Chapter Four:
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act: A Legislative History

In 1975 Assistant Interior Secretary Nathaniel P. Reed testified before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that passage of the Alaska Conservation Bill constituted "one of our highest environmental priorities and perhaps the most significant conservation measure since Theodore Roosevelt took the lead in establishing national forest reserves at the turn of the century." [1] In spite of any reservations regarding the Morton proposal, Park Service employees generally agreed and looked forward to a speedy passage of the bill. Their optimism proved unfounded. Neither the Nixon nor the Ford administrations showed any inclination to work for passage of the bill in 1974 or subsequent years. In the face of their disinterest, the Morton proposals languished.

Despite the administration's lack of fervor in pursuing congressional action, by late 1975 all elements necessary for a thorough discussion of the issues were present. Along with the administration's and the conservationists' bills, Alaska Representative Don Young and Senator Ted Stevens had introduced a predominantly multiple-use alternative—the "Alaska National Public Land Conservation Act," the state of Alaska released a proposal that was to be submitted as a bill at a later date, and the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission announced tentative recommendations regarding additions to the federal conservation systems. Representative John Dingell had introduced two bills that addressed wildlife refuges in Alaska, and NANA, a Native regional corporation, had released a proposal for a cooperatively managed (federal, state, NANA regional corporation, and village corporations)"Ecological Range" that would include considerable portions of the d-2 areas in the north (Gates of the Arctic and northwest Alaska). [2]

Senator Stevens and Representative Young, whose bill was similar in many respects to the recommendations of the state and JFSLUPC, proposed to set aside 66,800,000 acres in conservation areas. [3] Five national park units totaled 14,020,000 acres, national forest areas amounted to 28,000,000 acres, and 500,000 acres would be reserved for the Wild and Scenic Rivers System. [4] The bill designated eight transportation corridors to allow utilization of both known or potential mineral resources and provided for state regulation of sport hunting and control of subsistence.

The unique feature of the bill was a proposal to include the state in management of a major portion of d-2 lands through the creation of nine "Scenic Reserves" totalling 24,340,000 acres. These areas, which included Iliamna (2,850,000 acres), Noatak Valley (7,590,000 acres), Yukon Flats (2,210,000 acres), and Yukon Delta (2,540,000 acres) would be cooperatively managed by the state and federal governments. According to Representative Young, who was seconded by Alaska Governor Jay Hammond, this provision would more effectively meet the needs of local residents and provide greater management flexibility than was possible under any existing system. [5]

House and Senate committees held brief, largely informational, hearings in 1973 and 1975. In August 1975 members of the House Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, John Seiberling and Goodloe Byron, visited Alaska to inspect the proposed areas. [6] Both came away with an appreciation for Alaska and a commitment to work for the preservation of nationally significant lands there, something that would have an important impact at a later date. Generally, however, Congress proved little more willing than the executive to take up the question of the disposition of Alaska's national interest lands. Not until 1977, when three of the five years mandated for congressional action on the national interest lands had passed, would Congress take up the question in earnest.

This is not to suggest that work on the Alaska national interest lands came to a stop. In so far as the National Park Service and other federal agencies were concerned, quite the opposite is true. In the intervening years, from 1974 to 1977, the National Park Service carried on an intensive effort that would provide a more solid data base when Congress did begin its deliberations. These same activities would create an expertise that would be important for management of the areas when they were established, and assist the Interior Department in implementation of interrelated aspects of ANCSA. [7]

By July 22, 1974, the final closing date for review comments on the 1973 draft environmental impact statements, the department had received over 6,000 public comments. Merely cataloging these comments, not to mention incorporating them in the final statements, would be a massive undertaking that would involve the Washington office Alaska staffs of all "four-systems agencies," the Alaska Planning Group, and a sizeable number of people detailed to Washington specifically for the project. Pushed on not only by the need for completion in terms of legislation, but to assist the Natives in completing village selections, the department distributed the final impact statements between December 1974 and February 1975. [8]

In Alaska, moreover, the Service's Alaska Task Force continued master planning and updating of the legislative support data for the eleven NPS proposals. The accretion of knowledge of the proposed areas and areas of ecological concern came from continued on-site inspections as well as a wide variety of detailed studies. It would provide a basis for revision of the 1973 master plans and a re-examination of the proposed boundaries. The Service would, in addition, continue to expand its Native assistance program, and conduct follow-up work to develop certain issues that would be critical to the legislative process and future management of the areas—subsistence, sport hunting, carrying capacity determination, mining and minerals, and access, for example. A continually escalating part of their workload would be responding to congressional requests for additional information, commenting on legislative proposals, and synthesizing a growing body of knowledge to be used to defend Service's proposals at congressional hearings. [9]

Interior Department and bureau officials recognized, moreover, that the collection of data to assist Congress in its deliberations and the laying of a solid foundation for future management did not guarantee success for the department's program in Alaska. In 1974, following a course suggested by Theodor Swem and Al Henson the previous year, the Alaska Planning Group launched an intensive campaign to provide information for the American public and Alaskans, in particular, about the issues involved, the opportunities presented, and the Department's program for the Alaska. [10]

The campaign, which included slide shows in all national parks, hand-outs, articles in newspapers and magazines, speakers, and two movies—"Age of Alaska," and "One Man's Alaska"—complemented and stimulated a similar campaign carried on by the private sector. [11] The effort in 1974-77 certainly helped to raise the level of public consciousness about Alaska. Moreover, it helped to lay groundwork for the conservationists' "grass-roots" campaign that would be so important a part of the successful effort to secure passage of an Alaska national interest lands act after 1977.

Despite the obvious importance of collecting information which would assist in future congressional deliberations on the Alaska lands, the lack of legislative progress proved frustrating. By late 1975, prompted by recent developments in the long-simmering Cook Inlet situation, Theodor Swem and Curtis E. Bohlen decided that one way of moving the larger Alaska bill might be to attempt to secure passage of a bill that provided for establishment of one or more areas. If Congress could be convinced to act at all, they hoped, it might be stimulated to take action on the larger package. [12]

In many ways the Cook Inlet episode is a microcosm of the larger struggle over Alaska's lands, involving, as it did, conflicting claims over the land, differences in interpretation of the law (ANCSA), lawsuits, and the negotiated resolution of extraordinarily complex issues. The question at Cook Inlet revolved around the meaning of "lands of character similar" (deficiency lands), which were to be withdrawn for regional and village selection when lands in the immediate vicinity were inadequate. In the Cook Inlet region, patterns of previous state selections and federal withdrawals prevented full entitlement. [13]

Secretary Morton had withdrawn a total of 209 townships (approximately 4,815,360 acres) to meet deficiency requirements in the region, some 1,100,000 of which were in the proposed Lake Clark National Park. [14] The Natives did not quarrel over the amount of land. Rather, they argued that only 691,000 acres of the withdrawal land fulfilled the requirements of "character similar," and "proximity," the rest being "mountainous or glacial." [15] To resolve the differences, Cook Inlet Regional Corporation brought suit on March 21, 1973. [16]

If the Cook Inlet Regional Corporation was successful in its suit, NPS planners believed, it could result in deletion of a considerable portion of the Service's Lake Clark proposal, an amount that would bring the viability of that area into question. Interior Department attorneys suggested, moreover, that the suit threatened the September 2, 1972 agreement between the state of Alaska and Secretary Morton, something that could give the state land in the Wrangell-Saint Elias, Gates of the Arctic, and Mount McKinley proposals. [17] Although the corporation lost its case in the District Court, it appealed the decision, an action that Interior Department attorneys believed would, regardless of the outcome, prevent Congressional consideration of the areas involved for at least two to four years. At the same time, Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Lloyd Meeds promised to seek congressional relief for the Natives. [18]

In April 1975 a Department of the Interior team, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary Bohlen, with A. Durand Jones of Ted Swem's staff representing the NPS, and Bill Reffalt representing the FWS, began negotiations with the Natives and the state in an effort to reach an out-of-court settlement. By December, the negotiators had hammered out a three-way land exchange. Incorporated in Public Law 94-204 (January 2, 1976), the Cook Inlet land settlement gave the Natives land in several areas, including Beluga Coalfields and selected parcels in Kenai National Moose Range, the right to develop a mineral project in the proposed Lake Clark National Park, and first right to concession operations there. The state received lands in the Talkeetna Mountains, in a d-2 area west of Lake Iliamna, and the Campbell airstrip tract. [19]

The agreement served to "purify" the Park Service's Lake Clark proposal, removing some inholdings and freeing 750,000 acres on the southside for possible inclusion in the park. By doing so, it effectively "nailed down" Lake Clark as a park unit. Afterwards there would be little controversy there. Of equal importance, the Cook Inlet Native Corporation agreed to publicly support the creation of a national park area at Lake Clark. In a broader context, it bolstered the Natives confidence in the Park Service's intentions in Alaska, something that would be of increasing importance as time passed. [20]

In light of the Cook Inlet land settlement, the Park Service reevaluated its earlier proposals for the area. As it did so, Alaska Task Force planners postulated one solution to the thorny problem of sport hunting—the adoption of the newly created "preserve" parkland category. The concept of a "preserve"—an area set aside to protect certain resources while allowing activities such as hunting, fishing, or extraction of minerals and fuels as long as those activities did not threaten the natural values, was not new. As early as 1958, more than fifteen years before the establishment of the first national preserve, the Park Service had proposed a list of preserves—areas to be preserved in their natural state, [21] and in 1969 Richard Gordon, an Alaska conservationist, had recommended establishing the first NPS preserve at Gates of the Arctic. In 1974, staff members of the Senate Interior Committee suggested using in Alaska the national preserve category which had been first used at Big Thicket, Texas and Big Cypress, Florida the year before. [22]

