BREACHING THE MARIANAS: The Battle for Saipan
by Captain John C. Chapin U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret)
D+8D+15, 23-30 June
Complications of a serious nature arose in the
execution of the battle plan for 23 June. The battalion of the 105th
Infantry still had not cleaned out Nafutan Point; there were semantic
and communications differences between the two Smith generals as to
orders about who would do what and when; the 106th and 165th Infantry
got all tangled up in themselves during a march to take over the center
portion of the American lines and were too late to jump off in the
attack, thus delaying the attacks of the Marines. When the Army
regiments did move out, they found that the rugged terrain in their
sector and the determined enemy in camouflaged weapons positions in
caves of the steep slope leading up to Mount Tapotchau made forward
progress slow and difficult. The 27th Infantry Division was stalled.
The corps commander, Holland Smith, was very
displeased with this situation. It had started with the difficulties
experienced in getting that division ashore; it was exacerbated by the
time it was taking to secure Nafutan Point and the mix-up in orders
there; now the advancing Marine divisions were getting infiltration and
enfilading fire on their flanks because of the 27th's lack of
progress.
Accordingly, Lieutenant General Holland Smith met
that afternoon with Major General Sanderford Jarman, USA, who was slated
to be the island garrison commander, and asked him to press Major
General Ralph Smith for much more aggressive action by the 27th. Jarman
later stated:
I talked to General (Ralph) Smith and explained the
situation as I saw it and that I felt from reports from the corps
commander that his division was not carrying its full share. He
immediately replied that such was true; that he was in no way satisfied
with what his regimental commanders had done during the day and that he
had been with them and had pointed out to them the situation. He further
indicated to me that he was going to be present tomorrow, 24 June, with
his division when it made its jump-off and he would personally see to it
that the division went forward .... He appreciated the situation and
thanked me for coming to see him and stated that if he didn't take his
division forward tomorrow he should be relieved.
This blunt meeting was followed the next morning
(D+9) by an even blunter message from Holland Smith to Ralph Smith:
Commanding General is highly displeased with the
failure of the 27th Division on June twenty-third to launch its attack
as ordered at King hour and the lack of offensive action displayed by
the division in its failure to advance and seize objective O-5 when
opposed by only small arms and mortar fire.
The failure of the 27th to advance in its zone of
action resulted in the halting of attacks by the 4th and 2d Marine
Divisions on the flanks of the 27th in order to prevent dangerous
exposure of their interior flanks. It is directed that immediate steps
be taken to cause the 27th Division to advance and seize the objectives
as ordered.
These objectives were given dramatic names by the
Army regiments: Hell's Pocket, Death Valley, and Purple Heart Ridge. It
was certainly true that the terrain was perfect for the dug-in Japanese
defenders: visibility from the slopes of Mount Tapotchau and from the
ridge gave them fields of fire to rake any attack up the valley. Holland
Smith didn't fully recognize the severity of the opposition, and, by the
end of the day, the 106th Infantry had gained little, while the 165th
Infantry had been "thrown back onto the original line of departure."
Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division on the left was
painfully slugging its way forward in the tortuous environs around Mount
Tapotchau. The 4th Marine Division (on the right) pivoted east, driving
fast into the Kagman Peninsula. There the ground was level, a plus, but
covered with cane fields, a big minus, as the rifle companies well
knew.
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From
left, BGen Merritt A. Edson, Assistant Division Commander of the 2d
Marine Division, confers with Col James P. Riseley and LtCol Kenneth F.
McLeod, 6th Marines commander and executive officer, respectively,
during a pause in the action. LtCol McLeod was killed several days after
this photograph. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 82481
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A platoon leader remarked:
The terrain here consisted of countless cane
fieldsone after another. And it was the same old story: in every
field the company would lose a man or two. It was wonderfully quieting
to the nerves to start into a growth of head-high cane, and wonder who
would not be coming out on the other side! The Jap snipers who were
doing the damage were dug in so deeply, and camouflaged so well, that it
was impossible to locate them before they fired. And then it was too
late; you were right on top of them, and they had nailed another one of
your men or maybe you! Then there was always that next cane field
up ahead....
Some of the fields had been burnt out by the
napalm-bombing of our planes. This gave us greatly increased observation
as we went through them, but clouds of choking dust arose from the ashes
to plague us and dirty our weapons. With water so scarce, one of our
chief sources of liquid sustenance was sugar cane juice. We'd whack off
a segment of the cane with our combat knives, then chew and suck on it
till only the dry fibers were left. In these burnt-out fields we weren't
even able to do this, as the cane was spoiled and tasted lousy.
