| Marines in World War II Commemorative Series |
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. . . AND A FEW MARINES: Marines in the Liberation of the Philippines by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) Phase Two: Luzon Dive Bombers While the Marine fighter planes had been prominent in the first phase of the Philippine campaign, Leyte, Marine dive bombers were soon to be similarly heavily employed. The Army's next major target was Luzon, on which Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, was situated. The 1st MAW had learned on 20 September 1944 that seven of its dive bomber squadrons would be used later on for the Luzon campaign, which was to follow Leyte. Marine Corps aviation recorded its war-time peak at the end of September 1944. It had rocketed from 13 squadrons following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to 145 squadrons at this time. Without waiting for that future commitment, on 10 October the Marine scout-bomber squadrons in the Solomons initiated a strenuous close air support training program. Squadrons of two units were involved, MAG-24 and MAG-32. Their squadrons and their colorful nicknames were:
MAG-32 was commanded by Colonel Clayton R. Jerome, who had been chief of staff to Major General Ralph J. Mitchell in the Solomons. MAG-24 was under Colonel Lyle H. Meyer, who had a brilliant and professionally enterprising operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon. It was McCutcheon who assembled all the published material that he could find on the theory and practice of close air support. McCutcheon organized the material for 40 different lectures for 500 pilots and gunners, arranged joint training exercises with the Army's 37th Infantry Division on Bougainville, and supervised the two solid months of extensive indoctrination in close air support tactics and new communication procedures vital to achieve maximum battle results. These new procedures called for a total change from the AAF practice of control through multiple command echelons to a radically simpler process. There would be a Marine air liaison party (ALP) with every ground unit down to the battalion level. The ALPs would directly control the close air support planes from radio-equipped jeeps, and would be headed by Marine aviators who very often personally knew the pilots making the close air support runs. On 9 December 1944, MAG-24 was ordered to begin its deployment to the Philippines from the Solomons. For the flight echelon their move meant a long, over-water endurance flight. For the ground echelon it meant a miserably long sea voyage. Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron (VMSB) 341 undertook such a move. The ground element left its Solomons base on 17 December, and its official history records the tortuous month on board ship that followed:
When the VMSB-341 ground element arrived at Hollandia, New Guinea, it alternated between that anchorage and the one at Lae, New Guinea, until finally departing for the Philippines on 8 January 1945. The squadron arrived at Leyte on 16 January and continued the trip the following day, arriving at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, on 21 January. Finally disembarking on the 22d, VMSB-341 proceeded 12 miles inland and then helped establish the airfield at Mangaldan. Lieutenant Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon
Born in 1915 and commissioned in 1937, McCutcheon had a brilliant career. Awarded an Army Silver Star and three Legions of Merit for his pioneering work on close air support in the Philippines, he went on to become known as "the father of Marine helicopter aviation." This title stemmed from his service as the commanding officer of the only such squadron in 1950, followed by 80 combat missions in Korea. In Vietnam he was Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and was awarded two Distinguished Service Medals. Duty at Headquarters, Marine Corps, brought a third DSM and nomination to be Assistant Commandant. A serious illness forced him to forego that honor, although he was promoted to four-star rank by Congress on 1 July 1971. Twelve days later, he died. The following year, at the Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina, was dedicated McCutcheon Field. Amid the speeches, there were memories of "his boyish smile, piercing eyes, and youthful, timeless face." Still more Marine air power was on its way. MAG-14, with its Corsairs, was also in the Solomons under Colonel Zebulon C. Hopkins, and on 7 December 1944, Pearl Harbor Day, it was alerted for movement to the Philippines. This was a group with a proud history, having been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its superb record at Guadalcanal. During the period 2-12 January 1945, its four fighter squadrons, VMF-212, -222, -223, and -251 flew the 2,350 miles to Guiuan Field on the island of Samar. (Their ground echelons would spend five long weeks on board ship enroute.) The field conditions were abysmal: too small for the group, partially incomplete with inadequate living quarters, omnipresent tropical diseases, and dangerous runway surfaces. The men of MAG-14 were glad to be part of the real action again, although the primitive conditions at the airfield led to 19 non-combat plane losses just in the remainder of January. The worst of these came on 24 January when Second Lieutenant Karl Oerth's Corsair hit bad runway bumps, blew a tire, and careened off the runway, out of control. It struck a rock, and then cartwheeled through rows of tents. When men nearby rushed to try to extricate Oerth, the plane suddenly exploded and became a cauldron of fire. The tragic episode killed 13 and severely burnt 54. Once Leyte was secured, the aerial pounding of Luzon increased in preparation for the Army's landing on 9 January 1945 at Lingayen Gulf in the northern section. In the landing with the assault troops were Jerome and McCutcheon. They picked out a site for an airstrip between two neighboring villages, Dagupan and Mangaldan. While the latter name was given to the air base being built, the former was incorporated into a title for Jerome: Commander, MAGSDAGUPAN (Marine Aircraft Groups, Dagupan). McCutcheon became operations officer, and welcomed his former "trainees" when MAG-24 and MAG-32 began flying in on 25 January 1945, ready to begin operations.