The Park Service's Alaska task force planners were aware of that suggestion when they received directions in early January 1976 to study alternative management approaches to the Lake Clark area. [23] After considering a number of possibilities, the group recommended a combination Lake Clark National Park of 1,800,000 acres, with a 1,800,000-acre national preserve encircling the western portion of the "core park." Neither hunting, subsistence uses, motorized transportation, nor new mineral entry would be allowed in the core park. Greater management flexibility allowed by use of the "preserve" category would, at the same time, permit hunting, subsistence, and snow machines in some areas, and mining in the Johnson River area and in the Kontrashibuna River watershed. [24]

Not all agreed with the decision—a vote of the Alaska planners was almost evenly split. John Kauffmann expressed concern over mining. He felt, too, that the preserve concept had been misconstrued, that it had been taken to mean an area "not quite suitable for national park designation," rather than an area that should be preserved for its natural values. Bryan Harry, Alaska area director, approved the preserve recommendation, but wrote that he believed that existing subsistence uses should continue within the core park area. [25]

The Washington office accepted the recommendations, but with some modifications, and Theodor Swem and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bohlen obtained a commitment from Representative Goodloe Byron to introduce a bill regarding Lake Clark. [26] Originally the Service proposed a somewhat broader bill to establish Lake Clark National Park and Preserve, Aniakchak Caldera National Monument and Preserve, Harding Icefield-Kenai Fjords National Monument, and Aniakchak Wild River. [27]

Nothing came of the Service's proposal, and when Congressman Byron introduced a Lake Clark bill (H.R. 15256) on August 26, 1976, it addressed only a Lake Clark National Park, and did not mention preserve. Nevertheless, the preserve did provide one answer to the difficult problem of sport hunting in NPS areas in Alaska. The concept of using a preserve category in Alaska would be available when Congress began to address the question of Alaska national interest lands the following year. [28]

By 1976, with the five-year time limit for congressional action on the d-2 lands quickly slipping away, those with an interest in Alaska's lands prepared for what all believed would be the final chapter in the legislative process. Significant changes occurred in the Park Service's WASO Alaska organization as it prepared for the up-coming legislative sessions. At the end of February 1976, Theodor Swem, who had directed the Service's Alaska effort since its inception, retired. William C. Everhart, a career NPS historian then serving as special assistant to the director, replaced Swem on an interim basis. [29]

Concerns had existed from the very beginning that the organization of the Park Service's Alaska effort, which existed outside the traditional line organization, could work to the detriment of the Service's decision-making ability. [30] In an effort to unify the organization more along functional lines as well as to strengthen the Service's own legislative capacity, Director Gary Everhardt transferred a major share of the Service's Alaska organization to the office of legislation, and on November 26, 1977, announced the appointment of Roger J. Contor, a career park manager and then superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park, as assistant to the director for Alaska. Contor, whose duties spanned all program areas in Alaskan matters, was given specific responsibility for improving communications and coordinating the Service's Alaska effort. [31]

Contor, who remained in the position until July 1979, was, by his own description, more conservative in his approach than Swem had been. Meanwhile, conditions had changed. After 1977 the role of the conservationists in the legislative process would increase dramatically, and the Alaska legislative effort within the Department of the Interior would be more closely controlled at the departmental level than before. Nevertheless, despite changes in personnel and circumstances, the basic objective and approach of the Park Service in Alaska would remain constant. [32]

Representatives of the Alaska mining industry prepared an "Alaska Resource Preservation" bill which would have added 12,925,000 acres to the National Park System; protected lands with "substantial agricultural, forest, mineral industry, or multiple-use potentials including recreation" by adding 20,000,000 acres of national forests; and established eleven "5th system" areas that amounted to 44,531,000 acres. [33] In April the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission published tentative recommendations for the addition of 24,100,000 acres to the National Park System, 11,500,000 acres to national forests, 16,700,000 acres to wildlife refuges, and 2,700,000 to wild and scenic rivers. [34] The commission recommended that hunting and mining be excluded from all national park units except national preserves (4,300,000 acres), that a total of 7,700,000 acres be reserved as "wilderness study areas," and that 31,300,000 acres be placed in a new management system—National Land Reserves. [35] The latter were areas that included both multiple-use potential as well as significant scenic and natural features. Planning and classification of these lands would be a joint federal-state effort, and management would be accomplished by one of the existing systems (not specified).

Conservationists had made significant contributions during the process leading to the Morton proposals. Nonetheless, by their own admission, they had reacted to events, while federal conservation agencies took the lead. Although there had been considerable contact with those agencies, both on a formal and informal basis, conservationists had been unable to overcome the influence of the multiple-use advocates in the bargaining that had shaped Secretary Morton's December 1973 legislative recommendation. Beginning in late 1974, and often in consultation with Department of the Interior staff, conservation groups developed organizational relations, agreed to funding of the re-invigorated Alaska Coalition that would be responsible for shepherding a d-2 bill through Congress, established priorities, developed a legislative strategy, and began work to build a political base that would, in the end, convince Congress of the desire of Americans everywhere for passage of a strong Alaska lands bill. [36]

The election of President Jimmy Carter in November 1976 brought the promise not only of action on the Alaska bill but also, that the previous administration's proposals would be strengthened. Carter had compiled a credible conservation record, had promised to support an Alaska lands bill during the presidential campaign, and had pledged to include conservationists in his administration. Equally important, a combination of circumstances in the election had left open the chairmanship of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with the likelihood that Representative Morris Udall would take over that post. John Seiberling, who had travelled to Alaska to examine the new areas in 1975, would assume chairmanship of a specially-created subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands, with Harry Crandell, who had been the Wilderness Society's director of wilderness reviews, as his chief of staff. [37]

Buoyed by this fortuitous turn of events, representatives of most major conservation organizations met within a week of Carter's election to map strategies, thrash out policy issues, and draw up the outlines of a new Alaska lands bill. [38] The conservationists did not have the resources to analyze the lands that federal agencies did. But, over the years, they had met regularly with staff of those agencies, exchanged data, and had access, of course, to the 1974-1975 environmental impact statements. [39] Using that information, as well as the expertise of knowledgeable Alaskans, the conservationists prepared a preservation package that was considerably different from the Morton proposal and whose boundaries were for, the most part, those that had been identified by Interior Department agencies in 1973 as areas of ecological concern or included as alternatives in the 1974-75 environmental impact statements. [40]

In the next several weeks, Alaska Coalition members and staff of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs polished the bill and cleared it with Representatives Udall and Seiberling. On January 4, 1977, the first day of the Ninety-Fifth Congress, Representative Udall, along with seventy-five co-sponsors, introduced what he said was "one of the most important pieces of legislation in the conservation annals of our country." [41] H.R. 39, and companion bills introduced by Senators Lee Metcalf, Henry Jackson, and Clifford Hansen, [42] proposed setting aside up to 115,300,000 acres in the four national systems. The largest amount, 64,100,000 acres, would go to the National Park System:

Twenty-three wild and scenic rivers totalled 4,000,000 acres, and 46,400,000 acres would be added to the wildlife refuge system. The bill provided for no new national forests, although it did authorize the President to add up to 1,600,000 acres to the Tongass and Chugach national forests.

H R. 39 prohibited sport hunting and mining in national parks and monuments, although it provided for subsistence uses in "subsistence management zones," and permitted sport hunting in national preserves. [44] The bill would have given the Park Service the responsibility for administering the wild and scenic rivers in Alaska. It would have established a specific mechanism for regulating subsistence through "regulatory subsistence boards" made up of subsistence users, and provided for a ten-year review of the effects of hunting and fishing that included subsistence use. Previous state land selections within national interest areas would be invalidated if adequate land could be found elsewhere. The conservationists' proposal would have authorized identification of areas of ecological concern and, in recognition of the importance of the Alaska lands, would have authorized establishment of separate regional offices in Alaska for three Interior Department bureaus—NPS, FWS, and BOR.

Finally, and this was the most controversial aspect of the bill, H.R. 39 authorized establishment of over 145,000,000 acres of "instant wilderness," bypassing the normal review process for wilderness designation. Included were virtually all proposed park areas in Alaska, and some 5.4 million acres of national forest lands in Southeast, that were not d-2 lands. [45]

Representative Udall, and virtually everyone who supported H.R. 39, made it clear that the bill should not be taken as final, but was, rather, meant to be a focal point for discussion of the question of the disposition and management of the public domain in Alaska. [46] It certainly proved to be that. Alaskans, with the exception of the members of the conservation community, generally opposed the bill. [47] The Alaska Federation of Natives, while agreeing to use the bill as a vehicle for amendments, expressed serious concerns regarding protection of subsistence, development options for Native corporations, and Native lands rights, as well as the large wilderness designations. [48] Development industries and related groups—chambers of commerce, tourist industry, logging industry, miners, and recreation interests—all expressed varying degrees of opposition, and became the driving force behind the Citizens for Management of Alaska Lands (CMAL), a lobbying group formed to oppose the Udall bill and work for one more favorable toward development. [49]

Following a series of meetings with different groups around the state, Governor Hammond, Senator Stevens, and Representative Young prepared a bill that they insisted represented a "true consensus of the vast majority of Alaskans who want to see a rational and well reasoned congressional decision on the national interest lands. [50] Introduced by Senator Stevens as S.1787 on June 30, 1977, the "consensus bill" would have set aside some 75,000,000 acres in the various management systems. [51] Five new national park units (Aniakchak National Monument, Cape Krusenstern National Monument, Gates of the Arctic National Park, Kobuk Sand Dunes National Monument and Wrangell-Saint Elias National Park), and additions to Katmai National Monument and Mount McKinley National Park totalled 10,450,000 acres. The bill provided for the addition of 8,040,000 acres to the wildlife refuge system, 1,000,000 acres in three wild and scenic rivers, 5,748,000 acres in additional national forests, and over 56,000,000 in "federal cooperative lands." The latter, along with state and privately-held lands, would be managed by the various agencies, and would be open to all uses, save disposal, authorized by the public land laws. [52] The bill provided for the establishment of a federal-state Alaska Lands Commission that would provide inventories of the lands, develop comprehensive land use plans, and make land classification of cooperative lands under its jurisdiction. Additionally, S.1787 guaranteed access, mineral exploration and development, wilderness review, and it prohibited the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture from administratively establishing new areas.

