Phase Three: Mindanao

With the first phase of Marine aviation on Leyte long gone, and with the second phase focused on Luzon successfully over, the complex operations in the southern Philippines now took center stage as phase three. The Army planned five major operations (code named VICTOR) to seize eight different islands. Marine planes would be called upon to provide fighter cover and landing zone bombing for these, and then to furnish close air support for both guerrillas and Army divisions as they battled the Japanese. Thus, MAGs-24 and -32 would close down their MAGSDAGUPAN operations on Luzon and move to Mindanao when an airfield was ready to receive them. MAG-12, under a new commanding officer, Colonel Verne J. McCaul, would leave Leyte to join them. Jerome would be in charge of all three air groups. Meanwhile, MAG-14 would remain on Samar to support operations on Panay, Cebu, and also Mindanao. The new squadrons would also play their part: Marine Bomber Squadron 611 with its North American Mitchell PBJ medium bombers and Air Warning Squadron 4 with its electronic capabilities would come into Mindanao early, with AWS-3 joining later.

The attack on Mindanao began in a unique way. A week before the first Army landing, two Marine officers and six enlisted Marines were inserted behind Japanese lines. They were taken to a guerrilla-held airstrip near the town of Dipolog, 150 miles from the main assault objective, Zamboanga on the far western tip of Mindanao. Within a few days, 16 Corsairs were there on the primitive Dipolog field to support the guerrillas, as well as cover the landing of the 41st Infantry Division at Zamboanga on D-day, 10 March. Also coming ashore on D-day was Jerome; his objective was the nearby San Roque airstrip. Taking over that site, the Marines renamed it Moret Field after Lieutenant Colonel Paul Moret, a well-known Marine aviator who had died in a transport crash after taking off from Noumea, New Caledonia in 1943.

Another D-day arrival was AWS-4. It would set up its radio and radar equipment to serve as the 76th Fighter Control Center, coordinating air-ground attacks. As one veteran aviator noted, "The air warning squadrons were the heart and soul of air defense and air traffic control."

Right behind them came McCutcheon. His assignment was to organize Marine Aircraft Group, Zamboanga (MAGSZAM) at Moret similar to MAGSDAGUPAN which had been so successful on Luzon.

On 15 March, the VMF-115 fighters of MAG-12 came in from Leyte. With Japanese air threats nearing zero, the F4Us would now shift their emphasis to close air support. A Marine aviation history explains the plane's versatility:

The Corsairs, although designed as fighter planes, proved to be well adapted for close support work. They had three bomb racks capable of carrying a variety of bomb and napalm loadings, and they were armed with six forward-firing machine guns. Faster than the SBDs, they possessed ample speed to get in and out of a target area in a hurry. Also, since Corsairs were equipped with both VHF and MHF radio sets, they fitted into the air-ground liaison system easily, without a necessity for additions or alterations to existing equipment.

When combined with the slow speeds of the L-4 Cub spotter planes, the fast F4Us were able to get pin-point directions for their targets from the jeep radios of their ALP Then the Marine fire-power grew even heavier as the SBDs of MAG-32 came wheeling in from Luzon on 24 March. The combination of F4Us and SBDs at Moret again gave the 41st Division daily close air support to the Army infantrymen. At a ceremony held at Moret on 29 March, Major General Jens A. Doe, USA, commanding the 41st Division, formally presented to Colonel Jerome and his Marines a plaque which commemorated the close cooperation between the Army and the Marines.

The plaque was six feet high and four feet wide, with Japanese naval signal flags, an enemy light machine gun, and a silk Japanese battle flag. The inscription read, "IN APPRECIATION - 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION." At the bottom their combined campaigns were listed: Jolo, Sanga Sanga, Basilan, and Mindanao.

