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On the morning of July 1, 1862, Lee knew he was about out of time.
McClellan's army was already on the banks of the James. If any chance to
damage the Federals remained, that chance would have to be seized today.
Malvern Hill was a narrow plateau of cleared land planted mostly in
wheat. After months in the forests and swamps around the Chickahominy,
the Northerners felt a sort of elation to be on high ground bathed in
warm sunshine. "Gazing out over the sea of waving grain," wrote one New
Yorker, "rippling beneath the touch of each passing breeze up to the
very breast of the high forest wall, whose dark green foliage formed a
fitting background to the picture, one could not help being entranced.
The sky, so high above, and so blue, was flecked with light, fleecy,
silvery-white clouds, which cast soft shadows upon the scene below, . .
. growing wheat, beneath the rays of the declining sun, undulated and
shone like a sea of liquid gold."
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SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES: DAY SEVEN—JULY 1 BATTLE OF MALVERN
HILL
McClellan's forces spread themselves out in a U-shaped
defense, with front lines defended by more than two dozen cannon. It
was, many participants later said, the strongest position held by
either army during the war. After a morning of little action, a series of
confusing events prompted a Confederate assault. Lee's men were forced
to cross open fields and climb steep slopes before reaching the enemy's
line. All the while Union cannoneers fired on the Confederate ranks
with cruel efficiency. Only darkness ended the frightful
slaughter.
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McClellan's engineers, of course, had selected the position not for
its beauty but for its defensive strength. Steep slopes on the west,
south, and east offered protection to the army's flanks and rear, so the
Federals prepared to defend the long, open northern approach—the
direction from which Lee's men would come. McClellan and his officers
arranged their cannon in long lines at the crest of Malvern Hill, and
the guns, with the 18,000 men of George Morell's and Darius Couch's
divisions in support, completely dominated the fields of wheat between
them and the Confederates. The rest of the Army of the Potomac reposed
nearby on the hill, waiting in support of Morell and Couch. In addition
to the artillery and infantry on Malvern Hill, U.S. Navy gunboats in
the James River, a little over a mile to the south, would be able to lob
their enormous heavy projectiles into the ranks of Confederate
attackers. The Federal position seemed impregnable.
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THE OPEN GROUND AT MALVERN HILL. GENERAL PORTER'S ARTILLERY CROWNED THE
DISTANT RIDGELINE. CONFEDERATE ASSAULTS CROSSED HERE BUT COULD ADVANCE
NO FARTHER THAN THE CABINS IN THE CENTER OF THE VIEW. (BL)
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Jackson's men, in their assigned place on time for the first time
that week, formed Lee's left flank, stretching around the northern and
northeastern approaches to Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill's troops were in
position in the Confederate center on the Willis Church and Carter's
Mill Roads. John Magruder's guides had misled him on the morning's march
and his men did not find their way to the battlefield until late in the
afternoon. They formed Lee's right, facing a narrow causeway between the
Carter's Mill Road and Malvern's steep western slopes.
While Lee waited for Magruder's troops to arrive, he discussed the
day's prospects with Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Jackson. Hill recognized
the great strength of the Federal position and stated flatly, "If
General McClellan is there in strength, we had better let him alone."
Longstreet felt differently, however, and chided Hill, "Don't get
scared, now that we have got him whipped." Longstreet, though ignorant
of the terrain, urged an attack. Lee agreed in principle but wished to
reconnoiter the Federal position before making a decision. He found a
fine artillery position on Jackson's front, and Longstreet discovered a
long ridge suitable for batteries on the army's right. The two generals
thought that massing Confederate guns on these two elevations would
produce a converging fire on the Federal guns. The crossfire, they
hoped, would weaken the Federals enough for a Confederate infantry
assault to succeed. Having designed the plan of the day's action and
issued the orders, Lee refrained from directing the actual operations.
He was ill and though he remained on the field, he left management of
the battle largely to his subordinates.
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POWERFUL FEDERAL BATTERIES SKILLFULLY OPERATED BY MEN LIKE THESE
MASSACHUSETTS ARTILLERISTS DOMINATED THE SLOPES OF MALVERN HILL.
(USAMHI)
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UNION GUNBOATS GALENA AND MAHASKAIN THE JAMES RIVER LOBBED
HUGE SHELLS TOWARD THE BATTLEFIELD WITH MIXED RESULTS. "OUR TROOPS
FEARED THEM QUITE AS MUCH AS THE ENEMY, AND AS A FACT I THINK THEY
INJURED OUR TROOPS MORE THAN THEY DID THE ENEMY," WROTE ONE NORTHERN
ARTILLERIST. (COURTESY MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, BOSTON)
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But the plan began to go wrong almost immediately. The Confederate
artillery was so dispersed through the column stretching back toward
Glendale that commanders could not get enough guns forward to the
positions selected by Lee and Longstreet, and the bombardment never
materialized. The few Southern batteries that did get into action were
knocked to pieces in minutes by the Federal gunners.