The first mission went out two days later on 27 January. It was a strike by VMSB-241, a squadron which had been awarded a Presidential Unit Citation for its superb performance during the crucial battle of Midway in June 1942. By the end of their first month, Marine pilots had already dropped over 200,000 pounds of bombs from their 168 SBD Douglas Dauntless dive bombers. Also crowding the Mangaldan strips were over 200 AAF planes, with the AAF's 308th Bomber Wing in operational control of everything, including Marine planes. The ensuing four months marked a period when Marine close air support truly came of age. With MAG-12 and its four fighter squadrons on Leyte, with MAG-14 and its four Corsair squadrons on Samar, and with MAGs-24 and -32 and their seven squadrons of dive bombers on Luzon, there was now a sufficient quantity of Marine planes to make a major contribution to the large-scale Army drive to reconquer the Philippines. Perhaps even more important was the quality of the Marines' role. The ground crews continued to show, under very adverse conditions, a remarkable ability to keep a high percentage of planes ready for their missions. The Corsairs continued to show superb ability in aerial combat and, when operating as a fighter-bomber, equal ability to strike deep tactical targets. Sadly, however, casualties were a normal part of intensive operations, and there was great concern on Samar when Second Lieutenant Kenneth G. Pomasl of VMF 223 failed to return from a mission on 23 January 1945. His was another fighter squadron with a storied history: first to arrive on Guadalcanal, 83 enemy planes downed, a Presidential Unit Citation, and a commanding officer, Major John L. Smith, who was awarded the Medal of Honor and was one of nine aces in the squadron in those earlier dog fights. (Now he was executive officer of MAGSDAGUPAN.) On 29 January, a plane arrived from Leyte, and, to everyone's delighted surprise, out jumped Pomasl. He had quite a story to tell. After becoming separated from his flight in bad weather, he found he could not make radio contact, so he flew on instruments for an hour and a half, but was unable to break out of the overcast. Then his gas supply finally ran low and he decided to bring his plane down to make a water landing. As he came down out of the overcast, he found himself over land, at an altitude of about 500 feet. When he swung out over the water, he saw he was being fired on by small arms.
He set the plane down easily, tail first. It remained afloat for about a minute, giving him plenty of time to get out of the cockpit and onto the right wing, from which he lowered himself into the water and inflated his rubber boat. It was early afternoon, and land was about half a mile away. After he had been on the water a short time, three small canoes put out from shore, headed toward him. The men appeared to be Filipinos and seemed friendly, so he allowed himself to be placed in one of the canoes, while his rubber raft was taken in tow by another. Pomasl described what happened next:
With a strong current pulling him towards land, Pomasl abandoned his raft and started swimming. Seven long hours after his plane went down, he finally got ashore on a beach. After a stay there of almost two days, he started inland. Suddenly 15 or 20 Filipinos appeared and ran up to him. They seemed to understand that he was the pilot of the plane which had gone down two days before, and one of them spoke a little English. They took him back into the jungle, where they brought him water and food, including rice, boiled chicken, eggs, bananas, and coconuts. He rested there until early evening on a mat they'd brought him, when his English-speaking friend returned with a pair of Japanese sandals for his feet. He learned then that the Filipino was a member of the Cebu Home Defense Force.