2dLt Willard C. Olson, left, and 1stLt Winfield S. Sharpe show how Sharpe doubled up in the cockpit of a VMF-115 Corsair, which supported guerrillas in their rout of Japanese forces threatening the Dipolog airstrip on Mindanao. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117637

During the ceremony, General Doe spoke of the Marines' "outstanding performance . . . . readiness . . . to engage in any mission . . . their skill and courage as air men, and their splendid spirit of cooperation in aiding ground troops . . . the most effective air support yet received . . ."

As always in war, there was a painful aspect to this massing of squadrons at Moret. First Lieutenant Charles F. Flock later wrote of the cruel fate of one flight to Mindanao when, on 24 March, Second Lieutenant Charles T. Rue (VMSB-142) encountered engine trouble off Panay Island:

One of the escorting transport planes accompanied Rue's SBD to a point over a small strip at San Jose on the SW coast of Panay. This strip had been labeled as friendly according to intelligence reports prior to take-off. Rue executed a safe landing, and he and his gunner, SSgt Robert R. Stanton, were seen to wave by the pilots in the transport before it continued on its way to Zamboanga. (The strip was too short for the heavily-laden transport to attempt an evacuation of the men.)

As it turned out, the strip was actually in enemy hands, and both Marines were taken prisoner. Later, when San Jose came under U.S. control, it was established that Rue and Stanton had been killed by the Japanese and buried near the airstrip.

Besides the missions on Mindanao, the Marine planes covered the successive landings on Basilan, Panay, Cebu, and Negros. One of the veteran squadrons over Cebu was VMF-251 from MAG-14 on Samar; it had previously been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) for its superb record at Guadalcanal.

The squadron history of VMF-115 describes a memorable occasion when it provided close air support for guerrillas. This featured one of the most unusual air-ground tactics used during the entire Zamboanga operation. On 27 March, in answer to a request from the American officer in charge of the guerrillas, Major Donald H. Wills, AUS, a division of four VMF-115 Corsairs (led by Captain Rolfe F. Blanchard) was dispatched to the guerrilla-held airstrip at Dipolog. About 150 Japanese troops, armed with knee mortars, a light machine gun, and automatic rifles, had advanced to within 16 kilometers of Dipolog. They were well-seasoned troops who had been moved into the area from Zamboanga about five weeks earlier. Major Wills felt that an air strike might boost the Filipino guerrillas' morale and damage the enemy at the same time.

However, control of the strike by normal means was impossible, because there were no maps or photographs of any kind available, no method for marking targets, and no means of communication with the troops. But VMF-115 ingenuity found a way:

Into the cockpit of a Marine Corsair climbed Major Wills, who was thoroughly familiar with the enemy positions; after him climbed the smallest of the Marine pilots in the division, First Lieutenant Winfield S. Sharpe. Both men squeezed into the narrow confines of the cockpit, with Sharpe sitting on Wills' lap.

Soon afterward, with the major pointing out targets to the pilot, Lieutenant Sharpe's Corsair led a four-plane division in six strafing passes over the enemy's positions. The enemy area was thoroughly strafed, and the Japanese were compelled to withdraw.

The Marines' aerial capabilities were once again dramatically expanded when VMB-611, with its 16 PBJ medium bombers, flew in to Moret on 30 March. Besides their rocket and bomb capacity, its PBJs had a massive array of .50-caliber machine guns, plus radar, long-range radio, and extensive navigational equipment. In a letter, one of the squadron co-pilots, First Lieutenant Willis A. Downs, sketched the varied missions of this squadron:

. . . During the Philippine campaign we strafed, bombed, skip bombed, fired rockets, photographed, flew observers, were sent on anti-sub patrols, were sent up at night as night fighters, and bombed at medium altitudes. In fact, one member of VMB-611 shot down with his fixed guns, and using his bomb sight as a gunsight, a Japanese twin-engine light bomber . . . .