The tragedy continued when the staff officer who wrote out Lee's
orders for the attack produced a badly written paper that would add to
the confusion of the afternoon. Brigadier General Lewis A. Armistead's
brigade of Huger's division was to trigger the assault by observing the
effects of the artillery bombardment and, at what he judged the most
propitious time, lead his brigade forward "with a yell." The cheering
of Armistead's men would signal other commands to come forward and join
the assault. Unfortunately, some of Armistead's Virginians went forward
prematurely and set off a larger, badly timed advance of Confederate
infantry. Magruder ordered two more brigades—those of Ambrose R.
Wright and William Mahone—to support Armistead's Virginians.
The Northern artillerymen responded with a thunderous discharge of
case shot and canister. Federal sharpshooters and the infantrymen of
Morell and Couch laid clown a steady musket fire, and the gunboats in
the river added their enormous shells for good measure, though the Navy
gunners' fire was inaccurate and certainly more frightening than
destructive.
D. H. Hill sent his men forward in support of Magruder, but his
assault lacked coordination. Though Hill had about 8,000 men available
to him, he did not send them forward en masse, and the Federals were
able to beat back each of the small attacks as they came. Still, wave
after wave of Confederates moved out of the woods—"grim and silent
as destiny itself," thought one Federal—and into the carnage in the
wheat. "We have seen some grand sights," a watching Northerner wrote
after the war, "some glorious and sublime spectacles in our day—but
never have we beheld anything to compare in sublimity and grandeur with
the scene upon which our eyes rested as column after column marched into
view."
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UNION SKIRMISHERS, INCLUDING MEN PROM BERDAN'S SHARPSHOOTERS, PEPPERED
THE CONFEDERATE POSITIONS BEFORE THE GRAND ASSAULT ON JULY 1.
(BL)
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And rarely in American history had as many men fallen killed and
maimed as quickly as were D. H. Hill's infantrymen cut down that
afternoon. "Within fifteen or twenty minutes," wrote brigade commander
Colonel John B. Gordon "the centre regiment (Third Alabama), with which
I moved, had left more than half of its number dead and wounded along
its track, and the other regiments had suffered almost as severely. One
shell had killed six or seven men in my immediate presence. My pistol,
on one side, had the handle torn off; my canteen, on the other, was
pierced, emptying its contents; my coat was ruined by having a portion
of the front torn away."
The Confederates were relentless in pressing their attacks; brigade
after brigade strode out of the woods, over the field littered with
bodies and debris, and up the slope. For all the tremendous volume of
fire from the Federal artillery, determined Southerners under Brigadier
General Lafayette McLaws fought their way all the way to the crest. "The
battle was desperately contested," recalled Union artillery commander
Colonel Henry Hunt, "and frequently trembled in the balance." At least
one battery withdrew, and the Federal infantry found themselves
hard-pressed. Fitz John Porter, who commanded the defense of Malvern
Hill, for McClellan was inexplicably absent from the front for much of
the day, scrambled to meet the threat. Brigades from the rear rushed
forward to reinforce Morell and Couch, restored equilibrium, and drove
the Confederates back with heavy loss.
The killing finally stopped just after dark, and the battlefield
presented a revolting sight. Hundreds of men lay dead or dying and
thousands more writhed in agony from wounds, giving the field, a Union
cavalry officer thought, "a gruesome crawling appearance." The New
Yorker who hours before had been entranced by the beauty of the wheat
and sky wrote, "The golden sea has vanished . . . . The ground is
crimson now."
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AS THE SUN SET, UNION GUNNERS CONTINUED TO BLAST THE CONFEDERATE
INFANTRY ASSAULTS AGAINST THE WESTERN FACE OF MALVERN HILL. (LC)
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WITH THE AID OF A BUGLER, UNION GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD ARRANGED
PERHAPS THE MOST FAMOUS BUGLE CALL IN MILITARY
HISTORY—"TAPS"—WHILE AT HARRISON'S LANDING. (USAMHI)
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With the advantages of position and plentiful artillery, the Federals
still lost more than 3,000 men at Malvern Hill, but the Confederates,
with few advantages at all, suffered more than 5,000 casualties. A
Northerner, writing about the battle after the war, thought "the grand
charge of the Confederates at Malvern is worthy of more than passing
notice; it is worthy, as an exhibition of manly daring, of
immortality." But D. H. Hill, less concerned with glory, saw that
Malvern Hill was nothing but a terribly expensive defeat. Angry about
the chaos and mismanagement that had cost so many Southern lives, Hill
recorded for posterity his own judgment on Malvern Hill. "It was not
war," he wrote bitterly, "It was murder."
The next day, July 2, McClellan retreated from his strong position at
Malvern Hill and moved his army through a rainstorm to Berkeley and
Westover Plantations on the James River. Supply officers had already
begun arrangements to feed the army from Harrison's Landing at Berkeley.