Park Service employees were ambivalent toward Representative Udall's H.R. 39. NPS Alaska planners generally found the bill to be an improvement over the Morton proposal, although most agreed that the bill was only a starting point that needed considerable correction. Those concerned with management of existing and future areas in Alaska, on the other hand, tended to be more critical. Both Bryan Harry and Roger Contor, for example, pointed out that H.R. 39 would create many wilderness areas that were already so impacted as to be virtually unmanageable. [53]

Cecil D. Andrus, President Carter's choice as Secretary of the Interior, made no specific recommendations regarding H.R. 39 when he appeared before the subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands in April 1977. He reaffirmed the administration's support for a strong Alaska lands bill, saying

The establishment and protection of large land areas in Alaska as units of the four systems called for in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is the highest environmental priority of this administration.

He promised completion of a detailed report on H.R. 39 and other legislation by fall, following additional analysis by the several agencies. He refused to support the Morton proposals, moreover, indicating that the Carter administration would not be bound by the recommendations "the staff made in years gone by." [54]

Actually, Andrus, with encouragement from Curtis Bohlen, had decided to strengthen the Morton proposals and increase the size of the d-2 package at an early meeting regarding the Alaska lands. Although no figures were discussed then, by August Secretary Andrus indicated that he could recommend 85-90,000,000 acres. Such a decision was in keeping for a man who had established a record of concern for the environment. Most probably, too, Bohlen's suggestion that a Democratic administration should go beyond a Republican one appealed to the political sensibilities of the former governor of Idaho. [55]

Andrus had decided, too, that because the legislation would cut across several bureaus, the direction of Interior's d-2 effort would be tightly controlled at the departmental level. He reconstituted the Alaska Planning Group with Curtis Bohlen as chairman, and on April 22, announced the appointment of Bohlen as Special Assistant to the Secretary for "planning and coordination of Interior natural and cultural resource issues for programs in Alaska." [56]

Secretary Andrus had promised to have detailed recommendations on H.R. 39 completed by September. Along with this analysis of H.R. 39, he ordered a thorough-going review of the 1973 Morton proposals. In this analysis, Curtis Bohlen admonished the agencies, they must keep in mind the secretary's determination to protect complete ecosystems, and that any boundary recommendation not including complete watersheds should include recommendations for protection and management of areas outside the boundaries. The comments on the types of resources within the boundaries, Bohlen indicated, would be central to establishing the Carter Administration's position on the Alaska lands bill. [57]

The Department of Agriculture quickly recognized the importance of the approach outlined by the Department of the Interior. It could, Assistant Agriculture Secretary M. Rupert Cutler warned, result in using H.R. 39 rather than the 1973 Morton proposal as a legislative base to establish the administration's position. While Cutler admitted that some boundary adjustments might be necessary, he wrote that the major changes to include ecosystems threatened the delicate balance of Secretary Morton's proposal. It would, he asserted, invalidate the Morton-Butz agreement that shaped those proposals, and would certainly conflict with state and Native selections, raising once again the possibility of litigation which could destroy the d-2 process. On August 16 Secretary Andrus confirmed Cutler's concern when he indicated that he would use the promised report on H.R. 39 as the vehicle for legislative action, rather than preparing an alternative proposal. [58]

The Bureau of Land Management had anticipated Secretary Andrus's directive for reevaluation of the Morton proposals. Asserting that the BLM Organic Act (Federal Land Policy and Management Act, October 21, 1976) provided a congressional charter which required a reconsideration of the 1973 recommendations, that agency proceeded to refurbish its "fifth system" approach to management of Alaska's public lands. It proposed establishment of six national park units and additions to Katmai and Mount McKinley that totaled 31,700,000 acres, four new wildlife refuges and additions to Arctic Wildlife Range and Cape Newenham, additions to Chugach and Tongass national forests, and 25,000,000 in new "state selection areas. " Eight "national conservation areas" totaling 119,800,000 acres would be managed by BLM for multiple-use purposes. [59] The Bureau had not, apparently, apprised the new Secretary of the Interior of its efforts. A premature release of the plans, and the following uproar in the Alaska press led an angry Cecil Andrus to put an end to the Bureau's proposals. [60]

The Park Service had begun a review of its own proposals during the first week of December 1976, when selected keymen met in Washington with Roger Contor to examine the proposals and the Service's proposed justifications for use in future legislative hearings. [61] Based upon three years of intensive research and on-site investigation, NPS Alaska planners had, by the early part of 1977, developed boundaries for each area that incorporated the ideal park unit. At Yukon-Charley, for example, Bill Brown suggested including the Kandik and Nation rivers and Ogilvie Mountains, and extending the southeast boundary to the 70-Mile River. John Kauffmann had delineated thirteen boundary adjustments at Gates of the Arctic that included Wild Lake, important resources of the upper Noatak Basin, and Kipmik and Amitchiak lakes. Bob Belous recommended extending the northern boundary of Cape Krusenstern to the north bank of the Omikviorok River, to include Ipiakuk Lagoon, the northern, terminus for the beach gravel migration system responsible for continuing beach ridge construction. Extension of the southeastern boundary would include important archeological resources along the foothills of Napaktuktuk Mountain. [62]

By July the Service had completed its detailed analysis of H.R. 39 which had been ordered by Secretary Andrus and Curtis Bohlen. The results of that analysis were presented to Director William J. Whalen during the first week in August for his decision. Brushing aside concerns over possible future management problems, Whalen resolved what had been a disagreement within the NPS Washington Office regarding the size of the recommended areas and the amount of instant wilderness to be proposed, and concentrated, instead, on what he saw as the opportunities presented for preserving major areas of land in Alaska as part of the National Park System. [63]

In his report to Assistant Secretary Herbst, Director Whalen recommended amendments to H.R. 39, which would have resulted in the inclusion of fourteen areas to the National Park System totalling 50,919,000 acres:

H.R. 39 proposed that the Noatak, which Secretary Morton had recommended for joint BLM-FWS management, be administered by the Park Service, something most in the Park Service had little difficulty accepting. Included as well in Director Whalen's recommendations was the addition of a number of areas recommended by NPS Alaska planners in the "ideal boundaries" prepared earlier in the year. At Gates of the Arctic, for example, a part of the recommended increase in acreage came at Wild Lake, the lower Alatna, and a portion of the John River and the Yukon-Charley proposal included the Kandik and Nation rivers as well as areas along the north bank of the 70-Mile River. Director Whalen recommended that the Cape Krusenstern boundaries as delineated in the Morton proposals be used, with the recommended additions described earlier as part of a designated "Area of Ecological Concern."

Whalen recommended, moreover, NPS management of wild and scenic rivers only in National Park System areas. He urged recognition of valid existing rights, but opposition to all new mineral exploration, location, and leasing. He asserted that development of surface transportation corridors would result in damage to park resources. He opposed sport hunting in parks, but indicated that controlled sport hunting would be allowed in certain areas of high-hunting use in preserves. He supported the "instant wilderness designation" in Gates of the Arctic, Wrangell-Saint Elias, Admiralty Island, Lake Clark, Glacier Bay, Kenai Fjords, and Denali, but argued that wilderness designation elsewhere should come only after appropriate studies.

The first NPS statements on subsistence had come in 1973. [65] Since that time the Service had conducted an intensive program that included detailed studies of subsistence in each of the proposed areas in an effort to satisfactorily deal with that issue. [66] Based on the additional information, Director Whalen indicated that although H.R. 39 was generally sensitive to subsistence, the mechanisms included in the bill were thought to be too specific and should be, instead, established through departmental policy and regulations.