Along with the death toll in the cane fields came the
physical demands placed on the troops by the hot tropical climate.
Lieutenant Chapin noted small, human issues that loomed large in the
minds of the assault troops:
All this time the sun was broiling down on top of us.
Our canteens had been empty for hours. Everyone was absolutely
parched.... Finally we did stop, as the effects of heat exhaustion and
lack of water started to become apparent. [Our company commander]
arranged for some water to be brought up to our position. When the cans
arrived, everyone crowded thirstily around, and we had to order the men
to disperse... . Then each platoon leader rationed out a can of the
precious liquid amongst his men. As was the age-old Marine tradition, we
waited till all our men had their share before we took ours. The water
was luke warm, rusty, and oily as it came out of the cans, but it still
tasted like nectar!
While these local events transpired on the front
lines, a major upheaval was taking place in the rear. Seeing that the
corps line would be bent back some 1,500 yards in the zone of the 27th
Infantry Division, Holland Smith had had enough. He went to see Admirals
Spruance and Turner to obtain permission to relieve Ralph Smith of
command of his division.
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This
Marine is demonstrating the dimensions of a large enemy gun emplacement
and undoubtedly giving thanks that the Japanese were not able to
complete construction. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 85336
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As
the fighting reached the interior of Saipan, the troops encountered
difficult foliage and terrain which impeded their movement. Note the
tops of the helmets of Marines peering from their foxholes. Department of Defense
Photo (USMC) 81845
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After reviewing the Marine general's deeply felt
criticism of the 27th Infantry Division's "defective performance," the
admirals agreed to the requested change, and Ralph Smith was superseded
by Major General Jarman on 24 June.
A furor arose, with bitter inter service
recriminations, and the flames were fanned by lurid press reports.
Holland Smith summarized his feelings three days after the relief.
According to a unit his tory, The 27th Infantry Division in World War
II, he stated, "The 27th Division won't fight, and Ralph Smith will
not make them fight." Army generals were furious, and in Hawaii,
Lieutenant General Robert Richardson, commander of the U.S. Army in the
Pacific (USARPAC) convened an Army board of inquiry over the matter. The
issue reached to the highest military levels in Washington.
While the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
General Joseph T. McNarney, reviewed the matter, he found some faults
with Holland Smith, but then went on to say that Ralph Smith failed to
exact the performance expected from a well-trained division, as
evidenced by poor leadership on the part of some regimental and
battalion commanders, undue hesitancy to bypass snipers "with a tendency
to alibi because of lack of reserves to mop up," poor march discipline,
and lack of reconnaissance.
The Army's official summary, United States Army in
World War II, The War in the Pacific, Campaign in the Marianas
(published 15 years after the operations) attributed some errors to
Holland Smith's handling of a real problem, and it also gave full
recognition to the difficult terrain and bitter resistance that the Army
regiments faced. The history stated that:
. . . there is no doubt that the 106th Infantry
Regiment of the 27th Division was late in jumping off in the attack on
the morning of 23 Juneeven though not so late as Holland Smith
charged. On the 23d and again on the 24th, the Army troops attacking
Death Valley were slow and faltering in their advance. According to the
testimony of General Jarman, who took over the division from Ralph
Smith, the unit leaders of the 106th Infantry were hesitant and
apparently confused. Although the Army troops in Death Valley sustained
fairly heavy casualties, the two Marine divisions on the flanks suffered
greater ones. Yet the Marines made considerable advances while the 165th
Infantry registered only small gainsthe 106th Infantry almost none
at all.
No matter what the extenuating circumstances were-and
there were severalthe conclusion seems inescapable that Holland
Smith had good reason to be disappointed with the performance of the
27th Infantry Division on the two days in question....
Back where the conflict was with the Japanese, the
4th Marine Division had overrun most of the Kagman Peninsula by the
night of D+10. The shoreline cliffs provoked sobering thoughts in a
young officer in the 24th Marines:
We were close to the northern shoreline of the
peninsula. And right there the Japs had dug a big emplacement. They
hadn't had time to finish it, but we could see that it was situated so
as to fire right down the beach-line. Any troops landing on that beach
would have received a terrible enfilading fire from this gun position.
Not far from the emplacement were the guns that had been destined to go
into it: huge, 5-inch, dual-purpose naval guns. They were deadly things,
and I was glad the enemy had never gotten them into action. Now they lay
there on their wooden skids, thickly coated with grease, wrapped in
burlapimpotent.