Lee pursued, but he and his officers decided they could do no more
damage to the invaders.
So ended a week of combat that would be known at the Seven Days
Battles. At the cost of nearly 20,000 casualties, Lee had delivered
Richmond from immediate danger, but the Army of the Potomac, ensconced
at last on the James in a strong position under the protection of the
heavy artillery of the Federal gunboats, had survived to fight another
day.
But how soon would that day come? Though several of his officers
urged him to take the offensive and march on Richmond, McClellan was
reluctant to do so until he was heavily reinforced. He had lost some
15,000 men that week. "Little Mac" assured Washington that he was ready
to resume the offensive as soon as he had enough men to do so. Lincoln
visited the army at Harrison's Landing and was pleased to learn that it
was not demoralized (although sickness was widespread and disease
continued to cost the army thousands of men). Washington sent McClellan
small numbers of reinforcements in July, but the general insisted he
needed many thousands more to contend with what he believed was the
Confederates' overwhelming numerical advantage. Newly appointed General
in Chief Henry W. Halleck conferred with the army commander on the James
and explained that the North simply did not have enough soldiers to give
McClellan all the men he desired. McClellan agreed to push the campaign
forward with what was available, but a few days later he resumed his
pleas for more and more men. Lincoln, his patience exhausted, declared
that if he could do the impossible and send McClellan 100,000 reinforcements,
the general would only ask for 400,000 more. Halleck ordered the
general to pack up his army and return with it to northern Virginia. The
Federals began taking steamers back up the Chesepeake, and by mid-August
the Peninsula campaign was over.
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PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN REVIEWING THE SURVIVORS OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC AT HARRISON'S LANDING. (LC)
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The Peninsula campaign was the largest, most complicated and
expensive campaign of the Civil War, and that it should end in failure
after so much time, money, and so many lives had been invested in its
success was a source of great frustration, even embarrassment, for the
Lincoln administration. The president and the War Department began
making war plans that did not include McClellan, transferring most of
"Little Mac's" troops to another command and removing his authority over
troops in the field. The Federal disaster at Second Manassas in August
1862 moved Lincoln reluctantly to reinstate McClellan, but the general's
star never again regained the luster that had so brightened Union hopes
before the Peninsula campaign. In November 1862, McClellan was relieved
of command and sent out of the war for good.
Much of the criticism leveled at McClellan stems from his failure to
win battles. He habitually absented himself from his army's battlefields
and showed none of the aggressiveness required of a great captain. After
the war, a private who had fought on the Peninsula passed judgment on
his former commander and seemed to capture the essence of the McClellan
era of the war in the East.
"Southern generals who fought against McClellan have said that they
feared him more than any other general who commanded the Army of the
Potomac, and that he struck them harder blows. This is probably correct;
but it was due to the fact that the rank and file of the Army of the
Potomac loved McClellan more than they loved any other commander, not
even excepting Grant. Had McClellan possessed half of Grant's will and
willingness to fight he would have finished up the war like a clap of
thunder. Grant did not know how to retreat; McClellan did not know how
to fight. There was always a lion in his path."
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WITH NAVAL SUPPORT, THE UNION ARMY ON THE LITTLE PENINSULA AT HARRISON'S
LANDING ENJOYED AN IMPREGNABLE POSITION. (LC)
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RICHMOND HAD SURVIVED ITS FIRST IMMEDIATE THREAT. THREE MORE YEARS OF
WAR WOULD FURTHER TEST THE RESOLVE OF THE CAPITAL CITY AND ITS PEOPLE.
(BL)
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One of the generals who rated McClellan highly and suffered hard
blows by him was Robert E. Lee, so there is irony in that Lee
contributed so heavily to the ruin of McClellan's fortunes on the
Peninsula. Lee was disappointed with the result of his first campaign in
command of the Army of Northern Virginia—"Under ordinary
circumstances," he wrote in his report, "the enemy should have been
destroyed"—but history need not share Lee's disappointment. When he
took command of the army on June 1, the Confederacy stood on the
precipice of defeat. Less than 30 days later, Lee had so altered the
situation that his men were maneuvering for the Federal jugular, and the
Army of the Potomac was fighting for its life at Glendale. It was Lee,
not any other man in the Confederacy, who put the army on the offensive,
directed the aggressive effort to push McClellan back from Richmond, and
attempted the destruction of his army. Lee, in the right place at the
right time, was the key ingredient in the Confederate renaissance in
Virginia in 1862.
For almost three more years, Lee would lead his army across Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania, compiling a record of military achievement
unmatched by any American soldier. The Virginian's talents as a
strategist, his ability to inspire his troops to exceptional efforts,
and his often untempered audacity earned him an international reputation
as one of history's great generals, and nowhere did Lee's exceptional
gifts flower more handsomely than amid the dismal swamps of the
Chickahominy during the battles for Richmond in 1862.
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Back cover: Malvern Hill by Don Stivers.
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