A Marine flight crew arrives to board a VMB-611 North American PBJ medium bomber (called the B-25 Mitchell by the AAF). Although a late arrival, the squadron made a major contribution with these planes in the Mindanano campaign. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 123037

During early April there were more Army landings, this time on the exotically named Sanga-Sanga and Bongao Islands. Bongao was a little island that commanded the invasion beach at Tawi Tawi for the Sanga Sanga landing. The PBJs had instructions to knock out the radar and radio installations, then strafe and rocket the barracks area in a night attack. A pilot of VMB-611 remembered years later the squadron's strike after it solved the problem of how to bomb, rocket, and strafe something it could not see in the night:

. . . Then a pilot (nobody knows who) suggested a simple, yet most ingenious solution. The flight leader would load his bombs (I think they were 500-pounders) with the bottom rack holding a parachute flare of one million candlepower. Each of the other five planes in the flight would load a parachute flare first, followed by the bomb load.

The tactic was simplicity itself. The flight leader would make a dummy run, dropping only his parachute flare. The second plane in the flight would bomb on the first flare, then drop his flare; the third plane would follow suit, followed by the fourth and fifth plane. By the time the fifth plane dropped his flare, the flight leader would be in position to drop his load on the last flare. It worked to perfection.

As the tempo of air operations on Mindanao rose, so did the use of Moret Field. Before long it housed a total of 299 widely varying types of AAF and Marine air craft: 96 F4Us, 151 SBDs, 18 PBJs, 2 F6Fs, 18 SBCs (Curtis Helldiver dive bomber), 1 FM (General Motors F4F Wildcat fighter), 2 TBFs (Grumann Avenger torpedo bomber), 5 R4Ds (Douglas Sky-train cargo plane), and 6 P-61s.

During April, MAG-14 back on Samar continued a heavy round of missions on familiar targets: Cebu, Negros, and other islands. Directed by the Thirteenth Air Force on Leyte, the Corsairs reported daily to AAF support air parties, often B-24 heavy bombers, for control of their strikes. In the teeth of poor weather, the group achieved more than 5,800 flight hours that month.

One pilot on Samar who had newly joined VMF-222 had been awarded a Medal of Honor for his record in the Solomons. Captain Kenneth A. Walsh, a former NAP, joined MAG-14 with a record of 20 victories. (He would get number 21 at Okinawa later in the war.)

The Army plans for operations in the southern Philippines were complex — there were lots of Japanese troops on lots of different islands. Besides the main objective of Mindanao, there was a chain of small islands, called the Sulu Archipelago, stretching southwest to Borneo. When all of these were captured, the life line of oil flowing to Japan from the Dutch East Indies would be severed.

Filipino guerrillas at Titcomb Field, Malabang, Mindanao, joyfully greet the Marine pilots who came to their aid. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117638

The first target in the chain had been Sanga Sanga. Now it was Jolo. On 9 April the 41st Division went ashore there. The division's previous close working relation ship with Marine air had led the commanding general and then all the officers of the assault regiments to make pre-landing reconnaissance flights on board the SBDs of VMSB-236. Then VMSB 243 took the commanding general to observe the actual landing.

On Jolo the Japanese had retired to the interior and holed up in Mount Daho, a defensive strongpoint studded with caves and pillboxes. For a week they held off the infantry despite artillery fire and repeated bombing and rocket attacks. One of these, by VMB-611, was later recalled by a veteran:

The first time out intelligence . . . ordered a 12-plane low level attack . . . . It's a wonder there weren't some mid-air collisions. We were tooling along at 250 feet alongside Mount Daho when the concussion of one bomb almost blew us out of the air. We strafed the top of the mountain, the target being a huge buried tank. My guess was a water tank of sorts. The tracers just ricocheted harmlessly off the silver-looking object. The entire mission was a dangerous fiasco . . . .