This unfinished state of the Japanese defenses was,
in fact, a critical factor in the final American victory on Saipan. The
blockading success of far-ranging submarines of the U.S. Navy had
drastically reduced the supplies of cement and other construction
materials destined for elaborate Saipan defenses, as well as the number
of troop ships carrying Japanese reinforcements to the island. Then the
quick success of the Marshalls campaign had speeded up the Marianas
thrust by three months. This was decisive, for "one prisoner of war
later said that, had the American assault come three months later, the
island would have been impregnable."
The 4th Marine Division encountered more than cane
fields in the Kagman Peninsulathe cliffs near the ocean were
studded with caves. A 20-year-old private first class in Company E, 2d
Battalion, 23d Marines, Robert F. Graf, described the Marine system for
dealing with these and the others that were found all through the bitter
campaign:
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When
a Japanese survivor did emerge from a cave, Marines were always on the
alert for treachery. This enemy soldier had a stick of dynamite in his
hands, but was shot before he could throw it. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
87137
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The firepower was intense, and we were working our
way up to where the shots originated. Quite often there would be multi
cave openings, each protecting another. Laying down heavy cover fire,
our specialist would advance to near the mouth of the cave. A satchel
charge would then be heaved into the mouth of the cave, followed by a
loud blast as the dynamite exploded. Other times it might be grenades
thrown inside the cave, both fragment type which exploded sending bits
of metal all throughout the cave, and other times [white] phosphorous
grenades that burned the enemy.
Also the flame thrower was used, sending a sheet of
flame into the cave, burning anyone that was in its path. Screams could
be heard and on occasions the enemy would emerge from the caves, near
the entrance, we would call upon the tanks, and these monsters would get
in real close and pump shells into the opening.
Graf went on to picture the use of flame-throwing
tanks, the ultimate weapon for dealing with the enemy deep in his
hideouts. He continued:
Some of the caves had artillery mounted on tracks
that could be wheeled to the entrance, fired and pulled back,
unobserved. There were caves with reinforced metal doors that protected
them from our artillery. Perhaps a direct hit from a 16-inch naval gun
could have blasted it open, but nothing else.
A fellow rifleman from Graf's company told him this
story:
You should go up and see the huge cave that I was
just in. It was large and contained a completely equipped operating
room, all the medical equipment, surgical tools, etc. The tools were
made from German surgical steel. When the battalion and regimental
doctors were told about it, they almost went crazy over finding such
excellent equipment. Each doctor wanted some tools for his use.
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Displaying the bazooka which knocked out four Japanese
light tanks are bazooka men PFC Lauren N. Kahn, left, and PFC Lewis M.
Nalder. The two Marines fired all their ammunition at Japanese tanks
advancing in a counterattack on the night of D+1. Kahn then grabbed some
grenades, approached one tank from the side, and tossed the grenade into
its open turret. Their action saved a 37mm gun crew, the objective of
the tank. The gun crew, with its men wounded, was also out of
ammunition. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 85167
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Some
of the Japanese caves, such as this one, had been carefully reinforced.
Marine riflemen move warily to inspect it. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
83566
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These attacks on caves were a tricky business,
because of orders not to kill any civilians who were also inside many of
them, hiding from the fighting. Graf recounted his experiences
further:
Throughout the campaign we were taking prisoners.
Seldom were they Japanese soldiers, instead Korean
and Chamorro laborers, both men and women, who mostly worked in the
sugar cane fields and processing plants. Chamorros were natives of the
islands, while the Koreans, of course, were brought over as forced
labor. Approaching us, hands up, and smiling and bowing the Koreans
would say in understandable broken English, "Me Korean, not Japanese."
Some Japanese civilians were also captured. The Japanese tradition was
that the male members of the family were the dominant members. Several
times when we tried to feed newly captured women and children first, the
male would shove them aside and demand to be first for rations. A few
raps to the chest with a rifle butt soon cured them of that habit.
As the sick, scared, and often starving civilians
would emerge from their hideouts, there were many pitiful scenes:
One sad incident I recall was when a captured
civilian Japanese woman came up to me. She was crying and when she got
close to me she started hitting me on the arm and pointing to my pack. I
did not know what she wanted until an interpreter came over and
explained that she wanted some food and water for her dead child. She
pointed to a wicker basket that contained her dead infant. I gave her
what she requested, and she placed the food and water in the basket so
that the child could have nourishment on the way to meet the baby's
ancestors.
