BLOODY BEACHES: The Marines at Peleliu
by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)
Maneuver and Opportunity
As the 7th Marines moved to its mission, the 5th
Marines was again successfully opening up opportunities on Peleliu's
eastern, "lobster claw" peninsula. Most of those opportunities,
unfortunately were never exploited.
By the end of D plus 2, the 5th Marines stood at the
approach to the eastern peninsula, and astride the East Road just east
of the 1st Marines' terrible struggle in Umurbrogol. It had fought
somewhat clear of the galling fires from Umurbrogol, and planned an
assault on the eastern peninsula across a narrow causeway, which the
Japanese should certainly defend. Then a D plus 3 reconnaissance of the
causeway revealed that the causeway was not defended. The 2d Battalion
hastened to seize the opportunity and moved across in strength. The
attack was hit by its own supporting fires. The forward battalion CP
group was strafed by Navy planes and then hit by artillery airburst,
causing the loss of 18 battalion headquarters personnel to "friendly
fire."
Nevertheless, a bridgehead across the causeway was
well established on D plus 3, and the 5th Marines' Colonel Harris moved
to exploit it. During the afternoon, he thinned his forces holding the
East Road sector, gave the former 3/5 mission to Company L, 3/5, and
gave the remainder of 3/5 a new mission. He ordered Gustafson into a
position within the bridgehead established by 2/5, and further ordered
both battalions then to capture and clear the eastern peninsula. Earlier
he had expected such an attack to be against the strong defending forces
originally reported on the eastern peninsula. However, the apparent
reduction of defending forces now appeared to offer an opportunity to
seize Purple Beach quickly, a logistic prize of some significance.
Harris knew that the division would need to shift its logistical axis to
Purple Beach, away from the fire from Umurbrogol, and away from the
threat of westerly storms.
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A
Marine war dog handler reads a note just delivered by canine messenger,
a Dober man Pinscher, one of the breeds used in the Pacific This Marine
has a pump shotgun. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96936
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Before dark, Gustafson moved two of his 3/5 companies
across the causeway, and moved his own CP group in with the 2/5 CP,
where the two commanders jointly planned the next day's advance. Hoping
for little resistance, they directed rapid movement, but armed their
point units with war dog sections to guard against ambush. Their lead
companies moved out just after dawn. In the 3/5 sector, there was an
ambush, but the war dogs warned of, and effectively thwarted, the
attempted surprise.
By the end of D plus 4, the two battalions had
cleared the main body of the eastern peninsula and had reached Purple
Beach from the rear. The defenses were most impressive, but many were
unmanned. Those enemy troops encountered seemed more interested in
hiding than in fighting, leading to speculation that Nakagawa's trained
infantry had been moved west to the fight on D Day and/or D plus 1. By D
plus 5, Purple Beach was cleared, as were the long peninsulas southwest
and northeast of Purple Beach. On D plus 6, 2/5 seized the two islands
immediately north of the northeast peninsula, and the next day occupied
the small unnamed islet just 1,000 yards east of the northern ridges of
Peleliu.
From that position, and positions elsewhere on the
other islands, and near Ngardololok, there appeared to be many
opportunities to attack by fire against the cave-infested north-south
ridges of central and northern Peleliu. Such positioning of heavy
weapons would be very difficult, but relative to the intense infantry
battles underway in Umurbrogol, such difficulties seemed acceptable.
Many of the prospective targets could have been vulnerable to direct,
flat trajectory fire across the front of U.S. units advancing north in
central Peleliu. Corps artillery units had conducted such direct fire
training before embarking for the Peleliu campaign. Such tactical
advantages and opportunities from the eastern peninsula were advocated
but never exploited. Only later, in the fighting for northern Peleliu
was the 5th Marines able to secure point-blank, heavy, single-gun fire
support.
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