Moving out in the dark, they crossed over to the eastern coast of the peninsula, where they waited three hours for a boat which was to take them to Santa Rosa Island, the first step back towards Leyte. It appeared at about 2200 and added the two men to its cargo of nine refugees from Cebu City along with their household goods. Pomasl continued his story:
Again, the lieutenant was overwhelmed with native hospitality, which recurred on every island he stopped at during the boat trip of several days to Leyte — including one greeting where he was hoisted on the shoulders of the Filipinos to carry him ashore. Concluding his account, Pomasl said:
While the Corsairs in MAGs-12 and -14 continued to show the quality of their work in spite of losses, the SBD dive bombers now at MAGSDAGUPAN would show something new in quality: flexible, pinpoint accuracy in truly close air support, directed right from the front lines of an infantry attack. Targets during just the first week on Luzon were spread in a 180 degree arc from north through east to south, up to 150 miles away, and included 10 towns in five different provinces. The SBD was, in actuality, an obsolete plane, long since abandoned in its AAF version (the A 24). Over Luzon, however, it proved amazingly effective. Its dive bombing procedure was well summarized in a 1951 Marine aviation history:
While the target was held in the pilot's sights, bombs were released at an elevation of about 2,000 feet. After that the nose of the plane was pulled toward the horizon, and the dive flaps were closed quickly for added speed. By this time the bombers would be about 1,000 feet above the ground, in a slightly nosed-down position. The planes would continue losing altitude quickly until they were at treetop level. There they used their accumulated air speed for violent evasive maneuvers to avoid the usually heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. Then the planes continued on to a rendezvous point for another bombing attack, or perhaps several strafing runs before gathering for the return flight to the base. A substantial number of flights were also made with delayed-fuse bombs released at 1,500 feet, and a pull-out at tree-top height. Air speed while using the flaps would be about 250 knots. Bombs varied from 100-pounders, 250s, 500s, and 1,000-pounders.
These kinds of tactics soon led the press to label the VMSB squadrons "The Diving Devildogs of Luzon." Jerome's own homespun description of their pattern of hitting small targets with great precision was "Pickle Barrel Bombers." McCutcheon was precise in his definition of the function of the SBDs: "Aircraft in close support are, in effect, aerial artillery. No one claims that they will replace it [ground artillery] or are superior to it; they augment it." There soon came a demanding mission to which the Marine SBDs were assigned — while Army and AAF senior officers watched and waited. It occurred when MacArthur directed Major General Verne D. Mudge, USA, to send a flying column of his 1st Cavalry Division to Manila to free the prisoners who had been interned at the Santo Tomas Camp there since 1942. MAGSDAGUPAN was to provide nine dive bombers to stay overhead at all times. They would scout out Japanese positions and troop concentrations to enable the column to avoid them. If necessary, the SBDs would bomb the enemy's strongholds. One Marine ALP would ride right with the column's commander, Brigadier General William C. Chase, USA, on the 100-mile trip. Chase was correctly concerned about his open flanks, with Japanese troops everywhere between his line of departure south of Lingayen and his target, Manila. The solution: Marine dive bombers would also protect the flanks. This was an excellent opportunity to prove the efficiency of the Marine mission control system using ALPs. Two radio jeeps and a radio truck, with a total of three officers and four enlisted Marines were assigned to the mission. They would relay the requests of the ground units for close air support missions directly to the SBDs. In reverse, the planes could communicate downward any information from their advance reconnaissance.
An interesting contrast to the handful of Marines in the ALPs and their direct ground-to-air communication was noted in the official Marine Corps history of World War II. In "astonishment" the Marine ALPs found that the AAF was also attaching its own "formidable" ALP. This consisted of:
In 66 hours, the column slashed through to Manila, and 3,500 internees were freed at Santo Tomas on 3 February. The Army was lavish in its praise for the performance of the SBDs and their ALPs. From the 1st Cavalry Division history:
Mudge had this to say:
The 1st Cavalry's dash to Manila had some very talented men in its ALPs. One of these was Marine Captain Francis B. "Frisco" Godolphin. He had been a language professor at Princeton University before volunteering at age 40. When he visited the 1st Cavalry before its drive, he ran into a staff officer who had formerly been a student of his. From this chance encounter and personal relationship came the plan to put nine SBDs overhead during the drive to Manila. This procedure circumvented the opposition of the AAF 308th Bomb Wing to direct control by the infantry units of their close air support. Godolphin not only served in an ALP en route to Manila, but he also spent 38 continuous days in action. A Marine combat correspondent, Staff Sergeant David Stephenson, reported on some of his other exploits:
Godolphin also helped to direct the largest Marine strike on Luzon, an 81-plane attack east of the Marakina River. In preparation for this, it was decided to send a guerrilla lieutenant — a civil engineer graduate of the University of the Philippines — into the area to be bombed. The officer, disguised as a native civilian, sketched and plotted the Japanese positions by night. After sufficient information had been brought back, Godolphin called in the dive-bombers. He radioed his data to Major Benjamin B. Manchester, the air coordinator, who was circling the target, picking out each point of attack as it was described to him. Then Manchester sent his planes down for the kill.
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