Physical conditions of many were pitiful. Every
illness that we had been briefed on was observed: leprosy, dengue fever,
yaws and many cases of elephantiasis. Most of them were skeleton thin,
as they had no nourishment for many days. Many were suffering from shock
caused by the shelling and bombing, and fright because they did not have
the vaguest idea as to what we would do to them. Civilians caught in a
war that was not of their making. . . .
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Marine talks a terrified Chamorro woman and her children
into leaving her refuge. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
83266
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Civilians are escorted back to safety, food and medical
care. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 83013
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One of the captured persons impressed Graf so very
much that the memory was vivid many years later. A Japanese woman,
obviously an aristocrat, probably a wife or mistress of a high-ranking
officer, "was captured. She was dressed in traditional Japanese
clothing: a brilliant kimono, a broad sash around the waist, hair
combed, lacquered and spotlessly clean. Although," as Graf remarked,
"she knew not what her fate would be in the hands of us, the barbarians,
she stood there straight, proud, and seemingly unafraid. To me, she
seemed like a queen."
Over on the west side of Saipan, the 2d Marine
Division had a memorable day on 25 June. Ever since the landing, the
towering peak of Mount Tapotchau had swarmed with Japanese artillery
spotters looking straight down on every Marine move and then calling in
precisely accurate fire on the American troops. Now, however, in a
series of brilliant tactical maneuvers, with a battalion of the 8th
Marines clawing up the eastern slope, a battalion of the 29th Marines
(then attached to the 8th Marines) was able to infiltrate around the
right flank in single file behind a screen of smoke and gain the
dominating peak without the loss of a single man.
Meanwhile, back at Nafutan Point, the battalion of
the 105th Infantry assigned to clean out the by passed Japanese pockets
had had continuous problems. The official Army account commented, "The
attack of the infantry companies was frequently uncoordinated; units
repeatedly withdrew from advanced positions to their previous night's
bivouacs; they repeatedly yielded ground they had gained."
The stalemate came to a climax on the night of D+11.
Approximately 500 of the trapped Japanese, all the able-bodied men who
remained, passed "undetected" or "sneaked through" (as the Army later
reported) the lines of the encircling battalion. The enemy headed for
nearby Aslito airfield and there was chaos initially there. One P-47
plane was destroyed and two others damaged. The Japanese quickly
continued on to Hill 500, hoping to reunite there with their main
forces. What they found instead was the 25th Marines resting in reserve
with an artillery battalion of the 14th Marines. The escaping Japanese
were finished off the following morning.
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The
37mm gun was a workhorse for the Marines in a wide variety of firing
missions. Those are Japanese bullet holes in its "shield." Department of Defense
Photo (USMC) 83989
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On the front lines in the center of the island,
General Jarman, now in temporary command of the 27th Infantry Division,
took direct action that same day (D+11). An inspection by two of his
senior officers of the near edge of Death Valley revealed that
battalions of the 105th Infantry were standing still when there was no
reason why they should not move forward." That did it. Jarman relieved
the colonel commanding the 106th and replaced him with his division
chief of staff. (Nineteen other officers of the 27th Infantry Division
were also relieved after the Saipan battle was over, although only one
of them had commanded a unit in battle.)
While these developments were taking place in the
upper echelons, the junior officers in the front lines had their own,
more immediate, daily concerns. As the author recalled:
I had worked out a pre-sleep routine which I followed
every night without fail. Before I lay down, I would make careful mental
notes of where the company Command Post [CP] was and where my squad
leaders' foxholes were. Then I would work out the rotation of the
watches with my CP group. Next came a check of my carbine to make sure
it was in perfect operating condition. When all this had been done, I'd
lie down, adjusting my helmet to serve as a pillow. Last, and most
important, was the placing of my weapons: my carbine lay across my body
so my hand would fall naturally on the trigger; my combat knife was
stuck in the ground where my right hand lay; and my grenades were
carefully arrayed at my left hand. Then I'd drift off to sleep.
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(click on image for an enlargement in a new window)
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For the next several days, the 27th Infantry Division
probed and maneuvered and attacked at Hell's Pocket, Death Valley, and
Purple Heart Ridge. On 28 June, Army Major General George W. Griner, who
had been quickly sent from Hawaii upon the relief of Ralph Smith, took
over command of the division, so Jarman could revert to his previous
assignment as garrison force commander. The 106th marked the day by
eradicating the last enemy resistance in the spot that had caused so
much grief: Hell's Pocket.