The problem was finally solved when one of the PBJ pilots offered a simple solution, "Why not go in at 8,000 feet and drop 1,000 pounders on it and cave the damn thing in." The veteran continued:

So back we came a day or so later. Six of us this time . . . . [Our bombardier] took his time and "walked" his three [bombs] right across the top of the mountain . . . . Some of the others got two big ones on top, some only one. But all six planes hit it. Results? They walked up Mount Daho the next day. Over 400 defending Japanese Imperial Marines had ceased to exist.

Meanwhile, on Mindanao, the Marines, carrying out instructions to support the guerrillas, flew daily sorties from the Moret and Dipolog fields. They worked in close conjunction with the Filipinos under the leadership of an American, Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, USA. When the American surrender in the Philippines occurred in 1942, Fertig took to the hills. With radio contact with MacArthur's far-away headquarters and supplies smuggled in by submarine or air or small boats, he built his guerrilla force. By February of 1945, he had 33,000 men under his command, with 16,000 of them armed. Their combined efforts provided crucial information which changed the whole landing plan for the Army's next thrust, this time on the other side of Mindanao.

As Fertig later recalled:

By February 1945, advance planning by X Corps indicated that the initial landing on the south coast of Mindanao would be made in the vicinity of Parang. With the assistance of MAG Zambo, the guerrillas were able to eliminate the strong Japanese garrisons at both Parang and Malabang. This action presented X Corps with a free beachhead when they landed on 17 April 1945. It would have been impossible for the guerrillas to have completed the elimination of the Japanese garrisons without the assistance of the Marine Air Groups, since the guerrilla troops were not equipped with artillery.

The key Marine in this intelligence coup, the man who gathered the vital information on the situation ashore and then got it to the ears of the X Corps commander, was none other than McCutcheon. He had flown down from Mindoro, borrowed an SBD at Moret, and took off to meet the guerrillas. The events that followed brought him an award of a Silver Star Medal by the Army. The citation read in part:

For gallantry in action against the enemy . . . . He arrived at the airfield five days prior to the landings of American forces. During the ensuing five days, from positions within close range of enemy machine gun and mortar fire and with utter disregard for his own safety, he reported the situation to the landing force afloat, briefed pilots and supervised the direction of air strikes . . .

Then, flying back to Zamboanga, McCutcheon got in a small boat, put to sea, and intercepted the Mindanao invasion convoy. His citation continued:

. . . His accurate information transmitted to the task force commander afloat enabled the formulation of amended plans and resulted in an unopposed landing on the Malabang area [i.e., nearby Parang] . . . .

Thus the landing took place at Parang 17 miles south of Malabang on 17 April. AWS-3 was the first Marine unit ashore and shortly became the 77th Fighter Control Center. With its two radar search sets and eight radio channels, it provided a valuable resource for increasing the number and efficiency of air strikes.

Of course, this Army landing was covered by Marine planes flying from their strips on the other side of Mindanao. One of that day's missions was by VMB-611, and one of its pilots later described what his flight encountered:

What happened in the next few minutes was a maelstrom of bullets, shells, and bombs. A Japanese 90 millimeter cannon began peppering away at us from its hiding place in the mouth of a large cave. Events moved too quickly to give an accurate accounting. What was supposed to be a single pass or two, turned into a wild melee. We all lost track of the number of passes.

Finally, a 7.7 machine gun bullet whined through our open cockpit window and out the windshield, and convinced me the Japanese had the range. It was time to abandon the area. Luckily, all planes escaped, although each was badly holed.

Once the strip at Malabang was available, the Marines poured in the dive bombers of MAG-24, which arrived on 20 April from Luzon. One of the first actions taken was to name the strip Titcomb Field in honor of Captain John A. Titcomb, killed while serving in an ALP on Luzon. Operations from there used new procedures. The Army's X Corps had 12 forward air control teams directing strikes for two different divisions (24th and 31st). More-over, there was a pattern of having a constant air alert overhead for the infantry. Working with the 24th Division, for instance, MAG-24 had a flight report in to the support air party every hour on the hour from 0800 to 1600 each day.