In its analysis of H.R. 39, the Park Service did address, necessarily, the question of the Noatak and Admiralty Island, agreeing that those areas met the criteria for inclusion in the National Park System. Elsewhere, the Service chose not to question the management system designations determined in 1973. [67] Several of the areas—Kenai Fjords, Chukchi-Imuruk, Lake Clark-Iliamna, for example—long had been of interest to both Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service. The distinction between park and wildlife values in these areas, as well as in the Noatak, was not clear. In 1977 the FWS, quite probably correctly so, interpreted Secretary Andrus' directive for a review of the Morton proposals as an opportunity to reevaluate management systems designated in that document. [68]

When the FWS completed its analysis of H.R. 39, it recommended, among other things, that Noatak, Kobuk Valley, Bering Land Bridge (Chukchi-Imuruk), Kenai Fjords, Bremner River area of the Wrangells, and portions of the southern addition of Katmai be added to the wildlife refuge system. [69] Assistant Secretary Herbst first accepted the FWS proposal when he began to reshape the recommendations of the NPS, BOR, and FWS. One day later (August 18), following intensive lobbying by Park Service officials, Herbst reconsidered, and restored Noatak, Bering Land Bridge, Kenai Fjords and Kobuk Valley to the National Park Service proposals. He transferred six townships in the northern Wrangells to the proposed Tetlin Wildlife Refuge, and the area in the Katmai addition near Bercharof Lake and Kejulik drainage to the proposed Bercharof Wildlife Refuge. The lower Noatak, as agreed to by the NPS and FWS, became the proposed Quagaguiaq National Wildlife Refuge. [70]

By August 23 Assistant Secretary Herbst had resolved most differences between the three d-2 agencies, and had forwarded a comprehensive proposal to Secretary Andrus that provided for the addition of more than 102,452,000 acres to the National Park, National Wildlife Refuge, and Wild and Scenic Rivers systems. Among some 51,646,000 acres of proposed national parks were four national preserves, including, for the first time, an 869,000-acre preserve in the Gates of the Arctic. [71]

In the next several weeks Assistant Secretary Herbst's proposals were reviewed by the other assistant secretaries, other departments, OMB, and the White House. At each stage the proposals were revised and on September 15, the Department of the Interior released its proposals. Release of the Interior Department's proposed amendments to H.R. 39 followed a period of intensive negotiations and overnight deadlines for preparation of proposals and maps that left everyone involved exhausted. The job could not have been made easier by the dismissal of Curtis Bohlen, who lost his job in departmental infighting in mid-August. Bohlen's replacement, Cynthia Wilson would direct the department's ANILCA effort through passage of the legislation. Wilson's involvement with Alaska the lands issue extended back to her position as the Audubon Society's Washington representative. She had most recently served as Secretary Andrus' assistant for environmental affairs. [72]

Asserting that "we can be certain that the crown jewels of Alaska—its most spectacular natural environments, recreation areas, and wildlife habitats," would be protected, Secretary Andrus offered amendments to H.R. 39 that, while certainly scaling down that bill, still proposed to set aside 91,800,000 acres in the four national systems. [73] He would have doubled the size of the National Park System by the establishment of ten new areas and additions to three existing ones totalling 41,770,000 acres:

He would have, additionally, doubled the size of the National Wildlife Refuge System with the addition of 45,100,000 acres, established thirty-three Wild and Scenic Rivers (2,540,000 acres), and added 2,450,000 acres to Chugach and Tongass national forests.

Secretary Andrus proposed to designate 41,320,000 acres—30,805,000 of it in NPS areas—as "instant wilderness." Sport hunting would have been permitted in national preserves, but prohibited in the parks and monuments. A non-racial subsistence policy was based primarily on NPS research completed since 1974. Subsistence would take place in specially designated "subsistence management zones, " and would be jointly managed by the state and federal governments. The Secretary of the Interior would designate zones, and have the right to close areas if resources were in jeopardy. The Alaska Fish and Game Department would assume responsibility for management, administration, and enforcement, and the state would have responsibility for determining, "without regard to race or ethnic origins," who qualified for subsistence use. The state would be authorized, as well, to establish local advisory boards to help determine who qualified. The Alaska Fish and Game Department would also be responsible, in consultation with federal managers, for management of fish and wildlife. Andrus proposed, moreover, establishment of an Alaska Cooperative Planning Commission, similar to the JFSLUPC, that would function in an advisory capacity in land and resource use, transportation, and the like. The proposal also would have established areas of ecological concern amounting to 80,000,000 acres. Secretary Andrus called for the establishment of two "mineral management zones" in Wrangell-Saint Elias National Preserve, where the secretary would be authorized to grant permits for the study of mineral potential and, under strict guidelines, could issue permits for exploration and extraction. Finally, reflecting NPS concerns, the department attempted to add an extra measure of protection for the areas by including a clear statement of purpose for establishment of each area. [74]

The Andrus proposal was, certainly, a much stronger preservation package than had been the Morton recommendations, although conservationists believed that it, too, fell short of the ideal. [75] It was, as the Morton proposal had been, a compromise that attempted to balance the concerns of a broader constituency than had H.R. 39. [76] At the last minute, for example, the Service lost an area which it had studied off and on since the 1930s—Admiralty Island—and the FWS lost the proposed Copper River Delta Wildlife Refuge through a decision that also foreclosed on the possibility of establishment of national forests in interior Alaska. [77]

While the Department of Interior analyzed H.R. 39 in the spring and summer of 1977, Congress conducted its own review. Representative John Seiberling's newly-formed Subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands embarked on an extensive series of public hearings to gauge the reaction of the American public to the issues addressed by H.R. 39. From April through September the congressmen met to take testimony not only in five major cities in the "Lower 48", but also in such places in Alaska as Bethel, Kotzebue, Anaktuvuk Pass, Fort Yukon, and Galena. It was a remarkable undertaking. More than 2300 people, 1,000 of them from Alaska, testified. The committee heard from people from all walks of life—former Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel P. Reed exhorted the committee to "be bold," reminding them that the "scars on the land in Alaska and the lower 48 states give grim evidence of our past failures"; Alaska's bush pilot-turned-Governor, Jay Hammond, reminded them that "it is not easy to be both the oil barrel to the nation and national park to the world"; and sixty-four-year-old Robert Vent from Wishdale on the Koyukuk River worried about the effect of sport hunting on subsistence. The testimony before the subcommittee, which is recorded in a sixteen-volume report, captures much of the essence of the struggle over the Alaska National Interest Lands. [78]

The Alaska Coalition, which had determined to use the hearings to demonstrate broad support for a strong Alaska lands bill, as well as to build support for the upcoming legislative battle, had done its work well. Supporters of the bill overwhelmed the opposition in the "Lower 48." Even in Alaska, where the congressmen expected to find near unanimous opposition, opinion was nearly evenly divided. [79]

Despite the show of strength the conservationists had been able to muster, the decision to rewrite H.R. 39 had been made earlier, and that decision had been reinforced during the hearings the past spring and summer. [80] In October staff members revised the bill to reflect concerns raised during subcommittee hearings as well as Department of the Interior recommendations. [81] The subcommittee ignored an alternative proposal made by Representative Don Young and adopted, instead, Committee Print No. 2 (October 28) as the mark-up vehicle for H.R. 39. The revisions incorporated in this version, John Seiberling indicated, accommodated mining and hunting interests, and left open seventy-five percent of Alaska's land for mineral development, eighty percent of its timber for logging, and sixty percent of the land for sport hunting. [82] The revision struck a balance, too, between the administration's September 15 proposals and H.R. 39 as introduced on January 4, 1977. The Interior Department, which had input along the way, praised the subcommittee's approach to areas and boundaries, which were generally in agreement with those in the Interior Department's September 15 recommendations. The committee proposed additions to the four national systems amounting to 104,717,000 acres, increasing NPS acreage to 45,670,000. The larger acreage was due primarily to the addition of a 1,100,000-acre Gates of the Arctic National Preserve in the Nigu-Etivluk Valley in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and inclusion of Squirrel River watershed portions of the lower Noatak (2,500,000 acres). The committee recommended the addition of 53,550,000 acres to the wildlife refuge system, 5,840,000 acres in forests, and 2,747,000 acres in wild and scenic rivers (fourteen rivers with provision for study of eleven more). [83]

The Interior Department expressed, nonetheless, concern over several provisions that remained in the mark-up vehicle. The amount of "instant wilderness" exceeded the administration's recommendation, although it had been reduced from 145,000,000 acres in the original version of the bill to 81,700,000 acres. A complex procedure threatened to open national preserves, wildlife refuges, and wild and scenic rivers to exploration and development of hard rock minerals and oil and gas. Finally, the Department of the Interior opposed a transportation title that established a process for rights-of-way across d-2 areas. [84]

Representative Seiberling hoped, originally, to begin mark-up sessions on November 9, 1977, but the subcommittee did not begin work until January 1978. The bill was not reported to the full Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs until February 7, following fourteen days of mark-up. [85]

The subcommittee had beaten back an effort to substitute a new "fifth-system," multiple-use proposal offered by Representative Lloyd Meeds as the mark-up vehicle, but had accepted, according to John Seiberling, eighty-five of eighty-nine amendments offered by Alaska Representative Don Young. [86] It had resolved, to a large extent, differences over outside boundaries, although Representative Young would introduce an amendment to reduce boundaries by a total of 5,000,000 acres during debate on the floor of the House in May. [87]

As a result, discussions during the nine days of mark-up by the full committee on Interior and Insular Affairs centered primarily on levels of protection afforded the areas. Once again Representatives Don Young and Lloyd Meeds led the effort to amend the bill, and though they managed to win some of their amendments, the major attempts to change the bill lost each time by one or two votes. [88] Among the changes sought, for example, were those increasing the size of preserves in Cape Krusenstern, Gates of the Arctic, Wrangell-Saint Elias, and converting Kenai-Fjords, Noatak, Yukon-Charley, and Bering Land Bridge into proposed wildlife refuges. [89]