The 2d Marine Division mean while inched northward
toward the town of Garapan, meeting ferocious enemy resistance. Tipo
Pali was now in 6th Marines' hands. The 8th Marines encountered four
small hills strongly defended by the enemy. Because of their size in
comparison with Mount Tapotchau, they were called "pimples." Each was
named after a battalion commander. Painfully, one by one, they were
assaulted and taken over the next few days.
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A
Marine 81mm mortar crew keeps lobbing shells into enemy positions ahead
of the unit it is supporting by fire. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
82260
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With
the Japanese well dug in, hidden in their well camouflaged positions, a
satchel charge of high explosive is tossed into their laps. If any of
them bolt out, the Marine riflemen are ready. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
83281
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Near Garapan, about 500 yards to the front of the 2d
Marines' lines, an enemy platoon on what was named "Flame Tree Hill" was
well dug in, utilizing the caves masked by the bright foliage on the
hill. The morning of 29 June, a heavy artillery barrage as well as
machine gun and mortar fire raked the slopes of the hill. Then friendly
mortars laid a smoke screen. This was followed by a pause in all firing.
As hoped, the enemy raced from their caves to repel the expected attack.
Suddenly the mortars lobbed high explosives on the hill. Artillery
shells equipped with time fuses and machine gun and rifle fire laid down
another heavy barrage. The enemy, caught in the open, was wiped out
almost to a man.
To the right, the 6th Marines mopped up its area and
now held the most commanding ground, with all three of its battalions in
favorable positions. In fact, since replacement drafts had not yet
arrived, the 2d Marine Division had all three of its infantry regiments
deployed on line. Thus it was necessary for its commander, Major General
Watson, to organize a division reserve from support units.
The pressure on manpower was further illustrated by
the fact that, in this difficult terrain, "eight stretcher bearers were
needed to evacuate one wounded Marine." In addition, there was, of
course, the deep-seated psychological and physical pressure from the
constant, day after day, close combat. "Every one on the island felt the
weight of fatigue settling down."
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During a break in the fighting, Marines of a
flamethrower and demolitions team pose with the Japanese flag captured
during action after the American landing. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
82608
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On the 4th Division front, the drive forward was
easier, but its left flank had to be bent sharply back ward toward the
27th Infantry Division. By nightfall on 28 June, the Marine division's
lines formed an inverted L with the 23d Marines and part of the 165th
Infantry facing north, while the rest of the Army regiment and two
battalions of the 24th Marines faced west. This strange alignment was a
focus of attention when each battalion was issued its nightly overlay
from corps headquarters showing the lines of the corps at that time, so
that friendly fire from artillery and supporting Navy destroyers would
not hit friendly troops. Once again, enemy planes raided, hitting both
the airfield and anchorage. As usual, enemy night patrols were
active.
The end of the saga of Nafutan Point, way to the
rear, had come the day before (27 June). The Japanese breakout had left
almost no fighting men behind there. Accordingly, the battalion of the
105th Infantry at last overran the area after enduring a final banzai
charge. The soldiers found over 500 enemy bodies in the area, some
killed in the charge and some by their own hand.
D+15 (30 June) marked a good day for the Army. After
fierce fighting, the 27th Infantry Division finally burst through Death
Valley, captured Purple Heart Ridge, and drew alongside the 8th Marines.
Holland Smith gave due recognition: "No one had any tougher job to do."
The gaps on the flanks with the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions were now
closed. In doing so, the Army had sustained most of the 1,836 casualties
inflicted upon it since D-Day. The 4th Marine Division, however, had
suffered 4,454 casualties to date, while the 2d Marine Division had lost
4,488 men.
The corps front now ran from Garapan, past the four
pimples, to the 4th Marine Division's left boundary. Here, it ran
sharply northward to Hill 700. From there it ran to the east coast.
Central Saipan was in American hands. Most of the replenishment supplies
had been unloaded. The enemy had begun withdrawing to his preplanned
final defensive lines. The Army's official history summed up these days
costly victories this way "The battle for central Saipan can be said to
have come to a successful end."
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Moving on the double, Marines go yard by yard through
skeletal Garapan, flushing out the Japanese defenders. Department of Defense
Photo (USMC) 85222
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Amidst the horrors of war, someone retained a sense of
humor, and put up this pre-World War II Marine recruiting poster in
Garapan. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87109
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