Describing the concentrated strikes in central Mindanao, one of the pilots, First Lieutenant Thurston P. Gilchrist, said:

. . . This was the most heavily bombed area of any in the whole Philippine campaign. The Japs were dug in underneath trees and in foxholes so well that we had to blow up the whole area before the Army could advance. Our Marine observers, who were with the ground liaison party in this area, said the damage was terrible and almost indescribable. Flight after flight of planes bombed and strafed this small area for days. When we began it was a heavily wooded area and when we finished there wasn't . . . anything left but a few denuded trees . . . .

The operations numbers for the F4Us told the same story of relentless attack; during February, March, and April the Corsairs of MAG-12 and -14 flew 29,836 hours on 11,642 sorties and destroyed 31 planes of the vanishing Japanese air strength.

For one of their squadrons, VMF-218, this marked a final phase in a diverse range of missions since it had first arrived in the Philippines. Beginning back in December, the squadron had patrolled the air over shipping in Leyte Gulf and Ormoc Bay; had flown cover over American convoys in various Philippine waters; had escorted South Pacific Combat Air Transport (SCAT) planes over Ormoc where they had dropped supplies to ground troops; had flown cover for Army ground forces on Mindoro and Cebu Islands; had covered the landing by Army troops at Zamboanga; had chalked up a number of close support missions on Mindanao; had escorted rescue planes; had escorted transport planes to Mindanao; had provided air cover for SBD strikes; and had regularly been on combat air patrols.

In addition, it had made many close-in strikes on southern Luzon, strafing enemy targets and destroying parked planes, railroad rolling stock, ammunition dumps, and oil storage tanks.

MAG-14 received a tribute from Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General, Eighth Army, in which he noted its "outstanding performance . . . against the enemy at Leyte, Samar, Palawan, Panay, Cebu, and Negros, Philippine Islands." He added, "The enthusiasm of commanders and pilots, their interest in the ground situation and their eagerness to try any method which might increase the effectiveness of close air support, were responsible in a large measure for keeping casualties at a minimum among ground combat troops."

The Douglas R4D Skytrain — known in its civilian guise as the DC-3 — was the work horse for a wide variety of missions while being flown by MAG-25, the South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command (SCAT). Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 108687

On 30 April, Marine planes used napalm bombs for the first time on Mindanao. Hitting a hill near the major town of Davao, the fire was terrifyingly effective. The X Corps reported:

From this time on, fire from the air was available, with strikes as large as thirty-two 165-gallon tanks being dropped on a target. In several instances, entire enemy platoons were burned in their positions and in other cases, flaming Japanese fled from positions, only to encounter machine gun fire from ground troops.

As the two Army divisions slugged their way across Mindanao, the PBJs of VMB-611 helped the 31st crack a tough nut. It was a strike near the Malita River that paid off handsomely. The Japanese were holed up in a town that controlled a road. When the Marine fighter planes would come over, the Japanese would dive into a deep gorge that ran alongside the town. When the fighters left, the Japanese would resume their defensive positions. Then someone suggested a coordinated attack with both the fighters and the PBJs. One of the pilots later remembered:

We were loaded with eight 250-pound bombs. The attack was to be low level . . . . The ravine had a big bend in it near the road. The key was to get as many bombs in it as possible, dropping in train. The fighters chased the Japs into the ravine as we came in low, bomb bay doors open.

When the fighters had passed over, the enemy reemerged — only to find the Marine medium bombers boring in on them. The PBJ pilot continued:

. . . our observer, yelled "Purrfect!" It seems the first bomb hit a small knoll and skipped into the ravine, and the rest of the load "walked" right up the ravine. It was a lucky drop. All the others got their loads in the ravine as well. Results? The entire Japanese force was either killed or so severely shocked from the concussions they were unable to defend the town.

On 8 May, VMSBs-241 and -133 flew what one squadron report termed "the closest support mission yet flown." The Japanese lines were only 200 yards from the infantrymen of the 31st Division, and the enemy was unyielding. Marked with smoke, the tiny target area was plastered with nearly five tons of bombs, and the Japanese position simply disintegrated.

