BREACHING THE MARIANAS: The Battle for Saipan
by Captain John C. Chapin U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret)
D+3, 18 June
When the infantrymen ashore woke the next morning,
they looked out in amazement at the empty ocean and a wave of uneasy
questions raced through their minds: "Where in hell are our ships? What
about food and ammunition we've got to have? Will we get back the
daytime naval supporting gunfire and also the star shell illumination?"
The men in frontline combat had no way of knowing that over 33,000 tons
of cargo had already been unloaded when the ships withdrew.
Both Marine divisions went on the attack, while the
105th Infantry joined the 165th on the far right flank, enabling Ralph
Smith to put his 27th Division into motion to occupy Aslito airfield and
attack along the southern coast.
That same morning, 18 June, the 4th Marine Division
attack objective was the seizure of the O-3 line. This would mean
reaching the east coast of Saipan and splitting in two the Japanese
forces. First, however, the 23d Marines, reinforced by a battalion of
the 24th Marines, had to seize the portion of the O-2 line in its zone.
This was to be the division's line of departure. The entire division,
with three infantry regiments abreast, jumped off at 1040. At 1340 the
25th Marines had reached O-3. The 24th Marines had tank-led Japanese
counterattacks on both flanks but was able to reach O-3 before dark.
The 23d Marines, however, was stopped by intense
enemy mortar and machine gun fire coming from southeast of Lake Susupe
right on the boundary line between the two Marine divisions, making it
unclear which division had responsibility for wiping out these enemy
positions. At the same time, it was impossible to fire artillery on them
for fear of hitting friendly troops. As a result, the 23d Marines
suffered heavy casualties. So, by the end of the day, although all of
the 4th Marine Division's regiments were in contact, a gap still existed
between the two Marine divisions.
The bizarre becomes common place in combat. For
instance, one of the 23d Marines' 75mm half-tracks fired into a Japanese
cave that day, and a dense cloud of noxious fumes came pouring out. A
gas alarm was sounded. This meant serious trouble, for all the riflemen
had long since jettisoned their burdensome gas masks. Relief flooded
through the men as it was established that the fumes were not poisonous
and came from picric acid the Japanese had stored in the cave.
Ground Command List
The Marine and Army units assigned to the Saipan
operation were under these senior commanders:
V Amphibious Corps - LtGen Holland M. Smith
2d Marine Division - MajGen Thomas E. Watson
2d Marines - Col Walter J. Stuart
6th Marines - Col James P. Riseley
8th Marines - Col Clarence R. Wallace
10th Marines - Col Raphael Griffin
18th Marines - LtCol Russell Lloyd
4th Marine Division - MajGen Harry Schmidt
14th Marines - Col Louis G. DeHaven
20th Marines - LtCol Nelson K. Brown
23d Marines - Col Louis R. Jones
24th Marines - Col Franklin A. Hart
25th Marines - Col Merton J. Batchelder
27th Infantry Division - MajGen Ralph C. Smith, USA
105th Infantry - Col Leonard A. Bishop, USA
106th Infantry - Col Russell G. Ayres, USA
165th Infantry - Col Gerard W. Kelley, USA
Division Artillery - BGen Redmond F. Kernan, Jr., USA
XXIV Corps Artillery - BGen Arthur M. Harper, USA
Saipan Garrison Forces - MajGen George W. Griner, USA
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Over in the 2d Division's zone, the 8th Marines saw
some bitter fighting over Hill 240. A heavily defended coconut grove
required saturation fire from the artillery of the 10th Marines before
the riflemen could smash their way in and clean out the grove.
The price for the two Marine divisions had been
heavy. By the night of D+3 they had been bled by more than 5,000
casualties.
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