On March 21, 1978, having defeated another attempt by Congressman Lloyd Meeds to substitute a multiple-use proposal, the committee recommended the addition of some 98,387,000 acres to the four systems, including 42,650,000 in national park units, 50,710,000 in wildlife refuges 1,687,000 in wild and scenic rivers, and 3,340,000 in forests. The committee's revision included some 16,000,000 acres of national preserves, adding preserves in Gates of the Arctic (60,000), Denali (400,000), and Katmai (210,000) to those proposed by the administration. [90] The committee reduced "instant wilderness" by more than 6,000,000 acres, an action taken over the protests of committee staff. [91]

As ordered by the Speaker of the House, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee referred the revised bill to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, resolving a long-standing jurisdictional dispute between the committees. [92] Staff of the Merchant Marine committee had participated in the 1977 hearings, and the committee, which has responsibility for wildlife refuges, had held its own hearings on April 4-7, 1978. On May 3 the committee reported H.R. 39, with amendments increasing the size of the wildlife refuge system to 77,500,000 acres, decreasing wilderness designation in the refuges from 28,470,000 to 20,000,000 acres. The committee would have permitted coordinated management of fish and wildlife resources in the Bristol Bay region, providing for cooperative management of areas seaward of coastal refuges. The Secretary of the Interior would have been authorized to permit oil and gas leasing, construction and operation of pipelines, and leasing for exploration and extraction of locatable minerals in Alaska Wildlife Refuges following a determination of compatibility. [93]

In an effort to speed consideration of the Alaska lands bill by the full House, the two committees agreed to a compromise bill—H.R. 12625—that would be offered on the House floor. The bill did not purport to resolve all differences between the committees but was, rather, merely intended to be a vehicle for debate on the Alaska national interest land issue in the House of Representatives. [94]

Finally, six long years of planning, hearings, and review by agency professionals, congressional committees and staffs were over, and Congress took up the question of the disposition of the Alaska national interest lands. Knowing that nothing more could be done than the counting of the votes, interest groups—conservationists, state of Alaska, Natives, and virtually every industry with any interest in Alaska—had marshalled their forces when Morris Udall addressed what he called " surely the greatest conservation opportunity ever to be placed before the House of Representatives" on May 17, 1978. [95]

The debates on the floor of the House of Representatives had been presaged in the preceding six years. Harrowing as it may have been for the participants, the record of the three days of debate provides a fascinating, if sometimes bewildering, glimpse of the legislative process. After considerable wrangling over parliamentary procedures, the defeat of an amendment by Don Young to cut some 5,000,000 acres from d-2 lands and make them available for state selection, and defeat of multiple-use alternatives offered by Representative Lloyd Meeds, the vote on H.R. 39 came on May 19, 1978. [96] Following a rousing speech by Morris Udall, the House defeated an effort to recommit, and passed H.R. 39 by a vote of 279-31. [97]

H.R. 39, as passed by the House on May 19, certainly did not contain everything either the conservationists or NPS officials hoped it would. Although compromises had been made, the bill was stronger than the bills first introduced in 1974, and some believe that it may have been the best bill passed by either house during the entire d-2 process. The bill provided for the addition of more than 100,000,000 acres to the four national systems. Ten new park units and additions to three existing areas totalled 42,720,000 acres:

Seventeen national wildlife refuges totalled over 77,000,000 acres. [99] The bill as passed by the House provided for the addition of 2,740,000 acres to Chugach and Tongass national forests, and the designation of twenty-five wild and scenic rivers with an additional fifteen to be studied. A majority (41,690,000 acres) of the 65,500,000 acres to be added to the National Wilderness Preservation System would be in National Park System units. [100]

The bill provided for cooperative management of the Bristol Bay region and seaward areas adjacent to refuges. The bill protected subsistence, and allowed sport hunting in national preserves only by specific action of the Secretary of the Interior. Mining and mineral leasing in all units of the National Park System was prohibited, but the bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to continue a mineral assessments program in the state, and the president to submit a proposal for evaluating applications for mineral exploration and extraction on conservation system units by 1981. Additionally, the bill provided for an expedited consideration of applications for rights-of-way across units of the National Park System. [101]

In what was in part a result of the lengthening debate over Alaska's public lands, a growing complexity of the bill was noticeable. Among other provisions, for example, was the "grandfathering" of hunting guides in Katmai, Denali, Gates of the Arctic, and Wrangell-Saint Elias national parks; designation of the Iditarod National Historic Trail; amendment of the Klondike Gold Rush National Historical Park Act to permit state land exchanges; and authorization of existing and future navigation aids and facilities. [102]

Supporters of H.R. 39 hoped that the overwhelming margin of victory in the House of Representatives would put pressure on the Senate to act expeditiously. Few believed, however, that so strong a bill would emerge from that body. The Senate is traditionally very reluctant to pass any bill affecting a state over the protests of that state's senators. Both senators from Alaska were on record in opposition. Mike Gravel, who had introduced his own bill on April 19, had stated over and over that he intended to prevent passage of any bill that session.[103] Senator Stevens felt just as strongly, and had hinted, earlier, that a bill might not pass before expiration of d-2 protection on December 15, 1978. [104] But he recognized that uncertainty regarding the national interest lands was a barrier to progress in Alaska, and determined to work for resolution of the issue. He had made it clear, however, that any bill passed would do so on his terms. The tactic he followed from the beginning, and Representative Don Young had successfully followed his lead in the House, was to delay the bill at every step, recognizing that compromise would come more readily when the December 18, 1978 expiration of d-2 protection loomed closer. [105]

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (formerly Interior and Insular Affairs) had held hearings in preparation for Senate consideration of the Alaska lands bill in 1976 and seven additional days during 1978. Its staff had held workshops in seven Alaskan communities during September 1977 and February 1978. [106] Nevertheless, events seemed to conspire to slow progress of the bill in the Senate. Although Senator Henry Jackson had originally intended to report a bill during July, work on energy issues delayed mark-up until June 22. [107] H.R. 39, referred to the Senate on June 8, 1978, was only one of eleven different pending bills that related to the Alaska national interest lands. [108] On June 28 the committee voted to consolidate the pending bills, rather than using the House-passed H.R. 39 as mark-up vehicle. [109]

Senator Jackson, too, invited both Senators Stevens and Gravel to participate in the committee mark-up sessions, giving them an opportunity to delay and bring about significant changes before the bill reached the Senate floor. [110] Senator Gravel chose to follow his own counsel, and did not participate. Senator Stevens, however, attended every one of the forty-two oft-tedious sessions. He proved a skillful opponent. Cajoling and threatening, when necessary, he often dominated debate, and clearly left his imprint on the bill. [111]

Not until October 5, with just eight days before adjournment, did the committee formally report a bill that had, in the estimate of conservationists and Interior Department staff, severely weakened the protection afforded the lands in both the House-passed version of H. R. 39 and the Carter administration's proposals. The slightly more than 88,000,000 acres proposed for the conservation systems included over 16,000,000 acres in multiple-use lands—8,520,000 acres in national forests and 7,550,000 acres in BLM-managed "National Conservation Areas" (including a 986,000-acre White Mountain National Recreation Area). The committee added a 1,530,000-acre Misty Fjords National Preserve in Southeast Alaska, bringing total acreage in proposed additions to the National Park System to 43,650,000 acres. Less than half of that total (20,650,000 acres) was offered protection as parks and monuments, however, and the balance was given less protection as preserves (20,340,000). [112]

The committee divided Gates of the Arctic into five separate units, three of which would be opened to sport hunting. A two-unit national park (Igikpak and Doonerak units) was divided by a national preserve in the John River Valley. Two national recreation areas totalled 1,040,000 acres The first would include the south half of the valley on the North Fork of Koyukuk River, just below the two peaks from which came the name "Gates of the Arctic." The second encompassed Selby Lake and headwaters of the Kobuk River. The 1,400,000-acre national recreation area in the Wrangell-Saint Elias proposal left much of the most important wildlife habitat and recreational land open to mining. The preserve at Katmai was situated so as to leave a "firing line"—an area open to hunting through which the bears would have to migrate. [113]

Elsewhere, the committee cut instant wilderness designation to 36,520,000 acres, 30,210,000 of it in the National Park System, and mandated oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Range. It established a process for expediting requests for transportation corridors through conservation units, mandating specific rights-of-way across Bering Land Bridge National Preserve and across the "boot" at Gates of the Arctic (the upper watershed of the Kobuk River and Selby Lake region) .

