49 (1951): 180.

159. Weyers interview, pp. 15-21.

160. Leicht interview, pp. 14-15.

161. Leicht interview, pp. 4-5.

162. Smith, Boise, p. 88.

163. Lafferty interview, pp. 9-10.

164. Smith, Boise, p. 87.

165. Lafferty interview, pp. 3-4.

166. Noble interview, pp. 20-23; Lafferty interview, pp. 3-4.

167. Smith, Boise, p. 88.

168. Earlier models had not been too reliable, but by the 1950's, these saws were used, Noble interview, pp. 24-26.

169. Clipping dated August 13, 1953, File: Targhee NF History, File 4, Targhee.

170. Weyers interview, pp. 7-8.

171. Leicht interview, pp. 5-6.

172. Leicht interview, pp. 12-14.

173. H. L. Ketchie to Forest Supervisor, November 16, 1954, with attachments, File: S- Sales- General, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC. This discussion has been modified on the basis of comments by William Hurst and Gordon Watts.

174. Smith, Boise, p. 88; Comments by Gordon Watts on a version of the manuscript.

175. Sack interview (Alexander), pp. 16-17.

176. Floyd Bartlett interview by Thomas G. Alexander, March 1984, p. 3, Historical Files, Regional Office.

177. Comment by Gordon Watts on an earlier version of the manuscript.

178. Leicht interview, pp. 28-29; Maughan interview, pp. 27-28; Braegger interview, p. 12, For a general overview of conditions on Utah forests see [W. L. Robb?] to Dear Orval, March 20, 1952, File: S- Sales, 1952, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

179. Peterson, "Watsatch-Cache," p. 137.

180. Thornock interview, pp. 33-36.

181. Smith, Boise, p. 77.

182. Croft, History of the Davis County Experimental Watershed, pp. 40-41.

183. Lafferty interview, p. 6.

184. Hurst interview, pp. 50-51; Leicht interview, pp. 14-15.

185. Lafferty interview, pp. 10-11.

186. E. L. Noble, "Erosion Control on Logging Areas," March 6, 1956, Historical Files, Boise.

187. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, "Timber Access Program, Boise and Payette National Forests, Idaho—To Prevent Economic and Social Dislocations in Southwest Idaho Communities Dependent on Logging and Lumber Industry," n.d., Engineering Files, Payette.

188. A. L. Anderson to Regional Forester, November 9, 1956, File: Targhee NF History, File 5, Targhee.

189. Norman Nybroten and Wade H. Andrews, Value of Forest Highways in Idaho (Moscow: University of Idaho, 1959, p. 5.

190. Johannsen, "The Southwest Idaho Timber Management Study," passim.

191. Joel L. Frykman and Gilbert B. Doll, "Examination of Timber Stands within the Proposed Boundary Extension, Hoover Wild Area, October 12-15, 1954," February 14, 1955, File: 2320, Toiyabe National Forest-Hoover Wilderness, Recreation and Lands Files, Regional Office.

192, Noble interview, pp. 39-42.

193. Comments by William Hurst on a version of the manuscript.

194. Personal experiences of the author; and Arval L. Anderson interview by Al J. Brady, ca. 1983, Historical Files, Regional Office.

195. Forest Service Report, 1956, p. 18.

196. Paul E. Packer to Davis C. Toothman, March 12, 1954, File: E- Roads and Trails, Boise, General Correspondence File, 1954, Boise National Forest Records, Seattle FRC.

197. Davis C. Toothman to Forest Supervisor, September 16, 1955, File: E- Roads and Trails, Boise, General, CY 1955, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

198. George Kreizenbeck to Engineers and Road Locators, January 25, 1956, File: E- Roads and Trails, Boise, General, 1957, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

199. Gordon Watts, comment on early version of the manuscript.

200. A. L. Anderson to the Record, October 29, 1957, File: E- Roads and Trails, General, 1957, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

201. George A. Garrett, "Six Decades of Growth," in Henry Clepper and Arthur B. Meyer, eds., American Forestry: Six Decades of Growth (Washington, D.C.: Society of American Foresters, 1960), p. 22; Forest Service Report, 1956, p. 11.

202. Hurst interview, pp. 21-22.

203. For a general discussion of a large number of projects see: A. R. Croft to the Record, January 6, 1954, File: M- Watershed General, Historical, FD 8, Historical Files, Manti-LaSal.

204. Jacobs interview, p. 71, Kolob Basin and Provo Peak Watershed Rehabilitation," June 10, 1966, File: 1658, Historical Data, 6, Watershed and Multiple Use Management, Uinta.

205. Haycock interview, p. 31.

206. Forest Service Report, 1959, p. 13.

207. Forest Service Report, 1956, p. 3.

208. Forest Service Report, 1956, p. 7.

209. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 43.

210. Croft to Record, January 6, 1954.

211. Koziol interview, pp. 10-11.

212. Forest Service Report, 1958, p. 7.

213. Forest Service Report, 1951, pp. 20-23.

214. Forest Service Report, 1951, p. 9.

215. Boyd L. Rasmussen to Forest Supervisors, June 28, 1957, File: F- Plans, Presuppression, Forest Plans, Historical Records, Caribou.

216. Forest Service Report, 1957, p. 7.

217. Sack interview, p. 122.

218. Forest Service Report, 1956, p. 5.

219. Braegger interview, pp. 14-16; Leicht interview, pp. 15-17.

220. Smith, Boise, p. 122.

221. Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 381.