As the end of the Mindanao campaign loomed in May, there were many changes for the Marine aviators. VMSB-244 said farewell to the venerable SBD and was re equipped with the new SB2C Curtis Helldiver. It was 20 knots faster, more heavily armed, and equipped with rockets. (When the SBD was officially retired on 16 July after its long and productive career, VMSB-244 became the only squadron of MAG-24 to remain active.)

The month of May also brought the new F4U-4 to the fighter squadrons, and with it came 41 more miles per hour of top speed (446 mph).

On 15 May, operations ended for MAG-14 on Samar. During its short four months stay there, it had amassed a total of 22,671 combat hours, 7,396 sorties, and destroyed 28 Japanese planes on the ground. On 7 June it flew off to join the battle then raging on Okinawa.

That month also saw the last serious operations and the most massive strike yet. On 21 June, the 31st Division was facing the threat of a major Japanese troop build up, so 148 dive bombers and fighter bombers were called in to drop 75 tons of bombs during a four-hour span. Reports afterward estimated 500 enemy killed.

With this kind of help, it is not surprising that Major General Clarence A. Martin, commander of the 31st, made an official report about the "invaluable assistance" of MAGs-12, -24, and -32.

The other division that fought its way across Mindanao, the 24th Infantry, had identical feelings about its Marine air support. Its commander, Major General Rosco B. Woodruff, also issued a lengthy tribute, applauding sorties "flying over enemy territory in the face of enemy anti-aircraft fire . . . flown with determination and courage in spite of losses from enemy fire. Many missions were flown at great risk because of unfavorable weather conditions . . ."

Amidst this pattern of intensive close air support, a sad, and exceedingly rare, tragedy occurred on one mission in support of the 24th Division. The Marine air coordinator used a system to direct the strike, "Bomb on my bomb!" That day, however, the flight leaders mistook Japanese artillery bursts for the signal bomb and 32 men of the division were killed and wounded. When Jerome went to see Woodruff to express the Marines' sorrow at the accident, the Army general agreed that it was most unfortunate, but nevertheless he would continue to rely on MAGSZAM for close air support.

On 30 June, Eichelberger declared the Mindanao campaign completed (although 2,235 Japanese would be killed in the ensuing six weeks). The total operational figures for all Marine aviation squadrons on the island were formidable: more than 20,000 sorties in 10,406 combat missions for the X Corps, with 4,800 tons of bombs dropped, accompanied by nearly 1,300 5-inch rockets.

The final recognition of the remarkable Marine performance throughout all the Philippine Islands came from the top. Eichelberger said, "The value of close support for ground troops as provided by these Marine flyers cannot be measured in words and there is not enough that can be said for their aerial barrages that have cut a path for the infantry. From all quarters, commanders down to the men with the bayonets, I have heard nothing but high tribute."

The last mission for MAGSZAM came in covering one more landing (at Sarangani Bay) of their friends, the 24th Division, on 12 July. On 1 August, MAG-24 was dismembered with the decommissioning of VMSBs-133, -236, and -241.

There was one final extraordinary episode which took place in a strike by VMB-611 on 9 August. A Japanese lieutenant, who had surrendered, went in one of its PBJs and guided them to their exact target.

The surrender of Japan on 15 August was preceded (on 4 August) by an order from the AAF for the 1st MAW to move up from Bougainville to Zamboanga. It was ironic that Mitchell and Jerome, the two men who had been so crucial in the Philippine assignment were now gone — back in the United States for a well-earned leave. Simultaneously, veteran squadron flyers were going home, and new commanding officers were taking over units that remained on active duty.

On 30 August, MAGSZAM was dissolved (but MAGs-12, -24, and -32 would live on to see duty in China after the war). The 1st MAW would move after the battle to China.