The bill reported by the Senate Energy Committee proved unacceptable to the Carter Administration, supporters of H.R. 39 in the House, and conservationists alike. [114] Because no time remained for a House-Senate conference to resolve differences before adjournment, H.R. 39, a bill that seemed unstoppable in May, appeared to be dead. [115]

What followed was one of the most intriguing, if misunderstood, events in the entire legislative process of the Alaska National interest lands. As early as October 9 staff of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, acting on Representative Udall's orders, had begun to prepare a series of minor amendments which could serve as the basis for discussion between the two houses. [116] On October 11 Senator Jackson called a meeting, attended by himself, Senators Stevens and Durkin, and Representatives Udall and Seiberling, to determine whether any hope for reaching a compromise existed. [117] The group agreed to make an effort to develop a compromise bill, something that certainly seemed possible when Senator Gravel wrote Senator Stevens to indicate that he would now support a compromise proposal. [118]

For two tension-packed days the "ad hoc" conferees met. On the 13th, Secretary Andrus, who had returned from vacation, was included as a full partner in the negotiations. [119] By late afternoon on that day it seemed possible to nearly everyone that success was once again within reach. The group had reached tentative agreement on most major issues, and had directed the staff to put down in legislative language what they believed had been decided, and to indicate what areas of difference remained. [120] At that point, Senator Gravel, who had not taken part in the proceedings, spoke up for the first time, listing demands for a Susitna hydropower project, a clause prohibiting future use of the Antiquities Act or wilderness withdrawals in Alaska, $800,000,000 for access and recreational facilities, and seven mandated transportation corridors across park and refuge lands:

NPR-A and adjacent state and Native lands across Gates of the Arctic and/or Noatak;

Interior (notably Ambler River copper district from Kotzebue across Kobuk and/or Selawik);

Ambler River across Gates of the Arctic "boot";

Ambler River District and interior across Seward Peninsula and Selawik and Koyukuk refuges;

Interior from Yukon-Kuskokim across the Yukon Delta Refuge;

Bristol Bay region from the Pacific Ocean across Becharof; and across the Stikine River Valley from Southeast Alaska to Canada. [121]

The other conferees thought Senator Gravel's demands to be so unreasonable as to bring the discussions to a close had he not assured Senator Jackson that they were negotiable. Senator Jackson instructed the staff to develop options for Senator Gravel's demands that night. The next morning, after an all-night session, the staffs of the two houses, assisted by representatives of the Interior Department, had completed a draft bill along with maps incorporating agreements reached in the previous two days. The draft bill contained much of what had been included in H.R. 39 as -reported by the Senate Energy Committee. Known as the "ad hoc" compromise, the staff draft written on the night of October 13, provided for the addition of over 95,000,000 acres to the five national systems, and just over 51,000,000 acres of wilderness. Nearly half (21,576,000 acres) of the 44,592,000 acres alloted to the National Park System received lesser protection as national preserves, with an additional 2,505,000 acres designated as national recreation areas. The staff draft provided for national recreation areas in the Noatak and Wrangell-Saint Elias, but had dropped that designation in Gates of the Arctic in favor of a national preserve. The draft did provide, however, that the Kobuk River area (or "boot") in Gates of the Arctic, would be managed as a national recreation area for purposes of transportation. [122]

The "ad hoc" conferees met Saturday morning to resume negotiations. No one had time to review the entire draft, although arguments regarding specifics did take place. No vote was taken, and evidence seems clear that the conferees did not reach agreement over the entire package. [123] Henry Jackson and Morris Udall did make a cursory review and concluded that, following additional discussion of points raised by Udall, the draft might be ready for consideration by both houses. At that point, Senator Gravel, who if nothing else certainly had a flair for the dramatic, brought the discussions to an end by announcing that the compromise access provision which permitted but did not mandate transportation corridors was unsatisfactory. Without mandated access, he said, he could not allow the bill to be brought before the Senate in the few hours left before adjournment. With any hope for a compromise gone, the conferees agreed to present a hurriedly-drawn provision extending the d-2 protection for another year. The House passed the resolution, but when it came before the Senate early Sunday morning (5:30 A.M.) as a rider to the Oregon Omnibus Wilderness Bill Senator Gravel killed that too with the threat of a filibuster. [124]

Senator Gravel blamed Morris Udall, John Seiberling, and the conservationists for forcing him to act as he did. He had killed the bill and d-2 extension-provision only after it became clear, he said, that they considered the bill only the "first step in a continuing effort for more reservations in Alaska." "They don't want just this," he said, "they want all of Alaska." [125]

Nevertheless, he had cast himself as the villain, and most everyone was more than willing to blame him for the demise of H.R. 39. The truth is, however, he unknowingly did others a favor. As negotiations progressed during the "ad hoc" conference, supporters of a stronger bill grew more and more apprehensive. Secretary Andrus was certainly concerned when it became apparent that the negotiations were going below what he considered his "bottom line," although he indicated that he would not be the one "to pull the plug." House staff hoped, as well, that Representatives Udall and Seiberling would "pull up their tents and silently steal away." The Alaska Coalition had played no direct role in the negotiations, but had watched with growing dismay the developments, and had given Morris Udall a list of their demands which he indicated he would present on Saturday morning—demands which would have undoubtedly been difficult for Senators Stevens and Gravel to accept. Whether or not Representative Udall or someone else would have killed the bill, or whether they would have felt compelled to accept the compromise at that point is, of course, impossible to determine. It may well have been that in the intensity of the time the process of passing a bill became more important to the participants than the substance of the bill itself. Whatever the case, Mike Gravel killed it. But, said Chuck Clusen, chairman of the Alaska Coalition, "we were not unhappy." [126]

Killing the staff "ad hoc" draft was one thing. Refusing to accept an extension of the d-2 protection was something else. Ironically, by doing that, Senator Gravel actually may have guaranteed passage of an Alaska Lands bill, or at least set in motion a chain of events that would be a major step in that direction.

For whatever reason he acted, Senator Gravel ignored Cecil B. Andrus' oft-stated determination to use whatever administrative means available to protect the 17(d)(2) lands in the face of Congressional inaction before December 18, 1978. [127] All 17(d)(2) lands, it will be recalled had been withdrawn simultaneously under Section 17(d)(1) of ANCSA, and would remain under that protection indefinitely. Nagging questions existed, however, as to whether this fully precluded the entry and location of minerals, or state selection of lands contemplated in the proposed legislation. The Park Service had taken the first steps to secure additional protection in the event legislation did not pass as early as July 2, 1978, when it began to draft national monument proclamations for proposed NPS areas delineated in Secretary Andrus' September 15, 1977 recommendations regarding H. R. 39. [128] Throughout the summer, and into the fall, both Interior and Agriculture Departments, at the request of the White House, conducted a through-going analysis of the effect that expiration of the 17(d)(2) provision would have on the proposed lands, and a review of the administrative options available to extend additional protection until enactment of the necessary legislation. [129]

As part of its on-going review process, the Interior Department assembled a special forty-two-member task force to prepare a supplement to the twenty-eight environmental impact statements prepared in 1974 to accompany Secretary Morton's legislative recommendation. [130] The group began its work, which involved an evaluation of environmental impacts on areas whose boundaries were a composite of maximum boundaries in the House-passed bill of May 19, 1978, the bill reported by the Senate Energy Committee, and Secretary Andrus's recommendations of September 15, 1977. The department released the draft for comment on October 25, shortly after Congress failed to act on the bill. On November 28, 1978, following a twenty-five day review period, the Department issued a final report. [131]

The Interior Department's analysis indicated that several existing authorities, or a combination of them, were available for use by the executive branch to provide additional protection for the national Interest lands. The President could establish national monuments under the Antiquities Act, a course recommended by the National Park Service. [132] The Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) provided the Secretary of the Interior with emergency authority to segregate and withdraw public lands from mineral entry, mineral leasing, and state selection for as long as two years (Section 204(e)). Finally, Section 22 (e) of ANCSA gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to withdraw public lands in Alaska to replace acreage selected by Native villages from existing refuges. [133]

There is no doubt that the Carter administration intended to take steps to protect the national interest lands should Congress fail to act before expiration of the d-2 provision, and that it enjoyed considerable support in that decision. [134] On July 18, and again on November 9, 1978, the National Park Service recommended that, in so far as proposed national parks were concerned, the areas be designated national monuments under authority of the Antiquities Act. [135] There is some evidence to suggest, however, that the administration did not intend to go that far, but rather would have segregated all areas under Section 204(e) of FLPMA, and designated a small number of monuments by way of illustration. [136]

The state of Alaska, ironically, forced the administration's hand, and determined in part the direction the Carter Administration would take. On November 14, 1978, in violation of what Secretary Andrus regarded as an oral agreement to restrict any state selections to lands outside the proposed conservation areas, state officials filed for selection of some 41,000,000 acres of land. Included were over 9,500,000 acres within proposed conservation areas (3,970,000 in national park areas and over 5,000,000 in proposed refuges). [137] Two days later, citing the need to protect the "integrity of Alaska lands," Secretary Andrus withdrew 110,750,000 acres of land under Section 204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. [138]

On December 1, 1978, President Jimmy Carter, in the most sweeping application of the Antiquities Act in history, designated seventeen national monuments in Alaska that totaled approximately 56,000,000 acres. Two areas—Becharof (1,200,000 acres) and Yukon Flats (10,600,000 acres)—would be managed by the FWS, while the Forest Service would manage Misty Fjords (2,200,000 acres) and Admiralty Island(1,100,000 acres). The 41,000,000 acres to be managed by the NPS would nearly triple the size of the National Park System:

On November 17, additionally, Agriculture Secretary Bergland requested that Secretary Andrus withdraw all potential wilderness and wilderness study areas in Southeast Alaska (11,000,000 acres) under section 204(l) of FLPMA, an action that automatically segregated those lands from operation of the public land laws. Secretary Andrus directed Interior Department agencies, additionally, to prepare support material for possible application of a section 204(c) withdrawal on all lands withdrawn under section 204(e), but not included in the monument proclamations. The latter included some 40,000,000 acres in wildlife refuges and 4,000,000 in potential park areas (lower Noatak Valley, northeast corner of the Wrangell-Saint Elias, west portion of Lake Clark, and eastern portion of Aniakchak). Thus, the Carter administration had used its authority to protect virtually every acre of land under consideration by Congress. [140]

