. . . AND A FEW MARINES: Marines in the Liberation of the Philippines
by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
Problems on Leyte
Other events on Leyte after the landing brought an
unexpected change in plans for the air war. The foul weather of heavy
tropical storms, with 35 inches of rain in 40 days, had badly impeded
both the advance of the Army infantry and the construction of adequate
air fields for American use.
Japanese bombing continued in spite of preemptive
strikes by planes from Halsey's fast carriers. Most serious of all,
waves of enemy troop reinforcements were continuously being landed at
Ormoc on Leyte's west coast. The numbers were distressingly large; some
official estimates were as high as 47,900. In any event, it was clear
that enemy strength on Leyte had more than doubled. There was also a
special problem in the air war. The Japanese night fighter-bombers, the
Nakajima Ki 43 Hayabusa called "Oscars" by the Americans, were too fast
for the Army Air Force P-61 Northrop Black Widow night fighters.
Late in November, MacArthur acted decisively. He
arranged for a switch in which the AAF squadron would go to Peleliu and
the Marine night fighter squadron there, VMF(N)-541, with its F6Fs and
their 313-knot top speed, would come to muddy Tacloban Field on
Leyte
Simultaneously, came one of those flukes that change
forever the course of events. Halsey was anxious to leave Philippine
waters for a strike at Tokyo, and Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid,
commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, was very concerned about Japanese
kamikaze attacks on his ships. (Kamikaze was the Japanese
term for bomb-laden suicide planes whose pilots would crash on purpose
into U.S. ships.) So, Halsey recommended a substantial participation of
Marine aviation. He later wrote:
I had under my command in the South Pacific a Marine
Air[craft] Group [12] which had proved its versatility in everything
from [air combat] to blasting enemy vessels. I knew that this group was
now under MacArthur's command, and I knew too, without understanding
why, that when Kenney was not keeping it idle, he was assigning it to
missions far below its capacity.
Kinkaid's complaint of insufficient air cover
prompted me to take a step which was more than a liberty; to a man of
meaner spirit than MacArthur's it would have seemed an impertinence. I
called these Marines to his attention. He ordered them forward, and
within twenty four hours of their arrival, they had justified my
recommendation.
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