222. "Report of Fire Analysis of Wallace Canyon Fire, 7/18/59-8/1/59, Las Vegas District, Toiyabe N.F." File: 5100-1- Fire Analysis, Wallace Canyon Fire, FY 1960, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

223. Safran interview, pp. 61-62.

224. Recreation Handbook, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Intermountain Region (n.p., 1957), Historical Files, Regional Office.

225. Garrett, "Six Decades," p. 23.

226. Garrett, "Six Decades," p. 23.

227. Garrett, "Six Decades," p. 23.

228. The following information on the relationship between Region 4 and the commission was given with a promise of anonymity for the source.

229. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," p. 274.

230. Forest Service Report, 1950, p. 44.

231. Sack interview, p. 108.

232. Harry H. (Rip) Van Winkle interview by Arnold R. Standing, June 1965, p. 17, Historical Files, Regional Office.

233. Peterson, "Wasatch-Cache," p. 273.

234. "16-Year Gain Noted at Snow Basin," Salt Lake Tribune, June 26, 1953, Historical Files, Wasatch-Cache.

235. "Outdoor Recreation Situation, Ketchum Ranger District," pp. 1-2, papers in possession of Art Selin, Sawtooth.

236. Braegger interview, pp. 17-18.

237. George Urdahl interview by Thomas G. Alexander, April 1984, pp. 4-6, Historical Files, Regional Office.

238. Jacobs interview, p. 58.

239. Sack interview, p. 110.

240. Information supplied by Gordon Watts.

241. Floyd Iverson to Forest Supervisors, April illegible, 1957, File: 1380, Reports, 2300, Five Year Report, Recreation Area, Facilities and Services, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

242. Floyd Iverson to Supervisors and Project Leaders, August 6, 1959, File: 1310, Planning, 3 Studies and Surveys, NF-RRS, FY 1960, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

243. Leicht interview, pp. 24-25.

244. Hurst interview, pp. 28-29.

245. I. M. Varner to Payette, March 28, 1951, File: G-Management Reports: Payette, 1944-1952, Pierson Collection, Payette.

246. Idaho Outfitters & Guides Association, "Minutes of Annual Meeting Held December 11, 1954, at Boise, Idaho," File: 1680- Forest Service History; Salmon Forest Historical Data, 1916-1937, Salmon.

247. Forest Service Report, 1958, p. 16.

248. Mike Gaufin interview by Thomas G. Alexander, February 1984, pp. 13-14, Historical Files, Regional Office.

249. L. G. Woods to C. J. Olsen, July 11, 1955, File: 1680, History, Wildlife Management (2600), Historical Files, Regional Office.

250. John W. Parker to Regional Forester, December 30, 1957, File: 2620, Planning, 1 Plans, Old Plans and Maps, Historical Files, Caribou; Foyer Olsen interview, p. 8; Noble interview, p. 36; Smith, Boise, p. 101.

251. Forest Service Report, 1951, p. 62.

252. Ralph C. Holmgren and Joseph V. Basile, "Range Revegetation and Deer on the Payette," Reprint from Idaho Wildlife Review (Sept.-Oct. 1956), Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

253. Forest Service Report, 1958, p. 12.

254. William O. Deshler interview by Elizabeth M. Smith, November 1974, pp. 14-15, Historical Files, Boise.

255. Hurst interview, p. 23; Wilcox interview, pp. 5-6; Thornock interview, pp. 26-27; Noble interview, pp. 14-15; Alfred Klein to Lon Hansen, December 12, 1950, File: D- Supervision, General, 1950, Regional Office Records, RG 95, Denver FRC; Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 26.

256. Oraph C. Lindstrom to Targhee, July 20, 1950, File: W- Management, Annual Reports, Targhee, 1950, Targhee National Forest Records, RG 95, Denver FRC.

257. "Minutes of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Caribou Woolgrowers Association" (1956), File: 2250, Range Cooperation, 2, Associations, FY 70, Caribou Woolgrowers Association, No. 2, Caribou National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

258. Charles F. Brannan, Closure Order, May 25, 1950, File: G- Trespass, Toiyabe, Regulation T-12, 1950, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC; C. M. Granger to Secretary of Agriculture, May 16, 1950, ibid.; C. E. Favre to William Streshley, October 23, 1950, ibid.; Undated clipping entitled "Concern Over the Wild Horses," ibid. Sack interview (Glass, p. 142. Hurst interview, pp. 16-17.

259. Ruth Clayton, "The History of Recreation Residence Building in Logan Canyon" (Seminar Paper, Utah State University, 1971), p. 16.

260. Sack interview (Alexander), p. 35.

261. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 27.

262. K. M. Daniels to Idaho Power Co., December 6, 1950, File: E- Power- Boise, Idaho Power Company, PL-65-1866, Anderson Dam, Boise National Forest Records, RG 95, Seattle FRC.

263. United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, "Effect of Act of July 23, 1955, on Mining Claims" (n.d., ca. 1958), File: U- Adjustments- Toiyabe, General, 1958-1959, Toiyabe National Forest Records, RG 95, San Bruno FRC.

264. Forest Service Report, 1953, p. 28; Thornock interview, pp. 39-42.

265. L. A. Dremolski to Regional Forester, September 12, 1958, File: Information and Education, Historical Files, Humboldt; Lafferty interview, pp. 32-33.

266. A. G. Nord to Regional Forester, August 2, 1955, File: Recreation, Manti-LaSal Trails, Manti-LaSal.

267. Thornock interview, pp. 39-42.

268. Hurst interview, p. 28.

269. Hurst interview, pp. 53-54.

270. Comments from William Hurst on a version of the manuscript.