President Carter emphasized that his action had been made necessary by Congress failure to act before expiration of 17(d)(2), and was taken in anticipation that Congress would do so in the near future. That disclaimer, however, did not prevent a firestorm of protest in Alaska. State officials had already gone to court in an unsuccessful effort to prevent the Carter administration from exercising its withdrawal authorities. Senator Stevens had included an amendment in the Senate's Interior Department appropriation bill forbidding use of appropriated funds from implementing section 603 of FLPMA. He introduced, and later withdrew, an amendment that would have prevented use of the Antiquities Act to withdraw the d-2 lands. He and Senator Gravel would offer legislation to that effect the following year. [141]

Some Alaskans, the editors of the Anchorage Daily News, for example, took a more moderate stance and sought to remind Alaskans of the role that Senator Gravel had played in the whole affair. State legislators, on the other hand, debated, and finally rejected a plan to fund legal assistance for people charged with violating regulations in the new monuments. Citizens in Fairbanks burned President Carter in effigy and people living near Denali National Monument endeavored to engage in civil disobedience in the "Great Denali Trespass." [142] The city council of Eagle, a small village on the Yukon River near Yukon-Charley Rivers National Monument, passed a resolution stating:

We do not intend to obey the directives and regulations of the National Park Service. The city council of the City of Eagle Alaska does not advocate violence, but we can be no more responsible for the actions of an individual citizen than we can be for any animal when it is cornered. The policy of the Eagle City Council shall be to offer no aid or assistance to the National Park Service or its employees while your current regulations are in effect. [143]

In preparation for a January 1979 visit by John Cook, the newly appointed director of the NPS's Alaska Area Office, Eagle residents plastered the village with signs warning:

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE EMPLOYEES and anyone else advocating a dictatorship (including those locally who support National Park Service activities under the Antiquities Act) ARE NOT WELCOME HERE! [144]

Interior department officials anticipated, all along, a strong reaction in Alaska to the national monument designations and other withdrawals. [145] A particular problem proved to be a lack of information, or, in some cases, misinformation about national monuments, their boundaries, and the uses allowed. [146] Interior Department officials recognized the urgency of this situation, and began preparing management regulations for the new monuments almost immediately after the President acted. [147] By June 28, 1979, following extensive review within the Department, as well as outside, the Interior Department published proposed regulations for the national monuments. These proposed regulations attempted to reconcile conditions in Alaska with policies that guided managers in the "Lower 48," permitting traditional subsistence activities (but not sport hunting), the use of aircraft, and carrying of firearms in the national monuments. [148]

Looking ahead to the ninety-sixth congress, Senator Gravel said that he did not foresee passage of "a possible workable d—2 bill in the immediate future; the future is three years." [149] Nevertheless, the Carter administration's actions had the effect intended—of marshalling support in Alaska for some sort of legislative solution to the question. The burden had shifted, and the opponents of H.R. 39 now had to work for an acceptable bill, one that would not so weaken the protection afforded by the national monuments as to be perceived by the public as an attack on the National Park System. [150]

At the same time; seventy-five seats in the House of Representatives had changed hands in the November 1978 election, resulting in a clearly more conservative body than the previous year. The opponents of H.R. 39, moreover, were in considerably better position to exploit this change than they had been before. The Alaska legislature, for example, had voted an appropriation of $2,500,000 for a campaign to ensure that its interests were met. [151] The pro-development lobbying group, Citizens for Management of Alaska Lands, had received additional help in its lobbying efforts when Exxon Corporation and the National Rifle Association assigned their regular lobbyists to the d-2 question. [152]

The events at the end of the ninety-fifth Congress had taken its toll on the participants. It was a far more somber Morris Udall who, along with ninety-one co-sponsors, reintroduced H.R. 39, stating that "it is regrettable that the House must once again take up the greatest of land conservation issues in our history." [153] This bill, which Representative Udall described as a "refinement" of the House-passed bill of the previous Congress, actually went beyond the earlier bill. The new version—the proposed Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1979 reaffirmed the actions taken by the Carter administration, and deleted many of the political compromises that made House passage of the previous bill possible. The bill proposed the addition of more than 114,000,000 acres to the four conservation systems (including some 44,000,000 acres to the National Park System), and over 85,000,000 acres of wilderness, an increase of 20,000,000 over the previous bill. Gone were the transportation and mineral titles and the grandfather clause for hunting guides. [154]

The Department of the Interior, informed that the revised H.R. 39 would be used as a mark-up vehicle, decided not to attempt to revise its earlier proposals, but to put its imprint on the legislation through amendments to H.R. 39, much as it had done in 1977. [155] Following a review process similar to that followed in 1977 (although now involving only agencies, assistant secretaries, Alaska Policy Group, and Secretary) the department forwarded its recommendations on February 26, the day the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee was scheduled to begin mark-up. [156]

Following three days of hearings the 1979 version of H.R. 39 was revised and offered as a substitute by Representative Lamar Gudger. During the four days of mark-up meetings that followed, however, the effect of the 1978 congressional election became evident. The reconstituted Interior and Insular Affairs committee spurned its chairman (Morris Udall), defeated the Gudger substitute, and voted, by a margin of twenty-two to twenty-one, to adopt a second substitute offered by Representative Jerry Huckaby of Louisiana (H.R. 2199, February 15, 1979). [157]

The Huckaby substitute, and a somewhat similar measure (H.R. 2219, Breaux and Murphy, February 15, 1979) adopted by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries over Representative Gerry Studds's conservationists-favored substitute, incorporated much of what had been included in the staff draft of October 13, 1978. [158] Although there were differences, both can fairly be described as pro-development measures that weakened the protections already given the conservation areas. In terms of the Park System, the Merchant Marine substitute (known as Breaux-Dingell) proposed the addition of 32,390,000 acres, with 20,030,000 in parks and monuments, and 12,360,000 in preserves. Bering Land Bridge, the Noatak, and 2,450,000 acres in Wrangell-Saint Elias would have been designated as wildlife refuges. Representative Huckaby proposed setting aside some 44,000,000 acres for the National Park System, with 20,510,000 acres as parks and monuments, 21,590,000 acres in preserves, and 2,510,000 acres as national recreation areas, including one totaling 1,270,000 acres in the Noatak. Both included a preserve in the center of Gates of the Arctic and both included provision for a transportation corridor across the "boot" of that area. The Huckaby bill, in addition, included a "no more" clause, prohibiting "further studies on withdrawals of federal lands" unless authorized by a concurrent resolution of Congress. [159]

The Alaska Coalition indicated that they preferred no bill at all to the Huckaby substitute. Congressmen Udall and Seiberling wrote that if enacted, the Huckaby bill "would represent the largest raid on the National Parks and Wildlife Refuges in the history of this country," and indicated that they would vote against it if it reached the House floor. [160] Udall, along with Republican Representative John Anderson of Illinois, introduced a bipartisan bill, H.R. 3651, to be introduced as a substitute when the full House took up the question. [161]

When the House took up the question on May 15 both sides were confident of victory, and had marshalled their forces for what they hoped to be the final chapter on the issue. [162] For a time, as the House took up debate, it seemed that the larger issue of the division of Alaska's public lands would be lost to the question of gun control. The National Rifle Association, acting in concert with other opponents of the Udall-Anderson substitute, had launched a last-ditch, intensive effort to derail the proposal by calling it a gun-control measure that would have a negative effect on hunting everywhere in the United States. [163] It took an opponent of gun control and one of the Alaska Coalition's "doubtful" votes, Representative Pat Williams of Montana, to defuse the issue, which he did when he took the floor to accuse the NRA of misrepresentation in its contention that the Udall-Anderson bill could be construed as a gun-control measure. [164]

Actually supporters of Udall-Anderson had already won a crucial vote when the House Rules Committee decided that the full House would vote first on Udall-Anderson, which would be presented as an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Huckaby bill. During the debate, supporters of the Breaux-Dingell and Huckaby bills merged those bills in an effort to present a stronger front. When the vote came, however, the House chose Udall-Anderson over the Breaux-Dingell Huckaby substitute by a margin that surprised supporters and opponents alike—268-157. Subsequently, the House passed the Udall-Anderson bill, as amended, by a vote of 360-65. [165]

Once again jubilant supporters of H.R. 39 hoped that the margin of victory on the floor of the house would create a momentum for a bill that would carry it through the Senate. The Senate Energy Committee, however, had already indicated that it would reconsider the bill it reported the previous October, and Senator Henry Jackson had introduced legislation to that effect. [166] Senator Gravel had indicated he would continue efforts to prevent consideration of a bill, and attempted, unsuccessfully, to delay proceedings by trying to convince the committee to hold additional hearings on the matter in Alaska. [167] Senator Stevens, who had given up his seat as ranking minority member of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to become a voting member of the Senate Energy Committee, wrote that "settlement of the d-2 lands is the most important issue to face Alaska since it became a state," and argued that legislation along the lines of the staff draft prepared for the "ad hoc" conference would prevent protracted consideration of the issues. [168]

H. R. 39 was referred to the Senate Energy Committee on May 24. Although Senate Energy Committee had been given an added incentive to act in the form of Secretary Andrus' directive to Interior Department agencies to complete necessary documentation required for potential final, twenty-year withdrawals of land under section 204(c) of FLPMA, the committee seemed in no hurry, and did not begin work on the bill until October 9. It agreed to use Senator Jackson's S. 9 instead of H.R. 39 as the mark-up vehicle. [169]

The Senate Energy Committee held twelve mark-up sessions, during which Senator Stevens dominated proceedings, much as he had the year before. On October 30, with freshman Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts casting the lone dissenting vote, the committee reported a bill similar to that deemed unacceptable by supporters of the House passed version the previous year. [170]

Both the Interior Department and conservationists began work immediately on amendments designed to strengthen the bill when it reached the floor of the Senate. [171] At the urging of the Alaska Coalition, Senators Tsongas and William Roth of Delaware attempted to employ the strategy Morris Udall had used in the House of Representatives by introducing an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Energy Committee bill. Although similar in most respects to the House-passed bill, the Tsongas-Roth substitute did include a number of items that were present in the Senate Energy version, but not in the House bill. The substitute provided, for example, for the continuation of commercial fishing at Cape Krusenstern National Monument, access across conservation units to private holdings within, or "effectively surrounded by those units," revocation of the 1978 national monument and FLPMA withdrawals, and facilitation of U.S. Borax operations in Misty Fjords National Monument. [172]

Senator Gravel once again had threatened to prevent consideration of the Energy Committee's proposal. Introduction of the Tsongas-Roth substitute convinced Majority Leader Robert Byrd to postpone debate until early in the next year. Resolution of the issue had been postponed once again, when only months earlier it had seemed the battle might be over.

The weary group that returned to Washington in January 1980 had hoped for a quick end to this seemingly endless legislative process. But their hopes were soon dashed when Senators Tsongas and Durkin, in return for a limit on the number of amendments to be allowed and debate on the bill, agreed to postpone consideration by the Senate until after the Republican presidential convention recess on July 21. [173]

Secretary Andrus had done his best to nudge the Senate into action by indicating that he would use his authority to permanently withdraw some 40,000,000 acres that had been temporarily protected under section 204(e) of FLPMA since 1978. On February 11, 1980, he acted to withdraw 40,120,000 acres of land under section 204(c) of FLPMA, saying that, "I'm glad the Senate is finally looking to scheduling the bill, but I am very concerned that the lateness of that date will lead to a stalemate in the closing days of the 96th Congress just as happened to its predecessor in 1978." [174] Included were 36,910,000 acres in wildlife refuges, and 3,210,000 acres in "natural resource areas"—Aniakchak (160,000), Lake Clark (1,150,000), Noatak (660,000), and Wrangell-Saint Elias (1,240,000). The latter were proposed NPS areas included within the composite boundaries withdrawn under section 204(e) of FLPMA, but were not in the national monuments. [175] They would be managed by the Bureau of Land Management, with the assistance of the National Park Service. [176]

The delay forged on February 7 gave both sides time to mount one last public relations campaign, and let the Senators prepare the amendments allowed under that agreement (Jackson, Gravel, and Stevens, three each, and Tsongas, five). [177] On July 21, 1980, finally, the full Senate took up consideration of the Alaska national interest lands with consideration of the first of five strengthening amendments, this one a wildlife refuge amendment sponsored by Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and four co-sponsors. [178] Despite efforts by Senator Gravel to delay action through parliamentary devices, the strength of support for a strong d-2 bill became obvious in votes of 64-30, 66-30, and 62-33 against stalling or weakening the Hart amendment. [179]

For the participants, however, the legislative progress of the Alaska lands bill must have been akin to riding a roller-coaster. Once again, their hopes were dashed just when victory seemed so certain. Senator Stevens, recognizing that he was almost certain to lose, prevented a vote on the Hart and other amendments by introducing the first of eighteen secondary amendments. In so doing, the Alaska senator, who was under increasing pressure to block consideration of the bill altogether, forced Majority Leader Byrd to take the bill off the floor. He also set in motion a series of meetings between key senators and their staffs, from which Amendment No. 1961, a substitute for the Senate Energy Committee bill, would emerge. [180]

On August 18, following a vote (63-25) to end Senator Gravel's filibuster, the Senate voted 72-16 to accept Amendment 1961 as a substitute. The next day, in what was almost an anti-climatic end, the Senate passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 by a vote of 78-14. [181]

Both Senators Stevens and Jackson warned that they would accept no changes to the Senate bill by the House of Representatives. [182] Despite their public "take it or leave it" position, efforts to reach a compromise between the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 39 commenced almost immediately, and lasted through September. [183] But neither side seemed willing to compromise substantive issues, and by October 2, negotiations had broken down. Representative Udall, along with Tom Evans, Lud Ashley, John Seiberling, and Philip Burton introduced HR 8311, which Representative Udall described as a "blueprint for final compromise." Representative Udall had devised an ingenious, if somewhat complicated "two-bill strategy" for HR 8311 , that did not reject the Senate substitute, but rather, would amend the Senate bill once it was signed into law. [184]

Hopes of strengthening the Senate-passed H. R. 39 came to an end, however, with the 1980 elections which would bring into office an administration that had expressed an opposition to the bill and give the Republican party control of the Senate. On November 12 a crest-fallen Morris Udall, indicating "that neither I nor those who support me consider this legislation to be a great victory for the cause," asked the House of Representatives to give its approval to the Senate bill. The nine-year-old battle over Alaska's National Interest lands ended that day by a desultory voice vote. [185] On December 2, President Jimmy Carter, saying that "never before have we seized the opportunity to preserve so much of America's natural and cultural heritage," signed into law the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980. [186]

Although those who had been involved in the struggle for so many years sighed in relief that it was finally over, few were really happy with the way things turned out. Both Ted Stevens and Don Young decried the amount of land set aside in the conservation systems and the resources "locked up" there. Conservationists, who had come so close in August, were sorely disappointed with the failure to include a considerable portion of the proposed wilderness areas of Southeast (West Chichagof, Duncan Canal, Karta, Rocky Flats, and Yakatak Forelands), deletion of significant wildlife habitat in the Copper River Delta and National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (proposed Teshekpuk-Utukok National Wildlife Refuge); the removal of 149,000 acres of wilderness in Misty Fjords National Monument to allow U.S. Borax to go forward with mining there; the $40,000,000 annual subsidy and guarantees of an annual cut for timber interests in Tongass National Forest; and mandated oil and gas exploration on the sensitive coastal plain of the Arctic Wildlife Range. Everyone recognized all along that accommodations must be made. Yet the departures from wilderness policy—the lack of statutory protection from mechanized access in wilderness areas, for example—disturbed a good many people. The proposed national recreation areas at Gates of the Arctic, Wrangell-Saint Elias, and Noatak had been dropped, but many believed that the balance between parks, monuments and preserves had shifted too far in the direction of the latter, which provided less protection. The law mandated a transportation corridor across the "boot" at Gates of the Arctic from the haul road to Ambler mining district. Provisions protecting customary uses on conservation lands—access, cabins, subsistence—all seemed to hold the promise of future difficulties for managers from all agencies who were given too few, unclear, or contradictory directions for dealing with them. [187]

Partially as a result of the extended legislative process, and partially as a result of the failure to hold a conference to iron out differences between versions of the bill and perfect language, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act is flawed in a number of ways. It is a complex, often vague, and sometimes contradictory act. There was (and there is today), however, too often a tendency to dwell on the problems of ANILCA and overlook what had been accomplished. The act was a milestone in the history of conservation in America. Never before, and surely never again, would lands be preserved on so vast a scale.

The bill provided for the protection of critical wildlife habitat through the addition of 53,720,000 acres to the National Wildlife Refuge system (nine new areas and six additions to seventeen existing ones). Segments of twenty-five free-flowing rivers were added to the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, with portions of twelve others designated for study as potential additions. The Forest Service would manage two national monuments—Admiralty Island and Misty Fjords, as well as additions to Chugach and Tongass national forests. More than two million acres were taken out of proposed Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge to be managed by BLM as multiple use areas (Steese National Conservation Area and White Mountains National Recreation Area). Although falling short of expectations, some 56,400,000 acres were added to the National Wilderness Preservation System. [188] ANILCA extended, finally, National Park System protection to ten new areas and additions to three existing ones that totalled 43,600,000 acres of land. As described by Representative Morris Udall, the Alaska parks would

offer the full range of nature and history in Alaska, mighty land forms and entire ecosystems of naturally occurring geologic and geomorphic processes, intricate water forms and spectacular shorelines, majestic peaks and gentle valleys, diverse plant communities and equally diverse fish and wildlife:

In an interesting sidelight, virtually all the new lands included in the National Park System under ANILCA, had been identified as parklands, or "Areas of Ecological Concern" in 1973.

Congressman Clausen of California said that the passage of ANILCA "will end uncertainty regarding land status which plagued Alaska for the last 9 years." [190] Actually the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act was as much a beginning as it was an end. Representative Don Young, seconded by Senator Stevens, indicated that he would be back to attempt to open up more land to additional uses the next session of Congress. [191] Similarly, both Representatives Seiberling and Udall promised to work to amend the act to include the stronger provisions that had been in the bill that passed the House of Representatives in May 1979.

Ginny Wood, a thirty-year resident of Alaska, and one of its leading conservationists, testified before the House subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands that "Ironically, I know that after a D-2 bill is passed I will then be fighting to protect the D-2 lands from other development and other management by the very agencies instructed to protect them - The National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and Forest Service." [192] While not all might agree with her assessment of the management approaches of the several federal agencies, and while she did not recognize the role of the Department of the Interior in decision-making in Alaska, she was correct in the emphasis she placed on future management of the conservation areas. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act extended systems protection to vast amounts of land. Complex as the 186-page act may be, however, the manner in which responsible federal agencies implemented it would determine in large part the future of the Alaska national interest lands.